Title: ‘Citizens of the Region’: party conceptions of regional citizenship and immigrant integration

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Abstract: Citizenship is usually regarded as the exclusive domain of the state. But changes to the structure of states resulting from decentralisation and globalisation have required a re-conceptualisation of citizenship, as authority is dispersed, identities multiply and political entitlements vary across territorial levels. Decentralisation has endowed regions with control over a wide range of areas relating to welfare entitlements, education and cultural integration that were once controlled by the state. This has created a new form of ‘regional citizenship’
based on rights, participation and membership at the regional level. The question of who does or does not belong to a region has become a highly politicised question. In particular, the article examines stateless nationalist and regionalist parties’ (SNRPs) conceptions of citizenship and immigration. Given that citizenship marks a distinction between members and outsiders of a political community, immigration is a key tool for deciding who is allowed to become a citizen. Case study findings on Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia reveal that although SNRPs have advocated civic definitions of the region, and welcome immigration as a tool to increase the regional population, some parties have also levied certain conditions on immigrants’ full participation in the regional society and political life as a means to protect the minority culture of the region.
‘Citizens of the Region’: party conceptions of regional citizenship and immigrant integration

Citizenship has until recently been perceived as the exclusive domain of the state. The rights, duties and responsibilities of citizens have been seen as forming part of the relationship with the state-level political community (Brubaker 1992; Benhabib 2005; Bauböck 2007a). However, changes to the structure of states resulting from decentralisation, European integration and globalisation have necessitated a re-conceptualisation of citizenship, as authority is dispersed, identities multiply and political entitlements and engagement are diffused across various territorial levels. But while a multitude of studies have examined the emergence of citizenship above the level of the state (for example, Bauböck 2007a; Soysal 1994; Shaw 2007), few studies have conceptualised citizenship below the state. This is a key omission, given that the steady decentralisation of states has granted regional governments a range of competences that shape citizens’ rights and services (Marks et al. 2008; Greer & Mätzke 2009). Thus, while supranational integration and globalisation have resulted in the transfer of certain state powers upwards, the parallel decentralisation of states has ensured that other important citizenship rights have been allocated downwards.

Regions have emerged as important social, economic and political actors in the postwar period.¹ They have become important territorial units for economic development (Storper 1995), for distinct forms of party competition (Hough & Jeffery 2006), and key actors in the formulation and delivery of public services (Keating 2002; Wincott 2006; Greer & Mätzke 2009). Devolution and federal reforms have endowed regions with authority over a wide range of policies including health, education and policing. A study by Marks et al. (2008) demonstrates that ‘regional authority’ – a combined measure of regional-level democratic institutions, policy competences, tax-raising powers and input into central
government policy making – has strengthened dramatically across OECD countries since 1945. The devolution of powers to regions may be explained by a desire to improve administrative efficiency and the delivery of public services, to reduce ‘overload’ at the centre, and to satisfy demands for regional autonomy (Keating 1996). Furthermore, regions are important sites for identity and belonging – especially if the region has claims to nationhood (Keating 1996; Guibernau 1999). The question of who does or does not belong to a region has become a highly important and politicised question, especially in the face of international migration. As immigration alters the composition of regional populations, it raises important questions for the future survival of regional cultures (Carens 1995; Kymlicka 2001) and challenges regional actors to develop new understandings of regional membership.

The aim of this article is to explore how political parties at the regional level have conceived and constructed issues of citizenship. Whilst there has been a growing body of research on the rights of citizens in federal or devolved states (Kymlicka 2001; Wincott 2006; Greer & Mätzke 2009), as yet there has been a dearth of research on how regional parties mobilise and construct issues of citizenship. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the immigration goals of three stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) in the United Kingdom, Canada and Spain, and how they construct their conceptions of regional citizenship. Given that citizenship marks a distinction between members and outsiders of a political community, immigration is a key means of deciding who is allowed to become a citizen. Thus, migration determines ‘the boundaries of citizenship’ (Bauböck 2007b). Demographic change has become an increasing concern of SNRPs, which have sought to increase the autonomy of the territory in order to protect distinct minority cultures in the face of globalisation and immigration (Zaslove 2004; Hepburn 2009b). According to Hussain and Miller (2006: 2), these parties ‘are driven to emphasise diversity within the wider state in order to justify separation from it. But at the same time they are driven to emphasise the unity,
coherence and identity of their sub-state “nation” or territory'. In other words, immigration poses a particular challenge to these parties in deciding whether or not to include non-nationals in their construction of a unified and distinct regional community. By prioritising the pursuit of autonomy and claiming solely to protect the interests and identity of a regional population (rather than a statewide one), SNRPs distinguish themselves from other political parties (De Winter & Türsan 1998). As such, this discussion focuses on how SNRPs have conceived citizenship and immigration as part of their territorial goals, though consideration is also given to the broader party political context in which these debates have emerged.

The article begins with some theoretical contributions to the study of citizenship, before turning specifically to the concept of regional citizenship. Within this section, the three principal components of citizenship – rights, membership and participation – are explored from a substate territorial perspective. This frames the subsequent comparative analysis of SNRP conceptions of regional citizenship. Three case studies on Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec are employed to illustrate party constructions of, and competition on, issues of citizenship and immigration at the regional level. The closing section identifies a number of factors to explain variation in regional approaches to citizenship.

**Citizenship in multi-level political systems**

Citizenship is commonly understood as a relationship between the individual and the state. As Jenson (1997: 627-8) puts it, ‘states construct the boundaries of their political community by recognizing their own citizens, often with the hope that this will generate a sense of belonging and national integration’. This understanding correlates national integration with state-building, whereby the state and the nation are considered one and the same thing. This is problematic, however, given that people have been shown to have strong attachments to more
than one political community in multi-level states (Moreno 1999; Keating 2001; Berg 2007).

How, then, may we define citizenship? ‘At a minimum, citizenship defines the population to whom the state owes protection and the persons who owe the state loyalty. To be a citizen means to enjoy certain rights and obligations, guaranteed by the state’ (Jenson 1997: 628). This conception of citizenship as exclusively conferred by the state has been dominant in the literature, in which citizenship rights have been perceived as a force for statewide integration and nation-building (Marshall 1992 [1950]). However, many scholars contend that we now live in a post-sovereign system in which identities, powers and rights are distributed across multiple levels (Keating 2001). It is no longer the state alone that ‘confers’ citizenship.

