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Policy Entrepreneurship in China’s Response to Urban Poverty

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Abstract:

Recent studies of policy and policy actors in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have made use of the policy entrepreneur concept which has been popular in studies of policy in North America and Europe. These approaches have understood the concept in its traditional form dealing with agenda setting and non-state actors. The policy entrepreneur has developed beyond these confines and now offers a broader descriptive framework within which to understand the successes and failures of particular initiatives.

This paper uses these new developments, specifically the framework outlined by Mintrom and Norman (2009), to describe the success of policy entrepreneurship in the development of the urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG). This case was selected because existing scholarship has ignored the entrepreneurial role of bureaucrats in its development. The use of this framework without adaptation to describe policy actors in China demonstrates the further application of policy entrepreneurs outside of Western democracies.

Keywords: China, policy entrepreneur, MLG, social assistance

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Introduction

The process of opening up and reform has in terms of policy studies made two significant differences to research on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the one hand, those concerned with the emergence, development and implementation of policy in the PRC have had greater opportunities for observing and studying the policy process than would have seemed possible in the Maoist era. On the other hand, China has gone through a profound transformation since 1978 not just in economic policy but in many other areas as well. This has meant that whilst we now know more than ever before about the workings of the policy process in the PRC a great deal of scholarly work and output has focused on addressing the changes and outcomes of specific policy developments rather than addressing theories and frameworks which aid our understanding of the policy process. This article will contribute to an emerging and exciting introduction to policy studies in China, the concept of policy entrepreneurship. It will specifically tackle how policy entrepreneurs contribute to the policy process based on the case of the urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) system between 1994 and 1997.

The role of actors in the policy process is an area which has attracted attention from China scholars both before and after China opened up. The elite factionalism model, best encapsulated in the debate between Tsou (Tsou, 1976) and Nathan (Nathan, 1973, Nathan, 1976), focuses on the clashes between elite leaders and their factions. Policy developments are the result of these clashes and reflect the ascendance or collapse of a particular faction within the upper tiers of the PRC government. Emerging in the late 1980s the fragmented authoritarianism (FA) model combined an understanding of policy actors as bounded rational decision makers operating within a structure of institutionalised constraints and fragmentation which often led to policy actors bargaining and negotiating policy developments (Lampton,
Studies of reforms in social security, but not the MLG, reflect the findings of the FA model and implicitly challenge the assertion that factional elites dominate the policy process (Beland and Yu, 2004, Duckett, 2001, Duckett, 2003, Frazier, 2004a, Frazier, 2004b). The common theme to these works on social policy reform is that policy actors, at both elite and bureaucratic level, are important when explaining the outcomes of policy in the PRC.

There have also been recent efforts to introduce new concepts to address policy actors in contemporary China with the policy entrepreneur offering much promise (Mertha, 2009, Zhu, 2008). Policy entrepreneurship became a popular concept with Kingdon’s seminal text on agenda setting in the United States (US) policy process. Kingdon sees policy entrepreneurs as the key actor when bringing together the different streams of policy issues (the problem, politics and ideas) through the exploitation of so-called policy windows in the policy process (Kingdon, 1984). Policy entrepreneurs are identified as actors who can occupy any part of the political arena and are motivated by many different factors which can range from ideological beliefs to a “love of the game”. The policy entrepreneur concept has been popular in policy studies and has appeared in a number of other explanations of the policy process such as punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) and the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Both Zhu (2008) and Mertha (2009) reflect the traditional focus of the policy entrepreneur as an actor who helps to shape or capture the agenda in order to promote a particular policy solution. In the case of Zhu’s (2008) contribution significant adaptation of the concept was required through the introduction of case specific actor tactics in order to fit with the case investigated.
The concept of the policy entrepreneur has not been stagnant since Kingdon’s contribution. In particular studies of the US policy process (but not exclusively), there is a growing recognition that policy entrepreneurs are neither exclusive to the agenda setting stage and nor are they exclusive to particular elites or campaigning advocates (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, Teodoro, 2009, Meier, 2009, Nowlin, 2011). This raises new questions and possibilities, such as the role of policy entrepreneurs beyond agenda setting and within the bureaucracy, for study in China and it is this opportunity that this paper will engage with.

In their discussion of policy entrepreneurs and policy change Mintrom and Norman (2009) provide both a clear definition of what a policy entrepreneur is and also a clear framework for describing the success or failure of a policy entrepreneur. This paper will use this framework to explore the role of policy actors in the development of one particular policy development, the urban resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee system (MLG or dibao hereafter), a minimum income guarantee system first introduced during the 1990s. This case

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2 Throughout this paper I use the term concept when referring to policy entrepreneurs and framework when referring to Mintrom and Norman’s contribution. Referring to policy entrepreneurs as a concept is not controversial and has been standard practice in the literature (for example Kingdon, 1984: 122). The term and use of policy entrepreneur also satisfies more defined parameters for being a concept put forward by some researchers (Jabareen, 2009). Referring to the contribution made by Mintrom and Norman as a framework is more contentious. Both Ostrom (2007) and Schlager (2007), for example, present clear arguments regarding what a framework is and the relationship between frameworks, theories and models when seeking to analyse and explain the policy process. The “elements of policy entrepreneurship” presented by Mintrom and Norman (2009: 650) fits best with the idea of a framework working as a means to “bound inquiry and direct the attention of the analyst to critical features of the social and physical landscape” (Schlager, 2007: 293); the alternative, following Schlager’s distinction between the three terms, would require much more specific values to be allocated to the “elements” and this is not done. What Mintrom and Norman present is not theory or a model. In addition, the idea that a framework provides a “meta-theoretical language” (Schlager, 2007: 293) which would allow scholars to compare different theories also fits with the “elements” as presented by Mintrom and Norman. A final point is recognising that such a distinction is not without difficulties and the boundaries between these labels can be subjective and as a result “fuzzy” (Stanley, 2012: 475; Shanahan, Jones and McBeth, 2011: 556).
is used because the move from the traditional category based social assistance system in China to *dibao* was a radical change and it also saw significant roles played by particular policy actors. There has, however, been a limited discussion of the role played by specific bureaucratic actors in the existing literature on the MLG (Gao, 2006, Guan and Xu, 2011, Leung, 2006, Leung and Wong, 1999, Solinger, 2001, Solinger, 2005, Solinger, 2011, Tang, 2003, Tang, 2005, Shang and Wu, 2004, Gao et al., 2011, Gao et al., 2009, Saunders and Shang, 2001, Saunders and Sun, 2006). It is a case which lacks an explanation of policy change focused on the role of particular actors.

