Unlike the more ambivalent transnational concepts of ‘Americanization’ and ‘Globalization’, the increasingly popular term ‘Europeanization’ is generally used to describe unambiguously positive processes of political, socio-economic and cultural integration within the institutional framework of the European Union.¹ Peaceful forms of cross-cultural encounter, shared values, free trade, transnational exchanges of ideas, a culture of compromise and increasing inter-state cooperation at various levels are, so it seems, at the heart of what we commonly perceive as ‘Europeanization’, a transnational process that culminated in the EU, a realm of peace and prosperity in which the demons of a nationalist past have become history.²

It has become commonplace to contrast this process with the violent upheavals and nationalist confrontations that characterised the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century – from colonial rivalry to wars within Europe – and to view ‘Europeanization’ as a lesson Europeans learnt from their violent and ultimately self-destructive pasts. Influential works by Tony Judt and James Sheehan, for example, have juxtaposed the divisive nature of nationalism, war, and destruction of Europe’s early twentieth-century on the one hand and European internationalisation with its emphasis on transnational discourses, peaceful conflict resolution, and cultural convergence on the other.³

There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with a historical interpretation in which the astonishingly swift reconstruction of post-war (Western) Europe and the indisputable successes of European integration are emphasised as remarkable achievements. On the other hand, however, a binary model of European conflict and ‘Europeanization’ can easily result in a somewhat unsatisfactory ‘happy history’ of European integration, a history which contrasts sharply with the shared European experiences of violence that shaped the lives of millions of Europeans. To be sure, wars and conflicts were by definition the result of difference and division and not, in the main, self-referentially European. States (mainly nation-states) were the agents in the military conflicts which is why their history has usually been written within national frameworks of analysis. Yet, as Ute Frevert has rightly pointed out, the two world wars also constituted genuinely transnational conflicts in which millions of people gathered intense experiences of (voluntary and involuntary) mobility and cross-border contacts.⁴ Between 1914 and 1945, and in parts of Europe until much more recently, ethnic conflicts, wars and civil wars, were indeed the most defining transnational experiences of border-crossing and inter-cultural exchange and they, too, contributed to a vast array of (intended or unintended) contacts and transfers of ideas and personnel across real or imagined borders as well as to the reordering of ‘mental

In assessing the unintended effects of these (often involuntary) contacts and border crossings on the process of Europeanization – understood here as a convergence of life experiences within Europe – we do not wish to dispute the primarily *divisive* nature of violence. Europeans obviously did not become more European as a result of violence. Yet if, as the editors of this volume emphasise in their introduction, ‘Europeanization’ is not to be understood as a one-dimensional, teleological process that began in the ruins of war-torn Europe in 1945 and ended with the creation of the supra-national EU, we should at least consider the possibility of viewing violence as a quintessential part of what René Girault and Hartmut Kaelble have emphasized as an important dimension of ‘Europeanisation’, namely *l’Europe vécue*, the Europe of shared experiences. Although it would go beyond the scope of this essay to offer a comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which violent experiences contributed to the process of ‘Europeanization’, we hope to offer suggestions for future empirical studies on the subject matter.

To be sure, the idea that peaceful European integration, democracy and violence are not mutually exclusive has been challenged before. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer have pointed to the dialectic of progress while a number of historians have convincingly demonstrated the compatibility of and historical connections between European democracy and mass violence. As John Horne and others have pointed out the cultural and political currents generally identified as pillars of European civilisation – Christianity, the Enlightenment, science, and democracy – have also contributed to war and revolution, often decisively. Furthermore, as Daniel Schönpflug and Martin Aust have recently argued,

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some of the most enduring transnational learning processes in twentieth century-Europe were prompted by mutual hostility, conflict, and war.\(^9\) Recent publications on Nazism have furthermore demanded a ‘Europeanized perspective’ on the history of the Third Reich, not in order to downplay German responsibility for the Second World War or the Holocaust, but to address transnational connections brought about by intra-European fascist collaboration, expulsion and the redrawing of geographical and mental maps that can only be explained insufficiently from a nation-centric perspective.\(^10\) A recent example of the fruitfulness of such a perspective is Mark Mazower’s *Hitler’s Empire* which investigates the ill-fated and ultra-violent attempts at Nazi Empire-building from a genuinely transnational and ‘Europeanized’ perspective.\(^11\)

Our essay will build on this relatively recent body of scholarship and our own research interests in order to formulate some tentative hypotheses about the connections between violence and (de-)Europeanization. By discussing the ‘Europeanizing’ effects of two violent projects of epic dimensions, European colonialism and the two world wars, we engage with what one might call the dark side of transnational history in order to promote an ambivalent concept of ‘Europeanization’ that weaves together histories of extremely violent encounters and border-crossings and those of economic success, democratic reorientation, and collective recovery. In other words: our purpose is not to replace the meta-narrative of peace and prosperity at the heart of Europeanization with a dysfunctional version of the European civilisation thesis in which violence becomes the kit of European identity. Instead we aim to emphasise multiple dynamics and to complicate the ‘happy’ image of Europeanization that still dominates in scholarly and political debates. At the same time, we aim to test the usefulness of


‘Europeanization’ as a transnational conceptual approach for the investigation of aspects of European history that are often perceived as the direct opposite of ‘Europeanization’.

