Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

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Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

Results From A Survey Conducted in 13 Cities Across Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2013

Authors:
George R. Wilkes
Ana Zotova
Zorica Kuburić
Gorazd Andrejč
Marko-Antonio Brkić
Muhamed Jusić
Zlatiborka Popov Momčinović
Davor Marko

Sarajevo, 2013.
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Banja Luka
Bihać
Bijeljina
Brčko
Jajce
Livno
Mostar
Sarajevo
Srebrenica
Stolac
Teslić
Trebinje
Tuzla

http://relwar.org

http://www.ceir.co.rs

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Reviewers:
Professor Ivan Cvitković, University of Sarajevo
Professor Milan Vukomanović, University of Belgrade
Professor Jolyon Mitchell, University of Edinburgh
Professor Ahmet Alibašić, University of Sarajevo
Dr Vahdet Alemić, Islamic Community, Banja Luka

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1. Executive Summary

This summary presents key findings from a survey focused on the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a sample of 2060 respondents answering a written questionnaire with 78 questions. A diverse sample of respondents were found in 13 cities, selected to capture very different economic, cultural, political and geographical contexts.

Subsequent sections of the report explain the study’s design and results, and give further detail that will be important to readers with an interest in attitudes in their city, or amongst different parts of the country’s population: women and men; wealthier and poorer; employed and unemployed; older and younger; more educated and less educated; more religious and less religious; former soldiers, prison camp inmates, refugees and other civilians during the war; members of the constituent peoples and minorities.

The launch of this report begins a period of public discussions and stakeholder consultations across the country designed to investigate further the significance of the study’s findings. Additional detail will be published in larger publications in 2014-2015.

Background to the research

A previous study of 616 respondents showed strong support for a reconciliation and trust-building process encompassing a broad range of actors in the population (Wilkes et al, 2012). This was most strongly evident amongst citizens who identify themselves as religious. 70-80% of respondents believed a forward-looking reconciliation process would be important, while 40-50% indicated that engagement with the country’s past is important.

How much commitment to the reconciliation process was shared across the population? What real steps towards major change do citizens support? Would this pattern of support be shared in the poorest, most predominantly monoethnic cities on the country’s periphery?

This second survey provides the most solid research base published to date for understanding public feelings about reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead of framing the study in terms of optimism or pessimism about the country’s future, the survey is designed to capture nuances of opinion, and to reveal the influence of contextual factors which affect public beliefs about trust-building.

Key Findings

Reaffirmation of the strength of public support for reconciliation and trust-building, across all 13 cities

This second, larger study confirmed the strength of support for reconciliation and trust-building across the population, and particularly amongst more religious citizens. This time, non-religious and less religious were also shown to be more favourable to activities fostering understanding across the constituent peoples than the average across the sample.

75.4% of the total sample indicated that a serious attempt to build relationships amongst religious and ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have an impact on the future of the country (77% of those who responded to the question). This strong support was repeated across a number
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A much smaller proportion of respondents saw trust-building or reconciliation initiatives as unimportant or very unimportant.

Nevertheless, most respondents (60.8%) indicated improving the economy was the greatest priority facing the country, 39.9% believed political change was most important, and only 29% indicated that improving social relationships was the most important priority for the country. Respondents could tick more than one option.

**Respondents support real concessions, public expenditure and support for the vulnerable**

The results showed strong public support for public money to be spent on educational activities fostering understanding, appreciation of diversity and reconciliation (84.4%), and on recognition and compensation for wartime victims in their locality (71.4%).

By contrast, only a half of respondents believed that a formal reconciliation process in their locality would be important – large enough to be important to local politicians, but smaller than the numbers who expect their locality to provide for the rights of victims and minorities after the war. A proportion of respondents were indicating their belief that their local authorities ought to extend support and protection for returnees or other minorities, but did not judge that the local authorities were the appropriate bodies to promote reconciliation.

**Engaging with the past, looking to the future**

Many studies on reconciliation confine their attention to activities focused on justice and reaching an agreed national narrative about the past. This survey confirms the pattern set in the previous study: Support for projects building understanding and focused on the future was greater than support for expert examinations of the causes and experience of the war, or for the creation of memorials at sites of war crimes.

Nevertheless, 68.2% indicated it was important or very important for a process of trust-building to reach agreement on the historical facts relating to the genocidal programme, and 64.7% saw it as important to arrive at agreement on those historical facts which show the extent to which all sides suffered during the conflict. Far more than might be expected, these figures held across the cities represented in the survey. Again, approximately half of the sample indicated that reconciliation activities addressing the past were important or very important for the country’s future.

**Who is most trusted to advance the reconciliation process?**

Both first and second studies indicated the importance of a broad range of participants in reconciliation activities, suggesting distance from an official process only encompassing a small politically important elite.

Reaffirming patterns seen in the first study, teachers and figures who represent all and not any one single national group were the most highly rated potential participants in a reconciliation process (viewed as important or very important to the process by 67.2% and 72.7% respectively).

Politicians and religious leaders were again seen as important by smaller though significant proportions of the sample who completed the questionnaire (48.6% and 54.3%). Though respondents were far less positive about the potential role to be played by politicians, they were also strongly in favour of a reconciliation and trust-building process in which politicians seriously engaged with the opin-
ions of ordinary people (72.7%). Many respondents may have low levels of trust in political parties, but recognize that they could be a part of effective reconciliation activities.

Respondents indicated greater confidence in other civil society actors in this survey than in the previous survey. NGOs representing victims and the vulnerable and women were credited as important for a reconciliation process by 63.1% and 57.4% respectively, more than indicated political or religious leaders are important.

**Respondents place most value on a country-wide reconciliation process**

75.4% indicated that a serious attempt to build relationships amongst religious and ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have an impact on the future of the country. A reconciliation process at local level or involving Serbia and Croatia was far less important across the sample, though both were still recognized as important to them by substantial proportions (49.6% and 61%, or 50.7% and 62.2% of those who responded to the question). In cities across the country, the importance of reconciliation activities at the country or state level was considerably greater than local or regional processes, regardless of which political parties are strong in those cities.

**More striking than geographical differences were the similarities across all cities**

More notable than the differences between respondents from different cities was the striking similarity in their responses, across all 13 cities. Where city-level responses were less enthusiastic or more enthusiastic than the country-wide average, it was often only by a slight variation. There were no cities in which the population sampled appeared to be dominated by uncompromising hard-line opinion, though in some – Bijeljina, for instance – significantly more non-committal and more negative responses were received than nationally. The importance of arriving at agreement on the historical facts about the genocidal programme in the 1990s was as strong in Banja Luka (73%) and Srebrenica (64.8%) as was the case nationally. The 13 cities included a number of cities not associated in public discussion with strong commitment to the process of reconciliation, perhaps because they are more mono-ethnic, impoverished, located on the country’s periphery, or because they experienced the most extreme forms of ethnic cleansing during the war.

Belief in the importance of a country-wide process building relationships of trust and honesty across religious and ethnic groups was nevertheless notably stronger in Sarajevo (87%) and in Banja Luka (82%) than in Bijeljina (64%). Support for reconciliation with Croatia and Serbia was highest in Mostar (69%), Trebinje (70%), Tuzla (71%) and Sarajevo (81%), and there was an unusually high level of support for a local reconciliation process in Mostar (55.5%), Stolac (65.3%) and Sarajevo (84.2%).

The differences between the results from each city are not simple reflections of any particular factor: economic, political, national or geographical. The results do not support the view that economic progress will by itself do away with the need for a deliberate focus on reconciliation. In this report, the results in each city appear to reflect distinctive sets of local conditions, not a single pattern or a fixed geographical divergence.

**National and religious identity: not perceived as obstacles to change**

44.9% of respondents say that a sense of national identity is not important to them, and a very small percentage see it as shaping decisions in their personal lives affecting friendships (7.4%). Those who
indicated that their national identity affects their vote nevertheless were as likely as the entire sample 
were to indicate high levels of trust in the role to be played by individuals who advance the interests 
of all citizens and are not identified with the interests of any one constituent people.

Differences between the respondents who identify with the three constituent peoples were often 
slight. A consistent pattern of striking differences distinguished more religious and non-religious 
respondents. Respondents who identified themselves as more religious were more likely to support a 
public reconciliation process and one which would address issues associated with the past. Muslim 
respondents were more likely than Catholic or Orthodox respondents to support reconciliation activ-
ities addressing the past or focused on the needs of victims and minority groups. At the same time, 
agnostics and atheists were more likely than the average across the sample to support educational 
and dialogue initiatives which are designed to build understanding and reconciliation across the pop-
ulations. These differences were statistically significant, but they were not so great that attitudes to 
reconciliation should be conceived of as greatly different between the constituent peoples.

**Personal background makes some groups within the population value reconciliation more 
strongly than others**

Those parts of the population most strongly in favour of reconciliation activities included pension-
ers, war veterans, women and workers in secure full employment.

More detail will be found below indicating different tendencies which correlate with political vote 
(and a sizeable proportion of the sample who did not vote in the last elections), with majority-minor-
ity status, with wartime experience, with age, and with levels of education attained.
2. Essential Background to the Research

Research objectives

This survey project was instituted as part of a research project designed to show the grounds for more nuanced understandings of the nature of attitudes and influences on attitudes to reconciliation, and this differentiates the study from one commissioned to test attitudes to a particular policy or to indicate support for a particular agenda.

The project was initiated after selected consultations with civil society activists and academics indicated a series of points of disagreement over the state of popular attitudes to reconciliation:

- Is there a gap between popular interest in reconciliation and the interest shown by the religious and political leadership and the media? If so, why?
- Is there a clear popular understanding of what a reconciliation process entails shared amongst the diverse religious and secular populations across Bosnia and Herzegovina, or is this better seen as a subject about which there is marked disagreement or confusion? Is it overshadowed by the political debate over different constitutional futures for the country, and for its constituent peoples? Does the population believe reconciliation is worth greater public commitments?
- What are the preferred frameworks for thinking about a better future for the country: Political or economic change? Reconciliation? Peace? Justice? Social repair? The creation of public trust or of new relationships across different communities? The creation of new reasons for public trust in political leaders, the media, and religious figures? Greater acceptance of difference or greater acceptance of commonality across difference within the population? How, if at all, is facing the past together understood to be related to facing the future together?
- What is expected of politicians in this process? And journalists?
- Is the involvement of religion helpful or a hindrance for reconciliation activities? Are citizens more interested in embracing diversity, or more concerned to avoid the harmful effects identified with division?
- Is support for reconciliation most clearly identified with an educated, relatively affluent elite, living in large cities? What is the state of opinion in smaller, poorer, more predominantly monoethnic cities?

The survey questionnaire contains a series of questions about social relations, the public sphere, politics, welfare, education and personal outlook. It is designed to open room for new perspectives on the state of public interest in reconciliation as a process made up of a diverse range of activities, not simply to test public attitudes to a single concept or mechanism. Respondents were asked to state whether they see political, economic and social change as priorities: it was not assumed that there is a clearly understood need for particular changes.

The project builds on a number of previous studies which focus on particular aspects on the reconciliation process, on attitudes between different parts of the population, and on the role of religion in public life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further details will be found in the bibliography.
The results will be the subject of public discussions across the country in 2014, and the full range of responses which help to clarify further the meaning of the survey findings will feed into the academic publications which conclude this phase of the study.

Key terms

‘Reconciliation’ and ‘Trust Building’

Across the world, states face issues associated with social and political divisions – this is not a problem arising only from the country’s distinctive past.

The terms ‘reconciliation’ and ‘trust-building’ are not chosen to imply a particular idealistic solution or agenda is needed for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s problems, nor to imply that Bosnia and Herzegovina suffers from a clearly-identified set of problems derived from the war or from the Communist era.

The meaning of ‘reconciliation’ is vague and contested. The term has many critics, among other reasons because 1) it is identified with amnesties for perpetrators; 2) it may be used to suggest a focus on actors with an equal share in a conflict that can be resolved between them, avoiding moral questions about the perpetration of crimes against humanity; 3) it implies a focus on symbolic events involving a selection of perpetrators and victims, instead of the reality and needs of the wider population; 4) its meaning as a concrete process is vague, in part because different religious literatures and communities present reconciliation as a goal or as an imperative instead of as a process. Supporters of the term often acknowledge these problems (Philpott 2012).

Reconciliation is used here as a term which implies activities, practices and processes involving the building of relationships, both ‘horizontal’ relationships across the wider population and ‘vertical’ relationships, begging questions about the perception of a need for accountability between representatives and the populations they seek to represent. Unlike ‘transitional justice’, ‘reconciliation’ does not assume that a particular judicial mechanism or a focus on a set of perpetrators and victims will lead to a change in the country’s social or political development. Unlike ‘peacebuilding’, ‘reconciliation’ does not imply the primary problem facing Bosnia and Herzegovina is a threat to social or political peace. The survey addresses some potential limitations of using ‘reconciliation’ as a framing device through questions testing attitudes to all of the four points above.

‘Reconciliation’ is paired in a series of questions with ‘trust-building’ in order to press respondents into considering two practical dimensions of the reconciliation process: the actors and communities in which they have confidence, and the actors and communities in which they have a low level of trust.

