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The Lemon-Squeezing Problem:

Analytical and Computational Limitations in Collateralised Debt Obligation Evaluation

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This article analyzes Collateralised Debt Obligations (‘CDOs’), complex securities that were at the heart of the recent financial crisis. The difficulties of analyzing these securities are considered, and it is argued that the increasing complexity of CDOs that repackaged Mortgage-Backed Securities outpaced the returns available to investors, and therefore the resources available to pay for the analysis required to value the securities adequately within the timeframe available. CDOs therefore faced the problem of computational intractability. Such an outcome was, the article argues, inevitable in financial innovation that sought to create ever-higher returns from the fixed returns on a pool of assets. CDOs created what the article labels a Lemon-Squeezing Problem. Implications for regulatory responses to the crisis are briefly explored.

Keywords:
Financial markets, financial regulation, financial crisis, derivatives, market devices

‘If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it’. Peter Drucker
Introduction

At the heart of the financial crisis, it is widely argued, lay Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), especially those whose underlying assets were Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs). Understanding these complicated financial instruments is central to understanding first why difficulties in the relatively small financial market of sub-prime mortgages became a systemic global financial crisis, and second to consider appropriate regulatory responses. This article also examines CDOs in detail, but focuses on the problems of valuing these securities, to reach novel conclusions as to the underlying problem with the financial innovation that produced these ‘toxic assets’. We show that the nature of CDOs meant that it was impossible for the returns they offered to be sufficient to meet the costs of analyzing them satisfactorily.

The successive ‘slicing and dicing’ of a finite cash flow from a pool of assets inevitably increases complexity and equally inevitably outruns the analytical computational capacity to complete timely evaluation that investors buying low return securities could justify paying. Asymmetric information has been seen as lying at the heart of the problem with CDO evaluation. In the terminology of the classic article by Akerlof (1970), there is a lemons problem. The CDO market, in the same way as the second-hand car market Akerlof discusses, is undermined by the fact that sellers possess superior information about the product for sale than buyers (‘lemons’ is American slang for a second-hand car that turns out to be very unsatisfactory). We show that the CDO market also involves what the article calls a ‘lemon-squeezing problem’: the inherent conflict between fixed returns (a finite quantity of ‘lemon juice’) and the growing complexity of CDOs, a complexity that outpaced the resources needed to understand it.
This article draws on 104 interviews with participants in the credit derivatives and asset-backed securities markets in the US and UK (based mainly in London and New York). The 90 interviewees (some of whom were interviewed more than once) were made up of 16 current or former rating agency employees, 19 quantitative modellers, 37 arrangers, brokers or traders of MBS and/or CDOs, 6 regulators and 12 in various other roles in these markets. These were semi-structured interviews, which we recorded (except on the rare occasions interviewees refused permission) and had transcribed. Documentary sources are also analyzed, including the offering circulars (the information provided to prospective purchasers, sometimes also referred to as a prospectus) for a range of MBSs and CDOs, and interview recordings, taken from the website of the United States’ Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC).

We contribute to two bodies of literature. The first is the literature on ‘market devices’, which is heavily influenced by the work of Callon (1998). The second body of literature (also burgeoning, but rather more disparate than the first) to which we contribute concerns the role of complexity in finance, for example in the genesis of the credit crisis (e.g., Arora, et al., 2009; Bryan, et al., 2012; Engelen, et al., 2012).

The structure of the article is as follows: in the next, second, section we discuss the two bodies of literature to which we make a contribution. Section three briefly introduces CDOs. Section four considers the analysis of CDOs, discussing the analytical software system Intex, which our interviews revealed was crucial to the MBS and CDO markets. Section five focuses on the low returns on highly rated CDO tranches, and section six on the need for timely analysis. In section seven, we consider the increasing complexity of the structural innovations in the CDO market, and how this has outpaced the increase in returns at each
stage of market innovation. Section eight looks at the ways market participants try to deal with computational limitations. Section nine concludes.

**Market devices and computational complexity: The literature**

This section discusses the two areas of existing literature to which we contribute, and outlines that contribution. We discuss first the literature on market devices, and the lack of consideration for the cost of these devices. We then consider the literature on computational complexity and the limits of computing capacity.

**Recognising the Cost of Market Devices**

Examples of market devices range from the mundane (supermarket shelving and trollies) to the esoteric (pricing systems in financial-derivatives markets) and from technological objects (such as stock tickers) to mathematical concepts (such as those deployed in financial economics). Market devices are ‘the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets’ (Muniesa, et al., 2007: 2). The work sparked by Callon and by the focus on the role of devices in economic life has been influential, not least in highlighting the importance of these often-overlooked influences on market outcomes (MacKenzie, 2006 and 2011) and in drawing on examples dealing with a physical commodity (Çalışkan, 2010). Nevertheless, the work has been the object of multiple critiques, for example for its ‘neglect of power and politics’ (Ertürk, et al., 2013: 338; Mirowski and Nik-Khah, 2007). The critique that is most relevant here, however, is that the literature on market devices tends to ‘miss that which is precisely capitalist about capitalism: namely that the aim of any private enterprise is to generate profit, not construct a market’ (Ertürk, et al., 2013: 339). Paradoxically, the burgeoning literature on the role of devices in economic life contains surprisingly little
discussion of the economics of those devices, of how much they cost, relative to the revenue available for their acquisition and use. That issue that is our focus here.

