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Informality Versus the State? Islamists, Informal Cairo and Political Integration by Other Means

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Abstract: The relationship between non-state actors and the broader political order is one of the fundamental problematics of the political informality literature. Our examination of informal Cairo, neighbourhoods established without planning permission, and the political trajectory of the once militant Gama’a Islamiyya (GI) since the 1980s, challenges the understanding of informal politics as taking place ‘outside the state’. Salafi-jihadist agendas and informal Cairo have been seen as fundamentally oppositional to the state and political order, but at the same time have actually been quite closely linked to it. In some respects they are integrated into the political order established after 1952 and at the very least are diagnostic of its own informality.

Keywords: Cairo, Informality, Gama’a Islamiyya, Egypt

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Cairo's informal neighbourhoods now constitute over half the city. They are the product of a grassroots social movement creating a built environment from below, outside the state's administrative umbrella, in the face of successive governments' failure to expand the existing agglomeration. Since the 1990s, they have been labelled 'ashwa'iyyat (random or haphazard zones) and pathologized as sites of socio-spatial disorder, a threat to both the Egyptian capital and the polity more generally. Such discourses of social menace have been closely linked to clashes between the GI, which had established strongholds in a number of informal areas, and the security forces in the 1990s. They re-emerged quickly after the 25 January 2011 Revolution. There the GI exploited the absence of state institutions and effective governance, as well as patterns of criminality imported from Cairo's old neighbourhoods, to create parallel 'counter-societies' autonomous from the state. Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s the Mubarak regime had crushed the GI insurgency. In 2011 both the GI and other similarly inclined Salafi preachers have sought to present themselves as essential intermediaries between the military administration and slum-dwelling rural immigrants prone to sectarian violence.

On the basis of such phenomena, it is tempting to argue that the Mubarak government had lost control of its capital by the 1990s and, indeed, that the Egyptian state might be best understood as a "gate-keeper", controlling only the main axes of the country." Discourses of social pathology notwithstanding, the regime did relatively little to strengthen its governance of informal Cairo, reverting to long-standing policies of indifference and neglect by the end of the decade. While the case of informal Cairo illustrates the limited reach of the formal Egyptian state, in other respects the 'ashwa'iyyat have been integrated effectively into the top-down political dispensation. Many informal districts had their genesis in Nasser's expansion of the public sector after 1956 and successive governments have regarded such urbanization a cheap means of housing low-income Egyptians. They have also maintained a modicum of informal political control through local notables and the clientelistic distribution of scarce public services.

The GI, for its part, strove from the early 2000s to present itself to the regime as a viable social interface between state and society. Although in comparison to the previous state of jihad against the infidel regime this seemed like an incredible volte-face, it was far from unprecedented. The GI was a component of the Islamist student movement that emerged in the 1970s as a direct result of the political space opened up by President Anwar Sadat. The Islamic movement as a whole from the 1970s reflected what Bianchi has called 'hybrid sectors', which combined the corporatized 'statist' organization typical of the Nasser years with more 'purely' informal or 'pluralist' sectors. Some student groups, such as the Shabab Islam (Youth of Islam), were regime creations, whereas others, like the Gama'at that emerged after 1974 enjoyed more independence. Later the GI straddled the boundary between being encouraged, tolerated and illegal. Since the fall of Mubarak in February 2011, the GI has sought to position itself as an interface between the state and society for the purposes of moral guidance, education and the maintenance of social peace.

Hence both informal Cairo and the GI can be seen as standing in a similar relationship to the Egyptian state. Their informality is not entirely antagonistic or external to it, but in part derives from the informal means through which power has been exercised since 1952, and is closely related to a regional political economy that facilitated the transnational flow of money and ideas. This contention will be elaborated in what follows, beginning with a brief interpretive discussion of the problematics of locating informality vis-à-vis the Egyptian state. It will be followed by a discussion of informal housing in Cairo and the political trajectory of the GI.

**States of Informality**

As Grzymala-Busse notes, the informal sector, broadly speaking societal activities and practices unregulated by the state, is not free-standing social space, but must be studied within a broader state and institutional context. In Egypt, the informal sector must be seen as embedded in a highly
top-down state and authoritarian political order in place since the Free Officers' seizure of power in 1952 and subsequent establishment of the Nasser regime.

A Lame Leviathan?

Students of Egyptian politics have commonly depicted the post-1952 state as a bureaucratic administrative Leviathan, penetrating into the depths of Egyptian society by virtue of the state-led development approach begun in earnest after 1956. This state and political economy have been the basis for a highly authoritarian political order. Egypt has been ruled by a succession of “presidential monarchs” atop a coalition of dependent groups including the military, security forces, public sector bureaucracy and since Sadat's economic opening of the 1970s, and particularly following neoliberal reforms in the 1990s crony capitalists. Economic opening was also accompanied by a measure of political liberalization. Nasser's successors Sadat and Mubarak tolerated a degree of political pluralism and façade democracy. Nonetheless the president and political elite have continued to monopolize formal political life and preferential access to state spoils, wielding power through an informal politics of clientelism and personal rule. Until recently this dispensation of power has proven highly resilient in the face of internal and external challenges.

