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Chapter 15

Substate strategies in response to Europeanizing and globalizing trends

Eve Hepburn

15.1 Introduction

Most approaches to globalization focus almost exclusively on its impact on the economies, cultures, political structures and legal systems of states. More often than not, these aspects of statehood are considered to be under grave threat by global economic restructuring, the strengthening of suprastate political institutions, international law and the evolution of a (Western-dominated) world culture. Some modernist theorists have gone so far as to predict that globalizing processes will eventually erode state boundaries and undermine egotistic nationalism to the point that we have created a global society (Hobsbawm 1990; Badie 1995). This is considered to be a normatively desirable outcome. Yet these state-centric accounts of the restructuring of territory at the end of the twentieth century neglect an important component of this global transformation. Whilst state sovereignty is being undermined by globalizing pressures, state competences are equally being eroded by substate regionalizing pressures. These pressures have
arisen from cultural, economic and political factors specific to the territory, which have been mobilized by substate actors to advance territorial interests. Yet they have also developed in response to the reconfiguration of the state resulting from globalization, and in defence of substate cultures and economies in the face of global pressures. In other words, the process of globalization has – counter-intuitively – reinforced territorial claims.

With the trend towards decentralization across states, scholars of territorial politics have explored how substate regions have become increasingly important actors in supranational political structures and global markets (Jeffery 1997; Keating 1998; Storper 1999). Many of these studies have focused on regional engagement in the European Union (EU) – a body of institutions that were created as a result of the globalization at the end of the Second World War. But whilst globalization and European integration can be considered as similar processes – in terms of unifying markets, creating new structures of multi-level governance, and rendering territorial borders ‘fuzzy’ – there are some crucial differences. Unlike globalization, European integration has been accompanied by the creation of institutions with which to steer these processes, thereby limiting the impact of free market forces on the territories of Europe, and bringing an important political dimension to integration which the United Nations (UN) can only envy.

Europe also offers several channels for substate regions to influence the nature of integrationist decision-making. From the 1980s, there have been demands for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ to sit alongside, or even replace, a Europe of the States. However, regions’ ability to take advantage of opportunities to
increase their voice in the EU varies depending on a number of factors, including their political weight, economic strength and constitutional status. This chapter will explore how regional actors have used different strategies to enhance their powers and influence during this period of structural change. It draws upon three diverse cases to illustrate the uneven impact of globalization and European integration on different places: Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia. The discussion focuses on how substate actors may seek more autonomy to respond locally to European and global challenges, and how they use state and European structures to protect and advance their territorial interests in response to globalization.

15.2 The Westphalian State versus the Global, European, Regional?

The processes of globalization, European integration and substate regionalization have upset many traditional assumptions regarding the distribution of power, functions and authority across and within states. Some scholars have bewailed the ‘emptying’ or ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Rhodes 1994), whilst others speak of a return to a prestate model along the lines of the Holy Roman Empire, with autonomous localities and city-states competing for trade and territorial expansion (Halden 2006). Although these predictions may appear to be exaggerated, the transformation of territory does force us to question our assumptions about how space is constructed. In the 1960s and 1970s political geographers began questioning the state’s status as a bounded, historically- and geographically-
determined entity. Instead, they pointed to the social construction of territory,
serving to demystify and de-emphasize state and regional boundaries (Cox 1973;
Agnew 1987). Moreover, they highlighted how other geographical scales, such as
locality and region, constitute politics on different levels. The previous primacy of
state-centred models, argue Agnew and Corbridge (1995: pp. 84-94), was based
on the assumption that states have exclusive power within territories and that state
boundaries define societal boundaries. This exclusive sovereignty no longer holds
given that states are entering international agreements where sovereignty is shared,
global economic developments undermine the state’s capacity for economic
management, and where regional mobilization challenges the authority of the
state.

Globalization is a complex, uneven process involving an increased
interdependence and interconnectivity in the global economic, political, social,
cultural and ecological spheres. Although Ohmae’s (1994) claim that we are living
in a ‘borderless world’ remains highly contentious, many scholars have
acknowledged that state borders have become permeated and porous, allowing a
range of actors to become involved in global transactions, from multinational
corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to website ‘bloggers’
(Anderson and O’Dowd 1999). One scholar has even argued that globalization
will lead to ‘continuing de-territorialization of social, political, and economic
structures, and, consequently, the role of physical space as a determinant of human
behaviour will diminish as is manifest today in the expansion of electronic
communications, the rise of global, universal human rights, and the
decentralization of production’ (Teune 2004; cited in Lachapelle and Paquin 2003: p. 6). These types of assertions are staples of the modernist approach, which asserts that globalization will herald the diffusion and standardization of legal, economic and political norms and behaviour, the replacement of territorial with functional cleavages, the breakdown of particularist and pre-modern ties, and the ironing-out of territorial variations.

