Police Amalgamation and Reform in Scotland: The Long Twentieth Century

ABSTRACT

This article examines shifting debates about police amalgamation and governance reform in Scotland since the mid-nineteenth century in the light of the creation of a single police service (Police Scotland) in 2013. From a proliferation of 89 separate police forces in 1859, the number had been reduced to 48 by 1949 and eight in 1975. Yet the move towards a single police service was far from inevitable, as comparison with England and Wales demonstrates. The idea of a ‘single’ or national force was mooted from the 1850s onwards in moments of unrest, disorder and emergency, but for most of the twentieth-century it remained anathema. For the Scottish Office and Home Office as well as for many police officers, the move towards larger policing units was seen as desirable on the grounds of economy, efficiency, and professionalization. Yet the assumption that ‘local’ control of police forces through municipal and county councils best enabled accountability and hence legitimacy remained intact until the 1960s, whilst the regional model set up in 1975 persisted for forty years. The article explores the reasons for this, focusing on the changing dynamics of the relationship between central and local government across the last 150 years.
On 1 April 2013 Police Scotland formally came into being as a single service replacing the former eight regional ‘legacy’ forces through which policing had been delivered since 1975.¹

Official rhetoric has steered clear of the idea of uniform ‘national’ policing, emphasising the aim ‘to keep people safe across the whole of Scotland’ whilst stressing the need ‘to keep local policing … at the heart of what we do’.² The creation of the single service has been widely described by senior police officers as ‘the most significant change to the Scottish policing service in its history’.³ The genesis of police forces and constabularies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a result of the ‘local initiatives’ of ‘local elites’ rather than intervention from the centre.⁴ The pull towards centralisation—or rather, the careful balancing act between centre and locale—can be dated to the Police (Scotland) Act of 1857, which compelled towns, burghs and counties to establish police forces. By 1859 there were eighty-nine police forces in Scotland. Yet almost as soon as they proliferated, calls for amalgamation were put forward by civil servants and senior police officers. The number was reduced to sixty-four by 1899, forty-eight by 1939, thirty-three by 1959, and then eight from 1975 to 2013.⁵ Whilst retrospectively the trajectory appears to be an inexorable move towards ever increasing amalgamation, it would be ahistorical to assume that a single police service in Scotland was inevitable. The eight ‘legacy’ forces based in regional administrative areas were in place for four decades. Moreover, as Table 1 suggests, there was significant stasis in the number of county constabularies between 1859 and the late 1940s. The decrease in the number of burgh police forces was steadier, but with reductions concentrated in 1930 and the 1960s. We might, therefore, ask why it was that the model of local burgh and county policing was sustained for so long?

This article has three main aims. Firstly, it seeks to chart and contextualise shifting debates about police reform and amalgamation in Scotland since the mid-nineteenth century in the light of the creation of Police Scotland, identifying the arguments that were made both
for and against geographical consolidation, and examining who was articulating them within a public sphere. Secondly, given the current preoccupation with ‘local policing’ and the desire to retain it as an emphasis within a single service, it examines how the idea of ‘local policing’ was articulated in the historical past, and what was understood by it, both for those who supported as well as those who opposed greater amalgamation. Finally, it addresses comparative questions. As Clive Emsley’s work has shown, ‘the steady march of centralisation’ is equally apparent across the history of policing and governance in England and Wales in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet in the twenty-first century its organisation has gone in almost diametrically opposed ways, with the continuation in England and Wales of some forty-three separate police forces and, in 2012, the creation of the elected office of Police and Crime Commissioner as well as the ending of the direct link between the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police through the introduction of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in London. In England and Wales, therefore, the trend has been against further centralisation. The article will seek to comment on points of commonality and divergence between Scotland and other parts of Britain across the twentieth century, reflecting in particular on the dynamics of the relationship between the Home Office and Scottish Office. Whilst addressing these questions, the structure of this article is a chronological one as that which best enables the charting of continuity and change. It is not our intention to revisit the emergence and development of police forces in Scotland in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which has been comparatively well-charted in a range of doctoral studies and other works. Rather, we seek to fill a significant gap in terms of the dearth of research on the twentieth century. The evidence-base is largely archival, drawing substantively on officially generated files in the National Records of Scotland, as well as local and national newspaper coverage; nevertheless, reference is also made to
interviews with former police officers that touch on their experiences of regionalisation (the creation of the eight ‘legacy’ forces in 1975).

Table 1: The Amalgamation of Police Forces in Scotland 1859-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>County Forces</th>
<th>City/Burgh Forces</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland, 1859-2013, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers
**Nineteenth-century contexts: Alfred List and David Monro**

The idea of a single policing body for Scotland has its origins in the nineteenth century, was largely grounded in fears of civil unrest and disorder in the Borders and Highlands (rather than rapidly urbanising areas), and was promoted by a new but small elite of highly influential professional policemen (including inspectors of constabulary). It failed to gain wider currency because of the liberal consensus amongst the political classes that associated such a centralising agenda with autocratic foreign regimes and because of the dissipation of any real threat of civil disobedience.