To this end the article will be structured as follows. A more detailed discussion of the literature and theory informing the choice of Mintrom and Norman’s framework follows immediately. This is then followed by a description of the methods used for collecting and analysing the evidence presented here. I then outline the definitions and approach developed by Mintrom and Norman (2009) in their discussion of policy entrepreneurs and policy change. The MLG is then introduced and a brief history of the program is set out. Next, I discuss policy entrepreneurship with special reference to the role played by Minister of Civil Affairs Duoji Cairang between 1994 and 1997. In the next section I address the issue of how to avoid what Mintrom and Norman refer to as “indiscriminate application” (2009: 650). I then conclude by discussing the application of policy entrepreneurs as a descriptive framework for understanding the policy process in China and possible future avenues for research in the PRC.

**Theoretical Discussion**

The transfer and application of a descriptive framework developed for a particular political system to another very different system presents a number of questions that should be
addressed. First, is it possible to transfer a framework from a liberal democratic system to an authoritarian system. Policy entrepreneurship may have originated and been applied with success in liberal democratic political systems but one of the most appealing characteristics of the concept is that it is not dependent on particular features of such a system. There is no inbuilt necessity that policy entrepreneurs appear only in systems which have elections or a free media.

In addition the policy entrepreneur concept has been adopted, and in some cases adapted, with success to describe developments in certain aspects of Chinese policy change. Mertha (2009) uses policy entrepreneurs as Kingdon (1984) describes them to describe the actions of particular officials and campaigners seeking policy changes in environmental policy. Mertha highlights that the existing understanding of Chinese authoritarianism as fragmented is particularly important because it allows space for entrepreneurs to operate. In contrast, Zhu adapts the policy entrepreneur to suit the Chinese case examined suggesting that the different political system means that entrepreneurs have to play up the pragmatic side of their policy preferences by presenting “technically unfeasible” alternatives (2008).

Finally I would argue that the Chinese system is, in spite of its authoritarian nature, not the monolithic top-down state machine which Beijing presents and Western observers perceive. There is space within the political system and hierarchy of the bureaucracy for individuals, or groups of like-minded individuals, to have an impact on the policy process. This has been recognised since the late 1970s and the discussion of factions within the elite leadership affecting policy decisions (Nathan 1973, 1976, Tsou, 1976). Goodman et al (1984) demonstrated that even in the early period of reform and opening there was space for groups to advocate and pursue their policy preferences, albeit with limited success, from within the
bureaucratic structure of the Chinese state. The final contribution worth noting here is that of Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s fragmented authoritarianism model (1988) which highlighted the role of the bureaucracy, as agents and structure, in China’s policy making. The key element here is recognition that the Chinese system is fragmented and this provides the opportunities for the bureaucracy, at different levels of the system, to influence policy. Initially this led to a focus on the conflicts between agencies within the bureaucracy but as Mertha (2009) demonstrates this fragmented authoritarianism also provides opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to influence the policy process. These studies of China contribute both to theoretical (Bentley, 1908) and empirical (Skilling, 1970, 1983, Skilling and Griffiths, 1971) studies which have argued against the simplistic notion that authoritarian bureaucratic systems squeeze out all possibility of individual entrepreneurial behaviour in the policy process.

A second question regarding the use of a particular approach also needs to be addressed: what alternatives to Mintrom and Norman’s contribution are there and should these have been used? There are a number possible alternatives which could arguably have provided a framework in which to explain the role of Minister Duoji in the development of the MLG. The first to be considered would be Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s fragmented authoritarianism model (1988). Whilst the description of state structure within which individuals make and implement policy has been, to date, peerless the articulation of how individuals go about influencing policy is limited to a model of bounded rational decision making which, as I have argued elsewhere (Hammond, 2011 and 2011a), does not capture the dynamism of individual behaviour especially when a new policy is being pushed. It is for these reasons, as well as additional concerns raised regarding China’s modernisation (Oksenberg, 2002), which suggests that alternative frameworks should be sought for describing actors within the bureaucracy.
Both Mertha (2009) and Zhu (2008) demonstrate the contribution that can be made to understanding Chinese policy making through the adoption one such alternative: the policy entrepreneur. Mertha (2009) uses the PE in a classical sense of identifying three different sorts and describing how they affect the policy process. The problems of using policy streams have been discussed elsewhere (Sabatier, 2007). Another issue raised by these studies is the adaptation of the concept to fit the Chinese case which is a point of concern because it, arguably, leads to the possibility of the concept being diluted or reshaped in order to achieve wider applicability. Zhu (2008) introduces the idea of technical infeasibility as a strategy for facilitating policy change. This did not occur in the case of the MLG and is also specific to particular actors who are commonly outside of the policy process in China. It is therefore an interesting contribution but of seemingly limited application outside of the particular case examined.

Other approaches utilising policy entrepreneurs mentioned are resource or data intense. Specifically punctuated equilibrium relies first and foremost on extensive statistical data being available in order to identify the punctuations; this is generally not the case in China and absolutely not the case with regards to the MLG (Hammond, 2009, 2011 and 2011a). The ACF requires an early decision, methodologically, to adopt the tools with which to analyse a particular policy. It also implies competing factions regarding a policy brought together by the entrepreneur which was not apparent with the MLG.

Mintrom and Norman provide a framework which can fit with existing theoretical contributions regarding China studies. Specifically the use of PEs, the existing understanding regarding China’s institutional structure and the impact this has on policy processes (the so-
called FA model discussed previously) and a means to identify and to a limited degree explain the success or failure of a PE. The framework was also formulated with extensive application in mind as demonstrated in the original article.

A final point is a number of recent studies have highlighted the use of the policy entrepreneur to describe the role played by bureaucrats in the policy process (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, Teodoro, 2009, Meier, 2009, Nowlin, 2011). The appeal of using Mintrom and Norman’s work is that it provides a means to utilise the policy entrepreneur using a qualitative approach within a clear framework. This means that this paper will address two points which make a contribution to both the China and policy studies disciplines: first, does the policy entrepreneur concept adequately describe the development of urban *dibao*; second, does Mintrom and Norman’s framework provide the means to identify, describe and evaluate the success of policy entrepreneurship in China without modification?

**Methods**

The findings presented in this paper are based on research conducted between 2005 and 2010 as part of a wider study into the development and implementation of *dibao* between 1992 and 2003. The primary output of this research was a PhD dissertation which argued, in part, for a conceptualisation of policy actors in the PRC which was very similar to the policy entrepreneur but sought to take account of the specifics of the Chinese system; this concept was called the policy sponsor and has been applied in the Chinese context elsewhere (Hammond, 2009 and 2011). However, as the discussion of the literature above demonstrates, the creation of a new concept is a somewhat pointless exercise; this became increasingly clear when trying to condense a concept devised in the comfort of a thesis for more direct and brief
delivery in article form. This prompted a return to the original material collected and a re-
evaluation of the arguments against policy entrepreneurship being applied in China.