We are aware that it could be objected that the dynamics described in this essay were ultimately not distinctively European, but increasingly manifest in different forms across the globe. This is only partly true, however, since their origin was distinctly European even if they were subsequently globalized. Furthermore we believe that Europe should not be treated as a sealed-off entity, but as a constellation of states whose peculiar and often violent interaction with each other (and the rest of the world) gave it its distinct character in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. ‘European’ identity was generally most strongly developed when it was threatened by real or imagined ‘others’, be they America, African immigrants, or ‘Asian’ Bolshevism. In this essay, we will distinguish between aspects of extra-European ‘Europeanization’, that is: imperial projects aimed at wielding power over non-European territories and populations, and projects that contributed to the violent ‘Europeanization’ of Europe between 1914 and 1945.

II

The ‘golden age’ of colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is generally viewed as a period in which European rivalries were decisively exacerbated, contributing to the clash of European nations in 1914.\(^{12}\) It is often suggested that only the process of de-colonization after the Second World War helped to diffuse nationalist rivalries on the colonial periphery while at the same time giving important impulses for European economic integration.\(^{13}\) However, without denying that colonialism was clearly also a factor in de-Europeanization, it also constituted a shared European experience characterized by transnational learning processes with respect to the (generally violent) treatment of non-European natives and the construction of colonial identities of white


\(^{13}\) Kaelble, ‘Europeanization’, 85. The European economic reorientation away from the colonies and towards the European market can be observed from a number of countries. See, for example, for France: D. Lefebvre (2005), *Chère Algérie: La France Et Sa Colonie, 1930-1962* (Paris).
Gerwarth / Malinowski, Europeanization through Violence?  

supremacy. In this context, the following section will emphasize four aspects of colonial history that seem particularly relevant to the subject of ‘Europeanization’: colonialism’s character as a transnational European project; the convergence of colonial experiences of dominance and violence; the repercussions of these experiences on Europe itself; and, finally, the evolving patterns of mutual observation and transnational knowledge transfers.

From Christopher Columbus, an Italian trained in Portugal in the fifteenth century and financed by Spain to ‘discover’ the New World to the transnationally coordinated wars of European decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s, colonialism was an experience many European states – from Portugal to Britain, Belgium to France – shared. Transnational similarities in regard to the methods of colonial rule and oppression - from economic pressure to systematic mass murder – testified to the degree to which this transnational project of subjugation rested on mutual observation and international learning processes. In consequence, violent conquest, the maintenance of colonial rule, and, in the twentieth century, the ‘modernizing mission’, followed similar pan-European patterns which not only led to the familiar European rivalries but also to contacts and shared learning experiences.

When entering the colonial realm, Europeans often left their specific national contexts behind and formed new groups with other Europeans rather than with their ‘colonial peoples’. The crew of the Congo steamer on which Joseph Conrad’s protagonist Marlow penetrated the Heart of Darkness, for example, was just as ‘European’ as the non-fictional crew which brought the Polish-British anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski, to Papua a few years later. Like so many other scholars active in colonial settings, Malinowski’s expedition relied heavily on European infrastructures and European cooperation. The German  

explorer Hermann Wissmann had already referred to these pan-European structures when in the early 1890s he dedicated his memoirs to King Leopold of Belgium for whom he felt ‘deepest gratitude’ for supporting his expeditions. One of the striking aspects of the ways in which these explorers described their experiences was the distinction between ‘savages’ and ‘Europeans’. In the 1920s, Malinowski, too, referred to the relationship between the colonial actors and the natives in terms of ‘European culture’ and ‘European education’, just as he later did during the Second World War. In the midst of this war, whose impact Malinowski noted with particular bitterness, the unity of European culture and identity continued to appear just as self-evident from his ‘African perspective’ as it had been twenty-five years earlier in the Pacific Islands. Anthropologists and the Colonial Office alike spoke of ‘the social adjustment of the primitive peoples of Africa to European Culture’. Fifteen years later, the ethnologist and heroine of the Résistance, Germaine Tillion, who sought to strengthen the bonds between Algerians and France through a new educational system, used a similar terminology, speaking of the ‘European’ culture and education that was to be spread across North Africa. On the military side, both French and British counter-insurgency officers simultaneously touted the forms of warfare that ‘the European’ should practice or avoid in Indochina and North Africa.