Several scholars have proclaimed the emergence of new forms of citizenship above the state. At the global level, Benhabib (2005: 674) has argued that globalisation and migration have caused ‘the lines between citizens and residents, nationals and foreigners’ to shift, thereby creating new spaces for transnational citizenship. On a similar note, Soysal (1994) argues that recent migrations have eroded the link between nationality and citizenship, leading to forms of postnational citizenship based on human rights. Other scholars have pointed to the European Union as the most advanced supranational citizenship project in the world. In the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the EU granted citizenship to all nationals of member states, which included civil rights, such as freedom of movement and access to the European Court of Justice, in addition to political rights to vote and stand in some local and European elections – though not statewide elections – and to petition the European Parliament (Jenson 2007; Shaw 2007; Painter 2008: 6). As a result of these changes, ‘while the state is clearly still a location for the rights of citizens, it is not the only one’ (Jeffery 2007: 73, italics in original). In multi-level political communities, citizenship rights have been disaggregated across multiple territorial levels. However, there is one level that has received limited
attention by social scientists as forming part of a ‘multi-level citizenship’ construct (Painter 2002). This is the level of substate regional citizenship.

Conceptualising regional citizenship

With the decentralisation of powers to substate levels of government, regions now exert authority over a wide range of areas relating to welfare entitlements, political rights and cultural integration. What implications might this have for citizenship? According to Greer and Mätzke (2009: 12), devolution reforms ‘change citizenship. They change the governments that make citizenship rights real. They thereby change the nature and content of citizenship rights’. Thus, decentralisation has led to the functional rescaling of public goods and services, and the redefinition of welfare and social values in a regional frame (Jeffery 2009). It has also resulted in an increased sense of regional identity and loyalty to the region (Benhabib 2005; Guibernau 2006; Bellamy 2008). Despite this, there has been a normative objection to enabling regions to develop their own forms of citizenship. As Castles and Davidson (2000: 209) posit, ‘There is clearly also a danger with returning management to national minorities and ethnicities…this power “from below” can rapidly turn into a new and more narrow exclusivism’. Scholars are suspicious of the potential exclusionary appeal to regional cultural identities (Painter 2008). However, this generalisation ignores the complexity of regionalisms, of which many are seen as more progressive and inclusive than state nationalisms (Keating 1996: 2001).

Despite the wealth of citizenship studies to have emerged since the 1990s, there remains no authoritative definition of citizenship (Bellamy et al. 2004). Most understandings of citizenship are limited to participation and rights, yet others have emphasised membership as another central component in the broader sense of belonging to a community (Jenson
2007). Shaw (2007) and Bellamy (2008) argue that it is necessary to include all three aspects of citizenship: incorporating rights, participation and membership. This enables an exploration of citizenship not only as a legal status, but also as an identity (Kymlicka & Norman 1994). In the following discussion I draw on this framework to consider the rights, participation and membership dimensions of regional citizenship.

Rights

The dominant approach to citizenship has been based on rights (Bellamy 2008: 603). Most famously, Marshall (1992 [1950]) distinguished between three types of citizenship rights: *civil rights* include personal liberties such as freedom of speech, movement, assembly and the right to own property; *political rights* refer to those rights which enable citizens to participate in the political process by voting or standing for election; and *social rights* consist of minimum welfare standards such as protections against the risks of ill-health, old age and unemployment. According to Marshall, each of these rights was guaranteed by the state. However, this situation no longer pertains in states of a devolved or federal nature.

As Greer and Mätzke (2009: 7) argue, when the powers and responsibilities of states are redistributed across different territorial scales, the rights associated with these functions are also rescaled. As regions are granted ever-increasing control a large number of policy areas, claims to these services and freedoms become regionally based. Yet decentralisation has had a greater impact on some rights than others. In particular, few competences have been devolved in the area of civil rights, with some exceptions such as control over criminal law (see Keating 2009: 102). However, in the realm of social and political rights, there is evidence of strong regionalisation. Political citizenship is exercised at the regional level through rights of participation in regional electoral processes (as well as state and European processes) for
residents of the region. And according to Jeffery, ‘the regionalisation of political rights of citizenship appears likely to spill over by default into a growing regionalisation of social rights’ (Jeffery 2009: 95, italics in original). Indeed, as the vast majority of social rights have been devolved in multi-level states (including health, education, social work, housing), regions are able to develop their own standards of welfare provision and offer a wider range of social services than other parts of the state (Keating 2009: 111). As a result, social policy divergence has led to uneven development of access to social citizenship (Painter 2008: 9).

**Participation**

The regionalisation of states also brings additional opportunities for citizen participation. Most notably, in asymmetric federations (whereby the constituent units of the state possess different powers) citizens who reside in a region with an elected assembly have more opportunities for political participation than those who do not (Grahl 1996). For instance, UK and EU citizens living in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Greater London enjoy greater political representation through the devolved assemblies than those living in parts of England outside London, which do not have devolved institutions (Painter 2008: 14). Yet citizenship is not only about the passive conferral of rights – it also implies active engagement in political processes and civil society (Bellamy 2008). Citizenship participation may include becoming a member of a political party, pressure group, labour union or civil society organisation. In decentralised states, citizen participation may be partially or wholly circumscribed at a regional level. For instance, scholars have demonstrated that some regions have historically maintained a civil society distinct from the rest of the state, which forms the most important social and political community for citizens of that region (Keating 1996: Guibernau 1999; Velten 2006). By becoming members of territorially circumscribed stateless nationalist and
regionalist parties, citizens may also view participation in regional political processes as more important than statewide processes, (De Winter & Hürsan 1998). Correspondingly, citizen participation in social and political processes may be achieved within a regional context.

**Membership**

Membership is the third basic building block of the modern concept of citizenship (Bellamy et al. 2004: 7). This refers to a citizen’s sense of identity and belonging, and his or her allegiance to a given political community (Painter 2002). Often, citizenship is made synonymous with nationality (Brubaker 1992). However, this correlation is problematic for a number of reasons, not least because nations are rarely congruent with states. Citizens ordinarily consider themselves to be members of several political communities, such as the city, the region, the state and Europe – though some allegiances are stronger than others (Moreno 1999: 70). As such, citizens have multi-level attachments and allegiances, whereby citizen identities may be understood as plural, contested and changeable (Berg 2007; Jenson 2007).