One of the most useful contributions to the literature on post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stover and Weinstein 2004) uses ‘social repair’ as an alternative term, on the basis that the need for mending society is more readily accepted than the term ‘reconciliation’ is. In our previous survey, both terms received roughly equal appreciation from respondents. The present survey included a series of questions probing attitudes to the need for social, political and economic change.
2. Essential Background to the Research

‘Constituent peoples’, ‘minorities’ and ‘national identity’

The academic literature on national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects a vibrant intellectual debate, over and on top of the highly politicised public debate on the topic. This survey was designed to reflect an open approach to respondents’ own description of their identity, and represents the largest survey on the subject to date which allows for contextualised representations of popular identity across different regions, religious groups and economic classes.

The survey gave respondents the opportunity to indicate whether they identify with one of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to define their identity using the terms they prefer to use. Questions are also included which gave respondents scope for indicating whether this identity was important to their public, political and private lifestyle choices.

A question also addressed whether respondents identify themselves as part of a minority. Constitutionally, citizens who identify as part of the Bosniak or Bosnian Muslim, Croatian or Serbian peoples are not minorities, even if they are living in an area where that part of the population is small in numbers. Respondents from all backgrounds were free to choose to identify as part of a minority, and results are reported below.

‘Religious’ and ‘non-religious’

This represents the largest survey relating to religion in the country since the 1980s, when a study was conducted of over 4000 respondents (a study based on the results was published in a special limited edition during the war: Bakić 1994).

The present questionnaire included questions about the ways in which respondents described themselves in relation to religious and non-religious identities, how often they attended religious activities (if at all), and what their attitude was to religious belief. A range of options was given which enabled respondents to indicate that they were definitely religious, agnostic or atheist, or something in between. Survey respondents were also able to describe themselves as spiritual rather than religious. The results should not be seen as an attempt to divide the population into ‘religious’ and ‘not religious’, or ‘traditionally religious’ and ‘liberal’. The survey did not ask respondents if they were opposed to clergy or other religious actors being involved in reconciliation activities, nor whether they opposed atheist or other non-religious actors in reconciliation activities.

In describing the involvement of ‘religious’ actors in reconciliation activities, the survey distinguished ‘religious leaders’ and ‘sincere lay believers who play active social roles’. The notion of the ‘sincere lay believer’ can be understood in many different ways, and who is to be included in the category ‘religious leader’ can also be a subject of disagreement. This survey was not aimed at defining a particular approach to religion, nor to suggest that religion must be deployed in reconciliation activities because of any particular hypothesis about religion and secularism.

Research Methodology and Sample Description

This survey was conducted as a part of the project “The role of religious communities in the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (“Uloga verskih zajednica u procesu pomirenja u Bosni i Hercegovini”) of the University of Edinburgh and the Center for Empirical Research of Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The present survey is a follow-up to the 2012 pilot survey published as: “Rec-
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onciliation and Trust Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina, A Survey of Popular Attitudes in Four Cities and Regions: Bana Luka, Bugojno, Mostar and Sarajevo” (Wilkes et al., 2012).

Sample
In this survey, we covered 13 cities: Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Stolac, Jajce, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Livno, Bijeljina, Brčko, Trebinje, Bihać and Teslić. The cities were chosen to encompass all regions, cities of different sizes, cities with more predominantly monoethnic and more mixed populations, and cities dominated by Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian populations.

The number of respondents was assigned to cities by size, such that Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar were allocated 300 respondents each, Trebinje, Bihać and Teslić 100 respondents each, and other towns 200 respondents each. 50% of respondents live in large cities (population over 80,000 residents), 35% live in small cities (population below 25,000), and 15% live in a medium-size city (between 25,000 and 80,000).

In choosing cities in which to conduct the survey, account was taken of their position in relation to neighboring countries. Thus, 62% of respondents come from the central part of the country and 38% come from border areas. 59% of the cities where the survey was conducted belong to the Federation, 34% to the Republika Srpska and 7% to the Brčko District.

By comparing place of birth with the location in which a respondent filled out the questionnaire, it appears that 60% of respondents filled out the questionnaire in the place of their birth, 16% had come from a nearby city (up to 60 km away), and 17% had been born in a city in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is farther than 60km away from the place where they currently live. 5% of respondents were born in another state within the borders of the Former Yugoslavia, and 2% in other European Union countries.

Questionnaire Design
The questionnaire was designed by a research team to comprise questions relating to general information about respondents, questions related to religious affiliation and belief, attitudes to reconciliation and to the experience of respondents during the war. The questions were mostly of the closed-ended type, with a possibility to choose one of the given options or to not answer the question. The number of variables was 78. The questionnaire was printed in three languages: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.

The Time of Conducting the Survey
Field research lasted between 1 April and 2 July 2013. Most questionnaires were completed in May, after which data entry and SPSS processing commenced.

Sex/Gender
The survey was conducted on a sample of 2,606 respondents, of whom 1,281 were male (49%) and 1,316 female (51%).

National Identity and Majority/Minority Status
The survey was administered so that the diversity of contexts in which citizens from Bosniak, Croat, Serb and minority backgrounds could be encompassed. Interviewers deliberately encompassed areas in
cities with a higher concentration of people belonging to the smaller of the local constituent peoples, in order to make this diversity of background and opinion visible. Consequently, the sample in our survey does not reflect the proportions in which the constituent peoples are found in the population as a whole. Crossing the national identity variable with the city where the questionnaires were filled out, we obtained a result that 66% of respondents identify with the constituent people which is the majority in their city and 34% of respondents belong to national group which is a minority (statistically, not legally) in their city. In answering the question how they identify themselves, 37% indicated that they identified themselves as Bosniak, 32% as Serb, and 24% as Croat. The number of those who identified as Croat is proportionally larger than in the general population, following the methodology outlined above. The other 7% of respondents belong to a national minority or chose the option not to declare an identification in response to the survey question.

Religion

In a European perspective, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a relatively religious society. 72% of respondents declared they were religious, of whom 36.7% indicated that religion was a very important part of their life, 35.3% that it was important, while 10.5% were explicitly non-religious. The survey revealed that a large part of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina believed in God – approximately 79%, significantly above the European average (which is slightly above 50% according to the results of Eurobarometer Poll 2010). Of the remaining 21%, 9% believe that there is some kind of spirit or life energy and prefer to indicate that they are not certain as to whether that is God. 3% of respondents are agnostic (choosing the option ‘maybe God does exist, maybe not’), 3% are atheists who do not believe in God or in any kind of spiritual or supernatural power, approximately 3% say they have never thought about it, and another 3% preferred not to answer the question.

If we compare responses about faith in God to responses about how active respondents are in their church, mosque or religious community, it is striking that only 24% of those who believe in God are regularly active in their local religious community. A further 26% of those who believe in God are sometimes active, and 40% say that they only rarely attend church or mosque. A further 151 of the 2,606 respondents said that they believed in God but never went to church or mosque, approximately 7.5% of the sample. This could be described as a segment of the population which believes without belonging to any religious community in the full sense (a statement about their religiosity, not a statement about their ethnic identity).

The survey reveals the reverse phenomenon as well: belonging without believing. Among those who do not believe that God exists or that any other spiritual force or something supernatural does – those who indicated that they were atheists – there are those who visit church or mosque every now and then, albeit infrequently. Among agnostics, 47% go to church or mosque, albeit rarely, and 11% describe themselves as sometimes active in their religious community.

Responses indicating an affiliation with religious traditions revealed the sample was comprised of 35.0% Muslims, 30.7% Orthodox, 23.8% Catholics, 1.9% agnostics, 3.4% atheists, 1.5% members of other churches and religious communities, and 2.7% chose not to respond to this question. Thus, our sample included more Catholics than are present in the population of the country as whole, according to accessible data. Again, this was for the methodological reasons noted above. Almost a quarter, 22.5%, of respondents indicated that they felt that they were a minority in a religious sense, 69.8% felt that they were part of a majority, and 7.7% preferred not to answer.
80.9% of respondents indicated that all members of their immediate family belonged to the same religious tradition, compared to 17.5% who stated that they live in a “mixed family”. This points to a significant homogeneity of family life. Comparing religious affiliation and family homogeneity/heterogeneity, we find that the sample from the constituent people which is on average least religiously mixed is the Bosniak sample. In immediate families of Bosniak respondents, 11% include members who do not belong to the same religious tradition. In immediate families of respondents who identify as Serb, this is 13%, and among those who identify as Croat 22%. In the immediate families of respondents from national minorities, 44% do not belong to the same religious tradition. Among those who gave a written answer as an alternative instead of choosing one of the main categories listed for national identity, 58% have religiously mixed families – their families are predominantly inter-religious. Significantly, 64% of those who did not want to indicate their nationality have religiously mixed families. 31% of respondents who did not want to answer the question on family homogeneity did not answer the question on national identity. 29% of Serb respondents did not want to say if they had a religiously mixed family, 26% of Bosniak respondents, and 10% of Croat respondents.

In the immediate families of agnostics and atheists, 53% and 59% do not belong to the same religious tradition. This is still more true of those who chose “Other” when asked about their religious affiliation (78% do not belong to the same religious tradition). Among those who did not want to declare their religious affiliation, more come from religiously mixed families, and the majority chose not to indicate whether their family was an interreligious one. Among those who did not want to declare their religious affiliation, the majority have religiously mixed families 54%, and 46% do not. Among those who did not answer the question about the religious homogeneity or heterogeneity of their family, 31% are Orthodox, 21% Muslims, 7% Catholics, 5% atheists, and 5% ‘Other’. 26% did not want to respond to the question on religious affiliation.

65% of respondents indicated that they are not members of a minority, defined in religious terms, and that their immediate family are members of the same religious tradition. 18% indicated that they are members of a religious minority and everyone in their immediate family identifies with the same religious tradition. 15% of respondents do not feel that they are part of a religious minority and indicated that their immediate family is interreligious. 7% feel that they belong to a religious minority and indicated that they have a religiously mixed family. It is statistically significant that those who do feel they are part of a religious minority have 13% more religiously-mixed families than those who do not feel they are a part of a religious minority. The difference is 9% if we count only members of the traditional churches.

**Age**

The largest group of respondents are between 18 and 30 years old (38%), followed by older respondents (above 51), at 25%. This can be explained by the fact that the survey was conducted in urban areas in public, frequented by young people. It may also have been the case that younger and older persons were more willing to cooperate with interviewers and to fill in the questionnaire, which took a lot of time due to its size. 19% of respondents fell in the group between 31 and 40 years of age, 14% were 41 to 50, and 6% were younger than 18 years old.
Family and Economic Status

Marital status of respondents is as follows: 45% married, 44% not married, 4% divorced, 5% widowed, and 2% other. The number of members of the household in which a respondent lives is most frequently four or five (43%), then two or three (39%), then more than five (10%), and 8% of respondents live alone.

Asked about their employment status, 35% of respondents indicated that they have permanent employment, while 13% work part-time and have temporary employment. The number of unemployed in our sample was 834 respondents, or 32% of the total. 8% are students who do not work and 7% are pensioners. Asked about their monthly income, the highest proportion of respondents (42%) indicated that they receive between 500 and 1,000 KM (approximately $350-$700, or 255-510 Euros). 25% earn less than 500 KM per month, and 23% of respondents earn 1,000 to 2,000 KM. 10% of respondents receive a monthly income of more than 2,000 KM.

Education

Looking at the levels of education attained by the survey sample, the majority of respondents graduated from secondary school (54%), 31% have a college or university diploma, 9% finished elementary school, 3% earned a master’s or doctorate, while only 1% have no formal education. Looking at the levels of education attained separately for each constituent people reveals a distinctive feature of the sample. Among Croat respondents, 38% had a college or university diploma, whereas this was the case for 28% of Serbs and 27% of Bosniaks.

Wartime Experience

One survey question raised the wartime experience of respondents, who were given six options: soldier, civilian, refugee, prison camp inmate, “None of the above”, and “I’d rather not say”. Respondents could choose any or all of the given options, or could choose not to answer the question. The largest proportion in the sample indicated that they had been refugees (36.8%), then civilians (26.2%), then respondents who chose “None of the above” (21%), then soldiers (13.1%), then respondents who chose “I’d rather not say” (6.6%), and the smallest number indicated that they had been prison camp inmates (2.1%). The majority of those who indicated “none of the above” were younger than 18, which means that they were not yet born during the war.
3. Attitudes to Reconciliation and Trust Building: the Results in Greater Detail

A series of questions were posed in the survey, placing questions about building relationships of trust, honesty and understanding, about trust-building, and about the reconciliation process, in the concrete contexts in which they arise in public life:

- First, basic questions about the state of the nation and personal satisfaction,
- then questions about which issues appear most important for reconciliation activities,
- and, finally, questions about which actors are most relied upon to advance reconciliation activities.

The results confirm our earlier findings about a public preference for future- over past-oriented processes, and about a preference for a process involving a wide range of non-political actors over political acts of reconciliation conducted by established political actors. There is also nuance where respondents have indicated particular reckonings with the past are a priority for the next steps in reconciliation, and where they have indicated political actors can gain credit through embracing change. The figures also leave room for differences of interpretation over exactly what level of commitment respondents would have to concrete historical and political work respondents given that future-oriented activities draw most enthusiasm.

**Question 19 and 20: satisfaction in life and the need for change in the country**

An important background for respondents’ assessments about the need for trust-building or reconciliation was explored through a series of questions about the need for change in the country, and about preconditions for that change. Asked first whether they were satisfied with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 76.4% of respondents declared that they were dissatisfied, while 21.7% affirmed that they were satisfied. Respondents were then asked about the need for economic, social and political change. 60.8% affirmed that economic change was needed if life in the country is to become better, a much lower proportion (39.9%) affirmed that political change was needed if life in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to improve, and considerably less – 28.7% – indicated that social change is needed if life in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to improve.