Analytical Complexity and Computational Limitations

In the literature on the role of complexity in finance, the notion of ‘complexity’ is sometimes used in the everyday sense; more rarely, the formal meaning of ‘computational complexity’ (touched on below) is deployed, as for example by Mirowski (2010). In both meanings of the term, it is clear that in the run-up to the credit crisis, the process of financial innovation – well characterized by Engelen and his colleagues as involving not a ‘rationalist grand plan’ but bricolage, ‘the creative and resourceful use of materials at hand… to fashion new structures out of conjunctural events’ (Engelen, et al., 2011: 51) – led to a sharp increase in the complexity of financial instruments, and that this complexity (and the resultant opacity of those instruments and of the economic circuits in which they were implicated) was an important driver of the crisis.

Issues of analytical complexity are clearly not confined to the social sciences; they are also, unsurprisingly, a central focus of computer science. One example is the ‘Travelling Salesman problem’, concerning the absolute and increasing computational difficulty of calculating the optimum journey between points. A recent solution involving 85,900 points justified a Princeton University Press monograph and required the equivalent of years of computing time. This is an ‘NP-complete’ (Nondeterministic Polynomial) problem: the difficulty of calculating a solution increases exponentially with additional points (Maymin, 2011). For the purposes here, a solution may be even more impractical if it must be found quickly with limited resources. With CDOs, the resources available to pay for analysis are the return on the securities in question, and they are intrinsically constrained by the initial pool of assets.
involved. The core of the self-undermining nature of the financial innovation involved in CDOs results from this constraint of limited resources for analysis. Increasing complexity is required to produce ever-greater volumes of highly-rated securities from an underlying pool of assets whose returns cannot increase. (The assets underpinning a MBS or CDOs are debt instruments – mortgages, loans, etc. – and the returns from these are fixed by the underlying contracts.\(^1\)) Fixed returns result in complexity outstripping calculative capacity. Financial innovators faced a ‘Lemon-Squeezing Problem’ which undermined financial stability.

The article therefore seeks to bring questions of computational complexity into discussions of financial markets and their regulation. At its most ambitious, the literature on computational complexity points out the incompatibility of computational and market efficiency (Maymin, 2011), and looks to challenge neoclassical macroeconomics (Mirowski, 2010). We join Hasanhodzic, et al. (2009) and Arora, et al. (2009) in seeing the issue of computational complexity as an extreme example of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). For Simon, our ability to act rationally is not limited by the availability of information, but rather by our ability to process that information because of limited computational capacity. In our analysis, the constraint on rationality is available resources relative to the time and computational capacity required to value securities.

Arora, et al. (2009) see the issue in terms of informational asymmetries and Akerlof’s lemons problem: ‘designers of financial products can rely on computational intractability to disguise their information via suitable “cherry picking”.’ Such problems of information asymmetry certainly exist within the story of CDOs. Goldman Sachs’ infamous Abacus transactions are a well-known example, and legal actions against Goldman seek to demonstrate the firm’s information advantage (see, e.g., Lewis Baach, 2011). We focus, however, on the
‘intractability’ or ‘infeasibility’ of calculation, within the available returns on the securities involved. Computational intractability, within available resources, is a problem for a market actor with all relevant information (see Hasanhodzic, et al., 2009, although their focus is not CDOs or derivatives), rather than with almost all relevant information (Arora, et al., 2009). This is not a lemons problem, but a lemon-squeezing problem. Two striking features of the CDO market support a focus away from information asymmetries. First, banks that structured the securities and owned mortgage-originating companies made substantial losses on holding the AAA-rated tranches of CDO issues they themselves structured. Any superior information these banks possessed did not protect them. Second, the necessary information to value these securities was available, using information systems such as Intex. The problem was only partly that few used this system, remarkable as that is. The overriding problem, our interviews revealed, was that using this system required uneconomic – in the sense of costing more than the returns available from owning the CDOs – amounts of skilled inputs and impractical levels of computer capacity to complete analysis within the resources and time available.

The returns on CDOs, and the increasingly limited time available for considering a purchase, means, we argue, that they must be ‘information-insensitive’ securities, requiring limited analysis (see, e.g., Gorton, 2010). The purchase of CDOs was part of the increased global demand for such debt securities in the years preceding the crisis. This fits with analysis that sees the crisis as more an issue of demand than supply. Global demand for low risk US$ securities in excess of available US Treasuries and Agency debt drove securitization (Bernanke, et al., 2011; Caballero, 2009). Such analyses draw us into the issue that dominates much discussion of the financial crisis, the question of who, if anyone, should be blamed. This article is not interested in exonerating anyone, least of all the bankers and credit rating
agencies involved in CDOs. Issues of complexity and the limits of knowledge as contributors to the crisis, and the implications for apportioning blame, are considered elsewhere (e.g., Bryan, et al., 2012; Engelen, et al., 2012). This article suggests fault lies with actors and structure, but (mainly) with actors who should have recognized the need for far greater analysis, and that the financial innovation involved in CDOs did not, and could not, allow returns that were sufficient for this analysis.