Convergence of experiences in non-European areas did obviously not automatically lead to ‘Europeanization’. The link between colonialism and Europeanization had clear boundaries. In the long term European settler communities demonstrated how the colonial exodus – with its new reference points and identities – led the settlers away from Europe and

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H. Wissmann (1891), Im Innern Afrikas: Die Erforschung des Kassai während der Jahre 1883, 1884 und 1885 (Leipzig)


G. Tillion (1959), L’Afrique bascule vers l’avenir (Paris).

towards new structures that were neither ‘colonial’ nor ‘European’. The development of distinct identities in the United States, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand or Australia represents the clearest examples. From the perspective of the search for European convergences and formative, collective European experiences it is nevertheless debatable whether these emigrant groups were actually ‘lost’ to Europe in the late nineteenth century, as various European nations discussed with growing concern.\(^{23}\)

Even in the United States, the inhabitants of European origin still represent around 74 per cent of the population. In all former white settler colonies, powerful links to Europe endure. Even today, these populations stand apart - socially as well as politically - from groups of non-European backgrounds. This is as true in South America as in Australia and the United States.\(^{24}\)

If we regard shared experiences as a key aspect of ‘Europeanization’, then the settler colonies are of particular relevance. The worlds in which the settlers lived can be described as mixed European ‘special zones of experiences’.\(^{25}\) Three characteristics of this settler culture seem particularly relevant for the subject of Europeanization: first, there is the transnational, mostly pan-European composition of the settler colonies. Secondly, one would have to investigate the ways in which the settlers systematically distinguished themselves from the ‘natives’. Overseas, the internal European boundaries, which were so clearly delineated on the continent, tended to fade in importance. What was regarded as ‘European’ and what was not appeared to be far more evident from the perspective of the settlers abroad than in the European capitals. A third characteristic of European settlements in colonial contexts is the ‘frontier situation’ in which settlers were bound together by fear of real or imagined ‘enemy natives’. The ‘thin white line’ of European settlers, who were in a minority position everywhere, could always be crushed in an


instant during the next uprising. In these fragile ‘Islands of White’, the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was defined along the colour bar, not necessarily along ‘national’ lines. The new ‘we’ group was therefore made up of Europeans who transcended national differences. They came defined their shared identity against the indigenous population and invented legal codes and conventions designed to separate the groups. In one recorded case of the 1890s, Indians living in African colonies were explicitly required to salute ‘Europeans’ whenever they encountered them. African uprisings were interpreted as attacks on ‘European civilization’ represented by the white settlers. The metaphor of the trek and the laager, with which the nationally heterogeneous settlers conquered and subdued colonial spaces and joined forces in violent attacks on the ‘savages’, accurately describes the process of transnational ‘European’ identity-building in the colonies.

For one of the largest European settler cultures in Africa, the settler community in Algeria, which consisted of shopkeepers, craftsmen and merchants from France, Spain, Italy, Malta, Switzerland and Germany, there was a special term: ‘pieds-noirs’. In most contemporary sources (both French and Arab), these settlers were commonly referred to as ‘Europeans’ and not as Frenchmen. Their living quarters in Algerian towns and cities were known as ‘European quarters’. The Algerian independence movement, the FLN, targeted ‘European’ facilities as part of its technique of urban terror. As it stated in the summer of 1956: ‘Descendez n’importe quel Européen, de dix-huit à cinquante-quatre ans.'

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Pas de femmes, pas d’enfants, pas de vieux.' In its tracts, the threat of ‘représailles terribles s’abattront sur la population civile européenne’ pointed to a line of conflict where ‘Europeans’ could become collective targets. This dichotomy, which blurred the internal differences between Europeans, could also be found in many decolonisation manifestoes within Europe itself. Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous preface to Frantz Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*, for example, was not addressed to his fellow Frenchmen, but explicitly to ‘the Europeans’.

Frontier and laager mentalities produced solidarity towards fellow Europeans and aggressive exclusion of and violence towards the ‘native other’. The parallel, sometimes joint European penetration of the non-European world led to a continually expanding European ‘settler archive’ where experiences of colonial rule were stored and accessed. This was reflected in transnational distinctions between Europeans and natives that were evolving in the fields of criminal law and voting rights as well as in the construction of a new ethnic category: ‘Europeanness’. The introduction of such a new ethnic category was sanctioned by ‘scientific findings’ which offered ‘proof’ for racial differences. The German anatomist, Frederick Tiedemann, for example, pointed out in a lecture at the Royal Society in London that the brain of the ‘negro’ was more similar to that of an Orang-Utan than to the brain of a European. ‘The principal result of my researches on the brain of the Negro, is, that neither anatomy nor physiology can justify our placing them beneath the Europans in a moral or intellectual point of view.’ As with the closely related case of ‘scientific’ racism, which must also be understood as a

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33 Ibid., 453.
34 See Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to: F. Fanon (1965), *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York).
joint European invention, the creation of colonial legal norms was aimed at permanently separating Europeans and natives from one another by means of racial laws, marriage regulations, workplace regulations and colonial urban planning.

