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An Uncivil Partnership: Egypt’s *Jama’a Islamiyya* and the State after the Jihad

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**Abstract**

This paper will examine the JI as an example of a group that has, in different ways, tried to shape patterns of civility and position itself as an interface between state and society in Egypt. It charts and offers an explanation for the JI’s intellectual and programmatic transition from aspiring to create a totally new polity based on a *salafi* Islamic form of civility, to an accommodation with the state and apparently more tolerant posture vis-à-vis society. The paper analyses the JI’s shifting interpretation of *hisba* and argues that although the JI appears more reconciled to a more cooperative stance, the group continues to promote an unrealistic vision of state-society relations in Egypt. Whereas before the revisions the JI proceeded from an idealised conception of the Islamic state and the potential for its realisation in Egypt, the JI’s new ideas suggest an equally naive conception of the existing state and its ability to regulate, and police, society. The political and intellectual trajectory of the JI tells us much about the role of societal groups in sustaining authoritarianism in Egypt and suggests that any compact between the JI and a regime like that of Mubarak is likely to remain ‘uncivil.’

The ideological ‘revisions’ of the Egyptian Islamic Group, the *Jama’a Islamiyya* (JI), have been lauded as a major success story of deradicalisation in the post-9/11 era. Less attention has been paid, however, to the significance of the changes for the JI as a domestic actor in Egypt, or on their relationship to the Egyptian political context. This paper will examine the JI as an example of a group that has, in different ways, tried to shape patterns of civility and position itself as an interface between state and society in Egypt. It charts and offers an explanation for the JI’s intellectual and programmatic transition from aspiring to create a totally new polity based on a *salafi* Islamic form of civility, to an accommodation with the state and apparently more tolerant posture vis-à-vis society.

Prior to the revisions process, the JI’s ideological attitude to the regime was in line with that propounded by Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s. It was, because it ruled according to man-made laws, outside of Islam: it was part of the sphere of ignorance (*jahiliyya*, adj. *jahili*) or unbelief (*kufr*) and would have to be forcefully overthrown in order for the Islamic movement to realise its goals. Following the permanent ceasefire unilaterally declared in 1997, and then the ideological revisions process that began in 2002, the JI deemed the state to be authentically Muslim even if not everything it did could be attributed directly to the Qur’an or the example of the Prophet (*Sunna*). The new JI strongly affirmed the regime’s authority and legitimate monopoly of violence. In return for this recognition, the group expected the state to allow the ‘Islamic movement’ (*al-haraka al-islamiyya*) to carry out its distinctive purpose in society, namely education, moral guidance and proselytising (*da’wa*).

The ceasefire and revisions process most prominently signalled the end of the JI’s *jihad* against the Egyptian regime. But on an ideological or theoretical level, the shift was also reflected in the reinterpretation of *hisba*, or *al-amr bi-al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkir* (Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil), which was arguably a far larger part of the group’s programmatic armoury. The most important element in the change concerned the individuals authorised to discharge this function (the
During the period of confrontation with the regime, in light of the fact that all state agencies, including al-Azhar, were seen to be tainted by their belonging to the *jahili* state structure, the JI deemed the state unfit for this purpose and called for Muslims, particularly those at the vanguard of the Islamic movement, to assume the role of *muhtasibun* themselves. Following the revisions, the JI spelt out the precise nature of the *muhtasibun* more clearly and limited the extent to which private individuals could use force or the threat of force to maintain or create moral order. Its focus shifted from moral issues *per se*, such as drinking or selling alcohol, unveiling, or playing music, to crimes like theft, assault or drug use. Apparently lawless thugs (*baltajiyya*) frequently topped the list of societal ills. Under the new ideology, although the ordinary citizen—JI member or otherwise—could intervene to prevent a crime (*jarima*) from taking place, ultimate responsibility for policing behaviour rested with the state and the ‘appointed *muhtasib,*’ and the regulation of moral behaviour depended not only on Islamic law (*shari’a*), but also on the established mores and customs of society, which were acknowledged to vary from place to place.

This paper argues that although the JI’s intellectual orientation has shifted dramatically, the direction of this shift from idealism to realism is more apparent than real. Whereas before the revisions the JI proceeded from an idealised conception of the Islamic state and the potential for its realisation in Egypt, the JI’s new ideas suggest an equally naive and unrealistic conception of the existing state and its ability to regulate, and police, society. In seeking to form the backbone of a new Islamic civil society, not just promoting good behaviour but also helping the state to police it, the JI has overlooked the ‘incivility’ of the postcolonial Egyptian state. If we define civility in Weberian terms as embodying codes of behaviour and interaction judged acceptable by citizens, then the ability of the state—as the monopoliser of the legitimate use of violence—to safeguard and promote civility in accordance with the law depends on whether the state and its organs themselves are perceived to be not only legitimate, but also civil. As many scholars, and almost all Egyptians, have long recognised, the agents of the Egyptian regime—and the police in particular—have been associated more with corruption, criminality, and capricious coercion than with principles of civic virtue.

The paper will first briefly discuss the emergence of the JI as a challenge to state authority. Next it will review the pre-revisions ideology of the JI as it pertained to its notion of civility, including the roles of state and societal actors in ordering and transforming a common social and political public space in Egypt. Next, the paper suggests some of the main reasons why this vision of the civilising process in Egypt failed, before examining the group’s new positions on these topics as well as on its own aspirational role as a link between the Islamic movement and the state. The paper concludes with some reflections on what the JI case reveals about the nature of Egyptian politics in general.

**The Jama’a Islamiyya’s Jihad**

Although best known for its role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the bloody conflict in Egypt in the 1990s, the *Jama’a Islamiyya*’s current political stance of non-
confrontation with the regime is not unprecedented. The JI emerged in the 1970s as a direct result of the political space opened up by President Anwar Sadat, who nurtured Islamist activists on university campuses as a counterweight to the then dominant, and hostile, left. In addition to providing moral and material support, Sadat granted students of a religious inclination unprecedented freedom of action.

