Turkish Organizations in Europe

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Turkish organisations in Europe: how national contexts provide different avenues for participation.

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, to identify opportunities and constraints for migrants to participate in the host society. Second, by using Turkish migrants as a case study, to further explore variance in formal political participation. Turks are one of the largest migrant groups in Western Europe and have settled in several European countries. Since a majority of the Turkish migrants display similarities in terms migration and socio-economic background, this provides an ample opportunity to analyse the outcome of different integration policies and the extent of political integration of Turks in Europe. Finally, the article assesses how different citizenship policies give rise to different types of participation and different targets for claims-making.

The article will first discuss how different understandings of citizenship and implementations of citizenship policy give rise to a different set of opportunities for migrants to participate in the political sphere. This will then be exemplified with reference to Turkish organisations in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Not only do a majority of the European Turks reside in these countries but these states have also chosen very different paths in terms of integration and citizenship policies. This results in a different set of opportunities for Turks to formally participate where some countries have more favourable policies than others.
Introduction

Migration in Western Europe has steadily become more and more diverse in terms of origin and reasons for migrating. Migration that was often supposed to be temporary, e.g. the post-war labour migration, has in many cases led to semi-permanent settlement. Continued chain-migration of family members has contributed to the presence of second and third generation migrants which has prompted states, voluntarily or involuntarily, to find ways to incorporate migrants into the polity.

Although differences in terms of citizenship acquisition are still prominent, a number of civil, social and politics rights have gradually been made available to resident third country nationals. This partial dissociation of nationality and citizenship, on the one hand, and identities and rights, on the other, poses particular challenges to nation-states (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2002; Bloemraad et al., 2008). However, it also provides migrants with a number of different avenues to participate politically in the host society.

It will therefore be important to take into consideration how different types of host society institutions, or structures, give rise to different types of political opportunities and ways of participating. The most obvious marker is whether formal political participation, for example voting, is dependent on being a national. If this is the case then non-nationals will be prevented from having an influence on who governs and will be excluded from a key arena of political engagement. In addition, if an exclusive citizenship policy, exemplified by e.g. Germany pre-2000, becomes liberalised, this could alter the electoral landscape in terms of party competition for the migrant vote (Yurdakul, 2006).

In practice the citizen/non-citizen distinction is not always clear cut and nation-states often provide some type of formal political rights to non-nationals. In Britain, for example, non-nationals from Ireland and Commonwealth migrants enjoy national voting rights whereas in Sweden and the Netherlands, resident third country nationals are allowed to vote in local elections after three (Sweden) and five years (the Netherlands) of residence. Most commonly, however, national level voting rights is the privilege of nationals and local voting rights for third country nationals are the exception rather then the rule.

Although the importance of citizenship has been viewed to be declining in the post-national era (Soysal, 1994), there is also evidence showing citizenship to be on
the offensive⁴ (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). This is most notable in the way that states are beginning to emphasize citizenship as a reward rather than as a tool of integration. This shift indicates that non-nationals are under increasing pressure to show that they are potential citizens through the introduction of formal and informal integrations requirements. These requirements are indicative of how citizenship once again is becoming a focal interest for nation-states⁵ (Odmalm, 2007).

This new situation of tightening access to the polity by making naturalisation more difficult gives for an interesting paradox among liberal democracies. On the one hand, the formal exclusion of groups due to their non-national status is identified as a problem, and on the other, citizenship is becoming more exclusive and may disproportionally affect the very groups that are considered to be at risk of exclusion.

The aim of this article is therefore threefold. First, it will focus on different citizenship policies and understandings of citizenship in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Second, the outcomes of these different policies will be discussed in relation to how they provide sets of opportunities for migrants to participate (conventional or non-conventional forms) as well as determining the level where these claims are aimed (host state, supra-state or home-land). Finally, the article will utilise a key migrant group in Europe – the Turks – as an illustrative example of how different citizenship policies give rise to different types of participation and different directions of claims-making. The article will initially discuss the backdrop to Turkish migration to Europe and then go on to how different states have responded to this group in terms of citizenship policies and access to rights and, finally, what opportunities these settings give rise to for participation.