In June 1853 the head of Midlothian Police, Alfred J. List, put forward a plan for ‘a uniform system of county police’ in evidence that he gave to the Select Committee of Police.\(^9\) Having joined the Metropolitan Police as an original ‘Peeler’ in 1829, List had been appointed as the commanding officer of the first Scottish county police force of East Lothian in 1832, where he received praise for his success in introducing a ‘very efficient system of police’.\(^10\) In 1840 he had published *A Practical Treatise on Rural Police* and moved to lead Midlothian constabulary.\(^11\) This publication and his work in advising counties in the south of Scotland on the formation of their ‘new’ police forces ensured that he became the most influential writer and thinker on policing in nineteenth-century Scotland.\(^12\) List’s ideas for the consolidation of police forces were drawn from his experience of the difficulties of policing large populations of navvies working on the building of the railways and of ensuring public order with relatively few men.\(^13\) He looked back fondly upon his service in London where a large number of police officers could be assembled to deal with an emergency.\(^14\) A further factor, however, that shaped his plan for consolidation was the ability of people and communications systems to traverse administrative boundaries, an argument that came to be emphasised in the twentieth century as the development of motor traffic increased the pace of
transport further. When List gave evidence to the 1853 select committee he advised that the
four counties who had not yet formed police forces should be compelled to do so under a
rural police act, because ‘there is no uniformity of action, in the case of escapees, or
information being sent from one part of the county to the other’. List went on to outline the
structure of a uniform policing system:

Its governance should be under an officer attached to the Crown Agent’s office, with
a sub for the north, and another for the south of the Tay; and as many counties are
small, and others entirely rural, two or three should be united together for police
purposes, under the charge of a superintendent or inspector; all orders or instructions
to emanate from the chief constable, and periodic reports to be made by him to the
Lord Advocate.

For List the system had three main advantages: economy of scale; consistency in approach;
and a significant reduction in local interference. The last point was the most controversial in
effectively proposing an elevation of a technocratic head of police and a diminution in the
power of local elites:

… I would not set aside the Commissioners of Supply, but I would not allow them to
interfere with the men; they should have only certain duties to perform, and should
not interfere with orders emanating from the head of the police.

List might have hoped that his reputation would ensure that he would be the obvious
candidate for the role of chief constable of all the counties of Scotland. In making his case,
however, he had over-stepped the mark in criticising those with whom his own position,
status and authority was bound up. At a meeting of the (elected) Police Commissioners of
the City of Edinburgh, List was described as ‘one of the leading witnesses in support of
centralising opinions’ and likened to ‘some petty German prince … laying down the law to
the Emperor of Austria or King of Prussia’.\(^\text{18}\)

As Graeme Morton has carefully shown, municipal government in early nineteenth-
century Scottish burghs was seen as the protector of civic virtue, associational culture, and
civil society in opposition to the model of a centralised authoritarian nation state. Yet centre
and locale were bound together in a symbiotic relationship since statute law enabled local
self-determination: ‘the centre gave powers to local government to do its bidding, but this
approach was balanced and thereby sanctioned for the reason that local government in turn
demanded its own powers from the state’.\(^\text{19}\) Police constables gained any legitimacy they had
from their association with local civil administration and thence from the idea that municipal
authorities were locally elected and thus directly answerable to local opinion. Central
government, in turn, was dependant on locales for the regulation of public order. For Morton,
municipal government ‘was suitably empowered by the central state to govern on its behalf
and this maintained the legitimacy of each’.\(^\text{20}\) This equilibrium was reconfigured but
maintained as a result of the 1857 Police (Scotland) Act which, whilst not introducing the
single police force that List had hoped for, compelled towns, burghs and counties to form
their own police forces, introduced a state grant amounting to ‘One Fourth of the Charge for
the Pay and Clothing’, and created the post of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary for
Scotland (HMICS).\(^\text{21}\) The inspector was ‘to visit and inquire into the State and Efficiency of
the Police appointed for every County and Burgh’, and he was empowered to advise that the
state grant be refused if a force was deemed inefficient.\(^\text{22}\) The Act referred to amalgamation
by stating in section 61 that ‘Burghs may agree to consolidate their Police with County
Force’; although it was expressed in terms of permission rather than compulsion, the potential
to withhold the grant on the grounds of ‘inefficiency’ could be used as leverage.\textsuperscript{23} In this way, then, centre and locale held a set of checks and sanctions against each other, including the sharing of the allocation of resources.

