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Citation for published version:

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/0305764X.2014.960910

Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer

Document Version:
Peer reviewed version

Published In:
Cambridge Journal of Education

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Can an expanded interpretation of phronesis support teacher professional development for inclusion?

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Abstract

This paper presents an overview of the concept of inclusive pedagogy, conceptualised as an approach to teaching that focuses on extending what is generally available to everyone (as opposed to providing for all by differentiating for some) while taking account that there will be differences between learners. It considers the concept of phronesis as a tool for exploring questions about teacher decision-making in relation to inclusive pedagogy and how phronesis might be taught. To this end, we review some of the ways in which phronesis has been used in teacher education, and consider the potential of broadening the term based on a Heideggerian rather than Aristotelian conceptualisation of it. We consider whether this broader conceptualisation may help facilitate the development of teachers to understand the limitations inherent in traditional approaches to learner difference and adopt an inclusive pedagogical approach instead.
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Introduction

Over the past twenty years, many studies of inclusive schools have highlighted a large degree of variability in practice that confounds efforts to understand the differences between teachers who are inclusive and those who are not. As many commentators have noted, variability in practice reflects a lack of conceptual clarity in the literature about what counts as inclusive practice and how it might be evidenced, furthering criticism of inclusive education as a ‘theory that has outpaced its practice’ (Artiles, Kozleski, Dorn & Christensen, 2006, p. 97). At the same time, increasing calls for more emphasis to be placed on inclusive education in teacher education (EADSNE, 2011; Forlin, 2012) demand a high degree of clarity and coherence about the concept of inclusion and its enactment if it is to be taught to new teachers or fostered as part of teacher professional development.

In recent years, questions about how additional or specialist support can be provided to some students without perpetuating the segregation and discrimination associated with traditional approaches to learner difference have been key drivers of research in the field of inclusive education. Our own work has been prompted by an interest in why some teachers exclude, or refuse to include, certain students on the grounds that they do not have the requisite knowledge and skills to teach them, while other teachers, sometimes in the same school, are able to include students with many different types of additional needs. As teacher educators we also have been interested in what we can learn from experienced teachers and how we might use this knowledge to support the development of new teachers.

To this end, a group of colleagues have been studying the ‘craft knowledge’ of experienced teachers who have been able to sustain a commitment to inclusive education over time while also maintaining high academic standards (Black-Hawkins, Florian & Rouse, 2007; Florian & Black-Hawkins, 2011; Black-Hawkins & Florian, 2012). In this work, we use the term ‘craft knowledge’ to refer to the “knowledge that teachers develop through the processes of reflection and practical problem solving that they engage in to carry out the demands of their jobs” (Cooper & McIntyre, 1996, p76). We adopted the term as an explicit reference to knowledge that is learned from experience as opposed to other current uses based on Aristotelian notions of techne or craftsmanship.

The findings from our studies of inclusive practice suggest that it is in the ways that teachers respond to individual differences, the choices they make about group work and how they utilise specialist knowledge that differentiates inclusive practice from other pedagogical approaches and frames teachers as thinkers, and decision-makers. As we began to consider how this approach might be taught to less experienced teachers and/or those who are preparing to become teachers, we focused on the connections between the decisions and practical judgments of teachers who adopt an inclusive pedagogical approach and the social norms which govern behaviour in
groups and societies (Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2011). While we were aware that attempts to describe teaching in terms of normative behaviour and rules that render the complex task of teaching as something that can be systematized and taught by experts to novices has largely been discredited (Korthagen & Kessels, 1999), it seemed that the essential work of articulating how the practicing teachers in our studies use specialist knowledge was unfinished. In other words, if a deeper understanding of the inclusive practices of experienced teachers held the key to professional development, theoretical work was also needed. The aim of this paper is to extend what we have learned from studying the practices of experienced teachers in an attempt to consider how we might help less experienced teachers to develop their practice. In so doing, we position inclusive pedagogy as a aspect of teacher professional knowledge which begins with initial teacher education and continues throughout the teacher’s career. This is of particular importance because traditional approaches to teacher education and teacher professional development tend to treat inclusive education as a separate subject or body of knowledge rather than an integral part of effective teaching.

