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Forgotten connections: reviving the concept of upbringing in Scottish child welfare

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Abstract

The concept of upbringing is a central one in social pedagogy. It is also apparent in a Scottish social welfare tradition, most evidently in the 1964 Kilbrandon Report. Kilbrandon’s broad understanding of upbringing or social education was, however, subsequently subsumed beneath increasingly compartmentalised and instrumental approaches to child care and education. These fail to adequately understand and, arguably, impede and distort adult responsibility for bringing up children. This article draws on European literature, and particularly the writing of the German social pedagogue Klaus Mollenhauer, to begin to articulate the concept of upbringing, locating it as the central task of child care and education. Bringing up children is identified as, fundamentally, a moral and cultural endeavour, brought about through caring, intergenerational relationships. The article concludes by suggesting that elements within a Scottish tradition and within current policy might be drawn on to support a broad understanding of upbringing.

My thanks are due to members of the Centre for Understanding Social Pedagogy (CUSP), under the guidance of Prof Pat Petrie and in particular to Paul Stephens, Professor of Social Pedagogy at the University of Stavanger for introducing me to the work of Klaus Mollenhauer (in its English translation).

Introduction

The roots of the term pedagogy derive from the ancient Greek, pais (child) agein (to lead, bring up) (Eichsteller and Holhtoff, 2010). Pedagogues in ancient Greece were family attendants (usually slaves) whose duties were to supervise the young sons in a household. They took boys to the gym and the school, remaining with them in the classroom. They were also expected to supervise their young charges’ manners and
behaviour in the home, the street and in school, where the pedagogue was a symbol of parental authority (M. K. Smith, 2009).

The pedagogical task of leading a child and taking responsibility for their care and education is encapsulated across different European languages and traditions in the concept of upbringing (Cameron and Moss, 2011). The ‘social’ element in social pedagogy has roots in German philosophical responses to industrialisation and concerns about loss of community and in the democratic movements that emerged across Europe following the revolutions of 1848 (Hamaleinen, 2003). It had distinct egalitarian and reformist underpinnings, being expressed as ‘educational action by which one aims to help the poor in society’ (Infed, 2005). Social pedagogy involves the induction of a child into a wider civitas and identifies the pedagogue as ‘an “upbringer” on behalf of society’ (Cameron and Moss, 2011: 13). In that sense it brings together concepts of care and education. Professional groupings such as teachers and youth workers, but perhaps more especially residential care workers and foster carers, all might play a role as upbringers.

In Anglo-American traditions, care and education have become largely separated from one another, with education happening in the classroom and care in the family. In a Scottish context, however, a broad understanding of upbringing is encapsulated in the 1964 Kilbrandon Report. In its deliberations the Kilbrandon Committee looked beyond Anglo-American ideas and towards Scandinavian ones. It also picked up upon extant Scottish views of education (Smith and Whyte, 2008, Smith, 2012). Kilbrandon concluded that children who offended and those in need of care and protection shared a common need for ‘special measures of education and training, the normal upbringing processes having, for whatever reason, fallen short’ (para 15).

Upbringing, from Kilbrandon’s perspective, encapsulated care, education, treatment and control. It was ‘to include all children whose educational requirements are not met by the normal educational processes of the home or school’ (para 94). Kilbrandon’s conception of education was social education, ‘education in its widest sense’, which was understood as happening at home as well as at school. The remedy for a shortfall in ‘upbringing’, was additional measures of education, a ‘re-education’
or a 're-upbringing' for the child, and, where appropriate for the parents, in order to strengthen ‘those natural influences for good which will assist the child’s development into a mature and useful member of society’ (para 17). This is an important point.

Upbringing was identified as a social as much as an individual process, incorporating wider community interests and, in that sense, aligning with the European humanistic philosophical traditions (Smith and Whyte, 2008). Kilbrandon was undoubtedly aware of European ways of thinking and in many respects sought to eschew Anglo-American models. Asquith et al suggest that:

> there are grounds to believe that what (Kilbrandon) intended was not an ‘education’ department in the traditional sense but rather a department based on principles much akin to those of social pedagogy. The social education department proposed by Kilbrandon may well have had its roots more in the notion of allowing an individual to realise his/her potential in society, much as with the role of the educateur in France (2005, p.23).

In the UK any wider social dimension to upbringing was diminished during the Thatcher years and indeed subsequently, when the focus of education and care shifted towards individual achievement and individual responsibility. Reflecting this, the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 identifies upbringing as first and foremost, a family affair, the local authority’s duty of welfare being ‘so far as is consistent with that duty, (to) promote the upbringing of such children by their families’ (Section 22 (1) (b)). Those children entrusted to the state were, in a terminological shift, no longer in care but merely looked after or looked after and accommodated.