From their appointment in 1859, HMICSs pressed for the amalgamation of small burgh forces with their surrounding counties or adjacent burghs. There was some early success in that five burghs (Dysart, Kirkcaldy, Musselburgh, St. Andrews and Wishaw) agreed to consolidate with their counties under the enabling clause of the new police act.\textsuperscript{24} For first HMICS John Kinloch, operational efficiency meant having a ‘well-disciplined police’ that was effectively drilled, trained and properly paid. He was highly critical of small burghs of fewer than 5,000 population and who ‘in some cases had their town officers, lamplighters, scavengers (and in more than one instance, the sexton), sworn in as constables, dressed in a blue uniform, and exhibited to me as their “police force”’.\textsuperscript{25} As David Barrie has shown, two-thirds of burgh forces were deemed ‘inefficient’ upon their first inspection in 1859 compared to only two of the thirty-two rural constabularies.\textsuperscript{26} However, the sanction of the grant was rejected by some burghs who attempted to remain relatively autonomous. Aberdeen and Dundee both declined to accept the grant even if the Inspector reported them as efficient, and Perth and Kilmarnock did not respond to Kinloch on the question of the grant.\textsuperscript{27} Any re-balancing was subject to negotiation, avoidance or resistance. Kinloch’s successor as HMICS, Charles Carnegie, wrote in 1869 that ‘Annan, Kelso, Kirriemuir and Maxwelltown, cannot be reported as having efficient forces’ and that ‘these small places should be compelled to unite for police purposes with their respective counties’.\textsuperscript{28} Yet the heavy hand of compulsion could not be wielded, and the tactics of persuasion and suggestion required careful diplomacy. In 1899 the next HMICS, Captain David Munro, wrote approvingly of creeping amalgamations, which would reveal the benefits of consolidation, whereby a chief constable was shared by two counties (for example Berwick and Roxburgh) or a county and a
burgh (as in the case of Renfrewshire and Bute and the burgh of Kinning Park). Fifty years after its formation the Inspectorate was still reporting that the large number of small forces were ‘not conducive to efficiency or economy’. By far the most developed call for a ‘national’ police force came in 1886 from Munro in response to the crofters’ protests in Skye and Lewis over the shortage of grazing land. As Ewen A. Cameron has observed, those in positions of authority assumed that violent episodes had been exacerbated by Irish ‘agitators’, escalating both assumptions about its political significance and the orchestration of the response, which included the use of ‘coercive, as well as conciliatory, tactics’. To deal with the disturbances Inverness-shire Constabulary had more than doubled in size between 1880 and 1883, from forty to ninety-four officers. However, in January 1884 a detachment of police officers had been driven away in a humiliating manner by crofters in Glendale, in the north of Skye. The involvement of the county police had simply reinforced already entrenched assumptions that they were simply the ‘agents of the proprietorial class’. The police failure also acted as a further impetus for Inverness-shire’s sheriff, William Ivory, to lead two military expeditions in 1884-5 and 1886 to attempt to pacify the island’s crofters. Munro’s response was to propose to the recently-appointed secretary of state for Scotland, Arthur Balfour, the setting up of a ‘Government Force’ with the country divided into police districts. In November 1886 he submitted a more detailed plan, in which all of the police in Scotland would be transferred to the Crown and commanded by a chief commissioner in Edinburgh. A large body of men could be easily assembled and sent to any area suffering similar disturbances, and the ‘erroneous impression, so prevalent, in the Highland counties especially, that the Police are the Landowners’ Servants, would be removed entirely’. Pay, conditions, promotions and police procedures could be standardised, a general superannuation scheme introduced, and the existing pattern of burgh and county forces would be transformed into fifteen county and five city areas. As
the disturbances petered out, so did the impetus for the plan and no government force was set up in the nineteenth century. What is significant, however, is that arguments for a professionalised, impartial (in relation to landholders and local elites), and nationally-coordinated service had been put on the table. Between 1857 and the end of the nineteenth century the move to combine forces seemed to be gathering a slow momentum although it was not a one-way process: in 1888 the burgh of Broughty Ferry decided to leave the county of Forfar Police and set itself up as a ‘small separate force’ once again.37

**Burgh forces and country constabularies in the twentieth century**

Shane Ewen’s study of the police and fire services in Birmingham and Leicester between 1870 and 1938 has explored cogently the fine lines of interaction between central and municipal government in the negotiation of resources and processes of decision-making. Despite the increasingly regulatory role of the centre, services continued to be organised and delivered at the local level and the power relationship between them is best characterised as one of ‘interdependence’ in the running of a ‘national local government system’.38 Networks that were personal, associational and professional ran across as well as along the local/central axes, binding as well as sometimes fracturing policy communities. In Scotland a further layer of complexity was clearly added by the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 which, it has been argued, exercised a largely mediatary role in its early years, advising councils on their statutory duties.39 With the upgrading of the role of the secretary of state for Scotland in 1926, relocation to Edinburgh, and the expansion of the civil service associated with it, a more interventionist role developed.40 If the Scottish Office was unlikely to act as a point of resistance to Westminster, it sought nonetheless to negotiate compromises that took Scottish particularity into account.
In addition to the tripartite relationship between Home Office, Scottish Office and local administration that was established by the interwar period, the decision-making process was shaped by a further set of groupings or constellations of interest, influence and authority that together constituted the policy community associated with policing. Local authorities had formed their own associations and lobby groups (representing the royal burghs, the cities, and county councils). The Police Act of 1919, which enabled the secretary of state for Scotland to standardise pay and conditions, set up the (Scottish) Police Federation to represent the views of rank and file police officers. Similarly, in the same year the Chief Constables (Scotland) Association began to meet, with a representative of the Scottish Office in attendance and this was used as vehicle to discuss collaboration between forces (such as the sharing of training), and the interpretation of new guidelines as well as the sharing of best practice; an Association of Superintendents and Lieutenants was also established. Through the setting up of the Police Council, representatives of these policing groups were to meet with the inspectorate, secretary of state, and representatives of the local authorities to discuss changes to conditions of service. Thus 1919 saw the imposition of a consultative model.

The pressure to amalgamate into larger forces on the grounds of efficiency and economy was maintained from the centre (both Westminster and Edinburgh) in the years after the First World War. The 1919 Committee on the Police Service (Desborough committee), which had focused on pay and conditions (addressed in the 1919 Act), had recommended a reduction in the number of Scottish forces. The Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1929 had abolished eight small burgh forces and combined two pairs of county forces. In 1933 the Police Consolidation (Scotland) Committee (Ormidale committee) had proposed the gradual reduction of Scottish forces on the grounds of efficiency and economy to a total of fourteen. The areas covered were to be sufficiently small to allow senior officers ‘to visit all police stations at regular intervals, and so acquire and maintain an
intimate knowledge of local affairs throughout the whole of the district’; they were also shaped by existing sheriffdoms. It was suggested that Glasgow City, for example, should be amalgamated with Lanarkshire and the burgh forces within this area; Edinburgh would be amalgamated with the Lothians and Peebles. The Ormidale report drew attention to the current anomaly in which two police forces (the county and the burgh) sustained separate headquarters in the same town (this was the case in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Inverness, Ayr, Hamilton, Dumbarton, Stirling, Perth, Paisley and Inverness). Significantly, the Ormidale committee rejected the idea that Scotland should simply be divided into two or three districts along the lines of a ‘national’ force because ‘the present close association of the police with local affairs and local administration … no doubt helps to create a good and friendly atmosphere between the police and the public’. The recommendations were supported by the cities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen, whilst county councils were split and policing groups remained neutral. However, fifteen of the nineteen Scottish cities or burghs had vociferously objected to the proposals and, through a deputation to the Scottish Office, had ‘made it clear that the Committee’s recommendations were quite unacceptable’. This uncompromising position meant that the report was ‘pigeon-holed’ (as senior civil servant Charles Craik Cunningham put it), and only one attempt to bring about voluntary amalgamation was successful throughout the 1930s (the case of Dumfries).

