The Puritan faction had boasted that the Acts of Perth should never pass in a law (so confident were they of their favourers in the parliament-house).\footnote{John Spottiswoode, History of the church of Scotland, ed. M. Russell (3 vols., Spottiswoode Soc., 1851), iii, 262.}

How the votes were gathered, the clerk will be answerable to God one day ... But if they had wanted their proxies, and the votes of the officers of estate, they had succumbed. We will subjoin the names of the voters, to the honourable remembrance of the disassenters, and ignominie of the assenters.\footnote{David Calderwood, History of the kirk of Scotland, eds. T. Thomson & D. Laing (8 vols., Wodrow Soc., 1842–9), vii, 498.}

Division lists are almost unknown in the history of the Scottish parliament; almost all the recorded ones come from the period 1689–1707.\footnote{R. S. Rait, The parliaments of Scotland (Glasgow, 1924), p. 412.} But one division was recorded in 1621 by the contemporary presbyterian historian David Calderwood. It is not a random survival: this was a highly significant parliament. By the vote were ratified the Five Articles of Perth, the liturgical innovations which were causing enormous controversy. Equally important, the parliament also passed a larger ordinary tax than any previously voted, plus a new tax on annual rents which was a radical departure in public finance; as we shall see, opposition came just as much to the annual rents tax as to the Five Articles. What follows is not, then, a study of the Five Articles, or the tax, as such, but of the divide that had grown up in the political nation.

Calderwood's record of the voters' names has long been known, but general histories of the period have tended to skirt round it. Historians interested in the
Five Articles, meanwhile, have concentrated either on the Perth general assembly of the church that first adopted them in 1618, or on their reception in the country at large. But the tacit assumption that the parliamentary vote was a sideshow by comparison was not shared by Calderwood, who knew that it had been a close vote – closer, in fact, than in the general assembly. An analysis of the pattern of voting can tell us much about political divisions in early seventeenth-century Scotland. Since these divisions had much to do with the relationship between the political nation and the Anglo-Scottish court, and since, as we shall see, some of the patterns that emerge have been extensively discussed in English historiography, aspects of the study have implications for the history of England.

I

King James had last summoned parliament in 1617, during his return visit to Scotland. No politically-significant legislation had been passed then. James had had a legislative programme to increase the powers of the crown, to centralise and intensify the royal administration, and to assert his control over the church. With the ratification of his restoration of diocesan bishops in 1612, that programme had been completed. His main concern now was with the restructuring of worship in the church, and here too he had achieved his aim with the adoption of the Five Articles by the general assembly of August 1618, a decision which was seen as final. The Five Articles were ratified by the privy council in October 1618, ‘to have the force and streth of lawis in all tyme coming’, but nobody suggested parliamentary ratification. Parliament was summoned in 1621 for the same reason as in England: to vote money for the king’s foreign policy efforts to support his beleaguered son-in-law, Frederick, Elector Palatine. In England, James recognized from early October 1620 that he might have to summon parliament; but he was reluctant to do so, and instead tried to collect money for the Palatinate by a voluntary ‘benevolence’. It failed. The decision to summon parliament was made on 3 November, just five days before Frederick’s Bohemian forces were overwhelmed at the battle of the White Mountain.

In Scotland too, the king sought alternatives to parliament – thus showing that the ratification of the Five Articles was not the main priority in what followed; a convention of the nobility was summoned some time before 25


5 For a recent survey of the political implications of Anglo-Scottish union, see K. M. Brown, Kingdom or province? Scotland and the regal union, 1603–1715 (London, 1992).

6 Register of the privy council of Scotland [RPCS], xi, 454–6.

October 1620. It assembled on 24 November, but after discussion 'at verie grite lenthe', the meeting decided not to appoint a contribution from the nobility alone but to advise the king to call a parliament.8 James would not take no for an answer, and ordered the council to call the nobles together again. They met on 25 January 1621, and the same arguments (poverty of the country, shortage of coin, large proportion of national wealth not in nobles' hands) were rehearsed; they asked the burgh of Edinburgh and members of the college of justice if they would contribute, but were refused; in the end they came to the same decision, that only a parliament could serve. Archbishop Spottiswoode was sent to court to convey the unwelcome news; 'he took journey about the end of the same month, and obtained, after a little insisting, his majesty's warrant for a parliament'.9

Meanwhile the English parliament had assembled on 30 January, and the Commons unanimously voted two subsidies on 16 February – though not without jars over freedom of speech which threatened to take over the session.10 It seems to have been James's delight at this vote, rather than Scottish archepiscopal eloquence, that led to his decision. The Venetian ambassador, who knew of the Commons' decision the same day, then knew only that Spottiswoode had arrived to ask for a Scottish parliament.11 James commented to Spottiswoode that 'there was never onye parlament yet but his majestie had hairme bye it'.12

When a further royal proclamation, on 25 April, expatiated at length on the mutual love between the king and his subjects, the subjects cannot have been surprised to find this a prelude to the remark that 'the importance and necessitie of oure adois geveth us just hoip to looke for ane supplie to be granit to us be oure subjectis of oure said kingdome in a gritar measour nor hes bene at ony tymte heitroifor'.13 Spottiswoode had claimed that a parliament might vote as much as £1,100,000 sterling (£1,120,000 Scots).14 But James mainly wanted a Scottish parliament, which he no doubt hoped would be more subservient than its southern counterpart, to set a good example to the latter. As he put it: 'it is not so muche the importance of the soumes wich ye are able to contribute that wee respecte, as the tryayl of your affections, your

8 Privy council to James, 25 Oct. 1620, State papers and miscellaneous correspondence of Thomas, earl of Melros, ed. J. Hope (2 vols., Abbotsford Club, 1837), ii, 373–4; RPCS, xii, 378–80; earl of Melrose to James, 27 Nov. 1620, Melros papers, ii, 376–82.
9 Privy council to James, 21 Dec. 1620, RPCS, xii, 387–8; Acts of the parliaments of Scotland [APS], iv, 589–90; Melrose to James, 29 Jan. 1621, Melros papers, ii, 391–2; Spottiswoode, History, iii, 260.
10 Journals of the house of commons, 1547–1628 (London, n.d.), p. 523. For the debate, see C. Thompson, The debate on freedom of speech in the house of commons in February 1621 (Orsett, 1897).
11 Calendar of state papers, Venetian, xvi, 578–9. On 8 Mar. the privy council acknowledged the king's instruction to summon parliament: Melros papers, ii, 392–3.
13 RPCS, xii, 475.
14 Spottiswoode to John Murray of Lochmaben, 9 Jan. 1621, Original letters relating to the ecclesiastical affairs of Scotland, ed. D. Laing (2 vols., Bannatyne Club, 1851), ii, 644–5. Murray was a gentleman of the bedchamber. Sums of money will be given in £s Scots, one-twelfth of sterling, unless otherwise stated.
straining of yourselves to your wtermost abilities, may give exemple to your
neighbours of grater wealth, to doe the lyke in thir dew proprionate.\textsuperscript{15}