Since then, and particularly under New Labour, parenting has become a pronounced social policy focus, finding expression for children in state care in the notion of corporate parenting. I argue that upbringing is a better concept than parenting within which to set out the state’s responsibility for children. Upbringing encapsulates but also avoids the pitfalls and tensions of aligning the task too closely to parenting. While state care ought to perform the roles of a good parent, carers cannot nor should they take on the blood bond involved in actual parenting. At the same time, upbringing
incorporates the broadly social and civic aspects of undertaking this task on behalf of society, which parenting alone may, ideally, but does not necessarily, do.

Since Kilbrandon, the concept of upbringing has been left largely unarticulated. The term appears periodically, (in the 2012 National Parenting Strategy, for instance) but it is not conceptualised. I argue here that upbringing is in essence a cultural endeavour, through which a valued heritage is passed on to children across generations. In seeking to develop such a concept of upbringing I draw upon the work of the German social pedagogic thinker, Klaus Mollenhauer (1928-1998). Mollenhauer’s book, Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing (1983), from which I shamelessly borrow the title of this article, is regarded as one of the most important German contributions to educational theory and scholarship in the 20th century. It has been translated into several languages, but has not yet appeared in English. Thankfully, it is in the process of translation through the endeavours of Norm Friesen and Tone Saevi (Canadian and Norwegian scholars respectively). Early and partial translations are available online (www.culture-and-upbringing.com/index.php/Main_Page). Mollenhauer himself says that his book ‘is nothing more than a rough sketch of what a general study in upbringing could consist of today’ (p.14). This article is, therefore, a rough sketch of a rough sketch. But, there is no doubt that Mollenhauer’s work challenges us to explore the concept of upbringing further and in so doing, calls into question much of what we have come to take for granted in how we think of caring for children, shifting the focus of this from the individual child to incorporate a broader social function.

Mollenhauer draws on a number of autobiographies from St. Augustine to Kafka and on artistic representations to explicate his account of upbringing and its historical development. The general structure of his book covers an introductory chapter on what is upbringing, followed by chapters on what he terms ‘Presentation’ and ‘Representation’. Subsequent chapters on ‘Trusting that children want to learn’, on ‘Self-activity’ and on ‘Identity’ are as yet not available in translated form but are outlined by Friesen and Saevi (2010). This article focuses, mostly, on the available chapters, augmented by other writing by the translators.
Locating Mollenhauer

Before discussing Mollenhauer's ideas on upbringing it is important to recognise his work as being deeply rooted in European philosophical traditions. As such it can be counterposed with more instrumental and scientific North American paradigms that have been influential in the UK. Lagemann, an historian of American education, explains that: 'one cannot understand the history of education in the United States, unless one realizes that Edward L. Thorndike won and John Dewey lost' (1989 p.185). Thorndike, note Friesen and Saevi, 'was a psychologist who studied animal behaviour to understand human learning, and his work anticipated both Skinner on operant conditioning and current connectionist research in neuroscience and cognitive psychology' (2010, p.215). His was a positivist method. For Dewey, on the other hand, what was required for learning was participation in community life. Crucially, he argued that children learn through interacting with a social environment. In that sense, Dewey was far more aligned to the humanistic European tradition within which social pedagogical ideas have their roots. Thorndike won out, however, and his supremacy in the education wars, might be argued to have had far-reaching consequences in the Anglo-American world, contributing to greater specialisation and focus on technique within education and by extension in areas such as residential child care.

It may also be important to locate Mollenhauer in time. His writing evokes a modernist belief in human progress, much, in fact, like Kilbrandon. The sense of community imagined, held together by a common moral purpose reflects Ferdinand Tönnies idea of gem einschaft (Stephens, 2010). In that sense Mollenhauer might be thought to propose a normative view of upbringing and one that perhaps fails to identify its role in arguably reinforcing class structures. It is a moot point whether such a rosy and homogenous vision of community is possible within a context of postmodern pluralism. The fragmentation and reconfiguration of communities that are features of
contemporary life may make ideas of upbringing somewhat more complicated but no less important.

What is upbringing?

Paul Natorp (1904), often thought of as the father of social pedagogy, identifies the essence of the discipline as being the upbringing of an individual and their integration into society. Man (sic), according to Natorp, can only become man through human interaction; individuals can only develop fully as part of society. Children, thus, need to be brought up as social beings.

