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How ML Evolved

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1982

ML is one among many functional programming languages. But not many were designed, as ML was, for a more-or-less specific task. The point of this note is to summarise the process by which we were guided to ML, as it now is, by the demands of the task. We (at least I) feel that to find a good metalanguage for machine assisted proof, which was the task, we could hardly have gone in an essentially different direction; the task seemed to determine the language—and even made it turn out to be a general purpose language.

The context in 1974 (when the Edinburgh LCF project began) was our experience with the Stanford LCF proof assistant, developed there in 1971–72 by Richard Weyrauch, Malcolm Newey and myself. The development of ML as a metalanguage for interactive proof was the work of several people; in chronological order they were (besides me) Malcolm Newey, Lockwood Morris, Michael Gordon, and Christopher Wadsworth. Other people, who joined the LCF project after the language was more-or-less fixed, and used it for proofs, are Avra Cohn, Jacek Leszczyłowski, David Schmidt, Larry Paulson and Brian Monahan. In the following summary of the development process, the actual logic involved (PPLAMBDA) is rather irrelevant, and it now seems that the same principles apply to any formal deductive system.

Consider the activity of goal-directed proof. If we have a goal $A$, a logical formula to be proved, then it is sound to replace it by subgoals $B_1, \ldots, B_n$, provided we know how to construct, from achievements of all the $B_i$, an achievement of $A$. We may call any subgoaling method a tactic; it is a valid tactic, then, if it also provides—for each set $\{B_i\}$ of subgoals produced from a goal $A$—a way of extending achievements of the $B_i$ into an achievement of $A$, and this “way” we call a validation. Of course, only valid tactics are useful!

Now, given a fixed repertoire of tactics, a natural proof assistant would be one which maintains a goal tree, with the user always working at a leaf. The Stanford LCF system was like this. After some subgoaling, the tree might look thus:
Here, we suppose that the ringed subgoals have (somehow) been achieved; the little black boxes sitting at the non-leaf nodes are the validations waiting to be applied to the (achieved) sons to achieve their father. So, after achieving $D_2$ the proof assistant would collapse the tree to:

Clearly, under this rigid discipline of tactical tree walking, the only way of proving the main goal is to return to the root, and the only doubt that the theorem has been correctly proved is in the correctness of the built-in programs for the basic repertoire of tactics and for treewalking.

But in a more flexible system, a user should at least be allowed to compose tactics into more powerful ones. For example, he should be allowed to compose the three tactics which were applied to goals $A$, $B_1$ and $C_3$ to
produce the tree of our first diagram; this composite tactic applied to goal
$A$ would yield a flatter tree

![Diagram of tree structure]

Note that the validation produced by the composite tactic is a particular
combination of those produced by the separate tactics. (Of course, as in our
first diagrams, some of the subgoals may then be somehow achieved; we
have omitted the rings here).

Well, to program this composition the user must be allowed to hold
in his hand as objects (or: be allowed to bind as values to metavariables)
both goals and validations; moreover, to put them together properly already
suggests the need for structure-processing power of the kind found in LISP
and other functional programming languages.

What kind of object is a validation? It is a “way of extending the achieve-
ments of subgoals into an achievement of the goal”. But an achievement is
(in our case) a proof, or the theorem which is the last step of a proof; so the
validation for a tactic which produces subgoals $\{ B_i \}$ from goal $A$ could
perhaps be represented by the theorem $\vdash B_1 \supset \cdots \supset B_n \supset A$, and to
apply the validation is perhaps just to apply Modus Ponens repeatedly to
this theorem and the achievements $B_1, \ldots, B_n$ to produce $A$. So perhaps
validations are just theorems, proved somehow at the time that the tactic
is applied?

To see that this is wrong, consider the tactic which converts a goal
formula $\forall x. B(x)$ into a single subgoal formula, $B(x)$ (this is the common
method of proving that something holds for all $x$ by proving that it holds
for arbitrary $x$). According to the above suggestions then, the validation
should be the theorem $\vdash B(x) \supset \forall x. B(x)$, and there is no such theorem! In
fact the validation should not be a theorem, but a function from theorems
to theorems, i.e. a (primitive or derived) inference rule; in our case, it is the
rule of generalisation

$$\text{GEN} \quad \vdash B(x) \quad \vdash \forall x. B(x)$$

(This is why we called the tactic GENTAC).
We immediately see that a tactic is a function producing function; when applied to a goal it produces, as well as a subgoal list, a function which is the validation. So our metalanguage must express second order functions.

Further:

(1) when the validation function depends (as it may in general) upon the properties of the goal attacked, these properties will be bound into the validation at the time of tactic application, and the natural way of doing this critically requires the static binding convention, now normally accepted in preference to the dynamic binding of LISP. (In Landin's terms, the validation is a closure, i.e. an expression paired with an environment).

(2) Since the user is to be allowed to compose tactics (second order functions), his compositions will be third order functions; clearly a metalanguage which expresses functions of arbitrarily high order is the only natural choice.