**Question 21: The impact of reconciliation activities**

Next the survey required participants to indicate whether a serious attempt to build relationships of trust and honesty would have an impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 75.4% of the whole sample (77% of those who answered the question) indicated that they believed it would have an impact. Asked the same question about their own city and the surrounding region, 49.6% of the whole sample believed it would have an impact (50.7% of those who answered this question). This response did not correlate straightforwardly with responses to some of the later questions in the survey focused on local steps towards reconciliation, as will be seen below, at which point a higher proportion of respondents signaled that these steps would be important. At a wider regional level, involving BiH, Serbia and Croatia, 61% of the sample (62.2% of those who answered this question) considered that it would have an impact. Approximately 2-3% of the sample did not give an answer to these questions.
Question 22: Should reconciliation work focus on the constituent peoples?
As asked whether such initiatives should focus on the relationship between the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 84.5% said ‘Yes’, 9.7% ‘No’, 2.7% ‘Other’ (the most popular written response being ‘Constituent Peoples and Minorities’, at 1.3%), and 3.9% gave no response.

Question 23: Should initiatives focus on the historic conduct of governments?
How important for trust-building initiatives are topics relating to past governments? 52.1% affirmed this is either ‘Important’ or ‘Very Important’, 13.5% indicated that ‘It does not matter’, and 17.1% affirmed that these issues ‘Are a Nuisance’ (12.5% indicated that they preferred not to answer and 4.8% did not respond to the question).

Question 24: What issues should trust-building work focus upon?
Respondents were then asked to respond to a series of ten questions about what would constitute an appropriate focus for an initiative which builds a relationship based on trust.

The approach to a trust-building process deemed more important than any other by the majority of respondents would be one which gives encouragement to school children to talk about what expectations they hold in common for their futures:

Graph 3.1.1
A trust-building initiative should be focused on ENCOURAGING SCHOOL CHILDREN TO TALK ABOUT THEIR COMMON EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE

The next most-favoured approach to a trust-building process would ensure that political leaders engage seriously with the people they represent:

Graph 3.1.2
A trust-building initiative should be focused on ENSURING THAT POLITICAL LEADERS SERIOUSLY ENGAGE WITH PEOPLE THEY REPRESENT
The response was considerably less positive to a process based on a serious encounter between important political personalities holding office today:

**Graph 3.1.3**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on SERIOUS ENCOUNTER BETWEEN FIGURES HOLDING POLITICAL OFFICE TODAY

Respondents to these questions consistently gave greater affirmation for processes which would lay a basis for trust through dialogue and discussion rather than through legal judgements, expert opinion or apologies from figures in power in the 1990s.

Asked about the importance of a process enabling citizens to understand each others’ perspectives and building mutual understanding, a solid majority saw this as important or very important, and very small numbers indicated that this was either unimportant or very unimportant:

**Graph 3.1.4**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on ENABLING CITIZENS TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHERS’ PERSPECTIVES

The same was true of the contribution expected of people who can see the perspectives of others:

**Graph 3.1.5**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on THE CONTRIBUTION OF PEOPLE WHO CAN UNDERSTAND THE VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES
3. Attitudes to Reconciliation and Trust Building: the Results in Greater Detail

Respondents asked to rate the potential contribution of religious believers with a sincere and personal faith gave responses which compare favourably with the expectations placed on politicians:

**Graph 3.1.6**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on the CONTRIBUTION OF BELIEVERS WITH A SINCERE AND PERSONAL FAITH

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<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Important</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>23</td>
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Affirmations of the importance of basing a trust-building process on the establishment of the truth about wartime events were fewer in number – and the proportion of respondents indicating that this was of little or no importance was also greater – than for questions about a process focused on discussion of future relations. The numbers of respondents who nevertheless indicated that a reconciliation process focused on the truth about the war is important or very important was still consistently between 44 and 52%.

Respondents were asked how important it would be for a process to elicit explanations of their actions from the political and military leaders of the time of the war:

**Graph 3.1.7**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on OBTAINING EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR ACTIONS FROM PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVENTS IN THE 1990s

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<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>10</td>
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A similar range of responses were given when asked how important it would be that the process focus on expert determination of the causes of the war:

**Graph 3.1.8**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on EXPERT DETERMINATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Not important at all</td>
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Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

Respondents were slightly less likely to affirm that expert agreement on the population’s experience during the war was ‘very important’, but also slightly less likely to indicate that this was ‘very unimportant’:

**Graph 3.1.9**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on
EXPERT AGREEMENT ON THE POPULATION’S EXPERIENCES DURING THE WAR

The same was true of respondents’ answers to a question about the importance of an agreement among experts on the reasons for the actions of military and political leaders during the war:

**Graph 3.1.10**
A trust-building initiative should be focused on EXPERT AGREEMENT ON THE REASONS FOR THE ACTIONS OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS DURING THE WAR

The trend is not solely an expression of support for future-oriented discussion and against past-oriented discussion: though there may be many respondents for whom it would be better to ‘leave the past behind’, there may equally be many who would favour discussion of all of the difficulties associated with the past in the context of a discussion that will make a difference in the future. There was another dimension in the fact that the questions which drew greater support focused on dialogue and discussion, not agreement, explanation or expert examination. Respondents tended to be more strongly in favour of a serious national dialogue, involving trustworthy members of the public as well as figures holding responsible positions, whereas the search for an agreed narrative about the wartime was deemed a ‘very important’ basis for trust by fewer respondents. Those who found the former approach ‘very unimportant’ were significantly fewer than those who indicated that examination and agreement on wartime issues was ‘very unimportant’.
3. Attitudes to Reconciliation and Trust Building: the Results in Greater Detail

Question 25: What are the next concrete steps for the reconciliation process?
Participants in the survey were then asked to evaluate a series of 10 statements about concrete steps that might or might not be important for the success of the reconciliation process. The responses are presented in the chart below (3.2).

Graph 3.2
Do you believe a reconciliation process would make an impact if it focused on the following?

If in my city minority returnees received special treatment and protection
- Very important: 18
- Important: 32
- Both important and not important: 30
- Not important: 11
- Not important at all: 9

If political leaders in my city acknowledged what was done to people from a minority
- Very important: 29
- Important: 36
- Both important and not important: 21
- Not important: 8
- Not important at all: 6

If at the state level, political leaders apologized for past crimes
- Very important: 32
- Important: 31
- Both important and not important: 21
- Not important: 9
- Not important at all: 7

If my city supported the memorial events of minorities
- Very important: 24
- Important: 34
- Both important and not important: 28
- Not important: 9
- Not important at all: 5

If constitutional reform ended the deep-seated conflict between the parties representing the constituent peoples
- Very important: 34
- Important: 33
- Both important and not important: 20
- Not important: 8
- Not important at all: 6

If agreement were reached on the historical facts relating to the programme of genocide
- Very important: 29
- Important: 34
- Both important and not important: 22
- Not important: 8
- Not important at all: 7

If agreement were reached on the historical facts that would clarify the degree to which all parties suffered during the war
- Very important: 33
- Important: 37
- Both important and not important: 20
- Not important: 7
- Not important at all: 4

If war veterans and victims showed the public how much they can change our perception of the war through talking with each other about the past
- Very important: 30
- Important: 36
- Both important and not important: 22
- Not important: 8
- Not important at all: 5

On mutual understanding and respect for differences among citizens
- Very important: 42
- Important: 36
- Both important and not important: 14
- Not important: 5
- Not important at all: 3

On mutual understanding and respect for the similarities between citizens
- Very important: 41
- Important: 34
- Both important and not important: 18
- Not important: 5
- Not important at all: 4
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

The particularly strong support for activities focused on increasing understanding and respect between citizens deserves attention. If respondents were not convinced that this was an important priority, it would have been just as easy to give non-committal responses rather than the high level of responses that these are ‘very important’. Support for veteran-victim discussions was almost as strong. These could be seen as relatively intangible activities, either difficult to see the concrete value of or easy to tick on a form without thinking. The high rating they received came despite the fact that they could easily be associated with the negative attitude to a focus on the past seen elsewhere in the two surveys.

A majority of those who responded to this series of questions indicated that it would be either important or very important to arrive at agreement on the historical facts of the genocidal programme. This was in spite of the public controversy associated with the topic, and with the fact that this is clearly focused on political differences centred on the past. A slightly larger majority indicated that it would be important to agree on the historical facts concerning the degree to which all peoples suffered during the war. In both cases, a low proportion of respondents indicated that this was not an important step for the near future. The figures were fairly similar to respondents’ evaluations of the importance of overcoming the constitutional conflict between the political parties representing the constituent peoples.

An indication that the strong support for these steps reflects more than a casual tick on a form is provided by the lower support for special treatment and protection for local minorities given in responses to the first of this series of questions. For that option, slightly more respondents were non-committal or viewed this as an unimportant step, and fewer indicated that this would be very important.

By contrast, local authority support for memorial activities in the cities in which respondents lived was given more important credit. Not a bread-and-butter issue for most people, this is nevertheless a live issue in cities across Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Question 26: Should public money be spent on reconciliation activities, and which activities?

Support for less tangible, forward-facing dialogue was also strongest when asked whether public money should be spent on activities fostering understanding and reconciliation, on recognition and compensation for local wartime victims, and on supporting victims and returnees in their city. Support for projects building understanding was greater than support for expert examinations of the causes and experience of the war, or for the creation of memorials at sites of war crimes.

52% of respondents supported public expenditure on memorials and public information centres at sites of wartime crimes, 41% did not.

65% supported expenditure on educational programmes to take young people to memorial sites so that they could learn about the past and about the lessons that can be learnt for today. 28.2% did not.

84.4% supported expenditure on educational programmes designed to help young people to get rid of negative stereotypes and to understand the common interests of citizens of different backgrounds. 10.3% did not.

72.5% supported expenditure on community-led initiatives designed to make clear to the public a basis for trust and cooperation. 20% did not.

71.4% supported increasing support for victims of serious crimes in the 1990s. 20.3% did not.

80.8% supported expenditure on social and cultural programmes focused on problems relating to coexistence in the country, or to a common national life. 13.2% did not.
3. Attitudes to Reconciliation and Trust Building: the Results in Greater Detail

**Question 27:** Who are the most important types of participant in a reconciliation process?
The range of responses confirmed a pattern from the pilot survey of 2012: much higher numbers of respondents attributed importance to teachers and to figures who represent all and not any one single national group, while the role of politicians was more divisive. Asked how important the involvement of politicians in activities designed to promote trust and understanding was, responses were spread across the spectrum:

**Graph 3.3.1**
How important would politicians be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18%</td>
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<td>9%</td>
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<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>21%</td>
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Slightly greater faith was indicated in the role of religious leaders:

**Graph 3.3.2**
How important would prominent religious figures be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH?

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<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
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<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>13%</td>
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and in the role to be played by women:

**Graph 3.3.3**
How important would women be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH?

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<th>Importance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td>7%</td>
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Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

The importance of groups representing victims and the vulnerable also appeared to be given greater credit than politicians:

**Graph 3.3.4**
How important would groups representing victims and the vulnerable be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Importance Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>7%</td>
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Teachers received a still stronger rating, as they had in the pilot survey of 2012:

**Graph 3.3.5**
How important would teacher be for the reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH?

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<th>Importance Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>6%</td>
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Lay believers who are active in society received fairly similar ratings to religious leaders:

**Graph 3.3.6**
How important would lay believers be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH?

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<th>Importance Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>13%</td>
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By far the most valued interlocutor in a trust building exercise: an individual who would support the interests of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not only the interests of one of the constituent peoples:

**Graph 3.3.7**

How important would persons who support the political interests of all citizens of BiH, not one of the constituent peoples, be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of BiH?

This confirmed the strong public support also seen in the 2012 pilot survey for this category of disinterested public actor.
4. Religion

In this study, especial attention was given to the question: is there a relationship between the religiosity or non-religiosity of respondents and their attitudes to factors and priorities in the processes of reconciliation and trust-building? Our preliminary study (Wilkes et al., 2012) had shown that religious people showed higher commitment to the reconciliation process than less religious and non-religious respondents, so we aimed this time to test this previous result further:

We included more questions related to religion than previously. We asked:

- whether everyone in a person’s immediate family belonged to the same religious tradition or not;
- about religious affiliation, with possible answers including Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, “Other _______”, “atheist”, “agnostic” and “I’d rather not say”;
- whether or not a respondent felt they were part of a religious minority in their region;
- whether they were actively involved in their religious community or not;
- whether religion was important in their life or not; and
- whether they believed in God, a life force or nothing of the kind.

It was possible to answer to the final three questions in four or five “strength levels” or not to answer at all.

We compared different indicators of religiosity with the attitudes of respondents to several types of questions about reconciliation and trust-building, including practical questions relating to the importance of different concrete reconciliation initiatives which might be important and relating to whether or not public money should be spent for those purposes.

Respondents to whom religion is more important attributed greater importance to topics focused on the past in the trust-building process. There were no strong differences on this issue dividing Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics. This was affirmed by answers to a number of different sub-questions. For instance, the less respondents saw themselves as religious, the less they were likely to think that trust-building initiatives must be focused on persons who are responsible for events during the war, or on agreement among experts on wartime experiences and causes of the war. The less religious they were, the less support they gave to increasing expenditure on the needs of victims of war crimes, on building memorial and information centres at the sites of atrocities, or on educational programmes concerning those events.