**Turkish migration to Europe**

Turks constitute one of the largest migrant groups in Europe with around four million located primarily in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Austria. Turks are also one of the longest settled migrant groups in the post-war period, on par with migrants from the Caribbean and Indian sub-continent in Britain.

There is however variance in terms of settlement patterns with The Netherlands and Germany having a much higher number of resident Turks and their
offsprings (12 and 25 per cent respectively) compared to the 5 per cent that Turks amount to in France\(^6\) (Guigni and Passy, 2004).

The German case provides a textbook example of recruiting migrants as ‘guest-workers’ and the Turkish community is very much rooted in this particular migration history. When the recession hit following the oil crisis in the early 1970s and the recruitment ban was initiated, Turks amounted to just over four million and the German government was faced with a difficult task of how to reduce any further inflow of dependents from Turkey. Several restrictive measures were put in place such as differential child benefit payments and restrictions on employment by family members (Avci, 2006), which was in line with Germany’s resistance to view itself as a country of immigration\(^7\). Paradoxically, the policies that were supposed to encourage Turks to return instead contributed to continued migration, especially in terms of family reunification which, while not actively encouraged, was still allowed\(^8\) (Green, 2007).

The Netherlands and France were comparatively late in recruiting foreign labour migrants, having initially relied on colonial migration for these purposes. The consequences of this strategy meant less foreign-born migrants in the Dutch labour force but with an over-representation of non-European labour migrants, where the Turks were one of the key groups. In France, Turkish migration only got started after the official stop to migrant labour in 1974 but has been mainly dominated by political refugees from the early 1980s. In a similar vein to Germany, labour migrants in the Netherlands were initially meant to be short-term but the measures to regulate and control migration were less stringent then the German counterparts resulting in migration becoming semi-permanent relatively early on\(^9\) (Odmalm, 2005). As in Germany, Turkish migration increased after the official labour halt in 1973 due to family reunification making Turks the third largest migrant in the Netherlands\(^10\) (Tillie and Slijper, 2007).

**Citizenship policies and institutional arrangements for participation**

Citizenship is a key marker in the relationship between the state and the individual. The citizen status sets out the rights and obligations which are appointed to the individuals perceived as members of that particular society. Citizenship also allows
these individuals to take full advantage of the political rights associated with this status. A common approach in the literature has been to classify states’ policies and understandings of citizenship according to three ideal types. These typologies are said to “define a particular institutional and discursive setting for political contention over migration and ethnic relations” (Koopmans and Statham, 2000:30) and distinguish between ethno-cultural and civic-cultural understandings of citizenship and formal access to citizenship.

The first of these, labelled the ‘exclusive’ or ‘ethnic’ model, provides an institutional set-up which either denies or makes it very difficult for migrants to gain access to the political community through the adoption of a jus sanguinis principle of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992). Germany pre-2000 is often used as an illustration of this approach. France exemplifies that second typology, the so-called ‘assimilationist’ or ‘republican’ model, which provides easy access to naturalization through a jus soli principle and semi-automatic citizenship for children of immigrant parents. The flipside is that citizenship comes with strong pressures on migrants to assimilate culturally and with little recognition of difference in the public sphere (Favell, 1998). Finally, the ‘multicultural’ model, which provides relatively easy access to naturalization and some rights for cultural difference in the public sphere. The Netherlands did for long time conform to this model but has made some dramatic changes in terms of policy over the last decade thus becoming more similar to France by limiting the public recognition of ethnic identities.