In the sections that follow, we provide an overview of the inclusive pedagogical approach and introduce the concept of phronesis (one of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, often translated as practical judgement, practical wisdom, or context specific practical reasoning) as a conceptual tool for exploring questions about teacher decision-making in relation to inclusive pedagogy. We review some of the ways in which the concept of phronesis has been used in teacher education and consider the potential of broadening and operationalising the term based on a Heideggerian rather than Aristotelian conceptualisation. We suggest that this broader conceptualisation may help facilitate the development of teachers who see themselves as ‘inclusive practitioners’.

Inclusive Pedagogy

The inclusive pedagogical approach begins with an acknowledgement that teachers are constantly thinking about and responding to individual differences between all learners within the context of whole class teaching (Florian, 2010). This stance does not imply a one-size-fits-all approach to teaching groups of learners without regard to individual differences, or uncritically argue that ‘good teaching is good teaching’ as if the multiple demands of diverse student groups were not relevant to practice. Nor does it suggest that classroom teachers can teach all learners without support, or that teaching can be reduced to a set of rules that are absolute. Rather, it points out that classroom teachers are already taking all kinds of difference into account in their daily practice because learners vary across many dimensions. It is only when the magnitude of a difficulty exceeds the teacher’s capacity to respond with confidence that a student is assumed to need specialist teaching or special provision that is beyond the expertise of the class teacher. As many studies have documented (e.g. Norwich and Black, 2014; Lewis, et al. 2010), it is in this relational space that variability in practice is both found and explained: a student who experiences difficulty in learning may be identified as having special educational needs by staff in one school but find no such designation is applied if he or she moves to another school. In such a situation, commonly understood as a form of ‘post code lottery’, the child is constant. The difference is in how school staff conceptualise and organise support.
In a craft knowledge study of inclusive practice (Florian & Black-Hawkins, 2011), we concluded that what we termed an ‘inclusive pedagogical approach’, or ‘inclusive pedagogy’ could be located in a conceptual difference in how teachers responded to individual learner difficulty. This conceptual difference centred on a subtle but important shift in teacher decision-making based on extending what was generally available to everyone, rather than differentiating learning opportunities for some based on teacher judgments about what a student could or could not do. Following Hart, Dixon, Drummond & McIntyre (2004) we described how individual differences between learners could be accommodated through classroom activities that were available to everyone, without the stigmatising effects of marking some students as different, or pre-determining the learning that is possible. For example, a teacher may plan a lesson based on differentiated activities that take account of student differences but will offer all students a choice of activity rather than assigning students to different levels. However, we found that such practice can be difficult to establish in education systems dominated by policy and practice that rely on ‘deterministic thinking’ (Hart, et al, op. cit.), or what Fendler and Muzaffar (2008) called ‘bell-curve thinking’ such as developmental norms to assess learning and identify and categorise learners by ability level (p. 826). We argued that these findings about both practice and context have important implications for teacher education and professional development because they offer suggestions about the choices teachers can make as well as ways they can be enacted. Additionally, they provided a partial explanation for why such practice is difficult to develop and sustain that we (and our student teachers) have reflected upon to refine our understanding of inclusive pedagogy.

As we conceptualise it, inclusive pedagogy calls for teachers to exercise creativity and imagination in developing alternatives to ‘bell curve thinking’ in the everyday practical judgments they make to extend the learning environment so that it includes everyone. The approach is underpinned by socio-cultural perspectives on learning that permit a consideration of individual differences as something to be expected and understood in terms of the interactions between many different variables rather than fixed states within individuals. The associated idea that learning occurs through shared activity in social contexts focuses thinking about inclusion on how learning occurs in the community of the classroom. Teachers must think in terms of everybody in the class and make practical decisions about how they will work together as opposed to differentiating for some students on the basis of judgments about what they cannot do compared to others of similar age. In this way the approach does not ignore individual differences between students but encourages a stance whereby class teachers extend the range of options that are available to everyone as suggested in the example above. In addition, the focus on learning as a shared activity can help to avoid the potentially negative effects of treating some students as different even when specialist support is required. (For additional detailed examples see Florian, 2010 and Florian and Linklater, 2010.)

