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Well Founding Grounding Grounding

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    Rights statement: This is the accepted version of the following article: Rabin, G. O., & Rabern, B. (2015). Well-founding grounding grounding. Journal of Philosophical Logic. doi:10.​1007/​s10992-015-9376-4., which has been published in final form at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10992-015-9376-4.

    Accepted author manuscript, 182 KB, PDF-document

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)349-379
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Issue number4
Early online date12 Jul 2015
StatePublished - Aug 2016


Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded ("the meta-grounding thesis") must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of "well-founded", which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of "well-founded". Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.

    Research areas

  • Ground, Metaphysical dependence, Well-founded, Infinite regress, Foundationalism, Grounding grounding, PRIORITY

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