The models intend to give us some indication of how receiving states perceive their new population. Furthermore, the typologies also provide us with an understanding of the opportunities available for political participation, the type of participatory acts that migrants engage in and where this participation is directed. However, these models inhabit certain limitations which make them problematic to use analytically. First, since states are classified in a dichotomous fashion, the typologies ignore or oversimplify the complex realities of how nation-states perceive nationhood and belonging and how they construct citizenship policies. Second, states may also change their policies over time - becoming either more liberal or more restrictive - which is not fully accounted for by these models. Finally, the models do not fully account for intra-state dynamics in terms of how different political actors compete for change in policies and understandings of citizenship (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). These limitations are highlighted if we consider how formal
naturalisation policies have been arranged. The three countries considered in this article display a number of similarities in this area even though the models would suggest that they should not. For example, access to nationality in all three countries is provided through 1) the jus sanguinis principle as well as 2) through recognition or legitimisation (e.g. through marriage) and through 3) naturalisation. However, there are variations in terms what the countries specify in terms of duration of stay and acceptance of dual nationality. There are also further similarities in terms of the additional so-called ‘integration requirements’ which are becoming more common in state policy\(^{15}\) (see further Odmalm, 2007). These similarities are part of a pan-European trend to upgrade citizenship by emphasising the civic integration of, especially Muslim, migrants which has gained momentum following post-2001 concerns about failing integration\(^{16}\) (Joppke, 2007).

To understand these similarities, Koopmans and Statham (2000) have suggested a two-dimensional conceptualisation of citizenship which to a greater extent captures these dynamic relationships\(^{17}\). This conceptual space is defined by a formal and a cultural dimension of citizenship. The vertical axis runs from an understanding of citizenship that favours ethno-cultural bonds as the basis for the political community to one that emphasises a civic political culture based on residence. The horizontal axis runs from citizenship understood as conforming to a single cultural model embraced by all citizens to a culturally pluralist conception that retains or encourages cultural diversity. This conceptualisation gives rise to a scale ranging from, on the one hand, civic republicanism – ethnic assimilation and, on the other, civic pluralism – ethnic segregation.

Viewing citizenship regimes in this way allows us to classify states as corresponding more or less to these ideal-types. It also highlights some of the commonalities shared by countries that would otherwise be considered as polar opposites. For example, both Germany and the Netherlands offered migrant children the possibility of education in their own language. However, in the German case this was intended as a way to facilitate re-integration upon return whereas in the Netherlands the same policy was intended to support and preserve a minority language within Dutch society. Similarly, we can use the typology to position different countries in terms of where the emphasis is placed and why countries are starting to introduce additional requirements such as language proficiency; loyalty to the constitution and/or that migrants need to show that they are sufficiently integrated.
At the same time, the Koopmans/Statham typology helps us to understand the different nature of migrant mobilisation and the various positions adopted by actors. But citizenship is not only a means by which rights and duties are allocated, but more importantly, it also marks the type of relationship that the state has with its newcomers. It is thus important to also consider the symbolic labelling that is placed on migrants. This enables us to understand the nature of claims-making (e.g. to improve migrants’ status in the host society or to gain further recognition for cultural rights) and where the claims are being directed (host state, supra-state or home-land).

France defines newcomers as ‘immigrants’, Germany refers to immigrants as ‘foreigners’ while the Netherlands has adopted the term ‘ethnic minority’. Despite using the same term, the interpretation and definition of, for example, ‘immigrant’ differs between countries. Comparing the French understanding of an ‘immigrant’ to its Swedish counterpart is particularly illuminating. In Sweden, the statistical definition refers to persons born abroad and to Swedish-born persons both of whose parents were born abroad. An immigrant in France, on the other hand, refers to persons born abroad but is at the same time used to indicate a status prior to becoming French or, more informally, to persons who are perceived as being unable to assimilate. Similarly, ‘ethnic minority’ as used in the Dutch context differs remarkably from, for example, the British. In the former, the term is based on objective criteria (place of birth of self and parents) and is used for socioeconomic monitoring of these groups by the Dutch authorities. In the latter, the term is used to signify geographical or ethnic origin (for example ‘Asian’, ‘Black’ and ‘White’) through self-identification in census surveys.