(3) Since the user is to be allowed to hold validations (and, in general, any primitive or derived inference rule) in his hand, it is critically important that he is only allowed to apply them to theorems, not to other objects (such as formulae) which look so like theorems that in a moment of misguided inspiration he may mistake one for the other! So the metalanguage must be rigorously typed, in a way which at least distinguishes theorems from other things.

(4) For a given tactic \( T \), there are usually goals for which it makes no sense to apply \( T \) (Example: it makes no sense to apply GENTAC to a goal formula which is not universally quantified). It would be vastly inconvenient to test a goal by some separate predicate before applying a tactic, so the tactic itself must assume the task of detecting inapplicability, and respond in some suitable way. But in a typed language, every result of applying a tactic must be a goal list paired with a validation, and it is irksome to have to construct a correctly typed but spurious 'result' when the application makes no sense; so the only alternative in this case is to have no result at all. Hence it is natural to have an escape or failure mechanism, under which senseless applications may avoid producing a result, but instead be detected for alternative action. In LISP this response could be to return the result NIL, for example.

(5) In a conversational typed functional language, it soon appeared intolerable to have to declare—for example—a new maplist function for mapping a function over a list, every time a new type of list is to be treated. Even if the maplist function could possess what Strachey
called “parametric polymorphism” in an early paper, it also appeared intolerable to have to supply an appropriate type explicitly as a parameter, for each use of this function. (Perhaps this latter is rendered more acceptable if types can be suitably abbreviated by names, but note that even simple list constructors and destructors—CONS, CAR, CDR or whatever—would need explicit type parameters) so a polymorphic type discipline, with rigorous type checking, emerges as the most natural solution. Note that it emerges as such on purely practical considerations; it is a gift from the Gods that this discipline happens to have a simple semantic theory, and that the type checking has an elegant implementation based upon unification (Robinson). We only discovered afterwards that the proper lineage for this type checking is from Curry’s functionality, through Roger Hindley’s principal type schemes.

This discussion was somewhat simplified w.r.t. LCF (for example, LCF goals are not simply logical formulae to be proved). But it is, in essence, the process by which we arrived almost unavoidably at the metalanguage ML as it now exists. It shows why ML is a higher order functional programming language with rigorous polymorphic type discipline and an escape mechanism (and, of course, static binding).

Perhaps the development of ML has been made to seem too clean and trouble-free, from the above discussion. There still remain, however, some big problems and question marks. It is important to mention some of them; in doing so, we also place ML in context with other languages—both applicative and imperative.

(1) It is natural to recover, within ML, the simple treewalking proof methodology with which we started. But this global tree is a changing structure; as such, it cannot really be implemented without strain in a purely applicative language. (Or so it appears to me; this is a challenge to applicative language devotees who wish to rule out state change completely). So ML has an assignment statement!

But this does not sit so easily beside the polymorphic type discipline. Recent work by Luis Damas (forthcoming Ph.D.) shows that the somewhat over-rigid treatment of the types of assignable variable in ML (viz. that they may not be polymorphic) can be relaxed; but the purity and obviousness of the discipline is inevitably lost.

(2) Even without assignment, the type discipline forced us to adopt a restrained form of escape mechanism in ML; it is not allowed to escape (or fail) with a value of arbitrary type, but only with a token. This problem has to do with the dynamic nature of the escape-trapping mechanism; the trap for each escape is not textually determined, and
it appeared to us most useful that it should not be so. A clean solution
to this problem—probably easier than that for assignable variables—
would be an important development.

(3) ML does not adopt the clausal form of function definition, which is
found so convenient by users of HOPE and PROLOG. How can we
get a semantically rigorous form of this clausal definition, in which the
constructor-patterns in formal parameters can involve not only prim-
itive constructors, but also the constructors of user-defined abstract
types? The problem is to know that these constructors are construct-
ors, in the sense of being uniquely decomposable (or else to admit non-
determinism into the language). If I understand Rod Burstall right,
this is partly why HOPE is called HOPE; the answer may eventually
become CLEAR.

(4) ML does not use lazy evaluation; it calls by value. This was de-
cided for no other reason than our inability to see the consequences of
lazy evaluation for debugging (remember that we wanted a language
which we could use rather than research into), and the interaction
with the assignment statement, which we kept in the language for
reasons already mentioned. In fact, this sharpens the challenge men-
tioned in (1) above; is there a good language in which lazy evaluation
and controllable state-change sit well side-by-side? John Reynolds has
for a long time worried about such possible incompatibilities between
applicative and imperative languages (cf. his “Syntactic Control of
Interference”, which exposes the problem with great honesty).

Conclusion

I hope this short essay has shown that machine-assisted proof provided a
beautifully appropriate focus for developing functional programming and
demonstrating its importance. It would be very useful for others to use
this newsletter as a medium for reporting other real exercises in functional
programming, so that a balance is kept between the seductive purity of
functional languages and the methodology of their use. The remarks above
tried to point out the considerable tension that exists between these two
aspects of programming, and to show that it is not at all trivial to resolve
the tension.