But for some decades scholars have been considerably more skeptical about the regime's capacity to govern Egyptian society: to penetrate and mobilize it in the service of its modernization and developmental goals, and even regulate society in the grassroots and on the periphery. Critics noted, for example, that state agencies were often underfunded and deployed as tools of devolved patronage and intra-elite political competition, sapping their capacity to make and implement policy. At the local level, the state bureaucracy was often too closely tied to local notables, part of a strategy for integrating these elites into the political order, further diminishing its capacity to foster social change and creating opportunities for bottom-up rent-seeking. Finally, Egyptian rulers since Nasser have been unwilling to risk the potential upheavals entailed in the top-down mobilization of Egyptian society in the service of state-led national development. A desire to maintain social peace resulted in political stagnation.

Hence the Egyptian state is probably best understood as a “Lame Leviathan”: “domineering and authoritarian” but also “ineffective, rickety, and porous”. Such capacity as it has been able to muster has often been externally generated. With only limited ability to promote growth in the Egyptian economy and extract the resulting surplus from society, regimes since 1952 have frequently relied on various kinds of externally generated income. The Nasser regime embarked upon its state-building and state-led development experiment with a combination of Soviet military and industrial development assistance, American food aid and commercial credits. The Sadat and Mubarak regimes had access to approximately $160 billion in the 1974-2009 period in oil revenues and Suez Canal receipts. The Egyptian economy also received essential foreign exchange in the form of approximately $200 billion in tourism revenues and remittances from Egyptians employed overseas. Most politically visible, of course, has been the extensive support from western patrons, notably the United States. Since 1974 Washington has provided roughly $45 billion in “strategic rents” reflecting its position as the principal guarantor of the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David peace agreements, but also Egypt's status as a key regional ally/client. So while Egypt is not a “rentier state” in the classical sense since its economy is too diversified with external rents now a relatively small proportion of GDP nonetheless state and economy rely on exogenous income for a substantial degree of their capacity.

There is probably no single explanation for the contemporary Egyptian state's lack of internal capacity. One salient factor is likely a history of dependent state formation. Although never formally colonized, Egypt was subject to repeated British interventions throughout the 19th century, eventually being occupied from 1882 to 1952. From the mid-19th century onward Egypt was integrated into world markets as a mono-crop cotton exporter. While the Egyptian state
played a crucial role in fostering the cotton export political economy, mainly by supporting the 'primitive accumulation' of the gentry, it never acquired more than a limited penetrative capacity in Egyptian society.\textsuperscript{18} Egyptian nationalist historians, moreover, have accused Britain of seeking to obstruct domestic industrialization.\textsuperscript{19} There has also been a robust debate amongst scholars as to whether Egyptian social elites often non-Egyptian expatriates and mainly located in the cotton and ancillary sectors supported such development.\textsuperscript{20} But whatever the specific reasons for the Egyptian state's capacity problems, there is a plausible case to be made that the Egyptian state lacked the necessary institutional and financial resources for the post-1952 state-building endeavour simply by virtue of its predominantly agricultural development trajectory up to that point.\textsuperscript{21}

The political dispensation in place since 1952 is a key explanatory factor for understanding the limited 'reach' and capacity of the Egyptian state. As Michael Mann has insightfully argued, autocratic political orders are rich in unilateral “despotic” capacity vis-à-vis the societies they rule but weaker with respect to the “infrastructural” power needed to govern them and implement policies effectively.\textsuperscript{22} Thus the Egyptian state's rule of much of Egyptian society may be described in terms of a “politics of neglect” in which the logic of authoritarian power relations undermines its governance capacities.\textsuperscript{23} For example, the inability of state agencies to penetrate Egyptian society and consequent reliance on local notables may be understood in terms of excessive transaction costs, in the absence of a compliant and consenting citizenry. Pre-existing patrimonial and clientalist structures have served in place of developing new bureaucratic capacity on a legal-rational basis. But this informal control, reliant as it is on patronage, leaves those excluded from state largesse able to develop the infrastructural and ideological capacity to flaunt, and oppose, state dictums. In recognition of this abiding danger, Egypt's rulers have tended to leave much of society to its own devices via a politics of risk avoidance that eschews interventions likely to catalyze bottom-up opposition.\textsuperscript{24}