These different national understandings of citizenship and ways of officially defining migrants give rise to very different possibilities for participation and may also have a structuring effect on the type of issues that migrants choose to mobilise around. Guigni and Passy (2004) point to how the institutional environment is crucial in order to understand how migrants participate. In France, they suggest, the assimilationist emphasis and inclusive nature of membership gives rise to, on the one hand, claims that relate to recognition for ethnic and cultural difference, and on the other, a more radical form of mobilisation due the closed institutional opportunities. In Germany, where citizenship policy for a long time made it more or less impossible for migrants to naturalise and thus become part of the political community, the lack of formal political opportunities have led migrants to develop alternative and more civil
society orientated means of participation. This indirect type of engagement coupled with a ‘foreigner’ status meant that claims were made in order to improve the status of migrants vis-à-vis the German state or to by-pass the state by aiming for the EU level\(^{19}\) (Kastoryano, 1998). In contrast, the Dutch multicultural model of relatively easy access to naturalisation and emphasis on migrants being able to retain the cultural uniqueness was complemented by a number of consultative bodies for the recognised minorities to be able to assert influence on policies (Rath, 1983).

The view adopted by Guigni and Massy is many ways symptomatic for what has been written on migration and political integration in recent years. This approach has been adapted from the literature on \textit{political opportunity structures} which focused on political institutions and social movements\(^{20}\) (Tarrow, 1994; see also Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). Accordingly, the state provides a number of institutional settings that make up the political environment and determines the rules and boundaries that political actors are obliged to adhere to. In this environment there are certain conditions which can either facilitate or constrain the political opportunities that these actors face when they pursue their strategic goals. But these opportunities are not only determined by the presence of the state. Other factors include specific configurations of resources and historical precedents which determine how and what type of groups mobilise. Studying and identifying these opportunities and constraints for participation sheds light on the differences of migrant mobilisation and how the contextual structures influence political behaviour.

In terms of the political institutions that provide the space available for contestation, a first distinction to make relates to the extent to which France, Germany and the Netherlands display corporatist or pluralist characteristics. The key distinction is whether a liberal polity is dominated by a monopolised and centralised system of interest organisation in which the state formally designates and recognises only a limited number of encompassing interests (corporatist) or multiple, overlapping, spontaneously formed, voluntaristically supported, easily abandoned, and politically autonomous associations (pluralist)\(^{21}\) (\textit{Schmitter, 1981}). The configuration of the polity in this way provides particular types of settings that shape the form of migrant mobilisation.

While the Netherlands can be said to conform mainly to a corporatist model with a few, state recognised bodies that represent particular social categories of society, Germany falls in-between while France displays few to none corporatist traits
German political life has furthermore been dominated by the dividing lines of class and religion which has, until the entry of the Greens, created a two-tier system with parties representing the broad categories of capital – labour and religious – secular groups. However, explicit political competition and conflict has by and large been absent in Germany due to what Conradt (2001) describes as a striving for absolute solutions in order to eliminate the causes of conflict. This aversion of conflict has thus led to both the elite as well as the general public being unable to accept the need for strong opposition parties or extensive bargaining within and between parties in parliament, opting for a more expert-orientated and legalistic conception of politics.

Consequently, this has generated a strong state presence in the political order that has generated a public sphere which is both highly centralised and bureaucratic despite its federal political system. Furthermore, the corporatist elements present in the German system provides opportunities for class and religious interests such as trade unions, welfare organisations, churches, business organisations, and so on, to participate in public policy-making (Soysal, 1994). At the same time, migrants and minorities are excluded from decision-making and influence by the exclusive nature of German citizenship as well as the limitations for the dominating cleavages to incorporate an ethnic as well as the, primarily, Islamic dimension (Koopmans and Statham, 1999).

The institutional arrangement in Germany, with limited corporatist influence, is also reflected in its way of organising resident migrants. Migrant organisations are not given a special role or status in the integration policy formulation and formal links with organisations, similar to those found in the Netherlands, are less well established. Instead, labour unions and churches play a more prominent role than migrant organisations. In addition, few provisions exist on a federal level for the collective participation of migrants, although due to the institutional nature of the German polity, one finds significant variance on a municipal level depending on whether the local government is positively orientated towards these organisations or not. In addition, there is also a high degree of variance in terms of funding for migrant organisations, which is often left to the discretion of the local government (Berger et al., 2004; Koopmans, 2004). Therefore Germany displays a relatively large amount of migrant organisations but of a very fragmented nature lacking the centralised and representative character of the Netherlands (Soysal, 1994). However, regional
differences are vast with the more liberal and multiculturally orientated cities, such as Berlin and Hamburg, have created favourable settings for funding of organisations and establishing links between migrant organisations, governmental bodies and political actors. These differences in host society settings and attitudes open up for a variety of roles and levels of engagement for organisations. Yurdakul (2006) points to this in her study of Turkish associations in Berlin where the more open attitude of Berlin’s political elite has resulted in close working relationships with certain Turkish associations, primarily in the area of integration\textsuperscript{27}. However, in line with the dominating class cleavage in Germany, the Turkish organisations on the left, and especially the Social Democratic ones, have established close links with the SPD and also managed to secure more state funding compared to the more conservative and trans-nationally oriented organisations.