Furthermore, decentralisation has promoted a re-thinking of the territorial scale of belonging and strengthened citizen identification with the region (Guibernau 2006; Jeffery 2009). Regional institutions are in a position to promote a regional identity and act as agents of socialisation. As Martinez-Herrera (2002) argues, regions ‘build’ identification with the political communities they govern, whereby the presence of a regional media and education system may help foster a sense of ‘regional consciousness’. Furthermore, regional identities are strengthened if they are underpinned by claims to nationhood based on the existence of historical traditions, culture and language. Survey data reveal that, in some cases, membership of the regional political community is even stronger than state membership (Moreno 1999; Guibernau 2006). In Spain, for example, 40 per cent of Catalans and 44 per cent of Basques
identify more strongly with the region than the state, whilst only 8 per cent of Catalans and 3 per cent of Basques ‘feel more Spanish than Catalan or Basque’ (Guibernau 2006: 66). In the UK, the Scots and Welsh are less likely to identify themselves as British (only 5 per cent of Scots and 10 per cent of Welsh feel ‘more British than Scottish/Welsh’) and more likely to identify themselves as ‘more Scottish/Welsh than British’ (30 per cent of Scots and 21 per cent of Welsh) (Jeffery 2009: 87). Decentralisation has therefore contributed to the consolidation of territorial identities, whereby the region has – for many citizens – become the primary political community of allegiance and belonging.

Regions, citizenship and immigration

The development of new forms of regional rights, participation and membership raises a number of questions regarding the limits of citizenship, especially concerning immigration. Immigration marks the boundaries of citizenship and divides individuals into members and foreigners, or ‘us’ versus ‘the Other’ (Brubaker 1992: 21). Some scholars have argued that immigration threatens the culture of regions as immigrants tend to be integrated into the dominant culture of the state (Zapata-Barrero 2003: 5). In particular, immigrants often choose to learn the language of the state rather than the region in question (English rather than French in Quebec, Castilian rather than Euskadi in the Basque Country) (Carens 1995; Conversi 1997). This makes immigration an additional state-integrative or ‘centralising’ pressure on regions. But instead of rejecting immigration as a threat, Zapata-Barrero (2003) argues that regions must turn this pressure into an advantage by integrating immigrants fully into the regional community. This also implies integrating immigrants into the regional language. A common language is an important means by which to create a sense of solidarity amongst citizens in order to build social citizenship as well as a key instrument in the construction of
identity and belonging (Bellamy 2008: 599). The remainder of this article will examine the extent to which SNRPs have sought to integrate immigrants into the regional citizenry.

 Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) differentiate themselves from other (statewide) parties by pursuing substate territorial empowerment and by seeking to attain or maintain common ideals of identity, unity and autonomy on behalf of a given population (De Winter et al. 2006; Hepburn 2009a). While some scholars have criticised SNRPs as pre-modern, closed and exclusivist movements (Hobsbawm 1990), others contend that such movements can be equally forward-looking and progressive (Keating 1996; Guibernau 1999). In particular, a growing body of literature has explored the ‘welfare nationalism’ of pro-autonomy movements, which have often couched their advocacy of the welfare state in a nationalist discourse (McEwen 2002; Béland & Lecours 2009). Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties have sought to redefine welfare on a regional scale and to offer public services that are more in line with regional social values (Jeffery 2009: 550). Moreover, instead of seeking to banish the ‘other’, many SNRPs have exhibited a self-consciously ‘civic’ or liberal-democratic brand of nationalism by endorsing principles of freedom, tolerance, equality and individual rights, rather than the ‘ethnic’ variety that stresses ancestry and a common heritage (Keating 2001; Elias 2008).

 The next section analyses how SNRPs conceptualise the rights, participation and membership aspects of citizenship. It does so by exploring: (a) what rights SNRPs believe immigrants should have; (b) the extent to which SNRPs have sought to encourage the political participation of immigrant groups; and (c) whether SNRPs have integrated immigrants into their party constructions of the territory. The empirical analysis draws on material from three case-studies: Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia. All three regions possess a wide range of legislative powers and each has exhibited a strong regional identity. Importantly, SNRPs, including the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Parti québécois (PQ), and the Convergència
\(i\) Unió (CiU) party, have each made a claim to nationhood for the territory. This provides a strong basis of comparison, allowing us to explore how SNRPs employ the language of nationality in their citizenship strategies. However, the parties vary in terms of their experience in government: the PQ was in control of the Quebec provincial government from 1976-85 and 1994-2003; the CiU was in control of the Catalan government from 1980-2003; and the SNP has been in minority government in Scotland since 2007. The regions also vary with respect to their constitutional status and relations with the state, which in the case of the UK is a devolved union-state, Spain an asymmetric quasi-federal state, and Canada a federal state. Finally, they have different levels of authority with regard to immigration: Quebec has the strongest powers, having its own devolved immigration policy; Scotland the weakest, with only limited control over immigrant graduate retention; and Catalonia lies somewhere in between, with control over immigrant reception.

**Citizenship in Scotland: A multicultural project**

Although net migration into the UK has increased to the point of being at one of the highest levels in Europe, Scotland has had difficulty in attracting its relative share of the immigrant population (Wright 2004).\(^7\) There are concerns in Scotland about demographic instability, due to emigration, low birth rates and an ageing population. However, the devolved Scottish Government is constrained in its ability to address these concerns as immigration is a policy area exclusively reserved to the UK Government. In response, the Scottish National Party (SNP) – which became the party of government in Scotland in 2007 – has advocated a devolved immigration policy for Scotland as a stepping stone to full independence and, with it, full control over all matters relating to migration. A devolved immigration policy – which would require the agreement of the UK Government and most likely the passing of relevant
legislation at Westminster – would allow Scottish ministers to set a population target for the region, based on a points system that takes into consideration skills, age and education (SNP 2007). However, the SNP Government has so far been unsuccessful in pushing for devolved immigration powers. When SNP Minister Mike Russell met with the UK Immigration Minister Phil Woolas in 2009 to discuss how the points-based UK immigration system could support Scotland’s population growth targets, Woolas only agreed to promote Scotland as a place to live, and to authorise a government exchange scheme supporting temporary workers. These concessions fell short of the SNP’s goals to regionalise the points-based system to give Scotland control over selection (Scottish Government 2009a).

