Multi-level voting and party competition in vertically simultaneous elections: the case of Ukraine

Abstract:
Vertically simultaneous elections to state-wide and regional legislatures provide us with a naturally occurring experiment in which to examine regionalism and multi-level voting. We examine the 2006 vertically and horizontally simultaneous state-wide and regional elections in Ukraine to determine how the internal dynamics of regionalism within a state account for the dissimilarity of voting behaviour across electoral levels. Drawing on the party competition literature we demonstrate that variations in both supply (parties) and demand (voters) produce considerable dissimilarity between regional and state results, with lower levels of consolidation and greater fractionalisation at the regional level. We show that political cleavages operate differently across levels, that regional distinctiveness rather than regional authority better predicts first order-ness in regional elections and that voters display varying tolerance for polarisation at the regional and state level (132 words)

Keywords: multi-level voting; second-order theory; regionalism; Ukraine; simultaneous elections; party competition; regional parties

1. Introduction

Current research on multi-level voting provides us with contradictory expectations about the anticipated similarity of voter preferences across simultaneous elections and we can distinguish between second-order and balance approaches. For second order theorists (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984, 1985, 1997), votes cast in regional, sub-state elections might be cast on state issues, with voters using evaluations of state government performance to determine their vote choices across both electoral levels. Second order theory would therefore predict similar political preferences expressed in simultaneous
state-wide parliamentary and regional elections if regional elections are second-order contests. Balance theorists (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, 1996; Fiorina 1996; Erikson and Filipov 2001) would suggest that voters consciously stabilise the partisan composition of the political system, using sub-state elections to offset or balance the partisan distribution of power in the state arena (or vice versa). This would lead us to expect dissimilar preferences in simultaneous state and regional elections. To evaluate these rival claims we examine voting behaviour and the nature of party competition across two electoral levels during the vertically and horizontally simultaneous state-wide parliamentary and regional 2006 elections in Ukraine. The result is a considerable advance on our understandings of voting in multi-level polities and the ability of existing voting theories to account for electoral trends in post-Communist states.

2. Literature Review

For what we might call balance theorists, voters not only cast ballots differently at distinct electoral levels, they do so consciously to facilitate a partisan balance across the political system as a whole. Such research, which originally highlighted the way American voters sought to establish a partisan balance across the Presidency and Congress to ensure moderate policy choices (Erikson 1988, 1990; Fiorina 1996, Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, 1996; Scheve and Tomz 1999; Mebane 2000; Mughan 1988), has since been adapted to examine cross-level voting in federal political systems, most frequently in the U.S. (Simon, Ostrom and Marra 1991; Simon 1989; Carsey and Wright 1998), Canada (Erikson and Filipov 2001) and Germany (Gabriel 1989; Kern and Hainmüller 2006; Lohmann, Brady and Rivers 1997), as well as by-elections and local elections in the UK (Cook and Ramsden 1997; Curtice and Payne 1991). Although the balance hypothesis
originates from an examination of mid-term US elections, it has been shown to travel well to multi-level systems. Such research suggests that voters prefer moderate policy choices, and seek to facilitate these by delivering a system that balances partisan strength across institutions or levels. It is not surprising that such research originated in a two-party system, but research in Canada and Germany proves also that it may help us to understand the motivations of voters in multi-party systems. In such systems, the issues on which voters seek to establish a balance need not be economic left-right, but can include issues of national constitutional importance. Timing, in this sense the length of time between state and sub-state elections, is irrelevant. Regardless of whether elections are consecutive or concurrent we would expect dissimilar voting preferences in state-wide and regional elections.

For second order theorists, by contrast, the congruence or dissimilarity of voting decisions is conditional on what is ‘at stake’ in each election and the timing of elections. Those casting ballots in first order elections - when there is something ‘at stake’ because governments can be formed, or legislatures have considerable autonomy - use cues or evaluations specific to that democratic level (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984; 1985; 1997). In other words, voters casting ballots in state elections evaluate the performance of the state government, identify their preferences for state policy, or use cues provided by state political parties, to reach a voting decision. Those voting in second order elections might rely on cues and issues relevant to levels of ‘first-order’ importance. In practice, this can mean that voters casting ballots in European, regional or by-elections vote according to state issues or the performance of state governments, each second order election effectively serving as a referendum on government popularity or valence issues such as its handling of the economy. Such research, which claims that the salience of particular institutional levels affects the way in which voters reach their voting decisions,
has often been interpreted in a way that suggests regional elections are typically less important than state elections. This was not the original claim of Reif and Schmidt, who merely emphasised the influence of varying levels of institutional salience on voters.

Furthermore, for second order theorists, the timing of state and sub-state elections would influence what we might expect of voter preferences. Even if voters consistently use state cues to reach their voting decisions for both regional and state elections, we should not expect uniform vote choices from voters. A regional election held during the honeymoon period for a state government might well return the governing party to office in the region as well. One held later in the electoral cycle might punish the state governing party for its record. Reif and Schmitt (1980) argued that we can observe a cyclical effect to support for governing parties. Critically for us, however, the second order thesis would suggest that for elections held on the same day, voters would exhibit uniform preferences across levels, if the regional elections were not themselves first order contests (Hough and Jeffery 2006). This raises three distinctions between second order and balance approaches. For balance approaches, timing and state performance are less relevant, as decisions are motivated by the logic of balance: state-level incumbents will always fare worse in sub-state elections since the role of such elections is to balance the results of state contests. For second order approaches, timing, the salience of the sub-state legislature and the evaluation of state performance will determine whether a governing party maintains or loses support. In simultaneous elections where the regional institutional level is weak – where regional elections truly are second order contests – we would expect similar results.³

There is, of course, a considerable body of research which suggests that certain types of polities are more or less likely to produce regional elections that operate as second order contests. Certainly there is a growing consensus that regional elections need
not necessarily be second order, that voters demonstrate distinct preferences (Heath et al 1999, Hough and Jeffery 2003, Wolinetz and Carty 2006, Schakel and Jeffery 2011), and take into account the performance of regional governments (Cutler 2008, Johns et al 2009) or the regional economy (Atkeson and Partin 1995, Leyden and Borrelli 1995, Ebeid and Rodden 2006). Both Anderson (2006) and Cutler (2004) show that confusion over attributions of responsibility in federal systems can at the very least dampen the propensity of voters to punish state governments for any mishandling of the economy. We have reasons to suspect that ‘split–level democratic citizenship’ (Cutler 2008), in which voters perform differing evaluations across multiple levels, is easier in federal systems where sub-state jurisdiction is obvious to voters. This was, of course, one of the original claims of Reif and Schmidt, that the institutional salience of different democratic levels affects whether individuals treat the contests as first or second order. We know, likewise, that turnout is not uniformly lower in regional elections (Schakel and Dandoy 2014, Horiuchi 2005) but dependent on regional identity and regional autonomy (Henderson and McEwen 2010). Regional elections are more likely to operate as first order contests in regions where regional identity is high, or there is a greater degree of perceived distinctiveness, whether because of regional language, regional cultural institutions or regional parties (Henderson and McEwen 2010). This sits comfortably with research showing the resilience of regions to operate as distinct small political worlds (Agnew 1988; Agnew 1994; Elkins and Simeon 1980; Pallarés and Keating 2003; Shin and Agnew 2002). In short, the extent to which second order theory would predict similar preferences in simultaneous elections depends on whether regional elections are truly second order. How then might we evaluate the claims of second order and balance theorists?
We believe that the literature on party competition holds the key to distinguishing between the relative merits of balance and second order approaches. Research on party competition is useful for two reasons. First, debates about party nationalisation – the homogeneity of party strength across a state (Caramani 2004; Bochsler 2010) – suggest that we might find dissimilar trends at the state and sub-state level. Second, in its focus on supply and demand factors party competition research helps us to understand whether voter behaviour alone or voter and party behaviour is responsible for dissimilar preferences. We address each theme in turn.

Research on party competition suggests we might expect greater nationalisation – greater similarity of parties’ vote shares across the state - at state elections (Jones and Mainwaring 2003) and greater regional diversity for sub-state elections. This holds for Central and Eastern Europe (Meleshevich 2007) as well as Western Europe (Caramani 2004). Schakel and Jeffery (2013) argue that regional elections display lower levels of nationalisation, with variation increasing markedly as the timing between parliamentary and regional elections widens. Such research would suggest greater levels of inter-regional similarity for simultaneous elections. The indicators upon which such claims are based include the degree of congruence between party shares across sub-state units and variations in the effective number of parties across regions. These help us to identify the levels of nationalisation, and in so doing understand the capacity for similar voting results across electoral levels.