It was taken for granted that the Five Articles would be submitted to
parliament, and presbyterian hopes of challenging them were running high as
the parliament approached.\textsuperscript{16} But the government began its own campaign of
persuasion on 18 July, with the arrival of the marquis of Hamilton, the king’s
commissioner. He had been selected by the king in 1617 as a patronage-broker
for Scotland, a sort of miniature Scottish Buckingham, and further
investigation of his role might be worthwhile.\textsuperscript{17} He met ‘some noblemen and
barons upon his way’, seemingly by arrangement, and ‘begane to require
their assistance in his charge of your majesties service’. Next day he ‘conferred
with the deane of Winchester and archbishop of St Androis, of church
matters and others, concerning your royall directions in parlement, and then
mett with some few of your most trusted officers and counsellaris; and least
the rest of the counsell and nobilitie should suspect that conclusions wer made by
a few number, and they neglected, he convened them all upon Saturday’, 21
July. In view of the matters that were discussed in Saturday’s wider group –
the time of fencing the parliament, the order of riding, and security
arrangements – it is clear that the important decisions really were made by a
‘few number’.\textsuperscript{18} According to one of Melrose’s later letters, this group, dubbed
by Calderwood the ‘cabinet counsel’, comprised Hamilton, clerk register
Hay, Lord Carnegie, the dean of Winchester, and Melrose himself.\textsuperscript{19} The dean
of Winchester was in fact a Scot, John Young, son of the king’s old tutor; in
1618 he had brought a letter from the king to the Perth general assembly.\textsuperscript{20}
Carnegie, who held three proxies at the parliament, must have been doing
some canvassing before it met; he was also closely connected with the king.\textsuperscript{21}
Hay and Melrose were loyal and experienced administrators.

Archbishop Spottiswoode, commissioner Hamilton, and chancellor Dun-
fermline opened parliament’s proceedings on 25 July with successive speeches
in which the details of the king’s need for money to sustain protestant warfare
took precedence over the details of protestant principle involved in the Five
Articles. Next the lords of the articles were elected. This was the key

\textsuperscript{15} James to parliament, 13 Jul. 1621, Sir James Balfour, \textit{Historical works}, ed. J. Haig (4 vols.,
Edinburgh, 1824), ii, 89–90.

\textsuperscript{16} For petitions and pamphlets aimed at influencing parliament, see Calderwood, \textit{History}, vii,
474–88; [David Calderwood, \textit{Quaeres concerning the estate of the church of Scotland} (n.p. [Leyden],
1621)].

\textsuperscript{17} N. Cuddy, ‘Anglo-Scottish union and the court of James I, 1603–1625’, \textit{Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society}, 5th ser., xxxix (1989), 107–24. This marked a departure from practice
under James’s earlier (Scottish) favourite, Somerset, who attempted to manage patronage in both
kingdoms.

\textsuperscript{18} Melrose to James, 26 July 1621, \textit{Melros papers}, ii, 411–12.

\textsuperscript{19} Calderwood, \textit{History}, vii, 491. It is interesting that his bishop, Lancelot Andrewes, later to
emerge as a leading Arminian, was a nominal member of the Scottish privy council: \textit{RPCS}, xi,
169.

\textsuperscript{20} James stayed for a week at Carnegie’s house, Kinnaird, during his seven-week visit to
Scotland in 1617: \textit{The Muses’ Welcome to the High and Mighty Prince James…At His Majestie’s Happie
Returne to his Old and Native Kingdome of Scotland}… (Edinburgh, 1618), pp. 85, 104.
committee, consisting of eight members of each estate, that prepared all business presented to parliament; by 1621 the formal role of the full parliament was limited to electing this committee and, some days later, receiving (and, if necessary, voting on) its report. The bishops chose eight nobles, these nobles chose eight bishops, ‘and these together chosen eight barons and eight burgesses’. The key role of the bishops meant that the entire committee consisted of royal nominees. They were chosen ‘with such dexteritie, that no man was elected (one onlie excepted), but those who, by a privat rolle, wer selected as best affected to your majesties service’, boasted Melrose; as Calderwood put it, ‘the choise was not made of persons most indifferent, of best judgment, and noe wayes partiallie affected to anie partie, as beseemeth free parliaments and counsels’. But this did not preclude opposition, even from within the committee; it had been impossible to choose as many as eight barons and eight burgesses of high enough status who would be compliant.

From 24 July until 3 August, the ‘hail estatis’ were ordered ‘to awaitt in the toun of Edinburgh’. The lords of the articles met daily at 10 a.m. in the Over Tolbooth, while the ‘cabinet counsel’, Melrose’s inner group, ‘met daylie in the Abbay [Holyrood] by sixe in the morning, and satt till nyne, to dress maters that were to be treatted amongst the Lords of the Articles’. They ‘treate[d] first of the taxation, hoping to induce such as were not affected to the ceremonies to a large subsidie, upon hope to be fried of the Five Articles’; the king’s second letter to the parliament, produced by Melrose (who had written it) about 26 July, was all about his needs for money to defend the Palatinate. The decision on the tax came on 27 July, and fell into two parts. Firstly there was an ordinary tax on the traditional assessment: the only question was, how much? A courtier, Lord Scone, announced that he was willing to pay his share of £1,000,000 merks, a figure which presumably represents the upper range of the government’s hopes. In the end they settled for £400,000, in four annual instalments. Secondly the novel proposal was made for a tax on annual rents (interest payments and annuities), a move directed against creditors, many of whom would have been creditors of nobles. There was ‘strict opposition’ from the burghs’ representatives ‘and others’, and the article was passed ‘efer great altercation, rether then reasoning’. The Five Articles seem to have been passed soon afterwards, with little discussion and only three dissenting votes.

22 Calderwood, History, vii, 490. For their names, and the names of all those at the parliament, see Appendix. The ‘barons’ were the shire commissioners, who had gained representation as a separate estate in parliament in 1567.
23 Melrose to James, 26 July 1621, Melros papers, ii, 416; Calderwood, History, vii, 490; cf. Rait, Parliaments, p. 370.
24 APS, iv, 594; Calderwood, History, vii, 491.
26 Melrose to James, 27 July 1621, Melros papers, ii, 421–3. Melrose gives the impression that the parliament as a whole had made this decision, but this cannot be correct. Notice that 1,000,000 merks (£666,666) was already only about half the £1,200,000 suggested by Spottiswoode in Jan.
27 Ibid.
28 Calderwood, History, vii, 491.
The real test, however, was whether the tax and the Five Articles would pass in the full parliament. The royal agents span out the remaining business in the lords of the articles to its maximum length, 'that they might have leisure to deale with the members of parliament, and to procure their consent to the Five Articles', said Calderwood. But in fact Melrose reported that 'we ar in good hope to obteane the Church Articles ratified with the ordinar taxation. Our greatest downt is of the taxation of anuelrents, which manie abhorre', it having been 'much impugned by the burgessi and some small barons'. Some opponents of the government were attacking on a broad front encompassing both measures:

Having craved permission to conveen, to prepaire motions to be proponed to the [Lords of the] Articles, [they] have converted the favour obteaned upon that specious pretexe, to a meeting of noblemen and barons, who ar reported to have dealt so passionatlie agains the confirmation of the church articles, and the taxation of anuelrents, that your majesties commissioner was forced to discharge the abused libertie of their assembling, and, since that time, hes been forced to take so continuall travell to dissolve their combination, and, by the assistance of his friends dulie affected to your majesties service, to convert them to their dutie, as hes permitted small time of rest or sleep to him. He inclined to have caused punish some of the most avowedlie malicious; but the errour being almost popular, he was counselled to forbear offensive rigour.