In seeking to address the questions outlined above this papers adopts a single case study
approach. The development of the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee system between 1994 and
1997 will be the focus of this paper. This was the time when *dibao* moved from a local
innovation to a nationally implemented program. As will be argued it was also during this
time that the entrepreneurial activity of the Minister of Civil Affairs, Duoji Cairang, was most
apparent and had the most significant impact.

The case study approach has come under significant criticism for many years. I do recognise
this criticism of case studies, and especially single case examples, which have been argued
strongly by scholars such as King, Keohane and Verba (1994). In particular the argument that
a single case may be subject to selection bias, limited scope, and have limited
representativeness (George and Bennett, 2004; Devine, 2002: 204) and a broad concern
regarding the generalisation of findings (Stake, 1978; Innes, 2001; Devine, 2002; Flyvbjerg,
2006; Thomas, 2010 and 2011) are all issues of concern for scholars who study not just
policy but all aspects of social life.

In spite of these criticisms there is still, and there always will be, merit in the use of the case
study (single or otherwise) as a method of social inquiry. Others have already adequately
articulated the merits of the case study (George and Bennett, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2006) but there
are a number of points which are worth reporting here.
First, in Chinese studies, I would argue that a combination of the discipline’s development and the reality of the fieldwork combine to make single or small \( n \) case studies the default option for scholars of China. In terms of disciplinary development Chin studies is arguably still building its knowledge base regarding numerous developments. There is also a disjuncture between the ideal of practicing social research in the literature and the actual experience in the field (Heimer and Thøgersen, 2006 is an excellent contribution covering this issue). It is notable that in both the previous works cited which use the policy entrepreneur concept the researchers in question use either a single case study (Zhu, 2008) or a very limited number of cases (Mertha, 2009) but to great effect.

Second, there is a widespread acceptance that the case study provides a richness of detail and description which is otherwise impossible to achieve. This allows for “a large amount of detail about the practices and process being studied” (Innes, 2001: 212) to be explored and analysed; similar sentiments, either directly articulated or inferred, can be found throughout the literature (Burnham et al, 2004: 53; Bryman, 2001: 51). Stake (1978) highlights the inherent strengths of the case study being built on the foundation of the “experience” and “knowledge” of the researcher. George and Bennett (2004) also argue that it is the possibility of detail which the case study approach presents which is its real strength in comparison to large \( n \) qualitative or quantitative approaches.

Third, the criticism of generalizability and single case approaches has been extensively discussed. There are two positions which are apparent and I am sympathetic to both of them. The first is that, especially amongst qualitative researchers, generalizability is not an aim of social research because it is simply impossible to achieve (Thomas, 2010; Stake, 1978; Bryman, 2001: 50). The second position is that the case study approach can make a
contribution to generalizability but that it needs to be understood as part of an ongoing process of scholarly investigation and discussion (George and Bennett, 2004; Stake, 1978; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Devine, 2002). The consistent point made is that it is vitally important how a case study is conducted as well as why.

The approach adopted in this paper embraces the single case study approach because of its strengths, not least the reality of working in China and the empirical detail and understanding which it can produce. I do, however, also recognise that because of this approach wider claims regarding findings need to be made carefully and with the understanding that this paper is a contribution to a developing discussion of policy entrepreneurs in China and is in no way conclusive of a general development. The use of a clear framework provides the means if other scholars so wish, to examine their own cases and as a result build a more convincing argument for, or against, the framework presented by Mintrom and Norman.

Document and interview data was collected during two field trips. The first trip was made from June to September 2006 and I was hosted by the Social Work Department of the Zhou Enlai School of Government at Nankai University, Tianjin. This trip also included a two week visit to Anqing city in Anhui Province. The second trip was made from September to November 2007 and I was hosted by the Social Policy Research Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. During both trips visits totalling three weeks were made to the Universities Service Centre at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, HK SAR.

Interviews

Selection and Arranging
Potential interviewees were identified from documents, websites and meetings. Once some interviews were conducted then snowballing could take place and this did lead to some additional contacts. Interviews were then arranged through the host institution. The only exception to this was the Anqing trip where interviews were arranged through a local contact. The significance of local contacts and host institutions as gatekeepers when conducting fieldwork in China cannot be emphasised enough. Who was available and whether I could interview them was dependent on their links with either my contacts, the host, or a recommendation following a previous interview.

There was a random element which I would have preferred not to exist in establishing contacts and arranging interviews. Desired interviewees were not always available or arrangements were made on the basis of the hosts own contacts. On more than one occasion interviews were rearranged or cancelled at the last minute. This reflects the reality of conducting fieldwork and whilst more interviews may have been collected ultimately valuable data was gleaned from those that were conducted. In total 21 individuals were interviewed in Beijing, Tianjin, Anqing and Hong Kong. See Appendix A for an anonymous list of interviewees.

*Interview Format*

The interview format depended to a degree on the interviewee in question. Typically I would meet the interviewee at their place of work. Interviews were semi-structured and frequently vetted in advance. The questions asked varied depending on who was being interviewed and at what point during the project the interview was conducted. For example later on in the project interview questions became more specific in an effort to clarify or uncover particular
details. Typically the number of questions asked was less than 20. Interviews lasted between 1 and 3 hours.

In all but three cases the interviews were conducted in Chinese. In two of these cases the interviewee was European and English was the best option to communicate in. In the other case the interviewee switched between Chinese and English throughout the interview.

In the majority of cases an “assistant” was assigned by the host institution and was present during interviews.

Documents

The Chinese language documents collected varied a great deal. The majority were official documents produced and made public by state organisations like the State Council or the Ministry of Civil Affairs. These included speeches, reports, circulars, notes from meetings and answers to submissions made by local Civil Affairs Bureaux. Other materials include newspaper articles, research reports, academic articles, official journals such as the Zhongguo Minzheng and Chinese books published on the subject by officials and researchers. In total at over 100 documents from the 1980s to 2000s were read and coded.

Analysis

Following a reading of materials an initial coding frame was established based on content, key words and phrases used. This frame was built on as more materials were read and coded until it achieved a stable format. See Appendix B for an edited example of the coding frame used.
From responses made in interviews, the documentary evidence and the themes developed from coding the basis of an argument was formed. Ideas were developed to explain the emergence of the MLG and were then critically assessed. Following the development of these ideas the documentary and interview material was returned to as part of this assessment. This process was cyclical over two years and saw the introduction of various ideas from other studies (the “theory” codes of 7xx in the coding frame which were used to highlight sections of text which supported a particular approach). The other codes included were based on them being mentioned in a text or interview and were arranged into groups or themes as appropriate.

