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From Solon to Sophocles: Intertextuality and Interpretation in Sophocles’ Antigone

Douglas Cairns

This paper develops from my discussion of the role of traditional Greek thought, and especially the concept of ἄτη, in Sophocles’ Antigone in a recent volume on Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought. It also complements and extends a more general interpretation of the play offered in my forthcoming Bloomsbury Companion to Antigone. Its main focus is the first and second stasima of Sophocles’ play and in particular on what they, their relations with each other, and their relations with other texts, contribute to an overall interpretation.

1. The first stasimon

The first stasimon is associated above all with fifth-century accounts of progress. This is not what I propose to discuss here, but these associations do form an important background to what I do want to focus on, because contemporary affirmations of the human potential for progress – the belief, generally speaking, that technological and cultural progress depend on the rational capacities that have allowed human beings to master their natural environment and establish civilized communities – stand in sharp contrast to what might be regarded as the traditional ‘archaic’ view of a decline from better to worse conditions of existence.

1 See Cairns (2013), (2014). I am grateful to audiences in (chronologically) St Andrews, Edinburgh, Tokyo, and Heidelberg for their comments on oral versions of this paper. I am especially delighted to be able to publish this version here in JASCA alongside the fine and complementary study of the first stasimon by Yoshinori Sano and I am very grateful to Professor Sano for advance sight of his work. I should also like to thank Professors Anzai, Ciesko, Itsumi, Kasai, Nakatsukasa, Sano, Takahashi, and their colleagues, students, family, and friends for their splendid hospitality in summer 2013.

2 The texts are assembled and analysed by Y. Sano in this volume. Among other studies see esp. Utzinger (2003); cf. Segal (1964) = (1986), 137-61; Guthrie (1969), 60-8, 79-84; Goldhill (1986), 202-5.

3 See Hes. Op. 106-201. Starkey (2013) takes me to task for using ‘traditional’ and ‘archaic’ interchangeably and objects ‘that a traditional feature need not be specifically archaic and might not seem out of place in any period of Greek literature’. In this context, I use both terms to refer to widespread and recurrent ethical and religious notions that can be found in poetry from Homer to Aeschylus (and, of course, beyond). I call this ‘archaic poetry’, though periodization as such is not my concern. Since all our evidence for this complex of ideas before Sophocles comes from archaic poetry, all such traditional ideas are archaic. There are, of course, ideas that may be associated with writers of the archaic period (especially the Presocratics) that are not traditional. But I am dealing with those that are. It is true that many of these ideas continue to be traditional long after Sophocles,
shall say here will confirm (in general terms) familiar interpretations of the first stasimon, especially those that identify irony, ambivalence, and latent reference to Creon. I argue that these interpretations are reinforced by a fuller understanding of the ode’s intertextuality with earlier poetry (as well as by intratextual relationships with the rest of Sophocles’ play, especially its second stasimon).

As examples of human skill (τέχνη) the Chorus offer seafaring (334-7), agriculture (337-41), hunting and fishing (342-8), the taming of animals (348-52), language, thought, and law (354-6), house-building (365-60), and medicine (361-3). But there are limits: medicine cannot in the end protect us from death (Ἄιδα μόνον | φεῦξιν οὐκ ἔπαξεται, 361-2). And there are qualifications: skill has bad as well as good applications, bad as well as good outcomes (σοφὸν τί τὸ μηχανόεν | τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐμπίδων ἔκχων | τοτὲ μὲν κακὸν, ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἐσθῆλον ἔστει, 365-7). The limits and ambivalence of τέχνη that are explicit in these lines are implicit throughout the ode, right from its striking (and strikingly ambiguous) opening phrase (πολλὰ πολλὰ δεῖν | κτλ.). The activity of ploughing that is central to the development of agriculture involves ‘wearing away the oldest (and most reverend) of the gods, earth the unwaning, the unwearying’ (θεῶν | τε τὰν ὑπερτάταν, Γάν | ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν ἀποσμένει, 337-9).5 ‘Thought’ (φρόνημα) is ‘windy’ (ἀνεμόεν, 354-5), suggesting speed, but also lack of substance. Φρόνημα (a word which has already been used by Creon in lines 176 and 207 in a way that invites an audience to evaluate his way of thinking as it is tested in practice) can also mean ‘pride’. Man has ‘taught himself the dispositions, ὀργαί, of civic order’ (ἀστυνόμους | ὀργὰς ἐδιδάσκατο, 355-6); but ὀργή is an emotion of which Creon has already given ample evidence in his response to the news of Polynices’ burial (244, 280-314), especially in his reaction to the suggestion that the deed may be the work of the gods (280: παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργής καὶ μὲ μεστῶσαι λέγων). Man has resources for everything (παντοπόρος, 360); he advances towards nothing that is to come without resources (ἀπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρξεται | τὸ μέλλον, 360-1). But the notion that man is resourceful in all respects is immediately contradicted in the reference to death (361-}

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6 See further below.
2), and the sense of being prepared for every eventuality is precisely what is described in the next stanza (365-7) as the kind of cleverness or skill that is ‘beyond hope’, yet only sometimes successful.

The ode has two especially prominent Athenian forebears: Solon 13. 43-62 W,\(^7\) and the opening lines of the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ *Choephori* (585-601).\(^8\)

1.1. Solon 13 W

Solon’s *Musenelegie* is clearly a poem that fifth-century Athenians knew well. Bacchylides makes use of it in praising an Athenian victor at the Isthmian games in his tenth Ode (35-48). That ode is undateable: but if (as is plausible, but not certain) Bacchylides died around 452 BC and the *Antigone* was produced in the 450s or 440s, it will show a ready familiarity with Solon’s poem at Athens at a period close to that in which the *Antigone* was performed.\(^9\)

The relevant passage of Solon’s poem, like the beginning of Ode to Man, takes the form of a *Priamel* of human skills (43-62):

\[
σπεύδει δ’ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος· ὁ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλάται ἐν νησίν ὃς χρήζων οὐκαδὲ κέρδος ἄγειν ἵχθυόντ’ ἀνέμοισι φορεόμενος ἄργαλεόσιον, \hspace{2cm} \text{45}
\]

\[
φειδώλην ψυχῆς ὑμείαν θέμενος· ἄλλος γῆν τέμνων πολυδένδρεον εἰς ἐνναυτὸν λατρεύει, τοῖσιν καμπύλ’ ἀρτοφρα μέλει· \hspace{2cm} \text{50}
\]

\[
ἄλλος Αἴηναῖς τε καὶ ᾿Ησαΐστου πολυτέχνεω ἔργα δαείς χειροίν ἐγνωσίτεται βίοτον, ἄλλος Ὀλυμπιαδῶν Μουσέων πάρα δώρα διδαχθείς, \hspace{2cm} \text{55}
\]

\[
μερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος· ἄλλον μάντιν ἐθηκεν ἀναξ ἐκάργυος Ἀπόλλων, ἐγνω δ’ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον \hspace{2cm}
\]

\[
ὦ συνομαρτήσως θεοῖ· τὰ δὲ μόροιμα πάντως \hspace{2cm}
\]

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\(^7\) See Friedländer (1967), 191-2. The general relevance of Sol. 13 to the first stasimon is noted by Müller (1967), 87, though he does not discuss the detailed correspondences. Cf. his p. 139 on the second stasimon, with Gagné (2013), 373-6. See also Sano, in this volume, 33, 46.