For our purposes, the party competition literature is also useful because it focuses on both the supply and demand side of electoral contests (Rose and Mishler 2010). Political parties clearly reflect the supply-side of electoral competition (Marsh and Norris, 1997; Katz 2008; Brunsbach, et al 2012; Pallarés and Keating 2006). Parties select candidates, establish electoral agendas and develop manifestos in the hope of introducing
their policy programmes when in office. Differences in the nature and number of parties standing for seats might affect the electoral outcomes at state-wide and regional elections as well as the potential for the similarity of results. If parties standing for office in regional elections do not contest seats in state-wide elections, then supply-side factors will affect the extent to which voters could ever express similar preferences across electoral levels. Voters, by contrast, present the demand side of the equation, and might make different voting decisions when faced with the same parties in different electoral arenas (Marsh and Norris, 1997; Katz 2008; Rose and Mishler 2010). Second order theory has long argued that voters are more willing to cast ballots for smaller parties in second order contests, where the stakes of electoral competition are low, than they are in first order contests. Of course we might find variations in both supply and demand across electoral levels. We know from studies of electoral competition that we are more likely to find regional or regionalist parties standing for seats in sub-state elections - where the chance of forming a government increases significantly - than in state-wide elections where such parties can at best hope to operate as swing votes in the national legislature. We can distinguish here between regional parties, which receive their vote share in one or a restricted number of regions (Brancati 2008) and regionalist parties, which seek greater self-government for particular regions (De Winter 1998). Both tend, in varying degrees, to appeal to regional identities that are popular within certain territorially bounded communities and to set agendas that are most relevant for particular regional arenas rather than for state-wide arenas (Schakel and Jeffery 2013; Passarelli and Tuorto 2012). Their presence provides an opportunity for variations in voter behaviour.

This leads us to our two main research questions: How similar or dissimilar are the voting results across vertically simultaneous; and how might we account for variations in support? For the first question we are interested not only in the similarity of preferences,
but interested too in whether we can record similar levels of nationalisation, fragmentation (Sartori, 1976: 120) and salient political cleavages\(^5\) across electoral levels. For the second question, we are interested to see whether regions which are typically more likely to produce first order sub-state contests are more likely to demonstrate dissimilar results, and interested too in the extent to which any variations in support are the product of supply as well as demand side factors. This leads to our more general aim, to distinguish between the ability of second-order and balance ‘theories’ to account for multi-level voting in simultaneous elections (and identify the conditions under which they may do so).

For the most part, efforts to examine multi-level voting have focused predominantly on the demand side of the equation (Johnston 1980; Clarke and Stewart 1987; Stewart and Clarke 1988; Erikson and Filipov 2001; Jeffery and Hough 2003; Cutler 2008; Hough and Jeffery 2005; Henderson and McEwen 2010; Schakel and Dandoy 2014). We believe, however, that variations in supply-side factors at different levels can affect the capacity of voters to express similar preferences across multiple levels and furthermore believe we can disaggregate among supply factors. We are interested in how parties coalesce into clusters, and whether the nature of clusters changes across levels. Our assessment of second order and balance approaches therefore takes into consideration demand-side behaviour as well as supply-side variations. Of particular interest to the supply side is the presence and role of regional parties.

If, as second-order theorists claim, smaller and more regional parties are more likely to contest seats at the sub-state level, voters may be given the opportunity to express dissimilar preferences at different levels. Of interest, however, is the extent to which such parties offer different political cleavages according to which electoral competition might be structured, or whether they reinforce existing political cleavages at
the state level. For example, the absence of regionalist parties in parliamentary elections and their presence in regional elections might introduce a regionalist dimension to party competition in sub-state elections that is otherwise lacking in state elections. Alternatively, regional parties might integrate themselves into a left-right political cleavage, providing merely an additional means of supporting a left or right-wing political bloc. Research interested merely in dissimilarity would view these two situations as identical, but a focus on political competition seeks to distinguish the ways in which voting and the context of voting might vary across different electoral levels.

3. Hypotheses

We believe that second order approaches are correct in their emphasis on institutional salience but believe that regional legislatures can serve as important organs of regional expression even in cases where institutional jurisdictional authority is minimal. Therefore:

\[ H1: \text{We will find significantly dissimilar voting patterns vertically simultaneous elections} \]

In keeping with the literature (Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Meleshevich 2007) on nationalisation and fragmentation, to the extent that there are dissimilar preferences across levels:

\[ H2: \text{We will find higher nationalisation and lower fragmentation for state elections and lower nationalisation and higher fragmentation for regional elections} \]

Furthermore, if we cluster parties by blocks, according to, for example, their economic position, attitudes towards language, foreign policy and history, we will be able to see whether voters support different parties but consistently back similar party clusters.
Support for one right-wing state-wide party might vary from one electoral level to the next, but if we group together all right-wing parties we would expect to see greater consistency of support. This clustering also allows us to determine if voter consistency is better explained by economic or identity motivations. Therefore:

**H3:** *We will find greater consistency when we examine electoral competition by electoral clusters rather than parties*

We believe that regional jurisdictions possessing linguistic and ethnic profiles that distinguish them from their neighbours, and in which there is an appetite for additional regional autonomy, are also more likely to develop political landscapes in which regional parties contest seats and where regional elections are fought on regional issues. We expect not only that regional elections will therefore be more fragmented but that the degree of fragmentation is dependent on levels of regional identity, cultural diversity and support for regional autonomy, features which we believe are more likely to produce split-level citizenship. This will have obvious consequences on the extent to which we can find similar preferences across levels. Therefore:

**H4:** *The similarity of voting preferences will vary by regional identity and measures of regional distinctiveness, with more dissimilar preferences in regions where identity and perceived regional distinctiveness are stronger.*

**H5:** *Dissimilar voting patterns across regional and state elections will be explained by the stronger support for regional parties in ‘distinctive’ regions*

### 4. Methodology

#### 4.1 Case selection

Vertical simultaneity across state and regional elections is relatively rare outside the United States. Fabre estimates that there have been fewer than 20 instances in post-
war Western Europe when national elections coincided with regional elections (Fabre 2010). Often this involves a single region holding its elections on the same date as state elections. Since 1996, for example, elections in the autonomous community of Andalusia have been held on the same day as Spanish elections. Rarer still is a combination of horizontal (all regional elections at the same time) and vertical (region and state at the same time) simultaneity, in which all the regions across a state elect their regional legislatures and national legislature on the same day. This has occurred, for example, in France in 1986, and in Belgium in 1995 and 1999. Simultaneous elections to the national parliament and regional assemblies is a regular practice in Ukraine (with the exception of 2010); however, only the 2006 multi-level elections in Ukraine were held according to the same electoral rules, in this case, proportional representation with no independents.

We have opted to study the 2006 vertically and horizontally simultaneous elections in Ukraine for five reasons. First, there is relatively little ‘at stake’ in regional elections in Ukraine. In the 2006 elections, Ukraine was a unitary state with 27 meso-level administrative units: 24 oblasts, two special status cities (Kyiv and Sevastopil) and one autonomous republic, Crimea. With the exception of Crimea (Sasse, 2007), regional legislatures do not form governments but share authority with regional state administrations. Furthermore, the 450-seat national legislature, Verkhovna Rada, is unicameral. There is no upper chamber that represents regional interests. If, as Cutler (2008) argues, voters are more likely to have ‘split-level citizenship’ in polities with clear areas of jurisdiction across levels, and where regions wield clear autonomy over policy, we must assume this is less likely to occur in Ukraine, where regional autonomy is not well established. Were we to find a significant difference in voting patterns across parliamentary and regional elections we would have reason to doubt the critical
importance of institutional salience upon which second order theory hinges many of its claims.