Collateralized Debt Obligations: A Brief Introduction

A bank arranging a CDO sets up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), a company whose sole purpose is to buy assets (collateral) that comprise other debt securities (Bomfin, 2005). The assets considered here are Residential MBSs, which themselves buy and securitize residential mortgages. In return for a higher return, investors in the least senior tranches accept the first losses from non-payment on the underlying assets. The most senior (including ‘super-senior’) tranches offer very low returns, a AAA rating and (supposedly) minimal risk of loss. Figure 1 sets out the structuring of a CDO which buys MBSs.
In the CDO market the less creditworthy tranches are further securitized into predominantly highly-rated, but a smaller volume of lowly-rated, tranches. The process was then repeated with these lowly-rated tranches. This is the lemon-squeezing whose inherent problems we explore. The highly-rated securities sold to investors offer higher returns at each stage of this chain of transactions, but the returns remain low (and had to remain low, since they were limited by the cash flow from the ultimate underlying assets) relative to the increasing complexity, and therefore analytical difficulties, of the securities.

**Analysing CDOs: the Intex system**
In this section, we discuss the single most important market device employed by participants for analyzing CDOs, a software system called Intex. When we began this research we were unaware of Intex (it had not, and has not attracted academic attention) until an interviewee told us about it in January 2009. ‘I defy anyone to … deal with [the complexity of MBSs and CDOs] without extensive computer power and big embedded software’, he said. ‘And Intex provided that. Without it, this market could simply not exist.’

Unlike the systems employed by ratings agencies such as the Gaussian copula model (see MacKenzie, 2011), Intex is simply a cash-flow model. Once the structural characteristics of the MBS or CDO are crystallized in the form of an Intex file (a task normally undertaken by the banks seeking to sell the tranches of the MBS or CDO), a prospective purchaser can choose a variety of scenarios, and use Intex to investigate the future returns for the tranches of the MBS or CDO. An MBS purchaser, for example, could choose a mortgage default rate and some other assumptions, and the Intex system will work out from these the resultant cash flows and whether or not a given tranche will default (i.e., fail to repay contracted amounts of interest and principal to investors).

Although other similar systems were available, Intex seems to have been most widely used for tasks such as this. Even a simple vanilla MBS is a complex instrument (in the ordinary sense of the term ‘complex’), hard to get one’s head around: the offering circular is an incomplete account of the instrument, and one that cannot easily be processed for the purposes of economic analysis; the full legal documentation of a MBS or CDO runs to hundreds of daunting, unreadable pages. An Intex file, in contrast, captures the structure of a MBS or CDO in a way that is easily transferrable from the computer system of the bank constructing the CDO to the prospective purchaser’s. The purchaser can then try out the
consequences of a variety of scenarios, decide whether or not to buy, or perhaps whether to request the constructor to change the instrument’s structure so that it was more attractive.

Other ways of evaluating MBSs and CDOs are also briefly touched on in section eight, where we consider how market participants dealt with computational limitations, but Intex is central to our argument. We ask what was involved in performing an Intex analysis on different instruments in the MBS and CDO markets and how long it might take. We also ask whether it could be paid for from the returns offered by the instruments. We do not claim to provide quantitatively exact answers to those questions – that would require data that we do not have, and may never have been collected by market participants – but the differences demonstrated between the economic and computational characteristics of the evaluation of the instruments we discuss are so large that the qualitative conclusions drawn are robust, and the implications significant.

**Low returns on highly rated CDO tranches**

In this section, we consider the surprisingly low returns available to the purchasers of CDOs, a crucial component of our argument that these returns were inevitably too low to pay for the analysis needed.

**Low Returns for Risk Taking**

Popular discussion of, and political discourse regarding, the financial crisis have made much of financial market actors’ greed (FCIC, 2011; Madrick, 2011; Mason, 2009). It is therefore noteworthy how low profit margins actually were for those financial institutions bearing the ultimate risk: the Dublin unit responsible for the collapse of Landesbank Sachsen, which
made investments in CDOs, made a total profit in 2005 of €44.2 million on investment of €8.3 billion (Kirchfeld and Simmons, 2008), or 0.53 percent. Deutsche Bank, in its 2007 annual report, noted earnings of just €6 million on commitments supporting similar investments of €6.3 billion, Bank of New York Mellon US$3 million on commitments of US$3.2 billion, both returns of 0.10 percent (Acharya, et al., 2011: 29; see also Arteta, et al., 2008). Market participants therefore faced not only the computational difficulties of analysing these securities: it was also that the returns they offered were too low to pay for such a full analysis.

**Low Fees for Collateral Managers**

Low returns for what should be complex analysis also occur elsewhere in the chain of transactions involved in a CDO. Part of the complexity is that these financial structures generally use a collateral manager. These managers are not buying securities on their own behalf, but choose the underlying assets on behalf of the final investors (Engelen, et al., 2011; Lewis, 2010). Investors quite reasonably feel collateral managers should protect their interests, but management fees were not high for what should have been a complex role. In one manager’s case, annual fees were said to be 0.09 – 0.17 percent of the transaction volume, with around 0.25 percent of additional performance fee (Shenn, 2010). Another estimate is that fees were 0.45 - 0.75 percent (Salas and Hassler, 2007). In equity fund management, these are fees closer to those charged by passive managers (investors that track the index rather than choosing individual stocks), not active managers, and fees appear to have declined over time (Chau, 2010). The total fees paid to CDO managers are large, at least US$1.5 billion for 2003-07 (FCIC, 2011: 131). However, that amount represents only 0.11 – 0.23 percent of the total volume of CDOs (depending on the estimates of total volume used). CDO management was popular not because fees were high, but because managers had to do
little analysis to earn them: ‘The CDO manager, in practice, didn’t do much of anything…’ two guys and a Bloomberg terminal in New Jersey’ was Wall Street shorthand for the typical CDO manager’ (Lewis, 2010: 141). Returns were maximized not by increased analysis of particular securities, but by not doing ‘much of anything’ on the largest volume of securities possible. Across the CDO industry, similar incentives resulted in huge volumes of insufficiently-analyzed securities.