In short, the same factors which have reproduced the post 1952 political order and aided its durability have severely constrained the governance capacities of the Egyptian state. The latter can be reasonably depicted as a “gate-keeper” state, in control of access to the outside world as well as the main internal lines of communication but only able to “[annex]" the rest of society “from the outside”.\textsuperscript{25} With limited capacity to govern in the rural and urban grassroots, Egyptian governments have frequently ruled what are otherwise “self-managing communities” through local notables and other allies on the ground, including seeking to co-opt elements of the Islamist movement to play the intermediary role.\textsuperscript{26} The GI, for its part, was tolerated and even encouraged in the 1980s on the understanding that it confines itself to Upper Egypt, remain small enough not to pose a threat and not too obviously compromise the state's monopoly on violence.\textsuperscript{27}

**Autonomy of the Informal?**

It is hence quite possible to see the Egyptian informal sector as embodying a broader state-society disengagement grounded both in state weakness and the self-absorbed character of patrimonial political order. Not only is informality by definition resistant to state control, but also such notions of disengagement are suggestive of a stronger claim that the informal sector is somehow external to and (at least potentially) autonomous from the broader political order, populated by those who desire “to run their own affairs, without involving the authorities or other modern formal institutions.”\textsuperscript{28} In some scholarly accounts, informality is the manifestation of a bottom-up popular agency providing ordinary Egyptians with the resources to contest their exclusion from formal politics.\textsuperscript{29}

While lacking the capacity to extract social surplus directly and efficiently from the Egyptian countryside, the state's efforts at indirect extraction from the agrarian sector had a highly negative long-term impact on Egyptian farmers.\textsuperscript{30} Despite its quite limited 'reach', it thus nonetheless has had considerable weight, for example by employing roughly a third of the work...
force in the 1980s and paying two thirds of the wage bill. So despite claims that the putative economic reforms of the 1990s marked the end of the Nasserist 'social contract', in which state social welfare spending was used to demobilize Egyptian society, the 'clientalization' of Egyptian society likely continued as access to state goods and services 'trickled down' (however indirectly and inequitably) into the grassroots. At the risk of abusing the metaphor, the state remains a 'gate-keeper' for things that many Egyptians want. Hence they are unlikely to regard the informal sector as a complete substitute for the formal system, for example resorting to informal types of conflict resolution in some situations and seeking redress in the courts in others depending on the circumstances.

Thus the nature of the Egyptian informal sector reflects a state that is frequently incompetent but rarely absent from Egyptian society entirely. Informality occupies an ambiguous middle ground between its nominally regulated sectors and those zones explicitly branded as deviant or insurgent. Although subject to routine harassment and perhaps intermittent sanctions, informal actors and activities tend not to be suppressed systematically unless they become highly visible. In other words, they generally evade the law without being definitively branded as outlaw. Not only may state officials effectively tolerate what they are unable to stop, de facto socio-political pluralism is not necessarily a challenge to the Egyptian state. It has often accepted the Islamist provision of welfare services and extra-state dispute-resolution systems as a shield from the bottom-up demands of Egyptian society.

Finally, informality in an Egyptian context may be understood as political integration by other means. By virtue of its ambiguous legal status and dependence on state tolerance, the informal sector is particularly vulnerable to top-down sanctions. Indeed, de facto state toleration may, ironically, give it a stake in the preservation of the status quo. While in some respects the informal may stand outside the clientelization process, it is nonetheless not immune to it. Informal institutions and practices in Egypt have often been linked to gaining access to various kinds of state goods and services.

For these reasons, it is problematic to see the informal sector as a potential source of autonomous social power standing in opposition to the state. With respect to the Middle East more generally, the informal sector's visible political challenge has been limited, with its constituents being least likely to engage in "openly political activities directed against the state." Rather than posing a bottom-up challenge to the post-1952 order in Egypt, informality may thus be sometimes diagnostic of its reproduction and durability.

The Politics of Neglect in Cairo

The case of informal Cairo exemplifies the ambiguous and problematic notion of informality presented here. A zone outside the umbrella of state planning and administration, nonetheless state agencies and institutions are implicated in its genesis and development. Branded an oppositional space in the early 1990s, the 'ashwa'iyyat are clearly integrated into the political dispensation at a number of levels.

Origins of Informal Cairo

Informal urbanization in Cairo reflects the Egyptian state's inability to manage the growth of its capital. Since the 1950s, it has become a mega-city having expanded rapidly from a population of 2 million in 1950 to as many as 18 million currently. However there has been no corresponding expansion of the existing agglomeration since the 1950s. Private urban development began to end in 1952, and the Nasser regime constructed only showpiece neighbourhoods (Madinat Nasr, Mohandiseen) for its supporters. Indeed, it made a deliberate, albeit ineffective, effort to divert
investment out of housing and into industry. While both the Sadat and Mubarak governments subsequently sought to 'deconcentrate' Cairo through the construction of new cities, some close by on the city periphery and others at a distance, they have not constituted a plausible alternative to the existing agglomeration.