This pattern of recommendations from the centre, resistance from municipalities, and reluctance to force the matter was broadly similar to the situation in England and Wales in the first part of the twentieth century. Emsley has commented that in terms of official rhetoric ‘governments and civil servants continued to support the idea of local control of the police except in London’ (where the Metropolitan Police had always been subject to direct Home Office control) whilst attempting to develop tactics to undermine this. Attempts to encourage amalgamation in the 1930s were opposed by the Association of Municipal
Councils in England and Wales, leading to a backing down on the part of the Home Office given concerns about police-public relations. At the same time, however, collaborations between forces (including the sharing of training and other resources) were encouraged with some success, as the acceptable side of consolidation; ultimately this could be used as an argument as to why full amalgamation was the next logical step.

In England and Wales the emergency situation created by the Second World War was a crucial motor for amalgamation; and it is here that Scottish divergence was apparent. In July 1942 new regulations were issued under the United Kingdom’s Emergency Powers (Defence) Act authorising the secretary of state for Scotland as well as the home secretary (for England and Wales) to enforce amalgamations if these were seen as necessary for facilitating naval, military or air force operations. As a result twenty-six forces on the English south coast were amalgamated into six in 1943. Municipal authorities were temporarily appeased by the promise that this was for the duration of the war only. Nevertheless, many police officers themselves advocated ‘nationalisation’ of the police, showing a clear mismatch between those involved in operation duties and their employers. In Scotland civil servants were extremely concerned about problems of communication between small forces, which had been exposed as a result of two incidents in East Lothian. A training exercise in August 1941—involving two men posing as ‘Fifth Columnists’—had gone badly wrong when the men were allowed entry to East Lothian police headquarters, Haddington, with obviously forged identity cards although clear descriptions had been circulated beforehand. In early 1942 East Lothian police had failed to pass on information about a parachutist sighted in the area to neighbouring forces. HMICS Brigadier-General H. M. Dudgeon, who had looked into the matter, was of the view that problems were exacerbated by the difficulty of attracting high quality recruits to small burgh and county forces; and the creation of larger forces would create more opportunities for promotion and career development. In February
1942, therefore, the Scottish Office was carefully considering a proposal to reduce the number of Scottish police forces to eighteen, but there were concerns this would be ‘highly contentious’ given that ‘public opinion is [not] yet prepared to support the government in legislation to force consolidation on unwilling Police Authorities’ and thus ‘politically impossible’. Senior Scottish Office civil servants (including Cunningham) were convinced in theory that complete ‘nationalisation’, ideally on a UK basis, was needed (along the lines of the reorganisation already carried through for the fire service). Discussions had taken place with the secretary of state for Scotland, Tom Johnston, as to whether a case should be made for Scotland to be omitted altogether from the Defence (Amalgamation) Regulations on the grounds that it would neither be popular nor resolve broader problems. Whilst, therefore, the regulations were applicable across the UK, Johnston made it clear that they were likely to ‘be a dead letter in Scotland’ and, indeed, no amalgamations resulted north of the border.

The debates concerning the Defence (Amalgamation) Regulations of 1942 provide clear articulations of the ways in which local policing was understood by those involved in municipal government in urban areas at mid-century and in the context of the war effort. In Scotland local councillors in Inverness Burgh galvanised themselves against what they saw as the centralising agenda of the Scottish Office when, in November 1942, it was suggested that the occasion of the resignation of the chief constable might be an appropriate opportunity for uniting with the county (Inverness-shire), arguing that ‘it was not democratic government to remove the powers of the local authorities’. The editor of the Inverness Courier and Advertiser argued that ‘The Highland blood is up … There’s need for increasing vigilance by local authorities over their rights and powers. They should not be overawed by the dictates of Edinburgh and Whitehall’. The Scottish Office proposal was for the appointment of the existing Inverness-shire chief to head up both police forces. HMICS Dudgeon complained that the press had been rabble-rousing, that he had been welcomed by ‘a very cordial
reception and a perfect hearing’ upon a visit a few weeks previously, and that the Scottish Office’s preferred candidate was ‘every inch a Highlander – born in Ross-shire, a Seaforth Highlander; his mother tongue – Gaelic’.

The issue, however was not Highland credentials. It was the matter of rivalry between county and burgh (that had manifested itself in disagreement over education matters), and the principle of central interference. The elected representatives of the royal burghs continued to defend their ‘right to local government’ that had been forged in the nineteenth century, rather than expressing any desire for Scottish national government.

It was significant that Inverness Burgh went ahead with the appointment of its own candidate as chief constable in January 1943 in what had come to be seen across Scotland as something of a test case. Rather than force the issue, Johnston simply approved the appointment.

The legitimacy of central government (including the Scottish Office), particularly given concerns about morale in wartime, was still bound up with and maintained by its ability to empower municipal autonomy in Scotland.