The need for timely analysis

Low returns had to pay for analysis that was not only highly complex, but also needed to be completed very quickly by nearly all market participants. In this section, we consider the need for timely analysis for a range of actors in the CDO market, before discussing the significant time advantages available to those who shorted – sold securities they did not own in the hope of profiting from price falls – CDOs.

Daily Valuation of Trading Books

Banks increased their return on equity, the return made for shareholders, before the crisis in part through higher leverage assisted by the favourable capital treatment of bonds held on trading books, where banks accounted for the ownership of securities they were expected to buy or sell frequently. The Federal Reserve’s Norah Barger (2010) suggests that much of the buying of the most creditworthy and lowest yielding CDO tranches (our focus in this article) only occurred because of lower capital requirements on trading books. Trading book assets must be revalued daily. The bonds on the trading books are also frequently bought with money borrowed, on a secured basis, overnight, in ‘repo’ markets widely seen as central to
the financial crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2009), which also require daily (if not more frequent) valuation. This introduces time pressure into calculations (see also Spears, 2014).

**Primary Market Purchases by CDO Managers**

CDO managers also needed timely analysis. The competition amongst CDO managers to buy assets, combined with the incentives for the constructing banks to sell quickly, meant that the time available for analysis for the purchase of the ‘mezzanine’ (BBB rated) tranches on which the CDO market depended was extremely short. It also declined as the mania gathered pace, falling from a week to a day or even less. One CDO manager told us his firm was able to do the analysis using Intex ‘in an hour or two’. Almost regardless of the amount spent on computer capacity, this was not sufficient time for a comprehensive analysis. The bespoke nature and small size of mezzanine tranches (only 3 percent of the original MBS in the typical structure shown in Figure 1 above) meant that they were illiquid – difficult to buy and sell – in the secondary market, so CDO managers had little choice but to buy new issues. In an example of how the dynamics of a bubble can reduce the time available for analysis, all the tranches of a new MBS were often sold within less than four hours.

**The Time Advantage of Short Sellers**

The most common explanation for the success of short sellers – investors, such as hedge funds, that made trades in the expectation of prices falling – is that a lemons problem exists. However, the success of short sellers fits well within our lemon-squeezing explanation. First, in contrast to the ‘long only’ buyer discussed elsewhere in this article, a hedge fund shorting an MBS or CDO is expecting substantial price falls and therefore substantial profit. The financial incentive to pay for analysis is therefore far higher. Second, the short seller does not face the time pressure of the MBS or CDO purchaser. The market opportunity is very
unlikely to disappear within hours. Whatever the rights and wrongs of Goldman’s Abacus transactions, Paulson & Co. clearly had the time they needed to select the assets they wished to short. Even so, it is noteworthy that the short sellers highlighted (e.g., by Lewis, 2010) generally shorted MBSs, not CDOs, despite the fact that they would have made even greater profits from shorting CDOs. This may suggest that short sellers also faced difficulties in analyzing CDOs.

The increasing complexity of CDOs

In the article so far we have outlined the broad constraints faced by CDO market participants in the analysis of the bonds they purchased. We have focused on two key issues: the economics of market devices and the complexity of financial instruments. In this section, we develop this argument by analyzing in detail the increasing complexity of the financial instruments which were structured in the CDO market as innovation developed. We investigate just what was involved in evaluating three classes of instrument of increasing complexity: 1) a ‘vanilla’ MBS; 2) a CDO of MBSs, in which tranches of MBSs (most commonly BBB rated) form the ‘pool’ of assets underpinning the CDO (see Figure 1 above); and 3) a CDO-squared, in which tranches of other CDOs, again most often BBB rated, form the asset pool. As this market became even more overheated, ‘CDO-cubed’ issues were also structured, repackaging tranches of CDO-squared, but we do not have access to an offering circular for such an issue.

Our presentation of a relatively straightforward linear process of financial innovation is of course highly simplified. Financial market actors, seeking to squeeze the lemon to create more saleable securities from the capped returns from the underlying mortgages, were
engaged in a far more complicated process than we outline here. The argument we make regarding the analytical intractability of these bonds, however, is only strengthened by any additional complexity.

In the next section, we first discuss a simple approach to demonstrating how increased complexity outpaced the resources (the returns from owning the securities) available for analysis. We then discuss interviewees’ experiences in using Intex to value these securities, before presenting further evidence of analytical difficulties.