The Netherlands has traditionally displayed a much higher number of corporatist features compared to France and Germany, both with regard to general policy-making as well as in the area of integration. This process has involved the assertion of individual influence through party channels as well as that of group influence via organisations. These settings constitute a particular institutional framework driven by a top-down perspective where the government recognises and identifies the needs and rights of immigrants and thus provide the context in which immigrants and their interests are organised. The state allocates certain functions – such as interest representation and consultative participation – thereby creating a unified and bureaucratic network. Even spontaneous and oppositional movements are incorporated into this scheme by being dependent on state funding\textsuperscript{28} (Soysal, 1994).

In France, migrant organisations are primarily not based on single ethnicities but are rather built up of cross-ethnic membership and usually located on the national level as in, for example, the case of SOS Racisme or represent cross-national ethnic groups (such as the Maghrebian organisation France-Plus). As with the key Turkish organisations in Germany, migrant organisations in France have traditionally established close links with parties on the left as a consequence of migrating for labour purposes and thus forming part of a French working class. Although France has relaxed its views on ethnic organisations, these are relatively scarce (at least compared to Germany and the Netherlands) as a consequence of the lack of recognition for ethnicity in French citizenship discourse and the dominance of four particular cleavage lines in the post-war era: class, religion (traditionally between
secular-clerical but today more around Christianity-Islam), foreign policy (protectionism–EU integration) and form of governance (presidential – parliamentary)\(^{29}\) (Wahlbäck, 1991). This has led to migrants being predominantly organised and unified with respect to specific political issues. These tend to be related to ethnicity and cultural-religious concerns, functioning outside of mainstream politics and as such emerge as a response to the particular political climate and environment. In this respect, they very much correspond to how interests and discontent are generally manifested in the French polity through what Mény calls ‘the periodic eruption of violence and protest that contradict or counterbalance choices expressed through the ballot box’\(^{30}\) (1996: 107). The reasons for this, Mény suggests, can be found in the institutional set-up of French society which through its exclusivity has not managed to channel violent social protests into peaceful and formal expressions. Parties, unions and interest groups have had difficulties to effectively organise group activity as a consequence of the extremely varied electoral rules. This has led to fragmented formation of wings and factions within parties and has made it difficult to set up alliances. Therefore in order to be heard, contenders must resort to extreme measures, such as violent demonstrations or large-scale strikes, which have been proven to pay off. This is due to the paradoxical nature of the French state which is on one hand haughty, all-powerful and disdainful but faced with violent protests tends to become ready to concede and forgiving since there is no other way out\(^{31}\) (see also Andrews and Hoffman, 1981).

**Outcomes of institutions: how do they structure political behaviour?**

Organised migrant interests and they way in which they mobilise are thus often understood to be a consequence of the particular organisational models provided by the host society. These models and institutions not only impact on the way these claims are made (conventional/non-conventional) but also, as Ireland (1994) has argued, direct these claims towards particular levels (host state, supra-state or home-land oriented)\(^{32}\). A point furthermore acknowledged by Soysal (1994:86), “[h]ost societies shape the collective organization of migrants by providing (or not) certain resources for and models of organizing/.../ certain host society institutions and policies encourage collective identity and organization”\(^{33}\). In other words, the presence or absence of particular opportunities for political engagement provides
migrant organisations with certain political cues from which they define their goals and strategies in relation to the host society.