Central social pedagogical perspectives on upbringing are reflected in the German terms erziehung and bildung. Erziehung can be translated loosely, as 'education', or 'upbringing', blurring the boundary between school and home, personal and professional. Bildung is often claimed not to have an equivalent term in English that conveys its scope. It is in essence about moral and social cultivation or formation (Lovlie et al, 2003). It is what Mollenhauer characterised as the 'way of the self'. It describes how we form ourselves and are formed by others, eventually to become mature individuals within a never-ending process of maturation. The context of bildung spans both formal and informal contexts and roles, familial, scholastic or recreational. In this sense, appeals solely to the power of the family or the school in upbringing and education are, according to Mollenhauer, inadequate; the task transcends these boundaries. It involves the cultivation of the inner life or soul of the child and their inauguration to culture, tradition, and humanity (Friesen and Saevi, 2010). Upbringing in this context is not so much something that is learnt in institutions such as schools (although schools undoubtedly do play a role in it) or through methods and techniques such as the latest social skills programme. Rather, it happens all around us, ‘so general as to be inseparable from basic human realities like language, work and –in the broadest sense—human culture’ (Mollenhauer, 1983, p.1).

Upbringing is first and foremost a matter of passing on a valued cultural heritage to prepare children to face the future. It is a debt owed by the adult generation to
children. Adult understandings of upbringing are, by their nature, backward looking; we construct a sense of what might constitute a good upbringing against a backdrop of our own experiences of being brought up. There is not necessarily an unambiguously good upbringing as might be suggested in current exhortations towards ‘best practice’; for most their upbringing was probably a bit like the curate’s egg, good in parts. Mollenhauer draws on autobiographies written over the centuries to bear testimony to the fact that, apart from being grateful to our parents for the upbringing they gave us, we also have reason to find fault with it. Each individual’s education and upbringing is at once a process of broadening and enrichment as well as a narrowing and impoverishment. Adults are more than mere midwives to the development of a child’s mind and spirit: they also, for whatever reason, through limiting or closing down opportunities, act as censors of the adult the child ultimately becomes (Mollenhauer, 1983).

Deliberations about upbringing raise a series of moral questions. Moss and Petrie (2002) identify one such question around what constitutes a good childhood. To answer this requires a conception of what Aristotle might identify as the good life, or the life lived well. It involves determining what in our own experience is of lasting value and is worth passing on to the next generation. There is little place in bringing up children for the moral relativism of present day state care, beset by what Webb (2010) identifies as ‘insidious leniencies’, which undercut the necessary structuring and ‘parenting’ of those who work in residential care – adults need to have some confidence in what is worthwhile to pass on to future generations. Mollenhauer challenges seemingly progressive or rights based educational philosophies, which might posit that children need to find their own paths in life. Such philosophies, he argues, seek to absolve us from our adult responsibilities to pass on our cultural heritage. They also ignore the fact that adult involvement with children is not neutral. As Michael Winkler puts it, ‘we cannot not engage in upbringing’ (2002, cited in Friesen and Hamelock, 2012 p.12). ‘It is simply unimaginable’, according to Mollenhauer, ‘for an adult to undertake any educational or child-rearing measure without conveying some aspect of him or herself or the way he or she lives, whether it is deliberate or not’ (1983, p.14). Thus, in failing to present children with a confident, if albeit contingent, image of what we consider to be the ‘good life’, we risk presenting
them only with a free-floating nihilism. We, therefore, have to address the question of what we want for our children and specifically whether the lives they witness us lead are ones that contribute positively to their upbringing.

**What do we want for children?**

Before staff recruitment was overtaken by psychometric testing and competency based questioning, a common question asked of candidates for residential care jobs was to tell about their own childhoods. It was generally an instructive question; some would say that they had experienced a joyous childhood and wanted to ensure that future generations shared a little of that – others might identify difficulties in their own childhoods that they would want to protect children from. One way or the other, their responses gave some insight into their hopes for children and a desire to fulfill these. The pedagogical call, for Mollenhauer, is part of such a call and response (Friesen and Hamelock, 2012). Mollenhauer proposes some ideas as to why we might respond to the call to be involved in children’s upbringing:

_I want the (perhaps very little) goodness in my life to be perpetuated. This response has at least three implications;
1. I would like human history to continue with a sense of optimism or at least of hope that also orients my own actions;
2. My own existence can be perpetuated in some small, indirect way through my children;
3. The way of life I teach children has some value._ (1983, p.12)

Mollenhauer’s development of these propositions is important and I reproduce it below:

_If these responses, cursory though they may be, make at least some sense, then the next question has to concern what adults bring to children. I refer to this as ‘cultural heritage,’ and the fitness of this heritage for the future. Anyone who does not have a heritage of some kind to pass on will probably take little pleasure in raising or educating children. ... When the desire to see_
generations born beyond one's own is extinguished, educational and even experiential possibilities are greatly diminished. Conservative excesses threaten to turn upbringing into a ritualized duty. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that adults lose the desire to raise children and only want to interact with them as mirror images of their adult selves (1983, p.12).

In the following section I bring together Mollenhauer’s ideas on how we pass on this valued heritage or convey a way of life to children, addressing his explication of the shift from presenting a way of life to children to that of ‘re-presenting’ it.