**The Policy Entrepreneur and Policy Change Framework**

Kingdon’s definition of a policy entrepreneur is rather general providing some significant degree of space for interpretation and variation. In his own words:

“Let us label these advocates policy entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs are not necessarily found in any one location in the policy community. They could be in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations. But their defining characteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of future return. That return might come to them in the form of policies of which they approve, satisfaction from participation, or even personal aggrandizement in the form of job security or career promotion” (Kingdon, 1984: 123)

In other studies policy entrepreneurs can fill particular roles, capturing images and venues in punctuated equilibrium or facilitating change within a coalition for the advocacy coalition framework. Within their framework for the policy entrepreneurs and policy change Mintrom and Norman also apply a potentially broad definition of what a policy entrepreneur is which
still provides the rigour to avoid the concept becoming over used or over applied. Their
definition is quoted below:

“Policy entrepreneurs distinguish themselves through their desire to significantly
change current ways of doing things in their area of interest.” (Mintrom and Norman 2009:
650)

This definition will therefore be used as the means to identify policy entrepreneurs in the case
of the MLG.

Identifying policy entrepreneurs is only part of the framework. Mintrom and Norman also
highlight four areas which they argue help to describe what makes a policy entrepreneur
successful. First, policy entrepreneurs display what the authors call social acuity. In essence a
policy entrepreneur shows an effective understanding of others and has the ability to engage
in policy conversations through the acquisition of knowledge and connection to the policy in
question (Mintrom and Norman 2009: 652). Second, policy entrepreneurs are effective at
defining problems. This can take the form of suggesting that a crisis is unfolding or imminent,
identifying and presenting the failings in the existing policy framework or by bringing in
actors to support the entrepreneur from beyond the immediate policy sphere. Mintrom and
Norman state that problem definition is always a political act because it ensures that
important groups or individuals will pay attention to the entrepreneur and what they are
seeking to achieve (652). The third area argues that policy entrepreneurs are effective at
building teams. Team building can, in this case, vary from the formation of an effective, tight
knit unit to a broad coalition of allies supporting the proposed policy change the entrepreneur
in question is pursuing (653). Finally policy entrepreneurs identify themselves and work
toward ensuring their goals are achieved through “leading by example” (653). One example
given is foundations and charities piloting particular schemes they support. The entrepreneur
will promote the policy in question through demonstrating their commitment to the change. In addition the entrepreneur promotes the policy change by reducing the risk associated with it. If a particular program is shown to be working effectively then risk adverse voters, bureaucrats or enterprises are less likely to argue convincingly for the status quo. In electoral or legislative contexts such an action can switch the agenda from the “consequences of action to a focus on the consequences of inaction” (654).

Mintrom and Norman add a final point to support their framework. They argue that the four points outlined above should all be present for a policy entrepreneur to be successful but this might not necessarily be the case. The context of a particular case study may demonstrate that a policy entrepreneur was successful in implementing significant changes in a policy area but without, perhaps, effectively building a team to support them through the policy process. In essence what Mintrom and Norman present here is “a starting point for thinking about the things that policy entrepreneurs might do to improve their chances of achieving success” (654). The strength of this approach is that it is rigid enough to provide a framework within which policy entrepreneurs can be identified and their successes explained but it is also flexible enough to explain failure or adapt to cases which do not necessarily demonstrate all the identified features described above.

**The MLG from 1994 to 1997**

The MLG is a means tested locally administered and financed program which supplements eligible household’s income. Individual households apply to the local authorities who then investigate their monthly income. If the applicant’s income is determined to be below the locally set MLG line then a monetary benefit is provided to bring the household income up to the MLG line. The MLG first appeared in the city of Shanghai in June 1993. This followed
investigations and discussions of possibly policy changes which had started in 1992. The policy was introduced as part of a two branch approach to alleviating local urban poverty. The other branch introduced was a minimum wage system. These policies were introduced with little fanfare and received little attention although both would go on to become significant national programs.

The MLG’s development from the local initiative in Shanghai to national implementation is at times presented as part of an overall plan by central government (Leung, 2006) or as fitting into a neat stages process (Tang, 2003). As I have argued elsewhere this is not the case and the MLG was subject to a disjointed development with cities adopting the policy in no clear pattern early on and with no interventions from the State Council until at least 1996 (Hammond, 2011a). The MLG was only adopted by a small number of cities after 1994. In 1994 7 cities had adopted the measure, by 1995 this had increased to 12 and by 1996 this had become 101 cities. In 1997, the year that the MLG was implemented nationally through a State Council circular (State-Council, 1997), the number of cities with MLG systems was 334 (Hammond, 2011a). This was still substantially short of the 2310 cities which had implemented the MLG by 1999 (Fan, 2000). In addition to the slow growth of the MLG the competing models of MLG administration, coverage and financing also suggests that the idea of a planned implementation from 1993 through to 1997 is misleading (Hammond, 2011a).

Until 1996 when Premier Li Peng reported on the MLG it was a policy pushed by the MCA and in particular Minister Duoji Cairang (Li, 1998b). Understanding the development of the MLG requires a different approach because it does not easily fit with available frameworks in Chinese studies. There was no elite interest until the later stages of the policy’s development which, for a full explanation, rules out factionalism. The FA model is limited here as well
because of the lack of resources involved and the absence of inter-Ministry bargaining. It is into this explanatory gap that the policy entrepreneur concept fits and can offer an explanation as to why the MLG developed the way it did.

**Identifying Duoji Cairang as a Policy Entrepreneur**

Mintrom and Norman’s definition of a policy entrepreneur identifies Duoji Cairang because he is distinguished by a clear desire to significantly change the existing way of doing things in his area of interest. This assumes that we take the remit of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which includes social assistance policy, as his area of interest. The significance of Minister Duoji’s link with the MLG does not stop with simple association by institutional remit. His link to the MLG and the corresponding inference of a commitment to significant change are demonstrated through documentary and interview evidence as well as Duoji’s own actions throughout the 1990s.

Evidence collected and analysed during fieldwork trips in 2006 and 2007 showed that Duoji was perceived as being particularly high profile when it came to the promotion of the MLG after 1993. A senior MCA official identified Duoji as fundamental to the emergence and development of the MLG during the 1990s (Interview with MCA Department Head, Beijing, 2007). Duoji also published high profile texts supporting the MLG including two books on the MLG, social assistance, social welfare and the reform process (Duoji, 1995c, Duoji, 2001). He also published editorials on the MLG in the *Jingji Ribao* (Economic Daily) and *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily), setting out the MLG through these mouthpiece publications (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998e). Duoji attended and gave speeches at various meetings related to the MLG and wider social assistance policies which will be discussed in more detail below. Finally, Duoji was visibly active on the MLG over a sustained period of time which straddled
multiple stages of the policy process giving speeches and writing on the policy in 1994 through to 1997.