By contrast, religious and non-religious respondents agreed it is important for building trust to enable citizens to understand different perspectives and to understand each other better. They also agree that it is important to encourage schoolchildren to discuss about their common expectations regarding their future.

In responding to questions about the importance (or otherwise) of involving a series of different actors in the reconciliation process, religious respondents do not diverge from less religious respondents where teachers, politicians and individuals who support political interests of all citizens are concerned. However, when compared with less religious and non-religious respondents, religious respondents were more likely to deem the role of women more important in the reconciliation process, and the same is true of the importance of involving socially-active lay believers, representatives of victims and the vulnerable, and prominent religious figures.
Different interpretations may be possible with respect to the finding that topics related to the wartime events and responsibility for those events are less important to individuals who declared themselves to be non-religious. It is possible that those to whom religion is important are more likely to feel themselves to be victims than those to whom religion is less important or who are not religious. Alternatively, it may be that attributing importance to topics related to the past reflects a stronger motivation amongst religious respondents for discovering broader aspects about the truth about the past. From the results of the survey, it would be difficult to show that one of these two interpretations is the right one, the other wrong.

However, what seems quite clear is that the less religious or non-religious respondents were generally less optimistic about reconciliation and trust-building than those to whom religion is important in life. Answering the question about which steps the reconciliation process should focus upon, religious respondents were more positive about almost every suggested activity (special treatment for the returnees, apologies for war crimes, constitutional reform, agreement on the historical facts about the genocide and suffering, the role of war veterans in changing public attitudes, etc.), except one thing: less religious and non-religious respondents gave greater importance to mutual understanding and respect based on the similarities between citizens. Concerning the importance of mutual understanding and respect for differences between citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, respondents to whom religion is more important did not differ from the less religious or non-religious. One could infer that the sharing of common values made more sense to the less religious respondents, while respect for differences proved a shared value.

The research indicated that individuals who were less active in their church or mosque, or those who did not attend church or mosque at all, were less satisfied with their life in Bosnia and Herzegovina than believers who are regular in their attendance at church or mosque. In the report of results which follows, we describe as more religiously-observant those respondents commonly referred to as “active believers”, based on their level of religious practice rather than on their beliefs or commitments. Whereas respondents declaring higher levels of religious observance were less likely than other respondents to consider that political changes would be important for the reconciliation process, they laid more stress on the need for improving social relationships than other respondents did. Their assessments of the importance of reconciliation and trust-building activities at the local and national levels were not significantly different from those of other respondents, but non-religious and less active believers did give slightly more support to the impact of a reconciliation process at the wider regional level (including Croatia and Serbia). Actively practicing believers attributed greater importance to a focus on topics relating to the past than those who are less religiously active or who are not religiously active did, just as was the case for respondents who indicated in response to another question that religion was important or very important to them.

More religiously-observant believers gave more weight than other respondents did to the importance of reconciliation and trust-building initiatives focusing on a serious encounter between persons in today’s political life, on the engagement of sincere believers, and on persons responsible for events in the 1990s explaining their actions. By contrast, respondents who do not attend church or mosque believed that reconciliation initiatives should be more focused on enabling citizens to understand each others’ perspectives better. Religious observant respondents were more likely than others to indicate that it would be important for the reconciliation process that minority returnees receive special treatment and protection in their cities, that political leaders apologize for crimes committed in the
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

past, that local communities support memorial events of minority groups, that constitutional reform end conflicts between parties, that agreement be made about the facts relating to the wartime, and if war veterans and war victims held joint discussions.

Religiously observant respondents were more likely than others to support public expenditure on memorial and information centres at sites of atrocities (the majority of respondents, regardless of their attitude to religious activity, were likely to be positive about this step). Expenditure on increasing support to victims of serious crimes in the 1990s was supported more by religiously observant respondents (81.6%) than by those who do not attend church or mosque (72.0%). The most religiously observant respondents were more likely to support expenditure on educational programmes designed to bring young people to memorial sites in order to understand the past and its lessons. This difference was not evident for the forward looking options: approximately 90% of both religiously observant and other respondent groups supported spending on educational programmes designed to help young people to get rid of negative stereotypes and to understand which interests are shared by all citizens regardless of their background, as well as on social and cultural programmes focused on problems of coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

When it comes to evaluating the importance of different types of actor in the process of reconciliation, the religiously observant were more likely than others to support including prominent religious figures, organizations representing victims or the vulnerable, and socially-active lay believers. On the other hand, less observant believers and those who do not attend church or mosque at all were more emphatic than religiously-observant respondents were about the roles to be played both by teachers and by those who represent interests of all citizens and not only the interests of one of the constituent peoples.

Respondent preferences concerning reconciliation and trust-building processes were also compared with answers to questions about religious affiliation (and non-affiliation). A majority of adherents of all religious traditions indicated that they were not satisfied with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina: more Muslims were satisfied with the life in Bosnia and Herzegovina (26.6% of Muslims), then Catholics (23.5%), and the least satisfied of the three groups was the Orthodox (16.2%) (Graph 4.1). The proportion of those unsatisfied with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina rises above 70% among atheists, and even above 90% amongst agnostics. The majority of respondents, regardless of their religious affiliation, believed that economic improvement was the most important factor which would contribute to better quality of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina (more important than improvement of social relations and of the political situation in the country), with the notable exception of agnostics, of whom less than a half indicated that an economic improvement would be important for improving quality of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only agnostics saw political reform of the country as the most important factor of improving quality of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. Religion

Graphs 4.1.1-3 show the proportion (%) of respondents of each religious and non-religious preference who responded to questions 19-20, focused on satisfaction with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the primary focus for improving life in the country.

Graph 4.1.1
Are you satisfied with life in BiH? * How do you identify yourself religiously?

Graph 4.1.2
In order to improve life in BiH, economic development is most important * How do you identify yourself religiously?
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

**Graph 4.1.3**
In order to improve life in BiH, social change is most important.  
* How do you identify yourself religiously?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not want to say</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 4.2 shows the proportion (%) of respondents who believe that an attempt to build trust and reconciliation would have an impact on state, local and regional level in relation to their religious affiliation.

**Graph 4.2.1**
Would a serious attempt to build relations of trust and honesty between religious and ethnic groups have any impact in BiH?  
* How do you identify yourself religiously?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not want to say</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Religion

Graph 4.2.2
Would a serious attempt to build relations of trust and honesty between religious and ethnic groups have any impact in my city and the surrounding area? * How do you identify yourself religiously?

Graph 4.2.3
Would a serious attempt to build relations of trust and honesty between religious and ethnic groups have any impact in the wider region of the former Yugoslavia? * How do you identify yourself religiously?
A large majority of respondents believed that a serious attempt to build relationships of trust among religious and ethnic groups would have an impact on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although this majority is considerably smaller among the Orthodox than among adherents of any other religion or worldview (including atheists and agnostics). Similarly, respondent groups from all religious and non-religious backgrounds believed that a serious attempt to build trust would have an impact in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia), although Muslims and Catholics were slightly less positive about this than others, and agnostics and atheists were remarkably positive. However, answering the essential question on the potential impact of a reconciliation and trust-building process in their local community (city and surrounding region), all respondents, and most markedly the members of the three largest religious communities, indicated significantly less belief in this than when answering the same question in relation to the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The research showed that confidence in the potential impact of the reconciliation process at each of the three levels (local, country, regional) was almost identical among Muslims and Catholics, Orthodox had more faith in the relevance of this process at local and regional levels, and significantly less at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and agnostics, atheists and others indicated consistently high confidence in this process.

To the question whether such initiatives should be focused on relationships between the constituent peoples, the majority answered positively, though this majority is slightly below the total sample average among agnostics and Orthodox respondents. Such a level of agreement between adherents of all faiths and worldviews counters the perception commonly presented in public that this is a ‘forced’ perspective: observing the problem through the prism of relationships between the constituent peoples is not exclusively connected with religious affiliation, i.e. choice of faith and worldview.
Answering the question what place topics addressing the past demand in the trust-building process, Muslim respondents were most likely to indicate that these issues were important or even the most important, the proportion of Catholics and Orthodox affirming this was slightly smaller, and the part of the sample attributing least importance to topics related to the past were those who identified as atheists.

*Graph 4.4 shows the proportion (%) of respondents who affirmed the importance for the process of reconciliation of topics related to the past in relation to their religious affiliation.*

**Graph 4.4**

How do you identify yourself religiously? *What is the place of issues arising from the country's past in such a process, in your opinion?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Not important</th>
<th>A distraction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not want to say</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is an interesting difference between followers of different confessions and worldviews in answering the question “What should an initiative of building a relationship of trust be focused on?” The greatest importance was given to serious encounters between politicians and to contribution of sincere believers by Catholics and the least by agnostics. Muslims indicated as important for this process that persons responsible for events in the 90s of the 20th century have to give an explanation for their activities, which was relatively important to Catholic respondents, and to a lesser extent to agnostic, Orthodox and atheist respondents. On the other hand, atheists, agnostics and “others” (religious minorities including Protestants) indicated the greatest support for a trust-building initiative focused on encouraging school children to speak about expectations for the future, and atheists and “others” particularly agreed that such an initiative should be focused on enabling citizens to un-
understand different views on this subject, to understand each other better, and on the contribution of people who can understand different perspectives. Atheists attributed more importance than others to serious engagement of politicians with people they represent. This may be indicative of the extent to which atheists are aware of their minority position in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that topics related to that have priorities for them. Among Orthodox respondents, it was not possible to observe any decisive trend in relation to attributing great importance to any of the suggested answers to what the trust-building initiative should be focused on, but it is possible to detect lesser attribution of importance to expert agreement on experiences of the population and causes for actions of military and political leaders during the war than it was the case across other confessions.

In response to questions about which steps would be important to take for the process of reconciliation (Q25), Muslim respondents were more likely than Catholic and Orthodox respondents to indicate that the spending budget money (Q26) indicated that Orthodox respondents were less likely than the average across all respondents to support expenditure for every type of activity listed. Muslims were more likely than the average, and Catholics were near the average. A fuller picture gives more nuance to these general patterns.

For instance, a large majority of Muslims was positive about spending public money on setting memorial and information centres at sites of atrocious crimes; a slight majority of Catholics supported this; a majority of Orthodox and agnostic respondents did not support it; among atheists and “others”, a half favoured it and a half were against it. Similarly, Muslims were most likely to support increasing financial support to victims of serious war crimes in the 1990s, and albeit to a lesser extent, this was also supported by members of other confessions, including the Orthodox. A huge majority of Muslims and a significant majority of Catholics and respondents who identified as “Other” favoured spending public money on educational programmes to bring young people from across the country to memorial sites so as to enable them to understand the past and learn the lessons from it. A slight majority of agnostics and atheists also affirmed this, and a half of the Orthodox respondents agreed while a half did not. The Orthodox part of the sample were more positive about spending money on social and cultural programmes focused on problems of coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, over and above the general consensus behind this type of activity.

Almost a quarter of the sample (including members of all religions and worldviews) saw themselves as a religious minority in the place where they live. Concerning the perspective of a religious minority in a certain territory, it appears from the survey data that those who perceive themselves to be part of a religious minority feel more strongly about the need for the engagement of politicians in reconciliation work, about the need for school children to meet and to identify the expectations that they share regarding their future, about the engagement of sincere believers and about the role to be played by those members of different communities who are capable of understanding different attitudes and views. Faced with options for reconciliation activities that would be important to take now (Q25), those who identified themselves as part of a minority gave much more support to all of the listed activities than those who did not identify with a minority religiously.

Asked about the role to be played by different actors (Q27), those who identify themselves as members of a minority in religious terms indicated greater support than other respondents did to including
prominent religious figures, teachers, religious lay persons, and individuals who support the political interests of all citizens rather than the interests of one constituent people. There were no differences in the two groups’ responses to the role to be played by politicians, women and groups that represent victims’ interests. Since many in minority positions have experienced being unprotected and wounded as a group – and many of these wounds are still unhealed – it was to be expected that minority members would attribute greater importance to topics addressing the past than majority members did, and this was the case. Equally, the data confirmed that minority respondents are less satisfied with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina than members of the majority, who, either directly or indirectly, have a more significant impact on living conditions and exercising rights in places where they are majority. Given this, it is notable that both minorities and majority agreed, almost to the same proportion, that the primary focus for improving the situation in the country should be to solve economic problems, and both ranked political reform lower and social relations lower still. In that light, it is striking, and indicative of the difference between minority and majority experiences and perspectives, that a greater proportion of members of religious minorities (92.6%) indicated that reconciliation processes should focus on a relationship between the constituent peoples (for other respondents the figure was 88.9%)

Within local religious or non-religious groups in the sample, the majority-minority proportion across the respondents was as follows. For Muslims, 76.6% identified with the majority, 17.0% minority, and 6.4% of Muslims did not answer this question. Similarly, of the Orthodox respondents, 77.7% identified with the majority, 16.5% as a minority, and 5.9% did not answer. Among Catholics, the situation is different – the group which identifies as part of a minority is larger: 62.6% with the majority, 20.9% as a minority, and as many as 8.4% did not want to answer. 55.1% of agnostics and 59.6% of atheists identified as a minority.