The SNP’s pro-immigration platform is largely uncontested in the Scottish political context, where the political elite have been ‘united and consistent in proclaiming their vision of an “inclusive” Scotland’ (Hussain & Miller 2006: 27). Notably, Labour (the SNP’s main opponent) negotiated the introduction of a ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative with the UK Government when it formed a devolved coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in 2004, to allow overseas students to apply for a two-year extension to their visa. Also of importance is the lack of success of a far-right anti-immigrant party in Scotland, which contrasts with the electoral achievements of the British National Party in England (Hopkins 2004). Owing to these factors, the Scottish political context has been amenable to the SNP’s pro-immigration approach.

Once they achieve their goal of independence, the SNP argue that they would expand the rights of immigrants by giving them full access to public services and political participation. The SNP have sought to present their citizenship policy as more open and inclusive than that of Westminster (SNP 2003a). For instance, the party criticised Westminster’s 2008 points-based system for skilled immigrants, which did not reflect ‘the needs, requirements and indeed the values of Scottish society’ (Scotsman, 30 September
The SNP also opposed Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s suggestion of creating conditions for immigrants to access social services, such as undertaking community service, which is a requirement usually imposed as a non-custodial penalty for a criminal offence (Tempest 2007). Moreover, the SNP has questioned the UK’s ‘Proud to be British’ citizenship rules which require immigrants to take special citizenship classes and an oath of loyalty to the UK, arguing that ‘it is perfectly right for newcomers to our country to have a dual identity – to be passionately proud of being Scottish, and also to retain a strong affinity to the country that they come from’ (SNP 2003b).

These policies are part of the SNP’s plan to establish a devolved immigration service, which would enable a Scottish government to ‘create a fair and efficient process for people coming to Scotland’ (SNP 2003a: 30). This would include introducing a ‘Green Card’ that sets particular criteria for immigrants to Scotland, with the aim of increasing the number of skills-targeted immigrants in Scotland by up to 50,000 every year. The SNP proposes that anyone in receipt of a Green Card would be required to live and work in Scotland, and if they moved outside of the ‘designated area’ they would be deemed an illegal immigrant (Sunday Herald, 22 August 2004). The SNP’s main rationale for introducing the Green Card is to enable Scotland to ‘compete with other nations in the global market for non-EEA highly skilled workers and…encourage migrants to seek Scottish citizenship’ (Scottish Government 2009b: 24-25). Moreover, the SNP wishes to stabilise Scotland’s population and boost the labour market so that immigrant families can contribute to high-quality public services for future generations (SNP 2007).

The SNP has strongly sought to encourage the political participation of Scottish immigrant groups. In 1995, the party established ‘Asian Scots for Independence’ in order to encourage support for the SNP amongst Asian communities in Scotland. The party also launched ‘Young Asian Scots for Independence’ in 2006 in order to encourage political
participation amongst young Asian Scots. The founder of Asian Scots for Independence, the late Bashir Ahmad, was the first ethnic minority group representative elected to the Scottish Parliament in 2007. More recently, the SNP nominated Osama Saeed, chief executive of the Scottish-Islamic Foundation, as its candidate for Glasgow Central in the 2010 General Election. These efforts to convert traditionally Labour-supporting Scottish Muslim voters to the SNP appear to have paid off. A survey conducted by Hussain and Miller (2006: chap 8) found that Scottish Pakistanis were more likely to identify with Scotland than Britain (44 per cent), were more than twice as likely to vote for the SNP than the average Scot (47 per cent), and a majority supported complete independence for Scotland (53 per cent). The authors maintained that the ‘SNP’s welcoming political stance over the years and especially its opposition to the invasion of Iraq has made it even easier for [ethnic Pakistanis] to identify with Scotland’ (Hussain & Miller 2006: 169).

The SNP’s strong inclusion of ethnic groups in its electoral strategy underlines the party’s progressive approach to the issue of Scottish membership. The SNP-led Scottish Government (2009b: 5.13) stated that ‘citizenship in Scotland would be based on an inclusive model designed to support economic growth, integration and promotion of diversity’. As such, the party argues that Scottish citizenship should be based on residency or birth, so that ‘everybody who is here regardless of where they are from would qualify for citizenship’ (SNP 1997: 7). In particular, multiculturalism has become a keyword in the SNP’s articulation of Scottish national identity since the 1990s (Leith 2008). The party ‘welcomes the contribution of Scotland’s ethnic minorities to our national life’ (SNP 2003a: 28) and seeks to create a nation ‘sensitive to the needs of other communities which are a part of the rich tapestry of Scotland’ (SNP 1997: 17). Although ethnic groups comprise only a small proportion of the electorate, they are ‘of enormous moral significance for a party that wished to stress its “civic nationalist” credentials (Hussain & Miller 2006: 34).
Citizenship in Quebec: Membership of a ‘distinct society’

Although Quebec, as part of Canada, is a point of destination for immigrants, it has also had difficulty in retaining newcomers. In the 1970s and 1980s there were serious concerns about Quebec’s declining population, resulting from a low fertility rate and problems of outward migration. To tackle these problems, the Liberal government of Quebec signed the Canada-Quebec Accord (1991), which gave Quebec control over 60 per cent of its immigration and enabled the selection and integration of immigrants.8 As a result, Quebec now has its own points-based system with very little input from the federal government. The Parti québécois (PQ) was instrumental in pressing for this new immigration policy for Quebec, having put forward legislation as early as 1979 to widen the powers of the Quebec government in selecting and integrating immigrants (Kelley & Treblicock 1998: 392). In particular, the PQ demanded that a Quebec-specific immigration policy should focus on recruiting more French-speakers to the province – a goal that was achieved in the 1991 Accord. Upon coming to power in 1994, the PQ government set out a policy that aimed to facilitate access to French-language courses and to promote the integration of immigrants in Quebec society (see below).