Although ‘counter-acculturation’ – the cultural and physical ‘blending’ of European settlers and indigenous populations – was an important aspect of colonial life, it remained the exception whereas demarcation from the ‘natives’ became the rule in places wherever Europeans formed substantial minorities. This tendency greatly increased during the nineteenth century for a number of reasons, among which the rise of ‘scientific’ racism and increased immigration of European women (along with the greater sexual autarchy this entailed) were of particular importance.

These patterns have not altogether disappeared. In the political rhetoric of conservative and nationalist politicians today, Europe’s borders have to be ‘defended’ against illegal immigrants from the former colonies in Africa. Although this campaign points to some general conclusions about European policy, the transformation process is most impressive among the radical intellectual right in France. Groups that once sought to maintain a French-dominated Algeria through violence have now formed organizations such as the Groupement de Recherche et d’Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne. This intellectual circle, widely known by its revealing abbreviation, GRECE, is calling for the radical expulsion of all Arabs and Africans as well as the eradication of their cultural influences from France. In doing so, GRECE is also overcoming the traditional boundaries and concepts of French nationalism. It is no longer the integrity of France that is at stake but rather the ‘defence’ of European civilisation against the influence of the former colonies. The intellectuals

38 See the short survey provided by: D. Claussen (1994/2007), Was heisst Rassismus? (Darmstadt and Munich).
of GRECE do not base their argument on the concept of the nation, but rather on the concept of culture: today’s Europe is a place where Africans and other ‘people of colour’ are not. The metaphor of the colonial laager springs to mind again. Now, however, it is being transported from the colonies into the context of European immigration policy. The frontier is shifting to the inside, while the threat from the colonial ‘other’ provides a rallying cry for a common European identity.

Although we should be careful not to exaggerate the ‘boomerang’ argument while also seeking to maintain the sense of proportions frequently demanded by critics of transnational history, there is still abundant evidence that the dichotomy between Europeans and ‘natives’ in the colonies was imported back to Europe. This first applied to the returning settlers and their own culture of remembrance. Secondly, it also applies to those colonial officials, who returned to Europe after decolonization and who were frequently ‘recycled’ as experts for foreign policy or development aid. The continuities between colonial and post-colonial projects, from European economic policy to foreign policy, were considerable. The example of the European Economic Community reveals how French, Belgian and Dutch colonial expertise was Europeanized and re-channelled, particularly in the context of EEC development aid.

Alongside megalomaniac plans such as Hermann Sörgel’s *Antlantropa* project (which proposed to close the Straits of Gibraltar, to evaporate the

45 Detailed statistics on this can be found in: PRO, CO 1017/666.
Mediterranean and join Africa to Europe\(^{47}\) development aid projects provided a way of continuing European cooperation in the colonial sphere. In a rapidly changing international context, Europeans now sought to present themselves as ‘developers’ of other continents, particularly of Africa.\(^{48}\) At the time of its founding, the EEC consisted predominantly of sovereign colonial powers (some of which were still embroiled in colonial wars), which had explicitly included the ‘development’ of their overseas territories in the organisation’s founding statutes.\(^{49}\)

Systematic mutual observation, collaboration and transnational learning processes were, however, in no way limited to peaceful development policy. As far as the very similar forms of colonial wars, European concentration camps in the colonies, racism and the organization of European dominance were concerned, these processes ran largely parallel to the much more intensively researched development of a European civil society.\(^{50}\) A new collection of essays on the topic of colonial wars reveals how powerfully images of the self and the enemy ‘other’, and also concepts of warfare, have resembled one another over the centuries and from one European nation to the next.\(^{51}\) The violence unleashed by Europeans in the colonial sphere revealed the same structures in each case: asymmetrical warfare, the deployment of auxiliary forces, the division of indigenous populations into ‘hostile’ and ‘friendly tribes’, the expulsion and killing of civilians, the construction of concentration camps since the end of the nineteenth century, and the systematic use of means of warfare outlawed in Europe, such as torture and poison gas bombs, which the Spanish used in Morocco a few years

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\(^{49}\) Laak, Imperiale Infrastruktur, 342-363.


before Mussolini’s air force did the same in Ethiopia. Systematic mutual observation and transnational learning processes are also well documented for the simultaneous wars of decolonization in Kenya and Algeria were Britain and France attempted to learn from each other’s ‘counterinsurgency lessons’. Officers, soldiers and institutions were encouraged to learn from the anti-guerrilla warfare of other European nations and in the 1950s and 1960s, European knowledge and information transfers in this area were extremely intense. Recent debates on colonial massacres have raised the question of whether a special type of European ‘colonial warrior’ developed in the nineteenth and twentieth century, but this has yet to be systematically examined.