Effectively, then, the smaller municipal corporations had lost the argument in England and Wales as a result of the wartime amalgamations: the Police Act of 1946 single-handedly abolished a further forty-seven borough forces south of the border. In Scotland, however, the royal burghs had come out fighting. Whilst civil servants had attempted to use the occasion of retirement, resignation or death in service of chief constables to persuade the burghs to consolidate with adjacent counties, all suggestions had been ignored. As the Home Office began to make its plans for post-war legislation to retain powers to enforce compulsory amalgamation in 1944, Johnston instructed his civil servants to negotiate a middle course. Whilst he agreed with the home secretary (Herbert Morrison) that amalgamations ‘may be in the interests of efficiency’ he was ‘most anxious’ that this should be done through ‘voluntary agreement’ and that ‘compulsion should be used as a last resort.

In February 1945 a confidential note was sent out by the Scottish Home department to all
police authorities and associations asking for discussion of the procedures to be used to enable and ultimately, force, amalgamations:

There is no intention of suggesting that power should be taken to create Regional Police Forces, still less that police functions should be taken over as a national service. His Majesty’s government are satisfied that it would be wrong to make any fundamental alteration at present in the traditional framework of the Police Service … It is also recognised that the maintenance of a separate police force in a particular county or burgh may well be a legitimate cause of local pride.62

Police opinion was in favour of larger forces, and clearly accepted the argument that it would improve the status of police officers within a more professionalised service and thus the quality of recruits. With the exception of Charles Roy of Kilmarnock who sided with the oppositional stance taken in the burgh, the Chief Constables (Scotland) Association approved of the proposals. Similarly, lower ranks did not object to the possibility of amalgamation, although they asked that officers should have rights to remain within specific geographical locations rather than be transferred long distances against their wishes. Amongst local authorities, the Association of County Councils was similarly in accord, as were the cities. As in the 1930s, however, the Convention of Royal Burghs voiced concerns about the threat of compulsion; the Lord Provost of Perth argued that ‘they were proud of the ancient burghal powers and privileges’ although they would be ‘glad to take over the policing of the counties’.63

Clearly, if any form of amalgamation was to go ahead, the suggestion that one local authority was ‘taking over’ another would need to be avoided and, indeed, the notion of compulsion had to be handled with sensitivity.64 Rather than proceeding with a UK-wide bill,
a separate Scottish Bill was prepared and successfully enacted by a new secretary of state for Scotland in the Atlee administration, Joseph Westwood. Packaging the reform as part of the modern plan for post-war social reconstruction, he argued that:

the mobility of criminals, to whom the existence of numerous police boundaries was a godsend, the increase of road traffic and of road accidents, which created problems requiring unified police control over relatively large areas, the increasing need for expensive technical apparatus and for creating specialised police departments, all made it essential to have reasonably large units of administration.65

Furthermore, large forces would give police officers ‘wider opportunities of gaining experience and promotion’ as well as enabling economies of scale. When pressed in questioning by Scottish MPs at the committee stage, Westwood’s deputy, under-secretary T. Fraser, offered ‘an assurance that he did not intend to embark on any wholesale amalgamations’.66 Crucially, compared to the act for England and Wales, the Scottish legislation did not automatically abolish forces. The 1946 Police (Scotland) Act enabled two or more local police authorities working together to submit a voluntary scheme for amalgamation to the secretary of state for approval. If satisfactory voluntary schemes were not forthcoming, then a proposal could be put forward by the secretary of state for amalgamation on the grounds of ‘efficiency’. This would then be the subject of a full public enquiry, and would require the approval of Parliament.67

There were also differences between the Police (Scotland) Act 1946 and the legislation for England and Wales in relation to the organisation of local governance. In England and Wales an entirely new police authority—that was effectively autonomous of local councils—was to be created when forces were combined. In Scotland, however, a
slightly different model was adopted, that of ‘the joint committee consisting of representatives of the constituent authorities, who remained the police authorities for their respective areas but whose function relating to police … were delegated to the joint committee’.\textsuperscript{68} Local authorities were to work together and in partnership (albeit one that had been reconfigured and hence enabled by the centre) rather than feel that policing had been taken out of their hands.

A number of areas (nine in total) came forward with voluntary schemes (at the invitation of the secretary of state) that led to relatively easy consolidations by the late 1940s. These included schemes that led to: the creation of Dumfries and Galloway in February 1948; the unification of Berwick, Roxburgh and Selkirk in May 1948; the creation of a new police force for North-Eastern Counties in May 1949; the unification of Stirling and Clackmannanshire in March 1949; and the creation of Lothians and Peebles in 1950.\textsuperscript{69}

Acceptance of merger tended to come from counties, who were persuaded that there were significant advantages in terms of recruitment, the sharing of technologies, and improved systems of communication across large geographical areas and given the relative dispersal of population. In 1949, for example, when the new North-Eastern Counties Constabulary was created, local constituencies were reasonably satisfied that the relationship between police and community would not be undermined since ‘the village bobby will remain the backbone of the service’ and that there would be material benefits in terms of ‘greater resources, more mobility and no boundaries’.\textsuperscript{70} Arguably, in county areas, where individual constables were often isolated from each other but embedded within village life, it was the relationship that was forged though everyday encounters that was more important than formal structures of governance. Moreover, the role of the village constable had, since the late nineteenth century been concerned with largely administrative tasks that were peripatetic: attending sheep-dippings, checking fire-arms licences, undertaking the twice-yearly census of vagrants.
Furthermore, the increase in road traffic as a policing activity had increased awareness of the connectedness of rural areas. This contrasted with the model of burgh policing at mid-century, in which beat patrol still centred on the fabric and furniture of the street (owned by the burgh) and on the protection of the private property of local businesses, tradespeople and property owners (from which the burgh council was drawn).