The majority of young Islamists took advantage of this new tolerant attitude on the part of the regime to stake out a political space within the system and adopted a moderate, gradualist orientation in line with the mainstream of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In 1978, many student activists (such as Isam al-Iryan and Abd al-Mun‘im Abu al-Futuh) merged with the Muslim Brotherhood, breathing fresh life into an organisation whose ranks had been depleted during the Nasser years. Those who did not, including the majority in the universities of the Sa‘id (Upper Egypt), remained separate under the name ‘Islamic Group’ (Jama‘a Islamiyya). But JI violence in the 1970s was not initially directed against the state. It was aimed at leftist students, those behaving in ways deemed to be un-Islamic, and Copts. The young activists based in the Sa‘id were vehemently opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s gradualist and peaceful approach toward social change as a prerequisite for an Islamic state. Many, though not all, JI activists turned to violence to enforce correct behaviour. The fact that Islamists in the south were more interested in the use of force (al-taghyeer bi-al-yad) than those of the north has been attributed to the sudden introduction of deviant behaviours, as a result of the changes wrought by Sadat’s economic liberalisation policy (infitah), into the ‘unitary village culture based on religion and heritage, as opposed to the diversity of urban culture.’ Other scholars, as will be discussed below, have also stressed the specific Southern context of the JI’s violent agenda. Also significant in radicalising the group was the fact that the JI, in its bid to regain a presence in the north without mending fences with the derided Muslim Brotherhood, instead united with the more extremist Jihad group led by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, whose main raisin d’être was to plot the overthrow of the regime.

There were broader underlying reasons, related to the regional political economy, for Islamist students in the cities of the north to choose a compact with the regime over confrontation at that time. Infitah, fostered the creation of a more politically and economically empowered ‘devout bourgeoisie’ whose chief outlet for political expression was the Muslim Brotherhood. Many had made substantial fortunes in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states and now played a role in promoting economic links between Egypt and the Gulf. The Brotherhood increasingly came to represent a structure for urban social and professional advancement parallel to, and by no means always in conflict with, that of the state. For those willing and able to access Brotherhood structures there was little incentive to threaten this modus vivendi through overt confrontation with the regime.

Assassinating Sadat was not a goal from the beginning for the JI and there was considerable difference of opinion within the JI on this plan of action. For those ultimately in favour, environmental influences, particularly the Iranian Revolution,
certainly created a general atmosphere of possibility for Islamists as a whole. But what was probably more important was the growing feeling of power, omnipotence and concomitant recklessness that young activists in general felt thanks to the opportunities that had been afforded them by Sadat, as well as the realistic fear—sharpened by the security forces’ increasing exasperation with the JI’s violent activities in the Sa’id—of being caught up in Sadat’s ill-conceived purge of political opposition in September 1981. If there was ever going to be a chance to take the state and accelerate the process of change, the young Islamist activists felt, it would have to be taken sooner rather than later.

Later optimistically recalled as an Islamic revolution (thawra Islamiyya), the JI intended Sadat’s murder to spark a general uprising in Asyut, during which the Islamists would take control of the governorate and, ultimately, the country. The group’s focus on da’wa in the 1980s did not relate to any pre-existing belief in the desirability of a strategy of peaceful change. It reflected an acceptance of the dismal failure of the Sadat assassination to precipitate revolution, particularly in Upper Egypt (the Sa’id). Da’wa represented a means of raising public consciousness in the south such that future revolutionary gambits would be successful. Hisba, likewise, could be construed as a robust extension of da’wa aimed at accelerating the inculcation of Islamic civility according to the JI’s vision, in contrast to the gradual and patient approach of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Several hundred JI militants were released under an amnesty in 1984 and the Mubarak regime restored a kind of modus vivendi with the group. According to this understanding, the regime would tolerate the group’s activities on the proviso that the latter agreed to conduct itself peacefully and only in the south. The JI was active throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s in the Sa’id, and later in poor suburbs of Cairo like Imbaba, areas where the influence, and to a large degree presence, of the state were minimal. The JI’s activities centred on da’wa and hisba but, as relations with official law enforcement deteriorated once again in the 1990s, anti-regime violence resumed under the banner of jihad.

Civility in the Jama’a Islamiyya’s writings
The JI’s early writings reflect a clear-cut theory of political and social change. The Charter of Islamic Action, in circulation from early 1984, employed a metaphor of structural engineering to depict the goals and strategies of the Islamic movement. The construction of a new Islamic polity would require demolition and a fresh start and not simply the improvement or refurbishment of the existing structure. The new polity would have to be built on firm earth, upon solid supports (arkan) and with a sound roof, bricks, cement and door. The foundations of this metaphorical building would rest on adherence to God alone (al-i’tisam bi-habl Allah wahdahu), which would require the transcendence of selfish or narrower group interests, including nation, land, tribe or household and facilitate jihad in the path of God.