As in the late-colonial wars, there was also similar European cooperation in regard to the coordination and defence of European interests in the ex-colonies. As late as in 1960, English diplomats referred to talks ‘with our colonial colleagues’ whenever they held coordinating meetings with France, Belgium and Portugal. During the violent conflicts in the Congo, these powers coordinated their position prior to the UN general assembly meeting on the issue. The diplomats took great pains to hide the true nature of their discussions. ‘It would be most unfortunate’, one British diplomat wrote to his colleague, ‘if news of the talks leaked out; they would look like a conspiracy of European colonial powers in...


55 See the ongoing PhD project by Christoph Jens Kamissek (EUI Florence), ‘Kolonialkrieger: Eine transnationale Kulturgeschichte imperialer Gewalt im späten 19. und im frühen 20. Jahrhundert’.

face of the United Nations resolution on the Congo.\textsuperscript{57} What this example illustrates is that up until the late 1960s, colonialism remained firmly based on continuing contacts between the European colonial masters, contacts that existed alongside tensions at the level of high politics.

The wars of decolonisation also created tensions between Europe and the United States, since European cooperation in the colonial sphere frequently collided with Washington’s anti-colonial rhetoric.\textsuperscript{58} John F. Kennedy’s famous congressional speech against imperialism, for example, in which he referred to the colonial misdeeds of France and the USSR, likewise bore witness to a European-American confrontation that - at least in certain situations - helped to forge a common European front.\textsuperscript{59} The severe crisis following the violent commando operation on the Suez Canal in 1956 is the best-known example of this.\textsuperscript{60}

Just as the European powers confronted one another in the colonial arena, they also cooperated in staking colonial claims. These claims usually entailed a coordination of exploitation and a mutual toleration of violence, even in places where this violence assumed genocidal proportions. At the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884/85, for example, the diplomats not only divided Africa and planned the joint exploitation of the Congo but also signed an agreement that in the event of a European war, the combatants would not deploy any ‘coloured’ troops.\textsuperscript{61} This form of segregation also dovetailed with the spatially limited effectiveness of The Hague Land War Convention or the Kellog-Briand Pact, whose rules for civilised warfare and the proscription of war were conceived for Europe

\textsuperscript{57} Quotation in PRO, FO 371/125312 - (31.3.) xxx
and not for the colonies. When these conventions were perceived to have been violated, for example in the case of Germany’s ill-fated attempts to instigate in late 1914 a Jihad in the Near East against French and British colonial troops, Swiss missionaries protested vigorously against this breech of European conventions not to employ ‘savages’ against white soldiers. The German response to the Allies’ use of colonial troops and, more importantly, to France’s and Belgium’s decision to deploy more than 20,000 black colonial troops during the occupation of the Rhineland after the Great War was similarly met with horror (across all political and religious divides) about this ‘violation’ of European norms of warfare.

On other occasions, however, Europeans co-operated militarily in various colonial ‘trouble spots’. The brutal crushing of the Boxer Rebellion by the Eight Nations Alliance illustrates the fact that despite prevailing tensions in the colonial sphere, Western powers were willing to co-operate when they felt that their common interests were threatened. Despite the arguably global alliance which militarily intervened in China and which saw the German General Alfred von Waldersee entering Beijing alongside the Bengalese cavalry of the British colonial army, European collaboration remained at the heart of the Boxer expedition and demonstrated that inner-European rivalries and conflicts could be transcended when common European interests were felt to be threatened in the colonial realm.

63 A similar, equally unsuccessful attempt was made by Nazi Germany in 1941. See: K.-M. Mallmann and M. Cüppers (2006), Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft).
The transcendence of inner-European boundaries in colonial settings and the pooling of forces against a common enemy were two of the forms in which colonialism had fundamentally ‘Europeanizing’ effects. The second area that we will now examine also concerns violence, but this time it is violence between Europeans.

III

The Great War and its immediate aftermath had a seemingly paradoxical effect on Europe: on the one hand, it obviously reinforced the fragmentation of the continent and increased national tensions to a previously unknown extent. The first age of economic globalisation came to an abrupt end while close cultural and dynastic ties that had existed between the combatants right up until 1914 ceased to exist and were replaced by mutual hostility, suspicion and massively fortified borders. In that respect, the Great War certainly served as one of the key factors of de-Europeanization in the twentieth-century. On the other hand, however, the Great War also prompted international debates about European identity and Europe’s future place in the world on a historically unprecedented scale. Alongside the birth of ultra-nationalist movements across Europe, intellectuals all over the continent embarked on an intensified search for ideas of inner-European collaboration and, in some cases, even European unity. The League of Nations, originally designed as a global institution, turned out to be distinctively European in terms of its outlook and the distribution of power within its key agencies after the US Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty. Most of the issues the League dealt with – from refugees, to minority questions, and European reconstruction - had been raised by the Great War and demanded a Europeanized response articulated and implemented by a genuinely Europeanized civil service, the Secretariat. The League also provided the stage on which some of the most daring plans for European