Hence the demographic pressures on the capital have been expressed informally. From the mid-1960s, the lack of new sub-divisions resulted in a steady inflation of land and housing costs. Increasingly priced out of the formal housing sector, Egyptians began to purchase farmland on the city periphery, which was substantially cheaper as it lacked planning permission and services, for sub-division and development. The result was something of a grassroots demographic movement on the part of young families and others looking to improve their housing stock, leaving the capital's overcrowded and decaying historic neighbourhoods in favour of homesteading in the Giza sprawl and in north Cairo. While such communities are sometimes described in the Francophone academic literature as 'spontaneous,' they are not without a certain socio-spatial order. Spatially, their development has tended to follow the pattern of the original field boundaries and these neighbourhoods have had a distinct and predictable growth trajectory of first horizontal and then vertical densification. In the absence of formal planning, their growth and development has been largely driven by the market exigencies of land prices and the availability of capital (often remitted by Egyptians employed overseas).

By definition, informal communities lack planning and servicing (at least at the outset). The largely market logic of their development means that there are few land set- asides into which infrastructure may be added retrospectively. Such factors make for a difficult and sometimes unpleasant built environment. But, informal Cairo is not marginal housing. In 2000, its neighbourhoods represented 53 percent of Cairo's dwelling units and housed 62 percent of the population. The bulk of them are built on arable land although there are at least two other distinct building morphologies: informal neighbourhoods 'squatting' publicly owned desert/mountain land as well as old farming villages and other sites of uncertain status and tenure, absorbed into the existing formal agglomeration, which have been developed informally.

Whatever their differences, all such neighbourhoods constitute a substantial zone of the Egyptian capital where the state's administrative fiat does not hold sway. Landownership is not immediately problematic, the plots having been privately purchased, nonetheless the urbanization of arable land is in violation of numerous laws and decrees; it has also been criticized as a threat to Egypt's scarce supply of arable land. While informal Cairo is not entirely without state-provided infrastructure, nonetheless the state regulatory and service provision role is often so limited that one western student of the city has declared: “Basically Cairo manages itself—the state is largely irrelevant.”

'The Islamic Republic of Imbaba'

Such sweeping views were certainly correct through the late 1980s when the state response to informal Cairo was largely one of indifference and neglect. There were ample indications that state officials were at least periodically aware of such areas, but there was little relish for confronting an issue that already exceeded the resources of the state. The stigmatizing discourse of the informal as 'ashwa'iyyat a threat to the broader polityhas its origins in the clashes between the state security forces and the Gama'a Islamiyya (GI) militants who had established themselves in a number of Cairo informal neighbourhoods in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The most notable of these clashes was the 'Siege of Imbaba' in December 1992 in which the Mubarak government suppressed the so-called 'Islamic Republic of Imbaba,' proclaimed by the militants in the North Giza neighbourhood of Mounira Gharbiyya. The confrontation has been subject to varying interpretations. In some accounts it was the climax of an Islamist effort to infiltrate informal Cairo for use as a base of operations in the attempt to overthrow of the Mubarak government. In other interpretations, it was rather the intensification of an urban
guerrilla campaign provoked by the Mubarak regime's unwillingness to tolerate the existence of a GI-controlled counter-society in Mounira Gharbiyya. \(^{49}\) In any event, when Reuters press agency filed a story about the Islamic Republic of Imbaba, the sting of international humiliation, through the affirmation that Egyptian sovereignty was in some ways incomplete or qualified, proved to be the final straw for the regime, provoking the heavy-handed assertion of the state's monopoly on violence. \(^{50}\)

The decision to suppress the GI also probably reflected the broader difficulties the regime then faced in Cairo. An October 1992 earthquake had killed hundreds, displaced tens of thousands and done highly visible damage to poorly constructed public-sector infrastructure and formal sector buildings. The state response to the quake had been feeble, especially compared to relief efforts mounted by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist charities (Al-Awadi 2003). Displaced Cairenes took to the streets to demand housing and assistance. The government was subject to scathing criticism in the normally tame opposition press and controlled legislature. \(^{51}\) In one account, the state's failure to deal adequately with the earthquake was said to have encouraged Islamists to proclaim the Imbaba 'republic' in direct challenge to the Mubarak government. \(^{52}\)

Such events dramatically illustrated the Egyptian state's manifest shortcomings of urban governance, even suggesting that it was losing control of its capital. Informal Cairo provided a convenient scapegoat for such broader dysfunctions with the state-sanctioned 'ashwa'iyyat discourse portraying it as an objectification of urban disorder, stigmatizing its inhabitants as uncivilized peasants in need of rehabilitation and moral guidance and depicting it as hence a hotbed of terrorism. \(^{53}\) These stereotypes of social pathology seemed to offer the authorities essentially a blank cheque to undertake whatever measures against the informal housing sector they saw fit.