Thus, inclusive classrooms depend on teachers who are able to sensitively exercise their professional judgments in support of the learning of everyone while simultaneously making sense of multifaceted social and practical situations that include responding to individual differences between students and working collaboratively with other adults. On the one hand there is nothing new in this. As Carr (2007) has argued “good teaching requires sensitive context specific judgment in complex interpersonal circumstances”. On the other hand, we would argue that an inclusive pedagogical approach requires that such judgments involve a deliberate
decision-making process that actively avoids practices that may mark some students as different or less able. The inclusive pedagogical approach aims to move beyond current binary judgments about inclusion and exclusion towards understanding how a complex process operates in compliance with a set of principles or standards (for a discussion, see Florian & Spratt, 2013) that guide professional decision-making in support of positive and constructive student experiences of schooling. The practical reasoning associated with both ‘good teaching’ and the more nuanced ‘inclusive pedagogical approach’ invokes Aristotle’s concept of phronesis. In the following section we consider the role of phronesis in helping to articulate how the craft knowledge and decision-making processes of teachers who adopt an inclusive pedagogical approach in their teaching can be used to support the professional development of less experienced teachers.

Phronesis: an expanded concept for inclusive pedagogy?

While our interest in craft knowledge follows the work of researchers interested in understanding whether and how the knowledge of experienced teachers can be used in programmes of initial teacher education (Hagger & McIntyre, 2006; Loughran, 2005; McCluskey, 2007), interest in phronesis also has currency in teacher education research. Fenstermacher (1994), Noel (1999), Eisner (2002), McLaughlin (2005) and more recently Plowright and Barr (2011), among others, have examined a possible relationship between teacher reasoning and phronesis. Their deliberations have been helpful in framing the complexities of teachers’ thinking and decision making in the classroom and highlighting the limitations of reducing teacher decision making to a cognitive process. Such studies serve as a foil to technicist views of teaching where expertise and decision-making are reduced to instrumental and technical forms of rationality which can be ‘packaged’ and transmitted to practitioners in a hierarchical manner. Given that inclusive pedagogy represents a way of working rather than a skill to be applied, the concept of phronesis provides teacher educators with a useful conceptual tool for deliberations about how they can respond to the increasing calls to place more emphasis on inclusive education in teacher education (EADSNE, 2011; Forlin, 2012). This is of particular importance internationally because the traditional approaches to preparing teachers for inclusive education by requiring additional coursework or infusing content knowledge into existing courses, have proved insufficient as teachers in many countries continue to report that they do not feel adequately prepared for the demands of inclusive education.