**Increasing Complexity Outpaces Increasing Returns**

Our simplistic approach to the problem of increasing complexity outpacing increasing returns at successive stages of CDO innovation compares the returns available on the highest yielding AAA tranche\(^{iv}\) of the three classes of instrument, compared to the number of underlying mortgages which would need to be analyzed for each instrument. We use information from the offering circulars of three such instruments, which show the relevant returns and either give the actual number of underlying mortgages or allow a sensible estimate.\(^v\) To calculate the return, we assume the investors investing money borrowed from depositors or wholesale markets.\(^vi\) The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) represents a reasonable proxy for the cost of that borrowing. An investor therefore borrows funds at a cost of LIBOR, and uses those funds to invest in a security that gives a return of LIBOR plus a margin. The borrowing cost of LIBOR is matched by the LIBOR earned on the investment. This leaves a fixed margin, or return, regardless of changes in LIBOR. In the case of the MBS analyzed, this is 0.24 percent. We assumed an investment of US$100 million, giving a fixed return is US$240,000 on the MBS. The MBS had bought 4507 mortgages, giving a
return of US$53.25 for each mortgage in the pool of underlying collateral. For the CDO and CDO squared, the same methodology was used, as summarized in Table 1:

Table 1: Returns and Number of Underlying Mortgages, Various Securitization Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MBS(^{\text{viii}})</th>
<th>CDO(^{\text{x}})</th>
<th>CDO Squared(^{\text{x}})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Margin on Highest Yielding AAA Tranche</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on $100m Investment</td>
<td>US$240,000</td>
<td>US$400,000</td>
<td>US$1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Underlying Mortgages</td>
<td>4507</td>
<td>352,000(^{\text{xi}})</td>
<td>19,600,000(^{\text{xii}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return per Underlying Mortgage</td>
<td>$53.25</td>
<td>$1.14</td>
<td>$0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted above, ‘CDO-cubed’ were also arranged. If the CDO-cubed had as its collateral 50 CDO-squared securities, the number of underlying mortgages rises to 98,000,000.

As Table 1 shows, the returns to investors from investing in the highest yielding AAA tranche of each instrument increased considerably with each stage of innovation. However, the number of underlying mortgages which needed to be understood for a full analysis increased far more substantially. As a result, the return per underlying mortgage – our proxy of the resources available for analysis – falls, from $53.25 for the MBS to just 7 cents for the CDO-squared.

Central to the lemon-squeezing problem is the fact that the pool of mortgages initially created produces a fixed return. The investor has an amount of money to invest, in return for which it receives a portion of the cash flow from the mortgages. The bank constructing the deal can make changes to the structure, but the returns from the mortgages cannot materially change.
Adding more mortgages to the pool would not increase the return to an investor investing a fixed amount. The solution is the innovation of CDOs and CDO-squared, which increase returns, but at the cost of exponentially increasing complexity.

The article contends that the analysis of MBSs was feasible within the context of the resources available (the return on the bonds), and could continue on an ongoing basis with the frequency required to hold these bonds on a bank trading book. This feasibility can only be a contention (and clearly many initial purchasers likely regret their analysis, given subsequent events), but is based on a number of points. First, the MBS market was dominated by the largest investors who could meet the cost of analysis (including the purchase of Intex). Furthermore, absolutely precise valuation is not the issue, given the enormous losses subsequently made. Large financial institutions could still aggregate information across the various deals they held. To create sufficiently accurate outputs from Intex, it was not necessary to understand the detailed development of every mortgage, but to have a clearer picture of what was occurring with sub-prime mortgage lending in, say, California or Florida. This clearer picture could come with some analysis of the individual mortgages when the mortgages are of the number in an MBS, but not with the subsequent innovation of CDOs.

**Increasing Difficulties of Intex Analysis of the Three Instruments**

In this section, we use interview data to consider the difficulties of Intex analysis of the three instruments, starting with MBSs. One interviewee demonstrated a single Intex ‘run’ for a specific tranche of such a MBS. Inputting the necessary data (he used simply fixed values of the inputs, not – as he normally would – inputs that varied through time) took around 20 seconds, and the Intex system then took around 30 seconds to calculate the future cash flows to an investor in the tranche. He was using the version of Intex available to internet
subscribers, but he told the authors that the system’s response time would be faster – fewer than ten seconds – using the version running on his bank’s own servers. On the other hand, he would normally have to input full monthly curves of interest rates and default rates for the lifetime of the security. Nevertheless, he said that a single run could be completed in ‘minutes’.

A single run would not count as adequate analysis of the MBS. This would require multiple runs, interviewees told us. A full Monte Carlo simulation to get a ‘rough price’ would need 100,000 runs and ‘a million simulations or more to get some decent risk measures’. The inputs for this simulation could of course be entirely automated, but with each run taking a few seconds of computation time, the simulation was a time consuming task. It could be speeded up, for example by distributing the task over multiple computers, and certainly was not entirely impossible. It involves assumptions about future events (for example, prepayments – early redemptions by the borrowers – of fixed rate mortgages are closely linked to US government bond yields), but so must all investment. Consideration of the 4507 underlying residential mortgages in the MBS analyzed above is essential to ensure the aggregated assumptions about this mortgage pool entered into Intex produce valid outputs. The need for accurate assumptions will add time to any analysis. Nor is Intex cheap; the bank at which our interviewee demonstrated Intex was paying US$1.5 million p.a. to use it. This cost is presumably a major factor in the low use of Intex amongst (particularly European) investors. However, as our simplistic analysis above suggests, and what interviewees told us confirmed, Intex analysis of a ‘vanilla’ MBS was possible within the required resource and time constraints.
The same claim could not be made regarding the analysis of CDOs, which widely used Intex. That task was vastly more time consuming than analyzing a single MBS. First, appropriate inputs for the default rate, etc., must be chosen for each MBS: given the differences among them, choosing the same default rate for all of them was clearly inadequate, but judging the appropriate rates was a skilled, time-consuming human task. Then Intex had to be configured first to run a cash flow analysis for each underlying MBS, and second to feed the inputs from these analyses into the Intex model of the CDO. While, as noted above, a single run of Intex for a specific MBS tranche would take ‘minutes’, an interviewee told the authors that a single run of a CDO, ‘doing loan-level modeling for the underlying [MBS] bonds then applying it to [the] CDO… would have taken hours. So you might set [it] running on the evening then come back the next morning to look at the results [for a] single scenario’.