The case of Ayr Burgh

Significant nodes of resistance were maintained in the burghs of Inverness, Motherwell, and Ayr, the town clerk of whom had informed Cunningham in June 1947 that they would ‘fight to the end against amalgamation’. The case of Ayr demonstrates the tactics that might be deployed by municipal authorities to resist central intervention. Throughout 1947 and 1948 Ayr Burgh refused to discuss amalgamation (with Ayr County and Kilmarnock) and declined to attend meetings, effectively goading the secretary of state into using the powers awarded under the 1946 act. Mr Gordon Thomson KC was appointed to head a public enquiry, which took place in February 1949. The royal burgh was represented by counsel, Mr J. R. Philip KC, who called a series of witnesses to demonstrate that the burgh police force was efficient because of its current structure of governance. James Lowdon, who was seventy-three years of age and had acted as chief constable for the previous forty-six years, defended his track record as a pioneer in introducing new technologies such as finger-printing and photography early on, and in being one of the first to employ policewomen (in 1918); detection rates were ‘very good’. The case was also made that policing in the burgh was highly specialised or particular because of the unique demography generated by the tourism associated with Burns’s cottage, the herring fleet, and the ‘racehorse crowd’ (which had necessitated the introduction of a local system of regulation for bookmakers). Finally, the case hinged on an argument about the significance of local autonomy in achieving police successes. The chair
of the local chamber of commerce told the enquiry: ‘I think they have attained their efficiency through being friendly with the local population’. He agreed that ‘confidence springs from the identification of the police with the burgh’ and ‘the fact that the townspeople know the man on the beat’.

The issue of identity was picked up by the town clerk, who commented on the effectiveness of special constables during the recent war because there was a very strong ‘esprit de corps’ that was ‘associated with the Burgh community’ and ‘with the local character of the force’.

Whilst the inquiry was in process, the burgh’s counsel raised objections to the procedures: Philip had not been permitted to cross-examine the HMICS, Sidney A. Kinnear, and the view of Ayr County and of Kilmarnock had not been heard. Indeed, Thomson proceeded to recommend that the amalgamation scheme should go ahead without hearing the case in its favour. Ayr Burgh began appeal proceedings, culminating in a finding in January 1950, by Lord Birnam in the court of session, that the inquiry (and thus the whole amalgamation process) was, indeed, ‘irregular’. Before the month was out, the Scottish Office had written to the three police authorities (Kilmarnock Burgh, Ayr Burgh and Ayr County) inviting them to submit a voluntary amalgamation scheme; unsurprisingly, the two burghs declined. Jaded by the Ayr experience, Scottish Office civil servants advised that it was unwise to pursue further compulsory proceedings against other belligerent areas (including Inverness Burgh and County, Lanarkshire and Motherwell and Wishaw, Perth Burgh and County) until ‘amalgamation of the three Ayrshire forces has been achieved’.

Indeed, the town of Motherwell had previously been policed as part of Lanarkshire from 1859 but the experience had been such an unhappy one that it had tried to set up its own force in 1914 (the Scottish Office had refused to allow this to go ahead during wartime). In 1920 Motherwell and Wishaw were combined together for local government purposes and, as a result of extensive lobbying, successfully formed their own police force in 1929, which they
were determined to defend ‘to the death’\textsuperscript{81} Whilst it was suggested that in Edinburgh a shift towards rejection of amalgamation (with Lothians and Peebles) had been orchestrated by the Progressives (in response to a central Labour administration), in Motherwell and Wishaw amalgamation was ‘unanimously opposed by progressive, Labour and Scottish National Party (SNP) candidates at ward meetings in the build-up to local elections’.\textsuperscript{82} The Ayr Burgh victory undoubtedly had a galvanising effect on other burghs. In April 1958 Hamilton town council decided to appoint its own chief constable despite sharing one with Lanarkshire for the past ten years and continued as a separate force until 1967.\textsuperscript{83} In Scotland no compulsory amalgamations took place in the 1940s or 1950s and, indeed, there was little impetus or appetite at the Scottish Office to press the matter in the wake of the Ayr Burgh case.

However police reform continued as a matter of intense debate and discussion across the UK, culminating in the report of the 1962 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, which, amongst other recommendations, stated that something should be done about the ‘extreme case of the multiplicity of small forces’ in Scotland. ‘Very considerable further reduction’ was ‘urgently’ needed and only the four cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen) should remain as independent urban forces.\textsuperscript{84} In its evidence to the Royal Commission the Scottish Home Department had acknowledged that a reduction to nineteen forces was desirable but that this ‘would be bitterly opposed by the burghs’.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, the Royal Commission also carefully considered evidence for and against the idea of a ‘unified national police service’. Indeed, the police federations of Scotland, England and Wales were all in support of a regional or national service. Chief constables, however, were reluctant to endorse it (with the exception of Lancashire’s Colonel Eric St Johnston).\textsuperscript{86} Ultimately the commission endorsed the idea of local control of local forces, stating that it was persuaded by ‘the wide concurrence of view among witnesses representing the central Government, the local authority associations and the police [ie. Chief Constables]’ that
‘police organisation based on local forces and administered by partnership between local and central government’ would ‘meet the needs of the time’.87