Table 1. shows the proportion (%) of respondents who declared that they belong to the religious majority or to a minority who support spending public money on a series of activities aimed at reconciliation and trust-building.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you support public revenue being spent on:</th>
<th>Members of religious minorities (answered “YES”)</th>
<th>Members of the religious majority (answered “YES”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A memorial and public information centre at places where grave crimes were committed</td>
<td>56.5 %</td>
<td>56.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational programmes which bring the young together across the country to memorial sites in order to understand the past and the lessons it teaches</td>
<td>73.5 %</td>
<td>68.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational programmes which help the young to address negative stereotypes and to understand the common interests of citizens from different backgrounds</td>
<td>93.1 %</td>
<td>87.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-led initiatives indicating the bases of trust and public cooperation</td>
<td>81.4 %</td>
<td>77.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased support for victims of serious crimes in the 1990s</td>
<td>78.5 %</td>
<td>78.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and cultural programmes which focus on problems of living together in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>89.7 %</td>
<td>84.6 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The research showed that respondents whose immediate family members belong to the same religious tradition were more likely to indicate that topics addressing the past were more important than was the case for respondents whose family members do not belong to the same religious tradition. Similarly, respondents whose immediate family members belong to the same religious tradition were more likely to indicate that creating memorial and information centres designed to inform the public about the past would contribute to reconciliation. These respondents were more likely to attribute importance to expert agreement on historical facts about experiences and causes of the war and to a public accounting by individuals responsible for actions during the war. They were also more likely to support spending public money on increasing support for victims of war crimes.

On the other hand, respondents whose immediate family members do not belong to the same tradition were more likely to think that a trust-building initiative would be strengthened by the contributions of people who can understand the different perspectives of members of other communities. However, there were no differences between the two groups in relation to supporting educational programmes and to encouraging school children to talk about expectations they share regarding their future. Both groups support this in a large proportion.
5. The Thirteen Cities

When this study was designed, participants in public and specialist discussions wanted to know whether there would be lower levels of support for reconciliation activities in some cities than in others:

- lower in the most economically deprived locations (such as Livno, Srebrenica, Stolac or Teslić) and higher in more prosperous locations (e.g. Banja Luka, Sarajevo)
- lower in smaller or medium-sized cities (such as Bihać, Livno, Srebrenica, Teslić and Trebinje) and higher in large cities (notably Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Mostar and Tuzla)
- lower in cities which had experienced the harshest forms of wartime persecution, particularly where this involved ethnic cleansing (Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Trebinje), and higher in cities which had been comparatively fortunate or which saw a relatively low level of attacks on civilians and civilian areas during the war (Livno)
- lower in towns which had always been overwhelmingly inhabited by citizens of only one of the constituent peoples (Livno) and higher in mixed cities (Mostar, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, or Tuzla)
- and finally, lower in cities on the country’s periphery (Srebrenica, Livno, Bijeljina, Brčko, Teslić and Trebinje) and higher in the central areas of the country (which as commonly defined includes Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Jajce, Stolac and Tuzla).

Given these speculative expectations, what proves more striking in our results than the diversity across the 13 cities covered is the strength of the public support for reconciliation activities in all cities. Local conditions and local cultures can be detected in quite different patterns in each city in which the poll was conducted. Nevertheless, there was no single deeper factor making opinion optimistic or positive in one set of cities while opinion in others was radically opposed or so dramatically different as to make it clear that historic events, economics or politics is the primary factor shaping local opinion. Figures will be given here for responses to Q21, and distinctive features from the subsequent questions are also reported albeit without precise figures – more detailed results are to be published covering these questions in more in-depth publications in 2014/2015.

Across these cities a steadily high degree of support was shown for reconciliation as an embracing social process. Support for a country-wide reconciliation process does not drop in any city below 64% (Q21). It rises in Sarajevo and Banja Luka to 84% and 82%. In all cities, concrete steps backed where necessary by public funding were viewed as important. In all cities, a majority of respondents affirmed the importance of reaching agreement on the historical facts about the genocidal programme of the 1990s and also affirmed the importance of agreeing on the facts about the extent to which people from all backgrounds suffered at the time.

By contrast, the proportion of respondents who were consistently very negative about the importance of reconciliation initiatives was very small in all cities, a fairly steady 5%. It was approximately the same as the proportion of respondents (7%) who asserted that their sense of national identity was important in their decisions about whom they are friends with. A further 5% fairly consistently indicated that reconciliation initiatives were not likely to be important, rather than indicating that they were very unimportant.
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

There are some interesting variations, making clear that a proportion of the respondents in different cities either tended to favour different approaches to reconciliation or expected that these different approaches were more likely to promote reconciliation. It would not be easy to claim that variations in the responses of citizens in the 13 locations are due to any one factor. Indeed, the number of factors that might be at play make it difficult to give clear indicators of the influence of the war, of economics, of the size of a city, or of the differences between the centre and the periphery. The sample for locations at the centre of the country is dominated by the three largest cities, Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka, which are also three of the more prosperous cities in the sample and the most obvious examples of locations with ‘mixed’ (as against mononational) populations. The peripheral cities included here include a higher proportion of cities which are smaller, less prosperous and largely monoethnic.

That there is a difference between the range of responses in central and in peripheral cities is not without some interesting complications. Respondents in the sample from the cities in the centre of

Graph 5.1
A serious attempt to build relations between religious and ethnic groups will be likely to impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina

- Yes
- No

Sarajevo
87%
13%
Bihac
85%
15%
Stolac
85%
15%
Tuzla
82%
18%
Banja Luka
82%
18%
Mostar
78%
22%
Livno
75%
25%
Jajce
74%
26%
Brcko
73%
27%
Trebinje
68%
32%
Srebrenica
66%
35%
Teslic
66%
34%
Bijeljina
64%
36%
Bosnia and Herzegovina were significantly more likely than the sample from peripheral cities to
affirm the importance of reconciliation initiatives, whether they encompassed the city and its region,
or the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or also Serbia and Croatia (Q21). The central sample was
more likely to affirm the importance of any reconciliation process focusing on the relationships
between the constituent peoples (Q22), more likely to affirm the importance of almost all concrete
forms of reconciliation initiative described in the survey as possible ‘next steps’ (Q25) with the
exception of activities aimed at promoting the appreciation of diversity, and more likely to indicate
that a range of actors should be seen as important contributors to a process of reconciliation (par-
cicularly noticeable for assessments of the role to be played by women, representatives of victims and
vulnerable groups, teachers, and figures not identified with any one constituent people; Q27). The
difference between the range of responses given in central and peripheral cities was largely a result
of there being a higher proportion of central respondents who gave the response ‘Important’ and
‘Very Important’, rather than a more non-committal ‘It is and it is not [Important]’. In both central
and peripheral locations, the proportions of negative or very negative respondents were small. But
the peripheral cities also tended to encompass a significantly greater proportion of positive responses
to a different kind of question: expert judgements about the wartime (Q24) and the record of past
governments (Q23/4). Asked about the importance of various dialogue-based reconciliation activi-
ties (Q24), respondents from central cities tended to be more positive; asked about investigation of
the causes of the war, the nature of decisions made in the war, and the nature of the population’s ex-
perience during the war, the peripheral population included a greater proportion of respondents who
indicated that this is important. A similar divergence can be observed distinguishing the responses of
employed and unemployed participants in the survey (discussed further below).

In contrast to the temptation to rely on these contextual factors to explain positive responses in Sa-
rajevo and Banja Luka, or negative responses in Bijeljina, there are also specifically local contextual
factors which may be used to explain what is distinctive about responses from each city. What fol-
lows indicates that the data presents a more complex picture of opinion in each city than generalizing
explanations would allow.

Although in all cities a clear majority of respondents affirmed that a country-wide reconciliation pro-
cess was likely to be important, in Banja Luka and in Sarajevo the level of support was well above
the average for the whole sample, at over 80%. Affirmations of the importance of reconciliation at a
local level and at the regional level, including Croatia and Serbia, were less dominant in almost all
cities. In most cities, less than half the sample affirmed the importance of a reconciliation process
focused on the city and its immediate region. In three cities, however, a majority favoured such a
process: in Mostar (56%), in Stolac (65%), and in Sarajevo (84%). Whereas in most cities the pro-
portion of respondents who indicated that reconciliation on the larger regional level, with Croatia
and Serbia, would have an impact was between 50 and 63%, in Mostar it was 69%, in Trebinje 70%,
in Tuzla 71% and in Sarajevo 81%.

Asked a series of questions (Q24) about whether different approaches to a reconciliation process
were important, cities were divided into two types of response. A first set of cities (Bihać, Livno, Sre-
brenica, Stolac, Trebinje, Tuzla) fielded a large positive response and a very small negative response.
A second set of cities (Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Brčko, Jajce, Mostar, Sarajevo, Teslić) spread across
the range of possible responses more, still with considerably more positive than negative responses,
but also with large numbers giving a non-committal answer (instead of indicating ‘it is important’ or ‘it is not important’, indicating ‘Yes and No’).

**Graph 5.2**

A serious attempt to build relations between religious and ethnic groups will impact on my city and local region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Srebrenica</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livno</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banja Luka</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teslić</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihać</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trebinje</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brčko</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuzla</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jajce</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijeljina</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostar</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stolac</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph 5.3
A serious attempt to build relations between religious and ethnic groups will impact on the wider region (including Croatia and Serbia)
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

Among questions about the steps necessary for a reconciliation process (Q25) were some which might be expected to divide the population: questions about memorials and ensuring public recognition of the genocide of the 1990s. The city responses in fact generally diverge remarkably little from the average for the whole sample, with Bijeljina offering a more negative set of responses and Banja Luka, Jajce, Livno, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Stolac and Tuzla providing some of the most positive sets of responses. Teslić and Trebinje encompassed less very positive responses, but not markedly more negative responses. The range of opinion in Bihać and Mostar was near the country-wide average for most questions. In Brčko, responses to questions often matched the country-wide average, with memorials receiving less importance than the country-wide average, but a focus on the common interests of citizens being more solidly supported than across the country as a whole.

In response to questions about the importance of spending public money on various reconciliation activities (Q26), the range of responses in most cities was mostly near to the average for the whole sample. There were no great divergences from the overall sample in the range of responses given by respondents in Brčko, Mostar or Sarajevo. Questions about memorials for locals from the smallest and least favoured of the constituent peoples proved more divisive: viewed as a less important focus in Banja Luka, Bijeljina and Trebinje than elsewhere, they were emphatically supported in Bihać, Jajce, Srebrenica, and Tuzla. Opinion in Banja Luka was noticeably more in favour of some forms of expenditure on reconciliation activity than the country-wide average. Although in Banja Luka spending on memorials and information centres at sites of atrocity was not deemed at all important, the expense of sending groups of children to learn about these sites was seen as very important – as were programmes building mutual understanding amongst citizens, community trust-building initiatives and victim support. Srebrenica, too, saw a markedly greater importance than across the country as a whole given to community trust-building initiatives and the promotion of a common social and cultural life. In Bihać, Jajce, Trebinje and Tuzla, greater importance was indicated than was true across the country for programmes taking children to atrocity sites.

Local conditions appear to have played a part in distinguishing the range of responses to Question 27 about the importance of different types of actor in a reconciliation process, at least for some cities. This was not true for all cities, in a number of which the range of responses witnessed varied little from the average across the country. Thus, in Livno, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Stolac and Tuzla, responses were around or above the country-wide average for most or all questions (though in Sarajevo, political and religious leaders were given greater credit than across the country as a whole). In Bijeljina and Brčko, the range of responses was slightly less positive than the country-wide average.

In other cities, there were much more distinctive variations away from the country-wide average. There is no clear pattern of factors which explains this diversity across all cities, though a combination of local conditions may become apparent after further research planned in the coming year:

In Teslić, politicians and religious leaders were viewed more negatively, sincere religious believers received more emphatically negative responses, indicating that their potential role was very unimportant, and the representatives of victims received less positive responses than was true across the country. However, Teslić respondents were very positive about the roles to be played by both teachers and figures not identified with any one constituent people, able to understand divergent perspectives.
In Tuzla, an exceptionally positive response was given to figures not identified with any one constituent people, while otherwise the range of responses given in the city tended to approximate to the average for the sample across the country – a little more split over politicians, more non-committal about religious leaders, and slightly more negative about the notion of socially-active lay religious figures facilitating progress in reconciliation activities.

Trebinje respondents were far more positive about the role to be played by politicians than might be expected, were more clearly split over religious leaders than was true across the country, and were more lukewarm or negative about the role to be played by women, teachers and lay religious figures.

In Mostar, a greater proportion of respondents than across the country gave non-committal assessments of the roles to be played by women, teachers, religious leaders, and representatives of victims and the vulnerable. The potential role of politicians received a more negative response here than across the country, while the role to be played by socially active lay figures was viewed here more positively than across the whole sample.

Bihać saw slightly more positive responses to most of these types of reconciliation agent than was seen country-wide, with the clear exception of lay religious actors, who were valued less positively as a category than across the country.

While the roles of victims’ groups and of women received more very positive responses in Jajce than across the country, politicians were less highly valued here than elsewhere, and respondents here gave more polarized responses to religious leaders and active religious lay figures.

In Banja Luka, responses to the potential role of women, teachers and religious leaders were more positive than across the country, but evaluations of the role to be played both by 1) figures not identified with one constituent people and capable of seeing different perspectives and 2) by socially active religious lay figures were even more exceptionally positive. While Banja Luka respondents gave more lukewarm assessments of the roles to be played by politicians, religious leaders and representatives of victims and vulnerable groups, they also included a lower proportion of respondents giving negative or very negative responses than was the case across the country.

