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**Citation for published version:**

Erskine, A 2015, Polybius and the anger of the Romans. in *Emotions Between Greece and Rome*. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplements, vol. 125, Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London. <<http://www.icls.sas.ac.uk/publications/latest-supplements>>

**Link:**

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

**Document Version:**

Peer reviewed version

**Published In:**

Emotions Between Greece and Rome

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# POLYBIUS AND THE ANGER OF THE ROMANS\*

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## 1. Introduction

Towards the end of his history Polybius describes the fiasco of the Achaean War in the 140s, which led to the Roman sack of Corinth and the dissolution of the Achaean League. Polybius has nothing but contempt for the Achaean leaders at the time and has no hesitation in saying so. He himself was not long back from a lengthy period of detention in Rome, making him a suitable person to mediate between Greeks and Romans in the aftermath of the war.<sup>1</sup> It is his representation of his own actions that is of interest here. He draws a distinction between writing history and political action. A historian must value the truth above all, but in real life so to speak there has to be more flexibility; there are circumstances when it is necessary to be partial, to make clear your allegiance, and support a cause. As he puts it:

κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς τῶν περιστάσεων καιροὺς καθήκει βοηθεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὄντας τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, τὰ μὲν ἀμύνοντας, τὰ δὲ περιστέλλοντας, τὰ δὲ παραιτούμενους τὴν τῶν κρατούντων ὀργήν· ὅπερ ἡμεῖς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιήσαμεν ἀληθινῶς.

In times of danger it is proper that those who are Greeks help the Greeks in every way, whether by giving support, by concealing faults, or by pleading for deliverance from the anger of those in power. This is something that I myself actually did at the time of these events.<sup>2</sup>

So as a historian Polybius is highly critical of the Achaeans, but as a politician at the time of the crisis he took the side of his people. In particular he sought to plead for deliverance from the anger of those in power (ἡ τῶν κρατούντων ὀργή), that is to say the anger of the Romans. This is an arresting way of representing the relationship between Rome and Achaea, especially for a historian who is often considered to be very pragmatic and utilitarian, one who sees power in terms of the ability to enforce obedience; Rome, he

\* In addition to being read at the Tallahassee conference this paper was also given to the Oxford Emotions workshop. I am grateful to John Marincola for impersonating me at the first reading, to Angelos Chaniotis, Daniel King, and Cristobal Págan Cánovas, for comments at the second, and to Douglas Cairns for his careful reading of the draft version.

<sup>1</sup> A. Erskine, 'Polybius among the Romans: life in the Cyclops' cave', in *Imperialism, cultural politics and Polybius*, ed. C. Smith and L. Yarrow (Oxford 2012) 17-32 on detention and return.

<sup>2</sup> Plb. 38.4.7; for Polybius' actions, see Plb. 39.3-5; Plut. *Philop.* 21; D. Baronowski, *Polybius and Roman imperialism* (London 2011) 135-37.

says, has achieved universal rule when everyone obeys its orders.<sup>3</sup> Yet here Polybius adds another dimension to the relationship between subject and ruler. It is necessary to understand it also in emotional terms. Polybius is of course involved; he is at this stage an actor in his own history and the viewpoint he presents is that of the subject. So we might want to distinguish between the historian who thinks in terms of orders and obedience and the subject who thinks in terms of anger and how to respond to it.

Polybius' remark certainly found a receptive and sympathetic audience among his fellow Achaeans. Pausanias cites some elegiac verses written in Polybius' honour. They were to be found inscribed on a relief sculpture of the historian that was erected in the agora of his home city of Megalopolis. Here, with a clear reference to this passage of his history, Polybius is described as bringing an end to Rome's anger against Greece (παύσειεν αὐτοὺς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐς τὸ Ἑλληνικόν).<sup>4</sup> The very public character of this document suggests that Polybius' view of Roman anger was not exclusive to him.

Nor can Polybius' own comment on the anger of the rulers be treated as a casual remark. The anger of the Romans together with the problems that this caused for Greeks was a recurring theme within his history. Greeks here spend a considerable amount of time placating angry Romans, whether individuals, Romans in general, or the Senate. Yet scholars have paid little attention to this. Frank Walbank in his monumental commentary on Polybius has nothing on the topic.<sup>5</sup> Arthur Eckstein, who has written widely on Polybius, does briefly treat the theme of ὀργή in the *Histories*. For Eckstein it is largely a sign of lack of reasoning, displayed by unkingly kings such as Philip V of Macedon and by the mob, by women, by barbarians, and by mercenaries, but he is then puzzled that Polybius should depict the Senate as angry and is forced to conclude that this was an exception, because of 'Rome's unique power'.<sup>6</sup> Polybius does feature in William Harris' study of the control of anger in antiquity, *Restraining Rage*, but Roman anger is again sidelined. It is the opponents of Rome who get angry; the Roman Senate, on the other hand, 'is rarely and only in rather special circumstances said to have expressed anger: the one clear case seems to have concerned the Rhodian ambassadors of 169' and for this

<sup>3</sup> Pragmatism: F. W. Walbank, 'Political morality and the friends of Scipio', *JRS* 55 (1965) 1-16, esp. 8 (reprinted in *Selected papers: studies in Greek and Roman history and historiography*, (Cambridge 1985) 157-80); K. S. Sacks, *Polybius on the writing of history* (Berkeley 1981) 132-36; and B. C. McGing, *Polybius' Histories* (Oxford 2010) 4, although there are exceptions, notably A. M. Eckstein, *Moral vision in the Histories of Polybius* (Berkeley 1995) 16-27, arguing against and stressing instead Polybius' moralizing tendency. Orders and obedience: Plb. 3.4.2-3; P. S. Derow, 'Polybius, Rome and the east', *JRS* 69 (1979), 1-15 (4-6).

<sup>4</sup> Paus. 8.30.8-9; on Achaean honours for Polybius, cf. also Plb. 39.5.2; Paus. 8.9.1, 8.37.2, 8.44.5, 8.48.8; F. W. Walbank, *A historical commentary on Polybius*, 3 vols (Oxford 1957-79) III, 5 n.8. On Pausanias' treatment of Megalopolis: M. Jost, 'Pausanias en Megalopolitide', *REA* 75 (1973) 241-67 (259 on Polybius); for what survives of the honours for Polybius: P. C. Bol and F. Eckstein, 'Die Polybios-Stele in Kleitor/Arkadien', in *Antike Plastik* 15, ed. F. Eckstein (Berlin 1975), 83-93.

<sup>5</sup> Walbank, *Historical commentary* (n. 4 above).

<sup>6</sup> A. M. Eckstein, 'Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3.15 and the power of irrationality', *Classical Philology* 84 (1989) 1-15, esp. 6-7.

Harris cites, not Polybius, but a passage of Livy said to be derived from Polybius.<sup>7</sup> Polybius' own statement that he sought to avert the anger of the conquerors is played down; it was, writes Harris, 'probably a symptom of his having felt some real doubts about Roman imperialism in the years after 146'.<sup>8</sup> In their different ways, therefore, both Eckstein and Harris try to exclude Roman anger from their analysis; for Eckstein it is an exception, for Harris it is rare. Yet, it is neither exceptional nor rare, but a central and recurring feature of the second half of Polybius' history.

The main term used by Polybius to refer to anger is ὀργή, already observed in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Polybius also uses θυμός, a word often seen as virtually interchangeable with ὀργή, although θυμός is more likely to be employed when what he wants to convey is violent, aggressive, irrational, or mad. It frequently occurs in the context of battles.<sup>9</sup> Neither of these terms should be assumed to have an exact equivalent in English; ὀργή is found in earlier writers such as Thucydides to mean something along the lines of 'disposition', while θυμός can encompass far more than anger, from the source of emotions in Homer, to the spirited part of the soul in Plato that occupies a halfway position between reason and desire.<sup>10</sup> Cross-cultural comparison of emotions, whether contemporary or across time, is always problematic.<sup>11</sup> Any particular emotion in another culture and the vocabulary used to express it will only approximate to

<sup>7</sup> W. V. Harris, *Restraining rage: the ideology of anger control in classical antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass. 2001) 198, citing Livy 44.45.4.

<sup>8</sup> Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 199 on Plb. 38.4.7, quoted above.

<sup>9</sup> Interchangeable: J. Procopé, 'Epicureans on anger', in *The emotions in Hellenistic philosophy*, ed. J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pederson (Dordrecht 1998) 171-96 (194 n. 87) (first published in *Philanthropia kai eusebeia: Festschrift für Albrecht Dihle zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. G. W. Most, H. Petersmann, and A. M. Ritter [Göttingen 1993] 363-86); J. P. Lynch and G. B. Miles, 'In search of thumos: toward an understanding of a Greek psychological term', *Prudentia* 12 (1980) 3-9 (8), although see Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 53-54. Polybian θυμός as violent: 3.15.9, 6.56.11; aggressive: 5.76.3; irrational: 2.21.2, 2.35.3, 3.81.9; mad: 5.11.1, 32.15.8; it is frequently associated with the build-up to war, e.g. 2.21.2 (Gauls against Rome), 3.9.6, 3.10.5, 3.15.9, 3.29.1, 3.34.7 (Second Punic War); in battle: 2.30.4, 2.33.2 (Gauls), 3.81.9 (Flaminius at Trasimene), 33.10.5 (Oxybii); it can, however, be advantageous: cf. of Philip V, 16.28.8.