This chapter contends that globalization has not made the nation state obsolete, nor will it lead to an excessive standardization of legal, economic and political system. Rather, by transforming the functions of the nation-state and enabling a range of non-state actors to become involved in global economic, political and cultural processes, globalization has opened up new possibilities for substate territorial engagement. Substate regions have become important sites for economic development, and offer specific advantages on global markets. In defiance of a homogenous global culture, regions have valorised local traditions and cultures as a strength and resource to be exploited in international markets and to raise their competitive advantages. Many regions, for instance, have sought to ‘connect global trends with local traditions’ – a process known as ‘glocalization’ (Hospers and Benneworth 2005). Furthermore, in the political sphere, legislative regions have become active in the practice of ‘paradiplomacy’ (a term implying the external relations of substate regions), and some have developed international aid programmes. Instead of increasing uniformity, then, there is strong evidence to suggest that globalization has reinforced territorial diversity.
Yet there are, of course, limitations to what regions can do on the world stage. Although regions have responded locally to globalizing economic, cultural and political processes, their ability to influence and steer global developments are curtailed by their lack recognition, influence and power. International bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ignore substate territories altogether and instead define ‘regions’ in macro terms (Africa, Europe, Asia), whilst it is states alone that are exclusively invited into the UN. Even though regions are invariably affected by international trade and diplomatic agreements (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which for example required Canadian provinces to make adjustments to their statutes), they have no input into decision-making on these areas, as foreign affairs are the reserve of the centre – in federal and devolved states, as well as unitary ones. So how can regions assert their interests in the face of globalization when states are still pulling the few ‘strings’ that are left?

The following discussion explores how regions have sought to use the EU as a means of advancing and protecting their autonomy during the period of increased globalization. The European Union – which is a transregional product of globalization – and European integration – which can be seen as institutionalized globalization on a European scale – have offered regions an opportunity to participate in, and sometimes influence, political decision-making. As Bartolini (2005) observes, European integration has opened up possibilities to pursue regional interests that were once ‘closed’ by the expansion of the nation-state. (By European integration I refer to a process of institution-building, policy-making and
agenda-formation that allows for the formulation of interests and representation at
different territorial levels.) There has been a strengthening and deepening of
regional engagement in the EU due to the trend towards decentralization, and
simultaneously, an emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, which implies taking
decisions at the lowest level possible. Regional actors are now able to frame their
interests and demands at levels of authority beyond the state, and European
institutions, networks and lobbying organizations present certain opportunities for
regions to advance their interests and develop common ground in the face of
global challenges.

15.3 The Reassertion of Regions

In a world where state sovereignty has been penetrated from above and below,
territorial boundaries have become open-ended and indeterminate. This is
especially evident in the European Union, where ‘the roles of regions and their
boundaries are increasingly fuzzy since the open international markets put
regions… increasingly into competition’ (Paasi 2001: p. 15). With the
globalization of trade, finance and production, it has become apparent that the
market assumes different forms in different places, rather than leading to the
homogenization of market norms across territories. These ‘places’ are not
necessarily states, but rather regions situated within or cutting across nation-states.
Furthermore, the new ‘forms’ of markets – in particular the replacement of Fordist
by post-Fordist (i.e. mass to specialized) types of production – highlight the territorially specific nature of capitalist development. Regions, so long seen as an integral part of the state, have emerged as important areas for economic development.

The experience of regions shows that companies do not have to be large and centralized to compete successful on world markets. Small businesses are able to thrive in particular regions because they form clusters of cooperation (Piore and Sabel 1984), a result of shared cultural practices, the existence of strong social networks and the development of ‘social capital’ that contains ‘the features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’ (Putnam 1993, p. 167). These networks may be either rooted in traditional practices, such as craft production, or created by new technological spaces and the demands of the knowledge economy (Storper 1995). Regions thus appear to offer specific competitive advantages in the new markets.