Second, Ukraine is regionally diverse, portrayed as a ‘state of regions’ (Sasse 2001), with different components formerly belonging to different empires and states (Katchanovski 2006). Indeed it is often perceived as a country with two different halves, a predominantly rural, Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking, European-oriented and liberal Western half, and an Orthodox, Russian-speaking, pro-Soviet and pro-communist East (Aberg 2000; Barrington 1997; Birch 2000; Solchanyk 1994; Hesli 1995; Kuzio 1998; Shulman 1999; Kubicek 2000; Katchanovski, 2001, 2008; Munro 2007; Clem and Craumer 2008), although as Sasse (2001) points out, various cultural and social cleavages are cross-cutting rather than mutually reinforcing (see also Arel 1995; Kulyk 2008; Matsuzato 2001, Wolczuk 2002, Rodgers 2006). As a result, Ukraine provides a useful case where regional institutional authority is low but regionalism and regional identities are strong (Stepan 2005; Sasse 2001, 2010; Wolczuk 2002; Barrington and Herron 2004; Razumkov Centre 2007) and politically salient (Hinich, Khmelko and Ordeschook 1999; Miller, Klobucar, Reisinger and Hesli 1998; Barrington and Faranda 2009; O’Loughlin and Bell 1999) which enables us to determine the precise roles for legislative competence and perceptions of regional distinctiveness.

Third, Ukrainian electoral institutions have typically been designed to exert a nationalising influence on party competition. All parties are officially state-wide although they have core regions in which they gain particular support. The 2004 Law on Elections of Deputies in Ukraine has allowed regional branches of state-wide political parties to create electoral blocs and stand for regional elections in one or several regions. This provides new institutional opportunities for regional parties and blocs (Laboratory of Legislative Initiatives 2006) that were formerly not possible.
Fourth, the 2006 elections in particular provide a useful case study. Until 2006, all regional elections were held according to a majoritarian electoral system and included large numbers of independents. The 2006 parliamentary (Herron 2007; Clem and Craumer 2008) and regional (Syneokiy 2006) elections, however, both employed proportional representation with a 3% electoral threshold and excluded independent candidates. The 2006 elections were also recognised as free and fair by the OSCE and numerous international and domestic observers (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, see Myagkov and Ordeshook 2005 for an analysis of electoral fraud in earlier elections).

Fifth, multi-level voting behaviour and party competition in Central and Eastern Europe is heavily understudied. However dominant the state focus on voting behaviour in Western Europe, this is far more prevalent in former republics of the Soviet Union. In 2002 Tucker lamented that there had been only one – Russian – study of regional party competition in any post-Communist state.9 Despite academic attention to the importance of the 1990 regional elections in the USSR as vehicles of democratisation, post-communist regional elections remain understudied. As a result, claims regarding post-communist voting behaviour and party systems are based almost exclusively on studies of national elections (Kuzio 1995; Birch 1995, 1998; Bojcun 1995, 2011; Miller et al 1998; Wilson. and Birch 1999; Clem and Craumer, 2008; Copsey 2006, 2008; Ishiyma 2002; Meleschevich 2007; Zimmer and Haran 2008; Bochsler 2010. For exceptions in the case of Russia see Gel’man and Golosov 1998; Golosov 1999; Moraski and Reisinger 2003).

4.2 Data and variables

To analyse the dynamics of multi-level voting we have created a dataset that employs regions as cases. Electoral data on vote shares in the 2006 parliamentary and regional elections are from official election results and electoral reports. Our analysis relies on aggregate data. Individual recall of voting decisions in surveys, including whether a
respondent cast a ballot and which party was supported, is heavily conditioned by social desirability. We know that individuals are more likely to say that they cast a ballot when in fact they did not (Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001; Karp and Banducci 2008) and we know also that respondents are more likely to say that they backed the eventual winners. One benefit of using official electoral returns, therefore, is that it avoids these problems. Aggregate data raise other issues of validity, however. We are able to identify correlations between particular variables but unable to demonstrate their effect at the individual level. A region in which we know there to be a high degree of support for regional identity might demonstrate greater support for a regional party, or might display greater dissimilarity of preferences across electoral levels, but we cannot at this stage determine whether individuals with a greater strength of pride cast their ballots in this particular way. Furthermore, aggregate stability of responses might mask considerable individual-level volatility in voter preferences (LeDuc, Clarke, Jenson and Pammett 1980). We must therefore remain mindful of the ecological fallacy when we interpret our results.

To begin our analysis we classified parties according to three dimensions. We distinguished, first, between government and opposition parties and blocs, a full list of which appears in the appendix. We also identified regional parties, using Brancati’s definition (2008) of parties that seek seats in a restricted number of regions. Region-only parties can be found in eight of the 27 meso-level administrative units and in 2006 included ethnic parties beyond Russian or pro-Russian ones. We further distinguish between the regionalist (De Winter 1998) aims of such parties, separating a) those parties that appeal to the regional identities of those in territorially-bounded polities and position themselves at the extreme ends of state-wide cleavages such as language, which we refer to as ‘ideological’ regional parties and b) those parties that claim to represent the
interests of territorial communities better than state-wide parties but refer neither to regionalist agendas nor state-wide ideological cleavages. This classification was based on the content of party manifestos, as well as domestic analytical reports on campaigning (Yermolayev et al 2006; Laboratory of Legislative Initiatives 2006).

While studying stable multi-party systems, academics group parties into party families (Deschouwer 2000; Fitzmaurice 2004), but such an approach is not necessarily appropriate when party systems are not fully institutionalised (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). We believe that clustering parties would be more helpful in this case, because it helps us to identify consistent cleavages within the Ukrainian electorate at a time when the existence of parties can be fairly short-lived. We have created four clusters to examine the consistency of support across electoral levels, an economic (left-right) cluster, and three additional cleavages we believe tap identity considerations: attitudes to language, attitudes to foreign policy, and attitudes to history. These cleavages are perceived to have long-standing relevance to Ukrainian voters (Khmelko 2007) and were predicted to structure party competition in the 2006 campaign (Razumkov Centre 2005). Our clustering is based on the content of party manifestos. Parties and blocs are distributed fairly evenly across the economic cluster but their manifestos offered consistent approaches across the three identity clusters. Parties or blocs scoring 1 on the foreign policy cluster, for example, tended to have similar scores for the language and history clusters. For this reason in the analysis that follows we have created an ‘average identity cluster’ score. Full details for the scores for each cluster, however, may be found in the appendix.

To evaluate our hypotheses we have calculated several indices, including measures of dissimilarity and fractionalization. To evaluate hypothesis 1, which addresses the consistency of voting across multiple levels, we have calculated an index of
dissimilarity for all *state-wide* parties, expanding this to include all parties contesting seats in each region. Our index takes the absolute value of difference in party performance across state-wide parliamentary and regional elections. We have then calculated an aggregate score for each region by adding together the absolute differences for each of the statewide parties and dividing by two (Johnson 1980, Pallares and Keating 2003). Our state-wide party dissimilarity index allows us to evaluate how state-wide parties fare across state and regional elections. Our total party dissimilarity index allows us to examine the nature of party competition as a whole, rather than just the performance of certain types of political parties.

To account for variations in simultaneous voting behaviour across state and regional elections, we have calculated two measures of electoral fractionalization within each region for both state and regional elections: the proportion of votes earned by the two largest parties; and the effective number of parties (ENP). We are using the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula for the effective number of parties: one divided by the sum of the squared proportions earned by each political party (see also Blais and Carty 1991). The results will provide us with additional methods of evaluating voting behaviour across state and regional elections.

To evaluate hypothesis 4 we will employ the previously constructed dissimilarity scores as dependent variables in OLS regression. Our independent variables include various measures of identity and distinctiveness. Drawing on the comparative sub-state political behaviour literature (Pallares and Keating 2006; Wyn Jones and Scully 2006; Hough and Jeffery 2006; Henderson and McEwen 2010) we have constructed a measure of regional identity using data from the 1999 World Values Survey dataset. The indicator reflects the proportion of respondents who identified the region as the geographic group to which they are most attached. Our other identity variables employ data from a 2007
survey of regional identities conducted by the Razumkov Centre. We seek to separate attitudes to culture and attitudes to language, and distinguish too between attitudes to Ukraine and attitudes to Russia. We believe these to be important fault lines, particularly relevant to us because of the possible east-west variation in responses we might find. We also include two measures of perceived regional strength. The regional autonomy variable measures support for greater institutional authority for the meso level, and the regional distinctiveness variable reflects the proportion of survey respondents in each oblast who believe that eastern and western Ukraine are so different they should be considered different peoples. These we believe are essential to testing hypothesis 4, as well as identifying the oblasts in which we are more likely to find regional parties. In addition we have created indicators that relate to the party clusters, including a measure capturing identification with and the perceived importance of European identity, and an indicator of external identity, which is measured as perceived closeness to Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Romania (see White, McAllister and Feklyunina 2010 on the tensions between these). Last, we have included other indicators as controls, including socio-demographic variables such as average educational attainment, average income, regional gross domestic product (GDP), and ethnic profile. These regional socio-demographic data are from the State Statistics Committee. The resulting dataset offers for the first time regional-level data on voting behaviour at multiple electoral arenas, political cleavages, socio-demographic variables and attitudinal variables on regional identity, regional diversity, and views of regional autonomy. Full details of coding and data sources appear in the appendix.