One crucial trope in this discourse was that informal Cairo was outside state control with the GI exploiting “the political, social and security vacuum,” caused by the government's failure both to assert its presence and develop the area. \(^{54}\) Reportage during the Siege of Imbaba stressed the need for the state to assert its presence and to deny the GI refuge. \(^{55}\) Even some years later, a leftist writer asserted that the area still remained self-sufficient and detached, hence continuing to defy state authority on an everyday level. \(^{56}\) Ironically, such views were echoed in some western academic writings on informal Cairo, portraying its neighbourhoods as “spheres of dissidence” and arguing that Islamist “implantation” had succeeded by virtue of the militants managing to “anchor themselves in oppositional spaces already formed or in formation” by virtue of state absence and their (at least partial) autonomy. \(^{57}\)

The 'ashwa'iyyat discourse signalled what appeared to be a decisive shift in the Egyptian state's dealing with informal Cairo. Informal neighbourhoods no longer appeared to be an ambiguous tolerated space, but rather actively oppositional to the formal political order and to be dealt with as such. In this spirit, during Spring 1993 state officials announced a series of measures aimed at dealing with informal Cairo. These included the demolition of approximately sixteen settlements, mostly of the small 'squatter pocket' variety, and the systematic rehabilitation of dozens more including the construction of police stations and other measures to facilitate state access. \(^{58}\) In Summer 1996, the Mubarak government announced that further informal settlement of agricultural land would be prosecuted in the military courts, a tactic employed against Islamists. \(^{59}\)

Some two decades after the siege of Imbaba the pathologisation of informal neighbourhoods continues, well-illustrated during recent sectarian violence in Imbaba. The nature of these events, in which a Coptic woman Abir Fakhri had allegedly converted to Islam and been imprisoned by the Coptic church remain shrouded in controversy and rumour. But irrespective of what actually happened, the discourse reveals clear continuity in the assumptions of the metropolitan elite. Thus for Amr Hamzawy, a prominent participant in the 2011 Revolution and long-time democracy advocate, 'in Imbaba, inhuman economic and social conditions make it inevitable that an environment nurturing violence will prevail and speeches of incitement against the religious other will be accepted'. \(^{60}\)
Hamzawy was one of several respected intellectuals that contributed to compiling the report of the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) on the Imbaba affair. The report, in many respects a measured attempt to defuse the hysteria and rumour-mongering about the events, nevertheless plays into the established pathologies about Imbaba and the ‘ashwa’iyyat. The report notes, by way of setting the scene and providing a context for readers to interpret the events, that after some citizens gathered outside the church in the hope of rescuing Abir, “there gathered around them some thugs and simpletons of the area (ba’d ahali almintaqam gilalay al-wa’i wa-al-baltajjya).” It goes on to note that “the area around the Mar Mina church has a special character. There live there citizens who come originally from the Sa’id and the culture of carrying guns and munitions is widespread among them.” The report ends with a short section entitled ‘The Specificity of the Theatre of Events’ which notes that the violence can be blamed on “the predominance of the haphazard [‘ashwa’i] model, the absence of basic services and the overcrowding and the widespread unemployment and the absence of public authorities.” This social context is what triggers sectarian violence amongst peoples sensitive to any issue pertaining to “honour, religion or both” (Ali 2011). Among the report’s recommendations is that the sovereignty of law and of the state of institutions be affirmed in Imbaba, and that institutions of state, and not ‘individuals and groups’ take responsibility for the maintenance of security in the area.

The resumption of neglect?

The aftermath of the siege of Imbaba, suggests that implementing the recommendations of the NCHR may pose a significant challenge to the new Egyptian leadership. While the ‘ashwa’iyyat discourse in the 1990s was suggestive of a ‘hard’ Egyptian state finally ready to take decisive action against a direct security threat, implementation of these urban development initiatives was more in keeping with capacities of a Lame Leviathan. Although state coercive capacity had effectively demobilized and expelled the GI, state agencies lacked capacity to demolish or upgrade supposedly dilapidated and threatening areas systematically.

With respect to demolitions, the state continued to lack the resources to re-house those who would be displaced in large-scale clearances and was unwilling, on security grounds, to contemplate large-scale removals without some element of compensation. The threat of military prosecutions was eventually abandoned in 2004, ironically because its non-enforcement was actually encouraging informal urbanization. The Egyptian financed upgrading undertaken after 1992 was confined to a showpiece project in Mounira Gharbiyya. More systematic urban-development interventions continued to be largely funded by western aid agencies, with little indication that Egyptian state agencies had the capacity to normalize the still rapidly expanding informal housing sector through service provision.