The emphasis on mobilisation as a response to the political environment provides a different focus compared to the two previously dominating paradigms regarding the relationship between migrants/minorities and collective action. The first suggests a class-based approach where the underprivileged structural and socio-economic position of migrants has a direct consequence for their degree of mobilisation and underlying motives. According to this line of thought, economic divisions within the working class are seen as racialised under the structural crisis of advanced industrial capitalism which transforms a common race or ethnicity into a class of its own and serves as a common identity for political participation and as a form of emerging, but false, class consciousness. This precarious situation can only be overcome by co-operating with the indigenous working class through trade unions and labour parties, where the race category becomes subordinate to the more general class category. The second explanation – the ethnicity/race paradigm – takes an opposite stance, advocating that the ethnic class is not so much a display of false consciousness but rather a continuous form of collective action independent from class. Here, shared experiences, such as racism and discrimination, distinguish migrants from the host society’s population\(^34\) (Castles and Kosack, 1974; Rex et al., 1979).

However, the ultimate causes of behaviour – class and ethnicity – are taken as given and not related to the political specifics of the particular country contexts. Both approaches assume that migrants will tend to behave in a similar fashion regardless of the political institutional framework\(^35\) (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). In contrast, the political opportunity approach suggests that collective action is determined by external events, the availability of resources and opportunities made available by changes in the institutional setting. The key issue here is that the opportunity approach places group mobilisation in a political context and provides an explanation as to why mobilisation takes a certain appearance and when and why it is successful rather than why it originally emerges. Furthermore, this model also predicts that the amount and type of group formation are a direct outcome of the particular structure of political institutions and the construction of political power in a given society\(^36\) (Tarrow, 1996). Thus, it is when changes occur in the external opportunities that we are more likely to observe group action and formation. If
powerful groups change their attitudes against politically marginalised groups, these
groups should respond to this opening by increasing group action, founding new
organisations and using these as channels for mobilisation. This perspective originally
builds on the resource mobilisation theory of collective action which focused on the
perceived cost and benefits of alternative strategies and the need for resource
mobilisation prior to mobilisation. The impact stemming from the shift from local to
national power structures on organisational forms and types of collective action
makes an important addition to the understanding of the social and political terrain
that forms the condition for the emergence and success of modern movements\textsuperscript{37}
(Kitschelt, 1986).

It is however important to note that migrant organisations are also
qualitatively different from other types of voluntary organisations in terms of their
aims and functions. In terms of organisational aims, migrant associations can be said
to serve four characteristic purposes. First, migrant organisations can act as a link
between the sending country and the receiving one in that they can provide advisory
services for future migrants. This means that the organisation could potentially act as
an intermediary or an alternative for the complex bureaucracy in that it can offer first-
hand experience of the migration process in the host country. In addition, they can
also have a cushioning function, that is, they can ‘soften’ the shock of transition by
offering a setting in which immigrants could meet fellow-nationals and speak their
own language. Organisations can also maintain the interaction among immigrants.
This is especially relevant for migrants who lack informal ties, therefore they may
attempt to forge formal ties so as to retain some form of bonding\textsuperscript{38} (Cordero-
Guzman, 2001).

Second, organisations can function as an alternative or complement to the state
in terms of integration and adaptation to the new society. If an organisation or a
number of them are able to set up well-functioning relationships with authorities
responsible for integration policies, migrant associations can potentially facilitate
integration. This could include providing information about the host country in the
native language, or acting as a link between migrants and different socio-economic
areas of society and/or the political world. In this way, organisations allow migrants
to practice the ways of the host society in an ethnic setting. As such, they can thus be
used as a ‘training school’ for further political participation in the host society. Third,
migrant associations, if part of an established network, can serve as a unified voice for
their particular ethnic group in relation to the host society. Organisations can be used to translate the group’s consensus on certain subjects. The extent to which immigrants cluster in organisations is also an important indicator for measuring the extent of a collective (or collectively expressed) identity. The character, number and size of organisations indicate the extent to which immigrants intend to profile themselves as different, or are seen by others as different. Organisations can thus be viewed as an expression of the collectively felt identity of their members. They can be defensive (as a response to exclusion) or offensive (stemming from a choice of immigrants to set themselves apart from others). Furthermore, one should make a distinction between organisations that aim at enforcing the ethnic identity and those that encourage integration. Offensive organisations will often have as their goal the retaining of an identity, whereas defensive organisations have strategy rather than identity as their main goal, where strategy can either be stressing or eliminating difference39 (Vermeulen, 2005a). The concentration of migrants and their home-country-based social networks are viewed as crucial to their organising on the basis of ethnic attributes. Finally, migrant organisations can play an important role for the maintenance of a linkage between the ethnic group and the country or region of origin, especially in a diaspora type of situation. Also, they can serve as contact points between ethnic communities in different settler countries. This last characteristic has been particularly dominant amongst Turkish communities residing in different European countries40 (Schrover, 2003).