In fact it was normal for members of parliament to meet informally, often in their separate estates, 'severalie be thame selfis', while parliament was current, as Melrose's own account of the 1612 parliament shows. The 'privileges' of parliament were at issue:

The cheefe ringleaders, viz., the marqueis of Hammilton, the secretaire [Melrose], and the bishops, imployed some treacherous intelligencers, to try such as were yit unknowne to them. These insinuated themselfs in the meetings of noblemen, commissioners of shires and burrows, and other occasionall meetings, rarer or more frequent, as occasion was offered. They counterfitted a dislike of Perth Articles, where they found anie to dislike them. So they learned men's names, natures, intentions....At night, they returned to their directours, and informed them what was everie man's disposition, that the ringleaders might know with whom to deale, or caus deale. Wherupon the noblemen, commissioners of shires and burrows, were requeste in an imperious maner to forbeare their meetings; or rather, were restrained from the necessarie use of the ancient privilegges granted to the several states, to conveene by themselfs in time of parliament, for advising, reasoning, and preparing themselfs the more deliberatlie to vote in publicit.

The day before the vote, Melrose was still nervous about the annual rents tax, and considered announcing its abandonment in order to get the Five Articles

29 Calderwood, History, vii, 491–2.  
30 Melrose to James, 2 Aug. and 3 Aug. 1621, Melros papers, ii, 423–5.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Sir Thomas Hamilton, 'Memoriall anent the progres and conclusion of the parliament haldin at Edinburgh in October 1612', Miscellany of the Maitland Club, iii (1843), 116.  
33 Calderwood, History, vii, 492.
and ordinary taxation through. In the end, after frantic last-minute lobbying, it was decided to try for all three measures, but to present the Five Articles first and then to combine the two taxes as a single proposal. This stratagem worked: the Five Articles were passed by a majority of 27, and although some opponents of the annual rents tax demanded to vote on it separately, this was denied, whereupon ‘the rest became shamed to refuse, so as the opposites in that act wer scarce ten.’ It is important to notice, however, that Melrose clearly regarded the opponents of the Five Articles and the opponents of the tax as generally the same group. The key factor in their decision not to oppose the tax seems to have been the fact that the government had shown in the Five Articles vote that it possessed a working majority. Few wanted to be seen to be opposing the government unless they were in the majority, as they had been in the conventions of November and January. There was safety in numbers. Probably many of the uncommitted were disturbed by the unprecedented bitterness of the winner-takes-all contest, and would have preferred to search for a compromise.

The voting, according to Calderwood, was seventy-six in favour (including ten nobles’ proxy votes, a recent innovation), forty-eight against (including three proxies), and eighteen abstentions (including four proxies). The names, with a breakdown of the figures by estates, are given in the Appendix. The definitive official voting figures (for which we only have the totals, no names being given) were seventy-eight in favour, fifty-one against; presumably there were two positive and three negative votes of which Calderwood was unaware, thus reducing the genuine abstainers to thirteen. However, Calderwood’s list of those at the parliament tallies very closely with the official sederunt, sometimes even improving on it; despite his own partisanship he recorded the names of voters in order to do justice (as he saw it) to both sides. His list merits serious study.

34 Melrose to James, 3 Aug. 1621, Melros papers, ii, 425.
35 Melrose to James, 4 Aug. 1621, Melros papers, ii, 426; Original letters, ii, 661.
36 How consensus was sought in English taxation debates is described in C. Russell, Parliaments and English politics, 1621–1629 (Oxford, 1979), pp. 40–1.
37 Calderwood, History, vii, 498–501; for the official sederunt of parliament, APS, iv, 592–6, and the official voting figures, Original letters, ii, 661. Among Calderwood’s improvements to the sederunt is his inclusion of a substitute commissioner for Edinburgh, Andrew Scott, who replaced the goldsmith George Foulis when the latter was injured in a fall from his horse during the riding of parliament: cf. Extracts from the records of the burgh of Edinburgh, 1604–1626, ed. M. Wood (Edinburgh, 1931), p. 224. Calderwood listed the voters’ names, but gave no totals, and adding them up is not as simple as might be imagined. Two erroneous attempts to do so, the figures from which have unfortunately been widely quoted by later historians, are those of David Masson, in his magisterial edition of the Register of the privy council of Scotland (xii, 557–91), and R. S. Rait, in his equally influential Parliaments of Scotland (p. 408). Masson listed 85 voting in favour and 59 against; Rait’s figures were 86 to 59. The main error in both cases was to count the shire commissioners (and some burgh commissioners) as voting individually, whereas the voting unit was the shire or burgh. I have corrected this in my figures. The table includes one duke (Lennox) among the earls. To Calderwood’s list I have added Sir William Alexander of Menstrie, master of requests (I assume that he voted the same way as the other officers of state), and Viscount Lauderdale, whom Calderwood himself mentioned in his narrative of the parliament (p. 495) as abstaining. Another figure, more widely quoted, is the statement of Melrose that the government
II

One of the few historians to have tackled Calderwood’s figures has been Gordon Donaldson, who in a celebrated article on Scotland’s ‘conservative north’ observed that the government majority in favour of the Five Articles was derived largely from the north-east beyond the Tay, and identified this as part of a pattern that persisted between 1488 and 1690. From north of the Tay only two burghs (Montrose and Inverness), two shires (Kincardine and Inverness), and four nobles (Lords Coupar, Forbes, Gray and Kintail) voted against the government. Coupar was the brother of the radical Lord Balmerino, while Forbes may have been disenchanted with continuing crown favour for his traditional rival Huntly. Gray was connected with Menteith, another dissident, who was educating his son in 1627.

However, if there is a single pattern that stands out, it is not so much the ‘conservative north’ as the ‘radical central belt’. A line drawn roughly around Dumbarton, Ayr, Dunbar and St Andrews contains the great majority of opponents of the Five Articles: eleven nobles, six shires and twenty burghs. The government obtained little support in this area. It had as many nobles as the opposition, but this was proportionately less support than among the nobles elsewhere. The only shire to support the government was Lanark, where the marquis of Hamilton himself was sheriff; the shire was represented by the two sheriff deputes, one of whom, Sir John Hamilton of Lettrick, was his half-brother. Even then, the burgh of Lanark proved immune to Hamilton family influence.

Only six burghs from the central belt supported the government, and it is worth examining them too. One of them, Edinburgh, was in a special position, as we shall see. St Andrews had been a stronghold of presbyterianism in the 1500s, but for that reason had had its institutions thoroughly purged. The burgh’s commissioner in 1621, Henry Arthur, had been the royal nominee as dean of guild in 1611, one of a comprehensive and bitterly-resented slate of burgh officials imposed ‘to the furtherance and advancement of his majesties obedience and service within the citie of Sanct Androis’. Glasgow was an episcopal burgh, where the archbishop still had the right to present the candidate for provost; the commissioner, James Inglis, had been so presented.

majority was 27: Melrose to James, 4 Aug. 1621, Melros papers, ii, 426; also in Original letters, ii, 661–2. Rait’s figures also happened to produce such a majority, which gave them an undeserved credibility. Before leaving this subject, it should be observed that one contemporary gave the government majority as 9: John Row, History of the kirk of Scotland (Wodrow Soc., 1842), p. 330. It might be conjectured that he subtracted the votes of the proxies (10 to 3), of which he complained, and the 11 bishops; he revised his work after 1638 when bishops had been abolished, and as a presbyterian he may have extended their non-existence back to 1621.