Duoji’s interest in the MLG is further highlighted by the transition to him as Minister being marked by a noticeable drop in Ministry level interest in other policy areas. For example Duoji’s appointment as Minister of Civil Affairs in 1993 corresponded with the stalling of any significant action on community construction until 2000.\(^3\) Finally, the activity of Duoji regarding the MLG was significant in numerical terms. For example over 50% of available speeches and editorials released by the MCA on the MLG from 1994-1995 were delivered or written by Duoji Cairang\(^4\). The speeches given, work meetings attended, and editorials written could have all been dealt with by another more junior member of the MCA bureaucracy. As Minister Duoji could have delegated authority to a Vice Minister or even the Departmental Director for Disaster Relief and Social Relief, which would have day to day responsibility for running social relief at the time, in order to push the MLG within the MCA. This was not the case, it was Duoji Cairang who gave the speeches, wrote editorials, and actively connected himself with the policy.

Duoji’s association with the MLG, and his importance as a policy entrepreneur, is clear when the number of cities adopting the program is investigated. As noted above between 1993 and 1994, the emergence of the MLG and Duoji’s first high profile endorsement, a small number of cities had adopted the program: only 2 in 1993 and 7 by the end of 1994, note Duoji first

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\(^3\) This point was highlighted in discussion with Stephen Trott, University of Toronto, at the Association of Chinese Political Studies, King’s College London, June 2011.

\(^4\) This claim is based on analysis of available materials regarding the MLG. These materials included all MCA yearbooks as well as collected internally published collections of documents on the MLG (Chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu wenjian zike huibian referred to in the bibliography). During this time Duoji did deliver speeches on other aspects of the work of the MCA and in some cases the MLG was a specific part of a speech which touched on other aspects of the MCAs work. The indication is that whilst Duoji did focus on the MLG during this time, more so than other actors in the MCA, he was not focusing solely on this particular policy.
endorsed implementation in the first half of 1994. After 1994, as Duoji’s involvement intensified, the number of cities adopting a MLG system also increases (Hammond, 2009 and 2011a). It is impossible to say how far the MLG would have diffused without the involvement of Duoji but the trajectory of implementation and the importance assigned to the Minister in interviews suggests that his involvement had a significant impact on the development of the MLG at the national level.

Second, Duoji distinguished himself as an entrepreneur through the content of his actions. In 1994 he shifted the policy on to the national agenda and pushed for implementation. At the 10th National Civil Affairs Conference he raised the MLG’s profile by mentioning it specifically. The exact status of the MLG at this point is unclear because in 1994 Duoji calls for the policy to be “progressively introduced” (zhuba shixing) (Duoji, 1995b) and although in later documents a number of terms used by Duoji imply the policy should be implemented, such as shixing and tuixing (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998d), there is no call by any authority higher than the MCA or the use of stronger language. A phrase used later for implementation of the MLG, guanche, is not used at all. State Councillors and other members of the Government are also absent in supporting the MLG during this period. The unclear position of the MLG is further supported by other written sources (Tang, 2003) and also interviews (Interviews with two social policy academics, Tianjin and Beijing, 2006) which suggest that at this time the MCA was pushing the policy without the explicit support of the State Council.

This shift onto the national agenda occurred at the Tenth National Civil Affairs Congress held in May 1994 when the MLG was given a few lines in Duoji’s main speech, where he stated that the MCA should: “…target urban social assistance through the progressive introduction (zhuba shixing) of local minimum livelihood guarantee relief” (Duoji, 1995b: 24). There was
no other mention of the MLG and no reference to the system operating in Shanghai or any other model of the MLG that might be adopted. The MCA released a circular, a standard practice, which reported the speech and its contents throughout its bureaucracy and ensured that all involved in civil affairs work were aware of what Duoji had said.

Although a minor mention, in a speech dominated by other concerns and MCA responsibilities, categorising the MLG as a policy to be introduced was a significant development. This is because, whilst a local level experiment, the MLG would have had neither widespread coverage nor official endorsement and this would limit the policy in terms of expansion. It would remain an option for local policy makers to implement if they were even aware of the policy. However, once it became a policy on the national agenda it gained both in terms of information being spread and from being endorsed by a central level authority.

Having put the MLG on the national agenda Duoji worked to ensure that the policy remained there. This was managed through maintaining a visible presence supporting the policy in speeches (Duoji, 1998a, Duoji, 1998d, Duoji, 1998b, Duoji, 1998c), editorials in major party papers (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998e) and in the MCA’s own mouthpiece “China Society” (Zhongguo Shehui Bao) (Duoji, 1995a, Zhao, 1997, Duoji, 1997). Due to the unclear status of the MLG it occupied a grey area in the policy process. This was because, without the status associated with a State Council order to implement, the policy was an option which ought to be implemented rather than must be implemented. This meant that the MLG could arguably have slipped in terms of coverage and implementation if a certain level of activity was not maintained by interested parties and Duoji therefore provided important support for the measure.
Duoji was, however, unable to provide fiscal or legislative support for the policy because this would be impossible for a Minister. He could promote the policy in other ways. By maintaining a policy on the national agenda a Minister makes a very clear statement of intent. Duoji followed this by continuing to push for local government to adopt the MLG in spite of a lack of resources, limited central government support and local government opposition. His relative success, an overall increase in cities with MLG systems and eventually a State Council for national implementation, can be explained by the four qualities set out by Mintrom and Norman.

**Policy Entrepreneurship as Four Qualities**

Duoji had to deal with two significant institutional obstacles when promoting the MLG. Local government proved a stumbling block with provinces and cities resisting implementation or implementing systems which varied significantly. Resistance to implementation was highlighted during an interview with one MCA official (Interview with MCA Researcher, Beijing, 2006) and also by the problem being addressed in speeches and editorials by Duoji at the time (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998a, Duoji, 1998d). The second problem was getting the highest levels of central government to support the MLG. Without the support of the State Council and other top tier elements of the bureaucracy implementing the MLG nationally would be impossible.

In order to overcome local opposition to the MLG Duoji took two approaches. First he put forward a specific interpretation of the MLG policy to counter emerging arguments from local government about implementing the measure. Second, he intervened when possible in
the local policy making process. These actions clearly demonstrate Duoji’s social acuity, problem definition and willingness to lead by example.

Social Acuity and Problem Definition

As I have argued elsewhere local opposition to the MLG took four forms (Hammond, 2011a). First, some local Bureaux of Civil Affairs (BCA) felt that the MLG was not the responsibility of the MCA. Second, the MLG was too much work and too troublesome to be worthwhile. Third, it had no guidelines, no regulations and was unfamiliar. Finally, it was inappropriate in certain areas which were not very developed, fiscally poor but had a large population which would be entitled to the benefit (Duoji, 1998d).