However, Ostergaard-Nielsen (2000) suggests that the way in which Turks organise also tends to be less dependent host society institutions and more related to their socioeconomic position in the host society, developments in Turkey and developments in European-Turkish relations41. This situation, Ostergaard-Nielsen continues, is exemplified by the multitude of Turkish organisations in Germany that display a vast variety of political backgrounds and affiliations. In part they reflect the political affiliation of the Turkish migrants ranging from radical left and right-wing nationalist to more mainstream and moderate organisations42 (see also Yurdakul, 2006). In addition, there is also a large body of religious organisations such as the Alevis which developed in response to discrimination by the Sunni majority. Similarly, the Turkish Sunnis have developed a number of organisations around a secular form of Islam in the same vein as practiced by the Turkish state. This in turn has given rise to competing organisations formed by Milli Görüs which by and large
opposed the division of church and state. However, as argued above, whether Turkish organisations are more engaged in homeland or host society issues will be influenced by the structural conditions and opportunities available for participation. In Germany, naturalisation has traditionally been restrictive which has excluded many Turks from the mainstream political arena thus giving rise to two main types of political engagements. Either in the transnational activities described by Ostergaard-Nielsen or as trying to push for change in their status in Germany. At the same time, local conditions, as discussed by Yurdakul (2006), may allow for more inclusive participation in terms of co-operation with German authorities to improve processes of integration.

In the Netherlands, Turks have also imported their homeland politics to Dutch organisational life generating similar left-right and religiously oriented associations. However, it was not until the early 1980s that Dutch authorities began to seriously consider Turkish organisations in the same vein as the more established Surinamese counterparts. The new policy that was introduced aimed at promoting and preserving cultural identities; to emancipate their constituencies and to represent community interests. Furthermore, these new policies opened up a much more favourable funding climate for Turkish organisations in the Netherlands and also gave these organisations an enhanced status and legitimacy (Vermeulen, 2005b). Although Turks in many European countries have been described as being ideologically split and having difficulties uniting (see e.g. Yalcin-Heckman, 1997), van Heelsum’s (2005) study on Turkish associations in the Netherlands, finds that despite political and religious cleavages, a significant number of Turkish associations are in fact interconnected with each other through a cohesive network of interlocking board members. These changes in the way in which Turkish organisations were viewed by the Dutch authorities very much corresponds to the opportunities set out in Dutch citizenship policy which aimed at inclusion and emancipation through civil society engagement.

In comparison, migrant (as well as non-migrant) associations in France have a weaker civil society position where the French state has been prone to advocate and fund general organisations that cater for a cross-section of the population. Voluntary organisations have become more involved in local and regional level decision-making as equal partners but are at the same time in a weak position in that they are subject to local authorities or government agencies to ‘ok’ them and then admitting them within their orbit (Cole, 1998). However, this situation changed in the early 1980s when
following the abolishment of legal restrictions on migrant associations, the opportunities for starting up migrant organisations have increased. Although these organisations often lack national representation and do not tend to represent a united front. Turkish associations in France also differ numerically in relation to Germany and the Netherlands due to Turks being a relatively small migrant group. This has created a different scenario in France in that the ideological (left-right) and religious (secular-Islamic) splits are less prevalent and instead a linguistic-national split has surfaced between the Turks and numerically superior North African migrants48 (Yalcin-Heckman, 1997).