“Presentation and Re-presentation”

Mollenhauer argues that adults and children in pre-modern societies lived their lives in largely undifferentiated ways; adults simply ‘presented’ to children their grown-up ‘way of life’ (lebensform) in the course of what might nowadays be thought of as a sharing a common lifespase. The manner through which they passed on this way of life was unsystematic and unreflective:

The essential structures of adult behaviour are there for children to see, and, as they grow, children are able to learn about a very wide range of grown-up behaviours simply by living with them. It is the child’s principal educational task to reproduce this image. This manner of upbringing is implicit and habitual … (Friesen and Saevi, 2010: p.129).

It is also, to a large extent non-verbal. Augustine’s account of his learning contains words such as: ‘countenance,’ ‘glances of the eye,’ ‘gestures of the limbs,’ ‘tones of the voice’. Words and gestures achieve meaning in a particular cultural context within which a child can make sense of the referentiality between, for instance, an adult pointing at an object and the words used to name that object. This process is rarely didactic. As Augustine writes, ‘It was not that my elders taught me words … I myself learned this.’ In other words: ‘I reached my own conclusions,’ ‘I was the one who did it’ (in Mollenhauer, 1983, p.23). The child is thereby identified as an active participant in his or her learning. Interestingly, this way of learning might now be identified as
situated learning or legitimate, peripheral participation (Lave and Wenger, 1990), whereby participants in an activity learn how to engage in it through a process of watching and gradually becoming party to its conventions and requirements.

**Representation**

Mollenhauer uses illustrations to show how, with the rise of merchant capitalism in the 16th Century and its concomitant growing division of labour, adults’ ‘work’ gradually became separated off from children’s ‘learning’. This required that, rather than simply ‘present’ adult ways of life to children naturalistically, decisions began to be taken around which features of adult life ought to be presented or indeed interpreted as valuable and ‘re-presented’ and which features were to be filtered out. This led to an increasing emphasis on instructional techniques and methods through which to most efficiently pass on that which was considered culturally valuable, which in turn led to the growth of specialised institutions - schools, orphanages and youth clubs within which the young might be taught.

These specialised institutions served to filter out aspects of adult life and culture from young learners in what Mollenhauer refers to as ‘cultural compartmentalisation’. Formal education became separated off from wider processes of upbringing; adult culture was no longer presented to the child as a seamless whole, but only in part. ‘Whereas processes of presentation are implicit, habitual, and in this sense natural, those of representation are artificial, relying on forethought, planning, testing, refinement, and technical expertise’ (Friesen and Saevi, 2010, p.132). This poses questions for teachers and carers as to what way of life ought to be systematically represented to children and more technical considerations of choosing how best this might be done within the range of available methods (Mollenhauer, 1983).

The other side of the coin of what is to be represented to children is that of what needs to be filtered out? Parents and carers need to strike the balance between ensuring an age-appropriate ‘shielding’ of children from some of the harmful aspects of the adult world and helping them reach a ‘position facing the world’ (Plessner, in Friesen and Saevi, 2010). This negotiation of a ‘position facing the world’ is an important one in
that it involves a necessary delay or ‘slowing down’ of the impact of adult life upon children. The absence of such a ‘slowing down’ can give rise, from a pedagogical perspective, to problematic relations (Mollenhauer, 1983). Adults, therefore, have a role in pacing a child’s initiation into the adult world. For instance, while they may swear in the company of adult companions, they will not do so in front of children. Similarly, they may drink alcohol while in the company of children, and gradually introduce children themselves to it in a measured and thought-through way.

The interplay between presentation and representation

A dialectic emerges between questions of presentation and re-presentation. While the process of re-presentation involves some systematic interpretation and filtering of what to present to children, what to filter out and how to go about this, the mistake, Mollenhauer (1983) points out, is to assume that this kind of technical specialisation is what education is about. In everyday pedagogical practice, systematic and deliberate re-presentation is inextricably mixed with reflective and habitual presentation. In fact, messages that are transmitted by direct teaching are of more limited importance than those that unwittingly seep into a learner’s consciousness without either the teacher or pupil knowing anything about it. (Friesen and Saevi, 2010). In this process, a teacher or carer’s glance or countenance may be of more import than the latest curricular initiative or anger management programme. The pedagogical relation in this sense precedes educational methods and theories (Saevi, 2011); the task of upbringing is seen as ‘emerging from a sustained encounter between generations, specifically between a particular adult or teacher and a particular child or student as persons’ (Friesen and Saevi, 2010 p.142). Within such encounters ‘the child is always recognised as a unique, irreplaceable person, rather than being seen in terms of a developmental stage or category, or of a particular psychological diagnosis’ (Friesen and Saevi, 2011, p.139). Pedagogical practice, rather than looking to procedure or some elusive ‘best practice’, ‘speaks in anecdotes, stories, examples and questions that provide opportunity for experience rather than explanation, for listening rather than verification’ (Saevi 2010, p.2).