Given that, it is not surprising that interviews suggest that the analysis of CDOs using Intex typically took the form of only a handful of runs: a base case, incorporating the analysts’ most likely scenario, and a small number (perhaps as few as three, an interviewee reported) of ‘stressed’ scenarios to get some sense of the consequences of adverse outcomes. No interviewee reported attempting anything approaching a full Monte Carlo simulation: with a single run taking several hours, a million runs was clearly infeasible, even if one were able to distribute the computational task over multiple machines. (In 2006-7, an investment-bank computer room might have upwards of a thousand machines in it, but ‘parallelizing’ a programme is never fully efficient: running it on a thousand machines is not a thousand times as fast as running it on one, e.g. because the machines must communicate with each other.) The computation simply could not be completed in time.
These difficulties were very significantly compounded with CDO-squareds, which rendered even a single Intex run hugely time consuming. One interviewee told us that in consequence he simply avoided such CDOs: ‘I never did a … CDO with other CDOs in an underlying pool – never would have done – because I believe them…computationally intractable’. In addition, sharp-eyed readers will notice that the 98 million mortgages in a CDO-cubed are more than the total number of mortgages outstanding in the United States. Even 19.6 million, as in the CDO-squared analyzed above, is approaching half the total. The lemon-squeezers faced another constraint: there were not enough mortgages outstanding to achieve the diversification on which the ratings should have depended. Two solutions were employed, both increasing analytical complexity. Different asset types were included in the collateral pool, such as commercial MBSs in the CDO analyzed here. This represents at least partial diversification, but increases the range of expertise needed for the assumptions underpinning the Intex calculations. The other solution, increasingly common is 2006-7, is highly questionable in terms of diversification, and involved very significantly increased analytical complexity. The term an interviewee used for this solution was ‘circles’, whereby CDOs invest in each other’s asset pools. Circles often resulted from a ‘scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’ agreement between two CDO managers. CDO A would include a tranche of CDO B in its asset pool, and vice versa. The resultant computational ‘loop’ made evaluation ‘completely intractable’ said another interviewee: even a single Intex run was now effectively impossible.

Problems of a Changing Collateral Pool

Our discussion thus far understates the challenges in valuing CDOs, because it assumes a fixed pool of assets. Many CDOs, including those analyzed here, employ a collateral manager (see above), which MBSs do not. The collateral manager – within constraints set out in the
issue documentation, and, it has been claimed, subject to pressure from banks arranging CDOs (see, e.g., Shenn, 2010) – sells and buys assets in the collateral pool. Investors do not therefore face a constant collateral pool to analyze. A similar problem is that many deals have a ‘ramp-up period’. This involves a period – up to six months (Shivdasani and Wang, 2009: 9) – after the investors have bought the CDO tranches when further assets are purchased (again within preset constraints) to increase the size of the collateral pool. Cash flows into the CDO from amortization, maturities, prepayment or sales are also reinvested by the manager. Although the investors know the broad characteristics of these assets, they do not know the specific assets. This is particularly important when, as in subprime mortgages, the quality of the underlying assets deteriorated over time. CDO investors in 2005, for example, when subprime mortgages were of generally higher quality, found that their CDO bought mortgages from 2006 and 2007, when quality had significantly deteriorated (Goodman, et al., 2008: 286).

Further Evidence of the Problems of Analytical Complexity

We next discuss further anecdotal evidence which strongly supports the conclusion that computational complexity constrained analytical capacity. Barger (2010) recounts how Citigroup in late 2007 told regulators that they had not been including AAA CDOs in calculations to determine capital against their trading book. They were told to calculate the requirement as soon as possible. Citigroup had to analyze individual mortgages (the process discussed above), and took ‘several months’. In addition, investment banks’ valuation of the same financial product varied widely and valuation of different tranches within banks could be mutually inconsistent (Arora, et al., 2009). In part, this results from ‘clusters of [very different] evaluation practices’ (MacKenzie, 2011), but it also points to analytical difficulties. The long time that layered Intex models (i.e., analysis of CDOs that had purchased tranches
of MBSs) take to complete their calculations discouraged (with hindsight essential) evaluation. Even with enormous computing capacity (see discussion of Goldman Sachs, which still employed a shortcut, below), it is not clear that the analysis could be fast enough for daily revaluation of all positions. The complaint by Basis Yield Alpha Fund against Goldman Sachs discusses a ‘CDO valuation project’, which used ‘three different valuation methods to price all of its remaining CDO warehouse assets and unsold securities’ (Lewis Baach, 2011: 30); xvi i.e., ex post valuation of assets. The physical constraints for any investor attempting even incomplete evaluation were not just physical space and cost, but even the air-conditioning capacity to deal with the heat from hundreds of computers.

Dealing with computational limitations

Given the difficulties, outlined above, of analyzing a CDO from the ‘bottom up’ – i.e. by doing multiple Intex runs with different assumptions about the behaviour of the underlying mortgage pools – it is unsurprising that market participants sought analytical ‘shortcuts’. In this section, we explore the most common shortcuts and how these approaches failed to provide satisfactory valuations.