Aristotelian phronesis

Aristotle introduces phronesis in Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics where he categorises and examines five intellectual virtues: Sophia, Episteme, Nous, Phronesis and Techne. Here Aristotle presents phronesis as a form of situated awareness and contextual practical judgment. Phronesis is not procedural knowledge (know how) rather it is about perceiving more in terms of identifying the best means to the ends of which moral virtues are directed. For Aristotle, phronesis is concerned with both particulars and universals, viewing particulars as known from experience over time. According to Aristotle the development of phronesis necessitates an iterative process of personal trial and improvement by the individual. The message is clear; we learn to perceive more by doing and reflecting.
English translations of Aristotle’s ideas generally constitute phronesis as, ‘prudence’, ‘moral discernment’, ‘practical judgment’, ‘practical wisdom’, or ‘practical reasoning’, and scholars in the field of teacher education often examine phronesis in relation to another intellectual virtue. For example, Carr (2007) contrasted phronesis (translated as practical wisdom) with teche (translated as technical rationality). Eisner (2002) compared phronesis (translated as wise practical reasoning) with episteme (translated as true and certain knowledge). However, such binary positions obscure Aristotle’s seminal theorisation that phronesis is about *perceiving more*, and are of limited value in understanding phronesis for the kind of relational activity suggested by the inclusive pedagogical approach. In order to advance our understanding of phronesis for inclusive pedagogy we situated our reading of *Nicomachean Ethics* alongside *The Politics* to see if we might obtain further insight into the social aspect of phronesis.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle extends the role of phronesis to lawmakers to ensure the creation of fair laws to support the stability of the State. Juxtaposing insights from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *The Politics* begins to broaden Aristotle’s use of phronesis by linking it to questions of fairness, social justice and social cohesion within society. Such a linkage is of particular importance to us because it aligns with the conceptual underpinning of inclusive pedagogy as responses to individuals within the context of everybody in the community of the classroom (Linklater, 2011). However, it should be noted that the social nature of phronesis was not explicitly addressed by Aristotle. This was a task undertaken by Heidegger, ([1927] 2005) in *Being and Time*, a text which Weidenfeld (2011) has suggested may provide the broader conceptual resources needed to fully understand Aristotelian insights into phronesis and political practice under modern conditions.

**Heideggerian phronesis**

In *Being and Time* Heidegger provides a phenomenological description of the human person along with original insights about one’s existence in the world. Of particular relevance to our work is Heidegger’s idea that one’s understanding and interpretation of experience does not involve merely cognitive processes, but one’s whole being. The contribution of Aristotle’s thinking to Heidegger’s work has been emphasised by Weidenfeld (op cit.) who argues that Heidegger’s phenomenology is an appropriation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy and his conceptualisation of phronesis.

However, Heidegger also expanded the conceptual web of phronesis through an analysis of what he calls *circumspection* and *conscience*. For Heidegger, circumspection refers to a kind of sight in which one looks around before deciding what ought to be done next. However, Weidenfeld notes the limits of circumspection in explaining the nuances of phronesis in terms of how one might *perceive more*. For Weidenfeld, Heidegger’s notion of conscience, found in division two of *Being and Time*, suggests a sharpening of *circumspection* that is more useful in making sense of practical situations. In this section we explore Heidegger’s notions of *circumspection* and *conscience* drawing further from his ideas in *Being and Time* to include his concepts of comportment, essence, and solicitude.

* Circumspection: Heidegger defines circumspection as a specific kind of sight for making sense of practical situations. This sight involves seeing beyond the social norms and rules that govern action. For Heidegger, making properly informed
decisions depends on an awareness of how we have been conditioned to a particular understanding of ourselves and the world around us. For example, an assertion such as, ‘that’s the way we do things round here’ can be a potential barrier to alternative views about how to act because any attempt to act in a new/different way challenges existing social norms and rules.

Heidegger provides further elaboration for why we should pay attention to social norms and rules in his observation that human beings are not related to the world as subjects related to objects (Heidegger [1926] 2005: 98). For Heidegger, activity is not determined by conscious choices and aware states of mind, but how we act in the world. He illustrates this point by describing how a carpenter does not think about how to use a hammer, as its use is taken-for-granted. Heidegger further asserts that we are coping beings already involved in the world but we only become conscious (in most cases) when things go wrong. Most of the time we find ourselves moving along in a state of ‘taken-for-grantedness’ against a backdrop of social norms and rules that shape our possible ways for being. For example, the way we dress, our relationships with students and with colleagues, and our opinions are all set against a backdrop of habits, practices and dispositions that legitimise some ways of being and discourage others. As such, we end up sharing with others a sense of the range of opinions and activities that are permissible. While this can be positive in the sense that we don’t have to think about every decision we make and can concentrate on those decisions that are most important, there is also a negative side. Submission to conformity can, according to Heidegger, lead to an increasingly normalised state where one never takes a stand for oneself by choosing alternative actions. Therefore, if we are to intentionally imagine different possibilities for acting we require opportunities to bring to reflective consciousness the familiar (taken-for-granted) in unfamiliar ways. In other words, by deliberately focusing on the familiar from different perspectives we can begin to consider alternative practices.