Pedagogical relationships
The assertion that the pedagogical encounter precedes theory and method calls for further exploration as to the nature of pedagogical relationships. These, according to Mollenhauer, constitute a special kind of personal relationship between adult and child. Herman Nohl characterises this as ‘the loving relationship of a mature person with a “developing” person, entered into for the sake of child so that he can discover his own life and form’ (cited in Spiecker, 1984, pp. 203-204). Children:

*should be brought up not as if they were material to be changed and formed. Instead, they should be brought up in support for a kind of power and potentiality that develops itself, in a dialogical relationship, in a kind of mutual interchange or call and response* (Mollenhauer, 1983 p.93).

Mollenhauer’s understanding of the pedagogical relation is marked by a number of characteristics, which I summarise below:

- It is grounded in the difference between the generations and the personal and cultural need for upbringing (Seavi, 2011).
- There is a purpose, and a context to pedagogical relationships, such as upbringing, teaching, guiding or supervising.
- The adult is directed toward the child and wants or intends what is good for the child’s future. This relationship is oriented to what the child may become, but this is, by its nature, open-ended and cannot be determined by adult plans or goals; we cannot second-guess the outcomes of our attempts at upbringing.
- The relationship is asymmetrical, unlike many other personal relationships (e.g. friendship). The adult is ‘there’ for the child in a way that the child is not ‘there’ for the adult. The extent of any asymmetry might vary, depending on the purpose of the relation, the adult’s ability to care, the age of the child and their need for care.
- The relationship is dispositional, reflecting personal, physical and emotional elements of whom and how an adult is in relation to children.
- In the pedagogical relation the adult is *tactful*, involving holding back and waiting or maintaining a certain distance so that the child may act for him- or herself. This quality
might also be described as watchful and thoughtful, working out when to intervene and when to leave be. Inevitably this involves being prepared to take some risks.

- The relationship may at times be conflictual and can require adults to assert a level of authority or control. Kleipoedszus (2011) argues that relationships can be forged through conflict. Children need adults who will not avoid conflict due to fear, but who will work creatively with it. The connection created through genuine engagement and negotiation rather than artificial sensitivity makes it possible in the longer term for child care workers to encourage and nurture change rather than demanding it.

- Crucially, the pedagogical relation comes to an end. The child grows up and the asymmetry of the relation (if it is still maintained) dissolves. Indeed, the pedagogical relationship works towards its own dissolution. As Mollenhauer (1983) explains, 'upbringing comes to an end when the child no longer needs to be "called" to self-activity, but instead has the wherewithal to educate himself.' The grown child may still maintain a relationship with an adult who has acted pedagogically in the past, but this relationship will (or should) no longer be asymmetrical. It is or should instead be mutual and reciprocal, meaning that the pedagogical relation has dissolved and been replaced by one of friendship or mutual attachment.

- The arena for pedagogical relationships is our everyday life with children, where children and adults meet, communicate, and relate.

**The aporia and paradoxes of upbringing**

Mollenhauer identifies the process of upbringing as being irredeemably aporetic in that it is shot through with perplexity and what might be thought of as paradox. As such, it is not amenable to mindsets, either personal or organisational, that look for certainties, formulas or set methods.

A central aporia, perhaps, revolves around the idea of passing on what is deemed valuable in the present while, at the same time, recognising that the fruits of that endeavour cannot be pre-determined. We do not bring up children merely to live comfortably in our worlds, but to change those worlds for the better. We are, in the words of Oscar Romero’s poem, ‘prophets of a future not our own’. Yet, and this is the paradox, we need to pass on something that we consider to be of value. So, we pass on
what we consider to be valuable in our world, knowing that this might be rejected. An example of this process may be that of parents seeking to bring up children in a particular faith tradition. Ultimately, as adults within liberal western societies, those children may choose to accept, partially accept or reject their religious upbringing, but they, at least, will know what it is they are rejecting and what they might put in its place.

If the future cannot be predetermined then nor can the child. We do not, nor should we seek to, ‘know’ children. Attempts to ‘know’ them through ever more elaborate assessment frameworks and recording tools are ethically problematic (Hardy, 2012). The only way we can ‘know’ children is to make them like ourselves, to impose our adult ways and values upon them, thus ‘murdering’ their uniqueness and alterity (Levinas, 2000). Pedagogical practice, by contrast, involves ‘a thoughtful concern for the child’s unique person and for the uniqueness of the situation’ (Nohl 1970 cited in Saevi and Husevaag, 2009 p. 37). Mollenhauer makes a similar point noting that:

The pedagogical caring and thoughtful relationship between the adult and child gets its intrinsic life and energy from the tension of the opposite: the utter uniqueness and inaccessibility of the child’s self and lifeworld. Paradoxically this is the pedagogical opportunity that renders possible the pedagogical relationship (1983, p. 35).