Duoji Cairang countered each of these points in speeches to Civil Affairs bureaucrats. The target audience of Duoji’s speeches on these problems reflected the limitations of influence that came with his position as a Minister. Although he could influence his own bureaucrats it was the local People’s Government and Finance Bureaux who would decide the introduction of a new policy. Duoji was making an effort to convince those he was responsible for and, perhaps, hoping that his officials would go on to push their particular city into implementing a MLG system. He was also demonstrating acuity by dealing with these concerns. In addition Duoji configured discussion of the MLG to fit with the problems affecting China and local government at the time.

Duoji sought to overcome this local challenge with a comprehensive argument laid out in a number of speeches. He tied the MLG to the objective of ensuring social stability using the phrase baochi shehui wending (“maintaining social stability”) when outlining the benefits of the policy (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998d, Duoji, 1995a). Duoji also argued the MLG was a
policy which supported state responsibilities to the urban poor. This would encourage positive perceptions of the government arguing that:

“…this work [the MLG] reflects the Party and government’s care for the masses and the superiority of the socialist system” (Duoji, 1998a: 29).

And that:

“Carrying out the urban resident MLG line system is important to both our nation and to guaranteeing human rights, because the right to life and to development are the most basic human rights. Carrying out the MLG is a major initiative for guaranteeing the right to live, it will have extensive and far reaching impacts both internationally and domestically” (Duoji, 1998d: 33).

Duoji also linked the MLG to one of the core policy concepts of the post-Mao era, the reform project. The MLG guaranteed the continuation of the reform process. In a speech to a symposium on the MLG Duoji stated that: “Establishing a complete social security system is an important project which complements the deepening of economic reforms and establishing a socialist market economic system” (Duoji, 1998d: 33). By configuring the debate surrounding the MLG in such a way Duoji ensured that resisting the MLG for whatever reason would be unlikely as it would be the equivalent of questioning doctrine.

Duoji also argued that the MCA already had responsibility for China’s urban poor and the MLG was a continuity of this role. The MLG was presented as a reform of the existing Three Nos policy rather than a new policy (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998d). In one speech Duoji presented this argument as:
“We can very clearly say this work [the MLG] is a functional responsibility of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Because the MLG is a reform of the traditional social assistance system it is not a new or increased responsibility” (Duoji, 1998d: 35).

In the same speech Duoji argues that carrying out the MLG was not without guidelines and should not be troublesome because: “The practical experience of Shanghai, Dalian and other cities already answers the problem” (Duoji, 1998d: 36).

The last point addressed was opposition based on varied levels of development. This elicited a practical response. The expectation of implementation was staggered allowing underdeveloped areas more time to put in place MLG systems. Focus was put on those cities seen as developed – predominantly on the Eastern Seaboard and the self-governing municipalities. Those cities labelled as under developed, mainly in the Central-West of the country, were permitted to follow later when circumstances would allow it (Duoji, 1995d, Duoji, 1998c, Xi, 1998). It should be noted that, given no national implementation order had been made, it was ambitious of Duoji to be pushing such an agenda at the time.

**Leading by Example**

Duoji also pushed the development of the MLG by intervening in local government. For example Duoji is cited as personally intervening in order to see the MLG implemented in Beijing. In this particular case it is implied that pressure was exerted on the government of Beijing to implement the MLG. Given the status of Beijing as the political heart of the Chinese state and one of the Municipalities it would have been of great significance if the city had not implemented the policy. In terms of seeking national implementation establishing a base in important localities would have benefitted the process. Not only would it have leant weight to the push for the policy to be established but it would also expand the experience,
methods and support that could be drawn upon when other cities began to implement (Liu, 1997).

In addition Duoji is cited by a report published in 2002 on the MLG in Liaoning as having intervened in the development of the policy in the Province. In this example Duoji suggested, in 1995, that the city of Dalian establish an MLG system to provide an example to the other cities in the area on how to set up and manage such a system (Zhang, 2002). The local government in Dalian subsequently established an MLG system which was used as an example for not only cities in Liaoning but also in the rest of China (Interview with MCA Researcher, Beijing, 2006).

These interventions suggest that although Duoji might have been limited in his institutional capacity to push the MLG he was willing to take risks and lead by example. Duoji closely associated himself with local government adopting the innovation in the social assistance system. This was a risk because if the projects had failed or been censured then it would have negatively reflected on Duoji and potentially undermined his position as Minister. He was therefore taking a risk and leading by example when he pushed local government to adopt the MLG. The fact Duoji was able to do this suggests that he had two traits. First, Duoji was capable of persuading cities who were under no obligation to follow his instructions to implement MLG systems. This implies that he was either persuasive or had significant political capital in these cities where officials would listen to his suggestions. Second, Duoji may have been astute in tapping into the particular agendas of these cities when he made his interventions. It is entirely plausible that both Beijing and Dalian were at the time prepared to invest in establishing MLG systems because the cities were facing enterprise reforms and the potentially destabilising effects of increasing urban poverty, like Shanghai before them.
Team Building

The final area where Duoji was able to help the MLG overcome institutional obstacles was by raising the profile of the program with the elite decision makers in the State Council. For the MLG to become national policy it would require the State Council to agree on implementation. The process and rationale of decision making at this level of Chinese politics is opaque at best but there is evidence to suggest that Duoji worked to support the MLG at the highest levels of the Chinese state. In the absence of obvious team building this use of professional networks fits with Mintrom and Norman’s framework. First, officials in the MCA stated that Duoji reported up to the State Council regarding the MLG; and Premier Li Peng was swayed by positive reports of the system (Interviews with Chinese social policy academic, Beijing, 2006; and with MCA Department Head, Beijing, 2007). Second, as discussed above, Duoji had been very careful in establishing the MLG as an ideologically sound response to issues such as poverty and unemployment which were arising as a result of reform. In addition the attempted management of the spread of the MLG had ensured that by 1996 major cities like Beijing and Dalian, for example, had established systems and could be viewed as providing a network of systems in key cities and models to be examined. Taken together these points suggest that Duoji could have presented the MLG to the elite levels of government as a solution to emerging challenges. Given what MCA officials reported this appears to have been the case and would have gone some way, in combination with rising concerns regarding state owned enterprise reform, to overcoming the central government’s apparent apathy toward the program prior to 1996. This also demonstrates Duoji’s acuity and ability to define problems in a manner appealing to interested parties.

