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Probing Attacks on Multi-agent Systems from Electronic Institutions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDeclarative Agent Languages and Technologies IX
Subtitle of host publication9th International Workshop, DALT 2011, Taipei, Taiwan, May 3, 2011, Revised Selected and Invited Papers
PublisherSpringer-Verlag GmbH
Pages33-50
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-29112-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer Berlin / Heidelberg
Volume7169
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Abstract

In open multi-agent systems, electronic institutions are used to form the interaction environment by defining social norms for group behaviour. However, as this paper shows, electronic institutions can be turned against agents to breach their security in a variety of ways. We focus our attention on probing attacks using electronic institutions specified in the Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC) language. LCC is a choreography language used to define electronic institutions in agent systems. A probing attack is an attack against the confidentiality of information systems. In this paper, we redefine the probing attack in conventional network security to be applicable in a multi-agent system domain, governed by electronic institutions. We introduce different probing attacks against LCC interaction models and suggest a secrecy analysis framework for these interactions. The proposed framework could be used to detect the possibility of certain probing attacks and to identify some forms of malicious electronic institutions.

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