5. Results
We begin with a review of the performance of parties and blocs across electoral levels, the results of which appear in table 1. The results provide us with two obvious findings. First, the three largest state-wide parties and blocs (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Party of Regions and Our Ukraine Bloc) performed better in the state-wide parliamentary elections than they did in the regional ones, regardless of whether they were in (or aligned with) government or opposition. On average they lost between 2.6 and 8.8 percentage points from the state to the regional level. Second order elections theory would predict similar results in both electoral arenas, as there is little ‘at stake’ in Ukrainian regional elections, while balance approaches would predict voters to offset their government and opposition preferences. A first review therefore gives us reason to question each approach.

Second, we can see regional trends in the varying success of parties across electoral levels. As Table 1 demonstrates, state-wide parties tended to lose most support at regional elections in those ‘core’ regions where they fared best in state elections (Copsey 2006; Hesli 2007; Kachanovski 2008). For smaller state-wide parties, voters’ support across electoral levels appears remarkably consistent, as we can see in the dissimilarity scores for the Socialist and Communist parties, as well as Pora-PRP, the Vitrenko Bloc, and the Kostenko-Pliushch Bloc. This suggests a possible modification of the second-order theory where we distinguish not only between decreased support for governing vis-à-vis opposition parties but for large state-wide parties vis-à-vis smaller parties. Such a conclusion would also provide a new dimension to previous research on the structure of party competition and voting behaviour in 2006, all of which has been generated on the basis of state-level evidence (Copsey 2006; Hesli 2007; Kachanovski 2008; Clem and Craumer 2008).
To examine further the position of smaller parties, we examined the performance of regional parties, the results of which are in Table 2. In eight regions, regional parties won seats at sub-state elections but not at state elections. Within these eight regions, total support for such parties ranged from 4.58% for the sole regional party in Volynska oblast to between 15% and 17% in Crimea and Kyiv. Obviously this affects the degree to which support for state-wide parties can be mirrored across state and regional elections.

Table 3 about here

To what extent might these results change if we explore clusters of parties rather than individual parties across electoral arenas? Table 4 contains descriptive accounts of the performance of our four sets of electoral clusters. As with parties, we can identify those clusters that fared well or poorly at each level. Right wing parties in economic terms perform less well in regional elections, as did those favouring pro-Russian foreign policy. Indeed across the three identity clusters we see that the pro-Russian cluster consistently fares less well in regional elections. One possible interpretation is that polarised political options fare better in state-wide elections than in regional elections. Parties occupying the middle ground on economic policy, for example, fared better in regional elections, suggesting that the electorate is more polarised over economic issues in state-wide contests. This can be seen as a modification of regional elections as balancing elections. Rather than achieving a moderate political culture by backing polarised views at different levels, voters appear to have differing levels of tolerance for polarised political debate at different electoral levels. This is not a uniform finding, however, for we see little difference in the performance of the moderate and Ukrainian components of the history and language clusters. We can also see that across the three categories for each cluster there is greater absolute variation for the economic cluster than for the identity clusters.

Table 4 about here
We turn now to our measures of cross-level competition to evaluate demand and supply variations at different levels. Table 4 provides us with descriptive information about party competition in parliamentary and regional elections in each region, outlining the most popular party, the proportion earned by the two largest parties and the effective number of parties in each contest. The results also show that there are cross-level differences in the effective number of parties, with a greater number of effective parties in regional elections in all cases (7.45 vs 4.57). The differences are significant (t=5.2, p<.01). Not surprisingly, we see similar results for the electoral dominance of the two largest parties, which in all cases is greater in state-wide parliamentary elections than in regional elections.

The results in Table 4 demonstrate that there are significant levels of dissimilarity across the two levels. In his analysis of 4000 regional and national elections in 18 countries Schakel (2013) explains that dissimilarity is lowest in vertically simultaneous elections, with average dissimilarity scores of 12. The average dissimilarity score for Ukraine, which was not included in Schakel’s study, is 31.84 when we examine all state-wide parties, and 33.47 when we add regional parties. No region reports a dissimilarity score of less than 16.07. This is obviously a greater degree of dissimilarity than we usually find, and suggests that Ukrainian voters are expressing distinct political preferences across electoral levels, despite low levels of regional institutional autonomy. If we examine dissimilarity scores for clusters of parties, rather than individual parties, we find greater similarity, which we expected, and in particular greater consistency for identity cleavages rather than the economic cleavage. A brief evaluation of our preliminary hypotheses suggests that we have significant levels of dissimilarity, that this can in part be explained by greater degrees of fractionalization at the regional level, where regional parties are more present, and that clusters of parties display greater similarity,
with greater stability for the identity cleavages rather than the economic cleavage. The structure of party competition therefore appears to differ across levels in two important ways. First, different parties – or rather different types of parties – fare better at one electoral level. Second, the gap between vote shares at parliamentary and regional elections appears to differ geographically. Identifying why this might be the case is the focus of our next section.

Table 5 about here

Second order theory suggests that regional institutional authority will determine whether regional elections can be perceived as second or first order contests. We believe that while institutional authority might be important, so too might other indicators of regional salience, including identity and perceived distinctiveness. To understand the factors that account for the performance of parties and clusters across different electoral levels, we have conducted a multivariate analysis of multi-level electoral competition. Table 5 contains the results of this analysis. Second order theory would predict similar preferences at simultaneous elections but it is possible that in regions where regional identity and regional distinctiveness are strong, regional elections are in fact first order contests. The results in Table 5 therefore identify the variables that push together or drive apart political preferences at the state and regional level. As the dependent variables are dissimilarity scores, we can interpret positive coefficients as accounting for greater dissimilarity, and negative coefficients as driving cross-level convergence.

We have identified three groups of variables. The first speak to internal divisions within Ukraine, namely the Ukrainian-Russian divide. We created four variables, two testing support for Ukrainian or Russian cultural identity and two probing support for and use of Ukrainian or Russian languages. The four are, of course, clearly related. To probe the two distinct features we included in our regressions the variable on Ukrainian
language and the variable on Russian culture. Full details of the variables may be found in the appendix. We would expect indicators of Ukrainian language to have a nationalising effect on voting (in other words prompting greater similarity across levels) and support for Russian culture to prompt greater dissimilarity as voters engage with regional concerns. Our second group of variables concerns external engagement, and explores attitudes to Europe as well as attitudes to neighbours, in this case Russia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania. Our second group of variables also includes measures of standards of living across the regions of Ukraine. We would expect wealthier regions and those with greater engagement with Europe and neighbours to exert a nationalising impact on the vote. Last, our third group of variables includes measures of regional identity, desired regional autonomy and a belief in regional distinctiveness. We would expect each of these to prompt higher levels of dissimilarity as voters engage in first order voting at both levels. What we can see from the start is that none of the variables we have assembled is able to account for variations in the levels of dissimilarity among state-wide parties, with the exception of Russian culture: a one unit increase in Russian culture produces a .779 increase in the dissimilarity of state-wide parties, or, the more Russian an oblast, the more dissimilar the cross-level performance of its state-wide parties. This confirms our initial expectations but it is when we turn to the clusters that we begin to understand the dynamics of cross-level competition.

If we cluster parties according to their economic attitudes, Russian culture is again a positive predictor of dissimilarity. Those oblasts with higher scores on Russian culture are more likely to display greater dissimilarity for the cross-level performance of parties clustered according to their economic views. When we turn to the identity clusters we see that our variables are better able to account for variations across the different levels. Higher scores for the Ukrainian language produce a decrease in dissimilarity, as predicted
earlier, although it is worth noting that the opposite is true for the economic cluster of parties. A desire for regional autonomy also brings political preferences together. These results provide us with two findings.