This insight suggests that teachers using an inclusive pedagogical approach must hone their capacity to see beyond (or to use Heideggerian terminology ‘see through’) the existing social norms in their schools to imagine and to extend what is generally available to everyone as opposed to providing for all by making separate individualised responses for some as the taken-for-granted social norms of specialist provision often require. While such teachers would still need to pay attention to the social norms and rules evident in the school environment, the development of their practice would start from a position of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Because such a stance is embodied (dissatisfaction is something that is felt) attending to it initiates an imagining of different possibilities for learners. Consequently, perceiving more as a result of seeing through the taken-for-granted social norms may help teachers extend what is generally available to everyone and provides a ‘bridge’ to help the teacher reframe pedagogical decision-making.

Comportment: To enact pedagogical decision-making is to be bodily present in the classroom. The role of the body is highlighted in Heidegger’s notion of comportment. For Heidegger, comportment refers to one’s demeanour or way of carrying oneself as

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1 This has particular resonance for teacher education where work on the theory practice link has produced a Pedagogy of Realistic Teacher Education (Korthagen, with Kessels, Koster, Lagerwerf & Wubbels, 2001). Rooted in insights developed from mathematics education, the approach has strong parallels to teacher education for inclusion.
apparent in one’s disposition to different situations in the world. Heidegger claims that this ‘disposedness’ announces what matters (to us) in a non-cognitive bodily manner (i.e. through feelings and emotions) and forms the basis for one’s subsequent actions. Comportment is a type of bodily knowing that is evident in the way that we do things (how we act in the world) and relate to others.

In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962), offers conceptual insight into bodily knowing that builds on Heideggarian concepts. Accordingly, we access the world through our bodies, all knowledge is embodied knowing and, as Merleau-Ponty argues, we can never be free from embodiment. The importance of the body lies in its role as a means for revealing the taken-for-granted social norms and rules of a particular situation. In this way, comportment may be thought of as a type of interpretive, non-cognitive, perceptual knowledge of how we sense ourselves, that resonates with van Manen’s (1995) notion of ‘pedagogical tact’. As such the implication arising from Heidegger’s notion of comportment is that it illuminates the importance of foregrounding ontology and challenges us to consider how we might develop embodied ways of knowing in the preparation and on-going development of the teacher.

*Essence*: Linked to the idea of comportment is Heidegger’s use of *essence* as a verb. For Heidegger, ‘to essence’ means that the object of our attention,

“… comes to presence, it matters to us enduringly, moves or makes a way for us and concerns us. The essence thought in this manner names that which endures, matters to us in everything because it moves and makes a way for everything.” (Heidegger, [1959] 2003: 190)

Heidegger conceptualises essence within his description of the role of languages in establishing different styles of being-in-the-world: what is *essential* (in the Heideggarian sense) about a phenomenon can change over time as different ages and cultures can be comported towards the world in different ways. Essence, like comportment, is an interpretive activity in that it is orientated toward making sense of the situations in which we find ourselves. From the perspective of inclusive pedagogy this idea manifests itself in privileging the notion of everybody as opposed to pedagogical approaches that include all students by individualising for some. The privileging of everybody also announces an act of concern towards all students. Acts of concern are addressed by Heidegger in his explication of *solicitude*.