**Conclusion**

The political institutions of nation-states continue to have an impact on the way that migrant groups are able to mobilise politically in the host-society. The political opportunity approach helps us to understand why migrant mobilisation takes different expressions, modes and courses of action. Focusing on how states do, or do not, provide particular institutional channels for participation impacts on the possibilities that migrants have to exercise influence in the host society. The Turks in the Netherlands have since the 1980s enjoyed a situation of fairly inclusive state policies, although the exact level of influence still needs to be evaluated, which has allowed organised Turkish interests to participate on par with native Dutch interests and other ethnic minority groups. In contrast, the lack of a formal platform or arena in the host society can either re-direct participating groups (such as the Turks in Germany) towards a supra-national level or towards the sending country but it can also spark mobilisation for increased cultural rights and group specific recognition (as in France).

However, it should be pointed out that there are also some key changes underway with regards to how European states view citizenship and, especially, how they view ethnic political participation. Citizenship has moved away from being a primarily legal term expressing the relationship between the individual, the state and the territory, to also be a prominent feature in the integration debate. European states are now at a stage where they have to decide whether citizenship is a tool for integration or whether to go down the North American route and use citizenship as a
reward to be handed out to ‘successfully integrated’ migrants. The debate around citizenship has also shifted away from being primarily about rights and opportunities and towards an emphasis on active citizenship and its key role for social cohesion. The re-emphasis of citizenship can be explained with reference to two particular events. First, as an effect of immigration developing into a security issue. Migration, it is argued, has become a security concern and can pose new types of threat to the state (or even Western democratic values more generally). This process has further meant that issues relating to migration have started to move beyond the established rules of the political game and are now framed as issues which require either special measures or are considered to be above politics. As a security threat, the state can thus justify the use of extraordinary measures, e.g. giving state institutions increased powers to remove citizenship. Second, as a reaction to perceived failures of multicultural politics. The reasoning behind these arguments suggest that, on the one hand, becoming a citizen should mean more than merely acquiring a new passport and references are made to factors such as lack of social cohesion and problems of ethnic segregation. On the other, critics suggest that multiculturalism has had an isolating effect and contributed to extremism which is a point that has been particular prominent in the Netherlands.

These developments are likely to impact on the type of mobilisation that occurs and on the relationship that particular migrant groups have with the host society. Current trends could point towards a direction in which ‘ethnically exclusive’ participation will become increasingly more difficult for groups such as the Turks since host societies will be more concerned with migrants showing that they are properly integrated and participating in and through mainstream channels. An indicative development can be found in the increasing use of integration ‘tests’ that states are introducing as a requirement for naturalisation. Although many states believe that additional integration courses and tests are beneficial, it remains unclear as to exactly how these new measures are to achieve ‘better integration’ and what the connection to national identity is. However, these integration requirements may not solely serve as a way to filter out unwanted citizens, but could also aim to facilitate the political participation of migrants as citizens-to-be by providing them with necessary skills such as language and information on migrants’ rights and responsibilities.


14 See Koopmans and Statham (2000)

15 See further Odmalm (2007)


17 Koopmans and Statham (2000)

18 Guigni and Passy (2004)


21 PAGE 8, “Schmitter, 1981”: not mentioned in bibliography, needs source

22 PAGE 9, “Conradt 2001”- no reference in bibliography

23 Soysal (1994)

24 Koopmans and Statham (2000)

Soysal (1994)

Yurdakul (2006)

Soysal (1994)


PAGE 11, “Meny, 1996”- no reference in bibliography

PAGE 11, “See also Andrews and Hoffman, 1991”- no reference in bibliography

PAGE 11, “Ireland, 1994”- no reference in bibliography

Soysal (1994), p. 86

PAGE 12: (Castles and Kosack, 1974; Rex et al., 1979).- no reference in bibliography

Koopmans and Statham (2000)


Kitschelt (1986)

PAGE 13 (Cordero-Guzman, 2001)- no reference in bibliography


PAGE 14- (Schrover, 2003), no reference in bibliography


See also Yurdakul (2006)

Ibid.


PAGE 15- van Heelsum’s (2005)- no reference in bibliography


Yalcin-Heckman (1997)