Entrepreneur Motivations
Whilst it is not an important element in Mintrom and Norman’s framework the motivations of a policy entrepreneur are worth considering when describing their actions. The motivations of an individual, especially one who it is not possible to interview, is a challenging issue to understand but is possible to infer some motivations. First, I would argue that Duoji was not motivated by what might be called rational self-interest or a ministry building tendency. Although the MLG developed through the 1990s and 2000s to become a source of prestige and ultimately receive substantial central government spending after 2001 (MoF, 2005). This was not the case in the early to mid-1990s when the MLG was a risk for Duoji to support as he was asking local government to implement a policy with no resources to support it. This could have gone wrong for Duoji, politically, if he had aggravated provincial governors, city mayors and party secretaries.

A more likely alternative motivation are pragmatic concerns born of increasing urban poverty and enterprise reform. This explains why the MLG was linked closely with the dominant government concern regarding social stability. Duoji was also in Tibet in 1989 and soon after moved to Beijing which would suggest he had firsthand experience of anti-government protests. Finally, as noted in his justifications for the MLG Duoji drew a clear ideological connection between socialism, the legitimacy of the Party and the MLG. Therefore the most likely reason for Duoji supporting the MLG was a combination of factors. Post-1989 pragmatism and concerns over continued social stability fused with a strong ideological commitment to social assistance and socialist legitimacy. This combined with a concern for supporting the legitimacy of the Chinese state both in the domestic and international arenas to create a complex set of motivations for the Minister who pushed the MLG from 1994.

Not all policy actors are policy entrepreneurs
Not all policy actors which are influential or important to the policy process are policy entrepreneurs. This is an important point to consider because the usefulness of policy entrepreneurship in describing outcomes would be diluted if every actor involved was an entrepreneur. As discussed earlier Mintrom and Norman highlight the need to be careful when applying the policy entrepreneur label cautioning that “indiscriminate application must be avoided” (2009: 650). In the case of the MLG there are examples of important policy actors active in the policy process who are not entrepreneurs. This section will highlight three different actors who were important to the MLG at different points but who were not entrepreneurs. Rather two different explanations are put forward for their behaviour.

Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 1997 – 2002, President of the PRC from 1998 – 2003 and China’s paramount leader after Deng Xiaoping died in 1997 and Li Peng, Chinese Premier from 1993 to 1998, are both excellent examples of the temptation to make a policy actor an entrepreneur. Jiang Zemin’s support for the MLG was apparent because his institutional position in China meant that he would have needed to have at the very least agreed to national implementation in 1997. Jiang was also mentioned by one senior social policy researcher in China as being important to the MLG achieving national implementation in 1997 (Interview with Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher, Beijing, 2007). Li Peng has a similarly high profile regarding the MLG. He is cited in six interviews for his role in pushing the MLG after 1996 (Interviews with two social policy academics, Beijing, 2006; two social policy academics, Tianjin, 2006; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences research, Beijing, 2007; MCA Researcher, Beijing, 2006; and MCA Department Head, 2007). Premier Li also reported positively on the MLG when it was incorporated into the ninth five year plan and during meetings (Li, 1998c). Finally, Li was a firm voice in the State Council pushing the MLG in the run up to national implementation (Li,
It is, therefore, clear that both were actors of some significance to the MLG being implemented in 1997. Why do I discuss them here as policy actors and not entrepreneurs?

As discussed above entrepreneurs exhibit particular behaviour and for our purposes are distinguished by their desire for change. The four reasons that Jiang Zemin should not be considered a policy sponsor are related to these requirements. First, with the exception of one interview (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Researcher, Beijing, 2007) there was no other mention of Jiang Zemin in interviews on the MLG. Jiang was not highlighted, like Duoji Cairang, as making an unusual contribution to the development of the MLG. Second, this lack of exceptional behaviour is reflected in the documentary sources with Jiang Zemin mentioning the MLG on only one occasion when reporting to the 15th National Party Congress in September 1997 (Jiang, 1998). Third, his support for the MLG is inferred only by the requirement that he would need to “Okay” the policy because of his institutional position. In addition, the only time Jiang mentions the MLG is at the 15th National Party Congress which does support the 1997 State Council Circular but it is after the decision to implement the policy had been made. Jiang’s involvement in the MLG does appear fleeting when compared to Duoji. Finally, an interview with a senior MCA official suggested that it was Li Peng who persuaded the other elite leaders to implement the MLG nationally (Interview with MCA Department Head, Beijing, 2007). Jiang was not mentioned and the implication is that he was one of those in the State Council who was persuaded rather than an essential actor who did the persuading. Jiang therefore cannot be considered an entrepreneur. His role in the MLG was short lived, reactive and did not demonstrate a clear desire to change the system. Although a powerful policy actor, in the case of the MLG Jiang can be considered as “just doing his job.”
Premier Li Peng presents a more difficult case because he did make interventions which appear both significant and cover a period of time. His first comment on the MLG came in 1994 at the same meeting Duoji first promoted the MLG (Li, 1995) and he periodically appears regarding the MLG all the way through to the ninth five year plan and national implementation (Li, 1998b, Li, 1998a, Li, 1998c). Although highlighted in interviews as being a key actor in the development of the MLG and making interventions in the process more often than Jiang appears he does not distinguish himself for two reasons. First, although involved over a significant period of time it is sporadic and only intensifies near to national implementation. Li does not show a clear long term commitment to change. Second, Li only makes decisions on the MLG in contrast to Duoji who pushed and promoted the policy. This again highlights a limited albeit significant role in the development of the MLG.

There is one other example which helps highlight this difference. Zou Jiahua publicly supported the MLG but only when the State Council announced the measure in September 1997. Although used to publicise the MLG there was no evidence of a sustained interest in policy. Although Zou is high profile in 1997 on the MLG he is not during the period before or after the announcement of the Circular. A possible explanation for supporting the measure is that Zou was a known ally of Li Peng (Fewsmith, 2008). Speculatively, he may have supported the measure out of support for Li when he was overseeing national implementation in 1997.

Conclusion

This article has examined the application of Mintrom and Norman’s policy entrepreneur and policy change framework as a means to describe and explain the role of Minister Duoji Cairang in the development of dibao in the PRC. This discussion initially highlighted the on-
going evolution of understanding of policy and the roles for policy actors in the PRC. In particular the elite factionalism, group and fragmented authoritarianism models were all discussed as evidence of a developing understanding of policy in the PRC. In addition this body of work suggests that the policy process in China is more complicated than previously acknowledged. Recent scholarship has introduced new concepts to the debate on Chinese policy and this article focuses on the policy entrepreneur. These studies of policy entrepreneurs are associated with the agenda settings stage of the policy process but demonstrate the transfer and application of the concept in the PRC (Mertha, 2009, Zhu, 2008).

