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Single or Multiple Pricing in Electricity Pools?

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    Rights statement: © Anwar, A. (2006). Single or Multiple Pricing in Electricity Pools?. (ESE Discussion Papers; No. 143). Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.

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http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/ElectricityMarkets2.pdf
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages21
StatePublished - 2006

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers
No.143

Abstract

We present a 2 bidder multi-unit, common cost auction model
with uncertain demand and capacity constraints which ensure that
the participants sometimes face a residual market share. The model
is motivated by electricity pools. We show that a single-price auction
where the bidders can submit only one bid for all units weakly dominates
an auction where the bidders can make multiple-price bids in
terms of average prices. In the case of uniform price auctions we give
an example where the dominance is strict.

    Research areas

  • electricity pool, multi-unit auction, revenue ranking, D44, L13, L94

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