<sup>10</sup> ὀργή as disposition: Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 52 with n. 11; use in Thucydides, 1.140.3, 3.82.2, 8.83.3, on which: P. Huart, *Le Vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'œuvre de Thucydide* (Paris 1968) 157 ('disposition d'esprit'). θυμός in early Greek literature: J. N. Bremmer, *The early Greek concept of the soul* (Princeton 1983) 54-56; C. P. Caswell, *A study of thymos in early Greek poetry* (Leiden 1990); in Plato: *Resp.* 4.439e-42c. For the Homeric language of anger: D. L. Cairns, 'Ethics, ethology, terminology: Iliadic anger and the cross-cultural study of emotion', in *Ancient anger: perspectives from Homer to Galen*, ed. S. Braund and G. Most, Yale Classical Studies 23 (Cambridge 2003) 11-49; on Greek terminology of anger in general: Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 50-68.

<sup>11</sup> See the cautionary yet positive remarks of Cairns, 'Ethics, ethology, terminology' (n. 10 above) 11-20; cf. also D. Konstan, *The emotions of the ancient Greeks: studies in Aristotle and classical literature* (Toronto 2006) 3-40. Many of the issues raised by cross-cultural comparison are reviewed in B. Parkinson, A. H. Fischer, and A. S. R. Manstead, *Emotion in social relations: cultural, group, and interpersonal perspectives* (New York 2004), especially 25-86.

a similar emotion in our own culture or language. The present study of anger in Polybius faces this difficulty several times over, because not only is it necessary to address the Greek experience of anger but also the Roman interpretation of that experience, expressed principally by the Latin words *ira*, *iracundia*, and *indignatio*.<sup>12</sup>

This paper begins with an examination of what Polybius has to say about the anger of the Romans and the Greek response to it and then moves on to consider whether this can be fitted within a broader understanding of Polybius' ideas about anger. I am not suggesting that Polybius has any kind of developed theory of the emotions or of anger. What Polybius offers is a common-sense view of emotions and if there is any sign of philosophical influence it is very much second or third hand. For Polybius anger itself was not something to be criticized but it had to be justifiable, directed at the right people, and expressed in the right way, criteria which were often not met. The paper concludes by comparing Polybius with one of his readers, the Roman historian Livy, who, although willing to adopt much from Polybius, does not reproduce his stress on Roman anger. The result is a very Roman perspective, one that in the process serves to highlight the essential Greekness of Polybius' own outlook.

## 2. *The anger of the Romans*

The evidence for the anger of the Romans in Polybius' *Histories* is surprisingly plentiful. That reference to 'the anger of those in power' (ἡ τῶν κρατούντων ὀργή) in the opening quotation is but one of many, albeit perhaps the most personal. In the second half of the *Histories* state after state is found to be on the receiving end of Roman anger. It is useful, therefore, to review these examples briefly and without detailed analysis before exploring their significance further in the next section. Chronologically they fall roughly into three main sets, the 180s after the victory over Antiochus the Great, the 160s after the victory over the Macedonian king Perseus at Pydna, and the time of the Achaean War in the 140s, the latter being the context of Polybius' comment on his own actions.

The first case occurs in book 21, thus at the halfway point of his history. It is 189 BC and the Seleucid king Antiochus III has just been defeated by Rome at Magnesia, leaving his erstwhile allies the Aetolians exposed and anxious. As the Roman army advances towards them, the Aetolians approach the Rhodians and Athenians, asking them 'to send embassies to Rome to plead for deliverance from the anger of the Romans' (παραιτησαμένους τὴν ὀργὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων).<sup>13</sup> This word *παραιτέομαι* is one that I will return to in the next section, since a satisfactory translation is not easy. These ambassadors went first to the Roman consul in Greece, then to the Rome itself, where the Athenian ambassador addressed the subject of Roman anger directly in his speech to the Senate. The Romans, he said, were right to be angry; the Aetolians had been well-treated by them, yet rather than showing gratitude they had put Roman ἡγεμονία at risk. Nonetheless, he continued, it was the leaders who should be held responsible, not the Aetolian people themselves, who were like a sea

<sup>12</sup> On Latin anger words and their relationship to Greek ones: Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 68-70.

<sup>13</sup> Plb. 21.25.8-10.

tossed in a storm.<sup>14</sup> These themes will recur. Anger is an appropriate reaction to ingratitude and anger should be directed at those who are responsible.<sup>15</sup>

Victory over the Seleucid king opened up Asia Minor to Rome and Roman anger, which soon makes its presence felt there. In the extant text of Polybius the first to feel its force is Moagetes, the obscure ruler of Cibyra, not a man of whom Polybius had a very high opinion; he is described as ‘cruel and treacherous’. When the ambassadors of Moagetes go to meet the approaching Roman consul Gn. Manlius Vulso, they are taken aback by his display of anger (*καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἐπίφασιν τῆς ὀργῆς*), so much so that they abandon their mission and instead request that Moagetes himself might have a meeting with the consul.<sup>16</sup> A little further south, the Lycians were trying to avoid the consequences of supporting Antiochus in the recent war and so asked the city of Ilium to intervene on their behalf. The Ilians, after meeting with the Roman commission, go to Lycia where they announce that they have made a successful appeal to avert the anger of the Romans (*ὅτι παρήτηνται τὴν ὀργὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων*).<sup>17</sup>

Later in the 180s and still in the same book of Polybius, a Roman commissioner, Q. Caecilius Metellus, visits Achaëa on his return from the Macedonian king Philip and asks the Achaëan magistrates to call an assembly. When they tell him that this is not possible without a letter of authorization from the Senate, he becomes so angry (*ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὀργίσθη*) that he simply leaves, refusing even to talk with the Achaëan magistrates. The Achaëans subsequently defend their actions before the Senate, although there is no mention of Roman anger in Polybius’ account of the senatorial meeting.<sup>18</sup>

Next it was the turn of the Rhodians, whose support for Rome in the Third Macedonian War was felt to have been less than wholehearted, with the result that they are faced with Roman anger: ‘seeing the anger and intimidation of the Senate towards them’ (*θεωροῦντες... τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργὴν καὶ τὴν ἀνάτασιν τῆς συγκλήτου*). One consequence of this was possible war; indeed, to the alarm of the Rhodians, one of the praetors was said to have addressed the Roman people, pressing them to declare war on Rhodes. There follow a series of speeches before the Senate over several chapters and several embassies as the Rhodians seek to persuade the Romans to put aside their anger.<sup>19</sup> The anger of the Senate is later directed at another of Rome’s friends, the Bithynian king Prusias, one of the beneficiaries of the Third Macedonian War. His friendship with Rome soured when he pursued a war with the Attalids in defiance of the instructions of the Senate, which, Polybius relates, responded angrily (*ὀργισθεῖσα*), sending a commission to force him to bring the war to an end.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Plb. 21.29.9, 21.31.5-16.

<sup>15</sup> See further section 5 below.

<sup>16</sup> Plb. 21.34; on Moagetes: Walbank, *Historical commentary* III (n. 4 above) 142-43.

<sup>17</sup> Plb. 22.5.3-6; on Lycia’s links with Ilium: A. Erskine, *Troy between Greece and Rome: local tradition and imperial power* (Oxford 2001) 176-78.

<sup>18</sup> Metellus’ visit: Plb. 22.10 (anger in section 13); Achaëan defence: 22.11.6, 22.12.5-10.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius makes repeated references to Roman anger against Rhodes: 30.4.2-3, 30.23.2, 30.31.12-13, 30.31.17.

<sup>20</sup> Plb. 33.7.

Finally there is the Achaean war of 146 BC, when Polybius' own diplomatic skills played their part in freeing Achaia from the anger of the rulers. On this occasion the Achaeans were lucky that the anger of the Romans was not much worse. It was, Polybius writes, only the fortunate shortness of the war that prevented the anger and rage of the Romans from burning for longer (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο συνέβη μήτε τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ἐκκαυθῆναι πορρωτέρω...).<sup>21</sup> The fire metaphor captures both the intensity characteristic of anger and the dangers inherent in it.

In the half century from the war with Antiochus to the crushing of Achaia, therefore, there is no shortage of occurrences of Roman anger, at least in the pages of Polybius. Far from being something that can be dismissed as an exception or as rare, the anger of the Romans is a significant feature of Polybius' later books.

### 3. *A Greek perspective*

What is particularly striking about these examples is their perspective. So much writing on anger, ancient and modern, focuses on the angry person, what they feel, why they feel it, and how they can control it, but here the focus is largely on those who experience the anger of another, in this political context the subject rather than the ruler, the defeated rather than the victor.<sup>22</sup> Articulating this is in fact rather difficult because there seems to be no word for such a person – love has the loved, hate the hated, but anger tends to focus on the person being angry, with everyone else becoming collateral damage. The concentration on the angry person is especially a feature of Hellenistic and later philosophy and is not so evident earlier.<sup>23</sup> Aristotle, for example, had offered a much broader-based interpretation of anger in his *Rhetoric* and to a lesser extent in his *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>24</sup> In his work, attention is also paid to the kinds of behaviour that give rise to anger and the ways in which anger can be alleviated. As we will see later, there are similarities between this Aristotelian picture and the Polybian one.<sup>25</sup>

Reading these examples in Polybius, then, we observe anger not from the point of view of the person who is feeling the anger but rather from the point of view of those who are at the receiving end of another's anger. Thus we share the perspective of the Aetolians, the Rhodians, the Lycians, the envoys of Moagetes, and so on, when they are

<sup>21</sup> Plb. 38.4.7, 38.18.9-12; on Polybius' role, see notes 2 and 4 above.

<sup>22</sup> For the focus on the angry person, note, for example, Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above), or, for a sense of the direction of contemporary anger studies, see: M. Potegal *et al.*, ed., *International handbook of anger: constituent and concomitant biological, psychological and social processes* (New York 2010), where the emphasis of the essays tends to be on the angry person. There are exceptions, for example C. Faraone's paper on the way women use spells in response to male anger: 'Thumos as masculine ideal and social pathology in ancient Greek magical spells', in *Ancient anger*, ed. Braund and Most (n. 10 above), 144-62.

<sup>23</sup> See further the beginning of section 5 below.