However, Quebec nationalists have also at times perceived immigration as a threat to Quebec’s cultural survival. This is because immigrants have tended to view the English language as a better vehicle for social mobility, thereby augmenting the ‘majority’ culture of Canada (Ghosh 2004: 558). In particular, immigration has recently become a flashpoint of debate over the ‘reasonable accommodation’ of cultural differences. Several incidents in 2007, such as the passing of a ‘code of conduct’ by the town of Hérouxville that prohibited ‘non-Western’ practices, was symptomatic of popular anxiety about threats posed to the ‘common public culture’ in Quebec (Bouchard & Taylor 2008). However, while the PQ
immediately decried the Hérouxville code as an isolated case that was not reflective of Quebec values, public concerns over cultural differences gave rise to an anti-immigrant neoliberal nationalist party – the Action démocratique du Québec – that temporarily relegated the PQ to third-party status in Quebec (Bélanger 2008). In contrast to the PQ, the ADQ used the Hérouxville code to ‘fuel a populist discourse around the “reasonable accommodation” of cultural difference’ (Nieguth & Lacassagne 2009: 6). Compared to Scotland, this was a far more challenging political terrain for the PQ’s pro-immigration platform.

During this period, the PQ sought to tighten its position on immigration primarily by restricting the political rights of non-French-speaking immigrants. The party proposed a new ‘constitution’ for Quebec (Bill 195) that made Quebec citizenship conditional upon ‘an appropriate knowledge of French’ and ‘an appropriate knowledge of Quebec’ rather than simply a knowledge of either one of Canada’s two official languages (National Assembly of Quebec 2007: Art 49.2). This meant that an immigrant would be barred from holding public office, raising funds for political parties or petitioning the National Assembly for redress of a grievance if s/he was unable to pass a French proficiency test. Opposition parties denounced this proposal as retrogressive and in violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the bill was tabled (Canadian Press, 24 October 2007). In response, PQ leader Pauline Marois argued that a Quebec citizenship based on language requirements would send a strong message to immigrants who too often chose English when they arrived (CBC News, 20 October 2007). Although some members of the party did not support Bill 195, the PQ leadership’s restrictive position lent some credence to concerns that nationalists are still wary of opening their nationhood to immigrants who are not pure laine (Balthazar 1993; Berry 1996: 228).

To be sure, the PQ has actively sought to court the immigrant vote in Quebec and encourage immigrant participation in the political process. Yet the PQ has had a much more
difficult time convincing ethnic and immigrant groups that it is fully representative of their interests. Unlike the SNP, the PQ has not established any immigrant pressure groups that are tied to the party, and it has failed to elect many immigrant candidates to parliament. For example, in the 1998 provincial elections, only one ethnic minority representative was elected to the Quebec National Assembly for the PQ; all other minority Members of the National Assembly (83 per cent) were Liberals (Simard 2000: 15). This has led to criticisms that Quebec nationalists are ‘more concerned with defending the political interests of Quebecers of French origin, consequently alienating ethnic candidates’ (ibid). Equally, the PQ has failed to win the electoral support of a large section of the immigrant population. Instead, a majority of immigrant groups rejected the option of sovereignty in the 1980 and 1995 referendums and have consistently voted against the PQ in elections since 1976 (O’Shea 2000: 90). This led Jacques Parizeau, former PQ Premier of Quebec, to blame the defeat of the YES option in the 1995 sovereignty referendum on ‘money and the ethnic vote’. This declaration, which was later denounced by other PQ leaders, fuelled considerable resentment among ethnic minorities (Labelle 2003: 9).

Despite this, the Parti québécois has long espoused an associative civic nationalism, whereby the ‘membership’ dimension of citizenship is based on residence. The PQ defines the nation by political criteria, whereby the residents of the province of Quebec are Québécois, which is made up of ‘toutes les personnes qui ont choisi le Québec comme terre d’adoption’ (PQ 2003: 86). Following the defeat of the 1995 referendum, the PQ sought to foster a sense of membership and belonging among immigrant groups. In 1996, the PQ renamed the Ministère des communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration du Québec the Ministère des relations avec les citoyens et de l’immigration, which was interpreted as an invitation for ‘the whole Quebec citizenry, including new immigrants, to develop a sense of belonging to the peuple québécois and to the Quebec political community’ (Labelle 2003: 6). In addition, the
PQ government sought to create a number of symbolic markers of an inclusive citizenship, including a citizenship Week and citizenship Awards (Labelle 2003: 7). These initiatives were an important step towards the creation of an inclusive Quebec society. At the same time, the PQ maintains that language is central to Quebec identity, and it has sought to fully integrate immigrants into a French-speaking Quebec (Keating 1996). This has included requiring immigrants to send their children to French-speaking schools, to ensure the survival of the minority language (Carens 1995). As such, the PQ’s conception of citizenship means that language and residency – and not ethnicity – are the only requirements for becoming a Quebec citizen.

_Citizenship in Catalonia: Linguistic integration_

Catalonia is one of the wealthiest regions in Spain and has had an open immigration policy since its economic expansion in the 1960s, attracting at first southern Spaniards and later North Africans and South Americans (Maluquer 1998). Immigrants have accounted for approximately 40 per cent of Catalonia’s total population since the 1960s (Keating 1996: 166)\(^9\), which the _Convergència i Unió_ has welcomed as beneficial to the economy and the Catalan nation. Like the SNP, the CiU has sought to present its approach to immigration as more open than that of the Spanish state. In 2001, the CiU-led Catalan government drafted an immigration policy that had a greater emphasis on social rights and citizenship than the state immigration law (Sedura i Mas 2001). The CiU’s more progressive approach to immigration was continued by the tripartite government of the PSC (_Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya_), ERC (_Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya_) and IC-V (_Iniciativa per Catalunya – Verds_) that was elected in Catalonia in 2003. In particular, both the ERC and the PSC are strongly supportive of advancing immigrant rights (Velten 2006; Davis 2008: 9). In 2006, Catalonia
was granted a new Statute of Autonomy that delineated specific powers over immigration, including the reception and socioeconomic integration of immigrants (Generalitat, 2006: Art. 138). Based on these powers, the CiU supported the tripartite government’s proposed Pact for Immigration in 2008. This led to a bill for the reception of immigrants in 2009, which was designed to assist with immigrant integration, based on knowledge of the Catalan language, local society and customs (Generalitat 2008, 2009). The text states that all immigrants with at least three years of residency in Catalonia may obtain definitive residency if they can speak and understand Catalan. Yet whilst the Left has sought to extend the rights of immigrants, the right-wing Partido Popular opposed the Pact and advanced a much more restrictive and security-focused policy on immigration (Davis 2008). The increase in regional government control over immigration since 2006 has served to polarise the issue of immigration in Catalonia, to which the CiU has been forced to respond.