40 RPCS, ix, 277–8.
in 1609. As a member of the syndicate leasing the customs, Inglis was also intimately linked with the royal finances. Whether the town as a whole was conservative may be doubted: having rid itself of the archbishop, it was the only large burgh to oppose the Engagement in 1648. Inverkeithing may have been swayed by the fact that Secretary Melrose held lands in the burgh. The third Fife burgh to vote yes, Culross, was the company town of the mine-owner, Sir George Bruce of Carnock, treasurer of the royal mines.41

The incompleteness of the ‘conservative north’ concept is immediately apparent if one looks to the south of the central belt. In the Borders and south-west, the opposition could muster the support of only two burghs (Jedburgh and Kirkcudbright), one shire (Berwick), and no nobles at all. This is particularly noteworthy since the radicals of the covenanting revolution later drew considerable support from the south-west – the coup d’état of 1648, the Whiggamore Raid (which gave birth to the term ‘Whig’), was launched from that area. Perhaps a study is needed of Scotland’s ‘conservative south’. It may be that territorial magnates like Angus or Buccleuch were still influential in areas of the Lowlands more remote from Edinburgh. (The Highlands were largely unrepresented in the parliament, and Highland politics were only focused on ‘national’ Scottish institutions to a limited degree.)

Explanations for the radicalism of the central belt must begin with Professor Donaldson’s article, in which he suggested that it was due to nearness to institutions of central government and relative openess to new ideas – particularly from England but also from the Continent. There were many nobles among the government’s supporters, and Berwickshire, Stirlingshire, the Lothians and Fife had escaped from noble dominance. The distribution of negative votes seems to correlate with that of presbyterianism. The earl of Rothes and Lord Balmerino, opposition leaders, were Fifers, and almost all the many opposition Fife burghs had ministers who had been in trouble for opposing bishops – indeed, some were outside the parliament house protesting. The link is not an automatic one; the ministers of Inverkeithing and Culross, burghs which voted yes, were just as presbyterian as those of Anstruther Wester, Burntisland, Crail and others which voted no.42 We thus see a regional pattern being overlaid by special circumstances for the yes votes in Fife.

Here it is interesting to consider the regional pattern of enforcement of the Five Articles, as identified by P. H. R. Mackay from local church records.43 Leaving aside the Highlands, which were little involved in the struggle, he identified three main areas. The north-eastern dioceses of Aberdeen and Moray were conformist, where not catholic. The diocese of St Andrews north


42 On these ministers see H. Scott, Fasti ecclesiae Scoticae (8 vols., Edinburgh, 1915–50), under the relevant parish.

43 P. H. R. Mackay, ‘The reception given to the Five Articles of Perth’.
of the Forth (broadly Fife and Angus), plus Edinburgh, was the ‘Battlefield of the Five Articles’ with the archbishop making a determined effort to overcome equally determined presbyterian resistance. In southern Scotland, there was clear evidence of successful presbyterian nonconformity in Lothian (outside Edinburgh); fewer records survive for the rest of the area, but such as Dr Mackay was able to discover pointed in the same direction. This confirms the suggestion that the weakness of the parliamentary opposition in the Borders and south-west may not indicate religious conformity so much as magnate political dominance despite a disaffected population.

III

It was expected that parliaments in this period would support government proposals, though governments’ increasing demands meant that they were beginning to be reluctant to do so. Voting yes was normal and unsurprising, and to that extent more attention needs to be paid to those who voted no. However, before doing so it is worth looking at those who voted the way the king wished.

In a political study of English parliaments which has influenced much recent work, Conrad Russell has argued that ‘there were many disagreements on policy, often profound ones, but these were divisions which split the Council itself. On none of the great questions of the day did Parliamentary leaders hold any opinions not shared by members of the Council’. Can the ‘faction’ theory of parliamentary opposition be applied to Scotland? Given the size of the Scottish privy council (over fifty, of whom twenty-nine were voting members of parliament), any dissension among councillors should be easy to find. One councillor, the aged earl of Linlithgow, did indeed vote against the Five Articles; but this cannot have been the product of manoeuvres at the council table, since he had not been seen at the council table since 1618. Nor was he at the parliament; he sent a proxy. The forces of dissent were clearly excluded from the council.

This is not quite the end of the question. In the most detailed recent discussion of the parliament, Maurice Lee finds the most significant voting pattern in the five opposition nobles who were ‘close connections of the chancellor’. Chancellor Dunfermline, he argues, was disaffected from the policy of enforcement of the Five Articles, and although he himself voted for them he orchestrated a ‘demonstration’ against them which ‘looks too extensive to be accidental’. There is no direct evidence for Professor Lee’s theory – Dunfermline’s own conduct at the parliament showed exemplary loyalty; the case rests solely on the voting record. The difficulty is, as Professor Lee has more recently observed, that the aristocracy as a whole was ‘a group closely connected through personal acquaintance and intermarriage’;

45 For the council’s membership, see RPCS, xi, pp. cxlix–cli; xi, pp. cvi–cviii.
46 RPCS, xi–xii, per index.
Dunfermline had equally close ‘connections’ with nobles voting the same way as himself.\textsuperscript{48} If he was really organising a ‘demonstration’ against the Five Articles, he would not have omitted to secure a negative vote from John Hay, commissioner from Elgin, a ‘servitour to my Lord Chancellor’; but Hay voted with the government.\textsuperscript{49} If we take the ‘faction’ theory to mean that opposition was orchestrated from within the ruling group, then it cannot explain the division of 1621. If the king’s councillors formed a solid block at the heart of his party, the remainder was largely made up of nobles and others connected with the court – so much so as to justify regarding it as a court party. The parliament had not even dispersed before Lord Scone was off to court with news of the vote; he was created Viscount Stormont on 14 August.\textsuperscript{50} Several other members of the parliament were later promoted in the Scottish or English peerage under James or Charles: eleven of them (plus Scone) had voted the right way (Angus, Lennox, Carnegie, Garlies, Kinleven, Kinloss, Ogilvy, Sanquhar, Alexander of Menstrie, Hay of Kinauns, Scrymgeour of Dudhope and Stewart of Traquair), while only one dissident (Kintail) ever gained promotion. The point can also be illustrated by looking at those nobles who had acquired their titles themselves, through royal service, rather than inheriting them: thirteen voted for the Five Articles and only two against. Even more humble individuals sometimes had a court connection. Alexander Wedderburn, burgh clerk of Dundee, is believed to have done so. Alexander Craig, commissioner for Banff, had made a career as a court poet. The surgeon Andrew Scott, commissioner for Edinburgh, had been one of the king’s surgeons from the 1590s until at least 1617.\textsuperscript{51}

The quest for rewards from the court could take a quite naked form. Shortly after the parliament, the earl of Tullibardine wrote an extraordinary letter to

\textsuperscript{48} M. Lee, \textit{The road to revolution: Scotland under Charles I, 1625–1627} (Urbana & Chicago, 1985), p. 211; the point is illustrated with a list of the ‘connections’ of Dunfermline’s son and successor. Dunfermline’s ‘connections’ were partly based on the marriages he arranged for his nephews, the sons of the first earl of Winton: M. Lee, ‘King James’s popish chancellor’, in I. B. Cowan & D. Shaw (eds.), \textit{The renaissance and reformation in Scotland} (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 181. His five ‘connections’ among the opposition were the earl of Eglinton (his nephew), the earl of Linlithgow (Eglinton’s father-in-law), Lord Kintail (Dunfermline’s son-in-law), Lord Yester (his brother-in-law, with a further marriage between the families in 1621), and the earl of Rothes (whose later half-sister had been married to Dunfermline, making Dunfermline’s children by her Rothes’ nephews): M. Lee, ‘James VI and the aristocracy’, \textit{Sottia}, i (1977), p. 22. Equivalent ‘connections’ among those voting yes include: the third earl of Winton, Eglinton’s elder brother and the head of Dunfermline’s own family; Winton’s father-in-law, the earl of Errol; and the earl of Kellie, whose son had married Dunfermline’s daughter. Another daughter had married Viscount Lauderdale, who abstained. For these and other statements about the peerage, see J. B. Paul (ed.), \textit{The Scots peerage} (9 vols., Edinburgh, 1904–14), under the relevant title.