Regions not only exist as sites of economic activity, but also of political mobilization. Regions now operate within a post-sovereign or ‘post-Westphalian’ order in which authority is dispersed (Linklater 1998; Keating 2001), and where European integration has a direct impact on regional policy capacity. The notion of a ‘third level’ has been introduced in regionalism studies, which describes the new forms of regional engagement with Europe (Bullman 1994; Jeffery 1997). The reform of the European Regional Development Fund in 1988, which was established as an inter-state transfer mechanism in 1975, encouraged regions to
forge direct relations with European institutions in shaping development policies. In the EU-15, this led to the articulation of ‘political demands in regional terms and provided objects for political mobilisation’ (Hooghe and Keating 1994, p. 370). More recently, there were pressures on Central and Eastern European states in the 2004 enlargement round to create ‘regions’ in order to manage European structural funds (Keating and Hughes 2003).

Other aspects of a new regional role are indicated by the proliferation of European-wide regional organizations, networks and lobbying organizations (Hooghe 1995; De Winter 2001). The creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994, as stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty, provides a political arena for voicing regional demands. The CoR, which remains largely an advisory body, nevertheless created the first formal recognition of substate governments in the EU. In addition to the CoR, over 140 regional information offices have been established in Brussels to lobby European institutions, monitor European Community regulations and support regional proposals. Clearly, regions are seeking more access to European institutions and networks in order to give voice to their territorial interests. But one cannot assume that all regions view the processes of European integration in a positive light. As Jeffery (2004) has shown, whilst some regions have argued for Europe to ‘let them in’, others have demanded that Europe ‘leave them alone’. Some regions have begun to feel disempowered by European integration because of the way that competences are demarcated between the member states and Europe. To that end, they have sought to prevent the state from transferring regional competences upwards.
Regions can employ two strategies to protect and advance their interests in the face of globalizing and Europeanizing pressures: (1) autonomy strategies, where regional actors seek the constitutional recognition of a territory, ranging from independence to federalism or devolution; and (2) strategies to enhance the policy capacity of the region. The latter may include demands for more access to state and European bodies in order to increase regional representation, more control over resources, and protection from the state against unwanted global and European pressures. The following section will explore how three diverse regions have responded to European integration, and how they have interpreted and employed these two strategies to meet their own territorial needs.

15.4 Comparing Regional Strategies in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia

Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia are three economically, politically and legislatively diverse regions. The first is considered a ‘nation’ in a devolved political system, the second a ‘free state’ in a federalized system, and the third a ‘special region’ in a decentralizing system. Moreover, each has varying levels of economic power: whilst Bavaria is one of the richest regions in Europe, Sardinia is one of the poorest, and Scotland is somewhere in between. But what makes these regions comparable is the emergence of political actors seeking greater influence and power for the territory, the fact that the constitutional issue is open and contested, and that it has been linked to processes of suprastate integration. The aim of this
comparision is to examine the differential nature of territorial mobilization in
response to Europeanizing and globalizing pressures. For although the challenges
and opportunities of European integration and globalization are the same for all
regions, their responses vary significantly.

15.4.1 Scotland and Devolution
Scottish political actors have not taken a consistent line on European integration.
In earlier times European institutions were viewed more of a hindrance than an
opportunity. There was a fear that Scotland could have been further peripheralized
from the central areas of decision-making, thereby making Scottish elites doubly
distant from Brussels and London. However, this view changed during the late
1980s when the European Community came to be seen as protecting peripheries
and regional interests from globalizing pressures. The development of a more
positive image of the EC was partially due to the reform of the European structural
funds, which doubled the amount allocated to disadvantaged regions. In broad
economic terms, Scotland has a lower per capita income than the rest of the UK
and its economic growth and productivity have lagged behind the rest of the UK
(Coyle et al 2004; Swinney 2007). Despite higher increases in GDP per head than
the OECD average from 1999-2004 (OECD 2006; Scottish Executive 2006), the
average growth rate in Scotland was considerably lower than the UK as a whole:
1.8 per cent compared to 2.3 per cent between 1975 and 2005 (Swinney 2007).
Hence the offer of European regional development funding caused many
politicians, business leaders and civic leaders to view the EU in a more positive light.