*Solicitude*: Heidegger reserves the use of the term *solicitude* for acts of concern for other people. Conceptually he further discriminates between acts of solicitude as ‘deficient’, ‘indifferent’, or ‘positive’. Deficient and indifferent modes “… characterise everyday, average Being-with-one-another…” ([1926] 2005: 158) and include for example, boredom, daydreaming, passing by one another, or not mattering to one another. In contrast, the positive modes of solicitude take two, somewhat extreme, forms. The first form of solicitude is when someone, a teacher for example, ‘leaps in’ and takes over for students that with which the students should be concerned. Ironically this is a form of positive solicitude that while well intentioned, can be damaging to students if it puts them at risk of being dominated or dependent. The second form of positive solicitude occurs in this example when the teacher ‘leaps ahead’ of the students to provide support that leads them to a state of independence.
For Heidegger, our very being in the world is such that our relationships with other people necessitates some form of concern (act of solicitude) which may manifest itself in a positive or negative manner. In an inclusive pedagogical approach, for example, the idea of solicitude requires the teacher to adopt the second form of positive solicitude which ‘leaps ahead’ to ensure all students are active participants in the classroom community and demonstrate increasing autonomy in their learning. A key strategy here is to extend the range of choices and of learning opportunities available to students. However, acts of solicitude do not alone furnish a fruitful framework to support teachers’ decision making.

**Conscience:** In the second part of *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces the notion of conscience which is understood as “radicalized circumspection” (Weidenfeld, 2011). Here conscience is a form of self-awareness or self-understanding that works in tandem with circumspection to enable one to take a critical stance in relation to social norms and/or the status quo. Conscience also works alongside comportment and both are, for Heidegger, bound up in a non-cognitive understanding of the situation in which one finds oneself. Through consciousness we demonstrate the capacity for disclosing possibilities for acting in different ways in response to a cultural context created by someone else. Conscience enables one to notice (through our beliefs, feelings and emotions) taken-for-granted social norms and to see alternative ways of being. For Heidegger, change in how we organise and live our lives is possible; and phronesis may be characterised and understood as both individual and communal in the sense that our beliefs point back to our cultures and traditions (Gadamer, 1975) in nature. Heidegger’s notion of conscience can be linked to the stance required by an inclusive pedagogical approach. For example, this stance orients the teacher to seek alternatives to pedagogical strategies that rely on ‘bell curve thinking’. In so doing, it encourages the teacher to imagine and use a range of alternative possibilities for teaching.

The broader Heideggerian articulation of phronesis described above has stimulated us to consider whether this supplementary conceptual framework with its focus on perceiving more might be useful in deepening our understanding of inclusive pedagogy, which in turn might have implications for our work as teacher educators. Underpinning inclusive pedagogy is the principled idea that the actions of the teacher should aim to extend what is generally available in the classroom to everyone, whilst taking account that there will be differences between learners. This calls upon the teacher to hone their perceptual skills in pursuit of transforming classroom practices so that they do not limit students’ capacity for learning by prejudging what they can and cannot do. Honing perceptual skill involves both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of circumspection. Table 1 provides an example illustrating how inclusive pedagogy and Heidegger’s expanded notion of phronesis are linked.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic of Heideggerian Phronesis</th>
<th>Explanation for inclusive pedagogy</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circumspection (understanding)</td>
<td>Teachers take a critical stance towards the pedagogical situation asking whether and how existing</td>
<td>Teachers imagine the possibilities for transforming the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Comportment  
* *(demeanour/tact)* | Teachers embody an inclusive disposition that is orientated towards ‘everybody’ in the class. Teachers bodily position themselves to support inclusion. | Teachers move around the classroom, providing individual support without stigmatising some students as less able. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Essence  
* *(values)* | Teachers privilege the notion of everybody and the idea that they are responsible for the learning of all students drawing on specialist knowledge and support as needed to fulfil this responsibility. | Teachers draw upon socio-cultural perspectives on learning that acknowledge the importance of relationships between everybody in the learning environment of the classroom. |
| Solicitude  
* *(care)* | Teachers adopt a positive mode of solicitude which ‘leaps ahead’ in order to ensure all students have opportunities for meaningful and self-directed participation in classroom activities | Teachers expand the range of choices of learning opportunities without predetermining or assigning children to differentiated forms of a lesson. The aim is to empower learners to direct the course of their own learning. |
| Conscience  
* *(self-awareness)* | Working in tandem with circumspection, conscience is a form of self-awareness that adopts a critical stance relative to the social norms of the ‘bell-curve thinking’ such as ability grouping that underpins many educational practices. | Teachers can imagine and plan learning activities that do not depend on ‘bell-curve thinking’. They seek out and use alternative pedagogical strategies where possible. |