It is this new work on policy entrepreneurs that this article contributes to. In this article I use the framework set out by Mintrom and Norman because it provides a single framework for identifying and describing the success of a policy entrepreneur. Mintrom and Norman’s framework describes the qualities that might explain the success or failure of a policy entrepreneur: acuity, problem definition, leading by example and team building (2009). I use this framework to describe the development of the MLG and Minister Duoji Cairang’s relative success in pushing for significant change in social assistance policy in China. This article therefore addresses two questions: first, does the policy entrepreneur concept adequately describe the development of urban *dibao*; second, does Mintrom and Norman’s framework provide the means to identify, describe and evaluate the success of policy entrepreneurship in China without modification?

The evidence provided in this paper suggests that in the case of both questions the answer is a qualified yes. In terms of the policy entrepreneur adequately describing the development of the MLG the concept has clear advantages to an approach based on, for example, the fragmented authoritarianism or elite factionalism models. This is for three reasons. First, the
policy entrepreneur is more dynamic in describing the behaviour of bureaucrats than alternatives. In the alternative models a ministerial bureaucrat would be a static actor, the rational decision maker of the FA model, or ignored altogether when there is ample evidence that they can have a significant impact on the policy process. Duoji promoted the MLG when it was not a popular policy, over a significant period of time and across multiple stages of the policy process. Second, policy entrepreneurship can allow for what might appear as non-rational behaviour in a policy actor. Why does a policy actor support a policy which apparently does not best serve their interests at the time? Perhaps they are supporting it taking a long term view? Or acting under ideological motivations? In the case of Duoji supporting *dibao* when he did could be viewed as an irrational choice given the risks in aggravating local government with an unfunded mandate. Third, policy entrepreneurship provides a means to synthesise the impact that policy actors and institutional features of the Chinese state can have on policy outcomes. For example Duoji’s position as a minister limited him in his actions but also provided, in the fragmented Chinese system, the space to promote the MLG.

The second question is whether Mintrom and Norman’s framework can be used in the Chinese context without modification? The evidence produced here would support the argument that the framework can be used to describe cases of policy entrepreneurship and policy change in the PRC. Each of the four aspects of the framework worked in terms of providing an explanation for the success of Minister Duoji in promoting the MLG during the 1990s. The only aspect which was limited was the description of team building which did not directly fit Duoji’s activities. The use of his professional networks, however, was an aspect of Duoji’s work in promoting the MLG and this does fit with the general idea behind team building. Overall the framework provides a clear means to identify policy entrepreneurs and
also provides four key aspects with which to describe the success, or arguably the failure, of a policy entrepreneur.

This is, however, only a single case exploring the potential usefulness of Mintrom and Norman’s framework which means the evidence presented here cannot be an argument for a general application in the Chinese context. In order to more rigorously explore the possibilities presented by the framework it needs to be used to describe other cases. Because of the relative simplicity and clarity of the framework it has great potential. In addition the framework can describe policy actors who influence the policy process from both within and outside of the bureaucracy. This would take our understanding of non-state policy actors beyond the agenda setting stage within which the traditional concept of the policy entrepreneur occupies. Although briefly touched on in this article the potential for better understanding the policy process in the PRC presented by the policy entrepreneur are great.

**Appendix A**

List of interviewees (anonymous, in line with ethical agreement).
1. Researcher, Beijing.
2. Official, Ministry of Science and Technology.
3. Researcher, Tianjin.
4. Researcher, Tianjin.
7. MLG Recipient, Anqing.
8. 2 Researchers, Beijing.
9. 3 Researchers, Beijing.
10. NGO Official, Beijing.
12. Researcher, Beijing.
13. NGO Official, Beijing.
14. Researcher, HK SAR.
15. Researcher, HK SAR.
17. Official, Civil Affairs, Dalian.

**Appendix B**
Coding frame (edited for length).

**000. Institutional Codes:**
- 001. State Council.
- 002. MCA.
- 003. MoLSS.
- 004. MoF.
- 005. MoP.
- 007. Pricing.
- 008. Supervisory.
- 010. Development Research Centre of State Council PRC.
- 011. CASS.
- 012. National People’s Congress.
- 013. Standing committee of the National People’s Congress.
- 014. Remin Ribao.

**100. Administrative Codes:**
- 102. Department(s).
- 103. Bureau(x).
- 104. Province(s).
- 105. Autonomous Region(s)/
- 108. County(ies).
- 109. District(s).
- 110. Street Committee(s).
- 111. Shequ/ Community(ies).
- 112. Residence Committee(s).

**200. Party Codes:**
- 201. CCP/ CPC/ Chinese Communist Party.
- 202. CCP Consultative Congress.
- 203. National Party Congress.
- 204. Standing Committee of the National Party Congress.
- 205. Poliburo.

**300. People:**
- 301. Mao Zedong.
- 302. Deng Xiaoping.
- 305. Li Peng.
- 306. Li Guixian.
- 308. Hu Jintao.
- 309. Wen Jiabao.
- 312. Fan Baojun.
- 313. Li Bengong.
- 314. Yang Yanyin.
- 316. Guan Xingping.

**400. Titles:**
- 401. Chairman.
- 402. President.
- 403. Premier.
- 404. Vice-Premier.
- 405. Minister.
- 406. Vice-Minister.

**500. Legislative Codes:**
- 504. 1999 MLG Regulations.

**600. Policy Codes:**
- 601. “Economic reform and development.”
- 602. “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese characteristics.”
- 603. “Social Stability.”
- 604. Poor population (poor population’s living difficulties).
- 605. 8th Five Year Plan.
- 606. 9th Five Year Plan.
- 607. 10th Five Year Plan.
- 608. 11th Five Year Plan.
- 609. 2010 Goals.
- 610. Social Security.
- 611. Social Welfare.
- 612. Social Assistance.
- 613. MLG.
- 614. XG BLG.
- 615. UEL.
- 616. OAP/ Basic Retirement Pensions.
- 617. Basic Medical Insurance.
- 618. Education fee assistance.
- 619. Rent assistance.
- 620. Social Insurance.
- 621. Medical Insurance.
- 623. 3 Lines of Social Security.
- 624. 6 Parts of Social Security.

**700. Theory Codes:**
- 701. Fragmented Authoritarianism.
- 720. 4 Part Institutionalism.
- 740. SL-PNA.

**750. PE:**
- 751. PE Identify
- 752. PE SA
- 753. PE PD
- 754. PE Leading
- 755. PE T-Building

**800. Statistics Codes:**
- 801. Money/ Funding.
- 820. MLG Target Numbers.
- 840. MLG Level.

**900. Location Codes:**
- 901. China.
- 903. England/ UK.

**1000. Terminology Codes:**
- 1001. Research.
- 1002. Investigate.
- 1003. Funding.
- 1004. Targets.
- 1006. Pragmatic/ Pragmatism.
- 1007. Strengthen.
- 1008. Pushing/ promoting.
- 1009. Playing games.
- 1010. Incremental.


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