Such indisputable resource constraints are suggestive of the contention that Cairo's neglect is a consequence of the long-term underdevelopment of the Egyptian state and economy. Despite the long-term tendency of Egyptian governments to refrain from systematic interventions in their capital, the situation since the 1970s differs in at least one important respect. Since Sadat's economic and political opening to the West, western aid agencies have undertaken urban development projects in the capital and sought to foster an administratively competent Egyptian state capable of governing its capital. However such initiatives have been repeatedly obstructed and subverted by Egyptian state agencies which, while eager to lay their hands on western development funding, have resisted donor efforts to make them take a more activist and interventionist approach to Cairo's governance.

Thus the 1990s and subsequent decades continued to be characterized by an informal politics of toleration. The Mubarak government resisted direct interventions which might have engendered demands for representation and political participation while nonetheless ensuring that informal Cairo remained integrated into the political order by other means. Indeed, informal Cairo
has been closely associated with the Egyptian state, in the sense of its under-the-surface de facto workings, from its inception. While such urbanization has rarely been formally sanctioned, it nonetheless frequently 'piggy-backed' off the infrastructure installed for formal neighbourhoods or public-sector factories. In some cases, the Cairo authorities have tolerated, and even tacitly encouraged, particular settlements as a low cost means of housing low income Egyptians. Some observers have suggested that the very category of 'informal' has served as a means of rationing the very limited state spending on municipal infrastructure, a spending that has often likely been in the form of top-down patronage. Hence, there are ample indications that rather than being a zone of dissidence, informal areas have long been incorporated into the political dispensation through a clientelistic micro-politics of service acquisition. Thus the 1990s and subsequent decades continued to be characterized by an informal politics of toleration. The Mubarak government resisted direct interventions which might have engendered demands for representation and political participation while nonetheless ensuring that informal Cairo remained integrated into the political order by other means. Indeed, informal Cairo has been closely associated with the Egyptian state, in the sense of its under-the-surface de facto workings, from its inception. While such urbanization has rarely been formally sanctioned, it nonetheless frequently 'piggy-backed' off the infrastructure installed for formal neighbourhoods or public-sector factories. In some cases, the Cairo authorities have tolerated, and even tacitly encouraged, particular settlements as a low cost means of housing low income Egyptians. Some observers have suggested that the very category of 'informal' has served as a means of rationing the very limited state spending on municipal infrastructure, a spending that has often likely been in the form of top-down patronage. Hence, there are ample indications that rather than being a zone of dissidence, informal areas have long been incorporated into the political dispensation through a clientelistic micro-politics of service acquisition.

The Gama'a Islamiyya between Informality and the State

The challenge the post-Mubarak governments will face is magnified by the fact that societal actors in Egypt are also socialised to informality. The challenge of realising a more democratic or equitable future in Egypt is thus not just a question of the state's 're-learning' how to behave. The political culture as a whole would have to change. There is an established body of scholarship suggesting that effective top-down power cannot be purely unilateral, but depends on a degree of consent from those being taxed, conscripted or otherwise mobilized. The presence of informal intermediaries, or middle-men, between state and society contributes to the generation of such consent. Islamist political movements in Egypt have for many decades been imbedded within webs of informal political interaction in Egypt and prioritised the development of social and ideological tools that enable them to present themselves as the 'indispensable' mediators between state and society. They have also played an important role in keeping the avenues of communication between state and society informal.

In the discussion above we examined the ways in which Egyptian regimes have sustained informal patterns of interaction through a politics of neglect, traditionally preferring to leave large sections of Egyptian society to their own devices rather than to extend 'legal-rational' bureaucratic or institutional structures and norms. Intermediaries like the GI, while offering valuable services to the state in the form of outsourced security and control, nevertheless managed to carve out spheres of agency for themselves, largely as a result of their ability to mobilise significant followings among those disenchanted with the state. The GI thus represents a good example of a group created by, dependent on, and to a great extent acting to sustain informal modes of interaction.