In addition, the opportunities for substate territories within a ‘Europe of the Regions’ encouraged parties to consider how they wanted Scotland to fit into the newly emerging EU polity. The Labour Party – Scotland’s largest party in the postwar decades and the instigator of devolution in 1997-9 – underwent a u-turn in its commitment to constitutional change in the UK, which was intricately linked to its ‘about-turn’ on Europe. The party realized that it would be difficult for Scotland to have a voice in Europe without an elected devolved government. David Martin, former Member of the European Parliament, argued that an ‘enlarged democratic Europe of the Regions’ would connect ‘devolved economic and democratic structures at national and regional level [to] a more democratic European Community’ (Martin 1988, p. 83). In its 1997 campaign manifesto, Labour promised that Scotland would have more power in the EU, including direct access to the Council of Ministers, a high proportion of Scottish representatives in the CoR and a Scottish Minister of European Affairs. The main motivation behind these proposals was to undermine support for the Scottish National Party’s goal of independence in the EU, and to demonstrate how influential Scotland could be without seceding from the UK.

Although the Labour Government at Westminster has been at pains to emphasize that foreign and EU policy are reserved matters, the devolved Scottish government has also been encouraged to become involved in decision-making on EU matters that impact devolved areas, and to create links with other European
regions. Scottish Labour was active in the practice of sub-national
'paradiplomacy' – creating a regional office in Brussels, getting involved in
transregional lobbying organizations such as Regions with Legislative Powers
(Regleg), and undertaking trade and cooperation agreements with Catalonia,
Tuscany and Bavaria – activities that have been continued by the Scottish National
Party administration. Scottish parties have acknowledged that much of the
country’s potential economic success in global markets rests on its ability to
attract foreign capital investment, as well as its capacity to compete successfully
with other regions in the European single market. As Scottish Labour argued even
prior to devolution, ‘As European integration proceeds, the success of our
economy will increasingly depend on how competitive we are. The Scottish
Parliament will have a major input to European wider economic initiatives’ (SLP

But this autonomous role for Scotland in Europe has been tempered by
being part of a UK-wide team. Scotland has been encouraged to have a ‘close
working relationship with UK Ministers and the Scottish Secretary to ensure that
Scotland’s distinctive voice is heard’ (SLP 2003: Section 27). Labour in office has
sought to combine distinctive Scottish representation with the advantages that
come from being part of a larger state. But whilst there has been a commitment to
championing ‘Scotland’s interests in appropriate Council meetings of the EU and
inside the UK’ (SLP 2003) – the informal intergovernmental mechanisms that
determined the UK common line in the early years of devolution have come under
increasing strain since May 2007 when the SNP won the Scottish parliamentary
election and formed a minority government. The Nationalists’ electoral victory meant that different parties, with different positions on Europe, have been governing Scotland and Westminster. Although it is too soon to tell, at the time of writing, how intergovernmental relations will proceed on European issues, the SNP has demanded the re-establishment of the moribund Joint Ministerial Committee to decide UK policy on Europe, promising a more assertive Scottish stance in Brussels on marine and energy policy in particular.

15.4.2 Bavaria and the Defence of the Länder

Whilst all parties are unquestionably pro-European in Bavaria, there is nevertheless a growth in Euroscepticism as to what the EU can do for Bavarians, and where the limits of European integration should be drawn. Territorial debates since the late 1980s have been dominated by the notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. The rationale behind this concept was to prevent European integration encroaching on the legislative competences of the sixteen federated regions – Länder – of the Federal Republic of Germany. According to the Christian Social Union (CSU) – Bavaria’s regional ‘party of state’ and sister party to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) – the Länder ‘must be given rights of initiative and participation in the European decision-making process where their rights and interests are concerned’ as well as an independent legal right before the European Court of Justice’ (CSU 1993: p. 91). Although CSU lobbying in the EU has so far failed to obtain the latter goal, it did succeed in pushing for the establishment of a regional committee in the EU – this resulted in the creation of the CoR in 1994.
Since the failure of the CoR to become anything other than a weak advisory body, however, the CSU has tried another track in Europe. The Bavarian government has turned its attentions to fortifying the external (political) boundaries of the state in order to protect Länder competences from EU directives, rather than bypassing the state to seek direct representation of its interests in Europe. Furthermore, the CSU-led government has sought to strengthen Bavaria’s position in Germany in response to European and global pressures. For instance, it has demanded more financial powers and capacity to diverge in socioeconomic policies. The CSU argues that this would allow the regional government to control revenues and concentrate on dynamic sectors of the economy to make it more competitive in European and global markets. This indicates that the CSU has no desire to retreat from Europe, nor has it relinquished its political activities in the European sphere. Bavarian Minister for European Affairs, Eberhard Sinner, who held the Presidency of Regleg 2005-6, reiterated his commitment to a Europe of the Regions and the Bavarian government’s attempts to increase Bavaria’s autonomy in both Germany and Europe. The CSU-led government has been active in creating horizontal alliances with other European regions, creating mini-embassies in Brussels and other countries, and undertaking trade agreements and cultural exchanges. The CSU has realized that increasing its voice in European institutions is just as important as protecting its autonomy and interests by strengthening the ‘hard shell’ of the state – a two-pronged strategy that is envied by other, less powerful, regions in Europe.
15.4.3 Sardinia and the Renewal of Autonomy