Top-Down Analysis

By far the most common analytical shortcut was ‘the bond method’, or top-down analysis, involving no analysis of the underlying mortgage pools. Instead, the behavior of an MBS (or CDO in a CDO-squared structure) tranche was simply inferred from its credit rating, and the CDO was analyzed as if it were simply a CDO made up of corporate bonds. That is how the rating agencies and many market participants analyzed CDOs (MacKenzie, 2011). However, although default probabilities inferred from ratings had some credibility, the bond method
also required inputting figures for the correlations among MBS tranches: ‘There was never a
good source of correlation numbers’, reported an interviewee. As he told the authors, there
was a widespread understanding amongst market participants that the correlation figures (of
the order of 0.3) used by the rating agencies were far too low, but what was much less clear
was how high a figure to use: 0.5, 0.7, maybe even 0.8. Even now, the correct correlation
remains unclear. Indeed, most specialists would now agree that the bond method rested on a
mistaken analogy between MBS tranches and companies: it involved, as an interviewee put
it, ‘mistaking tranches for companies’.

Goldman Sachs developed perhaps the most intriguing shortcut. They employed, so an
interviewee said, a hybrid of the ‘bond method’ (top-down) and bottom-up analysis. It was
computationally very demanding – requiring a ‘computer farm’ in New Jersey, the authors
were told – but tractable. Goldman, however, was as far as we can tell the only market
participant to do things this way. Others either satisfied themselves with a relatively small
number of Intex runs, or fell back on the bond method.

**Outsourcing Analysis**

A common alternative shortcut was simply to outsource the credit analysis. A number of
legal actions argue that CDO arrangers and/or managers had responsibility for the securities
they sold, effectively challenging *caveat emptor*, or ‘buyer beware’ (e.g, Lewis Baarth,
2011). The main outsourcing, however, was to the rating agencies, particularly for AAA-
rated tranches, and criticism of their role is widespread. However, the key point to note here
is that rating agencies face the same constraints as investors. The rating agencies cannot be
exonerated for their role in the CDO market (and the reported failure of Moody’s and
possibly of other agencies even to subscribe to Intex is particularly noteworthy), but the
extreme analytical challenge and time pressure of such volumes of initial ratings and ongoing monitoring was far beyond the challenge facing any individual bank or CDO manager. At the 2006 peak, Moody’s was rating on average more than two new CDOs every business day (FCIC, 2011: 149).

None of the rating agencies did bottom-up analyses of CDOs: they all used variants of the bond method (fatally, with modest estimates of correlation). The closest to a bottom-up rating-agency analysis we found was a relatively small-scale experiment broadly similar to the hybrid method employed by Goldman Sachs (although as far as we can tell it was done entirely independently, with no interaction between the two teams). Correlations of around 0.8 were found, far above the 0.3 used in the bond method of CDO rating. It remained, however, just an experiment, with no influence on practice at the agency; the group conducting it did not have organizational responsibility for CDOs. It was ‘a case of intellectual curiosity’, one of the experimenters told us; CDO rating ‘wasn’t “under our watch” at the time’. The agencies did do significant analysis: Moody’s, for example, included a matrix with 1000 scenarios (Adelson, 2010), and Standard and Poor’s Monte Carlo based modeling tool does 500,000 iterations (Alblescu, 2010). However, these 500,000 iterations, which could be performed on a standard computer in less than a minute, did not ‘drill down’ to the underlying mortgages. Investors could not avoid the lemon-squeezing problem by outsourcing analysis to the rating agencies, as the agencies were not – and could not be – paid amounts sufficient for the analysis necessary.

**Successful Outsourcing Before CDOs**

In the market for MBSs before the emergence of CDOs, investors buying highly-rated tranches effectively outsourced analysis to investors in the mezzanine tranches of the
structure (see Adelson and Jacob, 2008). These specialist investors received relatively high returns for potentially significant risk. They therefore had the resources and incentive to complete meaningful credit analysis on the underlying mortgage portfolios. The unique position of these investors in the market also meant that they were given the necessary time to complete their analysis, which included examining the electronic records of the underlying mortgages. Essentially, investors in the more senior, low return tranches were dependent on the quality of this analysis. CDOs undermined this role, because CDOs purchased the mezzanine tranches at tighter spreads and with less time for analysis than traditional mezzanine investors were prepared to accept.

**Conclusion**

Space precludes a detailed discussion of how successful specific regulatory responses to the crisis have been in addressing the Lemon-Squeezing Problem. It is clear that increased capital requirements for trading books, especially for the securities we discuss here, leverage limits and greater scepticism about bank risk models are all potentially steps in the right direction. Complexity, in its more general sense, is both a recognised contributor to the crisis and an influence on regulatory responses, but these responses have addressed the issues discussed here largely accidently: the specific issue of the limits of computational capacity within finite resources has not been recognised. The result is that some responses – e.g., increasing competition in the credit rating industry – could arguably even make matters worse. The securitization industry is based on the use of increased complexity to squeeze ever greater returns from a finite income stream. That process must (and in only three steps did) reach the limits of computational capacity. Without regulatory constraint, this type of financial innovation will outpace increases in (affordable) computer power.
An important further question is obviously whether this inevitability is specific to CDOs, securitization generally, or is inherent in the bricolage (Engelen, et al., 2011: 51) that characterises financial market innovation more broadly. It is necessary to remain cautious regarding that conclusion, but it is nevertheless important to consider, first, the inherent problem with securitization, and, second, the extent to which attempts by financial market actors to deal with this inherent problem can be seen as applying in other forms of financial innovation. The inherent problem with securitization is the inevitable conflict between fixed returns – the interest on the assets in any underlying portfolio – and complexity – the computational difficulties that arise in the tranching of securities that is the central innovation of the securitization process.