\textsuperscript{50} Melrose to James, 4 Aug. 1621, \textit{Melros papers}, ii, 427.

the king. He was, he said, utterly insolvent, lacking money for basic necessities, and dared not return to Scotland for fear of his creditors. To restore his desperate finances he asked for £6,000 sterling (£72,000 Scots) from the Scottish taxation.\textsuperscript{52} Tullibardine had voted for the Five Articles (and, of course, the tax); now he hoped for a pay-off. He was not alone. The researches of Keith Brown have identified a number of insolvent nobles, and many were present at the parliament: as well as the marquis of Hamilton himself, there were the earls of Abercorn, Buccleuch, Lothian, Marischal, Nithsdale and Perth, and Lords Ogilvy and Sannquhar.\textsuperscript{53} All voted for the government. By comparison, the only notorious debtors identified by Dr Brown among the government’s opponents were the earl of Menteith, whose debts were incurred after 1621, and Lord Elphinstone, whose debts may have dated from the time that he had been forced out of the treasurership in 1601 – it is by no means clear that he recovered the £41,000 then owed to him.\textsuperscript{54} Of the net yield (some £500,000) of the taxes voted in 1621, £144,000 was granted outright to the marquis of Hamilton, while most of the rest was either given to other courtiers or paid to them in return for surrendering pensions previously granted.\textsuperscript{55} Aristocratic insolvency could have been worth up to a dozen votes to the crown.

The value of a court connection appears strongly in the distribution of pensions. Eighteen members of the parliament were receiving pensions, either for themselves or for members of their immediate family: five bishops (Brechin, Dunblane, Dunkeld, Orkney and Ross), three officers of state (Mar, Cockburn of Ormiston and Oliphant of Newton), seven nobles (Errol, Lennox, Haddington, Dingwall, Holyroodhouse, Kincleven and Scone), and three others (Sir Robert Stewart of Shillinglaw, Alexander Craig and Andrew Scott).\textsuperscript{56} The total annual sum paid out to them was £21,935 in cash, plus victual worth perhaps a further £2,850 – a quarter of the crown’s total pensions bill. In addition, the officers of state had their fees. These were significant sums for the crown, and for the recipients too: Lord Kincleven was said hardly to be able to live without his pension.\textsuperscript{57} By now it hardly needs to be added that nobody on this list voted against the government.

As well as commissioner Hamilton, seventeen individual government supporters received acts in their favour: three bishops (Dunblane, Dunkeld and St Andrews), four officers of state (Melrose, Cockburn of Clerkington, Hay

\textsuperscript{52} Tullibardine to James, n.d., Letters and state papers during the reign of King James VI, ed. J. Maimdent (Abbotsford Club, 1838), p. 322. The editor assigns this letter tentatively to 1620, but mention of the taxation places it after Aug. 1621.

\textsuperscript{53} K. M. Brown, ‘Noble indebtedness in Scotland between the reformation and the revolution’, Historical Research, lxii (1989), 260–75. To this list may be added Lord Dingwall: M. Prestwich, Cranfield: politics and profits under the early Stuarts (Oxford, 1966), p. 73. \textsuperscript{54} RPCS, vi, 287.

\textsuperscript{54} MS accounts of ordinary and extraordinary taxation, 1621, S.R.O., E65/8-9.

\textsuperscript{54} Treasurer’s accounts, 1621–2, S.R.O., E21/88; Comptroller’s accounts, 1620–1, S.R.O., E24/38. Stewart of Shillinglaw’s pension, strictly, was as agent of the duke of Lennox, but he is included on the assumption that both benefited from the arrangement: E24/38, fo. 26r. That he had such a close connection with the arch-courtier Lennox is itself significant.

\textsuperscript{57} HMC, Mar & Kellie, i, 113.
of Kinfauns and Oliphant of Newton), nine nobles (Angus, Kellie, Lothian, Nithsdale, Roxburgh, Winton, Carnegie, Scone and Spynie), and one shire commissioner (William Douglas of Cavers). One abstainer, Lauderdale, was also favoured; but no opponent of the government received anything. As Melrose told the king, those burghs who voted in the negative ‘wer recompensed by your commissioners refusing to authorise their acts and ratifications’. The only burghs receiving private acts were Edinburgh and Elgin. Dumbarton sought the ‘getting of the tounis ryt of patronage of the kirk ratifit in the said parliament’, but this must have been one of the acts blocked by Hamilton: the burgh had voted the wrong way.

Larger burghs, particularly Edinburgh, simply could not afford to displease the government. The royal burghs, those represented in parliament, depended on their legal monopoly of overseas trade, and the king had given plenty of evidence of his willingness to interfere with burgh charters when crossed. The heavy royal demands of the 1630s amply illustrate the dependence of Edinburgh on the crown. The town staggered under the financial burden, but attempted to shoulder it with remarkably little protest. The sanctions which could be deployed by the crown included the removal of the courts of justice, the replacement of the provost (or even of all the magistrates) by royal nominees, or the invocation against the town of dormant penal statutes such as that banning the export of bullion. The citizens of the capital were overwhelmingly disaffected from the Five Articles, but their magistrates could not afford to express this. They had only to look to England to see how much damage an insensitive government could do to commercial interests, with the notorious Cockayne Project of 1614–17.

Most of the abstainers, as well as some even of the yes voters, were probably sympathetic to the opposition, but overawed by government pressure. Melrose hoped to persuade some of the less determined members of the opposition to leave the parliament, while Calderwood also recorded that some ‘were so terrified, howbeit otherwise well affected, that they left the town’. They risked a good deal from royal displeasure. Melrose promised to send the king, ‘who may and can judge of their merite’, a list of all those who voted in

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62 For instances of disaffection, see Calderwood, _History_, vii, passim.
63 A. Friis, _Alderman Cockayne’s project and the cloth trade, 1603–1625_ (Copenhagen & London, 1927); B. E. Supple, _Commercial crisis and change in England, 1600–1642_ (Cambridge, 1959), ch. 2.
64 Melrose to James, 2 Aug. 1621, _Melros papers_, ii, 424; Calderwood, _History_, vii, 492; cf. Row, _History_, p. 330. When, in the English Short Parliament, ‘some quarter of the lay peerage…voted against the king in public,’ Professor Russell suggests that ‘the proportion who were unhappy with his course was at least double that’: G. Russell, _The fall of the British monarchies, 1627–1642_ (Oxford, 1991), p. 112. It would be interesting to apply this formula to the division we are considering.
the negative. The earl of Mar had a legal case against Lord Elphinstone which reached a crucial stage in April 1622; Mar’s cousin the earl of Kellie wrote to him from court that ‘you neede not to feare ony thing to cume from his majestie to your prejudice; he hes assured me, besyds his respekt to your lordshipes, that he remembers of my Lord Elphinstones careiage and his sones bothe in tyme of the parlament... they warr bothe puritains and speciallye the young man’.65

IV

Showing that it was those without a court connection who tended to vote no is one thing; explaining why they actually did so, defying the king, is another. There is a simple answer available (though it needs elaboration): the two key measures in the parliament were highly unpopular in the country. Those who sought power and influence at court, or depended on the court financially, needed to vote the way the king wanted. But those who sought to stand well with the country (which for burgh and shire commissioners included their constituents) would have been tempted to vote the other way – if they dared. We therefore need to seek explanations for the opposition vote within the framework of ‘court–country’ analysis.66