Sardinian parties, like those in Scotland, moved from viewing European integration as a threat to their industry and society in the early 1980s to seeing it as a possibility for economic and constitutional reform. Changes to the structural funds in the late 1980s qualified Sardinia for ‘Objective 1’ status – the highest priority designation for European aid based on measurements of relative deprivation – and parties such as the Sardinian Party of Action (Psd’Az) and Christian Democrats began linking economic modernization to a renewed autonomy for the island in a ‘Europe of the Peoples’. However, this idea failed to take hold. This was ultimately because Sardinian parties were unable to reverse the image of the EU as a distant and bureaucratic structure, whose value was based on its financial generosity rather than its democratic potential. Given that European Parliament elections are low-profile affairs (largely due to the fact that Sardinia forms a single constituency with the much larger Sicilian region), parties have been unable to raise the profile of European issues. This has meant that demands for the renewal of Sardinian autonomy were only loosely linked to processes of integration, unlike the other two cases.

Since Sardinia was forced to exit its Objective 1 status in 2006, however, parties have begun looking for new ways of bolstering Sardinia’s underperforming economy. The ‘Sardinian Project’, a centre-left coalition that entered government in 2004, has sought to break with past strategies of (mainly centre-right) regional governments that sustained structural and economic dependence on the centre. Instead, the Project insists that Sardinia must become economically self-sufficient,
and it has sought to develop policies that maximize sustainable economic growth whilst celebrating the local culture and language – in line with the trend towards ‘glocalization’. The Project seeks to exercise Sardinian autonomy within an ‘Integrated System of Autonomy’ (Sardegna Insieme 2004: p. 101), a grand title which means increasing trade and cultural relations between regions – especially those closer to home in the Mediterranean – and making regions more powerful and competitive vis-à-vis states.

Sardinian regional elites have also focused on obtaining more influence within the Italian state and access to state channels in the EU. A revised Special Statute for Sardinia should ‘redefine the specialness of Sardinia, … and help to construct a new system that is based on solidarity and participation, with the European Union as well as with the Italian state. In this scenario, the Statute should guarantee the direction representation of the region in the organs and in the decision-making procedures at the Italian level and at the European level’ (Sardegna Insieme 2004: p. 102). Thus, state channels are considered the most effective way for Sardinia to protect its interests in the EU, whilst opportunities to act in the Mediterranean are seen as more important than trying to increase Sardinia’s voice in the distant centres of EU decision-making.

15.5 Territorial Strategies in Comparison
The substate regions of the EU have developed a variety of responses to integration and globalization, ranging from demands for more recognition of territorial distinctiveness, to protest against what is perceived as a threat to their competences. This section attempts to distinguish and explain the sources of variation in territorial responses to the process of European integration.

First, regional actors operate within distinct opportunity structures determined by the incentives and constraints of state territorial management. Thus, substate political actors have different levels of access to European institutions within and across cases. Whilst Scotland and Bavaria have relatively good access to European institutions, directly and through state channels, Sardinia has been unable to elect a single Member of the European Parliament since 1994. Second, the economic status and resources of regions influence their territorial strategies in the EU. For richer regions, parties in government can mobilize the population around programmes that increase the region’s autonomy to act in European and global markets without fear of losing economic protection from the state. Indeed, wealthy regional governments may want to reduce what amounts to their protection of other regions in the state through equalization programmes, such as Bavaria. By contrast, in poorer regions, the territory’s dependence on transfer payments and state protection may undermine demands for more autonomy.