First, regional authority, the classic barometer of whether a regional election might be considered first order (Jeffery and Hough 2009), should facilitate divergence. If both regional and state-wide contests are first order then we have no reason to anticipate similar results. What our results suggest, however, is that increases in regional authority prompt similar results across electoral levels when we cluster parties ideologically. This suggests we might wish to distinguish between different forms of first ordered-ness, namely institutional salience and sociological distinctiveness.

Second, the distinction between language and culture suggests that if regional identities form around culture, we will see greater dissimilarity across state and regional elections than if they are formed around language. We should distinguish, however, between the extent of dissimilarity and our ability to account for it. The identity clusters are themselves more consistent across state and regional elections for some regions – which raises the possibility that identity is a more enduring cleavage of political competition – while what difference there is across levels we are better able to explain with the presence of our variables.

Table 6 about here

Previous multi-level voting research reminds us that dissimilarity across electoral levels is partially explained by the presence of regional parties and blocs. In 2006, regional parties and blocs were successful in eight of our regions but within these regions we are able to determine which factors drive support, and for which type of regional party. Were we to lump all regional parties and blocs together, we would claim that oblasts with higher scores for the Russian culture, European identity and standard of
living prompt greater support for regional parties. If we distinguish among the different types of regional parties and blocs, as we highlight above, we can see that standard of living relates only to those pragmatic regional parties and blocs, that is those parties who claim to represent the interests of territorial communities better than state-wide parties but refer neither to regionalist agendas nor to state-wide identity cleavages. The electoral success of ideological regional parties, that is those choosing to appeal to regional identities, however, is positively influenced by Ukrainian language and by Russian culture, as well as desired regional autonomy. These findings further develop our understanding of markers of first-orderedness, namely sociological distinctiveness as captured by language and culture and regional autonomy, for they exert independent effects on dissimilarity. In regions with successful regional parties and blocs that appeal to political identities of their voters, sociological distinctiveness might help to explain the losses of state-wide parties at regional elections.

Of course we know that one particular oblast is perceived to be particularly distinct. For this reason we replicated the results without Crimea in the dataset. When we do so, we see little change n the predictors significant at the .05 level in the original model. There are not changes at the .05 level in the all-parties model, the ideological cluster or for pragmatic regional parties and only one variable significant at the .05 level ceases to be significant for the regional parties model (Russian culture is no longer significant). All other significant variable perform as they did for the entire dataset. There are two expectations to this, when we cluster parties according to the economic dimension the social distinctiveness variables (language and culture) ceases to be significant but the regional autonomy variable become significant, predicting similarity across levels. With the ideological variables the regional distinctiveness variables remain significant but the social distinctiveness variables cease to be so. In general, then, the language and culture
variables are less strong when we exclude Crimea from the dataset but the regional autonomy variables as well as Europe and standard of living are fairly consistent across the two. This might suggest that Crimea is elevating the perceived importance of Ukrainian-Russian distinctiveness when we look at Ukraine as whole.

6. Conclusions

An analysis of the vertically and horizontally simultaneous 2006 elections in Ukraine not only offers the first comprehensive analysis of multi-level voting in a post-Communist state, and thus widens the geographical area of a field typically restricted to established democracies in Western Europe and North America, it also advances our understandings of multi-level voting in general. Our analysis relies on aggregate voting results and we must be mindful that any effort to understand the individual calculations made by voters requires an analysis of individual-level attitudes and behaviour. This would help us to determine, for example, whether policy moderation, or the perceived competitiveness of elections (Burden and Kimball 2004) is in fact motivating voter behaviour, or whether individuals back different political parties if they have a stronger sense of regional identity or if they have more polarised or moderate preferences. From the aggregate data we can draw five main conclusions.

First, our findings confirm hypothesis one, showing that simultaneous multi-level elections in which there is little ‘at stake’ in regional elections, can still produce dissimilar voting behaviour across the two electoral arenas. Indeed we found dissimilarity scores more than twice those found in other studies (Schakel 2013). This in itself is a significant finding as regional legislative autonomy is relatively low in Ukraine, something that would suggest regional elections should be second-order contests, fought and won on the
same issues as those determining state-level results. Certainly if legislative autonomy is the only measure of salience we would have reason to doubt second-order theory. In addition, our research also shows that the largest state-wide parties saw the largest deviation in vote shares across levels, with parties losing support in regional elections and losing most in their core regions of support. One possible modification of second order theory, therefore, would distinguish not between the fortunes of government and opposition parties, but for large state-wide parties vis-à-vis small parties.

We see greater nationalisation and lower fragmentation for state elections vis-à-vis regional elections, confirming hypothesis two. The performance of smaller parties at regional elections is partly why we are able to demonstrate that regional elections are more fractionalised than state-wide elections (which in turn confirms hypothesis five). This is evident both in the lower levels of consolidation (measured as the proportion of support for the two largest parties) and higher numbers of effective parties for regional elections. Our analysis also helps to identify the regions in which regional parties, as one important form of small parties, are likely to fare well, with higher standards of living driving the presence of pragmatic regional parties and Ukrainian language use and support influencing ideological regional parties. Our third hypothesis, that we would see greater consistency by clusters is also confirmed. Dissimilarity scores for the economic and ideological clusters are lower than for state-wide parties.

Our fourth hypothesis, that dissimilarity can be explained by variations in regional identity and regional distinctiveness is also partially confirmed. Our efforts to identify the variables most likely to drive apart cross level voting results vary by form, Russian culture most likely to drive apart state-wide parties in general as well as those treated as part of economic clusters. Our analysis of identity clusters suggest that Ukrainian
language and desired regional autonomy makes voting more consistent. What then, might we conclude of the utility of second order and balance approaches?

Second order theory would predict similar preferences in simultaneous elections if the regional elections are in fact second-order contests. We see, however, that the two simultaneous elections produce dissimilar results. Balance theorists would suggest that we would see different results because voters would seek to punish incumbent state parties, but this does not appear to explain our results either. Governing parties and opposition parties lose support in regional elections (and lose most in their core regions).

We had assumed Ukrainian regional elections to be second-order contests due to low levels of regional institutional authority, but were they instead to be first order contests, the second-order elections theory would correctly predict divergent results. When we include models that test regional salience – the mechanism that would transform second-order contests to first-order contests - including for example, regional identity, perceived regional distinctiveness and support for further regional autonomy, we find that desired regional institutional salience drives preferences together.

When we turn to clusters we see increased tolerance for more moderate economic choices in regional elections, and for more polarised views with respect to foreign policy. This, we would argue, offers an important modification to balance hypotheses. We interpret the results as suggesting that across levels there are varying degrees of tolerance for polarisation. The balance hypothesis suggests that voters are intolerant of extreme political systems, preferring to achieve moderation by backing different partisan options that in the aggregate balance each other. The 2006 elections in Ukraine suggest that voter preference for balance and moderation might well be correct, but that tolerance for balance or extremism varies across electoral levels, with electorates offsetting more polarised political climates at one level with more moderate ones at another level. The
issue, therefore, is not whether voters balance institutions to achieve a ‘moderate’ political culture, or whether they perceive one democratic institution to be more salient than another, but rather that the dynamics of political competition in different elections held on the same day demonstrate that parties and voters are motivated by different issues at different levels.