Previous CiU governments from 1980-2003 openly welcomed the arrival of ‘newcomers’ and sought to advance immigrant rights and services to assist with their integration into Catalan society. Linguistic rights were of particular concern to the party. In the 1980s, the CiU enacted a language ‘normalisation’ law to accomplish ‘full integration of the non-Catalan population into the Catalan culture, so as not to create cultural ghettos’ (cited in MacInnes 2006: 680). In the area of social rights, former CiU governments incorporated immigrants into welfare state services, and immigrants were offered free Catalan language immersion courses, whereby the ability to speak Catalan was seen as a ‘badge of achieved status’ (Keating 1996). More recently, as a condition of signing the 2008 Pact of Immigration, the CiU insisted that immigrants be given local voting rights and full citizenship after five years of permanent residence (La Vanguardia, 19 December 2008). For the CiU, the goal was not to achieve a multicultural society but to assimilate immigrants into the Catalan community so that the nation remained culturally distinct from the rest of Spain (CiU 2008).
Yet this strong emphasis on assimilation has at times edged towards a more restrictive understanding of citizenship. For instance, during the debates surrounding the revised Statute, the party argued that only immigrants with knowledge of the Catalan language should be given equal access to social services (Hens 2006). More recently, the CiU has proposed a system of social benefits and rewards for well-behaved immigrants (*The Economist*, 4 February 2010). The CiU’s proposed ‘voluntary contract’ for immigrants, whereby knowledge of the Catalan language and culture would guarantee access to more public services, was criticised by the CiU’s opponents as a ‘human rights ration card’ (*El país*, 21 October 2006).

With regard to the ‘participation’ dimension of citizenship, immigrants in Catalonia lack political representation and channels to influence the political process. Very few parliamentary representatives have been born outside Catalonia (MacInnes 2006). In particular, while the CiU has sought to welcome immigrants as members of the Catalan nation-building project, the party has yet to elect an immigrant to the Catalan Parliament. Indeed, only the ERC has succeeded in electing a representative of immigrant origin – a Maghrebi – to the regional parliament in 2006, whilst making the voting rights and the civic and political participation of immigrants a central theme in its election campaigns (Velten 2006). Otherwise, the CiU has made only moderate attempts to build electoral support amongst immigrant groups and none of the Catalan political parties has developed any formal connections to immigrant associations (Velten 2006).

Yet the CiU has – in similarity to the SNP and PQ – expressed a liberal-democratic national identity, which includes foreigners as members of the stateless nation. This position is encapsulated in former CiU leader Jordi Pujol’s (1976) assertion that ‘everyone who lives and works in Catalonia and has a wish to be so and feels tied to this land, is Catalan’. For the CiU, membership of the Catalan nation is based on civic and territorial markers, rather than
race or descent (Conversi 1997). However in Catalonia, as in Quebec, language remains a strong marker of identity and has been used as a tool for assimilation. Linguistic normalisation, which compels immigrants to become ‘culturally Catalan’, is central to the CiU’s nation-building project in Catalonia (Keating 1996). Furthermore, some scholars have criticised the former CiU government’s non-linguistic cultural assimilation practices, such as the preferential funding of mainly Catholic private-sector schooling (Davis 2008). This is especially contentious in light of new waves of immigrants from North Africa with a Muslim heritage, which Pujol once described in 2001 as a threat to Catalonia (MacInnes 2006). More recently, the CiU’s 2006 election campaign director stated that the party favoured recruiting East European immigrants over North Africans because Muslims found it harder to integrate (MacInnes 2006: 690). In the context of these remarks, it is not surprising that only one in twenty immigrants perceive themselves as belonging to a Catalan nation rather than a Spanish one (ibid). In any case, whilst the CiU has generally succeeded in quashing strains of ethnic nationalism within the party, it is clear that rather than advocating a multicultural approach to regional citizenship that recognises diversity, the CiU’s goal is to fully assimilate newcomers into the culture of Catalonia.

Comparing party responses to immigration and citizenship

This analysis demonstrates that, whilst there are similarities in the ways in which stateless nationalist and regionalist parties in the three case studies articulate regional citizenship, in practice they have developed a variety of responses to questions of immigrant integration. The Scottish National Party, the Parti Québécois, and the Convergència i Unió have all advocated ‘civic’ and ‘territorial’ approaches to citizenship membership, whereby anyone living in the territory may consider him/herself to be part of that political community. But in reality, some
SNRPs have created barriers to the other two dimensions of citizenship. With regard to *rights*, for example, the CiU has advocated linguistic requirements to access social services in Catalonia, whilst the PQ has suggested that immigrants must demonstrate proficiency in the French language before being eligible to vote. And on the matter of *participation*, only the SNP has actively encouraged immigrant groups to vote and engage in political processes by creating affiliated organisations such as Asians for Independence. What factors might explain the differing responses of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties to immigrant integration?

It is possible to identify three variables that correlate with the observed difference in party responses. The first factor of importance is the degree of party polarisation on immigration. In Scotland, for instance, there was very little polarisation on this issue. Scottish political parties were unanimously pro-immigration and united in their pleas for tolerance and diversity. This has enabled the SNP to develop an inclusive conception of the Scottish nation that welcomes full citizenship for immigrants, which is largely unchallenged due to the lack of success of anti-immigrant parties in Scotland. Furthermore, the SNP does not face competition from other stateless nationalist and regionalist parties with more exclusive approaches to questions of immigration and cultural diversity, and as such, it does not have to defend its claim to represent the Scottish nation or protect a Scottish culture from a competitor SNRP. The situation was quite different in the other two cases.