Regardless of the de facto condition of non-confrontation with the regime, Islamising the state remained the JI’s central theoretical goal, as it was for the Muslim Brotherhood. But while the Brotherhood made a strategic decision to establish a
political presence through contesting elections in the 1980s, the JI maintained a principled boycott of all official political activity. The regime, in its estimation, was not Muslim and could not be influenced in a positive way. Since the rulers did not implement *shari’a*, but governed instead by laws imported from abroad, it was incumbent to fight them via *jihad*. Confrontation was, as in the title of one of the JI’s more famous pamphlets, inevitable. The Jihad Organisation theorist Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, who was executed for his role in Sadat’s murder, had condemned any idea of forming an Islamic political party as it would validate and buttress the infidel state. And the JI similarly argued that working within the *jahili* system would only strengthen it. Islam and unbelief could not coexist: ‘there is no alternative but to fight to get rid of every sultan that worships another, every ruler that stops in the face of the Islamic call, every ruler that refuses to allow Islam to flourish…’

There was not, for the group’s spiritual guide Umar Abd al-Rahman, any difference between rulers that abstained from implementing part of the *shari’a* and those that neglected it all: all were unbelievers (*kuffar*). Conceiving all around to be *jahiliyya*, the JI interpreted the struggle for Islam as a tightly structured, logical and ‘deductive’ process. The entire political sphere would have to be dissolved and reconstituted, with the existing hierarchies that supported the apostate ruler circumvented if not demolished. The idea was, in emulation of the first Islamic community in Medina, to build a parallel structure of allegiance and political agency, the ‘*jama’a*’, which would embody a new contract of clientage (*mawala*) among believers. In the 1980s, though, *jihad* remained largely a theoretical issue, with *da’wa* and *hisba* to prepare the ground for the coming revolution forming the backbone of the JI’s political programme.

*Hisba*

Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil represented for the JI, as it did for the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia with whom the JI had great affinity, a central duty in Islam. The body of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) on which the JI drew specifies the types of behaviour that are correct and those that were unacceptable within the Islamic community, as well as the roles of the state and individual Muslims in maintaining moral and legal order. *Hisba* represents, in other words, a blueprint for the creation and preservation of an Islamic civility.

The crucial difference between the prescriptions grouped under the rubric of *hisba* and those under *jihad* was that the former aimed to preserve and advance the moral integrity of the existing Muslim community, whereas the latter regulated the community’s behaviour vis-à-vis non-Muslims. The state of *jahiliyya* that supposedly prevailed in Egypt, as well as the large Coptic presence, however, could easily blur the distinction. Thus although *hisba* was defined as being aimed at Muslims, the JI remained resigned to the fact that the individual implementing *hisba*, the *muhtasib*, confronted an uphill struggle given the parlous state into which Muslim society has descended. The Charter asserts that the *muhtasib* should not fear being shunned or rejected by seeking to correct aberrant behaviours. It reminds the potential wavering that the duty of *hisba* remains even if there is little chance that the particular *ihitsab*
(the act or implementation of hisba) will succeed. The jama’a, after all, is supposed to provide a new sense of belonging and security. Thus the charter reassures the Islamic activist that:

You must know that you will be a stranger among the people because most of the people have lost their way and that those in the right will feel aliened from those in the wrong—the alienation of light in the depths of darkness.

Hisba is a resolutely social and public imperative, aimed at safeguarding the collectivity rather than aiding the salvation of the individual Muslim. It is not concerned with private faith or behaviour, but rather targets sins that are open (zahir) and thus 'harm the general public' (adarrat bi-al-’ama). The munkir (evil or wrong) should be obvious, and nobody should engage in spying or surveillance in order to expose it. The charter notes that a munkir is ‘broader than sin’: if a young boy drinks alcohol, for example, he has not committed a sin because he is a minor. But if the boy drinks in public, he offends society and has committed a munkir which must be rectified. The munkir also has to be actually taking place at the time of ihtisab since it is not the job of the muhtasib to implement the hudud or ta’zeer (punishments). Were there to be a muhtasib designated by a Muslim Imam such on-the-spot punishment may be acceptable.

Once a munkir has been identified, hisba triggers a series of escalating responses, beginning with informing the culprit that his or her behaviour is wrong (ta’rif), passing through advising, admonition, force (taghyeer bi-al-yad) and ending with physically attacking that person. Before violence can be used, the perpetrator (al-muhtasab ’alayhi) must first be given the chance to rectify matters, by, for example pouring away his own alcohol. If beatings should become necessary to stop the munkir, care must be taken that a wider confrontation is not provoked wherein the muhtasib and the muhtasab alayhi draw weapons or gather accomplices against each other. The Charter notes that the duty of hisba should not be discharged if it will give rise to a greater munkir, especially causing discord (fitna).

Certain restrictions are laid out in the Charter concerning what practices should activate the steps associated with hisba, or what may be treated as a munkir justifying corrective action. In this area, the JI’s ambiguous approach to the broader Egyptian society appears problematic. Since historically hisba was elaborated to rectify aberrant behaviours, and the JI considered much of Egyptian society to have lapsed into jahiliyya, the conservative aspect of hisba fell down and it became a doctrine for cultural revolution. The Charter notes the jurisprudential principle that only munkirs intersubjectively accepted as such (such as behaviour around prayer, fasting, adultery or alcohol) obligate hisba. More obscure behaviours, or activities on the legality of which there is disagreement among ulema, should not initiate an ihtisab on the part of private individuals. But it is left open in the Charter which community, given jahiliyya, needs to have reached a consensus on correct versus unacceptable behaviour. The clear implication is that the Jama’a, as the new society in waiting, constitutes the legitimate arbiter of right and wrong.
Although it has been suggested that the JI only recently accepted an interpretation of hisba as a fard kifaya (collective duty), the JI has actually remained consistent on this point. Like ‘offensive’ jihad, for the group, not every member of the community was obliged to undertake hisba. But the Charter quotes Ibn Taymiyya to the effect that it becomes an individual obligation (fard ayn) on every able person if nobody else is doing it. Hisba, the Charter notes, ideally occurs in the framework of rule by a Muslim imam who can appoint a suitably qualified person as muhtasib. However,

In our time when our rulers have apostasised by replacing the shari’a they have no moral mandate and the duty for everyone is to rebel against and remove them. How could anyone say they should be obliged, or even permitted, to carry out hisba?