Cook, Chris and John Ramsden, Eds (1997) *By-elections in British politics*. 2nd ed Routledge


Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera (1979) Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe, *Comparative Political Studies*, 12: 3-27


Ross, Cameron (2011) The Rise and Fall of Political Parties in Russia’s Regional Assemblies, Europe-Asia Studies 63(3): 429-48


Table 1: Variations in electoral performance for vertically simultaneous state-wide and regional elections, Ukraine 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Party of Regions</th>
<th>Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc</th>
<th>Our Ukraine Bloc</th>
<th>Communist Party of Ukraine</th>
<th>Socialist Party of Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>25.46</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytska</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>4.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volynska</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovka</td>
<td>18.98</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyrska</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpatska</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhka</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankivska</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyivska</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovohradska</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liovivska</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhanska</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaivska</td>
<td>18.87</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odeska</td>
<td>22.72</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>(5.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltavska</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivenska</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumska</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternopilska</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkivska</td>
<td>12.85</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khersonska</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnytska</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherkaska</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivetska</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihivska</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopil</td>
<td>20.57</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>14.58</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean gap(st dev)</td>
<td>8.78 (7.4)</td>
<td>3.97 (3.5)</td>
<td>2.60 (3.0)</td>
<td>0.48 (1.1)</td>
<td>1.00 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures indicate drop in support from state to regional election. Figures in parentheses indicate increased performance in regional elections.
### Table 2: Regional political parties and blocs in the 2006 regional elections in Ukraine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Regional political parties and blocs</th>
<th>% support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>Union Party Kunitsyn Bloc</td>
<td>7.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volynska</td>
<td>Klymchuk Bloc ‘Native Volyn’</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovska</td>
<td>Lazarenko Bloc</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpatska</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Hungarians in Ukraine The Community of the Hungarian Culture in Zakarpattya</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankivska</td>
<td>National Choice Bloc The Renaissance of Prykarpattya Bloc</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lvivska</td>
<td>Svoboda</td>
<td>5.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Ivanov ‘For Sevastopol’ Bloc Kondratevskyi Bloc</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Chernovetskyi Bloc Civil Activists of Kyiv</td>
<td>12.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Variations in support for clusters of parties and blocs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic clusters (10.06)</th>
<th>Average performance state-wide parliamentary elections</th>
<th>Average performance regional elections</th>
<th>Average difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>8.86 (5.72)</td>
<td>10.10 (5.85)</td>
<td>-1.24 (3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>15.15 (11.66)</td>
<td>19.56 (12.08)</td>
<td>-4.41 (7.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>51.59 (12.21)</td>
<td>40.77 (11.10)</td>
<td>10.81 (11.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign policy (7.3)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>36.14 (23.44)</td>
<td>27.81 (20.91)</td>
<td>8.33 (4.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24.31 (13.13)</td>
<td>25.33 (13.40)</td>
<td>-1.03 (4.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/NATO</td>
<td>15.16 (11.66)</td>
<td>15.48 (13.82)</td>
<td>-.32 (3.72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language (7.05)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian language</td>
<td>32.38 (27.72)</td>
<td>25.05 (24.73)</td>
<td>7.33 (5.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority languages</td>
<td>31.50 (16.95)</td>
<td>29.00 (14.91)</td>
<td>2.50 (5.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian language</td>
<td>16.85 (14.66)</td>
<td>15.24 (13.63)</td>
<td>1.61 (2.76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History (5.99)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Army saved Ukraine in WWII</td>
<td>36.14 (23.44)</td>
<td>29.83 (23.55)</td>
<td>6.31 (5.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both saved Ukraine in WWII</td>
<td>25.84 (13.82)</td>
<td>23.68 (12.71)</td>
<td>2.15 (3.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPA saved Ukraine in WWII</td>
<td>16.85 (14.65)</td>
<td>15.24 (13.63)</td>
<td>1.60 (2.76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results are average % won in each election with standard deviations in parentheses. For difference, higher numbers indicate greater support in state elections. Negative numbers indicate improved performance at regional elections.
Table 4: Multi-level voting in vertically simultaneous elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-wide parliamentary elections</th>
<th>Regional elections</th>
<th>Difference state-region</th>
<th>Dissimilarity indices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Largest party Sum, 2 largest parties</td>
<td>Largest party Sum, 2 largest parties</td>
<td>Sum, 2 ENP largest parties</td>
<td>State-wide parties All parties Economic cluster Average, ideological clusters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>PR 65.63 2.84</td>
<td>Yanuk 40.17 7.53</td>
<td>25.46 -4.70</td>
<td>48.09 55.68 45.04 2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytska</td>
<td>YT 53.25 5.56</td>
<td>YT 44.96 7.87</td>
<td>8.29 -2.32</td>
<td>24.56 24.56 5.86 6.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volynska</td>
<td>YT 64.63 4.09</td>
<td>PR 60.19 4.62</td>
<td>4.44 -5.3</td>
<td>16.07 18.36 5.27 3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropevskaya</td>
<td>PR 60.01 4.30</td>
<td>PR 38.50 9.58</td>
<td>21.51 -5.27</td>
<td>41.16 46.81 7.29 9.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetska</td>
<td>PR 80.43 1.82</td>
<td>PR 68.79 2.55</td>
<td>11.64 -7.3</td>
<td>43.56 43.56 6.75 4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyrska</td>
<td>YT 42.91 7.09</td>
<td>YT 36.70 10.53</td>
<td>6.21 -3.44</td>
<td>27.47 27.47 12.23 7.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpatska</td>
<td>OU 46.08 6.90</td>
<td>OU 42.20 9.20</td>
<td>3.88 -2.30</td>
<td>28.86 32.06 8.80 7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhka</td>
<td>PR 62.17 3.52</td>
<td>PR 43.40 7.05</td>
<td>18.77 -3.54</td>
<td>40.62 40.62 8.91 6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankovskaya</td>
<td>OU 75.45 3.34</td>
<td>OU 65.04 4.32</td>
<td>10.41 -9.8</td>
<td>29.67 33.53 1.65 4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyivska</td>
<td>YT 56.13 4.31</td>
<td>YT 46.16 6.26</td>
<td>9.97 -1.95</td>
<td>22.63 22.63 5.46 5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovohradskaya</td>
<td>YT 50.23 6.47</td>
<td>YT 43.78 7.57</td>
<td>6.45 -1.09</td>
<td>21.97 21.97 8.69 7.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lvivska</td>
<td>OU 70.99 3.87</td>
<td>OU 51.05 7.11</td>
<td>19.94 -3.23</td>
<td>32.93 35.74 4.10 7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhanska</td>
<td>PR 79.54 1.79</td>
<td>PR 75.54 2.02</td>
<td>4.00 -2.3</td>
<td>40.04 40.04 2.88 1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaivska</td>
<td>PR 62.23 3.60</td>
<td>PR 42.09 7.87</td>
<td>20.14 -4.27</td>
<td>44.81 44.81 14.77 12.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odeska</td>
<td>PR 57.36 4.03</td>
<td>PR 36.52 10.27</td>
<td>20.84 -6.24</td>
<td>46.95 48.55 18.22 11.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltavskas</td>
<td>YT 47.19 6.67</td>
<td>YT 38.89 9.38</td>
<td>8.30 -2.71</td>
<td>24.96 24.96 5.90 5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivnenska</td>
<td>YT 56.78 5.51</td>
<td>YT 49.13 7.06</td>
<td>7.65 -1.55</td>
<td>24.47 26.32 5.21 5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumka</td>
<td>YT 52.64 5.74</td>
<td>YT 40.68 9.02</td>
<td>11.96 -3.27</td>
<td>27.10 27.10 8.71 9.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternopilska</td>
<td>YT 68.65 4.03</td>
<td>YT 65.76 4.44</td>
<td>2.89 -1.4</td>
<td>21.02 21.02 5.94 3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkivska</td>
<td>PR 64.38 3.43</td>
<td>PR 48.63 5.88</td>
<td>15.75 -2.46</td>
<td>37.26 38.86 7.68 7.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khersonska</td>
<td>PR 56.57 4.95</td>
<td>PR 37.52 11.43</td>
<td>19.05 -6.48</td>
<td>37.49 37.49 11.24 9.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnytska</td>
<td>YT 53.90 5.51</td>
<td>YT 49.80 6.85</td>
<td>4.10 -1.34</td>
<td>24.60 24.60 9.90 8.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherkaska</td>
<td>YT 51.64 5.17</td>
<td>YT 41.19 8.10</td>
<td>10.45 -2.93</td>
<td>21.26 21.26 10.01 6.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivetska</td>
<td>YT 57.38 5.45</td>
<td>YT 40.96 10.47</td>
<td>16.42 -5.01</td>
<td>34.34 34.34 6.96 6.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihivska</td>
<td>YT</td>
<td>49.50</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>YT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>YT</td>
<td>55.06</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>YT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopil</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>74.35</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PR = Party of Regions, YT = Yulia Tymochenko, OU = Our Ukraine, Vit = Vitrenko bloc, SPU = Socialist Party of Ukraine, Lyt = Lytvyn
Table 5: Modelling dissimilarity across parties and clusters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party dissimilarity State-wide δ 31.84</th>
<th>Economic cluster dissimilarity δ =10.06</th>
<th>Average identity cluster dissimilarity δ =6.78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.12 (11.47)</td>
<td>-14.41 (10.68)</td>
<td>11.829 (4.32) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian language</td>
<td>-.127 (.08)</td>
<td>.136 (.08)*</td>
<td>-.058 (.03) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian culture</td>
<td>.779 (.42) *</td>
<td>1.88 (.39) ***</td>
<td>-.014 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European identity</td>
<td>.480 (.30)</td>
<td>.299 (.28)</td>
<td>.211 (.11) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relations</td>
<td>.390 (.27)</td>
<td>-.240 (.25)</td>
<td>-.044 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard of living</td>
<td>3.14 (14.68)</td>
<td>19.70 (13.67)</td>
<td>2.27 (5.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional autonomy</td>
<td>.088 (.25)</td>
<td>-.182 (.23)</td>
<td>-.283 (.09) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional distinctiveness</td>
<td>.244 (.43)</td>
<td>-.214 (.40)</td>
<td>.065 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional identity</td>
<td>-.052 (.23)</td>
<td>-.085 (.21)</td>
<td>.033 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R²</td>
<td>.560</td>
<td>.527</td>
<td>.220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01, δ = Dissimilarity score. DS for identity cluster is average across all three components.
Table 6: Modelling support for regional parties and blocs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All regional parties and blocs</th>
<th>Ideological regional parties and blocs</th>
<th>Pragmatic regional parties and blocs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-19.364 (6.93)</td>
<td>-15.472 (4.97) ***</td>
<td>-3.892 (4.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian language</td>
<td>.054 (.05)</td>
<td>.100 (.04) **</td>
<td>-.046 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian culture</td>
<td>.550 (.26) **</td>
<td>.638 (.18) ***</td>
<td>-.089 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European identity</td>
<td>.403 (.18) **</td>
<td>.196 (.13)</td>
<td>.207 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relations</td>
<td>.085 (.16)</td>
<td>.135 (.12)</td>
<td>-.050 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard of living</td>
<td>33.773 (8.88) ***</td>
<td>4.690 (6.37)</td>
<td>29.08 (6.2) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional autonomy</strong></td>
<td>.015 (.15)</td>
<td>.213 (.11) *</td>
<td>-.197 (.10) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional distinctiveness</td>
<td>-.483 (.26) *</td>
<td>-.316 (.19)</td>
<td>-.168 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional identity</td>
<td>.126 (.14)</td>
<td>-.092 (.10)</td>
<td>-.034 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj R²</strong></td>
<td><strong>.434</strong></td>
<td><strong>.389</strong></td>
<td><strong>.583</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01
Appendix