It should be stressed that religion alone cannot explain the opposition – or only if religion is taken to embrace a broader range of ideological attitudes. True, catholics and episcopalian voted for the Five Articles, while presbyterians voted against. But catholics also voted for the annual rents tax, while presbyterians wished to vote against. Yet this pattern was highly paradoxical, for the government stressed that this was a tax intended to enable James to go to war against Europe’s leading catholic powers in defence of his Calvinist son-in-law.67

The only explanation for these voters’ disregard for their religious interests is that they saw their religion within a wider frame of reference. It is a commonplace that the parallel English parliament proved reluctant to vote money for a war of which, in theory, they fully approved. Protestants committed to an apocalyptic view of the European struggle were disenchanted with James’s cautious diplomacy – though how they had come to distrust his approach (on the face of it a reasonable one) is a complex story. It is even harder to explain why catholics should have been such keen supporters of a policy which (from their point of view) was still protestant. The Spanish ambassador in London was working franticly to get the English parliament dissolved to prevent taxes being voted, and it might seem that Scottish catholics were undermining his efforts while presbyterians were playing into

65 Melrose to James, 2 Aug. 1621, Melros papers, ii, 424; Kellie to Mar, 9 Apr. 1622, HMC, Mar & Kellie, ii, 117. Elphinstone’s son (Alexander, master of Elphinstone) was not at the parliament; Kellie likely meant his nephew, Lord Balmerino.


67 Cf. Balfour, Historical works, ii, 84.
his hands. The fact is that catholics were also loyalists; presbyterians had become dissidents. Perhaps a fortiori, the converse is also true; dissidents supported the presbyterians, while loyalists were more likely to discover the virtues of catholicism. There were plenty of catholics at court, but few committed presbyterians.68

These dissidents could be motivated primarily by local concerns, or by broader ones. They might simply resist central interference and seek a quiet life, or they might have their own ideas about the kind of things king and parliament should be doing. Here we need the useful distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘official’ country attitudes adumbrated by John Morrill.69 Opposition to the annual rents tax was probably primarily local, a ‘pure’ country concern, since taxation was a classic local issue. The opposition of Berwickshire may have been connected with the summons issued in June 1621 to all its ninety-seven freeholders to produce their infeftments and retours ‘for setting down ane perfect tax roll’. To those who wished to avoid heavier taxes, it was important to maintain the existing assessment system. A statute of 1621 ordered the revision of the tax roll of Kincardineshire, another dissident shire.70

To act as local foci for such discontent there must have been networks or institutions of some kind. Were there county communities in early seventeenth-century Scotland? Historians have not looked for them, and anything I can say is necessarily tentative. But the regional pattern of opposition, noted above, was connected with the disappearance in the ‘radical central belt’ of traditional magnate dominance, and it would not be surprising to find gentry-dominated local communities – not necessarily based purely on counties – in these areas. There certainly was a local community in the Eastern Borders, which had come to be dominated by lairds since the 1540s, while Angus and Kincardineshire seem also to have formed such a community.71 Further studies will probably reveal more about the links between such localities and the centre.

Presbyterians, however, organized nationally – indeed internationally, for Calderwood and other leaders were in exile on the Continent. The emerging underground ‘conventicle’ movement, for those conscientious objectors to the Five Articles’ ceremonies at communion, provided grassroots support.72 We

have seen that there were meetings during parliament at which criticism of the government programme was voiced, and this may well have drawn on, or been connected with, presbyterian organization. Only through such meetings, or through prior lobbying, could the presbyterians have known enough to make the boast recorded by Spottiswoode, quoted as epigraph to this article. As we have seen, they articulated a consciousness of ‘free parliaments’ as something threatened by the crown, a natural progression from the way in which they had objected to royal and episcopal interference in general assemblies of the church since at least 1597.73

We can also detect the emergence of a national opposition leadership, notably the earl of Rothes and Lord Balmerino, whose negative votes in 1621 launched them on long careers of public activity from an opposition viewpoint; they eventually became covenanting leaders. They did not want to be in opposition—they were seeking court influence. But with the programme that they favoured, like the familiar ‘official’ Country of Pym, Bedford and others in England, they came up against a brick wall. Traditional patterns of politics, in Scotland or England, would have sought to include them (and thus the constituency that they represented) within the kaleidoscope of factions at court so that normal politics could be carried on. But the phalanx of privy councillors voting in a block for highly unpopular measures shows that this was not happening, and perhaps was no longer possible; ‘faction’ could not defuse the tension when fundamental issues were at stake. Rothes, Balmerino and their friends continued to probe for openings at court until Balmerino’s dramatic trial for treason in 1634–5 (for concealing an opposition petition) closed off all such options for the remainder of Charles’s personal reign.74

Some ‘country’ activists thus had their own programme, and in 1621 the polarisation of politics was not yet complete. What concessions might the government make in order to achieve its central aims? Religion was high on the agenda, and no compromises were possible here; but were there other aspects of economic reform, retrenchment and renewal that might detach those with purely local concerns from the presbyterians? Hamilton’s ‘insinuation’ in his opening speech ‘that he had a warrant to give way to a good advise, whereby money might abound in the country after the taxation’ sounds like a promise to make legislative concessions to a ‘pure’ country interest, and several such laws were in fact passed.75 There was a law against superfluous banqueting, apparel and funeral celebrations.76 Another discharged past penalties for breach of penal statutes (a group of acts restricting commerce), and cancelled an obnoxious monopolistic commission to enforce them.77 A commission was set up on the coinage, to remedy the ‘present

74 For their careers in the next reign see Lee, Road to revolution. A detailed study of their role is needed.
75 Calderwood, History, vii, 489.
76 APS, iv, 624–5, c. 25.
77 APS, iv, 624, c. 23; for the parallel English statutes, see M. W. Beresford, ‘The common informer, the penal statutes and economic regulation’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., x (1957–58), 221–38.
scairsitie of money’, by looking at the possibility of allowing circulation of foreign coins (something that landlords had been demanding and the authorities had tended to resist). An even bigger concession, from a government upheld by insolvent nobles, was the package of measures to improve the collection of debts. The famous ‘Bankruptcy Act’ of 1621, still partially in force, curbed fraudulent alienations by landed debtors. It was accompanied by a large number of related acts regulating debt and credit, of which all except the last (against demanding interest payments in advance) would have delighted the creditors’ lobby. This was emphatically not the legislative programme that the court favoured; it suggests that the government’s managers were seeking to win over the middle ground.

The political divide we see in 1621 was quite new. Professor Donaldson, in his important study of late sixteenth-century politics, concluded by noting ‘the extent to which an individual’s religious or political principles might be either channelled or diverted by familial and personal influences…in general the allegiance of the “following” was determined by the party alignment of its head’. This could not possibly have been written about the 1621 parliament. We have seen Chancellor Dunfermline’s family divided, with brothers voting on opposite sides. Commissioner Hamilton was embarrassed when the most obdurate opponent of the government in the lords of the articles turned out to be Sir John Hamilton of Preston, resisting all pressure from ‘his cheefe’. Religious and political principles – presbyterianism, dislike of an autocratic crown, desire for more representative parliaments and general assemblies, distrust of tax-subsidized courtiers – were to the fore.

