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No interpretation of probability

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1195–1212
Early online date15 Sep 2017
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2018


I argue that none of the usual interpretations of probability provides an adequate interpretation of probabilistic theories in science. Assuming that the aim of such theories is to capture noisy relationships in the world, I suggest that we do not have to give them classical truth-conditional content at all: their probabilities can remain uninterpreted. Indirectly, this account turns out to explain what is right about the frequency interpretation, the best-systems interpretation, and the epistemic interpretation.

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