In the absence of an Imam, then, the responsibility must be carried out by others, and those working in the service of Islam (‘al-’amilun li-hadha al-din’), by implication the members of the JI, should constitute the ‘tali’a’, or vanguard, of hisba.

The Charter deals with the anticipated objection that in the absence of a Muslim imam the duty of hisba, like jihad, falls into abeyance. This spurious conditionality, it insists, is without basis in fiqh. Some of the salaf themselves even used hisba against the imams if the latter acted in contravention of the shari’a. In support, the Charter cites the famous hadith that ‘the greatest jihad is a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler’, pointing out that it would be ridiculous, in light of this, to have to ask that ruler’s permission to speak out against him. The Quranic verse (Al ‘Imran: 104) is interpreted to mean that the umma is charged with hisba, even in the absence of an Imam. As we will see, the JI reinterpret this verse later to mean that only certain people must carry out the function.

The JI leaders’ were certainly not against a strong state role in maintaining an Islamic civility. The Charter authors admit that in the best of cases hisba should take place under the aegis of a state authority (sulta):

An effective ruler [sulta dhat sultan] is more able than an ineffective one to enjoin the good and forbid evil, but this does not mean carrying out hisba falls into abeyance when that authority is absent, as is the case now. If enjoining good and forbidding evil is required when an imam exists, then surely the duty is even more pressing in his absence.

The JI thus rejected the philosophy of other groups, like the Jihad Organisation, that hisba, and da’wa, should be set aside until the infidel regime is overthrown and a legitimate imam installed in power. Giving up hisba, as an Islamic injunction, would just be one more victory for jahiliyya. It should not be ignored in favour of correcting the greater munkir, rule by jahiliyya. Jihad, hisba and da’wa must all take place simultaneously.

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1 The verse reads ‘Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity’ (Yusuf Ali translation.)
Hisba and Jihad in Context

It must be emphasised that there was no simple association between the JI’s ideological or theoretical statements and its activities on the ground. For one thing the historic leadership that authored the texts remained behind bars, whereas the so-called ‘second tier’ leaders, rank and file and those fighting jihad in Afghanistan, were caught up in different contexts that had their own dynamics. But the way in which the Charter tackles the question of hisba did reflect the JI’s uncertain position vis-à-vis society. The JI saw itself in the process of establishing an exclusive jama’a that would restructure the social terrain of Egypt and inculcate a new Islamic civility, but at the same time its leaders wanted to build a mass movement and hence could not alienate society as a whole, as did more marginal obscurantist groups like the Society of Muslims (also known as al-takfir wa-al-hijra). Although accepting Sayyid Qutb’s designation of state and society as jahiliyya, in seeking to build a large grassroots following the JI could not, like those groups, pronounce takfir (accuse of unbelief) on all Egyptian Muslims aside from the narrow jama’a of committed jihadists. The JI thus made strategic use of the Islamic concept of al-’adhr bi al-jahl, or ‘excusing ignorance.’ Under this rubric, being in a state of jahiliyya was no barrier to membership in the group since Egyptians could not be blamed for failing to follow the right path in the face of the longstanding and multifarious conspiracies against Islam in the country.

Similarly the ‘egalitarian’ components of the Charter and other writings—those calling for the establishment of the ‘jama’a’, transcending family and tribal loyalties—resonated with the practical contexts that JI activists confronted. In the new quarters of Cairo, for example, tribal or familial systems of arbitration, conflict resolution and symbolic solace broke down and the JI mobilised in an atmosphere of criminality as a substitute for both traditional and modern (i.e. state) patterns of civility. In rural areas in southern Egypt, the JI emerged not in a socio-political vacuum or alongside criminal gangs, but in a tribal society in transition. It was also the relative absence of both the Muslim Brotherhood as a parallel structure of belonging and the official ulema, as ‘organic intellectuals’ of the state in the south and popular urban quarters, that led many people to join the Jama’ a Islamiyya.

The egalitarianism of the Charter also perhaps reflected the frustration of some elements of the rural middle class with the socioeconomic transformations of the 1970s. One of the ways in which Sadat undermined Nasser’s support base in that decade was by reversing some of the latter’s agrarian and political reforms to increase the standing of the rural aristocracy in national political and economic life. This disadvantaged the lower-status peasants that had benefited from Nasserism, many of whom left Egypt to work in the Gulf. The regime could be blamed for the persistence of a blocked and often repressive rural social system, bolstered by Sufism, into which the returning nouveau riche could or would not integrate. Islamic activists in urban centres instead sought political expression among the similarly ‘discontented former rural working class.’

The discursive traditions of Islam offered a resource for both legitimising and opposing the status quo. As Fandy has observed, in at least some parts of Southern
Egypt, rural elites rationalised their superiority with reference to Qur’anic precepts, such as: ‘We raised some of you above the others by different degrees.’ The dominant groups within Sa’idi society also unsurprisingly tended to emphasise the importance of local tradition and customs, often relying on illustrious descent in order to affirm their Islamic piety. Bereft of such hereditary attributes, the religious respectability of lower status peasants could be enhanced through regular attendance or perhaps preaching at new mosques, often built by newly rich peasants returning from work in the Gulf and infused with egalitarian religiosity:

The educated sons of the newly rich preached in these mosques, emphasizing very different Islamic messages from those of their tribal predecessors. The message from these new mosques undermined the traditional tribal hierarchy: Islam says that there is no difference between those who are from Arab origin and those who are not. What is important in Islam is piety.