<sup>24</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 2.2-3 (1378a-80b), *EN* 4.5 (1125b-26b); the difference between the two Aristotelian treatments of anger is partly to be explained by the different aims of each work, the *Rhetoric* being specifically about persuasion, with book 2 treating persuasion by means of arousing emotions in the audience.

<sup>25</sup> For further discussion of Aristotle see the end of this section and section 5 below.

faced with Roman anger. It is they who see or speak about the Romans as angry. The Rhodians see (θεωροῦντες) the anger of the Romans and later they see (θεωροῦντες again) that it has not ceased; the envoys of Moagetes are alarmed (καταπλαγέντες) at the display of anger; again when the Aetolians ask the Rhodians and Athenians to intervene to deal with Roman anger, it is the Aetolian reasoning that is presented to us. Or Roman anger occurs in speeches or in the mouths of others: the Athenians talk of it when they defend the Aetolians before the Senate, as do the Rhodians when they defend themselves before the Senate, and the Ilians, speaking in Lycia, say that they have averted the anger of the Romans.<sup>26</sup> All these cases, then, are ones that reflect a viewer's perception of the Romans. A possible exception to this pattern is Metellus' anger at the Achaean magistrates after they refuse to call a meeting of the assembly. Here we are not told that the Achaeans saw that Metellus was angry or talked about him being angry, it is merely said that he was angry (ὠργισθη). But in this case the historian's and the Achaeans' perspective might be hard to separate. Polybius was an Achaean and his father Lycortas played an important role in the decision that so infuriated Metellus, so that what we have here is anyway very much from the Achaean point of view.<sup>27</sup> Only in one case do we not get the victim's perspective, that of Prusias of Bithynia; it is simply stated that the Senate was angry, something that Polybius appears to feel was quite justified, and here Polybius' own contempt for Prusias seems to put him alongside Rome, sharing their viewpoint.<sup>28</sup>

These repeated references to Roman anger largely reflect the perspective of the Greeks and others who encounter Rome, or what in narratological language would be termed embedded focalization.<sup>29</sup> Until recently, Polybius has attracted narratological treatments rather less than some other ancient historians.<sup>30</sup> Nonetheless, an important contribution to understanding the way that Polybius orchestrates multiple perspectives has been made by James Davidson, albeit in a study that, although narratological in approach, eschews the language of focalization and opts instead to talk of 'the gaze'.<sup>31</sup> Davidson argues that 'we

<sup>26</sup> Rhodians seeing: Plb. 30.4.2, 30.23.2; envoys alarmed: 21.34.8; Aetolian reasoning: 21.25.9-10; speeches: 21.31.7-15, 30.31.12-17, 22.5.6.

<sup>27</sup> Plb. 22.10.8 for Lycortas' role.

<sup>28</sup> Plb. 33.7.3; for Polybius' negative opinion of Prusias: 33.18.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. I. J. F. de Jong, 'Introduction: narratological theory on narrators, narratees, and narratives', in *Narrators, narratees, and narratives in ancient Greek literature, studies in ancient Greek narrative*, ed. I. J. F. de Jong, R. Nünlist, and A. Bowie (Leiden 2004) vol. 1, 1-10, with 8-9 on the problems posed by historiography.

<sup>30</sup> Thucydides in particular has benefited here, see: S. Hornblower, 'Narratology and narrative techniques in Thucydides', in *Greek historiography*, ed. S. Hornblower (Oxford 1994) 131-66 (put into practice in his commentaries on Thucydides, especially vols 2 and 3) and T. Rood, *Thucydides: narrative and explanation* (Oxford 1998). On Herodotus, note especially C. Dewald, 'Narrative surface and authorial voice in Herodotus' *Histories*', *Arethusa* 20 (1987) 147-74.

<sup>31</sup> J. Davidson, 'The gaze in Polybius' *Histories*', *JRS* 81 (1991) 10-24. His decision (10-11) to prefer the term 'gaze' to 'focalization' has been criticized for over-emphasizing the visual, thus C. Pelling, 'Seeing through Caesar's eyes: focalisation and interpretation', in *Narratology and interpretation: the content of narrative form in ancient literature*, ed. J. Grethlein and A. Rengakos (Berlin 2009), 507-26 (509 n. 5). Other studies of Polybius influenced by narratology are the chapters by T. Rood in *Studies in ancient Greek narrative*, ed. I. J. F. de Jong *et al.* (n. 29 above)

are presented in the *Histories* with a complex network of appearances and perceptions, where events are always mediated through the gaze of the inhabitants of his history and that of his supposed readers'.<sup>32</sup> The gaze of the inhabitants is to be found in the examples discussed in section 2, but it is a gaze that also overlaps with that of Polybius' Greek readership, some of whom certainly did pick up on the theme of anger, as the honorific verse inscription quoted by Pausanias shows.<sup>33</sup>

In all the cases examined above Polybius rarely presents the reader with matter-of-fact statements about the Romans, that they are angry and why they are angry, but instead allows the reader to view the Romans from the Greek perspective, something much easier of course if the reader is indeed Greek, which many of his readers will have been. This is where the stress lies. Why the Romans are angry might be evident from the narrative but it is not made explicit. Indeed the very idea that the Romans are angry at all is a Greek interpretation of Roman behaviour. Yet a different way of presenting these incidents was possible, placing the focus instead on those who are angry. For example, when explaining the origins of the Second Punic War in book 3, Polybius writes that the Carthaginians were angry because of the Roman seizure of Sardinia and the amount of money they had been forced to pay the Romans, so here there is the fact of Carthaginian anger and the reason for it.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, once a reason is given, we are moving away from a neutral description towards the Carthaginian perspective, especially if this is a reason that the Carthaginians could reasonably be believed to have held. But, if all those occasions on which Greeks and others coped with Roman anger were described from the Roman point of view instead of from a Greek one, it may be that anger would not be as prominent as it currently is; perhaps it might even disappear. Roman concern instead might be with ensuring obedience.

But what Polybius gives us is the view of the subject that the ruler is angry. It is their, the subjects', concerns that are to the fore. For them it is less the causes that matter than the steps necessary to bring the anger of the Romans to an end. So what do those on the receiving end of Roman anger do in response? What we find are attempts to change the mind of the Romans and to get them to put their anger aside.

Several times Polybius uses the same verb, *παραιτέομαι*, of attempts to bring Roman anger to an end, for instance in the opening passage when he talks of himself and people like him: *παραιτουμένους τὴν τῶν κρατούντων ὀργήν*. It is also to be found in several of the other examples discussed above: *παραιτησαμένους τὴν ὀργὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων*, when the Aetolians ask the Rhodians and the Athenians to send embassies to Rome on their behalf; *παρήτηνται τὴν ὀργὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων*, when the Ilions report the results of their mission back to the Lycians; and the Rhodians in a speech to the Senate describe Roman anger as

vols 1-3; McGing, *Polybius' Histories* (n. 3 above) 95-128; N. Miltos, 'The perils of expectations: perceptions, suspense and surprise in Polybius' *Histories*', in Grethlein and Rengakos, *Narratology and interpretation*, 481-506; and N. Wiater, 'Speeches and historical narrative in Polybius' *Histories*. Approaching speeches in Polybius', in *Stimmen der Geschichte: Funktionen von Reden in der antiken Historiographie*, ed. D. Pausch (Berlin 2010) 67-107.

<sup>32</sup> Davidson, 'The gaze' (n. 31 above) 10.

<sup>33</sup> Paus. 8.30.8-9; see section 1 above.

<sup>34</sup> Plb. 3.13.1, *cf.* 3.10.

long-lasting and δυσπαραίτητος.<sup>35</sup> Coming up with a satisfactory translation of παραίτεομαι is difficult; English translations of Polybius often choose words such as ‘pacify’, ‘soften’, or ‘appease’ the anger of the Romans.<sup>36</sup> While these translations identify anger as the object of παραίτεομαι, they tend to focus on the result, that anger has been reduced, rather than the process. They do not explain how this is achieved. The stem αἰτέομαι suggests the interaction and relationship that brings about the reduction, something in which two parties are involved, and that the mind of the other needs to be changed. Liddell and Scott give ‘avert by entreaties’, which brings in the idea of asking, making a case, begging even; it is an act of supplication that helps suggest the difference of status, the power of the Romans.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, ‘avert’ could misleadingly imply that the anger is threatened rather than present. ‘Deprecate’ would be another suitable word but not one widely used in this sense nowadays.<sup>38</sup> What we are seeing is the supplicant using entreaties in an effort to rid themselves of something that is a problem, effectively to plead it away; I have preferred to capture this with the translation ‘plead for deliverance from’. When Polybius uses παραίτεομαι of his own actions in relation to Roman anger, he is talking about the process, whereas the inscription honouring him uses παύω, the result, the stopping of Roman anger with no indication of how it was achieved.

Begging that the Romans put aside their anger could take several forms. There might be speeches to the Roman authorities, whether directly by the object of Rome’s anger or indirectly through an intermediary, or there might be behaviour which demonstrated subservience and inferiority, or indeed there might be a combination of these. There are similarities here to the way a defence might be conducted in the Athenian courts, where both words and general demeanour would be aimed at persuading the jury.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Plb. 38.4.7, 21.25.10, 22.5.6, 30.31.13; cf. also the use of ἔχειν ἀπαραίτητος at 21.31.15, with reference to the Roman refusal to yield to Aetolian appeals; with a similar sense but different grammar, see 27.6.2 for the ambassadors of Perseus in the Senate (παραιτεῖσθαι τὴν σύγκλητον); the phrase, παραίτεομαι ὀργήν, is not used only of the Romans, cf. 28.20.5, where it is used of Antiochus IV. Polybius also uses παραίτεομαι with other objects (ἀσέβεια: 4.18.11; ἄγνοια: 21.41.5).