Scoring for Party Clusters

If the party manifesto made no reference to cluster topics they were coded as missing.

Economic cleavage

(a) Scores 1-3, the left, parties and blocs opposed to liberalism, calling for increased share of state-owned property

(b) Scores 4-6, the middle, parties and blocs who support further foreign and domestic privatisation of state-owned property and expect that state to increase public spending

(c) Scores 7-9, the right, parties and blocs actively supporting further economic liberalisation and/or represent the interests of big business

Foreign affairs

(a) Scores 1-3, parties and blocs in favour of stronger economic and military cooperation with Russia

(b) Scores 4-6, ‘neutrals’ who suggest Ukrainian cooperation with the EU should not automatically preclude foreign trade with Russia score

(c) Scores 7-9, parties and blocs eager to join NATO and to remove the Russian fleet from Sevastopol as soon as possible

Language

(a) Scores 1-3, parties and blocs that call for the introduction of Russian as a state language, either across Ukraine as a whole or in specific regions

(b) Scores 4-6, parties and blocs that support Ukrainian as a state language but promote minority language rights, including rights for Russian speakers
(c) Scores 7-9, parties and blocs that call for the increased use of Ukrainian in public services and the media throughout the state, regardless of the ethnic structures and linguistic profiles of regions.

**History**

(a) Scores 1-3, parties and blocs that claim the Soviet Army saved Ukraine during the WWII

(b) Scores 4-6, parties and blocs seeking to remain neutral in their attitudes towards history

(c) Scores 7-9, parties and blocs who believe that the Soviet Army betrayed Ukraine during WWII.

**Manifestos**


Electoral Contestants (Blocs and Political Parties)
Scores for clusters are in parentheses [economic, foreign affairs, language, history]

Parties and blocs that won seats in the state-wide parliamentary and regional elections in 2006

Communist Party of Ukraine [2, 1, 1, 1]
Our Ukraine Bloc (The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists + People’s Rukh of Ukraine\textsuperscript{25} + the Party of Industry and Business of Ukraine\textsuperscript{26} + Party of Christina-Democratic Union + Political Party ‘The National Union ‘Our Ukraine’’ + Ukrainian Republican Party ‘Sobor’’) [6, 10, 10, 10]
Party of Regions [7, 4, 1, 1]
Socialist Party of Ukraine [3, 3, 4, 4]
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (All-Ukrainian Association ‘Fatherland’ + Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party) [7, 6, 5, 5]

Parties and blocs that won seats in the the 2006 regional elections and but did not win seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections

Kostenko and Pluishch Bloc (The Party of Free Peasants and Businessmen of Ukraine + Political Party ‘Ukraine United’ + Ukrainian People’s Party) [8, 10, 10, 10]
Lazarenko Bloc (Party ‘Social-Democratic Union’ + Hromada Party + Social-Democratic Party) [7, -, 5, -]
Lytvyn Bloc (People’s Party + Party of All-Ukrainian Association of the Left ‘Fairness’ + Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party) [5, 5, 5, 5]

Oppositional Bloc ‘Ne Tak’ (All-Ukrainian Political Association ‘Women for Future + Political Party ‘All-Ukrainian Association ‘The Centre’’ + the Republican Party of Ukraine + the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)) [7, 4, 3, 3]

Bloc Pora-PRP (PORA Party + 'Party of Reforms and the Order') [9, 10, 10, 10]

Viche [9, 5, -, -]

Vitrenko Bloc 'People's Opposition' (Party ‘Russian-Ukrainian Union’ (RUS) + Progressive Socialist Party) [1, 1, 1, 1]

Parties and blocs that won the 2006 regional elections and did not stand in the 2006 parliamentary elections

Electoral Bloc ‘Civic Activists of Kyiv’ (Kyiv city branches of Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine + The Party of Legislative Supporters of Non-Governmental Organisations of Ukraine – ‘Party of Legislative Support’ + People’s Party of Banks’ Investord and Social Security) [4, -, -, -]

Electoral Bloc of Leonid Chernovetskyi (Kyiv city branches of Christian-Liberal Party of Ukraine + Ukranian Party ‘Green Planet’) [4, -, -, -]

Ivanov Bloc 'For Sevastopol' (Sevastopol city branches of Party of Industry and Business of Ukraine and the Party ‘Christian-Democratic Union’) [5, 1, 1, 1]

Klymchuk Bloc 'Native Volyn' (Volyn branches of Motherland Party; Republican-Christian Party and Ukrainian Conservative Party) [5, -, -, -]
Kondratevskyi Bloc (Sevastopil branches of the Party of National-economic development of Ukraine and Young Ukraine Party) [5, 1, 1, 1]

Kunitsyn Bloc (Crimean organisations of National-Democratic Party, Democratic Party of Ukraine and Party of State Neutralism of Ukraine) [5, 1, 1, 1]

National Choice Bloc (Ivano-Frankivsk regional branches of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Republican Party ‘Sobor’) [5, 10, 10, 10]

Bloc ‘The Renaissance of Prykarpattya’ (Ivano-Frankivsk regional branches of the following parties: Renaissance + Republican-Christian Party + Democratic Union) [4, 5, -, -]

Russian Bloc Party [1, 1, 1, 1]

Yanukovych Bloc (Party of Regions + The Russian Bloc Party) [4, 1, 1, 1]
Variables

Ukrainian language \( (\alpha = .924) \)
Additive index created from:
* Ukraine should be the only state and official language
* Speak Ukrainian at home
* Ukrainian native language

Russian culture \( (\alpha = .689) \)
Additive index created from:
* In 20-25 years Russian cultural traditions will dominate the Ukraine
* In 20-25 years Soviet cultural traditions will dominate the Ukraine
* Identify with Soviet cultural tradition
* Identify with Russian cultural tradition
+Russian national identity

External relations \( (\alpha = .945) \)
Additive index created from:
*How close do you feel (0-10) to:
Hungary (8, 9, 10 close)
Slovakia (8, 9, 10 close)
Romania (8, 9, 10 close)
Poland (8, 9, 10 close)

Europe \( (\alpha = .620) \)
Additive index created from:
* Identify with all-European cultural tradition
* In 20-25 years all European cultural tradition will dominate in Ukraine

**Standard of living** ($\alpha = .856$)
Additive index created from:

# Index of finances
# Living conditions
# Level of education
# Demographic development
# Job market development
# Welfare

**Regional autonomy** ($\alpha = .584$)
Additive index created from:

* One would like oblast to gain autonomy in Ukraine
* One would like oblast to get more competencies

**Regional distinctiveness**

* Western and eastern Ukraine are so different that can be called two different peoples

**Regional identity**

+ To which geographic group do you belong first (region).