The JI’s growing popularity alarmed the erstwhile quiescent regime, as did the challenge to the authority of the state presented by the group’s persistence with hisba. Quiescence turned into repression. This in turn provoked violence as ‘the accumulative effects of constant government arrest, torture, and humiliation in the Sa’id… pushed pious activists across the thin line that heretofore had separated them from those committed to mayhem.’ This was expressed ideologically as the activation of the third element in the JI programme, jihad. Reciprocal violence found clear theoretical support in the JI’s tracts, in particular in the staged and proportionate approach to building the new Islamic society it prescribed. The Charter notes, for example, that the enemies of Islam will use a variety of techniques against it, including media, education and force. Elsewhere, the JI exhort followers to fight power with power, to confront violence with violence.

State violence, as such, would be met with jihad. Both hisba and jihad received some, not wholehearted, approval in society. In addition to providing security and protection to dislocated peasants, the JI engaged in a number of well-received welfare activities, such as selling books and Islamic dress at cut prices and providing medical assistance to the poor via doctors that were members of the JI, as well as holding seminars and preaching. All this went a long way toward lessening the negative effects of the violence.

Al-Awa also suggests that people were broadly sympathetic to the JI’s ideological message and that the group was well connected with its society, that it ‘coexisted’ (matta’ayish) and that despite the fact that many people became victims of JI violence, as acts of resistance against a state toward which few harboured affection, they were tolerated. But they did not effect sufficient dislocation—or generate sufficient support—to propel Egypt into a general civil or revolutionary war.

It may be argued that part of what was distinctive about the JI jihad was not the violence per se, but the use of violence unregulated by existing social norms, and the promotion, with or without violence, of new practices and structures—supported by new ideas—as alternatives to the traditional hierarchies and their legitimating Sufi ideology on which the Sadat regime at least in part depended to rule. This jihad
failed not only because of the vastly superior levels of force arrayed against it, or because of the Egyptian public’s disgust at the escalating brutality, but because the attempt to build the *jama’a*, to inculcate new structures of meaning, organisation and clientage, also failed. Egypt’s uneven development process may ultimately hold the key. Beneath the surface modernisation contained in *infitah* and structural adjustment, the social structure underpinning the political system tenaciously remained.

Traditional religious and tribal norms certainly persisted in the Sa’id, with the distinction between the two often blurred. As Neilsen suggests, ‘to many people of Upper Egypt, tribalism and Islam ... refer to the same cultural register.’ Despite the ink spilled elaborating the technicalities of *hisba*, and the exuberant execution of this imperative by young Islamists, the JI was ultimately not able to decisively erode customary beliefs and practices. Saudi-style *salafism* did not consistently impact traditional customs and beliefs in the countryside even as JI *da’wa* activities and labour migration increased. Instead,

Ironically, while the Saudi regime tries to promote some form of the Wahhabi creed, what many also gain from time spent in the Arabian Peninsula is an experience that underscores the importance of tribal or quasi-tribal affiliations.

Although some *Sa’idis* may have returned from the Gulf, established mosques and promoted a new, more egalitarian, Islam to subvert tradition, others spent ‘significant time and effort in defining (or redefining) themselves within the existing tribal system.’ The complex of influences including education and labour migration could just as much reinforce hierarchies as prompt insurrection against them. Often, as Rashwan has reported, the tribal structure remained a bulwark of stability: ‘Despite the death of numerous clan members during the phase of extremist violence from 1992-1997, clans never used their allegiances to start a vendetta against the state or its security services. ... traditional clans remained, largely, above the extremist foray [sic].’

Others have similarly identified the mutually reinforcing symbolic and structural role of Sufi orders in militating against the JI’s intellectual and organisational success in the Egyptian countryside, where it was strongest:

Given [the] isomorphism between the village social structure and the orders it is not surprising that the various ‘fundamentalist’ movements in Egypt had barely penetrated into villages ... which are organized hierarchically. These movements tend to have strong egalitarian tendencies, and at some level are a challenge by youth to elders.

**The new revised Jama’a Islamiyya**

By the mid-1990s, not only were the Egyptian security forces exacting a massive toll on JI operatives and enclaves in Upper Egypt and Cairo, but excessive and apparently indiscriminate violence was also apparently turning public opinion against the JI. It
was also being openly condemned by key Islamist forces regionally. Both local and regional condemnation increased markedly after the 1997 Luxor massacre, which was carried out by a renegade faction after the permanent ceasefire declared in the same year. In 2002, the leadership announced its ‘ideological revisions’, touring prisons to lecture the membership on the new course. Not only was the regime no longer to be considered kafir, but the assassinated president Sadat was described as a martyr.

Since then, the JI has positioned itself as a legitimate patriotic actor seeking to promote the cause of Islam in society. Although banned under Mubarak from reviving its traditional interfaces with the people, particularly the mosque pulpit, the JI continues to promote a distinct worldview through its writings and very active website and aspires to establish a legally sanctioned NGO or association (jam’iyah). Its general orientation has remained one of moralistic conservatism with a focus on identifying and rectifying moral problems in Egyptian society such as rising crime and baltaja (thuggery), drug and alcohol use, corruption, as well as—in common with the Islamist phenomenon as a whole—secular ‘extremism’ and communism while, perhaps most consistently, lambasting the excesses of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. The JI also consistently called on the Mubarak regime to adopt a hard line against criminality and those it saw as fomenting fitna, including sectarian strife, within Egyptian society.

The JI’s evolution marks the group’s acceptance of a prevailing elite consensus in Egypt that insists upon the distinct but complimentary roles of state and society in the broader national project and, in particular, the maintenance of Egyptian national unity against external threats. The transition involved shifts in attitudes toward state and society. Although the destruction of the group’s infrastructure by the state was important in halting the violence, as important was the JI’s failure to build its jama’a, which is in turn explicable in terms of the resilience of the rural social system and its Sufi ideological counterpart. On the international level, also, the events of 9/11 and the destruction visited upon Afghanistan had as sobering an effect on the JI as that of the Iranian revolution of 1979 was invigorating. In particular the Taliban’s fate seemed to highlight the folly of a salafist jama’a trying to bridge the gap between social and cultural reform, on the one hand, and governing a modern state, on the other.