<sup>36</sup> Pacify: Shuckburgh (22.5.6); soften: Shuckburgh (21.25.10), Harris (*Restraining rage* [n. 7 above] 199); appease: Paton (38.4.7).

<sup>37</sup> H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English lexicon*, revised by H. Stuart Jones (Oxford 1968), s.v. παραίτεομαι. J. Henderson, ‘From Megalopolis to Cosmopolis: Polybius, or there and back again’, in *Being Greek under Rome: cultural identity, the Second Sophistic and the development of empire*, ed. S. Goldhill (Cambridge 2001) 29-49, brings out the supplicatory character with his translation of 38.4.7: ‘begging mercy from the wrath of the conquerors’ (47).

<sup>38</sup> Used by Paton in the Loeb translation (21.25.10, 22.5.6) and also by Shuckburgh (38.4.7)

<sup>39</sup> For the ways that speakers in the Athenian courts sought to persuade the jury, see S. Johnstone, *Disputes and democracy: the consequences of litigation in ancient Athens* (Austin 1999), in particular his remarks on the defendants’ use of supplication (109-25). Note also E. Hall, *The theatrical cast of Athens: interactions between ancient Greek drama and society* (Oxford 2006) 353-92, who stresses the performance aspects of an Athenian court case, together with her earlier paper, ‘Lawcourt dramas: the power of performance in Greek forensic oratory’, *BICS* 40 (1995) 39-58.

Polybius reports several speeches, the object of which was to persuade the Romans to lay aside their anger and it is worth looking at what sort of things are said. One strategy is to acknowledge that Roman anger is justified but to argue that it is being directed against the wrong people, hence to this extent is unjustified, or to suggest that the punishment exceeds the offence. Thus, when the Athenian ambassador addresses the senate on behalf of the Aetolians, he says that the Romans were right to be angry with the Aetolians, because in spite of all the benefits the Aetolians had received they showed no gratitude in return and instead put Roman rule at risk. But, he continues, it was wrong to hold the masses responsible; the fault lay with the leaders who had forced the people to act contrary to their nature. Any appeals from the leaders should be rejected (here the phrase *ἔχειν ἀπαραιτήτως*) but the people themselves should be pitied.<sup>40</sup> The Athenians are speaking on behalf of someone else, so there can be a certain distance in the way the arguments are presented. The Rhodians, on the other hand, defend themselves before the Senate. Their speaker Astymedes is vividly compared to a man pleading to avoid a flogging; with this Polybius neatly establishes the power dynamic, servile Rhodians and angry rulers. The Rhodian speaker admits that the Romans are justified in being angry but argues that Rhodian suffering was more than their error merited. Like the Athenian speaker, he also argues that responsibility for any mistakes lay not so much with the people but with a small group, who have now all been executed. Anger against the people themselves was therefore misplaced.<sup>41</sup> Such speeches, like speeches in court, serve a purpose, to change the mood and therefore the actions of the Romans. Consequently they play with the truth, hence Polybius' own distinction between what he says as a historian and what he says as an advocate of the Achaeans to Rome. But while concealment may be acceptable to Polybius, that is to say not mentioning actions that would look bad in Rome, he strongly disapproved of making accusations against other cities and informing on them. Consequently he is heavily critical of an earlier speech to the Senate by Astymedes, in which the Rhodian speaker not only concealed the wrongs committed by his own people but argued that everyone else was worse than the Rhodians and made clear in what ways they were worse.<sup>42</sup>

It is not only words that are used to change the attitude of the Romans; behaviour is also important, in particular the way in which relative status and emotional condition can be expressed by dress and manner. The Rhodians on a previous occasion had so panicked at the way Roman anger was transforming into action (war) that they paraded themselves around Rome in mourning clothes and, with tears flowing, begged that no irreversible

<sup>40</sup> Plb. 21.31.7-15; *cf.* appeals for pity in the Athenian courts: Johnstone, *Disputes and democracy* (n. 39 above) 109-25.

<sup>41</sup> Plb. 30.31.

<sup>42</sup> When Polybius mentions the need to conceal things from the ruling power at 38.4.7, the word he uses is *περιστέλλω*, the same word he uses of Astymedes (30.4.14), but it is the criticism of other cities that Polybius has a problem with (30.4.11-17). Yet Polybius himself adopted a not dissimilar strategy when defending Philopoemen's statues against Roman threats: Plb. 39.3; Plut. *Philop.* 21; on which: J. Thornton, 'Oratory in Polybius' *Histories*', in *Hellenistic oratory: continuity and change*, ed. C. Kremmydas and K. Tempest (Oxford 2013) 21-42 (38-40).

decision be taken.<sup>43</sup> The ruler of Cibyra, Moagetes, came out to meet the Roman commander without the trappings of power; instead he was said to have presented himself as simple and humble in his dress and general demeanour. Nor is his speech based on purely rational argument; he bewails and laments his powerlessness and the weakness of the cities he rules (κατολοφυρόμενος τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν ὧν ἐπῆρχε πόλεων).<sup>44</sup> The Jewish historian Josephus offers a number of parallels for this kind of self-presentation. Just as the Rhodians chose mourning clothes, so Pheroras seeks to avert the anger of his brother Herod by throwing himself at the king's feet, dressed in black and shedding tears. Just as Moagetes chose to dress and behave in a simple manner, so Herod himself after the defeat of his ally Antony presented himself to the victor Augustus not in the attire and style of a king but that of an ordinary person.<sup>45</sup> Such behaviour is part of the non-verbal language of the Hellenistic east. In the cases of both the Rhodians and Moagetes, the objects of Roman anger present themselves as weak and vulnerable; the Roman display of aggressive emotion, therefore, is countered by other emotions appropriate to suffering, such as grief.

These are emotions deliberately displayed in order to influence the Romans, but there are other emotions that are more spontaneous and reactive. The Rhodians first feel demoralized and despondent (εἰς ἀθυμίαν ὀλοσχερῆ καὶ δυσχρηστίαν); the ambassadors of Moagetes are afraid (καταπλαγέντες).<sup>46</sup> This, of course, is because the impact of Roman anger is not trivial; it could lead to war or loss of revenues, privileges, or freedom.

These responses to Roman anger are an acknowledgement of Roman superiority and authority and call to mind Aristotle's treatment of anger in the *Rhetoric*, where anger is said to be the result of a slight or belittlement (ὀλιγωρία). Here anger is very much linked with questions of status and recognition of status by others. The situation in which one person is angry with another is resolved not by an apology from the person who has provoked the anger but by their humbling themselves (ταπεινουμένοι) before the other, in other words by acknowledging their own lower status in relation to the person who is angry.<sup>47</sup> Aristotle's remarks resonate especially strongly in relation to Roman power: '[those who humble themselves] seem to agree that they are inferior and the inferior are afraid and no one who is afraid belittles another; that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves is demonstrated even by dogs, since they do not bite those who sit down.' Significantly, too, Aristotle numbers among the humble or submissive those who

<sup>43</sup> Plb. 30.4.5: ὅστε καὶ φαῖα λαβεῖν ἱμάτια καὶ κατὰ τὰς παρακλήσεις μηκέτι παρακαλεῖν μηδ' ἀξιοῦν τοὺς φίλους, ἀλλὰ δεῖσθαι μετὰ δακρύων μηδὲν ἀνήκεστον βουλευσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.

<sup>44</sup> Plb. 21.34.10.

<sup>45</sup> J. *BJ* 1.504-8, 1.386-7; on both these and the general theme of deportment in Josephus: M. Gleason, 'Mutilated messengers: body language in Josephus', in *Being Greek under Rome*, ed. S. Goldhill (n. 37 above) 50-85, esp. 64-65.

<sup>46</sup> Rhodians: Plb. 30.4.3; ambassadors: 21.34.8.

<sup>47</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 2.2-3 (1378a-80b), on which: D. Konstan, 'Assuaging rage: remorse, repentance, and forgiveness in the classical world', *Phoenix* 62 (2008) 243-54; cf. also his *Before forgiveness: the origins of a moral idea* (Cambridge 2010), with review by D. Cairns, *AHB Online Reviews* 1 (2011) 103-13.

plead for deliverance from anger (*παραιτουμένοι*).<sup>48</sup> This is what we find in the examples discussed in this and the previous section; the Greeks and others come as suppliants, humbling themselves before the Roman rulers, whether by begging and pleading, by dress, or by general demeanour. This way of approaching the Romans then is a public recognition of relative status.

#### 4. *The Romans become angry*

This paper so far may have given the impression that the Romans spend much of Polybius' history being angry, or at least being seen to be angry. What is curious, however, is that the Romans only begin to get angry in the latter half of the history. The earliest incident discussed in section 2 above is the Aetolian reaction to Roman anger in book 21. In fact there is very little Roman anger in the first half of his forty-book history. That does not mean that no one is angry, only that it tends to be other people, not Romans. Yet it is the first half the history that survives best: the first five books are complete, book six almost complete, and books seven to eighteen are based on a fuller set of excerpts than subsequent books.<sup>49</sup> Given the very fragmentary state of the latter books, their emphasis on Roman anger becomes all the more surprising.

This demands explanation. One possibility would be to look to Polybius himself; perhaps his attitude had changed during the course of writing his history. Indeed Walbank has suggested that Polybius developed a more cynical view of Roman policy in the latter part of his history, but he identifies this new cynical outlook as beginning with book 30, thus significantly later than book 21, where the first of our examples of angry Romans is to be found.<sup>50</sup> Instead it seems preferable to make sense of Roman anger within the context of the history itself. There are other ways in which the first half can be compared with the second.