NOTES: $\alpha =$ Cronbach’s Alpha. Original data sources: * Razumkov Centre, + World Values Survey, # Ministry
FOOTNOTES

1 Throughout, we refer to the regional level as the meso-level, between the state and municipal or local level. We use regional and sub-state interchangeably.

2 Here regional elections mean the elections to the Parliament of Crimea, to Kyiv and Sevastopil city assemblies and to regional assemblies in 24 oblasts of Ukraine. The OSCE judged the 2006 elections in Ukraine to be free and fair (OSCE, 2006).

3 We distinguish between two issues: the extent to which individual voters express similar preferences across electoral levels; and the decision-making calculus of voters, whether, for example, they evaluate the issues, leaders, parties and policies specific to the level for which they are casting a ballot. Reaching the same voting decision can of course be arrived at through different processes. Individuals can vote according to state factors in both elections and support the same parties or might choose different parties if there are variations in the supply of options at different electoral levels. Alternatively, individuals might evaluate each election on its own terms and find themselves drawn to similar or to different parties. The two issues: similarity of preference outcomes (votes cast) and the similarity of the decision-making process (voter motivations) are therefore distinct.

4 Massetti (2009) notes, for example, that there are approximately thirty regionalist parties that are significant players in regional party systems.

5 In the paper we refer to political cleavages that were salient during the particular electoral campaign, rather than to the classic understanding of sociological cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

6 According to the Law on Local Self-Government in Ukraine (2001), which governs regional assemblies, legislatures can set tax rates over estate property and parking. In all
but Crimea taxes levied are sent to the centre, which then redistributes these to the oblasts. Each regional assembly therefore has discretionary power over the distribution of regional spending returned from the centre. They have little institutional influence over constitutional debates and no right to protect minority languages in their region. The Crimean parliament has more authority, with primary legislative power, and the ability to form a government with a Prime Minster, albeit one appointed by the Crimean Parliament with the consent of the Ukrainian President.

7 According to the Law on Political Parties in the Ukraine (2001), all parties should maintain a state-wide programme of social development (Article 2), and prove their public support in at least 2/3 of districts in at least 2/3 of regions (Article 10).

8 Specifically, the Law on Elections of Deputies in Ukraine (2004) allows the same party to stand as part of a bloc with other parties for one election (parliamentary or regional) and as a stand alone party at the other electoral level.

9 A rare exception from this trend includes the most recent studies of regional elections in Russia (Ross 2011a, 2011b) that link party competition at regional elections with state-wide democratic record and encourage us to investigate voting behaviour at regional elections in other post-communist states.

10 During the 2006 electoral campaign, government and pro-government parties and blocs coalesced into the Orange team (Copsey 2006; Hesli 2007; Kachanovski 2008, see also Mykhnenko and Swain 2012). Mainly national democrats (Way 2005), these were represented by state-wide parties and blocs such as the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Our Ukraine Bloc, by small and new blocs of parties such as Pora-PRP and the Kostenko-Pliushch Bloc, as well as a small and established party Rukh. The opposition camp was
mainly represented by the Party of Regions. Its leader Viktor Yanukovych lost the 2004 presidency, but the party still had parliamentary representation in 2005-06. Parties of the Ukrainian left (the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Vitrenko Bloc) are classified as state-wide small parties. The largest state-wide parties and blocs therefore included the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Our Ukraine Bloc, and the Party of Regions

11 The Community of Hungarian Culture in Zakarpattya, and Democratic Party of Hungarians in Ukraine

12 For example Svoboda, The Russian Bloc Party

13 For example, the Chernovetskyi Bloc, the Civic Activists of Kyiv.

14 Yakymenko (2008) notes that Ukrainian voters pay attention to party manifestos while casting their ballot. The party manifestos and the activities of political parties and blocs is very important for 60.2% of voters and relatively important for 26.5% of voters. This is further supported by a more recent study showing that voters are affected by party manifestos, ideas and suggestions (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2012). In his 2008 report Yakymenko claims that the differences between parties are small on issues such as the rule of law and respect to human rights but he later clarifies that parties offer meaningful differences, particularly with respect to language policy and foreign policy; two of the items we have evaluated. This later view is supported by research both before and after the 2006 elections (Romanyuk and Shveda 2005; See also UNIAN news item (2012) on research by Dr Oleksandr Vyshnyak).
Dissimilarity = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} |x_{is} - x_{ir}|}{2} where x_{is} is performance at state elections and x_{ir} is performance at regional elections.

In one particular region the presence of regional parties complicates our understanding of the similarity of voting preferences. In Crimea, the Party of Regions did not run as a separate political party in the regional elections, but teamed with the Russian Bloc (party) to run as the Yanukovich Bloc. Voters seeking to exercise uniform political preferences would therefore have had to cast a ballot for different political actors. Also in Crimea, Rukh ran as a separate party in regional elections but as part of the Our Ukraine Bloc in state-level parliamentary elections. For the analysis that follows, we treat the Yanukovich bloc as the equivalent of the Party of Regions and Rukh as the equivalent of Our Ukraine Bloc for the regional elections in Crimea. Once we turn to clusters these issues disappear.

Effective number of parties = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i)^2} Where p_i is the proportion of valid votes earned by a political party. See also Golosov (2010) for an alternative formula.

The survey was conducted 31 May – 18 June 2007. Sample size is 10,956. The survey was conducted in 403 locations (212 urban and 191 rural ones). The theoretical error of the sample, disregarding design-effect, is no more than 1.0%.

We rely on language use rather than native language. See Kulyk 2008 on the significance of this distinction.
There are statistically significant differences (p<.1) in dissimilarity scores for those regions where regional parties compete and those where they do not.

Collinearity diagnostics, as well as correlations among the variables suggest it would be problematic to include all four in a regression equation. For this reason we have chose the two variables that do not present collinearity problems (in this case tolerance levels less than .2, a variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than 5) (Hair et al 2006). We are also subscribing to best practice on the ratio of predictors to sample size (Van Voorhis and Morgan 2007).

Neutrality in foreign affairs means avoiding membership in international military blocs and prioritising the interests of national business rather than fostering membership in international economic unions.

According to the 1996 Constitution, Ukrainian is the only state official language, and it is impossible to introduce a second state language without constitutional changes. Nevertheless, calls to introduce Russian as the second state language were frequent during electoral campaigns.

Attitudes to history not only reflect preferences for public policies in education (such as the teaching and research of history), but also reflect identity politics (Rodgers 2006). Interpretations of history played a crucial role in the nation-building project of President Victor Yushchenko (Motyl 2010). Here attitudes towards history include attitudes towards World War II and the Holodomor (the Great Famine) of 1932-33 in Ukraine. For example, both the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Patriotic Army (UPA) participated in World War II but were on opposing sides. Contemporary public opinion is divided on the extent to which one or the other defended or betrayed Ukraine (Motyl 2010).

*Rukh* campaigned on its own in Crimea in regional elections.

Party of Industry and Business of Ukraine won seats in Lvivska regional assembly on its own.
The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists joined the Our Ukraine Bloc at the parliamentary elections.

Campaigned individually in Sevastopol’