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Perspectival modeling

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    Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Philosophy of Science in July 2018, available online: https://doi.org/10.1086/697745

    Accepted author manuscript, 849 KB, PDF document

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    Rights statement: This article has been published in Philosophy of Science 85, no. 3 (July 2018) and can be access on The University of Chicago Press website, https://doi.org/10.1086/697745

    Final published version, 1.51 MB, PDF document

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)335-359
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jul 2018
EventAcádemie Internationale de Philosophie de Sciences (AIPS) Conference October 28-30, 2016 - Technische Universitӓt Dortmund , Dortmund, Germany
Duration: 28 Oct 201630 Oct 2016


The goal of this essay is to address the problem of inconsistent models, and in particular, the challenge it poses for perspectivism. I attend to two main tasks. I analyse the argument, draw attention to some hidden premises behind it, and deflate these premises. Then I introduce the notion of perspectival models as a distinctive class of modeling practices, whose primary function is heuristic. I illustrate perspectival modeling with two examples taken from contemporary high-energy physics at LHC, CERN, which are designed to show how a plurality of seemingly incompatible models (once suitably understood) is often methodologically crucial to advance the realist quest in cutting-edge areas of scientific inquiry.


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