In the first half of the history, much of the focus is on the wars between the Romans and the peoples of the west, in particular the Carthaginians and the Celts. Both these peoples, traditional enemies of the Greeks who are defeated by the Romans, tend to be presented by Polybius in the manner of barbarians, and anger is often seen as a characteristic of barbarians.<sup>51</sup> The Romans, on the other hand, are defined in opposition to

<sup>48</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 2.3.6-8 (1380a). The relationship between anger and power/respect is already evident in Homer (*Il.* 1.78-83): κρείσσων γὰρ βασιλεὺς ὅτε χῶσεται ἀνδρὶ χέρηϊ. See further: H. van Wees, *Status warriors: war, violence and society in Homer and history* (Amsterdam 1992), esp. 109-25.

<sup>49</sup> On the state of Polybius' text: J. M. Moore, *The manuscript tradition of Polybius* (Cambridge 1965).

<sup>50</sup> F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley 1972) 168, stressing books 30-33, argued in detail in Walbank, 'Political morality' (n. 3 above) 4-8 (though note typo on p. 4 giving 'books III to XXXIII', an error repeated in the reprint).

<sup>51</sup> On Polybian (and Greek) views of Carthaginians and Celts: A. Erskine, 'The view from the east', in *The Hellenistic west: rethinking the ancient Mediterranean*, ed. J. Prag and J. Crawley Quinn, (Cambridge 2013) 14-34 (24-29); Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 171, 176, 194; cf. on uncontrolled passions of barbarians in the fifth century: E. Hall, *Inventing the barbarian: Greek self-definition through tragedy* (Oxford 1989) 125-26.

them and Greek-like qualities are invoked to explain Roman success.<sup>52</sup> But in the latter part of the history, as the Romans are increasingly involved in the Greek east, so they come to be seen in opposition to Greeks. Becoming angry, therefore, might be a natural consequence of this opposition as they come to look more like barbarians themselves.

Carthaginian anger is prominent early in the history, not least because of its role in the outbreak of the Second Punic War. In his account of the origins of this war, Polybius places great stress on the Carthaginian Hamilcar's passionate anger (*θυμός*) and on the anger (*ὀργή*) of the Carthaginian people as a whole. Polybius may have seen this anger as in part justified by the Roman seizure of Sardinia, but nonetheless his emphasis on it reflects a certain view of Carthaginian character.<sup>53</sup> A similar disposition to anger is found in Hannibal. When he met an embassy of Romans who were protesting at his attack on the Spanish town of Saguntum, his judgement was impaired because he was full of irrationality (*ἄλογία*) and violent anger (*θυμός βίαιος*).<sup>54</sup> Anger, too, spurs on the tribes of north Italy. It is longstanding anger (*ὀργή*) that encourages the Insubres to join the Carthaginians in their invasion of Italy.<sup>55</sup> It is worth noticing, however, that anger in itself need not be bad. Even in the case of the Celts, anger can be seen as an acceptable reason for action, thus they claim that it is their anger against the Romans that makes them want to advance into Roman territory, when in fact it is desire for plunder.<sup>56</sup>

Rarely, however, is Rome seen to be angry in the first half of the history and, when it is angry, the presentation of it is very different from the way that Roman anger is presented later. The perspective here in the first half is decidedly Roman. Twice Roman anger is provoked by treacherous attacks on its ambassadors, conduct that breached the accepted conventions of international diplomacy. The first occasion is when the Illyrian queen Teuta arranges the killing of one of the Roman ambassadors who has visited her, the second when the Carthaginians intercept a Roman ship and attempt to murder the ambassadors on board.<sup>57</sup> In both cases the reader shares the Roman viewpoint, identifying with them in the face of the treacherous barbarians. The contrast with Roman anger in the later books is striking. The one exception is C. Flaminius whose anger (*θυμός*), expertly provoked by Hannibal, led to the disaster of Trasimene, but it is very much Flaminius who is singled out for blame here, acting contrary to the advice of his colleagues.<sup>58</sup>

So in the first half of the history the Romans tend not to be angry – certainly much less frequently than in the rest of the history, in spite of the fragmentary state of the latter half

<sup>52</sup> C. Champion, *Cultural politics in Polybius's Histories* (Berkeley 2004) 100-43; A. Erskine, 'Polybios and barbarian Rome', *Mediterraneo Antico* 3 (2000) 165-82.

<sup>53</sup> Plb. 3.9.6, 3.10.5, 3.13.1; Sardinia is only given as an explanation of the *ὀργή* of the Carthaginian people, not of the *θυμός* of Hamilcar.

<sup>54</sup> Plb. 3.15.9.

<sup>55</sup> Plb. 3.40.8.

<sup>56</sup> Plb. 3.78.5.

<sup>57</sup> Teuta: Plb. 2.8.12-13; Carthaginians: 15.2-4; see further on both examples, section 5 below.

<sup>58</sup> Plb. 3.82, together with the general comments at 3.81.9 on *θυμός ἄλογος*. In war, however, Roman *ὀργή*, spurred on by the citizen-soldiers' need to defend their country and families, can be a good thing; it gives the Romans an advantage over Carthaginian mercenaries: 6.52.7.

– and when they do get angry it is largely justified. In the second half, however, the increasingly angry Romans are seen from a Greek perspective, Greeks for whom the Romans were barbarians and who might therefore interpret Roman behaviour in the light of that: as barbarians they were the kind of people who were likely to get angry.<sup>59</sup>

But the second half of the history also sees another change in the Roman relationship with the Greeks. Rome's successes in its wars against Philip V of Macedon and against Antiochus the Great mean that it is now the dominant power in Greece, effectively therefore making the Romans the rulers. As Harris has argued, there was something of a tradition of angry rulers going back at least to Herodotus' depiction of Persian kings, although the classical background can be overstated.<sup>60</sup> When a certain Lydian requests that the eldest of his five sons might be excused from service in the campaign against Greece, a furious Xerxes punishes him by slicing the son in half and marching the army between the two halves.<sup>61</sup> But the anger of the Persian king might equally be explained by his barbarian character. So too might that of another angry ruler, Alexander the Great, whose Greekness was not beyond question. It was anger that prompted him to murder his friend Cleitus at a drinking party.<sup>62</sup>

These examples tend to present royal anger as bad or even mad, but Polybius himself is not so ready to see the anger of a king as bad in itself. He does attribute Alexander's destruction of Thebes to the king's anger towards the Thebans, but he nonetheless finds things to admire in his handling of the Theban situation, notably his care in relation to temples and sanctuaries of the gods.<sup>63</sup> When Polybius looks at the kings of his own day, it is only Philip V who is frequently characterized as angry and generally in a very negative way. Yet it is the manner of his anger that Polybius objects to, not the fact of it; for instance, in contrast to Alexander, Philip does direct his anger against the gods and their sanctuaries.<sup>64</sup> An interesting parallel with Rome is found in the case of the Seleucid king

<sup>59</sup> The idea that the Romans were barbarians is reported by writers as diverse as Polybius (9.37.6, 9.38.5, 11.5.6-7, 18.22.8) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 1.4-5, 4.26.5) and was familiar to Romans such as Cato (Pliny *HN* 29.14). See further: Champion, *Cultural politics* (n. 52 above); Erskine, 'Polybios and barbarian Rome' (n. 52 above); and H. H. Schmitt, 'Hellenen, Römer und Barbaren: eine Studie zu Polybios', *Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresbericht 1957/8 des humanistischen Gymnasiums Aschaffenburg*, 38-48.

<sup>60</sup> Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 229-32, but Harris' discussion of the angry ruler tends to concentrate more on the Roman imperial period (241-63). The idea is clearly expressed in Arist. *Rhet.* 2.2.7.

<sup>61</sup> Hdt. 7.38-9, cf. 3.32 (Cambyses' violent anger causes his wife to miscarry and die), 3.34-5 (Cambyses angry that his Persian subjects thought he was too fond of wine), 7.35 (Xerxes whipping the Hellespont in anger).

<sup>62</sup> Arrian, *An.* 4.8-9, Plut. *Alex.* 50-51; on the arguments about the Greekness of the Macedonians: J. Engels, 'Macedonians and Greeks', in *A companion to ancient Macedonia*, ed. J. Roisman and I. Worthington (Chichester 2010) 81-98.

<sup>63</sup> Plb. 5.10.6. Generally, however, he is critical of the destruction of Thebes: R. Billows, 'Polybius and Alexander historiography', in *Alexander the Great in fact and fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford 2000) 289-91.

<sup>64</sup> Plb. 5.11-12.1, cf. 16.1.1-7; on the anger of Philip, see further section 5 below.

Antiochus IV. After Antiochus' invasion of Egypt, Greek ambassadors approach him on behalf of Ptolemy VI and encourage him to withdraw. Just as with the Romans, there is the phrase, *παραιτέομαι τὴν ὀργήν*, but this time it is of the king (*τοῦ βασιλέως*) rather than of the Romans (*τῶν Ῥωμαίων*). Furthermore, the rhetorical strategy employed by the ambassadors is similar, to show that the king's anger is misplaced: the fault really lay with Ptolemy's eunuch adviser and anyway Ptolemy was too young.<sup>65</sup>

So Greeks, when viewing their new Roman rulers, may have fitted the Romans into an existing pattern, one which in some ways was more appropriate to kings; it is easier to see an individual as angry and deal with that, than to do the same with a whole people, because group emotion is somehow more abstract and less tangible.<sup>66</sup> But although the Greeks may have interpreted their relationship with Rome in terms of an emotion, anger, and used this as a way of understanding Roman decisions, fundamentally that relationship was about power, a point that would not have been lost on Aristotle.<sup>67</sup> For all the rhetoric and strategies to turn aside Roman anger, it is obedience to Roman orders that was most likely to bring it to a close. The Senate tells the Achaeans after the Metellus incident to do what they are told in the future, Moagetes agrees to pay up as ordered, albeit less than Manlius originally proposed, and Prusias attempts to ward off Roman anger without success by obeying some of their orders.<sup>68</sup> The Rhodians are alarmed that in spite of obeying all Roman orders the Romans are still angry; closure is only reached once the Roman legate has confirmed that they have indeed obeyed all the decrees of the Senate.<sup>69</sup> Greeks thus see Roman anger as a way of enforcing orders and so closely bound up with the process of ruling.