The data from responses to all of these questions makes clear that the largest, mixed cities in the country’s central regions – Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka – were not always more positive than smaller, largely monoethnic cities in the country’s periphery – Bihać, Livno, Teslić and Trebinje.

The data from cities whose populations experienced the worst plight in the war were not clearly less positive then cities – like Livno – which had on the whole a less traumatic wartime experience. It might be inferred that cities would divide not according to the traumatic nature of the citizens’ wartime experience, but according to whether or not it was expected that compensation and restitution for victims from their city would be to the disadvantage of the current residents. Residents in Livno and Banja Luka appear more favourable to protection for returnees in their city than is true across the country as a whole; in Teslić or Bijeljina, the importance of protection for returnees and for their rights was less valued by respondents. In Srebrenica, this question received more very positive and negative responses than the country-wide average.

Samples from economically deprived cities – Teslić, Srebrenica, Livno, or Stolac – attest a more positive engagement with respect to a range of features of a reconciliation process than is true across
the country. In examining these cities, single factor explanations appear unhelpful. The temptation to generalize about single factors distinguishing attitudes across the cities appears no more than instinctively plausible once the evidence is examined carefully. Trebinje, for instance, is remarkably positive about reconciliation with Serbia and Croatia, and this appears unsurprising given the town’s close connections with Dubrovnik. But this did not move respondents in other cities near the borders with Croatia or Serbia, Livno, or Bijeljina, or Brčko, to see this wider regional reconciliation as more important than it is for the sample from the country as a whole. To explain this in terms of the city’s distinctive economics has the merit of simplicity, but its demerits as well. Trebinje industry and commerce are prospering and the workforce are benefitting economically from the city’s close relations with Croatia. It has a considerably lower level of unemployment than all other cities in the sample bar the municipalities of Sarajevo and Banja Luka. And yet the average wage of Trebinje workers is not as high as is found in Bihać, also historically defined by its status near the border of Croatia but not nearly as positive about cross-border reconciliation.

In conclusion, further research and the promotion of public understanding of these results demands a different discussion in each of the 13 cities included in this study. Different levels of trust or confidence are placed in different actors across the country, and this would naturally differentiate the format of research and public discussion in each city. Nevertheless, in light of the range of factors which help to distinguish city responses, the consistent commitments favouring a socially-inclusive country-wide reconciliation process represented in all cities are all the more remarkable. Respondents from all cities and all backgrounds were more or less equally likely to favour making real concessions to the needs of victims; equally likely to favour educational and dialogue based approaches to building mutual understanding across the population; and pretty much equally likely to favour a process which promotes public recognition of the atrocities and genocide and all of the suffering experienced during the war.
6. Economic Influences on Attitudes to Reconciliation

Our survey shows that changes in the income level and employment status of respondents do correlate with some of their responses – employment status and stability of economic expectations even more consistently than income level. It does not confirm the suspicion sometimes heard in public debate that rising income levels will be the best tool for bringing greater opening to reconciliation. Moreover, in responding to some questions, poorer respondents proved more emphatic about supporting commitments to reconciliation.

Correlations were first measured between responses to questions about reconciliation and a respondent’s joint household income. They were then measured between responses and a respondent’s reported income divided by the number of household members depending on that income. This measurement of higher and lower spending power per person correlated more frequently than a respondent’s household income level alone.

Responses were then correlated with a respondent’s work situation, with respondents stating whether they were employed full-time, part-time or occasionally, or unemployed, and whether they were students or pensioners. There are some revealing correlations with the attitudes of pensioners and students, who were, consistently and clearly, respectively the most and the least supportive respondent cohorts across the survey. Employed respondents were also generally more positive in their responses than unemployed respondents. The results may suggest generally more positive outlooks from respondents with greater levels of economic stability, whether or not their income levels are high.

An alternative hypothesis would be to explain these trends as responses to the different experiences of older and younger citizens: the wartime experience of citizens above pensionable age is more likely to lead them to believe reconciliation activities are important, an experience not shared by the generation which has grown up since the war. In some degree, employment situation, or expectations about employment, appear more consistently significant than age does by itself. The results for employment status overlap in many respects with the results correlating attitudes with the educational level attained by respondents, though there are distinctive findings about employment status which cannot be explained by educational influences.

When asked a series of questions about what reconciliation activities should focus on (Q24), respondents with more spending power per person were more positive about building mutual understanding among citizens and schoolchildren, and about the need to involve people in reconciliation processes able to understand the views of different communities. However, respondents living in households with less spending power per person were more affirmative about the need for expert evaluations of the causes of the war and of the reasons for military and political leaders’ actions during the war.

Employment status correlated still more consistently with answers to these questions. The employed were more positive about all types of reconciliation activity outlined. In responding to questions directly about the war, this supportive tendency was only slightly greater amongst employed respondents than amongst unemployed respondents – it was significantly greater with respect to all questions about citizens and political actors building trust and mutual understanding.

When asked a series of questions about the importance of a range of types of approach to the next steps in reconciliation (Q25), respondents with lower income levels were more likely to be positive about spending for the protection of returnees in their city, where these returnees are part of a
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

costituent people in a minority in that city. They were more likely to be positive about their city acknowledging what had been done to victims from those populations, paying compensation where appropriate. They were also more likely to approve support for the memorials of these population groups in their city, and more likely to view it as important that reconciliation activities deal with the suffering of people on all sides in the war. The employed were more likely to deem political and constitutional reform to be a priority, and more likely to affirm the value of activities promoting appreciation of diversity. Again, pensioners were on average the most positive group of respondents, and students the least.

Asked about priorities for government spending (Q26), lower income respondents were again more likely to affirm the desirability of funding memorials and public information centres in places where atrocities had taken place, and of bringing schools to visit these sites.

Respondents from households with higher spending power per person were more likely to view as important the involvement of politicians, women and teachers in a trust-building / reconciliation process [Q27]. By contrast, they were no more positive than lower income respondents about the involvement of religious figures, representatives of victims groups and figures who were not identified with any one constituent people. The employed, however, were more likely than unemployed respondents to view politicians, teachers and socially-active religious people as important in this process. Again, pensioners were on average the most positive group of respondents, and students the least.

The gap between pensioners and students demands further attention. In economic terms alone, it seems plausible to explain this in terms of the greater economic insecurity students can look forward to. Pensioners may have low income, but many can look forward to a retirement with a relatively low level of financial insecurity. It may well be that the explanation for the pensioner-student gap should be largely sought elsewhere: pensioners remember what the war was like, the vast majority of students do not; a greater proportion of pensioners were schooled in nationally-mixed classes, whereas today’s youth are mostly schooled in mono-ethnic classes. The impact of education, age and wartime experience are discussed further below.
7. National Identities

The survey posed a series of questions designed to provide nuanced information about respondents’ feelings about their national identity, and to provide a basis for assessing elements of the relationship between attitudes to national identity and attitudes to reconciliation. The results indicate respondents from Bosniak and Croatian backgrounds are on average consistently more positive about the importance of reconciliation activities than respondents from Serbian backgrounds, and there may be a number of factors at play which explain this. At the same time, attitudes to national identities do not consistently correlate with attitudes to reconciliation. And a large proportion of respondents do not see their national identity as politically important.

Asked how they see their national identity (Q12), 36.8% indicated Bosniak, 32% indicated Serbian, and 23.9% Croatian. For the respondents identifying with the three constitutional peoples, over 93% also identified with the religious community commonly associated with that national identity – Catholics with Croatian national identity, Muslims with Bosniak national identity, and Orthodox with Serbian national identity.

In a religious sense, 92% of Bosniaks identified themselves as Muslims, 3% were atheists, 2% Catholics, 1% Orthodox, 1% agnostics, and 1% chose not to say.

92% of Serbs identified themselves as Orthodox Christians, 3% were atheists, 1% agnostics, 2% chose other, and 1% did not respond.

93% of Croats identified themselves as Catholics, 2% as agnostics, 1% as atheists, 1% other, 1% did not answer.

The majority of respondents who did not answer the question related to national identity also did not answer the question on religious affiliation – 65%. The rest of these non-respondents were Orthodox 14%, Bosniaks 10%, Catholics 3%, atheists 3%, and other 3%.

After cross-referencing the question on national identity with the claim: “I am a minority in a religious sense”, a figure is obtained indicating that 22% of respondents are minorities in a religious sense. The majority of them belong to national minorities (70%). Of the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 31% of the Croat respondents believe they are part of a religious minority, 19% of the Serbs, and 18% of the Bosniaks.

Among the 161 respondents (6.2%) who gave other answers, 63 (2.4%) chose to describe their national identity in other terms: 25 (1%) chose Bosnian and Herzegovinian, 8 chose Bosnian, 7 chose Herzegovinian, 10 chose ‘Yugoslav’ and 10 indicated mixed backgrounds (Bosnian and Serb, Croat and Serb, etc). 10 further respondents (0.4%) identified with national minorities, 13 respondents gave other responses, and 75 (2.9%) indicated that they preferred not to answer the question. In addition, 29 respondents (1.1%) did not answer the question at all.

In their answers to questions about trust-building and reconciliation, the average for the sample of respondents identifying as Bosnian and Croatian was consistently more positive than the average amongst respondents identifying as Serbian about the importance of the activities and actors involved in these processes. For many questions, Bosniak respondents were on average more affirmative than Croatian respondents were, and the reverse was also true for as many other questions. The
10 respondents identifying with national minorities were consistently high in the rankings they gave to reconciliation activities and actors, while the group which chose alternative identities varied far more, providing high rankings in response to some questions, and low rankings in response to others. Different educational levels may influence some of the results: a higher proportion of respondents from Serbian backgrounds had finished education early than was true of the Bosniak and Croatian samples, and a higher proportion of respondents identifying as Croatian or preferring an alternative identity had completed higher degrees. There was also considerable variation within each of the three constituent peoples. Consequently, the divergent trend should be understood not as a radical difference between the three constituent peoples, but as a reflection of the strength of different responses favouring reconciliation activities within each national sample.

Question 13 prompted respondents to choose any of four options which they felt applied to their feeling about the importance of their national identity. 2.5% of respondents chose not to answer.

When asked whether their national belonging was important when they made decisions about whom to socialize with (Q13/1), only 194 (7.4%) ticked ‘yes’, 2348 (90.1%) indicated ‘no’.

When asked whether nationality was important for their vote (Q13/2), 210 (8.1%) indicated ‘yes’, 2331 (89.4%) ‘no’. Croatian respondents were more likely to tick ‘Yes’ than the average across the sample, while Serbian and Bosniak respondents were close to the sample average.

When asked (13/3) whether nationality was important to them because it was the group they felt they belonged to, 1029 (39.5%) indicated ‘yes’, 1512 (58%) ‘no’. Croatian and Serbian respondents were more likely than the average across the sample to agree with this.

When asked (13/4) to indicate whether nationality had no importance to them at all, 1169 (44.9%) agreed and 1372 (52.9%) disagreed. This time, Croatian and Serbian respondents were significantly less likely to agree than the sample as a whole. The average across the sample of Bosniak respondents was close to the sample-wide average.

The groups who responded ‘yes’ to Q13/3 and ‘no’ to Q13/4 about the feeling and importance of national group belonging were more consistent in their responses to the questions about priorities for a trust-building and reconciliation process in Q24 than was true of other questions: support for reconciliation activities correlated positively with being more likely to feel a national group is important in terms of belonging. The only two options in Q24 for which there were no significant correlations with Questions 13/3 and 4 were about the importance of dialogue activities to establish mutual understanding and the importance of programmes focused on understanding between young people – these options were as likely to be supported by those for whom nationality is not important as it was by those for whom it is important.

The relatively small group who responded ‘yes’ to 13/1 and 13/2 were significantly more likely to indicate support for the involvement of believers in reconciliation activities. Those who indicated that their national identity was important for their decisions about whom to socialize with (13/1) were also more likely to value expert judgements about the experience of the war. Those who indicated by contrast that their national identity did not affect choices about friendships were more likely than the average across the respondent sample to affirm the importance of citizen understanding, of a role in reconciliation activities for people who can understand others’ views, and of the importance
7. National Identities

of expert judgements about the causes of the war. Those who indicated national identity affected their vote (13/2) were more likely than the average across the sample to indicate the importance of apologies from those in positions of responsibility in the 1990s, and of expert judgements about the causes of the war.

The responses given in Q13 provided some further correlations with responses to Questions 25, 26 and 27, without providing a consistent explanation for preferred approaches to trust-building and reconciliation.
8. Politics

One of the most valuable features of the data from this survey is the inclusion of a large proportion of citizens who chose not to vote at the last elections at state and entity levels, or who have otherwise indicated their dissatisfaction with voting choices. As might be expected, these respondents indicated lower levels of satisfaction with life in the country, low levels of trust in political actors, and lower levels of trust in a number of forms of reconciliation process. Those who voted for the governing parties – the most-established parties which aim to represent each of the three constituent peoples – are not necessarily happy about their choice, nor are they necessarily more happy about the state of the country than those voting for opposition parties. And yet on average they do have a different attitude to the future of the country, one which cuts against assumptions about the mainstream parties deriving strength from an intransigent form of ethnonationalism. The most consistent levels of support for formal reconciliation processes came from those who at the last elections voted for one of the governing parties, and these voters were also more likely to support an engagement with the country’s history than those who voted for opposition parties.