\(^9\) On the dating of Bacchylides’ life and work, see Cairns (2010), 1-7. The date of the *Antigone* is unknown, and the indications that it belongs to the 440s much less persuasive than is sometimes supposed (see e.g. Scullion (2002) 85-6). But the general point stands regardless of the uncertainty over dating. On the afterlife of the *Musenelegie* at Athens, cf. Gagné (2013), 227, 375.
οὔτε τις οἰωνός όψεται οὖθ’ ἱερὰ·
ἄλλοι Παιδόνος πολυφαρμάκου ἐργον ἔχοντες
ἰητοῖ· καὶ τοῖς οὐδὲν ἐπεστὶ τέλος·
pολλάκι δ’ ἐξ ὀλίγης ὀδύνης μέγα γίγνεται ἄλγος,
κούκ ἂν τις λύσαι’ ἡπία φάρμακα δοῦς·
tὸν δὲ κακαῖς νούσοις κυκάμενον ἀργαλέαις τε
ἀψάμενος χειροῖν αἴψα τίθησ’ ὑψίθη

In both cases, a summary Priamel is followed by a more extensive list of examples
(σπεύδει δ’ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος, Sol. 13. 43; cf. πολλὰ τὰ δεινά, Ant. 332). Several examples occur in both lists. The first two are the same and appear in the same order in both; and the last member of each list is the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solon 13</th>
<th>Ant.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>seafaring</td>
<td>43-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agriculture and ploughing</td>
<td>47-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medicine</td>
<td>57-62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solon’s list has items that the Ode to Man does not. All Solon’s skills are ways of making money, whereas in Sophocles they are all ways of mastering the natural environment and developing civilized communities. One of these items in Solon’s list that does not appear in the Antigone is seercraft (53-6 – unless we think that ὀρνίθων in Ant. 342-3 evokes οἰωνός at Sol. 13. 56). But it nonetheless illuminates one aspect of Sophocles’ version. Like Solon’s seer, Sophocles’ ‘man’ has resources vis-à-vis the future (ἀποροφος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἐρχεται | τὸ μέλλον, Ant. 360-1); but seers have powers that ordinary men do not. According to Solon (13. 54), a seer can discern the evil that is coming to a man (ἐγνω δ’ ἄνδρι κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον); but not even his skill can avert what is fated (τὰ δὲ μόρσιμα πάντως | οὔτε τις οἰωνός όψεται οὖθ’ ἱερά, 55-6). Just so, the resources of ‘man’ in the first stasimon of the Antigone are of no avail in the face of the ineluctability of death. We notice, too, an identical sequence of ideas in both cases: (a) powers with regard to

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10 Cf. Sano, this volume, 33, 46.
11 Crane (1989), 107, notes the third item, but not the other two.
the future (Sol. 13. 53-6 ~ Ant. 360-1); (b) limitations of those powers (Sol. 13. 55-6 ~ Ant. 361-2); (c) medicine (Sol. 13. 57-62 ~ Ant. 363-4).

This notion of limitation is then applied to all the examples in Solon’s list (63-6): Moira brings mortals κακόν as well as ἐσθλόν (63); the gifts of the gods are inescapable (64); there is risk in every activity (65); and no one knows how things, once started, are going to end (65-6; note μέλλει in 66). With this, we can compare Ant. 360-2, 365-71: though man seems to advance towards nothing that is to come without resources (360-1, note μέλλον in 361), still people who put their hopes in skill and intelligence come to κακόν as well as to ἐσθλόν (365-7); there is a god that no one can escape (361-2); and intelligence can be misused, in violation of human law and divine justice (368-71).

We shall return to these topics.

1.2. Aeschylus, Choephori 585-601
The other major Athenian intertext is the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ Choephori (585-651), especially its first two stanzas.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰ τρέφει 585
δεινὰ δειμάτων ἀχή,
pόνται τ’ ἀγκάλαι
βρύουσι· βλάστουσι καὶ πεδαίμονοι
λαμπάδες πεδάοροι 590
πτανὰ τε καὶ πεδοβάμονα· κανεμόνεντ’ ἀν
αἰγίδων φράσαι κότον.

ἀλλ’ ὑπέρτολμον ἀν-
δόρος φρόνημα τίς λέγοι 595
καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσίν
tημώνων παντόλμους
ἐρωτας, ἀταισι συννόμους βροτῶν;
ξυζύγους δ’ ὀμαυλίας
θηλυκρατὶς ἀπέρωτος ἔρως παρανικῇ
κνωδάλων τε καὶ βροτῶν.

589 βλάστουσι codd., βλάπτουσι Butler
This also begins with a Priamel, but more than that, its opening words (πολλὰ μὲν γὰ τρέφει δεινα δεμάτων ἅχη, 585-6) are closely similar to the Antigone’s πολλὰ τὰ δεινα, 332. Aeschylus’ personified Ge who nurtures these terrors is recalled in the Ge who is worn down by the plough in Sophocles (Γὰν ἄφθιτον, ἄκαμάταν ἀποτρύεται, 338-9). The first stanza of the Aeschylean ode encompasses earth, sea, and sky (585-93); in the first two stanzas of the Sophoclean one (332-45) there is a chiastic movement from sea (πόντου), to earth (Γὰν), to sky (φῦλον ὸρνίθων) and then back to earth (θηρῶν ἄγριων ἔθνη) and sea (πόντου τ’ εἰναλίων φύσιν). Like the Ode to Man, the Choephori’s ode encompasses both birds of the air and beasts of the field (πτανὰ τε καὶ πεδοβάμονα, 591). Aeschylus’ Chorus then proceeds to focus on the ‘excessively daring φρόνημα of man’ (594-5): ὑπέρτολμον answers to τόλμα at Ant. 371-2; φρόνημα (here clearly in its negative sense) occurs also at Antigone 355 (where the adjective ἀνεμόεις also has its counterpart at Cho. 591); and ἀνδρὸς answers to the ἀνήρ who, by Antigone 347, has replaced the ἀνθρωπος with whom the ode began (332-3).¹²

The climax of the Aeschylean Priamel, however, is the wicked ἐφωτεὺς of women (596-8, 599-601), a point that is then illustrated by the catalogue of bad women who serve as analogues to Clytemnestra. The link between the Sophoclean ode and the preceding action of the play is not explicit until the end of the song (368-75). Ostensibly, the Chorus indicate here that the preceding reflexions on human ingenuity were prompted by the attempted burial of Polynices’ body: that action required the kind of daring that demonstrates the negative side of human intelligence. The Chorus assume (as did Creon at 248) that the perpetrator is a man. The audience, however, know that it was a woman, and will see the irony not only in the reference to περιφραδὴς ἄνηρ at 348 but also in the evocation of the Choephori’s powerful ode on female crime. But in that ode, too, doubts about the φρόνημα of men were raised as a counterpoint to women’s wickedness. Sophocles’ ode also raises the question of whether right, in this instance, lies with the woman or the man. We know that it was a woman who performed the burial; but is that woman a criminal, as in the Choephori, or does the daring that the Chorus condemn belong to the man who sought to exert his mastery over earth, supreme of the gods (338), and over Hades (361)? How stable is his ‘windy φρόνημα’? Will his ὀργαῖ preserve the city’s laws (354-5) or will they fall foul of the ‘laws of the land (or

¹² The phrase ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα (Cho. 594-5) will appear in the same form and with the same sense in the Antigone’s next episode, in Antigone’s boast that she is not the sort to break divine law ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς φρόνημα δείσασα, 458-9.
earth) and the justice of the gods’ (νόμους ... χθονὸς | θεῶν τ’ ἔνορκον δίκαν, 368-9)? The Ode to Man responds to the confidence in his own powers that Creon manifested in his opening speech, and to characteristics that he had already begun to manifest in his interactions with the Chorus and the Guard, not only to the supposed ingenuity of the transgressor who buried the body.13 For an audience that is aware of them, both of the ode’s major intertexts raise, from the very beginning of the Ode to Man, the issues of right and wrong that arise explicitly only in that song’s final stanza (365-75). Both might be said to present those issues within a traditional, ‘archaic’ moral and theological framework. The Ode to Man combines these influences with a more contemporary-sounding praise of human achievement and progress, but both intertextuality and the ode’s internal ambivalences suggest that its optimistic orientation is only superficial.14 It is the ode’s closing emphasis on the limits and ambivalence of human ingenuity that contextualize it, within its immediate context, within the play in general, and within wider traditions of Greek thought.