It is possible too that the idea of Rome as an angry ruler could have been strengthened by association with the divine. It is in just this period that Rome comes to be the object of cult worship among the cities of the Greek world. Already by the mid-190s the people of Smyrna in Asia Minor had established a cult of the goddess Roma and Peloponnesian Gytheion was giving quasi-divine honours to the Roman commander T. Quinctius Flaminius in the aftermath of his success in the Second Macedonian War.<sup>70</sup> If Rome in various ways came to be equated with the divine, why should it not be expected to behave like a god? Belief in divine anger was widespread throughout the Greek world and extended from Homer through to Late Antiquity.<sup>71</sup> Polybius himself has little to say about

<sup>65</sup> Plb. 28.20.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. E. R. Smith, C. R. Seger, and D. M. Mackie, 'Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93 (2007) 431-46.

<sup>67</sup> See final paragraph of section 3 above.

<sup>68</sup> Moagetes: Plb. 21.34.12-13; Achaeans: 22.12.9-10; Prusias: 33.7.4, 33.12.3-6.

<sup>69</sup> Plb. 30.23.2-3, 30.31.20.

<sup>70</sup> Smyrna: Tac. *Ann.* 4.56; Gytheion: *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 592, *SEG* 11.923; cf. Chalcis: Plut. *Flam.* 16, *IG* XII.9.931. On cults of Roman power: R. Mellor, *Θέα Ῥώμη: the worship of the goddess Roma in the Greek world* (Göttingen 1975); S. Price, *Rituals and power: the Roman imperial cult in Asia Minor* (Oxford 1984) 40-47. The divine power of Rome may have been enhanced by the ambiguity of Rome's name which translated into Greek as 'strength': A. Erskine, 'Rome in the Greek world: the significance of a name', in *The Greek world*, ed. A. Powell (London 1995) 368-86.

<sup>71</sup> On early Greece: van Wees, *Status warriors* (n. 48 above) 93-94, 111-13; J. Irmscher, *Götterzorn bei Homer* (Leipzig 1950); J. S. Clay, *The wrath of Athena: gods and men in the Odyssey* (Lanham

cults of Roman power in the extant text but they may nonetheless have helped shape the Greek view of the Romans. Significantly, perhaps, one of the few references he does make to such cult practices is to the Rhodian dedication of a colossal statue of the Demos of the Romans in the temple of Athena following the successful resolution of their difficulties with Rome, in other words after the cessation of the anger of the Romans.<sup>72</sup> On the other hand, when Polybius does speak of divine anger, the word he employs is μῆνις, one commonly used of the wrath of the gods since the time of Homer.<sup>73</sup>

These explanations, anger as a barbarian characteristic, anger as a characteristic of rulers and perhaps also gods, are not mutually exclusive; the one would reinforce the other. As non-Greeks, indeed barbarians, it would have been that much easier for the Romans to find themselves incorporated into a tradition of angry rulers.<sup>74</sup>

### 5. Anger as a social emotion

Ancient, especially Hellenistic and later, philosophical writing tends to approach anger from the point of view of the angry person, who is seen as suffering from the passion of anger. This is considered to be a bad thing, but bad not so much for the object of anger as for the angry person himself. If anger is controlled, restrained, or even eliminated altogether, then the angry person will benefit. Thus Plutarch in his *De cohibenda ira* advocates restraint and avoidance of anger and the Stoic Seneca in *De ira* goes so far as to propose total banishment – both texts that survive from the early Roman empire, one in Greek, the other in Latin.<sup>75</sup> It might be something of an oversimplification to say that

1997), esp. 46-53; later: R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth 1986) 230-37; more broadly: the essays in R. G. Kratz and H. Spieckermann, ed., *Divine wrath and divine mercy in the world of antiquity* (Tübingen 2008).

<sup>72</sup> Plb. 31.4; for Polybius' limited reference to any cult of Roma: Walbank, *A historical commentary* III (n. 4 above) 421-22.

<sup>73</sup> Plb. 23.10.14, 32.15.14, 36.17.15; on the use of μῆνις, see Cairns, 'Ethics, ethology, terminology' (n. 10 above) 31-33.

<sup>74</sup> An inscription from Olbia (*SIG*<sup>3</sup> 495 (*IosPE* I<sup>2</sup> 32) A, esp. lines 90-95) offers an interesting parallel. The Olbians detail all the payments they have to make to the barbarian king Saitaphernes, but it is the reference to the king's anger that reveals clearly their subordinate relationship (τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως... εἰς ὀργὴν... καταστάντος), noted in A. Chaniotis, 'Paradoxon, enargeia, empathy: Hellenistic decrees and Hellenistic oratory', in *Hellenistic oratory*, ed. C. Kremmydas and K. Tempest (n. 42 above) 201-16 (209-12). Like the Romans, he is both barbarian and ruler and, like them, he is observed from a Greek perspective.

<sup>75</sup> Plut. *De cohibenda ira* 16 (=Mor. 463b), Sen. *Ira* 3.1. Detailed discussion of this tradition from Homer to Late Antiquity is to be found in Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) with 339-90 in particular focusing on psychic health; cf. also M. Nussbaum, *The therapy of desire: theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics* (Princeton 1994); on Plutarch: G. Indelli and R. Laurenti, *Plutarcho: Sul controllo dell'ira* (Naples 1988); on Seneca: J. Fillion-Lahille, *Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions* (Paris 1984); Nussbaum, *Therapy*, 402-38, and the recent translation and commentary by R. Kaster in R. Kaster and M. Nussbaum, *Seneca: anger, mercy, revenge* (Chicago 2010) 3-129. For comparison of the approaches of Seneca and Plutarch, see L. van Hoof, 'Strategic differences: Seneca and Plutarch on controlling anger', *Mnemosyne* 60 (2007) 59-86 (Seneca seeing eradication as part of a redefinition of virtue and Plutarch seeing

these writings focus solely on the angry person; Plutarch, for instance, is concerned also with the impact of anger on those around: wives, children, and slaves.<sup>76</sup> Nonetheless, anger is presented very much as an internal problem, albeit one that involves others, both as catalysts of anger and its object. But their relative unimportance is apparent in Plutarch's suggestion that you can practise anger management on your slaves.<sup>77</sup> For Polybius anger is far more social, paradoxical as that might appear. His focus is on the Greek response to Roman anger rather than on the Romans themselves, thus unquestionably on the interpersonal rather than the internal. Even when we look at his history more broadly, it is the interactive character of anger that tends to be to the fore. Control of anger is not absent but it is far less in evidence than some have suggested.<sup>78</sup>

Polybius is less concerned with control and more interested in whether the anger is appropriate. Anger for Polybius is something that can be good or bad.<sup>79</sup> Contemporary philosophy does not seem to have had much influence on him in his treatment of anger or of other emotions. Despite the proliferation of Hellenistic treatises entitled Περὶ παθῶν (*On the Passions*) Polybius hardly uses the word πάθος at all and when he does it is not in this specialized sense.<sup>80</sup> Philosophically his conception of anger would seem to have more in common with Aristotle than with the other philosophical schools. Thus in the *Nicomachean Ethics* there is a right way for a virtuous person to get angry: 'The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised'.<sup>81</sup> Deviation from the mean leads to two failings, being angry at the wrong things, at the wrong people, at the wrong time, or for too long, or alternatively not being angry at all when you should be. But it does not follow from this that Polybius has a philosophical, let alone a Peripatetic, take on anger. Aristotle consciously took account of common opinions when developing his ethical writings and it is these common opinions that Polybius is reflecting.<sup>82</sup> Hellenistic and Roman philosophy can encourage us to overlook the acceptability of anger in everyday discourse. In the

control as the mark of a gentleman), and V. Tsouna, 'Philodemus, Seneca and Plutarch on anger', in *Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition* (Cambridge 2011) 183-20, who also treats the essay on anger by the Epicurean Philodemus. In contrast to the Stoics, the Epicureans do make some allowance for anger: D. Fowler, 'Epicurean anger', in *The passions in Roman thought and literature*, ed. S. M. Braund and C. Gill (Cambridge 1997) 16-35 (24-27) and Procopé, 'Epicureans on anger' (n. 9 above).

<sup>76</sup> Plut. *De cohibenda ira* 11 (=Mor. 459b-e).

<sup>77</sup> Plut. *De cohibenda ira* 11 (=Mor. 459b).

<sup>78</sup> Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 197-99, 240 tends to overstress the role of anger-control in Polybius.

<sup>79</sup> G. Longley, 'Thucydides, Polybius, and human nature', in *Imperialism, cultural politics, and Polybius*, ed. C. Smith and L. Yarrow (Oxford 2012) 68-84 (76-77) contrasts Polybius with Thucydides for whom 'anger is normally regarded as irrational and damaging'.

<sup>80</sup> P. Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris 1964) 212-13, 251. Excluding the *Fragmenta ex incertis libris*, πάθος is only found 6 times (3.53.2, 3.86.6, 10.4.7, 11.29.9, 34.3.10, 38.1.4).

<sup>81</sup> Arist. *EN* 4.5, 1125b35-1126a1 (trans. Ross); Nussbaum, *Therapy* (n. 75 above) 94-6.

<sup>82</sup> *EN* 7.1 (1145b2-7), *Top.* 1.1 (100a18-23); on Aristotle's methodology in these passages: T. Irwin, *Aristotle's first principles* (Oxford 1988), esp. 29-39.