David Stevenson has written that Scotland after 1603 was ‘virtually all country and no court’, a much-quoted phrase. This study has confirmed the validity of a ‘court-country’ analysis: the voters divided sharply between government supporters with extensive court connections, and government opponents with few or none, and with other sources of ideological validation. However, far from there being ‘no court’ in Scotland, the ruling classes seem to have been packed with courtiers, forming a powerful and successful court party. After all, they won the vote. Most of the government’s majority, it is true, came from the bishops and officers of state, whose votes were in a sense automatic; but they formed the inner ring of the court, and like the other courtiers had to be cajoled with rewards and influence. And even among the

78 APS, iv, 629, c. 34; Melros papers, t. 961–2; HMC, Mar & Kellie, 1, 97–8; for a discussion of the problem as it affected England, see Supple, Commercial crisis and change, ch. 4.
79 APS, iv, 615–16, c. 18.
80 APS, iv, pp. 609–12, cc. 6–8; p. 613, c. 13; p. 623, c. 20; p. 627, cc. 27–8.
81 G. Donaldson, All the queen’s men: power and politics in Mary Stewart’s Scotland (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 151. Of course, it is also noteworthy that ‘religious or political principles’ had already begun to make inroads into traditional patterns of allegiance.
lesser peers, shire commissioners and burghs, although fewer rewards percolated so far down the social scale, enough government supporters could be found to bring them almost level with the opposition. This was a notable success: the opposition had been hoping to defeat both the annual rents tax and the Five Articles. Outnumbered on the latter, most of them gave up the struggle when it came to the tax.

But they did not give up permanently. It is a pity that we have no record of the voting in the parliament of 1633, which seems to have been an even closer call for the government, and with the opposition attacking on a broader front. When an act giving the king the right to prescribe apparel for the church was combined with one recognising the royal prerogative, Rothes demanded that the two be separated, but when this was refused the opposition boldly voted against the combined act and almost defeated it.84 What we can do, however, is to look at those members of the 1621 parliament who survived into the covenanting period, since a high proportion of them took sides in the struggle.

There are difficulties in dividing people into homogeneous blocks of ‘covenanters’ and ‘royalists’—there were shades of opinion, and nobody actually wanted civil war. But it is still revealing to see what sides people chose when forced to do so.85 Let us examine the nobles present in 1621 who were still alive in 1638. Of those who had voted for the Five Articles, the earls of Angus, Kellie, Nithsdale, Perth, Roxburgh and Wigtown, and Lords Carnegie, Garlies, Kinloss and Ogilvy became royalists; the earl of Kinghorn and the obscure Lord Kincleven became covenanters. Of those who had voted against, the earls of Eglintron and Rothes, and Lords Balmerino, Burleigh, Cathcart, Coupar and Yester became covenanters; the earl of Menteith and Lord Gray became royalists. The correlation between allegiance in 1621 and 1638 is striking. One can even chart the changes of mind by the two young earls who fail to fit the pattern: Kinghorn had catholic sympathies in his youth but later became a presbyterian, while Menteith, later a leading courtier, had presbyterian sympathies in 1621.86 If a similar correlation cannot be established for the shire commissioners, it is only because the covenanting cause received such overwhelming support from this class; I have found only two royalists, Sir John Scrymgeour of Dudhope and Sir John Stewart of

84 Lee, Road to revolution, p. 132.
85 For what follows on post-1638 allegiance, see Stevenson, Scottish revolution; Scots peerage; lists of royalists and covenanters, S.R.O., Hamilton MSS, GD406/M9/88/6-7; Brown, ‘Courtiers and cavaliers’. I have taken a common-sense rather than mechanical view of allegiance: thus Lord Carnegie (earl of Southesk by 1638), though he eventually signed both covenants, exerted all his influence in a conservative direction and clearly more seriously the loyalty to the king that the covenanters nominally professed.
86 For Kinghorn see RPCS, xxi, 240–1. Menteith’s presbyterianism is inferred from the fact that the minister, John Craigenbelt, whom he presented to Aberfoyle parish in 1621 (having purchased the patronage and augmented his stipend) was later appointed minister to a covenanting regiment: Fraser, Menteith, i, 336–7; Records of the commissions of the general assemblies of the church of Scotland, 1625–1667, eds. A. F. Mitchell & J. Christie (Scottish History Society, 1892), p. 144. I am grateful to Dr Walter Makey for a discussion of Craigengelt.
Traquair, both of whom had received peerages between 1621 and 1638 – but they had both voted yes. There are more of those voting yes whose allegiance after 1638 cannot be traced, suggesting that they failed to support the Covenant.

Professor Russell’s recent suggestion that ‘many Covenanters seem to have been slowly and painfully converted to Presbyterianism by the logic of the struggle with Charles, rather than representing a continuous Presbyterian tradition surviving from the reign of James VI’ may have been true of Robert Baillie, the well-known example he cites, but doubts about the existence of such a tradition are clearly misplaced.87 Similarly, those who follow Professor Russell in insisting on the unique role of Charles I in stirring up opposition need to consider how far in fact the process was under way before his accession.88 By 1621, many of the battle lines of the Scottish revolution had already been drawn.

In a British context, this finding can lead to two opposite conclusions. Professor Russell, having stressed the unrevolutionary nature of England even in 1637, needs an explanation for the overthrow of Charles’s government and for the subsequent civil war; and he finds it in Scotland. ‘The Scottish crisis which began in 1637 deserves logical, as well as chronological, pride of place in the explanation of the British troubles. No one has ever argued for Scotland, as they have for England and Ireland, that there was not sufficient combustible material to explain what happened, nor that there was not sufficient depth of ideological difference.’89 This study, by confirming the deep-rooted nature of the ideological divide in Scotland, may seem to bolster this view.

But was Scotland really so different? Professor Russell is forced to argue that it was: Scottish politics, ‘like English politics in the fourteenth century’, were still dominated by the private warfare of magnates who could coerce kings with impunity.90 However, that was not what happened in 1621; private warfare had ceased, and coercing James’s new state machinery was not a realistic option.91 The Scots did not resort to arms; they resorted to parliament, much as their English counterparts might have done. If English historians find something familiar in my account of this Scottish episode, it may encourage them to consider the English and Scottish polities in 1621 as more similar than is sometimes believed. And this has implications for our view, not just of the Scottish revolution, but of the English revolution too.

89 Russell, Causes of the English civil war, p. 29.
APPENDIX

VOTING IN THE PARLIAMENT OF 1621

Source: Calderwood, History, vii, 499-501; APS, iv, 592-6. See also n. 37 above. Lords of the Articles (8 from each estate) are italicized; privy councillors are asterisked (*).