2. Second stasimon

Solon’s Priamel in the Musenelegie is embedded in a disquisition on the power of fate, the instability of fortune, the ambivalence of wealth, and the prevalence of ἄτη.15 ἄτη first appears (in 68) as a consequence of the inability to foresee the outcome of one’s actions: at the beginning of an enterprise nobody knows how it will turn out. One can try to achieve a good outcome, yet fall into ἄτη without realizing it, or one may be faring badly, and yet find that things turn out well (65-70):

πάσι δὲ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἔργασιν, οὐδὲ τις οἶδεν
πῇ μέλλει σχίσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου·
ἀλλ’ ὄ μὲν εὗ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος ὡς προνοήσας
ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπῆν ἔπεσεν,
τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν
προτυχήν ἀγαθήν, ἐκλυσιν ἄφροσύνης.

13 Cf. Else (1976), 46; also (at least in general terms), Crane (1989).
14 So in general Müller (1967), 87-8; contrast Staley (1985), 561; Crane (1989), 107.
15 For the purposes of this paper I pass over the much-discussed issue of the coherence or otherwise of Solon’s argument in this poem. For a good overview, with full doxography, see Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010), 127-39; more recently, cf. Versnel (2011), 201-6.
Ἄτη then recurs in 75-6, as punishment for greed and the illegitimate pursuit of πλούτος and κέρδος (71-6):

πλούτου δ' ουδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδρασί κείται·
oi γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον,
διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι τις ἂν κορέσειν ἀπαντας;
κέρδεα τοι θυητοῖς ὑπασαν ἀθάνατοι,
ἀτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεὺς
πέμψει πεφασμένην, ἄλλος ἄλλος ἐχει.

This concludes what we have of the poem, and perhaps the entire original poem, by forming a ring with the concentration on good and bad ways of attaining wealth, on the dangers of ὕβρις and ἄτη, and on the inevitability of Zeus’ punishment, even across the generations, which occupies its first 42 lines. If the first stasimon of the Antigone recalls Solon’s poem, then it must also recall its wider ethical framework. Equally, if the first stasimon of Antigone reminds its audience of the first stasimon of the Choephoroi, then that audience will think not only of its juxtaposition of male φρόνημα and female criminality, but also of the result of women’s villainous ἔρωτες, i.e. ἄται, disasters (597-8). In the relation between the Ode to Man and its intertexts, ἄτη is the elephant in the room. And ἄτη is the subject of the second stasimon.

2.1. First and second stasima compared
The second stasimon begins with μακαρισμός: happy are those whose life is free of the taste of misfortune (ἐυδαιμονες οἰσὶ κακῶν ἄγευστος αἰών, 582); but ἐυδαιμονία is impossible in a house that is shaken by the gods; in that case, all that remains is ἄτη (οἰς γὰρ ἂν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας | ουδὲν ἐλλείπει γενεὰς ἐπὶ πλῆθος ἔρπον, 583-5). Just such a house is the House of Labdacus, whose generations of trouble are continuing in the sufferings of its surviving members, and particularly in the death penalty that (in the preceding scene) was pronounced on both Antigone and Ismene (594-603). This is the first pair of stanzas. In the second pair, the Chorus sing first that the transgression of men (and again the word is ἀνδρες, 604-5) will never overcome the power of Zeus, and of the ἄτη that appears (despite the textual uncertainty) especially to attend the rich or the successful.¹⁶

¹⁶ The manuscript text (οὐδὲν ἔρπει | θνατῶν βιῶτο πάμπολις ἐκτός ἄτας) is emended in two main ways: in the version printed in Lloyd-Jones and Wilson’s Oxford Classical Text (Lloyd-Jones’s own
They then proceed to the hopes and delusions that lead men (ἄνδρες again, 616) blindly to act in ways that bring disaster (615-20), before concluding with an endorsement of the traditional wisdom that ‘sooner or later bad seems good to a man whose mind a god is leading towards disaster (ἄτη). He fares but the shortest time without ἄτη’ (620-5):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{σοφία γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ} & \quad 620 \\
\text{κλεινὸν ἔπος πέφανταί,} \\
\text{τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ' ἔσθλόν} \\
\text{τῶδ' ἔμμεν ὅτω φρένας} \\
\text{θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν·} \\
\text{πράσσει δ' οὐλίγιστον χρόνον ἐκτὸς ἄτας.}^{17} \\
\end{align*}
\]

The first and second stasima are linked by a series of verbal and conceptual echoes.\(^\text{18}\) In particular, their beginnings are closely parallel. They both begin with arresting, proverbial-sounding, stylized, and universalizing statements, before proceeding to a more specific case:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{πολλὰ τὰ δείνα καυδέν ἄν-} & \quad (332-3) \\
\text{θρώπου δεινότερον πέλει.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ευδαιμόνες οίσι κακῶν ἀγεύστος αἰών.} & \quad (583-5) \\
\text{οίς γὰρ ἂν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας} \\
\text{οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει γενεὰς ἐπί πλήθος ἔργων.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

In the first stasimon, the first example of mankind’s ingenuity is seafaring (334-7); in the second, the divine ‘shaking’ of a house, which entails all kinds of ἄτη, is compared to a storm at sea (586-93):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{τοῦτο καὶ πολιοῦ πέραν} & \quad (334-7) \\
\text{πώντου χειμερίῳ νότῳ} \\
\text{χωρει, περιβουχίσιοι} \\
\text{περών χτ' οἶδασιν} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ώστε ποντίας ἄλος} & \quad (334-7) \\
\text{οἴδαμα δυσπνόοις ὃταν} \\
\text{Θρησκευον ἔρεβος ὁφαλὸν ἐπιθράμμα πνοαίς,} \\
\text{κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν} \\
\text{κελαινὰς ἥνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι} \\
\text{στόνῳ βρέμουσιν ἀντιπλῆγες ἀκταί.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{17}\) οὐδέν’ ἔστη | θνατὸν βιότος πάμπολυς ἐκτὸς ἄτας | the reference to wealth is clearer, but the implication is there even with Heath’s emendation, οὐδέν’ ἔστη | θνατὸν βιότος πάμπολυ γ’ ἐκτὸς ἄτας, printed by Jebb and Dawe.

\(^{18}\) See Easterling (1978), 150; Sano (this volume) 40 and n. 44.
The link is reinforced by verbal echoes of the root ποντ- (335, 345/586) and the (ominous?) word οἴδμα (337/587). Perhaps, too, the metaphorical winds that represent ἄτη (a state of mind as well as a state of affairs) in the second stasimon recall the ‘windy thought’ of the first (especially δυσάνεμοι, 591, and ἀνεμόεν, 353). However that may be, it is clear that the sea in the first stasimon represents human achievement, but in the second its limits.

The second stasimon then moves on to the House of Labdacus, while the next point in the first stasimon is mankind’s invention of agriculture, but again the two themes are closely linked.

Mankind wears away Earth, supreme of the gods, the immortal (ἄφθιτον), the unwearied (ἀκαμάταν), as the plough turns, ἐτος εἰς ἐτος (338-40); in the House of Labdacus woe falls on woe in a similar, incessant rhythm (πήματα φθιτῶν ἐπὶ πήμασι πίπτοντ’); and where Earth is ἄφθιτος and ἀκάματος, the Labdacids experience further woes over and above those of the dead (φθιτῶν, 595); in the second stasimon it is the ‘months of the gods’ (ἀκάματοι θεῶν ἐκ μῆνες, 607-8), through which the power of Zeus remains undiminished, that are ‘unwearied’. Earth is oldest and most august of the gods, but the Labdacids are the gods’ victims (θεῶν in 337 and 597, 607); and the agriculture that is a sign of human inventiveness in the first stasimon is echoed in the ‘harvesting’ (κατ’ ... ἀμά) of the ‘last root’ of the house of Oedipus (599-602). There is no escape (οὐδ’ ἔχει λύσιν, 597), just as there

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For winds/storms as an image of psychological disturbance, see the parados, 134-7 (of Capaneus) and esp. the Chorus’ judgement of Antigone at 929-30 (ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνέμου αὐταί ἐν ψυχῆς ὑπαίτε τῆνδε γ’ ἐχοισιν); cf. Benardete (1999), 114; Cullyer (2005), 15-18. The association of such winds with ἄτη (e.g. A. Ag. 819. ἄτης θύειλαι ζῶσι; cf. esp. the storm which represents Zeus’ punishment, and thus the ἄτη which follows ὅρχεις; in Sol. 13. 11-25 W) suggests a folk etymology deriving ἄτη from ἄημι (Goebel (1877), 32-55; Francis (1983)). NB also the correspondence between 1274 (Creon has been shaken by a god) and 584 (when a house is shaken by the gods).
was no escape from death, in the first stasimon’s most explicit statement of the limits of human resourcefulness (362).