Athenian lawcourts in the fourth century, for instance, juries were expected to feel anger at the guilty.<sup>83</sup>

Polybius offers an insight into this more popular view of anger. In sum, he thinks anger should be justifiable, directed at the right people, and expressed in the right way. Even a historian, rather like a speaker in court, can excite anger in his audience, but if he is to do this it is important that he also give an account of why things are done and to what end. In other words only if you know why something was done can you judge whether or not you are justified in feeling angry. Phylarchus, for Polybius, is a prime example of a historian who tries to stir up emotion in the wrong way, leading to anger that is not properly grounded.<sup>84</sup> Treachery, bad faith, impiety, ingratitude, and insincerity are all found as good reasons for anger in the *Histories*.<sup>85</sup> Polybius can even countenance his own Achaeans becoming angry, although of course their anger is fully justified; on one occasion it is directed at treacherous Mantineians, on another at ungrateful Spartans.<sup>86</sup> But anger could also be irrational; this kind of anger, which would have no adequate justification, would be more likely to occur among barbarians, the masses or women.<sup>87</sup>

But once anger is justified, it has to be expressed in the right way. The most negative presentation of anger in Polybius is the case of Philip V of Macedon, who offers a case study in how not to be angry, even when his anger is justified.<sup>88</sup> This is developed particularly at the beginning of book 5, where Philip's anger at Aetolian sacrilege in looting and burning the sanctuaries at Dium and Dodona is held to be quite justified. But Philip's response exceeds what is acceptable; attacking the Aetolian town of Thermum, he exacts revenge by carrying out the same kind of acts of impiety as the Aetolians had inflicted on Dium and Dodona. After describing Philip's looting and destruction of Thermum, Polybius imagines what a good reputation the king would have earned if instead of these actions he 'had expressed his piety towards the gods and his anger

<sup>83</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 2.2 (1380a) on the role of the orator in fomenting anger; cf. Aesch. 3.197-98 on the anger of the jury; for the place of anger in the Athenian court, see L. Rubinstein, 'Stirring up dicastic anger', in *Law, rhetoric and comedy in Classical Athens: essays in honour of Douglas M. MacDowell*, ed. D. L. Cairns and R. A. Knox (Swansea 2004) 187-203; D. Allen, *The world of Prometheus: the politics of punishing in democratic Athens* (Princeton 2000) 172-74; and the succinct remarks of N. R. E. Fisher, *Aeschines: Against Timarchus* (Oxford 2001) 325.

<sup>84</sup> Plb. 2.56.13, D. Levene, 'Pity, fear and the historical audience: Tacitus on the fall of Vitellius', in *The passions in Roman thought*, ed. Braund and Gill (n. 75 above) 128-49 (133-35); cf. J. Marincola, 'Polybius, Phylarchus, and "tragic history": a reconsideration', in *Polybius and his world: essays in memory of F. W. Walbank*, ed. B. Gibson and T. Harrison (Oxford 2013) 73-90 (80) on acceptability of emotion for Polybius if treated appropriately.

<sup>85</sup> Treachery and bad faith: Plb. 2.58; 15.4.2; impiety: 5.10-12; ingratitude: 21.31.7, 22.11.8; insincerity: 15.17.

<sup>86</sup> Plb. 2.58, 22.11.8; cf. also within Achaea against Callicrates, 30.29.

<sup>87</sup> For example, barbarians: 2.21.2, 3.40.8; masses: 6.56.11; women: 15.30.1; cf. Eckstein, 'Hannibal at New Carthage' (n. 6 above) 6-7.

<sup>88</sup> For the centrality of anger to the Polybian picture of Philip, see Pédech, *La Méthode historique* (n. 80 above) 223-24: 'La clef de ses actes est la prédominance du θυμός, la faculté irascible, sur la raison.'

towards [the Aetolians] in a kingly and magnanimous way' (βασιλικῶς καὶ μεγαλοψύχως αὐτοῦ χρωμένου τῆ τε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ τῆ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργῆ). So, appropriate, even kingly, use of anger is possible.<sup>89</sup> In contrast to Philip, there is the behaviour of Scipio Africanus, who felt anger at the treacherous conduct of the Carthaginians in trying to murder the Roman ambassadors and responded by attacking Carthaginian towns and enslaving the inhabitants. This was an acceptable way of expressing anger, but what was not acceptable was taking revenge on Carthaginian ambassadors, which Scipio did not do, even though he had the opportunity, and so is accordingly praised for his conduct by Polybius.<sup>90</sup>

Philip's behaviour is repeatedly marked by anger, anger that can be disproportionate or misdirected. He destroys Thermum as observed above, but he also massacres the people of Maroneia when the Romans order him to relinquish part of his kingdom and at Pergamum he directs his anger, says Polybius, not so much against men as the gods. But on occasion his anger (ὀργή) and rage (θυμός) even serves his interests, inspiring him to overcome previous defeats.<sup>91</sup> But there are no explicit statements that he failed to restrain or control his anger, although this has not stopped translators from creating them, a sign of the strength of the 'controlling anger' tradition. The passage quoted in the previous paragraph, where Philip is imagined as 'expressing his anger in a kingly way', is translated by W. R. Paton and Robin Waterfield as 'curbing anger' and 'restraining anger' respectively.<sup>92</sup> Instead of the language of control or lack of it, Philip's excessive anger is several times spoken of in terms of madness.<sup>93</sup>

I suggested earlier in this section that Polybius' presentation of anger was less concerned with control and restraint and tended instead to highlight its social character. Here I am taking something of a cue from the 1996 paper by the psychologist Brian Parkinson, 'Emotions are social'. Parkinson, while not neglecting the internal aspects of emotions, stresses the importance of social context and interpersonal exchange for understanding them.<sup>94</sup> In particular he highlights the communicative character of

<sup>89</sup> Plb. 5.11.7-12.1. My translation of the χράομαι τῆ ὀργῆ here is influenced by that of Manuela Mari in D. Musti, M. Mari, and J. Thornton, *Polibio, Storie*, vol. III: Libri V-VI (Milan 2002) 43. χράομαι τῆ ὀργῆ could also be qualified with κακῶς: 11.7.2.

<sup>90</sup> Plb. 15.4. On the contrast between Polybius' treatment of Philip V and Scipio, see A. Erskine, 'Spanish lessons: Polybius and the maintenance of imperial power', in *Polibio y la peninsula Ibérica*, ed. J. Santos Yanguas and E. Torregaray Pagola (Vitoria 2003) 229-43 and Pédech, *La méthode historique* (n. 80 above) 223-28.

<sup>91</sup> Maroneia: Plb. 22.13.2-7; Thermum: 5.10-12; Pergamum: 16.1; cf. 11.7.3; inspiration: 16.28.

<sup>92</sup> Paton in the Loeb Classical Library edition (1923), also in the 2011 revision by F. W. Walbank and C. Habicht) and Waterfield in the Oxford World's Classics translation (2010); see further n. 83 above. This is not to say the language of restraint is never used in Polybius: cf. 15.4.11 of Scipio (παρακατασχὼν τὸν ἴδιον θυμὸν) when faced with the Carthaginian ambassadors.

<sup>93</sup> Plb. 16.1.2, 23.10.16.

<sup>94</sup> B. Parkinson, 'Emotions are social', *British Journal of Psychology* 87 (1996) 663-83; cf. the opening of S. Schieman, 'The sociological study of anger: basic social patterns and contexts', in *International handbook of anger*, ed. M. Potegal et al. (n. 22 above) 329-47: 'Anger is a highly social emotion'. Whereas Parkinson argues that emotions are fundamentally social, others such as J. Elster, *Alchemies of the mind: rationality and the emotions* (Cambridge 1999) see the social character of many emotions as only contingent. Elster (139-42) nonetheless does include anger

emotions; in the case of anger this might be a demand for some form of respect.<sup>95</sup> In Polybius too this is what we found. The opening sections of this paper explored the Greek view of Roman anger, in other words how someone reacts to and deals with the anger of another. In effect the Romans assert their superior position, the Greeks and other targets of Roman anger recognize it. But even when Polybius' focus is on the angry person or state it is generally in relation to others, the people who caused it, for instance by their treachery or ingratitude.

Two examples will help to illustrate the place of social exchange in the development of emotions. On the occasion of the First Illyrian War Polybius presents an escalating exchange of growing anger that leads to the outbreak of war. First the Illyrian queen Teuta speaks very arrogantly to the Roman ambassadors, then the younger ambassador becomes indignant (*δυσχεράνας*) and bluntly tells the queen that Rome would force the Illyrians to change their ways. Teuta in anger (*ἐξωργίσθη*) has the ambassador assassinated, an act that causes further anger in Rome (*διοργισθέντες*) and leads to the mounting of an expedition against the Illyrians. Teuta's anger here is without foundation – she reacts with a woman's passion and irrationally (*γυναικοθύμως καὶ ἀλογίστως*) – while the Roman anger is fully justified by the outrageous killing of their ambassador.<sup>96</sup> Another time Polybius points out that when people display great and genuine emotion due to suffering some major disaster, then the reaction of those who see or hear them is pity, but when the same thing is faked and done with the intention of deceiving, then the response is not pity but anger and hate.<sup>97</sup> This is not just about feeling anger but relating it very directly to other people and observation of their behaviour through hearing and seeing. Polybius even has the damaging effects of anger on other people recognized by that model of anger, Philip V, who lectures his own sons on how their anger towards each other will not only destroy themselves but everything around them.<sup>98</sup> So for Polybius anger is no mere internal character problem; it involves others and has consequences, prominent among which is war. Not only does anger play a significant part in the outbreak of the First Illyrian War, but Carthaginian anger is identified as one of the causes of the Second Punic War, and Aetolian anger lies behind Rome's war with Antiochus III.<sup>99</sup> In some ways, of course, this is not surprising, given that Polybius is writing history, not philosophy, but it does mean that he is offering a different, more interactive angle on emotions in general and anger in particular.

among the 'essentially social emotions', which he divides into emotions of comparison (such as envy) and emotions of interaction (such as anger).