In Quebec, the issue of immigration was polarised by parties. In particular, the PQ faced an anti-immigrant nationalist competitor in the form of the ADQ, which forced the party to strengthen its claim to be the main defender of the French culture and language in Quebec by tightening its rules on immigrants’ knowledge of French. Tellingly, it was at the height of the success of the ADQ, which argued that ‘concessions’ to immigrants had gone too far, that Pauline Marois began outlining her plans for a Quebec constitution that restricted the political rights of non-French speaking immigrants. While competition with the ADQ resulted in the
PQ taking a stricter position on immigration in the 2000s, competition with federalist parties (Liberals and Progressive Conservatives) also explains why the PQ adopted a stronger ethnic definition of Quebec identity and a more ambivalent attitude to immigrants during the 1995 sovereignty referendum. Bloemraad (2001) finds that the PQ initially appealed to a broad cultural identity that included non-Francophones and immigrants. However, during the weeks before the referendum, the party shifted to a much narrower ethnic conception of collective identity. This was largely due to the bitter competition between the YES and NO sides of the referendum, with Deputy Premier Bernard Landry accusing the federalist NO camp of ‘using non-integrated immigrants to purposefully inhibit all Quebecers from choosing to join the society of nation-states’ (La Presse, 14 October 1995; cited in Bloemraad 2001: 295). In response, the federalist camp attacked the PQ for being ethnocentric nationalists, and the PQ reverted to citing the historical exploitation of French Canada at the hands of the English as a motivation for gaining independence. Therefore, owing to party polarisation on immigrant belonging and integration, the PQ increasingly made emotional appeals to ‘old-stock’ Quebecers, whilst placing immigrant groups onto the ‘them’ side of the ‘us versus them’ (or French versus English) fence.

In Catalonia, parties also polarised the issue of immigration. For instance, the centre-right CiU faced competition from a left-wing nationalist party (ERC) with a more progressive immigration approach, and a right-wing party with a more restrictive immigration approach (PP), which required the CiU to carve out a more distinct niche for itself. In particular, when the CiU was forced out of power in 2003, it adopted a more populist approach to immigration that sought to restrict access to social rights, which contrasted with the tripartite government’s commitment to expanding such rights (Davis 2009). Therefore, whilst the PQ moved onto the populist nationalist terrain of the ADQ by seeking to restrict the political rights of immigrants in response to the right-wing nationalist threat, the CiU sought to distinguish itself from its
left-wing nationalist competitor by proposing fewer social rights than the tripartite Catalan government during the debates leading to the new Statute of Autonomy.

Second, language appears to be a crucial endogenous variable. Linguistic proficiency in French or Catalan is the main barrier for becoming a citizen in Quebec and Catalonia. As language constitutes the main aspect of nationality in both cases, the creation of a linguistic requirement for citizenship is related to fears that French- and Catalan-speakers would be ‘submerged’ as a result of immigration. In response, the immigration goals of the CiU and PQ have been to ensure immigrants’ cultural adaptation into the regional political community. Whilst there was a difference in the two parties’ chosen area of ‘conditionality’ – that is, access to social or political rights – the main issue was actually creating conditions for citizenship that required linguistic and cultural integration (or assimilation) of immigrants. It may be argued that these conditions were not entirely motivated by reasons of discrimination. Instead, through their linguistic assimilation policies, Quebec and Catalan SNRPs have sought to create a new generation of minority language-speakers to struggle for recognition of their distinctiveness, with immigrants envisioned as joining the ‘ranks’ of the stateless nation. In contrast, language is not the main carrier of the nationalist movement in Scotland. There are few fears for the future of Scottish culture, which is defined broadly as having a Scottish identity, rather than being able to speak a certain language. For instance, in a qualitative study involving 22 interviews and 11 focus groups with young Muslim men in Scotland, markers of ‘being Scottish’ involved having a Scottish accent, being brought up in Scotland, watching football, drinking Irn-bru (a local soft drink) and having an appreciation of Scotland’s natural environment and people (Hopkins 2004: 265). Owing to the lack of language as a marker for nationality in Scotland, barriers to citizenship appear to be much lower than in the other cases.

A third factor influencing party responses to immigration is the extent to which regional governments control immigration policy. Whilst Quebec has control over the
selection and integration of immigrants (since 1991), Catalonia only has control over immigrant reception (since 2006), whilst Scotland has no control over either selection or integration (its sole responsibility is the ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative). Indeed, the Scottish Government’s lack of legislative authority on migration issues has led to demands for greater control over immigration by all parties in Scotland, as immigration is universally seen to affect the provision of devolved services such as health and education. As a result of Scotland’s limited control over immigration policy, Scottish parties largely endorsed SNP demands for greater powers to encourage immigrants to live and work in Scotland. Therefore, the lack of devolved control over immigration in Scotland has subdued polarisation on this issue and united parties to focus on demanding more powers.

In contrast, various PQ and Liberal governments in Quebec have succeeded in obtaining greater provincial control over immigration. The Canada-Quebec Accord was designed to offset falling birth rates and curb outward migration, a goal that the SNP emulates. However, greater control over immigration policy has also led to greater polarisation on this issue. For example, whilst the Quebec Liberal Party is content with Quebec’s current immigration powers, and the PQ wants full control to assimilate immigrants into a French language-based Quebec citizenship, the ADQ emerged in the wake of the 1991 Accord with the goal of restricting immigration to Quebec. Thus, party polarisation occurred around the actual powers that Quebec exercises with regard to immigration. Similarly, polarisation on immigration in Catalonia increased during the period before and after the re-writing of the Statute of Autonomy when Catalonia was granted control over reception of immigrants. This gave the region exclusive power over the insertion of immigrants into Catalan society and culture, and executive powers over the issuance of work permits. However, Catalan parties have responded to the creation of these new powers in different ways: while the ERC voted against the Statute for failing to meet nationalist aspirations and
demanded even more devolved powers to give immigrants increased rights, the CiU moved to a position that demanded greater regional powers in order to reduce immigration flows to Catalonia (and to determine the country of origin). For instance, during the debates on the revised Statute Jordi Pujol favoured greater regulation of immigration to Catalonia because the influx of immigrants had ‘broken the seams of Catalonia’ (Barcelona Reporter, 9 June 2006). Therefore, the degree of regional government control over immigration is an important factor in determining party responses to immigration and polarisation on this issue.