**Implications for teacher education and the teaching of an inclusive pedagogical approach**

A Heideggarian interpretation of phronesis develops Aristotelian perspectives in a number of ways that are analytically helpful. First, understanding phronesis as both
individual and communal in nature brings to educators’ attention the importance of relations between persons and allows for shared practices. For example, the actions of a newly qualified teacher (or any teacher) are filled with meaning and purpose, therefore, phronesis is influenced by values, beliefs, theories, assumptions and prejudice which for the most part go unnoticed unless a deliberate attempt is made to bring them to reflective awareness. We are aware of the important work of teacher educators who have developed a theoretical framework which incorporates Aristotelian concepts of episteme and phronesis into research on teacher education (e.g. Korthagen, 2001). However, our concern has been to articulate a concept of inclusive pedagogy in order to consider its implications for teacher education. As a result, we remain - for the current time at least - focused on how we can use what we have learned from the craft knowledge study of experienced teachers to help establish a knowledge base that can inform teacher education programmes about what we understand by inclusive pedagogy. That is, how to support classroom teachers to develop the dispositions to see the learning of all students as their responsibility, even though specialist support may be needed in some cases. Hence, our interest in articulating what is essential about the practice, as well as our interest in social norms, rules and teacher decision-making.

Phronesis as practiced by the teachers in our studies has shown us that it must not be thought of as simply an individual action. The relationship between a teacher’s practice and the traditions and cultures (including personal history and cultural background) from which she draws to make sense of the world, point back to the communities which have helped shape that teacher as a person. Paradoxically, this very relationship has been shown to make the work of teacher education particularly unsuited to a ‘theory to practice’ type of approach. As Korthagen and Kessels (1999) have argued, the focus must be on ‘the degree to which there is an alternation and integration of theory and practice within the program’ (p.5).

However, using Heidegger’s ideas of circumspection, comportment and essence foregrounds the importance of ontology, highlighting the role of the body in disclosing what is important to us (for example, self-knowledge and beliefs about teaching). Applying these ideas within programmes of teacher education may serve to reveal the (limiting) social norms of any situation. In our own work on developing teacher education for inclusion, for example, we have developed a course of initial education that shows how the range of choices available to teachers is limited by the organisational structures, rules, and other social norms of schooling through a critique of bell-curve thinking and its associated practices (Rouse & Florian, 2012). What we are exploring here is the idea that interpretive perceptual knowledge (both cognitive and non-cognitive) contributes to the role of phronesis in ‘seeing through’ as Heidegger would have it, the taken-for-granted (social norms) and social practices that frees up space to consider alternative perspectives. In disclosing social norms and taken-for-granted rules Heideggerian phronesis enables one to see alternative possibilities. The question is, do we need Heidegger’s theory to achieve this?

Heidegger’s attention to (acts of) solicitude and conscience highlight the orientation of phronesis towards (practices) of human concern. Our presence in the world, according to Heidegger, is such that our relationships with other people necessitate some form of concern (solicitude) which may present itself in a positive or negative manner. The issue at stake here is the role that social relations play in making us how we are (rather than who or what we are); or, specifically in the case of teachers who
engage in what we have termed inclusive pedagogy, making visible how their practice differs from other approaches. To call a way of working ‘inclusive pedagogy’ is to assume that the activities or practices involved relate to a particular theoretical narrative about learning and teaching and a particular set of moral and/or ethical principles (relating to societal and institutional views of inclusion/exclusion) which orientate inclusive pedagogy to the world and provide the basis for interpretation and decision making in the classroom. In our view, this is the shift in focus away from the teacher providing something different or additional for some to the teacher extending what is generally available to all whilst taking account that there will be individual differences between learners.