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reconciliation and integration – those articulated by Stresemann and Briand – were first presented. To be sure, the initiatives for closer European collaboration presented by Stresemann and Briand came to nought. Young Europeanist movements of the 1920s that grew out of the circles around Romain Rolland, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Tomas Masaryck, Ortega y Gasset and others could not dispel dominant nationalist sentiments. Yet, their ideas, triggered by the destruction of what Stefan Zweig called *the World of Yesterday* and the subsequent search for a new European order lived on in the second post-war period of the twentieth century.

More immediately, and on the level of pan-European experiences, the Great War and its immediate aftermath created spaces for intensified transnational personal encounters and exchanges, not only between anti-war Dadaists in Zurich’s *Cabaret Voltaire*, but also between soldiers of different national backgrounds who fought on the same side. The war itself highly intensified transnational mobility and created pan-European networks that survived the end of hostilities in November 1918. The wartime alliance of Germany, Austria and Hungary, for example, lived on in paramilitary networks of the extreme right as well as clandestine attempts to establish, in the mid-1920s and again in the 1930s, a ‘White International’ which was to be based in neutral Switzerland and to include representatives of both the defeated and the victorious states of Europe bound together in their anti-Communist beliefs. In this context, the ‘future of Europe’ was a prime concern, as Waldemar Papst, responsible for the murderer of Rosa Luxemburg, long-serving military organizer of the Austrian *Heimwehr* and author of the White International’s manifesto phrased it. What exactly this ‘future Europe’ of ultra-nationalists was to look like was a divisive question consciously avoided by Papst who confined himself to stating that the ultimate European mission of the White International was ‘the replacement of the old trinity of the French Revolution [*liberté, égalité, fraternité*], [… ] with a new trinity: authority, authority,

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70 S. Zweig (1944), *Die Welt von gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers*, (Frankfurt am Main).
order, and justice.\textsuperscript{72}

The Russian and Hungarian Bolshevik revolutions simultaneously created sizeable refugee communities in cities such as Vienna, Prague, Berlin and London, where tens of thousands of disgruntled and uprooted counterrevolutionaries from Russia or Hungary had to adapt to new lives whilst seeking support from like-minded Europeans for their various plots to bring about the downfall of international Communism.\textsuperscript{73}

The Great War and its violent aftershocks between 1917 and 1923 also produced a large number of European adventurers who travelled the battlefields of post-war Europe from Anatolia to Upper Silesia, civil-war torn Russia and the Baltic States in search of violent action, material gain or ideological fulfilment. For the British Black and Tan whose violent journey led from the trenches of Flanders to post-war Ireland and Palestine, or those ex-officers of the former Central Powers who joined forces with Russia’s White Armies, fought with (and against) Baltic nationalists in Lithuania before assuming ‘advisory’ roles in Ataturk’s ethnic cleansing campaigns in Anatolia, \textit{l’Europe vécue} was a Europe of violence.\textsuperscript{74} Adoration for violence, newly radicalised and genuinely pan-European forms of anti-Semitism as well as war-induced notions of masculinity, served as trans-national touchstones for these movements and formed the basis of unlikely alliances and even friendships. After the temporary stabilization in European politics, this social type resurfaced in the 1930s. During the Spanish Civil War, both sides of the conflict were backed by considerable numbers of international volunteers: with up to 75,000 Italians, 19,000 Germans and around 700 of Eoin O’Duffy’s Irish Blueshirts fighting on Franco’s side and up to 30,000 foreign nationals, the vast majority of them Europeans, joining the Republican International Brigades\textsuperscript{75}, the Spanish Civil War provided a pan-European stage for violent encounters and transnational solidarity, so vividly described in

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\textsuperscript{74} On these themes, see: R. Gerwarth and J. Horne (eds.) (2010, forthcoming), \textit{Paramilitary Violence after the Great War} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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countless memoirs and the literary accounts of André Malraux, Arthur Koestler, and George Orwell. All of these accounts emphasise the peculiar experiences of transnational co-operation on both sides of the Spanish Civil War, experiences and encounters prompted by conflict. Although the Spanish Civil War was undoubtedly a highly divisive event, divisions did not follow national lines.