In what follows, comparisons are drawn not between voters for particular parties, but between those who indicated that they voted for the parties which have governed in post-war Bosnia (30.9% of the total sample), those who voted for smaller opposition parties (5.9%), those who did not vote (10.9%), those who elected not to indicate for whom they voted or whether they voted (43.1%), and finally those who did not respond to this question at all (9.2%). The interest here is not in the performance of particular political parties, but in the profiles of those who voted for continuity of government, those who voted for change, those who did not vote, and the remainder. The 43.1% of respondents who indicated that they preferred not to state their electoral preference reflect the high levels of mistrust in the political uses to be made by such data. A large proportion of those respondents will also be reflecting a general sense of disaffection with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a distance from the party political system.

Questions 19 and 20: The state of the country and priorities for change

Those who voted for the governing parties share a general popular dissatisfaction with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with the state of the country’s politics. A majority of respondents declared their dissatisfaction with the quality of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina (76.4%), while only 21.7% said they were satisfied (Question 19). Their focus was not political but economic change. In order to make life better, 60.8% of respondents indicated that improvements in economy are the greatest priority (Question 20). By contrast, only 39.9% of the sample believed that political change was more important in creating a better quality of life, and still less – only 28.7% – indicated that social change was the most important priority for improving life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the quality of social relations are not determining in this sense – 70.3% of those surveyed confirmed this, while 28.7% said improvement of social relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina will make their life better. A small but significant number of respondents to Question 20 rejected all three options and wrote out their own recipe for improving the country, much of which underlines the inadequacies attributed to the political system: creating an adequate government (0.8%), the fight against criminals and corruption (0.6%), differention of the Federation from Republika Srpska (0.5%), a politics favouring employment (0.4%), reconciliation and tolerance (0.3%), reaffirmation of moral and ethics (0.2%), rule of law and good laws (0.2%), and impact on people’s awareness (0.2%).
The data revealed a different trend amongst responses to the satisfaction with life question amongst those who voted at the last elections and those who did not. The most unsatisfied with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina (85.9%) were those who did not vote. 80.4% of those who voted for opposition parties were not satisfied with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The difference between these voters and those who voted for the parties in government was strikingly small: 79% of those who voted for the governing parties on the entity and state levels were not satisfied with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 75.7% of those who preferred not to say for which parties they voted expressed dissatisfaction with life in the country.

Comparable divergences with respect to priorities for change in the country were remarkably slight: There is strikingly little difference of perspective to questions about whether economic, political or social change should be prioritized between the responses of those who voted for parties in government and those who did not. A comparable pattern is reflected in attitudes to the importance of economic change for an improvement in the country’s life. Improvements in the economy proved equally important for those who voted for parties in government (64.4%), those who supported opposition parties (63%), and those who chose not to say for whom they voted (64%). Amongst those who indicated that they did not vote in the last entity and state elections, 59.6% indicated that economic change was the priority for improving life in the country.

The importance of political reform again saw only slight differences between voter and non-voter groups. 40.9% of those who voted for oppositional countries and 40.9% of those who voted but preferred not to declare their political preferences consider this to be the primary path to change for the better. By contrast, 37.3% of respondents who voted for the ruling parties and 37.9% of those who indicated that they did not vote judged that the political dimension is the most important area for change.

Improving social relations proved the least important for all groups. It was the preferred path for change for 31.4% of those who chose not to say for whom they voted, for 24.8% of those who voted for parties in government, for 24.8% of those who did not vote, and 24% of those who supported opposition parties.

**Question 21: Would a reconciliation process have an impact?**

Voters and non-voters present slightly different trends again with respect to the likely impact of a reconciliation process.

On a local level, the most positive response came from those who indicated that they did not vote (57.6%). Similarly, more than half of respondents who chose not to say for whom they voted believe that attempts to build a relationship of trust and honesty would not have affected the future of the city and local region in which they live. The trend was slightly different amongst voters who indicated that they had voted for a particular party: 53.5% of those who voted for opposition parties and 52.5% of those who voted for ruling parties said these initiatives would make an impact on their local areas.

A comparable pattern was evident with respect to reconciliation and trust-building initiatives at the country-wide level. 76.8% of the total sample surveyed said these initiatives would have a serious impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most positive were those who voted for the ruling parties: 79.1%. At the other end of the spectrum, 73.9% of those who did not vote agreed they would have a serious impact at this level.

The gap between the attitudes of voters and non-voters is not wide, but it is fairly consistent.
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

Question 22: should the focus be on the constituent peoples?
Almost 90% of respondents said that reconciliation and trust building initiatives should be focused on relations between the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The highest level of support for this came from those who did not vote in the last state or entity elections (92.3%). The lowest level of support came from those who supported opposition parties (87.9%). This figure is still strikingly high, given that a good number of these parties are committed to overcoming the political dominance of the main parties associated with each of the constituent peoples.

Question 23: should reconciliation activities focus on the acts of past governments?
More than half of the respondents in this study considered topics related to the past to be important (14.8% very important, and 38.3% as important). By contrast, 13.4% said these topics are not important, and for 17.4% these topics present an obstacle for the processes of reconciliation and trust building. 16.1% did not answer the question.

The most affirmative of a deliberate focus on past-related topics were those respondents who voted for the ruling parties in the last elections: 42.6% indicate these topics are important, 17.5% say very important. Those who did not vote were also supportive, albeit with a lower percentage – 36.2% indicated that these topics are important, 13.4% said that a focus on the past is very important.

The project of a reconciliation process focused on the past remains most controversial amongst those who did not vote for one of the governing parties in the last elections. 25% of those who did not vote and 20% of those who voted for opposition parties indicated that these topics are actually an obstacle rather than an aid to the process of trust building and reconciliation.

Graph 8.1
What is the place of issues arising from the country's past in such a process, in your opinion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A distraction</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I'd rather not say</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 24: How much are politicians trusted relative to other actors?
The table below compares the level of importance for reconciliation process attributed to politicians with the importance attributed to non-political actors. The most valued participants in the process of reconciliation were those who could advocate for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not exclusively for one of its constituent peoples: 51.1% of those surveyed considered their role to be very important, and an additional 21.6% said it would be important. By contrast, only 29% indicated that the role of politicians in a reconciliation process was very important, and 19.8% declared their role was not important at all – the highest percentage of all types of actor listed. The variety of categories included in Question 24 underlines the degree to which these distinctive responses reflected a general sense of dissatisfaction with party politics. They also reflect the divergence between the preferences of different groups within the sample: religious leaders and socially-active religious individuals elicited only slightly stronger support than politicians, but were also deemed unimportant by slightly smaller numbers; teachers, victims and women received still stronger levels of support, and still fewer indicated they were likely to be unimportant to reconciliation processes.

Graph 8.2
How important would the involvement of the following persons be for a reconciliation process designed to build trust and understanding across the population of B&H?

![Graph showing involvement of various persons in a reconciliation process]
9. Wartime Experience

This is the first set of surveys to study the attitudes to reconciliation and trust-building of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to their wartime experience.

The results affirmed key points in the findings of the pilot survey conducted earlier (2012) in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar and Bugojno, with some modification. In the pilot survey, wartime experience influenced attitudes to the importance of reconciliation process, but did not affect responses to questions about which steps should be taken. In that first survey, veterans and civilians were more likely to affirm the importance of the reconciliation process than those who were refugees or those who described their role during the war as “all of the above” or “none of the above”.

In this second survey, it was again shown that veterans were the most committed to support reconciliation and trust-building initiatives. In this second survey, regardless of the category respondents identified themselves with, all respondents indicated a positive attitude to all reconciliation initiatives. It was nevertheless clear that wartime experiences correlated with different responses to the importance of different types of initiative.

The survey examined the wartime experience of respondents through six given options: soldier, civilian, refugee, prison camp inmate, “None of the above”, and “I’d rather not say”. The largest group in the sample were refugees (36.8%), then civilians (26.2%), then respondents who chose “None of the above” (21%), then soldiers (13.1%), then respondents who chose “I’d rather not say” (6.6%) and lastly prison camp inmates (2.1%).

Respondents who were soldiers during the war answered all questions on trust-building initiatives encompassed in Question 24 more positively. They were much more likely to insist that initiatives should focus on enabling citizens to understand each other better, on agreement among experts on the experiences of the population during the war, on the importance of determining the causes of the war by experts, and on ensuring that political leaders seriously engage with the people they represent.

Graph 9.1

The importance of expert agreement on the experiences of the population during the war. * During the war, I was a soldier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not a soldier</th>
<th>Soldier during the war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both important and not important</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Respondents who were civilians attributed greater importance to: serious encounter between important personalities in politics today; encouraging schoolchildren to talk about what expectations they hold in common for their futures; the contribution to be made by people who are able to understand the different perspectives of members of different communities; and ensuring that political leaders engage seriously with the people they represent. It remains uncertain whether this indicates a genuinely high level of expectation that politicians might give a greater contribution to the process of reconciliation and become more engaged with the people they represent, or whether it is rather more indicative of a generally low degree of expectation that currently politicians seek to work in the best interests of citizens.

Respondents who were refugees during the war were more likely to see the following as important: encouraging school children to talk about the expectations they hold in common for their future; the contribution to be made by people with a sincere personal faith; and reaching an agreement between experts on the experiences of the population during the war. Those who went through prison camps during the war also placed higher expectations on an agreement among experts, both on this point and in determining the causes of the war.

Respondents who belonged to none of the listed groups during the war tended to answer all the sub-questions for Q24 with statistically significant values. This is most readily understandable in light of the trend that younger people in general showed less enthusiasm about all types of reconciliation initiative. Among those who declared they had been “None of the above” during the war, the majority was, as might be expected, younger than 18 years of age (75.4%).

Respondents who preferred not to report what they had been or done during the war were more likely to value an initiative focused on serious encounter between active political figures, and were more negative about enabling citizens to understand different perspectives concerning this issue, to understand each other better, about agreement among experts on the experience of the population during the war, and on ensuring that political leaders seriously engage with the people they represent. This correlates with a general tendency for those who chose not to indicate a role during the war to show slightly more skepticism about reconciliation initiatives.
10. Education

While the levels of education attained by respondents may be quite precise and widely understood, the impact of those levels of education might be understood quite differently, either through grouping educational cohorts differently, or through divergent expectations about the relationship between educational levels and outcomes. Whereas in a UNDP survey published in 2011 those with a higher level of education expressed more support for activities contributing to reconciliation and trust-building across peoples and citizens, the results of this survey indicate scope for different perspectives. What follows is only an introduction to the findings of the survey, which will be further clarified in publications in 2014-2015.

In this survey, respondents gave the following answers regarding their level of education: 1.3% of respondents indicated they had no formal education, 8.6% had finished elementary school, 53.3% secondary school, 30.3% had been to college or university, and the highest level of education – a master’s degree or doctorate – had been earned by 3.2%. Slightly less than 2% chose not to answer this question.

Graph 10.1 Education

When asked whether a serious attempt to build relationships of trust and honesty among religious and national groups would have an impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina, a larger number of respondents with higher education indicated that it would than was true of respondents with a lower level of education or with no education. Asked whether such an attempt would have an impact on a local
level or on a wider regional level (BiH, Croatia, Serbia), no significant correlations to the level of education attained by respondents appeared.

While higher levels of education correlated with more positive affirmations of the impact to be expected from a reconciliation process across the whole country, there were no differences between the responses of educational cohorts with respect to whether or not such initiatives should be focused on the constituent peoples. A significant majority of respondents of all educational levels recognized that relationships between the constituent peoples lie in the centre of the reconciliation process – relationships among the three constituent peoples are not merely an issue imposed either by an educated or political elite, nor out of a populist interest disconnected from a genuine sense of citizen interests. Why it is seen as important deserves further research.

A positive correlation obtained between higher education and greater levels of support for the propositions that an initiative for building relationships founded on trust should be focused on serious encounters between politicians and on encouraging school children to talk about their expectations for the future which they share. Even more highly educated respondents, at master’s and doctoral levels, were especially like to affirm the need for contributions from people who can understand the perspectives of members of different communities. On the other hand, and paradoxically, the same respondents who hold doctoral or master’s degrees had the least trust in expert contributions to the process of reconciliation and building trust. This was true regardless of whether experts were expected to be engaged with the experience of the population during the war, or with the reasons for the actions of military and political leaders during the war, or with the causes of the war. This can be interpreted in two ways: either people who are engaged with science have enough experience and enough knowledge about the methodological difficulties involved in accessing authentic and reliable data that they do not trust these processes, or, on the other hand, they are familiar with attempts, in the past and/or recently, to shape data, to blame “the other side”, or to emphasize desirable and to cover undesirable results.

Answers to the question “Do you believe it would be important for the process of reconciliation if a constitutional reform ended entrenched conflicts between parties which represent the constitutional peoples” showed that there were differences among respondents with different level of education: the same level of support for the proposition was given by those with no education and by those with a university degree, and a lower level of support was given by those who had graduated from elementary or secondary school.