The second stasimon also resembles the first in narrowing its focus from humanity in general to men in particular (ἀνδρεῖς, 604-5, 616; ἀνήρ, 348). This is notable in both cases, given that the event that prompts the first is what the audience know to have been the act of a woman, while the ruminations on the fate of the Labdacids in the second are prompted by a man’s imposition of the death penalty upon its two surviving members, both female.

In the first stasimon, speech (φθέγμα) and thought (φρόνημα) were central to man’s achievement (354-5), while in the second ‘senselessness in speech and a Fury of the mind’ cause the extirpation of the House of Oedipus (τεάν, Ζεὺς, δύνασιν τίς ἄν-| δρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι; 604-5); while in the first, man’s ἀστύνομοι ὀργαί (355-6) needed to respect both the law of the land and the justice of the gods (νόμος … χθονὸς | θεῶν τ’ ἔνορκον δίκαν) if he was to be high in his city (368-70).

In the first stasimon, man advanced towards the future (τὸ μέλλον) confident that his resources would suffice (360-1); but in the second it is the law of Zeus, the law that confirms his power and dictates that no great wealth (or nothing great) comes to mortals without ἄτη, that prevails ‘now and in the future (τὸ μέλλον) and in the past’ (611-12). Hope (ἐλπίς) may be no more than ‘the deception of light-minded passions’ (ἄ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλ- | τίς πολλοῖς μὲν ὀνήσεις ἄνδρῶν, | πολλοῖς δ’ ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων, 615-17), so that a man comes unawares to disaster (εἰδότι δ’ οὐδὲν ἔρπει, | πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ, 618-19); with wisdom has it been said, that bad seems good to one whose mind a god is leading towards ἄτη (σοφία γὰρ ἐκ του | κλεινόν ἄτος πέφανται, | τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ’ ἐσθλὸν | τῳδ’ ἐμμεν ὡτῳ φρένας | θεῶς ἄγει πρός ἄταν, 620-4). Just so, in the first stasimon, man might rely ‘beyond hope’ on his wisdom, yet come now to bad, now to good (σοφὸν τι τὸ μηχανὸν | τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχων | τοτέ μὲν κακόν, ἀλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἑσθλὸν ἔρπει, 365-7). His passionate aims, in the second stasimon (κουφονόων ἐρώτων, 617), may in the end be as ‘light-minded’ as the birds he traps in his nets in the first (κουφονόων … ὀργίθων, 342-3).²⁰

2.2. Second stasimon, Solon, and Aeschylus

Not all of these thematic and verbal correspondences are equally salient; but it does not matter much whether an audience catches all or only some of them, because all serve a single overall purpose, namely the contrast between (a) the potential of human reason and (b) its limits and failings. This contrast is inherent in the first stasimon itself, but deepened and extended by means of the interrelationship of the first and the second. In its close relation with the first stasimon, the second stasimon inevitably also has a close relation with that ode’s intertexts – many of the second’s echoes of the first reverberate further in the poems that are the first’s main sources.

But the second stasimon also brings in aspects of those sources that were either latent or inactive in the first stasimon. This is clearly so in case of ἄτη, which is prominent in both the Choephori ode and Solon’s Musenelegie. But it is also striking that activation of the Choephori’s reference to ἄτη also brings in its reference to ἔρως – as in Choephori 597-8 (and 600) ἄτη and ἔρωτες are linked at Antigone 617-25:

| ἄλλ’ ὑπέρτολμον ἄν- | ἀ γάρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλ- (615) |
| ὅ - δρός φρόνημα τίς λέγοι (595) | πεῖς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄντις ἄνδρων, |
| καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσίν | πολλοίς δ’ ἀπάτα κουφρονών ἐρώτων- |
| τλημόνων παντόλμους | εἰδότε δ’ οὐδὲν ἐςτεί, |
| ἔρωτας, ἄταισι συννόμους βροτῶν; | πρὸν πυρθερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ. |

These lines encapsulate what ἄτη is – a person has an aim in acting, hopes the outcome will be good, and acts; but one never knows how things will turn out; and so we realize we have made a calamitous mistake only when disaster strikes.21 This is precisely Solon’s characterization of ἄτη at 13. 63-70 (with verbal parallels with both the first and the second stasima in Antigone):

Μοῖρα δὲ τοι θνητοίς κακὸν φέρει ἰδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν,
δώρα δ’ ἀφύκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων.

21 On the meaning of ἄτη, and in particular the focal meaning of ‘harm’ (βλάβη) that links its so-called ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ senses, see Cairns (2012), 1-10; see also Sommerstein (2013).
That passage, however, forms a ring with an earlier one in the same poem (Sol. 13. 33-6):

\[\begin{align*}
\text{θνητο} & \text{ ὦδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε} \\
\text{πρὶν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ’ αὐτὸς ὀδύρεται· ἀχρὶ δὲ τούτου} & \text{χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα.}
\end{align*}\]

Compare Ant. 618-19:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{εἰδότι δ’ οὐδὲν ἔρπει,} \\
\text{πρὶν πυρ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ.}
\end{align*}\]

In Solon, this limitation defines the gulf between man and god. It vindicates the power of Zeus. Solon expresses this in an elaborate chiasmus:

A 17-32  power of Zeus  ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἑρόμενον τέλος … τοιαύτη 
Ζηρὸς πέλεται τόσο … ἀναιτίοι ἔρχαγα τίνοσιν! ἣ παίδες 
τούτῳν ἢ γένος ἐξοπήσει

B 33-5  human ignorance  θνητοὶ δ’ ὦδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε, 
ἐν ὦεὶν ἣν αὐτὸς δόξαν ἐκαστος ἔχει, 
πρὶν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ’ αὐτὶς ὀδύρεται

B´ 63-70  human ignorance  Μοῦρα δὲ τοι ὀθνητοὶς κακὸν φέρει ἢδὲ καὶ ἔσθλον, 
δώρα δ’ ἀφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων. 
πάσι δὲ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἐργασίαν, οὐδὲ τις οἶδεν (65) 
πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχιμενον· 
ἀλλ’ ὦ μὲν εν ὦδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας 
ἐς μεγάλην ἁτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔρημεν, 
τῷ δὲ κακῷς ἐρθοντι θέως περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν 
συντυχίην ἀγαθὴν, ἐκλυσιν ἄφροσύνης. (70)

A´ 75-6  power of Zeus  ἀτη δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἢ ὡσπέ Ζεὺς (75) 
πέμψει τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἀλλὸς ἔχει.
In *Antigone*, the sequence is simpler: A (power of Zeus, 604-14), B (human ignorance, 615-25).

At the same time, however, Sophocles’ lines 615-19 interweave (a) an echo of the first stasimon (hope and its ambivalence at 365-7), (b) an echo of the source passage in *Choephoroi* (the ἔρωτες of *Cho*. 597), and (c) an echo of Solon 13, where the κούρφαι ἐλπίδες of Sol. 13. 36 are recalled in the ἐλπίς that is nothing but the ἀπάτα of light-minded ἔρωτες. We should notice, too, that Solon’s image of Zeus’ power (at 13. 17-24, ἔξαπτίνης δὲ ὧστ’ ἀνεμος νεφέλας αὐξα διεσκέδασεν ἣμινός κτλ.) is one of a storm that begins at sea, as in both the first and second stasima in *Antigone* (334-7, 583-92).

Solon’s poem deals above all with the improper pursuit of πλοῦτος and ὀλβος. Ἄτη is especially relevant in this connexion because of its regular appearance as an antonym of κέρδος (where its regular sense, ‘ruin’, takes on a specifically financial form).  