In England and Wales the 1964 Police Act removed the powers to appoint, dismiss and discipline officers from watch committees (urban areas) and handed them over to chief constables (in Scotland this role was already undertaken by police chiefs). It also gave the home secretary further powers to force amalgamation, which were used by Roy Jenkins to cut provincial forces further from 117 to forty-nine in 1966.88 In Scotland civil servants were beginning to feel they looked ‘laggard’ in comparison and were instructed to re-open the files: ‘the chosen victim is Inverness – county and burgh’.89 Rather than attempt to introduce a new police bill for Scotland, the decision was made to use the arts of diplomacy on a case by case basis, with HMICS Andrew Meldrum, himself a former chief constable of Inverness Burgh, to play a key role in steering the process. In July 1966 secretary of state William Ross read out a statement announcing his desire for ‘a limited programme of amalgamation’ to reduce the total number of Scottish forces to twenty, which he hoped would be ‘brought about by negotiation and agreement’. Police authorities were to be encouraged once again to develop ‘voluntary’ schemes but public inquiry would be used if agreement was not reached.90 The feelings in Inverness Burgh had long been against a simple amalgamation with the county with whom it was described as ‘daggers drawn’ as a result of continued financial disagreements over education matters. By 1966, indeed, the town clerk ‘favoured nationalisation or regionalisation’ through amalgamation with the whole of the north of Scotland, given that similar structures were deemed to have worked well in the case of the fire service.91 Yet the secretary of state for Scotland refused to countenance this as ‘not in the public interest’ because he thought a police district covering the whole of the north would be ‘too large’, suggesting that even in the late 1960s the Scottish Office was reluctant to move to more regionalised structures.92 At this point Shetland (Zetland Constabulary) and Orkney
were required to consolidate with Caithness (although Shetlanders argued that their transport links were more obviously with Aberdeen). Ultimately, in the case of both Ayr and Inverness, the Scottish Office bounced the burghs into amalgamation with their respective counties by taking the matter to inquiry, which it ensured was conducted judiciously this time. By 1968, the Scottish Office had finally achieved its objectives in reducing the number of police forces to what was deemed an appropriate level but the system of direct local control by police committees, albeit ‘joint’ ones uniting burgh with county, continued.

Across the twentieth century, therefore, resistance overwhelming came from the royal burghs (although county constabularies also voiced objections). A strong sense of civic pride and identity was expressed through the rhetoric of democracy, in which it was argued that local police forces should be accountable to local people. Sense of ‘community’ was associated with local autonomy in opposition to the centralising state, and was articulated through sense of place. Moreover, local, meant ‘civic’. These beliefs—which were cultural and political—remained pretty much intact until the early 1960s. Supporters of amalgamation tended to make arguments that, in contrast, were financial and logistical. Arguably, the inability of the Scottish Office to resolve the debate resulted from the lack of agreement about its terms of reference.

Regionalisation and beyond

The final move towards regionalisation of the police service—and the creation of the eight forces that were to serve Scotland for the next forty years—was not the result of discussions about the optimum geographical entities to deliver effective operational policing. Rather it was an effect of the broader strategy of local government reform which saw the abolition of separate local government status for burghs, counties, cities and districts in 1975 with the creation of the new two-tier regional structure (of regional councils delivering major
services, underpinned by multiple district councils delivering local planning and improvements).

Effectively, then, the very councils who opposed police reform were themselves abolished. With the representatives of rank and file police officers already on side, there was little concerted opposition to the move. Indeed Dumfries and Galloway, the smallest of the eight, continued in its existing form. There were some difficulties in the new Northern Constabulary (Highlands and islands) arising from disagreements between the Highland regional council and the three island authorities (covering Orkney, Shetland and the Western Isles) regarding their numerical representation on the region’s joint police committee. Indeed, this had frequently been a focal point of disagreement in the past when counties had amalgamated. It is perhaps significant, however, that the new Northern Constabulary encompassed precisely those areas that Inverness Burgh had put forward in 1966. The only concerted opposition to police regionalisation came from the Scottish Borders. In 1946 Roxburgh, Berwick and Selkirk had refused to amalgamate with the City of Edinburgh, which then adopted a similar position of hostility. Thirty years’ later, feelings had not changed. In October 1974 the newly formed Borders Regional Council declared its intentions to form its own police force rather than sharing with the Lothians and Edinburgh, whom it felt it would be subsidising. Three MPs—the Liberal David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles), Labour’s John Mackintosh (Berwickshire and East Lothian) and Labour’s Robin Cook (Central Edinburgh)—vowed to fight it in parliament. Ultimately, however, Steel’s amendment to the Local Government (Scotland) Bill was defeated in the House of Commons by 96-12 (with many members of the Conservative opposition, on whom he had counted for support, siding with the Labour administration). The arguments for large policing units were convincingly made by 1975, given the transformations that had taken place since 1960 in the methods and technologies of operational policing, including ever-increasing specialisation and the computerisation of information. Arguably a regional or
national service had made little sense in an earlier era where information was held on index cards. In the case of Orkney and Shetland, it had made little sense until effective air and radio communications were possible. By the 1970s technological factors became pre-eminent.