Following the ceasefire and revisions process the most significant shift in the JI’s thinking toward the state was to retract the accusation that the regime or ruler was kafir. Whereas the JI had previously insisted that a ruler that omitted to implement any part of the shari’a was as bad as one that ignored all of it, following the revisions

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2 Following the ousting of Husni Mubarak on 11 February 2011 the historic leaders of the JI, including key spokesman and ideologue Najih Ibrahim and leader Karam Zuhdi began holding public meetings and addressing mosque congregations—including in the Sa’id—for the first time in three decades. The group maintains its commitment to peaceful political action and the formation of a jam’iyah, and does not rule out forming a political party.

3 See the group’s website, www.egyig.com, for copious articles and statements reflecting these stances.
process the leadership insisted that neglecting the duties of religion was sin (’asyan) and not unbelief (kufr). The neglect of duties does not make one an unbeliever, but merely ‘a believer with incomplete faith’ (mu’min naqis al-iman).60

In a substantial new intervention, the JI has sought to intellectually reclaim, or redefine, the notion of hakimiyya, sovereignty (of God), first elaborated by the Indian thinker Abu al-Ala’ al-Mawdudi, further developed by Sayyid Qutb, and then acted upon by jihadists from the 1970s. Hakimiyya, according to the new stance, has been misused as a way for Muslims to declare unbelief (takfir) on every Muslim leader regardless of their strengths and weaknesses on the grounds that they are not ruling absolutely by the shari’a. In reality hakimiyya should be understood to mean that the ultimate reference in governance should be God and the Prophet, but not that ‘every rule or earthly order must be found in these sources.’ While the ruler should not govern in a way that clashes with the shari’a, the Qur’an and Sunna do not address every single issue that a leader must confront.61

The new thought shifts the focus of hakimiyya away from rulers. Revealing a conception of governance more patriarchal than egalitarian, it insists that hakimiyya applies to everyone throughout the social hierarchy: to the man in his house, the manager in his company and the military commander in his unit. Hakimiyya obliges all people to act in accordance with the shari’a, which emphasises equality before the law. As such, Muslims should be no stricter on state rulers just because they are rulers: everybody makes mistakes, or commits sins, but this does not place them in the category of unbelief.62 But the JI’s promotion of equality now is not, as it was in the past, to bring the oppressed up to the level of the elites, but rather to protect those elites from undue criticism and rebellion.

This patriarchal sensibility also colours the new thinking on hisba. As part of the first tranche of writings laying out the revisions, the JI published a short tract entitled Advice and clarification in rectifying the understandings of those exercising hisba. The ‘old’ hisba, as Meijer has rightly noted, at times ‘represented a multi-faceted repertoire of contention that was also used to encroach upon the prerogatives of the authorities.’63 In the past, the JI now regret, some viewed hisba as a form of rebellion against the state, an aggression against its authority and a way of rejecting its right to regulate society.64 The new hisba confirms the authority of the regime and the sanctity of patriarchal governance.

Whereas the Charter called for displacing conflicting loyalties, such as those toward household, tribe and village, the more recent book on hisba devotes an entire chapter to honouring and respecting one’s parents. It quotes a hadith to the effect that honouring one’s parents is a second loyalty in Islam, after prayer and before jihad. The good Muslim should never be violent, insulting or threatening toward parents nor do anything, including hisba, which might harm them even indirectly. This excludes almost any culturally innovative or new behaviour and departs from the previous admonition to carry out hisba even if it will not work or makes the muhtasib the target of criticism. This advice is aimed at limiting potentially divisive
or controversial interventions since over-exuberant hisba could bring shame or embarrassment to one's parents.\textsuperscript{65}

The book covers much of the same ground as did the Charter on hisba, and much of the advice offered is the same: it is improper to spy (tajassus) or seek out transgression; the munkir must be open (zahir); threats of force must be proportionate, credible and consonant with shari'a; and the act of ihtisab must not result in a greater munkir, through spreading dissonance or fitna in society. But the Qur'anic verse (Al ‘Imran: 104) is reinterpretated not as evidence that the umma must engage in hisba regardless of the absence of an Imam, but that the notion of fard kifaya does not just mean that individuals need not engage in hisba, but that they should not if others are already doing so.\textsuperscript{66}

The sequence of escalating steps is the same, but the new treatment of hisba delves in more detail into the question of who can be the muhtasib, and here the key differentiator is that the ruler, being no longer considered an infidel, can appoint official muhtasibun. There thus exist two categories of muhtasib: the appointed (al-muhtasib al-mu’ayyan) and the volunteer (al-muhtasin al-mutatawi’). In all cases it is the appointed muhtasib who must take responsibility for executing the steps involving the use or threat of force. If the appointed muhtasib is present or can easily be summoned, private citizens can only assist on the request of the state-appointed official.

The muhtasib al-mutatawi’ can only take the initiative if the designated muhtasib is completely unavailable. At this point, the volunteer’s role is limited to intervening in crimes against society generally recognised as such, such as rape or pickpocketing.\textsuperscript{67}

The text continues that if thwarting the crime would clash with the values or customs of society or break the law, or if the mufsida (detriment) is greater than the munkir, then the individual should not intervene. That such customs and mores vary from one society to another, the book notes, complicates the practice of hisba.