ROYAL COMMISSIONER
James Hamilton, 2nd marquis of Hamilton*

BISHOPS VOTING IN FAVOUR (11)
Aberdeen: Patrick Forbes*
Argyll: Andrew Boyd
Brechin: David Lindsay
Caithness: John Abernethy
Dunblane: Adam Bellenden
Dunkeld: Alexander Lindsay
Galloway: Andrew Lamb
Glasgow: James Law*
Orkney: George Graham
Ross: Patrick Lindsay*
St Andrews: John Spotiswoode*

OFFICERS OF STATE VOTING IN FAVOUR (8)
Alexander Seton, 1st earl of Dunfermline, chancellor*
John Erskine, 2nd earl of Mar, treasurer*
Thomas Hamilton, 1st earl of Melrose, secretary*
Sir Richard Cockburn of Clerkington, privy seal*
Sir George Hay of Kincauns, clerk register*
Sir John Cockburn of Ormiston, justice clerk*
Sir William Oliphant of Newton, lord advocate*
Sir William Alexander of Menstrie, master of requests* [not in Calderwood]

EARLS VOTING IN FAVOUR (15)
James Hamilton, 2nd earl of Abercorn
William Douglas, 11th earl of Angus
Walter Scott, 1st earl of Buccleuch*
Francis Hay, 9th earl of Errol (Nithsdale [Mar in Calderwood] proxy)
Thomas Erskine, 1st earl of Kellie (Dunfermline proxy)*
John Lyon, 2nd earl of Kinghorn
Ludovic Stewart, 2nd duke of Lennox (Mar proxy)
Robert Kerr, 2nd earl of Lothian*
George Keith, 5th Earl Marischal (Mar proxy)*
Robert Maxwell, 1st earl of Nithsdale*
John Drummond, 2nd earl of Perth*
Robert Kerr, 1st earl of Roxburgh*
William Murray, 2nd earl of Tullibardine*
John Fleming, 2nd earl of Wigtown*
George Seton, 3rd earl of Winton*
EARLS ABSTAINING (2)
James Erskine, 6th earl of Buchan
William Douglas, 6th earl of Morton

EARLS VOTING AGAINST (4)
Alexander Montgomery, 6th earl of Eglinton
Alexander Livingstone, 1st earl of Linlithgow (Eglinton proxy)*
William Graham, 7th earl of Menteith
John Leslie, 6th earl of Rothes

VISCOUNTS ABSTAINING (4)
Henry Constable, 1st Viscount Dunbar (Melrose proxy)
Henry Cary, 1st Viscount Falkland (Nithsdale proxy)
John Ramsay, 1st Viscount Haddington (Wigtown proxy)
John Maitland, 1st Viscount Lauderdale [in Calderwood narrative, p. 495]

LORDS VOTING IN FAVOUR (13)
Robert, 7th Lord Boyd
David, 1st Lord Carnegie*
William, 1st Lord Cranston (Carnegie proxy)*
Richard Preston, 1st Lord Dingwall (Scone proxy)
Alexander Stewart, 1st Lord Garlies
John Bothwell, 2nd Lord Holyroodhouse*
John Stewart, 1st Lord Kinclean (Carnegie proxy)
Thomas Bruce, 3rd Lord Kinloss (Sanquhar proxy)
James, 7th Lord Ogilvy (Spynie proxy)
George, 1st Lord Ramsay (Carnegie proxy)
William Crichton, 9th Lord Sanquhar*
David Murray, 1st Lord Scone*
Alexander Lindsay, 2nd Lord Spynie

LORDS ABSTAINING (1)
John Maxwell, 6th Lord Herries (Sanquhar proxy)

LORDS VOTING AGAINST (11)
John Elphinston, 2nd Lord Balmerino
Robert Balfour, 2nd Lord Burleigh
Alan, 3rd Lord Cathcart
James Elphinston, 1st Lord Coupar
Alexander, 4th Lord Elphinston
Arthur, 10th Lord Forbes (Elphinston proxy)
Andrew, 7th Lord Gray (Scone [Spynie in Calderwood] proxy)
Colin Mackenzie, 2nd Lord Kintail
James, 6th Lord Ross
James Sandilands, 3rd Lord Torphichen
John Hay, 8th Lord Yester

SHIRES VOTING IN FAVOUR (9)
Aberdeen: John Forbes of Brox
Banff: George Ogilvy of Carnousie
Dumfries: Sir John Charteris of Amisfield
Sir William Grierson of Lag
Forfar: Sir James Scrymgeour of Dudhope, constable of Dundee
Thomas Fotheringham of Powrie

Lanark: Sir James Maxwell of Calderwood
Sir John Hamilton of Lettrick

Peebles: Sir John Stewart of Traquair
Sir Robert Stewart of Shillinglaw

Perth: Sir Patrick Ogilvy of Inchmartin
Sir Andrew Rollock of Duncrub

Roxburgh: Andrew Riddell of that Ilk
William Douglas of Cavers

Wigtown: Sir Robert MacLellan of Bombie
Sir John Vaus of Barnbarroch [in Calderwood only]

SHIRES ABSTAINING (4)

Bute: William Stewart of Kilchattan
Paul Hamilton, captain of Arran [in Calderwood only]

Edinburgh: Sir Alexander Lauder of Halton (wished to vote against)
David Crichton of Lugton (wished to vote for)

Linlithgow: Sir Walter Dundas of that Ilk (wished to vote against)
John Dundas of Newliston (wished to vote for)

Selkirk: Sir James Pringle of Galashiels
George Pringle of Torwoodlee

SHIRES VOTING AGAINST (9)

Ayr: Bruce Blair of that Ilk
Sir John Wallace of Carnall

Berwick: Sir David Home of Wedderburn
Robert Swinton of that Ilk

Dumbarton: John Colquhoun of Luss
Henry Stirling of Ardoch

Fife: David Beaton of Balfour
Sir William Oliphant of Newton*

Haddington: Sir John Hamilton of Preston
Sir Robert Hepburn of Alderston

Inverness: George Munro of Meikle Tarrel

Kincardine: Sir Robert Arbuthnot of that Ilk
Sir Thomas Burnett of Leys

Renfrew: William Sempill of Foulwood
John Brisbane of Bishopton [in Calderwood only]

Stirling: Sir Archibald Stirling of Keir
David Livingstone of Dunipace

BURGHS VOTING IN FAVOUR (20)

Aberdeen: Mr David Rutherford
Annan: David Millar
Banff: Mr Alexander Craig
Brechin: David Lindsay
Culross: Sir George Bruce of Carnock
Dumfries: John Corsan
Dundee: Mr Alexander Wedderburn
Edinburgh: Alexander Clark
    George Foulis
    Andrew Scott [replaced Foulis: Calderwood]
Elgin: Mr John Hay
Glasgow: James Inglis
Inverkeithing: William Blackburn
Lauder: Charles Murray
Peebles: James Williamson
Perth: Andrew Gray
Rutherglen: John Pinkerton
St Andrews: Henry Arthur
Sanquhar: Nicol (or Michael) Cunningham
Selkirk: William Elliott
Tain: Hector Douglas
Wigtown: John Turner

BURGHS ABSTAINING (7)
Forfar: Mr David Pearson [in Calderwood only]
Forres: William Forsyth
Inverurie: John Badenoch
Kintore: John Leslie
Nairn: Walter Hay [in Calderwood only]
Renfrew: William Somerville
Rothesay: Matthew Spens

BURGHS VOTING AGAINST (24)
Anstruther E.: Robert Mercer
Anstruther W.: Robert Richardson
Ayr: Hugh Kennedy
Burntisland: William Meiklejohn
Crail: Alan Cunningham
Cupar: Robert Paterson
Dumbarton: Thomas Fallisdale
Dunbar: George Purves
Dunfermline: Mr Thomas Wardlaw
Dysart: David Simpson
Haddington: Mr James Cockburn
Inverness: Mr John Ross
Irvine: Robert Brown
Jedburgh: Mr John Rutherford
Kilrenny: Norman Leslie
Kinghorn: James Boswell
Kirkcaldy: Thomas Lamb
Kirkcudbright: David Arnott
Lanark: Gavin Blair
Linlithgow: Andrew Bell
    John Glen [in Calderwood only]
Montrose: William Ramsay
North Berwick: George Baillie
Pittenweem: Walter Airth
Stirling: Duncan Paterson [Articles in Calderwood]