Those with higher education were less likely to support public spending on memorial and information centres at sites of atrocities than those with lower education were, and the same was true for educational programmes designed to bring young people from all over the country to memorial centres in order to help them to understand the past and the lessons it teaches. By contrast, more highly educated respondents gave higher rates of approval to spending money from public funds for educational programmes which help young people to address negative prejudices and to help them to understand the common interests of citizens of different backgrounds. This was also partially the case for support for community-led initiatives which identify foundations for trust and public cooperation. Put in other words, people with higher education gave less credit to the importance of clearing up issues from the past and more to activities which build the future. In contrast, differences in level of education played no part in evaluations of the value of increasing support for victims of serious crimes in the 1990s.
Finally, respondents with higher education tended to offer distinctive responses to the importance of involving different actors in the reconciliation process (Question 27). Respondents with higher education showed their most strongly marked preference for the role to be played by teachers, then for the role of politicians, then for women to a slightly lesser extent, and slightly less still for the role of religious figures and socially-active believers. This more highly-educated part of the sample showed least appreciation for the role to be played by groups which represent victims and vulnerable members of the population.
11. Age

The results broken down by age groups were significant and also interesting. There is a troublesome trend that younger people, especially those who do not remember the war or who were not even born at that time, appear to be more indifferent to the issues associated with reconciliation and trust-building. Perhaps this can be explained by a general youthful indifference. At the same time, younger respondents also appear to have slightly more negative attitudes to the question of trust in general. This probably reflects what these new generations learn about the war and the “other”, from parents, the media or school.

Regarding the attitudes of respondents from different age groups to the questions about facing the past grouped in Question 24, there are clear differences between the youngest population (below 18) and the older generations (especially above 51). Younger respondents rated all suggestions as less important, while older respondents (especially those above 51) regarded them as more important. The most striking divergence between the younger and the older generations was seen in their evaluations of the potential importance of a “serious encounter between important personalities in political life today”. The same difference is evident in answers to Question 27, on the importance of getting different citizens involved in the process of reconciliation, where the younger respondents again expected less from politicians than older respondents did. This fits the trend in responses to Question 10, according to which those under 18 year olds with no wartime experience showed less interest and enthusiasm for the entire reconciliation process.

This divergence was again evident in answers to Question 25, focused on the importance of a range of options for the next step in reconciliation and trust-building, such as “special treatment and protection for minorities”, “apologies of political leaders”. Again, younger respondents attributed less importance to all listed suggestions. In general, the older the respondents were, the more likely they were to rate the given options as more important. The difference is the most striking between the category of the youngest (younger than 18) and the oldest (above 51).

Regarding Question 26, focused on a series of propositions about spending public funds on different educational and social projects aimed at building trust, the majority of all age groups support spending on such initiatives (between 51.1% and 91.5%).

The general tendency differentiating a more positive older cohort from a more negative younger cohort does not apply for all questions. In answering the question about whether they approved of public spending on building “memorial and information centres at sites of atrocities”, respondents from the age group of 18-30 expressed more commitment than other age groups. There were no differences between different age categories in answers to the question of whether public funds should be used to support “educational programmes designed to take young people to memorial sites so that they could learn about the past and about the lessons that can be learnt for today”. The majority of all age groups support public expenditure on this type of initiative.

Across the sample as a whole, the most supported option for public expenditure was for “educational programmes that help young people to get rid of negative stereotypes and to understand the common interests of citizens of different backgrounds”. This support ranges between 86.4% for the age group 18-30 to 91.5% among respondents older than 51.
Significant support was also given by all age groups to the idea of spending public funds on “social and cultural programmes focused on problems relating to coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Here, the lowest level of support was given by respondents between 18 and 30 years of age (83.2%), whereas the highest level of support came from those respondents who were younger than 18 (87.9%).

Those younger than 18 were least likely to spend public money on memorial and information centres at sites of serious crimes (55%), and most likely to spend it on educational programmes which help young people to get rid of negative stereotypes (87.8%) and on social and cultural programmes focused on problems relating to coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (87.9%). The same trend is seen among respondents older than 51, who were also most likely to support the same proposals (91.5% and 87.2% respectively).

The age cohort which included the highest proportion of respondents who chose not to give answers to Question 26 was between 18 and 30 years of age, between 30.1% and 32.7%. Reflecting a common trend, younger respondents showed less consistency in filling out the questionnaire and generally less interest for the topic, although they were most frequent to volunteer to be respondents.

When asked how important it would be to include different categories of citizens in a process of reconciliation designed to build trust and understanding across the population, respondents were least likely to attribute a potential impact to politicians. Nevertheless, 31% affirmed that it is very important to include politicians in a reconciliation process, 21% that it is important, 18% that it is both important and unimportant, unimportant 9% and completely unimportant 21%. This was the largest proportion of negative attitudes to any type of actor who might be involved in the reconciliation process. This negative response was particularly noticeable among younger respondents; the level of importance attributed to a role for politicians in the reconciliation process then rose steadily with the age of respondents. The same trend can be seen in relation to expectations placed on religious figures, teachers (especially lowly ranked by those younger than 18) and lay believers. In regard to other suggested options (groups representing victims and the vulnerable, persons representing the interests of all citizens), there is a similar trend, albeit not so emphatic. Respondents younger than 18 attributed more importance to the role of women in the process of trust building than other age groups did.
12. Sex/Gender

The importance of attention to the influence of sex or gender on attitudes to reconciliation is acknowledged by a range of parties, some of which proceed from an ‘essentialising’ assumption about women as being inherently peaceful, immune to the factors which turn men into actors in a conflict. Undoubtedly women played and continue to play pioneering roles in promoting encounter and dialogue. The present study suggests grounds for seeing a distinctive dynamic favouring reconciliation activities amongst women who responded to the survey, and there were also some noticeable divergences between the tendencies amongst more religious and more secular women. It is not the case that the attitudes of men and women should be seen as different, but a number of features of the survey ought to be borne in mind by those seeking to understand how ordinary men and women approach topics associated with reconciliation.

The intuition that women have a distinctive role to play in post-conflict activities was widely shared amongst respondents, both amongst those identified with more secular parts of the population and those identified more with religious communities. In evaluating the role for different categories of citizen in reconciliation and trust building in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Q27), the role of women was recognized as very important by 33%, and important by 30% of respondents. Only 15% of respondents indicated that the role of women is not important in processes of reconciliation and trust building.

Differences between men and women in response to questions about reconciliation

In response to the first group of questions (Q24) addressing what initiatives the process of reconciliation should entail, the average of the sample of women ranked all ten listed initiatives as more important than men on average did, though only for half of them were statistically significant differences found:

- in indicating the importance of receiving explanations of their deeds from persons responsible for events in the 1990s,
- in recognizing the importance of citizens understanding each others’ different views,
- in encouraging school children to speak about expectations for the future which they share,
- in appreciating the contribution to be made by people who can understand the views of members of other communities, and
- in seeing value in an agreement among experts regarding reasons for actions of military and political leader during the conflict.

Although women on average ranked the importance of the role of today’s politicians in the reconciliation process more highly than men did on average, no statistically important differences were found. Women showed higher sensitivity toward the role to be played by “ordinary people”, yet also tended to attribute importance to politicians from the past explaining their own deeds as well as experts agreeing upon the deeds of military and political elites during the war. Those women who supported all of these points could be seen as more aware that reconciliation is complex social phenomena, embracing different processes which include the contribution of ordinary people, of experts, of youth and of people who took decisions during the war. It also seems statistically significant differences that women on average laid more importance on understanding as a key feature of reconciliation processes.
Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust

For Q25, all of the concrete steps listed for possible priority in reconciliation work were ranked of higher importance to women on average than to men on average. Statistically significant differences were found on the following points:

- providing special treatment and protection for minority returnees
- mutual understanding and respect of differences among citizens, and
- mutual understanding and respect of similarities between citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

More political, national and abstract issues, such as constitutional reform, agreement regarding historical facts and apology of politicians for the past were ranked more highly by women on average, but statistically significant differences were not found. This meant that for this group of questions women laid higher stress on average on the issues concerning the understanding of “ordinary people”.

Although more women on average than men approved the idea that the public means should be spent on memorial and public centres at sites where the most disastrous war crimes were committed, no statistically importance differences were found. The same is true of the second question regarding educational programs visits by youth groups to these places. It seems from the data that both women and men see such activities can be traumatic, and especially for young people. Only concerning educational programs to help youth overcome mutual prejudices and understand common interests of all citizens were statistically significant differences found between respondents of the two sexes. In addition, public spending on social and cultural programs focused on citizens living together in Bosnia and Herzegovina was supported by 2.2% more women than men, though this was not statistically significant.

Q27 presented a group of questions about the importance (or otherwise) of particular social groups in the processes of reconciliation. On average, women ranked all those categories mentioned more highly than men did – politicians, prominent religious figures, teachers, ordinary believers, persons that opt for the interests of all citizens, women, and groups that represent victims or the marginalized. Nevertheless, only for the last two was this statistically significant.

**Differences between more religious and non-religious women**

The differences of emphasis between those women who described themselves as religious and those who described themselves as not religious were clear in relation to some questions, but far from all. Some of the same patterns were observed in measuring how frequently or infrequently respondents indicated that they attended local religious communities, though there were some intriguing new patterns.

Religious women proved more content with life in Bosnia and Herzegovina than non-religious women (Q19), a pattern true of religious and non-religious men as well. By contrast, differences of approach to priorities for improving life in Bosnia and Herzegovina (economic, social, and political, Q20) were negligible. There were no statistically significant differences (Q21) relating to the importance of trust building on a local or a national level, although more religious women evidenced more trust in these processes on a national level than non-religious women did, and less trust than non-religious women on a local level. By contrast, on average religious women clearly considered the wider regional reconciliation process, including Serbia and Croatia, to be less important than non-religious women did, and this difference was statistically significant. More religious than non-religious wom-
en thought that these processes should focus on the constituent peoples (Q22), but this difference of tendency was not statistically significant.

The sample of religious women proved more keen on average to indicate that issues relating to the past are important for reconciliation than nonreligious women did (Q24 and Q25). As the research team investigates this further, the possibility that this is connected with religious traditionalism, with women commonly being construed as guardians of the memories of “our” victims, can be examined. Religious women were more likely to indicate they saw it as important that experts should explain the causes of the war, that politicians in the 1990s should explain their deeds publicly, that apologies for war crimes be made, and that agreement regarding genocide and the extent to which all war sides suffered be sought.

For most questions regarding peace-building activities which address present and future concerns, no significant differences were found. Thus, the approaches of religious and non-religious women roughly correlated in relation to the importance of mutual understanding of both differences and similarities between citizens. Naturally, the role of “ordinary believers” was more highly ranked by religious women, and this was also true of attitudes to the importance of a serious engagement between politicians and the people they seek to represent. Religious women also display more trust in the role of religious leaders in the process of reconciliation and in groups that present victims and marginalized people. On the other categories of actor raised in Q27, there were no statistically important differences.

Turning to the impact of involvement in religious communities, there were some unsurprising reflections of the same distinctions between respondents who indicated they were religious and those who indicated that they were non-religious, and there were intriguing differences. Women active in local religious communities were slightly more keen (though this was not clear enough to be statistically significant) to claim that for the improvement of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is important to improve social relations and to bring order to the country’s politics, and they gave less importance to economic change than non-religious women did (Q20). Women who are active in local religious communities were no more likely than other women to consider reconciliation initiatives on the local and national level to be likely to produce important change (Q21). However, religiously active women were less likely to consider reconciliation initiatives on regional level to be important, and this was statistically significant. They also (Q22) were less inclined to indicate that these initiatives should focus on the constituent peoples, although this was not statistically important – opening an intriguing possibility for further examination that on this question religion and religiosity cuts against the drawing of exclusive ethno-national boundaries in political life.

What was significant was the degree to which women who are active in the life of their religious communities were unimpressed by the importance of reconciliation activities focused on the past (Qs 24, 25). This contrasts with the figures based on declared levels of religiosity: there, the more religious a respondent claimed she was, the more likely she was to support activities focus on facing the past.

More religiously-active women gave more consideration to a number of forward-facing activities than religiously non-practicing women did, such as serious encounters between active politicians, activities promoted by people who are sincere believers, and activities enabling citizens to understand each other better. Differences in the role of expert are not statistically important between wom-
en who are religiously observant and those who are not, which means that generally speaking, both groups expect more of a contribution to be made by “ordinary” people than they do by experts. It is also interesting to note that whereas women who claim to be religious and women who claim to be religiously active, the first group ranked more the issues dealing with the past than the second one. Regarding the next group of question concerning reconciliation, the obtained correlation coefficient are only statistically important regarding the respect of both similarities and differences between Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens, where religiously non-practicing women considered this as more important than religiously active. It is also interesting to note that no statistically important differences were found on other questions, between women who are religiously active on different levels.

At the same time, religiously-observant women considered public spending on memorial centres at sites of atrocities to be more important than religiously non-observant women did, placed greater weight on educational programmes that enable young people to visit such places in order to better understand the past, and were more emphatic about increasing support to victims. On other issues covered in Q26, no statistically significant differences were found. Nevertheless, it is not unimportant that religiously observant women were less likely to emphasise reconciliation activities focused on the problems of common life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As for the importance of different social actors in reconciliation activities (Q27), statistically important differences were only found regarding the role of religious leaders and lay believers, where, logically enough, women who are religiously observant were more likely to appreciate their role than non-religious women were.

In conclusion, the entire sample, male and female, sees in women a potentially significant actor in reconciliation processes, and only 15% of respondents ranked their role as not important. Women proved more likely to indicate reconciliation activities are important than men, and on average women appeared more likely to be aware of the complex range of actors who could be important in reconciliation related process. And while there were differences of emphasis between religious and non-religious women – notably that the more religious women claim to be, the more emphasis they placed on the importance of addressing issues from the past – the trends were often not statistically significant.
13. Bibliography


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