A further aporia, this time at a more systemic level, is of relevance to the current growth of interest in social pedagogy at political and professional levels. Understandably, perhaps, much of this interest is predicated upon assumptions that outcomes for children are better in societies where social pedagogy underpins child care practice. This belief, however, belies particular assumptions of cause and effect, assuming that if we intervene with a particular proven treatment model we might expect better outcomes. Social pedagogy, however, does not work that way; it is at its most useful when it is not pinned down to positivist assumptions of cause and effect but when it remains elusive and contingent – once brought to heel it loses its potency as a dynamic and potentially unsettling force in society. Or, as Mollenhauer says, ‘The more finely the net of pedagogical strategies and institutions is woven, the greater a
contribution that is expected from pedagogy toward social progress, the more difficult it becomes to validate this’ (1983, p.88).

Discussion

Mollenhauer’s ideas pose profound challenges to received ways of thinking about how to bring up children. Specifically, they identify upbringing as cultural and relational rather than individual (or even, primarily familial) and instrumental. This cultural and social core of upbringing is mostly absent from approaches to children’s care within UK social work where children’s care has been entrusted, largely, to individualised concerns for rights, protection and treatment or intervention, all wrapped up within ever tighter procedural and regulatory apparatus. While each of these aspects of a child’s care constitute legitimate concerns, they should be considered subsidiary constructs that may or may not be helpful in supporting a broader conception of a child’s upbringing. Each element is also problematic in its own right. Children’s rights discourses, for instance, as they have emerged in public policy within neoliberal societies, are premised on ‘a particular understanding of the subject as a rational, autonomous individual’ (Dahlberg and Moss, 2005, p.30). By this way of thinking children and adults become linked to one another through a series of contractual arrangements rather than through the kind of close pedagogical relationships identified by Mollenhauer.

Protection, similarly, betrays a particular take on human relationships, essentially a misanthropic one, involving: ‘a very different conception of the relationship between an individual or group, and others than does care. Caring seems to involve taking the concerns and needs of the other as the basis for action. Protection presumes ... bad Intentions’ (Tronto, 1993, p.104). Assumptions and practices that derive from child protection discourses often, in fact, seriously limit carers’ capacity to engage in the kind of pedagogical relationships necessary for children’s upbringing for fear of allegation or suspicion. Moreover, if the aim of state care is to provide little more than
safety then child protection is a limiting prospectus indeed, one that fails to position children facing the world.

Recent decades have seen a pronounced psychological turn in child care. Notions of ‘treatment’ or ‘therapy’, in contemporary residential child care discourse, are increasingly located within an often ill-understood application of attachment theory, the ‘scientific’ provenance of which is claimed to be bolstered by developments in neuroscience, which talks of black holes in the brain caused by faulty early attachments (see Gerhardt, 2004). This is ‘scientific’ method writ large, promising that if only we can find the biological roots of a problem and intervene early enough we can then head off difficulties further down the line. It also reflects a more general ‘biologising’ of what is rightly social scientific terrain, offering ‘the comforting possibility of simple solutions to complex problems’ (Canter, 2012 p.112). ‘The idea that the brain causes behavior’ Canter goes on: ‘is easier to get across than the subtler and more complex explanation embedded in learning, interpersonal transactions and culture’ (112). Current preoccupations with early intervention are also redolent of the social investment state, within which intervention is deemed to minimise the need for subsequent and more costly state involvement and to promote future contributions to the economy (Gray, 2013); a seductive prospectus that plays well with politicians and policy makers eager to take debates out of ‘the disputed terrain of politics and relocate (them) into the tranquil, seductive territory of truth’ (Rose and Miller, 1990 p. 188).

Upbringing, however, has a meaning that cannot be subsumed to science and scholarship (Blankertz in Mollenhauer, 1983, p.i). It is not amenable to targeted interventions. Answers to complex questions of how to bring up children are not, according to Mollenhauer:

> provided by theories of child development, teaching and learning, educational psychology, socialization, interaction, or schools and curricula. Responses in these areas are necessary but insufficient because every instance of upbringing and education has to do with the culture as a whole” (1983, p. 13).
Upbringing, thus, cannot be reduced to mere technique or procedure. In fact, recourse to technique or procedure or to a range of 'technologies' in work with children and families avoids us 'having to ask difficult political and ethical questions about the causes of our problems or the meaning of success' (Dahlberg and Moss, 2005, p.58). Understanding upbringing as being to do with culture as a whole renders it irredeemably political, asking questions of economic systems that cause poverty and perpetuate inequalities and thus limit children's access to any conception of what might be considered a good life.