Since its inception in the 1970s one of the defining features of the GI was its strident aversion to formalised politics in Egypt. Of course, the group's leaders and members never expressed their views, or likely saw things, in this way. Instead, what they opposed were the 'man-made' laws, or imported doctrines that the regime and their political adversaries in society
seemed to be championing. This aversion itself harkened back to seminal Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb who, previously sympathetic to the modern project, was disillusioned by what he saw as the cold formalism of life in the United States. The virtues of the informal (taraahumi), as opposed to the formal or 'contractual' (ta'aqudi) have also been extolled by Islamist intellectuals like the late Abdel Wahhab Elmessiri, who like Qutb condemned the cold informalism of the United States and the West in general, and warned of the dire consequences that would befall Egypt if its political and cultural model were accepted whole-cloth.69

Groups like the GI, despite extremist pasts, did not evolve in a vacuum but instead imbibed and reflected the cultural and political milieu of their times. The GI emerged from the Islamic student movement in the 1970s and comprised those elements of the movement that eschewed absorption into the Muslim Brotherhood and opposed the latter's strategy of accommodation with the Sadat regime. In the 1980s, the group vehemently opposed the Brotherhood's participation in elections. But while coming out stridently against these elements of 'formal' political participation, under the ideological cover of opposition to imported political systems or strengthening the kafir regime, the GI was and continued to be linked to the regime via informal ties.

The Egyptian regime and the Islamist movement in general have a history of cooperation. The Muslim Brotherhood was, for two years after the Free Officers seized power in 1952, a staunch supporter of the new order and hoped to serve as the new regime's eyes, ears and moral compass in society. As Brownlee has pointed out, the MB has always been reluctant to ascend to political power, preferring instead to build their capacity in society. Even Hasan al-Banna, in running for parliament in 1941, did so in order to extract concessions from the government rather than to actually participate in formal politics, as evinced by his quick decision to pull out of the race on a prime ministerial pledge to allow the Brotherhood to “resume full-scale operations.”70 Formal politics, in other words, was sacrificed in favour of and via informal politics.

The GI owes its early growth on university campuses to the political space opened up by President Anwar Sadat, who far more energetically than he sought to revive parliamentary democracy, nurtured Islamists as a counterweight to the left. Many Islamist students joined the Brotherhood, while others, specifically in the south, remained in the Gama'a Islamiyya, which was distinguished by its muscular social policies. Intra-societal violence, directed against leftist activists, Copts and anyone deemed to be acting 'improperly' was sanctioned by the Islamic imperative of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil.71 But the group's violence did not incredibly given the GI's role in the assassination of Sadat put the GI wholly on the wrong side of the regime. Mubarak cracked down on those implicated in Sadat's assassination in 1981, but several hundred militants were released in 1984. Those that returned to their homes in Upper Egypt, led by the so-called '2nd generation' of GI leaders, worked under the 'eyes and ears' of the security forces in Upper Egyptian provinces like Asyut and Minya. The governor of Asyut was, until 1982, none other than Muhammad Uthman Isma'il, who brokered Sadat's experiment with bankrolling Islamists in the previous decade.72

In Upper Egypt, as with the informal neighbourhoods of Cairo discussed above, the influence, and to a large degree presence, of the state were minimal. Part of what the GI did was to substitute for the state's absence by providing social services as well as protection, mediation and conflict resolution. There, as in the informal neighbourhoods of Cairo, tribal or familial systems of arbitration, conflict resolution had long been breaking down and the GI operated as a substitute for those as well as for modern avenues of social and political participation.73 It was also the relative absence of the official ulema, as representatives of the state in the south and informal neighbourhoods, which led many people to join the Gama'a Islamiyya.74

To a great extent the GI and the regime shared a deeply conservative sensibility, wanting and fearing similar things. The regime as a whole shared the GI's ambivalence toward 'amoral' or subversive behaviour; of large public gatherings deemed to threaten public order, i.e. involving dancing, artistic expression, drugs, mixing of the sexes and alcohol. Local security forces had no problem with the GI stepping in to break up such gatherings with force, thus relieving them of the
politically costly task of using violence to control behaviour that may or may not have been formally illegal. If this politics of risk avoidance, designed to avoid bottom-up opposition to the regime, meant a few Copts or students being hurt or killed, then that was seen as a price worth paying.

The GI's challenge to the state's monopoly on legitimate violence had, as discussed above, outlived its usefulness by the early 1990s and by the middle of that decade the coercive capacity of the group had been largely eradicated. In the early 2000s the GI formally renounced militancy and sought instead to recover its position as the indispensable mediator between the state and the ever-expanding 'Islamic movement' in society. Since then the group has sought to transform itself into a 'type of permanent relationship between the Islamic movement and the state.' By empowering the Islamic movement, the GI argues, the state will benefit from the positive energy of the Muslim youth in developing society and 'nourishing its morals.'

GI leaders, in common with preachers belonging to the resurgent 'salafi' trend have put themselves forward as brokers between the state and society in order to defuse sectarian tensions. The cousins Aboud and Tariq al-Zumr have since their release from prison in the wake of the January 25 revolution, met with governors of Asyut, Qena and Giza. The governor of Asyut, for his part, remarked that 'the Asyut governorate is one of the leading governorates in terms of its security regime because of the honourable and wise people of all shades in Asyut, that help us to nip any disorder (fitna) in the bud before it spreads,' while adding, perhaps to ward off memories of the GI's previous privileged relationship with the security services, that 'we uphold the law over everyone equally.'