**Conclusion**

This article has argued that there are now multiple sites of citizenship in devolved and federal states, whereby there has been a reconfiguration of citizenship both beyond and beneath the boundaries of the state. In particular, there is compelling evidence to suggest a consolidation of citizenship at the regional level. This is due to the decentralisation of state powers in the areas of social welfare, the emergence of new forms of political representation and participation in devolved institutions, and the persistence of regional identities and attachments. Citizenship is intrinsically linked to immigration policy, as migration highlights the boundaries of citizenship. However, until very recently, debates on immigration have presupposed that the receiving society and the receiving state have coincided (Zapata-Barrero 2003: 3). This is not the case in multi-level states, in which there exist regions with a strong sense of identity and distinct political cultures. For that reason, immigration has become a mobilising issue for stateless nationalist and regionalist parties, which have sought to protect and advance regional identities and interests.
The case studies revealed that stateless nationalist and regionalist parties have sought to create an alternative framework to the state for realising citizenship rights. However, whilst the SNP, PQ and CiU all proclaim to abide by a civic definition of regional membership and advocate increasing immigrant newcomers to their territories, in practice the PQ and CiU have also levied certain conditions on immigrants’ full participation in the regional society and political life. The SNP, meanwhile, has avoided creating barriers to regional citizenship. This article identified three explanations for this: (1) the SNP does not face an anti-immigrant or SNRP competitor and so its pro-immigration approach is largely uncontested in the Scottish political arena; (2) the vast majority of Scots (over 98 per cent) speak English and so language is no more a political issue for immigrant integration than it is anywhere else in the UK; and (3) the lack of devolved control over immigration has subdued polarisation on the issue.

Whilst these three variables have helped to explain variation in SNRP conceptions of citizenship and immigration in Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia, there is scope for developing future research agendas based on these factors to determine the positioning of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties on citizenship and immigrant integration elsewhere. For instance, in Flanders language was extremely important in determining Vlaams Belang’s (VB) anti-immigrant position, as immigrants to Belgium were likely to adopt French rather than Flemish as their language of choice and therefore assimilate into the ‘dominant’ Francophone culture (Martiniello 2003). VB also demanded greater regional powers over immigration to halt the tide of ‘foreigners’, with capacity to deport immigrants who failed to integrate. Yet perhaps the most important factor determining the response of VB was party polarisation, whereby Flemish parties have adopted a range of positions on immigration, most notably the left-wing nationalist party Spirit adopting a more inclusive pro-immigrant position. In the case of the Lega Nord in Italy we can observe different dynamics. The perceived threat to
language is far less important than the perceived threat to Padania’s Celtic, Christian, and western culture (Zaslove 2004; Hepburn 2009b). Furthermore, increasing regional powers over immigration was not a priority for the Lega, which fields candidates throughout several electoral regions in northern Italy. Instead, the Lega perceives itself as a statewide political player, and as such has sought to halt further immigration to Italy as a whole. Again, what may be more relevant in determining the Lega’s response is party polarisation, whereby immigration has become a highly contested issue in Italian politics.

Although anti-immigrant SNRPs clearly exist, this article has demonstrated that these parties cannot be conceived as a homogenous group that are ethnically oriented and exclusionary in matters of immigration. Rather, it shows us that SNRPs may develop pro-immigrant platforms that are based on a civic conception of membership of the regional community. Moreover, the case analysis reveals that ‘immigrants can be active participants in the nationalist movement’ (Conversi 1997: 218) by increasing the population of the regional community; sharing in the common identity, culture and language of the region; and even taking up the goal of self-determination (evident in the Scottish case). To that end, regional citizenship should not be greeted with suspicion ‘lest it be grounded in potentially exclusionary appeals to regional cultural identity’ (Painter 2002: 8). This analysis has revealed that SNRPs have pragmatic and often progressive approaches to the question of immigration and citizenship, whereby the region may be constructed on a civic basis, and advocated as a more inclusive and tolerant community than the state.
References


SNP (1997). YES WE CAN Win the Best for Scotland. The SNP General Election Manifesto

39


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1 Although all three cases employed in this article have been described as ‘stateless nations’ (Keating 1996; Guibernau 1999), this article uses the term ‘region’ to describe an institutional unit that lies between the state and local levels, which has become standard terminology for comparative institutional analysis.

2 Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) seek to represent and advance the particular interests of the substate territory, which often includes obtaining or enhancing autonomy for their respective territory. For an in-depth analysis of the ‘core business’ of the SNRP party family, see Hepburn (2009a).

3 The UK is the sole state in Europe to grant non-nationals regional voting rights (Shaw 2007).

4 Studies on individual attachments to the local level are extremely rare (Berg 2007: 29). While local identities are often present, comparative work on the strength of local identity is prohibited by difficulties in defining the relevant territorial unit across cases – be it a city, county, municipality, province etc. Lacking such data, it is impossible to speculate whether or not local identities are generally stronger or weaker than regional identities.

5 This data was taken from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Datos de Opinión in 2003.

6 This data was taken from the British Social Attitudes Survey, Wales Life and Times Survey and Scottish Social Attitudes Survey in 2007.

7 As of 30 June 2008, 289,000 people (5.59 per cent of Scotland’s total population) were born abroad (ONS 2009). In the 2001 census, the ethnic minority population in Scotland stood at just over 100,000 (2 per cent of Scotland’s total population) (ONS 2003). Pakistanis are the largest minority ethnic group (31 per cent), followed by Chinese (16 per cent), and Indians (15 per cent) (Scottish Executive 2004).

8 Granting the Quebec government control over selection, through its own points system, was seen as a possible tool to revitalise Quebec’s population. Almost 25 per cent of the population is now of non-French descent, and visible minorities are increasing in numbers (Ghosh 2004). In 2000, the percentage of the ethnic minority population of Quebec stood at 13 per cent, reaching 26 per cent in the city of Montreal (Simard 2000: 13). Among recent immigrants, the largest percentage comes from China, India, the Philippines and Pakistan. Immigration from Asia – including the Middle East – has increased dramatically in the last two decades (Statistics Canada 2007).

9 More recent figures put the immigrant population of Catalonia at 10 per cent in 2007, having increased fourfold since 2000, when the number stood at 2.3 per cent of the total population (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2008). The most numerous immigrant populations in Catalonia are Moroccan, Ecuadorian and Columbian (see Velten 2006).

10 The Catalan government passed a Reception Bill in June 2009 that created reception services for immigrants, which include holding interviews with a reception agent and providing information and training on aspects relating to Catalan society, the labour market, immigrant rights and the Catalan language. The document also
established Catalan as a common and standard language in the reception process and reinforced the learning of the language, following the measures established in the Pact for Immigration (Generalitat 2009).

11 MacInnes (2006) drew his analysis from data provided by the Centro de Investigaciones Estudios Nos 2410 (2001) and 2610 (2005).

12 The 2001 census showed a total of 58,969 Gaelic speakers in Scotland, which constitutes 1.2 per cent of the total population (ONS 2003).