All in all, though, it is best to leave things to the recognised authorities, which in modern Egypt means the police. For the new JI, hisba has become a mandate for a form of civic responsibility leading up to citizen’s arrest that would not be unusual in most Western countries. The JI has not become pacifist and allows that citizens may sometimes legitimately use force, again in line with the legal environment in Western democracies. Violence is appropriate, for example, to prevent a rape or murder from taking place, or to thwart a thief. And the JI is a strong supporter of state violence, including the death penalty, as a means of reducing rampant criminality.\textsuperscript{68} It is also clear that the JI is most impressed with the system in Saudi Arabia where hisba is organised and administered via a ministry of state. The group has long been influenced by Wahhabism, but previously was rather more attracted to the concept of al-wala’ wa-al-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal)\textsuperscript{69} than it was to that of wali al-amr, which underpins the authority of the Al Sa’ud, and which the JI now seems keen to replicate in Egypt.
The approach to hisba promoted by the new Jama’a Islamiyya essentially represents a vote of confidence in the self-regulatory potential of Egyptian patriarchal society and authoritarian governance as well as an appeal to the positive role of official law enforcement that many Egyptians would find excessively optimistic and which, perhaps wilfully, ignores the fact that the Egyptian state exercises a very limited degree of control over behaviour in many rural and urban areas, and where it does have a presence is regarded as capricious and corrupt. Roel Meijer has recently celebrated the fact that the JI has:

[p]rovided the groundwork for a much more mature Islamic political theory that focuses on human agency and opens the way for an Islamic civil society based on an Islamic concept of civility and civic virtue that has left behind the rigorism and dogmatism of Salafism.70

Meijer also notes that ‘hisba has become the cornerstone of a new Muslim civil society that is based on the obligations and rights of the citizen in a new contractual relationship with the state.’71 This may, however, be wishful thinking. In an important sense the JI remains as ‘deductive’ as ever it was. The only difference is that whereas before the group proceeded from an ideal salafi vision of the world, now it proceeds from an idealised view of existing state-society relations in Egypt. The interpretation of hisba that now seems modern and progressive assumes the presence of an official police system that is respected and considered just by the citizenry. This most certainly does not exist in Egypt, and the revised version of hisba is thus no less fanciful than the old one.

More detail on the JI’s new self conception, and vision for maintaining civility in Egypt, can be gleaned from material on its website. A statement released in September 2010 calls on the Islamic movement to work toward coexistence and cooperation with the state to do good, protect the country and preserve the Islamic civilisational identity of the umma. The JI, the statement continues, wants to transform itself into a ‘type of permanent relationship between the Islamic movement and the state,’ and sees its revisions process as ‘reopening the file on state-society relations’. By empowering the Islamic movement (which will only happen if the state believes the ceasefire to be sincere) the state will benefit from the positive energy of the Muslim youth in developing society and ‘nourishing its morals’. But the Islamic movement cannot arrogate to itself rights given to governments, like hudud punishments or declaring wars: these are all issues for governments, not citizens. Islamists should also not pursue a futile quest for power, which international and regional forces would compel them to relinquish even if they were successful.72

The JI in the Egyptian context

Many Egypt observers see the nebulous but pervasive salafi trend to be more powerful (ideologically and perhaps economically) than the Muslim Brotherhood.73 The source of much of the salafis’ appeal, and ideological power, is arguably their principled opposition to and detachment from the state and what they see as secular politics. The country’s salafi preachers and their followers seem, along with
the leadership of the JI, to have accepted that state power is not worth fighting for. Neoliberalism, in addition to Egypt’s perceived subservience to foreign powers and relative freedom of expression for (the right kind of) Islamists has rendered such a struggle obsolete.

The Muslim Brotherhood, under the influence of the ‘1970s generation’, has moved steadily toward becoming a mainstream parliamentary force, even to the point of forming a political party. It has built bridges with secular forces in society, including the left. Many of its younger generation of bloggers are outspoken advocates of democracy and senior figures like Isam al-Iryan, Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Futuh and Khayrat Shatir offer pragmatic, realist policy directions. The political goal of establishing an Islamic state is notable only by its absence in most contemporary Brotherhood discourse. Nominally independent thinkers known as the ‘new Islamists’ and the wasatiyya or Middle Way pursued a similar course. Intellectuals like Fahmi Huwaydi, the late Muhammad al-Ghazali, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi have developed a pragmatic and conciliatory stance—gently challenging and engaging with the regime on policies rather than impugning its Islamic credentials.74

It is the Muslim Brotherhood’s continued engagement with the state, and perceived quest for political power, that has alienated many erstwhile and would-be supporters. Those lost followers see their interests better represented by the apolitical salafi trend, which many see as representing more of Egypt than the Brotherhood.75 The trend is manifested in satellite TV channels as well as individual educators and preachers. It appeals to those parts of society not included in the Brotherhood’s own patronage networks—particularly the vast urban poor. Its very aloofness from contestatory politics has led the regime to tolerate and encourage it as a counterweight to the Brotherhood. The JI is currently in limbo, but seems to be staking out a halfway house between the quiescent and disparate salafi ‘trend’ and the opportunistic Brotherhood. It offers a more coherent salafi agenda with the benefits of belonging and meaning that accrue to membership of a group.