Senior officers in the new al-Amn al-Watani (national security) service, which replaced the widely despised Jihaz Mabahith Amn al-Dawla (national security investigators apparatus), openly admit that they have been using Salafi preachers as intermediaries, 'due to their popularity with the people' to try and control the Imbaba 'fitna'. In the wake of the violence they also met with prominent Islamist figures. These included not only widely respected intellectuals like Muhammad Salim al-Awa, but also a number of GI leaders, including Isam Dirbala, Asim Abd al-Majid, Aboud Zomr, Abd aL-Akhir Hamad and Salah Hashim. There is clear reluctance within the broader intelligentsia to sanction such an approach to governance, and perhaps a realisation that such informal channels run the risk of stopping the revolution in its tracks by allowing such networks of support and outsourcing to take the place of advances in accountable policing and local governance.

**Conclusion**

From the foregoing discussion we can make a number of broader contentions. First, it is highly problematic to see the state as being in one place and informality “in another”. Informality is inevitably articulated in a domain demarcated by formal institutions, and is most interesting in the way that it is diagnostic of the official order's (perhaps hidden) workings. More generally, the patrimonial and clientelistic characteristics of the nominally formal Egyptian political order complicate any glib attempts at a formal/informal demarcation. Further, ‘institutionness’ is not exclusive to the ‘formal sector’. The cases under consideration here are suggestive of informal institutions or, at least, patterned ‘rules of the game.’ For example, informal Cairo's growth and development has taken place in a characteristic and routinized way.

Finally, the close association of the informal sphere with the state helps explain the durability of the Egyptian political order (at least through 2010). While some observers have seen informal communities as seeking autonomy from the broader dispensation, politics in informal areas have often been about attempts to secure access to state patronage. While the Islamist political project in Egypt has often been seen as antagonistic to incumbent rulers, Islamist groups have often sought not to challenge state power but rather to seek accommodation with it and even act as its intermediary with society. The extent to which Islamist actors, including the now
resurgent Gama'a Islamiyya, succeed in reproducing informality on a large scale with the emergent Egyptian regime will tell us much about whether Egypt is passing into a new more accountable or democratic phase.

NOTES

1 F. Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
10 Since the fall of Mubarak in February 2011, any discussion of regime durability is at risk of being overtaken by events on the ground. That said, the most immediate consequence of the upheavals has been the reassessment of the Egyptian military's predominant role at the expense of the presidency and the civilian crony capitalist wing (Black, I., “Egyptian army calls the shots as nation embarks on democratic transition,” The Guardian (11/02/2011). Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/11/egypt-army-
mubarak-political-reform [Accessed February 13, 2011]; R. Springborg, “Game Over: TheChance for Democracy in Egypt Is Lost,” Foreign Policy (Middle East Channel). Available at: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/02/game_over_the_chance_for_democracy_in_egypt is_lost [Accessed February 6, 2011]). However desirable, the prospects for a decisive break with the broader authoritarian dispensation and the beginnings of a genuine process of democratization are unclear.
Informality Versus the State?


24 It is worth reflecting on the fact that the January 25 revolution targeted, among other things, the corrupt crony capitalism exemplified by the informal networks leading to Gamal Mubarak and members of the Nazif government. The extreme forms of clientalism that developed in the final years of the Mubarak government generated resentment among the excluded that was ultimately sufficient to topple it, and with a speed and precision the GI could only have dreamed of during its jihad in the 1990s.


26 Roussillon, “Republican Egypt interpreted”, 390; Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism.


30 Sadowski, Political vegetables?

31 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat.


33 B. Drieskens, “Cairene Way of Reconciling,” Islamic Law and Society, 13(2006); Nielsen, “State and Customary Law in Upper Egypt”.


35 IF. Harik, Economic policy reform in Egypt (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997); Sadowski, Political vegetables?

36 Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt fragmentation of political order.


41 W. Wheaton, Public policy and the ‘Shortage’ of Housing in Egypt (Cairo: Cairo University/MIT Technology Adaptation Program, 1979).


W. Judson Dorman and Ewan Stein

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57 Dorman, The politics of neglect.


61 Dorman, The politics of neglect.


63 Dorman, The politics of neglect.

64 Dorman, The politics of neglect.

65 Ibid.; Dorman, “Informal Cairo.”

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.


74 MM. Ahmad, Mu'amira am muraja'a: hiwar ma' qadat al-tatarruf fi sijn al-aqrab [Conspiracy or Revision? Dialogue with the Leaders of Extremism in the Scorpion Prison] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2003), 133.