22 See especially Sol. 13. 70-6:

πλούτον δ’ οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται·
οἱ γὰρ νῦν Ἦμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον,
διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἄν κορέσειεν ἀπαντας;
κέρδεα τοι θυτοῖς ὀπασαν ἀθάνατοι,
ἀτη δ’ ἔξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὀπότε Ζεὺς
πέμψε τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Κέρδος, of course, is a substantial theme in *Antigone*; but it is one that we do not have time to explore in detail here. 23 A particular temptation of those who pursue material gain is ὑβρίς – also prominent in Solon 13 and regularly linked to Ἄτη by metaphors of growth and nutrition: honouring wealth with ὑβρίς leads to Ἄτη at Sol. 13. 11-13, and the nutritional metaphor is implicit in τίς ἄν κορέσειεν ἀπαντας with reference to the κέρδεα that lead to Ἄτη at 13. 73-5. There is not much of this in the second stasimon of the *Antigone*; but at 613-14 no great wealth (or nothing great) comes to mortals without Ἄτη. If the harvesting of the last root of the House of Oedipus (599-603) is an example of the Ἄτη that will never leave the Labdacids alone, then we may have a latent example of the metaphor of exuberant growth, of

22 See Sommerstein (2013), 2; cf. Cairns (2012), 1 n. 2, both with references. For a clear play on Ἄτη as both ‘loss’ (as opposed to profit) and ‘disaster’, see Thgn. 119 (and cf. 133, 205-6).
over-fullness, and of the crop of disaster that we find (for example) in Solon 4. 34-5 W, Aeschylus, *Persae* 821-2, and *Septem* 601.24

However that may be, in its relation to Solon 13, what the second stasimon does is to bring in the emphasis on the instability of human happiness, the ambivalence of wealth and prosperity, and the dangers of ἄτη in Solon’s poem that were implicitly present, by virtue of their very absence, in the first stasimon. The evocation of Solon in the second stasimon strengthens conclusions about the relation between the first stasimon and its sources in Solon and Aeschylus that an attentive audience will, at least provisionally, have drawn. ἄτη is, through these intertexts, an absent presence in the first stasimon, as well as the dominant presence in its own right in the second.25

There is, however, one important aspect of Solon’s *Musenelegie* that we have not yet considered: the affirmation (in lines 27-32) that Zeus’ punishment never fails, even if it falls on the transgressor’s children or grandchildren. This link with the second stasimon’s account of the generations of suffering (suffering that is caused, perhaps, by some ὑπερβασία, 605) in the House of Labdacus takes us into different territory and a different intertext, Aeschylus’ *Septem contra Thebas*.

This is a well-known intertext, so I can be brief. But the correspondences between the second stasimon of the *Antigone* and *Septem* 720-91 (which places the imminent conflict between Eteocles and Polynices in the context of the sufferings and transgressions of the House of Labdacus) are very striking.26 The following table sets out those that are most relevant to the subject of this paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second Stasimon, 582-625:</th>
<th>Aeschylus, <em>Septem</em> 720-91:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>εὐδαιμόνες οίσι κακῶν ἄγευστος αἰῶν.</td>
<td>κακῶν δ’ ὠσπερ θάλασσα κύμ’ ἀγει,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἰς γὰρ ἄν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας</td>
<td>τὸ μὲν πίπτον, ἄλλα δ’ ἀείρει</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει γενεὰς ἐπὶ πλῆθος ἔρηπον·</td>
<td>τρίχαλον, ὅ καὶ περὶ πρόμηναν πόλεως</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὡστε πονητὰς ἄλος</td>
<td>καχλάζει (758-60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἶδα δυσπνόοις όταν</td>
<td>θρῆσησιν ἔρησθος ύφαλον ἔπιδραμῇ πνοαίς,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Θρῆσησιν ἔρησθος ύφαλον ἔπιδραμῇ πνοαίς,</td>
<td>κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν (590)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 *Pace* Easterling (1978), 147. The link between ὑπερβασία and ἄτη in the second stasimon (605-15) recalls that between ὑπερβασία, ὑβρίς, and ἄτη in the preceding episode at 480-5. See Cairns (2013), xvi-xvii.

25 The relation between the first and second stasima, and between both and their intertexts, thus exemplifies what Dunn (2012) has identified as the dynamic force of Sophoclean intertextuality.

26 On the specific debt to *Septem* 720-91 (with 653ff. and 875-1004), see Else (1976), 16-24 (esp. 16-18), 28; cf. Bowra (1944), 87; Ditmars (1992), 77-9. Gagné (2013) 373 is more sceptical. The *Septem* is similarly a prominent comparator for *Antigone’s parodos* (100-54): see Else (1976), 35-40; Davidson (1983), 41, 43-8; Dunn (2012), 268-70; Rodighiero (2012), 108.
κελαίαν θίνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι στόνω βρέμουσιν ἀντιπλήγες ἀκηταί.

ἄρχαια τὰ Λαβδακίδαν οἴκων ὀρώματι πήματα φύτων ἐπὶ πήμασι πίπτοντ’, (595) οὐδ’ ἀπαλλάσσει γενεὰν γένος, ἀλλ’ εἰρεῖτε θεῶν τις, οὐδ’ ἐχει λύσιν. νῦν γὰρ ἐγχάθας ὑπὲρ’ 27 οἶς ἐτέτατο φάος ἐν Οἰδίποδος δόμοις- (600) κατ’ αὐ τὸν φοινία θεῶν τῶν νεφτέρων ἀμά κόνις, λόγου τ’ ἀνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς.

τεαν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀν- δρῶν υπερβασία κατάχχος; (605) τὰν οὐδ’ ὑπνος αἰεί ποθ’ ὁ ἓπαντογήρως† οὐτ’ ἀκάματοι θεῶν μῆνες, ἀγήρως δὲ χρόνω δυνάστας κατέχεις Ὀλυμποῦ μαρμαρόεσσαν αἴγαν. (610) τὸ τ’ ἑπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἑπαρκέσει νόμος ὅδ’ οὐδὲν’ ἑρπεὶ θνατῶν βίοτος πάμπολυς ἐκτός ἅτας.

ά γὰρ δή πολύπλαγκτος ἥλ’ (615) πίς πολλοὶς μὲν ὄνεις ἀνδρῶν, πολλοὶς δ’ ἀπάτα κουφονόν τιν ἐρωτών· εἰδότι δ’ οὐδὲν ἑρπεί, πρὸν πυρὶ θερμό πόδα τις προσαύσῃ, σοφία γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ (620) κλεινὸν ἐπος πέραντας, τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ’ ἐσθλὸν τόδ’ ἐμεν ὅτῳ φρένας θεός ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν· πράσσει δ’ ὁλίγιστον χρόνον ἐκτός ἅτας. (625)

(α) οἶς ἅματοβίβεσαν (755)
(β) ἓπει δ’ ἄν] γατὰ κόνις πίς μελαμπαγές αἷμα φοίνον (735-6)
(γ) παναληθῇ κακόμαντιν πατρός εὐκεταῖον Ἐρινύν τελέσαι τὰς περιθύμους κατάρας Οἰδιπόδα βλαψήρων (722-5)
(δ) νόν δὲ τρέω μη τελέσῃ καμψίπους Ἐρινύς. (790-1)
(ε) παράνοια συνάγε νυμφίους φρενώλης (756-7)

παλαιγενή γάρ λέγω παρβασίαν ωκύτοιν (742-3)

πρόπτρυμα δ’ ἐκβολάν φέρει ἀνδρῶν ἀλφοτάν ὅλβος ἄγαν παχυνθείς (769-71)