The JI was quick to condemn the car bombing at the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on New Year’s Day, 2011. In a press statement it echoed Mubarak’s insinuation that a ‘foreign hand’ lay behind the attack and called on Christians and Muslims to work together to avoid fitna. A subsequent article by one of the site’s editors, Islam al-Ghamri, reveals much about the JI’s political strategy, which is to lobby for an ever greater role as a source of moral guidance on which the regime can depend. Ghamri exhorts his readers:

Make room for moderate scholars and thinkers of all persuasions, in particular those of the Jama’a Islamiyya because of the wisdom they have gained through their trials and tribulations. The JI will be able, with God’s permission, to raise awareness among the youth (taw’iyat al-shabab). Prevention of disease is always better than cure.76

The extent to which whatever administration succeeds the Mubarak regime will allow such renewed activism to occur remains an open question, but the JI was
becoming more strident in its advocacy even before the new opportunities opened up by Mubarak’s sudden fall from power. The website underwent a major renovation in March 2010 and updates every day with new materials. JI spokesmen, particularly Nageh Ibrahim, have been frequent contributors in the Egyptian press for several years. Articles on the website include profiles and interviews with Islamic activists of various stripes, religious advice, documents related to the ceasefire and revisions process (al-mubadira), and news items reproduced from elsewhere. The site also features a regular ‘bulletin on the state of Egyptian society [nashrat ahwal al-mujtama’a al-misri].’ The bulletin often adopts a populist ‘bring back hanging’ tone that bemoans the rising criminality and corruption, and the overly lenient penal system in Egypt. Each bulletin covers a variety of topics and begins with a preamble outlining its rationale: the Islamic movement needs to shift its focus away from foreign affairs and toward internal social issues; the Islamic movement’s primary job is to ‘reform society and treat its ills’ and this requires a detailed understanding of society in all of its negative as well as positive aspects.

Conclusion
The story of the Jama’a Islamiyya tells us much about the resilience, penetration and hybridity of authoritarianism in Egypt. The JI has embodied two distinct approaches to generating civility in the country. The first, an egalitarian vision based on a salafi interpretation of Islam and a rejection of the legitimacy of the regime, fell down because it failed to make sufficient inroads into the hierarchical structures on which that regime was based. The second, ‘modern’ version more akin to Western conceptions of civic responsibility in which civil society, and law enforcement, act to reinforce the overall cultural basis of the state in ways that are broadly accepted as legitimate, also seems likely to falter due to its dependence on an unrealistic conception of the Egyptian state as an upholder of civic virtue and the law.

The JI seeks to reinvent itself as the key interface between state and society and the bearer of responsibility for moral guidance. But although the group continues to foreshadow both intra-societal and anti-regime violence, its consistent advocacy for the judicious deployment of the state’s hard power against society’s ills, and apparent willingness to accept—or even help to disguise—the inefficacy and corruption of state law enforcement, means that any evolving partnership between the JI and a regime like that of Mubarak is likely to remain ‘uncivil.’

Endnotes


2 For Weber, ‘Legal authority’ depends on the idea that ‘the typical person in authority...is subject to an impersonal order by orienting his action to it in his own dispositions and commands. (This in true
not only for persons exercising legal authority who are in the usual sense "officials," but, for instance, for the elected president of a state.' Max Weber, *Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology* (University of California Press, 1978), 217.

3 Following the Egyptian uprising of January and February 2011, which culminated in the ousting of Husni Mubarak, this truth appears almost self evident. For a discussion of the low esteem in which the police have been held, and some of the reasons for this, see Salwa Ismail, *Political life in Cairo's new quarters: encountering the everyday state* (U of Minnesota Press, 2006), 129-160.


6 Ibid., 132, 157.

7 Ibid., 162.

8 Ibid., 140.


22 Discussion of the rich corpus of Islamic jurisprudence on this issue is beyond the scope of this article. The definitive work on the topic is M.A. Cook, *Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).


24 Ibid., 19.

25 Ibid., 76.

26 Ibid., 78. Note 10.

27 Ibid., 78, inc. note 11.

28 Ibid., 80.

29 Ibid., 78. Note 9.

30 Meijer, “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya.”

36 Ibid., 84-85.
37 The GI leadership denies engaging in takfir against Egyptian society and is keen to stress the multifaceted, da'wa and welfare provision activities of the group. See Abd al-Akhar Hamad, "al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya wa-al-khususa ma'al-mujtama'a [The Gama'a al Islamiyya and the Conflict with Society]," al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya bi-Misr, n.d., http://www.egyig.com/Public/articles/mobadra/6/36422069.shtml.
38 Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, Dalil al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi al-Alim [Guide to World Islamic Movements] (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, 2006).
39 See Patrick Haenni, L'ordre des caïds, conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire (Cairo: KARTHALA (CEDEJ), 2005).
40 Muhammad Sha'ib, for example, recounted to Makram Muhammad Ahmad that one of the reasons he joined the GI was that al-Azhar and other official religious institutions were nowhere to be found in his home province of Asyut. He was thus receptive to the entreaties of the GI when one of their members approached him in a mosque. Makram Muhammad Ahmad, Mu'amara am muraja'a: hiwar ma'qadat al-tatarruf fi sijn al-aqrab [Conspiracy or Revision? Dialogue with the Leaders of Extremism in the Scorpion Prison, 2nd ed. (Dar al-Shuruq, 2003), 133.
41 For a systematic discussion of the role of the rural elites (the ‘second stratum’) as pillars of the Egyptian state, see Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Hamied Ansari, Egypt, the Stalled Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).
45 Ibid., 618.
47 Jama'a al-Islamiyya bi-Misr, Mithaq al-Amal al-Islami [Charter of Islamic Action], 103.
48 Jama'a al-Islamiyya bi-Misr, Hatmiyat al-Muwajiha [the Inevitability of Confrontation].
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
58 For a discussion of this consensus, see Ewan Stein, “The "Camp David Consensus": Ideas, Intellectuals and the Division of Labor in Egypt’s Foreign Policy toward Israel,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (September 2011).
61 Ibid., 110.
62 Ibid., 110-114.
63 Meijer, “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya.”
65 Ibid., 113.
66 Hafiz and al-Sharif, *al-Nash wa-al-tabyin fi tashih mafahim al-muhtasabin* [Advice and Clarification in Rectifying the Understandings of those Exercising Hisba].
67 Ibid., 154.
69 For a discussion of this concept, see Joas Wagemakers, “Framing the "threat to Islam": al-wala' wa al-bara' in Salafi discourse,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* (Fall 2008).
71 Ibid., 216.