Third, territorial strategies are affected by constitutional constraints. Each region operates within different state structures, of a devolved state, a federal state and a decentralizing state, which shape the constitutional preferences of political parties and the way they view their relationship to the centre. For instance, in Italy,
the main demands for constitutional reform were coming from elsewhere, that is, the Northern regions of Italy. This had adverse affects on Sardinia’s ability to control the constitutional agenda. The Sardinian experience stands in stark contrast with that of Scotland and Bavaria, where regional actors led the debates and demands for devolution and the reform of federalism in the UK and Germany, respectively. Furthermore, the regions have different capacities to legislate, to access European institutions, and to influence the state, all of which have shaped different responses to European integration. Whereas Germany and the UK have both formal and informal intra-state mechanisms for the representation of regional interests in delegations to Europe, Italy is only slowly developing these institutions following recent constitutional reforms.

It is now possible to build a more general theory of trade-offs. Prior to decentralization, regional elites were able to trade-off constitutional autonomy with opportunities to extract concessions and influence policy-making at the centre. With decentralization and the obtainment of constitutional powers, the focus moved to certain functional and policy goals for the territory, such as control over taxation, economic policy and regional planning. However, increasing territorial capacity presents a number of dichotomies to regional actors that include: policy divergence versus standardization, fiscal equalization versus fiscal autonomy, and the representation of territorial interests through state structures rather than forging direct links with EU actors. In periods of economic decline, or indeed in response to the perceived expansion of EU competences, access to the state may be seen by regional elites as more conducive to protecting territorial
interests than gaining ‘semi-independence’ (Keating 1988: p. 129). This trade-off is also preferred by state actors. Granting regions economic concessions and more influence within state bodies and delegations constitutes less of a threat to state integrity than giving them constitutional rights (devolution).

So far this discussion has considered how regions have used the state as a bulwark against unwanted EU encroachments. But how may regions use the EU as a tool against global encroachments? It has been argued that regions have preferred to strengthen regional influence in the centres of European decision-making through increased participation and access European funds. Whilst there are some cases of regions seeking to protect unique ‘local’ products such as Champagne, Parmesan cheese and Scotch whisky from economic globalization, here the EU has more limited powers to shield regional economies from globalizing forces. Perhaps more interestingly, regions may seek protection by the EU from the state itself – in the case of seeking recourse for regions to the European Court of Justice. But generally, it appears that regions feel better protected by the state government than by the EU, as the state government has a greater obligation, and desire, to protect the region – for reasons of social cohesion, economic solidarity and legitimacy – than does the EU.

15.6 Conclusion
The transformation of political authority in EU, resulting from globalization and
decentralization, has opened up functional and political spaces in which substate
actors may operate. This transformation means that authority may be reconstructed
on a basis that does not necessarily correspond to the state. I have discussed how
substate regions have sought to use European integration to protect and advance
their interests in response to political, cultural and economic globalizing pressures.
Regional actors have used European integration to pursue their territorial
autonomy and policy goals. But whilst some regions have sought to bypass the
state and seek direct access to the EU to do so, others have sought increased
access to the state to defend their interests from unwanted external pressures. In
particular, it was found that Scottish actors viewed the EU as a means of
advancing autonomy, for Bavarian actors European integration was seen as a
threat to autonomy, and the Sardinian Project viewed the EU as such a distant
entity that it believed autonomy was best exercised within a Mediterranean
construct. Moreover, it was shown that autonomy may be traded-off by regional
elites to obtain more influence in state structures, protection and resources.

This chapter has explored how regions have sought to access and influence
EU decision-making, either directly or through the state. But this discussion raises
another question that requires further analysis: why have states allowed, or even
encouraged, regions to pursue greater autonomy in Europe? Whilst one aspect is
certainly the desire to dampen aspirations for secession, there are other
motivations at play. Although not directed at the European dimension, Keating
(1988, p. 22) argues that the state has a number of reasons to pursue regionalism,
including reducing overload at the centre. This strategy makes sense in the state arena, which is, to a greater or lesser extent, calling the shots. But what are their motivations for advocating regional autonomy in the EU, especially when the increased power of regions, along with deepening European integration and globalization, is reducing the nation state’s own role and competences? One could speculate that, being more aware of the limitations of supranational integration, the state foresaw that when the regions became disenchanted, they would fall back yet again on state channels. This indicates that many of these European ‘opportunities’ were unsustainable in the first place.
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1 Interview with the author, Munich, January 2005