<sup>95</sup> Parkinson, 'Emotions' (n. 94 above), 677; the communicative agenda, he suggests, might be: 'take me seriously and give me the respect I deserve!'

<sup>96</sup> Plb. 2.8. A. Eckstein, *Rome enters the Greek east: from anarchy to hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-170 BC* (Oxford 2008) 40 suggests that such angry exchanges were typical in ancient diplomacy.

<sup>97</sup> Plb. 15.17.1-2.

<sup>98</sup> Plb. 23.11, drawing a contrast with the harmonious Attalids.

<sup>99</sup> Plb. 3.10.5, 3.7.1-2, on both: P. S. Derow, 'Historical explanation: Polybius and his predecessors', in *Greek historiography*, ed. S. Hornblower (Oxford 1994) 73-90 (87-89). For Polybius' unfavourable view of the Aetolians: Champion, *Cultural politics* (n. 52 above) 129-37.

If we return briefly to those Greek attempts to turn aside Roman anger discussed in sections 2 and 3 above, it can be seen that in these cases anger occurs mostly (though not always) as part of a longstanding relationship.<sup>100</sup> The Aetolians, Rhodians, Achaeans, and others are all people who would have counted themselves as friends of the Romans, and then suddenly find the relationship in jeopardy. As such, anger could here be seen as a response to ingratitude, reflecting the blurred nature of Roman rule; on the one hand the Romans are friends, on the other hand they are rulers. When Prusias fails to obey all Roman orders, the Romans renounce their friendship and alliance and pointedly leave him and make their way to Attalus.<sup>101</sup> The language of friendship and estrangement thus overlays the reality of power and enforcement.<sup>102</sup>

#### 6. *Livy reading Polybius*

One of Polybius' readers was the Roman historian Livy, who made extensive use of his Greek predecessor in his own account of the Roman conquest of the eastern Mediterranean. Where the two survive it is clear that Livy followed Polybius fairly closely, so it should be instructive to see how Livy handles the theme of the anger of the Romans.<sup>103</sup> It offers an opportunity to compare Greek and Roman treatments of anger, especially as Livy makes considerable use of the language of anger. Harris reports 321 uses of *ira* and 61 uses of *irascor*, making it, he says, a 'leitmotif' of Livy's history.<sup>104</sup> But when the two historians are compared, the results are surprising. Where Polybius writes of Roman anger, Livy has virtually nothing to say about it at all.

In Polybius the Aetolians turn to the Athenians and Rhodians, asking them to intercede on their behalf to deliver them from the anger of the Romans. In Livy there is much of the same information and the idea of *παραιτέομαι* continues in Livy's reference to prayers (*preces*), but the anger of the Romans has disappeared.<sup>105</sup> This could be dismissed as chance, but when we reach the meeting in the Senate where the Athenians speak, the anger of the Romans has again gone, even though Livy follows certain aspects of the Polybian speech closely – for instance he uses the same lengthy storm simile that Polybius does.<sup>106</sup> Another incident considered earlier was Manlius' encounter with the ambassadors

<sup>100</sup> Moagetes is an exception as Cibyra appears to have had no earlier relationship with Rome, cf. E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic world and the coming of Rome* (Berkeley 1984) 731-33.

<sup>101</sup> Plb. 33.12.5.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. P. J. Burton, *Friendship and empire: Roman diplomacy and imperialism in the Middle Republic* (353-146 BC) (Cambridge 2011), esp. 246-99 on the breakdown of friendship.

<sup>103</sup> On Livy's use of Polybius, note especially H. Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* (Basel 1977) and, most recently, J. Briscoe, 'Some misunderstandings of Polybius in Livy', in *Polybius and his world*, ed. B. Gibson and T. Harrison (n. 84 above), 117-24.

<sup>104</sup> Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 15, cf. 216-17.

<sup>105</sup> Plb. 21.25.9-10, Livy 38.3.6-7; Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* (n. 103 above) 91-93 looks at the way Livy abridges Polybius here, but neither he nor J. Briscoe, *A commentary on Livy, books 38-40* (Oxford 2008) 34-35 notes this particular contrast.

<sup>106</sup> Plb. 21.31.7-15, Livy 38.10.4-6; Briscoe, *Commentary on Livy* (n. 105 above) 53 observes various ways in which Livy has adapted the speech found in Polybius but not the absence of anger.

of Moagetes, where again, despite an almost identical narrative, Roman anger has gone. The phrase, ‘alarmed by this display of anger’ (καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἐπίφασιν τῆς ὀργῆς) is replaced by ‘alarmed by this speech’ (*perturbati hac voce*).<sup>107</sup> It is not always possible to make a comparison. The Ilian intervention on behalf of the Lycians is not included by Livy, nor is Metellus’ visit to the Achaean League.

Only in the case of the falling out between Rhodes and Rome at the time of the Third Macedonian War does Livy make mention of Roman anger. Comparison with Polybius is difficult here, because of the large gaps in Polybius’ narrative and because the text of Livy itself comes to an end in 168 during the telling of this dispute. At those points where Polybius gives us Roman anger it is again absent from Livy where the latter survives. But Livy does say that an arrogant speech by the Rhodians offering to mediate a peace settlement provoked anger in the Senate. His initial reference to this is very personal in tone so it is unclear whether or not Livy is reflecting Polybius here; he writes: ‘I am certain that even now it is not possible to read or hear these statements without indignation (*sine indignatione*); from this one can judge what the attitude of the Senate was as it listened’. Later, referring back to this speech, he reminds his readers of ‘the great anger of the Senate’ (*ingens ira patrum*).<sup>108</sup> What is clear, however, is that in contrast to Polybius the perspective here is firmly Roman and the reason for anger is given: Rhodian arrogance.

What does disappear in Livy, however, are those instances where the perspective is non-Roman, where others are looking at the Romans and considering them to be angry. This surely reflects Livy’s identification with Rome as ruler rather than with the subjects of Rome. Thus he does not write about how anxious the Rhodians were to be relieved of the anger of the Romans, but rather his concern is with how justified Roman anger was. Where anger is especially prominent in Livy’s text is in the early books covering the regal period and the development of the Republic. Much of the anger on display here is an expression of divisions within the state rather than directed outwardly, whether it is Romulus killing Remus, Tarquinius fuming at those overthrowing him, the Senate deciding not to return royal property, or numerous episodes in the conflict of the orders, where the plebeians in particular are prone to anger.<sup>109</sup>

The differences between Polybius and Livy may have been a consequence not only of a change of perspective and focus but also of the different social and intellectual environments in which the two were writing. By the first century BC, Roman writers were absorbing Greek philosophical ideas about the appropriateness of anger and that may in turn have influenced thinking about how to govern – and of course by Livy’s time the relationship with the Greek east was very much one of government rather than conquest. Certainly the incompatibility of anger and government, whether in Rome or beyond, occurs in a number of late Republican texts. Around 60 BC, Cicero wrote a letter to his brother

<sup>107</sup> Plb. 21.34, Livy 38.14.8-9; neither Trankle, *Livius und Polybios* (n. 103 above) 106-09, nor Briscoe, *Commentary on Livy* (n. 105 above) 63-64 comments on this difference, but it is noted by P. G. Walsh, *Livy Book XXXVIII* (Warminster 1993) 141.

<sup>108</sup> Livy 44.14.13, 14.35.4, cited by Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above), see section 1 above.

<sup>109</sup> Romulus: Livy 1.7.2; Tarquinius: 2.6; Senate: 2.5.1; Plebeians: 2.35, 2.42, 2.55.2. Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 216, notes that books 2 and 8 score particularly highly on the anger terms, *ira*, *iracundia*, and *irascor* (43 and 29 instances respectively).

Quintus offering advice on how to govern the province of Asia. Quintus' main character fault, Cicero opines, is a tendency to anger, a fault that was frowned upon in private life and even less desirable in a holder of high office. Making reference to the works of learned men, Cicero writes at length about how anger should be avoided or at least restrained.<sup>110</sup> The application of anger theory to the political sphere is also to be seen in Cicero's *De officiis*, a treatise influenced by the Stoic philosopher Panaetius. Here, after criticizing the Peripatetics for praising anger, Cicero writes: 'But in truth anger is in all matters to be rejected and it should be hoped that those who are in charge of the republic are like the laws, which are led to inflict punishment not through anger (*iracundia*) but through fairness'.<sup>111</sup> The unacceptability of anger among those who hold office is signalled also in the speech of Caesar in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*: 'what is said in others to be anger (*iracundia*) is called arrogance and cruelty in the powerful'.<sup>112</sup> It may be that it is not merely a Roman perspective that Livy is offering, but that he is influenced by arguments and opinions such as these, which suggest that anger and government do not go together well.

Nonetheless, my main concern in this paper has been with Polybius, whose approach to anger betrays little of contemporary philosophical debates. The focus of these debates tended to be on the internal character of anger, whereas Polybius is interested in how anger plays out in the relationships between the protagonists of his history. He shows how, from the subject's perspective at least, anger and empire go together, not least when that ruler is a barbarian. Consequently as the Romans come to wield power in the Greek world, so they are increasingly viewed as angry. Greeks, faced with the anger of the ruler, must then try to bring it to an end and re-establish good relations, but the onus is on them to achieve this. Polybius' own success in achieving this was there inscribed on stone in Megalopolis for all to see.

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<sup>110</sup> Cic. *ad Q. Fr.* 1.1.37-40, on which: Harris, *Restraining rage* (n. 7 above) 204-06.

<sup>111</sup> Cic. *Off.* 1.89.

<sup>112</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 51.14: 'quae apud alios iracundia dicitur, ea in imperio superbia atque crudelitas appellatur'.