27 For MSS’ ὑπέρ, followed by asyndeton, rather than readings/emendations which introduce a relative (ὁπέρ, K/Hermann; ὑπέρ οἶς ἐτέτατο, Hermann), see Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990), 129; Ferrari (2010), 52-3. To regularize the responsion with 588-9 Brunck (followed by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson) emends MSS’ ἐτέτατο to ἐτέτατο. Ferrari (2010), 53 believes that ἐτέτατο can stand.
A number of these correspondences deserve to be taken further. But for immediate purposes, the point is simply that the obvious links with this crucial ode in Septem help to reinforce two prominent aspects of the second stasimon of Antigone: (a) the notion of inherited suffering that is already there in the link with Solon and (b) the emphasis on irrational forces – Erinyes, on the one hand, but also various forms of mental impairment, on the other. ἄτη does not occur as such in Septem 720-91, but it is prominent in the immediate context (601, 687) as a significant aspect of what it means for Eteocles to face his brother in battle. The term occurs a further three times in play (315, 956, 1001); παράνοια in 756 is another word for ἄτη in its subjective sense; and βλαψίφρων, of Oedipus at 725, is a clear synonym of ἀεσίφρων/ἀασίφρων.29

This trawl through Solon and Aeschylus does not exhaust the potential for identifying significant parallels with the first and second stasima of Antigone. A number of general similarities with particular passages of archaic poetry and Aeschylean tragedy could also be mentioned. But in such cases we are dealing with parallels; what we have in the cases discussed above is something more specific – deliberate evocation of specific elements of well-known passages in a way that deepens an audience’s understanding of aspects of Antigone that are absolutely fundamental to a proper understanding of the play’s meaning.

3. ἄτη in Antigone

The basic point that arises from this discussion is that the cornerstones of the inherited tradition of archaic Greek ethics – and especially the notion of ἄτη – are not confined to the second stasimon, but play a major role in Antigone as a whole. This is not just a matter of adding, in a few localized passages, a superficial colouring of traditional moral and religious thought; it is rather (as the interplay

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28 In particular, perhaps, the way that reading Antigone in its relation to Septem confirms MSS’ κόνις against Jortyn’s κοπίς in 602; also the implications of the references to ὑπερβασία at Ant. 605 and παρβασία at Septem 744. I hope to pursue the former discussion, at least, elsewhere. Meanwhile, for a good recent defence of κόνις, see Ferrari (2010), 54-7.
29 βλαψίφρων glosses ἀεσίφρων at Apoll. Soph. Lex. Hom. 2. 7 Bekker, Hsch. α 28, Et. Mag. 20. 49-50, Σ bT on Il. 23. 603, and qualifies ἄτη at Triphiod. 411. Other βλαβή-words, such as φρενοβλάβεια, are regular glosses for ἄτη. See Dawe (1968), 101, 105; Stallmach (1968), 44; Cairns (2012) 42 n. 100; cf. above, n. 21, and below, n. 47, on ἄτη and βλάβη.
30 Many more examples in Cairns (2013).
32 Pace the implication of (e.g.) Griffith (1999), 229, on 613-14.
between the first and second stasima already shows) an integral and important aspect of the play’s design. I have argued this position at length in my introductory chapter to *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought*, and so shall not rehearse it in detail here. At the same time, however, the main points of that argument are also the main implications of the evidence as discussed in this paper, and so an element of summary is required.

The second stasimon is explicitly prompted by Antigone’s own situation and especially by the transgression that she admitted and Creon condemned in the second episode. But there is also plenty of support throughout the play for the analysis that the Chorus offer in that ode of her situation and her conduct. The word ἄτη is used of her and her family; her heredity is emphasized, and she is accused of folly, insanity, and transgression throughout the play. There is material here for an Aeschylean/Solonian picture of a family doomed by the actions of its previous generations, for the notion of the Labdacids as a house that must be extirpated if the state is to regain its health. Given the prevalence of disruption, madness, and irrationality – qualities that are predicated of a number of characters and permeate

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33 See 4 (corrupt, but almost certainly referring to the history of ἄτη in Antigone’s family), 17 (the family’s ills referred to as ἀτάσθαλι), 485 (Antigone will not defy Creon ‘without ἄτη’), 863-5 (the ἄται of her parents’ incest).

34 See the Chorus at 379-80 (‘unhappy child of an unhappy father’), 471-2 (she has inherited her father’s ‘raw’, ὀμόν, temperament), 856 (her ordeal is payment for some debt incurred by her father). Cf. Antigone herself at 857-67 (her father’s travails, those of the entire Labdacid clan, the ἄται of her parents’ incest, and the wretchedness of her own state: she goes to join them ‘accursed and unwed’, ἀφαιός ἁγαμός), 892-6 (her troubles are the latest instalment of her family’s). The use of the adjective ἀφαιός at 867 is the only positive indication in the play that the sufferings of Antigone may have an origin in an actual curse, but such is the play’s evocation of Aeschylus’ Theban trilogy that this may be enough to trigger the thought in an audience’s mind. For different views on this, see Lloyd-Jones (1971), 115-16; West (1999), 40-1; Sewell-Rutter (2007), 71, 114-20.

35 See Ismene at 67-8 (Antigone’s proposal to defy Creon’s edict exhibits no νοῦς), 90 (she is ‘in love with the impossible’; cf. ‘hunting the impossible’, 92), 99 (she is ἀνους); cf. Antigone herself at 74 (πανουργία), 95 (δυσβολία). The reference to ἔρως in 90 relates both to the hope that, for many, represents the ‘deception of light-minded passions’ (ἔρωτες) in the second stasimon at 617 and to the Chorus-leader’s statement at 220 that no one is so foolish as to be in love (ἔρως) with death (a generalization that is ironically contradicted by Antigone’s behaviour). See also the Chorus on her defiance of ‘the king’s laws’ (382), her ἀρφοσύνη (383), her ‘advance to the limit of daring’ (853), her ‘fall before the pedestal of Justice’ (854-5), her self-willed παραβασία (873-4); Creon on her ἄνοια (561-2), her ὑπερβασία (663-5). But note esp. Creon’s charge of ὑπερβασία, 449, and Antigone’s defiance (450-70); this is a token of her inherited savagery, according to the Chorus at 471-2, and of ὑδρίς, according to Creon (480-5). Cf. therefore the explicit reference to ὑπερβασία in the second stasimon at 605 and the implicit evocation of the ‘archaic chain’ of κόρος, ὑβρις, and ἄτη at 613-14.

36 For the development of this line of argument see Else (1976).
the play – it is possible to regard Antigone as in some way driven by forces beyond her control, perhaps as a victim of *ἀτη*. But this is also questionable; and it is a question that is raised by Antigone herself. This is 925-8, almost her last words in the play:

\[ \text{ἀλλ᾿ ἐι μὲν οὖν τάδ᾿ ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς καλά,} \]
\[ \text{παθόντες ἂν ἔχων γνώμην ἠμαρτηκότες,} \]
\[ \text{εἰ δ᾿ οἶδ᾿ ἀμαρτάνουσι, μὴ πλεῖον κακὰ} \]
\[ \text{πάθοιεν ἢ καὶ δρῶσιν ἐκδίκως ἔμε.} \]

Antigone certainly suffers; but is this the kind of suffering that arises from error? Is it *ἀτη*? In lines 925-8 the results are not yet apparent; but Antigone, at least, is confident that she is not the one who has erred. Her view that the error is Creon’s, and not hers, will be vindicated, she says, if what happens to him resembles what happens to her. And so it turns out, in ways with which we are all familiar – Creon becomes a ‘living corpse’ (a liminal figure between two worlds, like Polynices and Antigone); he loses a son, as he came between Antigone and her brother; and he loses his wife, as he came between Antigone and Haemon. In some ways, though Creon is a descendant of the Spartoi, he becomes an honorary Labdacide: like Laius, he is confronted by a son who tries to kill him; like Oedipus, his actions cause his wife’s suicide.