The Europeanisation of conflict and (generally) involuntary transnationalisation of violent experiences was taken to its extreme during the Nazi war of conquest after 1939. Under the auspices of radical racial and social inequality, Nazi policies triggered a historically unprecedented wave of involuntary transnational experiences that were shared by millions of soldiers and civilians, refugees and POWs. During the Second World War, for example, between 8 and 10 million forced labourers worked in Germany. By 1944, one out of three workers in the German armaments industry and one quarter of the workforce in the machine-building and chemical industries were foreigners. These extreme experiences obviously did not turn Poles and Czechs into Europeans, but for many of them, the change of place reconfigured the perception of nationhood and nationality; sometimes radicalizing earlier notions, sometimes destabilizing and modifying them. This is particularly true for the pan-European phenomena of resistance and collaboration. In his acclaimed novel, Éducation européenne, published in 1945, for example, the Lithuanian Jew Romain Gary tells the story of the 14-year-old Polish boy Janek Twardovski, who joins an underground resistance movement near Wilno after his parents have been murdered by the Germans. The group is a motley crew that includes Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews and Poles. Surrounded by a world of most extreme violence, the highly different members of the resistance group manage to abandon their national prejudices and develop a transnational identity. In a key scene, one of the protagonists points out: ‘Le patriotisme, c’est

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76 G. Orwell (1938), Homage to Catalonia (London); A. Koestler (1937), Spanish Testament (London); André Malraux (1937), L’Espoir (Paris).
l’amour des siens. Le nationalisme, c’est la haine des autres. [...] Il y a une grande fraternité qui se prépare dans le monde, les allemands nous auront valu au moins ça...”

Gary’s interpretation of transnational encounters as an unintended result of German force was partly informed by his own war-induced life experiences as an author born in (then Russian) Lithuania and educated in France who served as a fighter pilot for the Free French during the Second World War. But Gary’s notions of Europeanization through violence were also mirrored in the memoirs of other members of the European resistance.

The war indeed created new European communities of émigrés in North and South America, Australia and London which became the new home of various European governments-in-exile, providing for Belgian, Czech, Slovak, French, Luxemburgish, French, Greek, Norwegian, Dutch, Polish and Yugoslav exile communities in addition to Jewish refugees from Germany and other occupied territories. While the shared experiences of European exile could reinforce nationalism to the extreme, it also prompted new ways of thinking about European identity. War and destruction thus stimulated new forms of interaction between different European resistance groups and radicalized earlier plans for European integration. In 1942, for example, the committed anti-fascist Austrian refugee, Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, formerly a prominent figure in the League of Nations, suggested that the destructiveness of Hitler’s New Order had actually been helpful in making Europeans more European. Without intending to do, Hitler had destroyed the ‘myth of sovereignty’ and accustomed Europeans to think beyond their national borders. To be sure, not everyone would have agreed with such sentiments in 1942, but there is certainly some truth in Mark Mazower’s argument that ‘Nazi conquest linked together the peoples of Europe more tightly than they had ever been connected before’ and that in turn, ‘those fighting the Germans

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also found it necessary to plan in European terms. Both Nazi and Allied propaganda invoked images of transnational European solidarity to bolster their war effort, a fact that the Italian historian Federico Chabod commented on his *Storia dell’idea Europa* which he started to work on during the war: ‘in these last years there has been and still is much talk of Europe and European civilization and so on. Appeals, articles in newspapers and magazines, discussions and polemics: in all, the word ‘Europe’ has been tossed around with unusual frequency, for good reasons and bad.’

If Nazism appeared to most contemporaries to be the very opposite of ‘European civilisation’, Hitler’s crusade against Bolshevism also appealed to many conservative and fascist Europeans who rallied to the anti-Soviet cause. At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, in June 1941, some 600,000 non-German volunteers fought alongside Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. At the height of the Second World War, in 1943, every third soldier defending the German lines was in fact a non-German volunteer. In the spring of 1945, half of the roughly one million members of the SS were non-Germans from 15 different European nations. Romanians, Finns, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Spaniards, Belgians, Swedes, and Norwegians made Hitler’s army very ‘European’ indeed. Nazi efforts to ‘Europeanize’ the German armed forces were intensified immediately after the defeat at Stalingrad. Nazi propaganda labelled Operation Barbarossa a ‘crusade for Europe’ in order to mobilise non-German Europeans for the fight against the perceived ‘Asian’ threat of Bolshevism on the one hand and against American materialism and imperialism on the other. A new ‘Song for Europe’ was broadcast, stamps with the slogan ‘European United Front against Bolshevism’ were issued and Nazi propaganda maintained that ‘born out of discord, struggle and misery the United States of Europe has at last become a reality.’ The Europeanization of evil found its most

84 M. Mazower (2008), *Hitler’s Empire*, 569.
internationally recognizable form in the pan-European figure of the collaborator, the Vidkun Quislings, Léon Degrelles, Pierre Lavals, Anton Musserts, Andrey Vlasovs, Emanuel Moravec's, Eoin O'Duffys and William Joyce of Europe. To be sure, their aspirations for ‘Europe’ often differed substantially from the place in Hitler’s New Order which the German authorities were willing to grant them. They had to experience first hand that the Nazis’ ‘Europe’ was a German Europe and that nationalism provided a major obstacle to the realisation of a political union of European fascists. But the Nazis’ ability to forge a genuinely Europeanized community of fascists (however short-lived it may have been) was certainly remarkable.

