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Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

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    Rights statement: © Clark, S. (2007). Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like. (ESE Discussion Papers). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

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http://ideas.repec.org/p/edn/esedps/171.html
http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/ms17.pdf
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages23
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2007

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NameESE Discussion Papers

Abstract

This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes.

    Research areas

  • matching, sorting, uniqueness, horizontal heterogeneity, marriage, C7

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