There are two basic ways to deal with these limits on computational capacity. The first is to ‘outsource’ full analysis to others, be they the arrangers of the CDOs or the credit rating agencies. This can only be effective if the arrangers or agencies are being paid fees sufficient for them to complete the necessary analysis. In a market constrained by the lemon-squeezing problem, this cannot happen. The second is to use assumptions, as inputs to computer models, to simplify the analytical process, rather than undertaking sufficient analysis for the assumptions to be valid, and/or considering numbers of scenarios to cover a sufficient range of assumptions. One question regarding the more general applicability of the problems in the innovation of CDOs is therefore the extent to which these two approaches might be taken in other areas of financial innovation. There are certainly reasons to suggest that they might. Heavy reliance on the rating agencies, not least thanks to regulation, pervades financial markets, and much of the market for Exchange Traded Funds involves investors relying on arrangers of highly complex structures. Assumptions, particularly regarding the applicability
of past to future performance, are also central to financial markets, for example in the options market. Such assumptions were shown to be problematic with equity options in the 1987 stock market crash, but this did not prevent the assumption of no nationwide fall in US house prices causing financial disaster 20 years later.

The lemon-squeezing problem we highlight involves, at its heart, the increased complexity of trying to get ever more from a finite resource. Broad parallels can certainly be seen elsewhere in financial innovation, for example in developments in bank balance sheets in the years preceding the financial crisis. Banks increased their Return on Equity (the lemon juice) as their Return on Assets (the lemon) remained constant or even declined (Haldane, 2009). This was achieved by financial innovation (aided by regulatory forbearance) which both watered down what counted as bank capital and restructured assets (for example, turning mortgages into MBSs or BBB CDO tranches into AAA) in ways that reduced risk-weighted assets and allowed higher leverage. The result was greater complexity: ‘Banks appeared to have discovered a money machine, albeit one whose workings were sometimes impossible to understand’ (Haldane, 2009: 2). Equity investors temporarily received higher returns, but at the cost of banks they could not analyze. We argue in this article that financial innovation, in the specific case of CDOs, contains the seeds of its own destruction, because of the lemon-squeezing problem. Increasing complexity necessarily outpaces the resources to pay for the necessary analysis of this complexity. The extent to which this is inherent in financial innovation more widely is a question of considerable importance. The issues raised by computational complexity are therefore worthy of further study.
Payments to MBS or CDO investors are almost always fixed relative to LIBOR, and those investors in turn borrow at a cost also fixed relative to LIBOR. Therefore, interest rate rises increase the cashflow through the MBS or CDO, but generate no extra income for investors.

A further indication of their low returns.

A transaction undertaken for only one day also obviously reduces the return substantially. Lending US$100 million at, say, 3 per cent per annum overnight earns interest of slightly over $8000.

This is the most conservative possible approach. The overall conclusions apply even more strongly to the more senior, even lower yielding tranches. In the MBS analyzed, for example, three more senior tranches offered LIBOR plus 0.04, 0.14 and 0.16 percent respectively.

See http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/.

Banks were the main investors in the higher rated MBSs and CDOs. Hedge funds are similarly likely to be investing borrowed money. For investors in CMLT, see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/.

$240,000 divided by 4507.

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC2 (see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/).

Kleros Real Estate Finance I (see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/).

Timberwolf I (see http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/). 93 per cent of the collateral assets are Credit Default Swaps (CDS), so this is largely a ‘synthetic CDO’. Synthetic CDO sell CDS (i.e., are paid to take the risk of default on the reference securities underlying the CDS) rather than buying MBSs or CDOs. Issuance volumes are therefore constrained only by the willingness of financial institutions to ‘short’ the reference MBS or CDOs, either for hedging or speculation. Returns and risks on synthetic CDOs, however, are ultimately remain tied to the returns on the reference MBS or CDOs, which are securities of the kind discussed here, so the lemon-squeezing problem remains (for discussion of synthetic CDOs, see FCIC, 2010, 142-6).
Authors’ calculation based on maximum number if underlying securities under the single issuer concentration (prospectus, p.124), 88, multiplied by 4000, an estimation of the number of underlying mortgages in the chosen MBS. The lower number than 4507 is conservative, because the collateral includes ‘a substantial number’ (but a minority) of Commercial MBS, which have fewer underlying mortgages.

56 (number of underlying CDOs given in prospectus) multiplied by 350,000.

Monte Carlo simulation involves defining the range of possible values of each parameter (in this case, mortgage default rate, recovery rate, recovery time, prepayment rate and interest rates); creating a ‘scenario’ by using random numbers to choose a set of values within those ranges; calculating the result (in this case, cash flow) for that scenario; repeating the exercise many times (i.e., generating multiple scenarios); and aggregating the results across scenarios.

Particular features of CDOs’ ‘six-pack’ structure also increase the sensitivity of any valuation to the underlying assumptions used, further increasing complexity.

Barger says that Bank of America was in a similar position.

The case would presumably be strengthened if Goldman were shown to know the true value of the assets throughout.

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