Absolute destruction could thus go hand in hand with very intense forms of international encounter, which fundamentally reshaped the lives of millions of Europeans. The horrors of the Nazi concentration camps are an example discussed elsewhere in this volume. Another example, the case of Berlin in the spring and summer of 1945 illustrates how a city devastated by war became a stage for European encounters triggered and characterised by violence, a stage on which hundreds of thousands of civilians, soldiers, refugees, POWs, and forced labourers from virtually every European country engaged with each other in various ways amidst an epic nightmare of violence and destruction.

Any analysis of the paradoxical relationship between violence and Europeanization would also have to discuss how transnational experiences of war, expulsion and destruction were remembered and transformed into ‘lessons’ for European integration. Whereas war commemoration and hero cults after the Great War primarily served as a source for nationalist mobilization, (even though its forms, notably the cult of the Unknown

Soldier and medievalist forms of monuments, followed transnational patterns\(^{92}\) the same cannot be said about the post-1945 period. Commemoration of the Second World War soon focussed on European reconciliation as the only possible lesson to be learnt from the war. Increasingly, the suffering caused by war and conflict was emphasised as a shared European experience. It was this perspective which made certain transnational forms of commemoration possible: from the erection of the Cross of Coventry on top of the reconstructed Dresden Frauenkirche to the repeated meetings between François Mitterand and his fellow war veteran, Ernst Jünger, and Helmut Kohl’s visit to Verdun and his attendance at the commemoration ceremonies on the beaches of Normandy.

To be sure, neither the civilian populations of Coventry and Dresden nor the German and French soldiers at Verdun had any desire to die for Europeanization. It is in retrospect, prompted by the need to make sense of what appeared to survivors as a non-sensical conflict and to heal the wounds of fundamentally divisive events, that these events have developed a distinctively Europeanizing effect.\(^{93}\) This trend continues to the present day. In the recent Brussels-based exhibition, ‘50 Years of the European Adventure’, for example, the Museum of Europe presented a girl’s dress made of Allied flags, the illustrated memoirs of a young Hungarian in Budapest in 1956, a British soldier’s diary kept during the Suez crisis and Stasi memorabilia as objects ‘which tell us in a moving way what Europeans have experienced over the last 50 years.’\(^{94}\) The focus on civilians’ suffering allowed for a commemorative perspective in which the experience of violence, expulsions, and bombing terror could retrospectively be interpreted as a source for Europeanization through the convergence of experiences.\(^{95}\)


\(^{93}\) T. Lessing (1919), *Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen* (Munich).

\(^{94}\) http://www.expo-europe.be/

For obvious reasons, the term Europeanization is most frequently used to describe processes of positive change, integration and peaceful convergence within the historical realm that has become today’s European Union. There is certainly nothing wrong with emphasizing the legacy of the Enlightenment and Christianity, religious tolerance, or the integrating effects of European trade and cultural exchanges as crucial factors in the process of Europeanization. What has been argued in this essay, however, is that any analysis of ‘Europeanization’ would be incomplete if it ignored the processes of unintended convergence of life experiences of millions of Europeans brought about by war and conflict.

War, the destruction of whole cities, of national certainties, and of traditional forms of identity were common experiences for most Europeans. It may not be an accident that the construction of a distinctly European identity occurred in direct response to some of the most violent aspects of European history. Pan-Europeanism tended to remain on the political margins until the era of the two world wars and ideas for European integration were only implemented after periods of extreme, self-destructive violence.\(^\text{96}\)

If large-scale violence in Europe and Europe’s colonial possessions did produce convergent life experiences, trans-national learning processes and forms of emulation, the construction of a collective war memory in recent decades has also helped to turn originally divisive events into a shared legacy of Europeans, in which human suffering, irrespective of national contexts, is emphasized more strongly than immediately after 1945. In this meta-narrative of European identity, colonialism and the two world wars have become constant reminders that the Europe of the future has learnt the lessons of the past. For all these reasons, war and conflict should not be understood as the opposite of

\(^{96}\) From a German perspective: V. Conze (2005), *Das Europa Der Deutschen: Ideen Von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920-1970)* (Munich).
convergence, unification and compromise, but as an integral part of the complicated dynamics of Europeanization.\footnote{D. Gosewinkel, ““Anti-Europa” in der europäischen Zeitgeschichte?”, unpubl. manuscript, July 2008. We are grateful to the author for providing us with a copy of the text prior to publication.}