With real purchase for inclusive pedagogy, phronesis frames the role of the teacher as a thinker, interpreter of social norms, and decision maker, someone who can sensitively exercise professional judgments while simultaneously making sense of complex social and practical situations – all practices that are compatible with a Heideggarian view of phronesis as an interpretive activity. As teacher educators, mobilizing phronesis as a tool encourages us to educate teachers for critical self-awareness and to develop their capacity to interpret and make sense of their environment. For the inclusive pedagogical approach specifically, this self-awareness and sense making is underpinned by a moral purpose (to avoid the marginalization that can occur when some students are treated differently) and, where appropriate, transformation of the taken-for-granted social norms and rules (i.e. seeking alternatives to practices based on bell-curve thinking).

Understanding interpretive activity also requires teachers (and teacher educators) using or aspiring to use an inclusive pedagogical approach — to recognize the body as a means for eliciting perceptual knowledge to disclose and see through the social norms and the taken-for-granted rules in any given context. For example, teachers using an inclusive pedagogical approach will reject ability grouping as the main way of organising lessons and use alternative grouping strategies as part of daily practice. Such teachers will be both consciously aware of their bias and bodily attentive to their prejudice in decision making about grouping practices (things will or will not feel right). However they will also be able to imagine alternative possibilities and to make small changes (for example, expanding student choice of activity in some lessons) that begin to change the environment in terms of the social norms and rules that characterize a particular situation. Preparing and supporting teachers to imagine alternative possibilities has implications for teacher education and professional development. In particular it points to the need to foreground ontology, to provide opportunities and spaces to reflect on the familiar in unfamiliar ways, imagining alternative practices and engaging with reflexive practices conducive to good teaching.

An expanded Heideggarian understanding of phronesis offers a perspective on school norms, and how and for whose benefit they function which, in turn, enables alternative choices to be imagined. This is probably the most important contribution of Heidegger’s articulation of phronesis: teachers must know themselves, think critically and act ethically. Because inclusive pedagogy requires an ongoing critical relationship with the social norms and the taken-for-granted rules (e.g. bell-curve thinking) that drive school practice in ways that perpetuate the marginalisation of difference, Heidegger’s more precise and expanded articulation of phronesis, within a coherent ontological framework, may permit the kind of detailed unpacking of the
complexities of inclusive pedagogy in action that are needed to be able to teach the concept to others.

To date, our efforts to teach inclusive pedagogy in teacher education programmes have involved activities that draw upon lived classroom experiences and exposure to a range of case studies of class teachers who have devised ways of ensuring inclusiveness (see for example, Florian and Linklater, 2010). Until now, we have not made explicit reference in our work to phronesis, nor have we explicitly foregrounded the importance of embodied ways of knowing. However, our reflections on how the intentions of teachers using an inclusive pedagogical approach could be further articulated in ways that might be helpful to the developing practice of other teachers has led us to a Heideggarian approach to phronesis, where the teacher is positioned as a ‘social norm/rule interpreter/changer’ who, by perceiving more and imagining alternative ways of working, can bring about a transformation of taken-for-granted social norms and fulfil the role of change agentry (Fullan 1993; Pantić, 2014.). To this end, we are now considering the role of bodily knowing in supporting the development of inclusive pedagogy. While the ultimate value of phronesis in inclusive pedagogy needs to be more fully understood, it does appear to afford better understanding of some critical principles of teacher development and classroom practices, than do more reductionist approaches that foreground knowledge transfer at the expense of ontology and aim to distil teaching into a set of skills to be applied in specific situations but do little more than perpetuate the problems inherent in many existing practices.

References