All of this, quite explicitly, is Creon’s *ἀτη*. Solon’s strictures regarding our inability to foresee the consequences of our actions are implicit in the substantial hostage to fortune that Creon offers in 175-7:

37 Of Antigone: see esp. 603 (cf. also above, n. 35); of Creon: 765 (cf. 755); of Haemon: 633 (hypothetically; cf. 648-9), 754; cf. 790 (of the one who ‘has Eros’, i.e. Haemon; but NB ἐφᾶν used of Antigone at 90 and, indirectly, at 220), 1231; of Eurydice: 1254. Cf. Creon of Ismene, 491-2. Cf. the frenzy (*οἰστροξ*) of the birds whose unintelligible cries Tiresias reports at 1001-2, and various references to the destructive power of forces such as ὀργή and θυμός (718, 766-7, 875, 955-6); also the ambivalent presence of Dionysus in the parodos, fourth stasimon, and fifth stasimon (134-7, of the madness of Capaneus; 153-4, Dionysus as leader of celebratory choruses; 955-65, Lycurgus’ mad attempt to stop the god’s mad women; 1116-52, invoked to come, with his frenzied female followers, and heal the city).

38 See 1165-7, 1288, 1320-5; cf. Antigone on her own plight at 559-60 and 850-2, Tiresias on the anomalous liminality of Antigone and Polynices at 1068-71 (a predicament which, he predicts, awaits Creon himself, 1076).

39 See Loraux (1986), 183-4; Goldhill (1986), 104-5; Zeitlin (1990), 150-1; Segal (1995), 131; Liapis (2013), 103-7. For Else (1976), 81-96, Sophocles develops this pattern by basing his characterization of Creon in *Antigone* on that of Oedipus in Aeschylus’ (lost) *Oedipus*, a phenomenon that explains the similarities in characterization between the Creon of *Antigone* and the Oedipus of *Oedipus Tyrannus*, similarly based on the Aeschylean model. But this is pure speculation.
Creon’s γνώμη has an impeccable ‘archaic’ pedigree, but he is also using words and ideas that are then probed in both the first stasimon and the second. Almost immediately afterwards (184-6), Creon expresses his determination to speak up should he see ἄτη advancing on his fellow citizens:

εὖ γὰρ, ἵστῳ Ζεὺς ὁ πάνθ’ ὤρων ἀεὶ,
osτ’ ἀν σιωπήσαμι τὴν ἄτην ὀρὼν

στείχουσαν ἀστοῖς ἀντὶ τῆς σωτηρίας …

But ἄτη (disaster), when one is in the grip of ἄτη (delusion or error), is not the kind of thing that one sees coming. Zeus sees everything; Zeus knows (184); Creon does not. In the end, as Tiresias makes clear (1015), Creon himself is the one who threatens the city’s safety. As the Chorus point out, and as he himself accepts, this is his ἄτη (1257-69):

Χο. καὶ μὴν δδ’ ἄναξ, αὐτὸς ἐφήκει

Κρ. ἵω

Φρενῶν δυσφρόνων ἀμαρτήματα

στερεὰ θανατόεντ’,

ω κτανόντας τε καὶ

θανόντας βλέποντες ἐμφυλίους.

ὁμοί ἐμών ἄνολβα βουλευμάτων.

ἰὼ παῖ, νέος νέω ἔνυν μόρῳ,

αἰαὶ αἰαὶ,

ἐθανεῖς, ἀπελύθης,

ἐμαῖς οὔδὲ σαισί δυσβουλίαις.

40 Cf. Arist. EN 5. 1, 1130a1-2: καὶ διὰ τούτο εὗ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὃτι ἀρχῇ ἄνδρα δείει, with Bowra (1944), 69; Budelmann and Easterling (2010), 299.
In his opening speech, Creon stressed the importance of good leadership and aspired to manifest what is regarded as one of the most important qualities of a good political leader, the ability to foresee how one’s current situation is likely to develop.41 The first and second stasima together re-emphasize the uncertainty of the future and the limits of human beings’ ability to control their own destinies. Good intentions can have bad results. In Creon’s case, Tiresias is, initially, prepared to take a sympathetic view of his error (1023-4):

ταῦτ’ οὖν, τέκνον, φρόνησον. ἀνθρωποίς γὰρ
tois pάσι koinόν εστί τούξαμαρτάνειν.42

But the fact that it is Tiresias who provides authoritative confirmation of Creon’s lapse into error takes us back to the first stasimon, where the issue of man’s resourcefulness with regard to the future was first explicitly raised (360-1) and where the intertextual link with Solon’s *Musenelegie* implied a distinction between the limited foresight of ordinary human beings and the specialist craft of the seer.43

There is more to the ἄτη-sequence in Creon’s case than this; and its implications are considerable. In *Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought* I try to explore in detail the application of the ideas of the second stasimon to Creon and the links between ἄτη (and its partial synonym, ἀμαρτία) and the pervasive theme of wisdom and folly, as well as its links (especially via its antonym, κέρδος) with the themes of material versus other forms of prosperity, and the contribution that this dialectic makes to the play’s reflexions on the nature of εὐδαιμονία. In this context, however, I want to end with just one final point – one more example of how the centrality of ἄτη to the understanding of the play is underpinned by intertextuality.

Tiresias exits at 1090, but his warnings and prophecies alarm the Coryphaeus (1091-4), and Creon shares his concern (1095-7):

ἐγνώκα καῦτος καὶ ταφάσσομαι φρένας·

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41 Already at e.g. *Il.* 1. 343-4, but see esp. Themistocles at Thuc. 1. 138. 3 and Pericles at 2. 62-3, 2. 65. 6 (also at Plut. *Comp. Per. Fab.* 2. 3); cf. Phormio at Thuc. 2. 89. 2; Nicias at 6. 13. 1. See also D. 18. 246. For Plato’s Socrates, the ability to foresee and forestall future trouble is the mark of a good doctor, lawgiver, and beekeeper (*Resp.* 564c).

42 For the thought, cf. Thgn. 327-8; E. *Hipp.* 615, 916, 1434, *Supp.* 250-1; *Rhet. Alex.* 36. 35; and the further passages cited by Pearson (1917) on S. fr. 665 Radt. As Pearson observes, the thought is commonplace, but by no means trivial.

43 Cf. Sano, this volume, 36-7, 40.
Creon must act quickly, or it will be too late: ‘the gods’ swift-footed Harms cut off the wrongheaded’ (1103-4):

τό τ’ εἰκαθείν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀντιστάντα δὲ Ἄτης πατάξαι θυμόν ἐν λίνῳ πάρα.\(^44\)

As a parallel for the swift-footed Blabai one might think of the ‘swift-footed Erinys’ of Septem 791; but their true progenitor is the personified Ate who features in the Iliad’s allegory of the Litai (9. 496-514):\(^45\)

"ἄλλ’ Ἀχιλεὺς δάμασων θυμόν μέγαν· οὔδέ τι σε χρή νηλεῖσ ώς ἴτορ ἔχειν· στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοὶ, τῶν περ καὶ μειῶν ἄρετῆ τιμή τε βίη τε. καὶ μὲν τοὺς θέεσσι καὶ εὔχωλης ἀγανήσι λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶς· ἀνθρωποὶ λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κὲν τὶς υπερβή καὶ ἀμάρτη. καὶ γὰρ τε λιταί εἰσι Δίως κούραι μεγάλοιο χωλαῖ τε ὄνοσαὶ τε παραβλῶπες τ’ ὀφθαλμῷ, αἰ δὲ τε καὶ μετόπισθ’ ἀτης ἀλέγουσι κιούσαι. ή δ’ ἀτη σθεναρῆ τε καὶ ἀρτίσος, οὐνεκα πάσας πολλὰ πολλὰν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δὲ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ’ αἴαν 500

505

\(^{44}\) Lloyd-Jones’s and Wilson’s text, with Lloyd-Jones’s own Ἄτης ... λίνῳ for MSS’ Ἄτη ... δεινῷ in 1097 (Lloyd-Jones 1964). Lloyd-Jones (1964), 129 translates ‘by offering resistance my anger may strike against the net of Ate’, but taking ἀντιστάντα as referring to Creon, the subject, and θυμόν as object of πατάξαι (‘accusative of the thing set in motion’, LSJ s.v. πατάσσω, II) gives the verb its regular sense. I translate: ‘To give in is terrible, but to stand firm may be to strike one’s θυμός on Ate’s net.’ Professor Tetsuo Nakatsukasa points out to me that πατάξαι θυμόν (with θυμός as subject) would recall the Homeric θυμός ἐν στήθεσι πάτασσεν (Il. 7. 216); I agree that this locution may have influenced Sophocles’ choice of words here, but doubt (unless the text is more corrupt than suspected) that the sense ‘my θυμός beats’ can made to play a role in this context. As for the paradoxis, repetition of the adjective δεινός in both halves of the antithesis is unlikely without a modifier in the second half, such as καὶ, and ‘it is a terrible prospect to strike one’s θυμός with Ἀτή’ is anyhow weak. The notion of Ate’s net, on the other hand, has good Aeschylean pedigree (Pers. 97-9, Ag. 355-61; cf. Pr. 1071-9), on which cf. Sommerstein (2013), 6-7, 15 n. 36. For an alternative emendation, see Dawe (1968), 113-14 n. 40.