At a practice level, recognising upbringing as a broadly social and cultural endeavour draws our attention back from a focus on children's psychological deficits or their rights claims towards providing them with experiences that might prepare them to take their rightful place in society. As Saevi and Husevaag note:

*Including children in the traditions of a society by exposing them to situations where conventional behavior and adherence to social norms are expected, is an unavoidable ingredient of pedagogical practice, and a source of socially adaptive capacity and learning for children* (2007 p.1).

In passing on the traditions of a society certain practices might be considered constant even in times of increased plurality and constant change. Steiner (1923) identifies eternal verities of truth, beauty and goodness in bringing up children. In any age, access to sport, music and theatre provide means through which to pass on a valued cultural heritage, while at a micro-level exposing children to everyday practices such as how to shake hands, how to greet a visitor and how to offer a cup of tea all equip them to take their place in society. Seeking to pass on such cultural norms of behaviour to children in care is not a middle class affectation but is a debt owed by adults to children to induct them into the world in which they will have to take their place. Adults for their part need to have some belief in those aspects of their own cultural heritage that are worth passing on. Central to upbringing is the exercise of responsibility. In the absence of adults having some confidence in what is good and worth passing on in their lives we are left with what Webb identifies as a:
‘free-floating approach to welfare ...apparently ‘progressive’, and terrified of censoriousness or of being oppressive, the consequences for practice are permissiveness and laissez-fairism. Under these conditions the psychological and cultural powerlessness of young residents leads to the appropriation of their identity as they become swept along by the trivial and everyday. This is where leniency leads us, despite being superficially attractive, ‘progressive’ and ‘democratic’. Far from allowing an identity that is liberated from convention, the child in care becomes subject to the pervasiveness not so much of dominant culture but the mundane everyday culture (Webb, 2010, p.1395/96).

It is a common misconception in much of the discourse around the subject in the UK that social pedagogy is based around simplistic assumptions of children’s rights and participation. In fact, any such rights and any meaningful participation cannot be mere abstractions but only emerge within purposeful pedagogical relationships within which adults are sure of and are supported to exercise their responsibilities in bringing children up.

Bringing up children demands certain personal qualities from adults, taking into account disposition rather than merely whether they are assessed as having achieved pre-set competencies, which may or may not have much relevance to how they are with children. Upbringing, as identified by Dahlberg and Moss (2005), is an ethical, reflexive practice rather than one that can be practised through following procedure. This, in turn, has implications for the nature of training thought appropriate for those who work with children. Obscuring the messy and ambiguous realities of human relationships behind prescriptive qualifications frameworks, especially the reductionist vocational qualifications favoured in the UK, obviates the need for critical and ethical thinking. Dunne (2001) grapples with the same dilemma regarding the dominance of method over practical wisdom in teaching. Quoting Wittgenstein he notes that: ‘We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!’ Upbringing happens on
the rough ground of human relationships; it cannot be reduced to a practice manual – it needs the friction of ethical debate, wise judgment and of not knowing.

Scottish Connections

This section draws the article to a close by suggesting that there are forgotten connections that align Scottish approaches to child care more closely with Mollenhauer’s conception of upbringing and through this to European humanistic thought, than with more ‘scientific’ Anglo-American traditions (Smith and Whyte, 2008). A feature of Scottish philosophy from the Enlightenment was its focus on human connections and of man (sic) as a human animal. This is evident in Hutcheson’s notion of benevolence, Smith’s sympathy or Hume’s moral sentiment (see Tronto, 1993). At another level, that of epistemology, Scottish philosophers considered that the specialisation of knowledge as propounded by the English radicals led to excessive compartmentalisation and atomisation in society (Davie, 1991). Knowledge was to be grounded and contextualised rather than abstract and codified thus fitting with Mollenhauer’s identification of the limitations of scientific knowledge. In terms of social structure, MacInnes (1996) notes that in the 17th and 18th centuries, clans engaged in what might now be thought of as ‘fostering’, whereby sons of chiefs or other clan gentry would bring up each other’s children for a formative period of at least seven years, being responsible for their education, a practice designed to reinforce ties of kinship and loyalty. Together these philosophical and social strands come together to encourage the quality of collectivism identified at different levels in the Scottish body politic (Paterson, 2000).

These strands of thought stressing, human connection, scepticism of scientific rationality and an obligation on adults for children’s upbringing are continued into the last century. Scottish human relations theorists, Suttie, Fairbairn and Sutherland, understood attachment as a social rather than the primarily biological and ethological drive identified by Bowlby (see Miller, 2008). The presence of the other within human
relations thought is identified as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end such as the management of anxiety, as might be interpreted from more biologically based models. Running alongside these identifiably Scottish interpretations of attachment theory, John MacMurray’s philosophical writing identifies us as ‘persons in relation’ (see McIntosh, 2004; Kirkwood, 2012), who come to be who we are only in personal relationship. Care is not possible, according to MacMurray, in terms of duty and obligation but must emerge as an ethic of love. This identification of care as an ethic of love chimes with Mollenhauer’s caution that upbringing should not be turned into a ritualised duty but needs to be understood as a moral response from adults to children.

At a policy level, initiatives such as Getting It Right for Every Child (GIRFEC) (Scottish Executive, 2008) and Curriculum for Excellence (Scottish Executive, 2006) may be thought, potentially, to reprise Kilbrandon’s proposals for social education. GIRFEC, is based around themes of social justice, children’s rights and wellbeing and is intended to apply to key areas that affect children’s upbringing, such as health, education, early years, youth justice, child protection and anti-poverty strategies (see Aldgate, 2010). Within this, Curriculum for Excellence (CfE), aims to develop successful learners, confident individuals, effective contributors and responsible citizens. As such it embraces ‘a broad view of education, which focuses on the development of the whole person in a social setting’ (Bloomer, 2008: 32). Education is also seen as having ‘a key role in tackling a range of social problems and in promoting cohesion in a more diverse society’ (Bloomer, 2008: 32). Bringing together GIRFEC’s broad understanding of children’s care needs with CfE’s conception of education takes Scotland a significant way along the road to European understandings of social pedagogy as education in its widest sense. So, a policy framework is in place that might promote a broad conception of upbringing.

While current policy might provide a relatively enlightened framework for children’s upbringing, caveats need to be introduced as to how likely it is that this might happen. In common with most policy over recent years, GIRFEC and CfE are prey to the managerial obsessions of the social investment state with all its talk of outcomes and of children as the ‘human capital’ that will fulfil the government’s economic
aspirations. The concern, then, is that policy makers seek to measure and record at every stage along the way, how safe or active a child may be or how far they have moved along the road to become a successful learner or responsible citizen and in so doing negate the open-ended nature of these processes. The nature of upbringing as articulated by Mollenhauer raises profound challenges to current preoccupations with outcomes in children’s services. This focus is both practically and ethically problematic; practically, because we do not know the outcomes of our interactions with children and ethically because attempts to do so foreclose children’s development, identifying it only against our own adult standards. Questioning the outcomes fetish that dominates current policy does not signal a lack of concern about what happens to children, nor is it to say that adults and agencies working with children should not be guided by particular hopes and a resolute sense of purpose that children are afforded access to a conception of the good life. But, these are philosophical questions that require that society engages in debates about what it wants for children rather than have these short-cut by narrow and foreclosing managerial demands.

**Conclusion**

The term upbringing appears periodically in policy discourse about children’s care and welfare. It has never, however, been fully articulated in a UK context. This article has drawn on Klaus Mollenhauer’s work to articulate a conception of upbringing as a cultural endeavour and has argued that it ought to be thought of as the first order construct against which other considerations in children’s care ought to be subsidiary.

Upbringing involves a call and response encounter between adults and children within which adults assume responsibility for passing on a valued cultural heritage to the next generation. To do so they need to possess an optimism and belief that they have something valuable to pass on. That confident sense of an adult self, however, can also cope with the knowledge that some of what we seek to pass on may be rejected or changed, hopefully for the better. Upbringing, ultimately, is an optimistic notion, predicated on a belief in human progress and in a future as yet unknown.
Mollenhauer’s articulation of upbringing is embedded within social pedagogic thought. In a context of increasing interest in social pedagogy in the UK, it needs to be understood that it is not just another approach or method that might be employed in working with children but is set within a European humanistic philosophical tradition. Its starting point has to be in philosophical debates around what is a good childhood and what kind of relationships adults should enter into with children (Moss and Petrie, 2002). We should not attempt to set aside these irredeemably moral questions in the quest for a more effective method of working and of measuring and accounting for our work. Trying to graft social pedagogy onto systems that are based around assumptions of scientific rationality and of readily measured outcomes, as seems to be the case in many initiatives to introduce social pedagogy in the UK are unlikely to bring about lasting improvements because they misunderstand the essentially open-ended nature of the discipline.

Scotland may be better placed than the rest of the UK to embrace social pedagogy in that ideas of social education are not new and the rudiments of a broad conception of upbringing might be found in Kilbrandon. Moreover, current policies might, if interpreted sufficiently imaginatively, offer a framework within which to enter into debates about what we want for our children beyond narrow concerns about their safety or individualising versions of rights.

Finally, upbringing is not an abstract notion but involves being with and taking responsibility for children. Professional discourse around upbringing needs then to be located not with psychologists, social workers, children's rights advocates or a burgeoning child protection industry, but with those engaged in the day-to-day care and education of children. This would support a case for social pedagogy to be recognised and promoted as a discipline in its own right, one that is centrally concerned with and which derives its theoretical substance from involvement in and curiosity about how we bring up children to take their place in the world.

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