\(^{45}\) Remarkably, the clear link between the two passages is (as far as I have seen) recognized only by Dawe (1968), 113-14 n. 49.
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Not only does this passage demonstrate the relation between ἄτη and ἁμαρτία – an important point if we want to understand the importance of ἄτη in Antigone46 – it is also one of many passages that illustrate ἄτη’s core or focal meaning, ‘harm’. ἄτη and βλάβη are synonyms.47 In Iliad 9, ἄτη harms people (βλάπτουσ’, 9. 507), and when the ἄτη of the original offence gives way to the ἄτη of the victim who refuses reparation, that person is harmed (βλαφθείς, 512). The personified Ate is ‘strong and sound of foot’ (9. 505), and so can outrun the Litai (504-7); just so, the Coryphaeus’ Blabai are swift-footed and outrun the imprudent (1103-4).

ἄτη plays a central role in the plot and thematic structure of the Iliad: Phoenix’s allegory in Book 9 is the fulcrum of a balance between the ἄτη of Agamemnon, which causes the quarrel and its disastrous results, and that of Achilles, which lies in his rejection of the Embassy and results in the death of Patroclus.48 In the Antigone, the evocation of this passage comes at the point at which we begin to discern the balance between the sufferings that await Creon and those that he has imposed upon Antigone. This represents the fulfilment of Antigone’s wish that Creon’s ἁμαρτία should involve him in suffering as painful as her own, and of Tiresias’ prophecy that Creon will be caught in the same evils as he inflicted upon Antigone and Polynices (1074-6):

τούτων σε λοβητήρες ύστεροφθόροι
λοχώσιν Άιδου καὶ θεῶν Ἐρινύες,
ἐν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσι τοίσδε ληφθήναι κακοῖς.

46 See e.g. 925-8, fulfilled in 1259-60. See further Dawe (1968); cf. Bremer (1969), 99-134.
47 See Dawe (1968), esp. 104-5; Stallmach (1968), esp. 1, 12-14, 24, 29, 31, 46-7, 59, 63, 80-4, 88, 94-5, 102; Padel (1995), 167-92; Cairns (2012), with further references, ancient and modern, in 1 n. 1; Sommerstein (2013).
48 For a full defence of this position, see Cairns (2012), 26-33.
These evils come upon him after he has rejected Tiresias’ advice to heal his errors by changing his mind (1023-32):

ταῦτ’ οὖν, τέκνον, φρόνησον. ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ τοῖς πάσι κοινόν ἐστι τοὐδ’αμαρτάνειν· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀμάρτη, κείνος οὐκέτ’ ἔστ’ ἀνήρ ἅπευλος οὔδ’ ἄνοιβος, ὅστις ἐς κακὸν πεσὼν ἀκείται μηδ’ ἀκίνητος πέλει. αὐθαδία τοι σκαίστη’ ὀφλισκάνει. ἀλλ’ εἶκε τῷ θανόντι, μηδ’ ὀλωλότα κέντει τὶς ἀλκῇ τὸν θανόντ’ ἐπικτάνειν; εὖ σοι φρονήσας εὖ λέγω· τὸ μανθάνειν δ’ ἥδιστον εὖ λέγοντος, εἰ κέρδος λέγοι.

1025 1030

Tiresias plays the role played by Phoenix in the Iliad, and ὅστις ἐς κακὸν πεσὼν ἀκείται μηδ’ ἀκίνητος πέλει (1026-7) is another allusion to the allegory of the Litai, who ‘come after to heal the damage’ (ἀἱ δὲ ἐξακέονται ὀπίσω, 507). There is also a direct relation to the first stasimon, where, as in Solon’s Musenelegie, medicine is the final element in the Priamel of human skills (363-4).

49 Creon has brought illness, not cure; the skills he sought to apply have, in the words of the first stasimon, brought him to evil rather than to good (367); he begins the play ‘high in the city’ (ὑψίπολις, 370), but by failing to honour the laws of the land (or the laws of the earth) and the justice of the gods (368-9) he brings disaster on the city – he is ἅπολις (370).

The Blabai that the Coryphaeus fears will overtake Creon if he does not remedy his folly in time (1103-4) are prefigured in the Erinyes who, according to Tiresias, lie in wait for him (1074-6, above). The words ἀπετήρες and ύστεροφθόροι emphasize the harm that the Erinyes cause. ύστεροφθόροι occurs only here in classical Greek. But Sophocles’ phrase is quoted by Eustathius on Il. 9. 506-7, where he notes that, in so far as they are ύστεροφθόροι, the Erinyes of the Antigone resemble the Litai in Phoenix’s allegory, who see to it that Ate attends anyone who rejects them:

49 Cf. Goheen (1951), 41-4; Segal (1964) 64 = (1986) 160. NB too the juxtaposition of medicine (57-62) and seercraft (53-6) in Solon’s Priamel; the intervention of the seer, Tiresias, with his remedy for Creon’s error, further confirms seercraft’s absent presence in the first stasimon as a function of its intertextuality with the Musenelegie.
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ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ὃτι Ἐρινύς μὲν “λωβητήρες υ̣στεροφθόροι” παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ, Λιταὶ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκέντοιται ὑπόκω, ἤγουν υ̣στερον, πλὴν καὶ αὐταί, εἰ μὴ ἀκουσθῶσιν, υ̣στεροφθόροι γίνονται τῇ υ̣στερον ἐπελεύσει τῆς Ἀτης, ὡς ὑ̣ηθήσεται, εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὑ̣πακούσαντας.⁵⁰

Eustathius has seen the link between this passage of the Antigone and Iliad 9. That link is further substantiated by the way that Sophocles’ υ̣στεροφθόρος so clearly recalls Aeschylus’ υ̣στερόποιος, of Erinys at Ag. 58-9, but of Ate at Cho. 382-3.⁵¹ Ate and Erinys are associated;⁵² and so in Antigone both 1074-6 (with Erinyes) and 1103-4 (with Blabai) recall the Second Stasimon’s reference to λόγου τ’ ἁνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς as the psychological cause behind the disaster that is extinguishing the surviving light of the House of Labdacus (599-603).

There, it was Antigone’s actions that were attributed to an Erinys. But whether or not this is accurate, Antigone’s actions do certainly have an effect on Creon, and the parallelism between her fate and his that she wished for in 927-8 is a real one. Creon has been destroyed by an Erinys, by Blabai, and by his own ἄτη – he erred his own ἄτη, no one else’s (1259-60, quoted above). But a very substantial role in his downfall was played by Antigone, one of the two ἄτα that Creon nurtured in his house (532-3).⁵³ If Antigone, partly as a result of her Labdacid heritage, is driven by λόγου τ’ ἁνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς, the same madness and the same demons come in the end to engulf Creon.

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⁵⁰ Eust. 2. 777-8 Van der Valk on Il. 9. 506-7; cf. 2. 760 on Il. 9. 454.
⁵¹ Elsewhere only at Nonnus, Dion. 9. 135.
⁵³ οὐδ’ ἐμάνθανον τ’ ἐκφέρον δ’ ἄτα καταναλιστάσεις θρόνιον. The conceit of the sisters as δ’ ἄτα is repeated, in a different context, at OC 531.
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