As the evidence given to the Royal Commission suggests, it was the Scottish Police Federation—speaking on behalf of the rank and file—who most keenly embraced ideas for a regional/national service in the 1960s and into the 1970s. A motion was passed at the annual conference in 1966 advocating the ‘nationalisation’ of Scottish policing, whilst a Federation working party went on to propose a reduction to ten forces for the whole of Scotland (and which was not significantly out of kilter with the creation of the regionalised service). However, this endorsement was to change as a result of the experience of regionalisation, particularly in the west of Scotland, where the new Strathclyde force encompassed the dense urban conurbations of Clydeside, the mining villages of Lanarkshire, and the rural areas of Argyllshire and islands such as Arran and Islay. Strathclyde’s first chief constable, Sir David McNee acknowledged there were teething problems given the tensions between the need for ‘standardization’ and that of ‘flexibility’. These challenges were reflected in the Scottish Police Federation decision to drop its support for the creation of a single Scottish police service in 1976 (having endorsed this policy for the last fifteen years). The Federation secretary was reported as saying that ‘it would be a greater disaster than regionalisation has proven to be … We have lost out on conditions of service by changing from small units to much larger units … it is very hard to police an area like Mull and have the same policy in the East End of Glasgow’. Arguably, the matter was not helped by the decisions that were made to roll out what had been the Glasgow City model across the new Strathclyde policing area. Given the domination of the Federation by Strathclyde officers (on account of its
sheer size) it was the Strathclyde experience that was most closely mirrored in the Federation’s policy shift.

Interviews with former officers who were serving at the time indicate that in the new Northern Constabulary, criticism of the regional structure was much less marked than in the central west of Scotland. In rural areas officers retained significant amounts of autonomy and discretion and their role continued to be that of a generalist; for them regionalisation brought greater access to resources and enabled them to call on those who were specialists when this was needed. While officers did find themselves having to move greater distances for new posts this was offset for many by the increased opportunity for promotion. In contrast, in urban areas of the central west of Scotland where policing was largely street-based, officers had less autonomy, a more specific set of tasks and duties, and a more geographically defined area of responsibility. While they still enjoyed a high level of day-to-day discretion, they were more constrained by their role, meaning front-line working practices were more susceptible to alteration if and when bureaucratic structures and procedures changed. Therefore, when Glasgow’s working practices were rolled out to the outlying areas of Strathclyde after regionalisation, the changes were always likely to be more substantial and more keenly felt than amongst their ‘Northern’ counterparts. With the perception among many officers that a model of policing based on Glasgow City was unsuitable for other locales, the attempts to unify working practices were often met with grudging acceptance, and occasionally even outright resistance. To those less enthusiastic about these imposed changes, the newly formed force was disparagingly referred to as ‘Strath-Glasgow’. However, as was the case in Northern, many officers appreciated the career benefits brought about by being in a larger force. The experience of regionalisation varied depending on the career trajectories of individual officers and the forces that they served in. The interviews do suggest, however, that the introduction of any new policing
model needs to be sufficiently flexible to recognise differences in local cultures and local needs whatever the larger structures, labels or identities that are formally set in place.

Conclusions

From the setting up of a Scotland-wide system of ‘local’ policing in the mid-nineteenth century, the desirability of a move towards a regional or national model was discussed and debated. The Victorian assumption that ‘local’ policing meant ‘local’ control through municipal and county councils as that which best enabled accountability and hence legitimacy was challenged but remained intact until around 1960. Whilst the control of local elites may have persisted in the dominance of particular classes as elected members of police authorities, the rhetoric of ‘the public’ was increasingly used to refer to wider democratic principles and to defend the status quo. For the Scottish Office (and Home Office) as well as for many police officers themselves, however, the move to much larger policing units was desirable on the grounds of economy, efficiency, and professionalisation, including the ability to pool resources, invest in shared specialised units, and offer greater prospects of promotion and career progression. The development of transport systems that made populations (including criminal ones) increasingly mobile was a further incentive. For most of the period, however, the idea of a ‘national’ force remained anathema, its proponents making the case most emphatically in relation to periods of unrest, disorder and emergency, a strikingly different context from the creation of Police Scotland in 2013.

Whilst its trajectory was broadly similar, the pace of amalgamation was different in Scotland compared to England as a result of the pressure exerted by the royal burghs (as well as some counties and cities). In the nineteenth century the leverage that central government had been able to exercise was also different given the lower central grant: initially a quarter of expenditure compared to the Treasury contribution of a half that was enacted in England
and Wales in 1876. Whilst this had been equalised in Scotland after the First World War, the Scottish Office was acutely aware of its dependency on local government for the effective delivery of law and order. From the mid-1930s until the 1960s a series of secretaries of state for Scotland (and civil servants) used the tactics of suggestion and persuasion to try to shift the climate of opinion. Whilst party political rivalries reared their head at various points, this was more to do with factionalism and the flexing of tensions within the relationship between local and central government. Compulsion was to be used as a last resort, but there was considerable nervousness around doing so. The approach was often piecemeal and opportunistic rather than strategic, with the retirement (or occasional disgrace) of chief constables being seized upon to press for amalgamation with a neighbouring force.

The final reduction to twenty and then eight forces was a result of the reconfiguration of local government, and is illustrative of the fact that the organisation of policing has tended to follow the organisation of local administration rather than any logic regarding the geographical needs or characteristics of operational policing. However, it can also been seen as a result of the intensification of technological change and the beginnings of a communications revolution that transformed operational policing itself. From the early nineteenth century to around 1960 urban policing had been delivered through the model of the beat constable who used foot patrol to make his presence felt on the streets, who was largely engaged in the protection of property and whose knowledge was personal, local and experiential. In contrast, the last thirty years of the twentieth century saw the shift to mobile policing units, the sharing of information through telecommunications and digital technologies, and the growth in concern about international and cyber-crimes.

Whilst the ‘local’ continues to be a central focal point and priority, the emphasis from the 1970s onwards has been towards the idea of local community (and, indeed, pluralised communities that are both geographical and diasporic) rather than the formality of local
government, municipal boundaries and officialdom. Further local government reform in 1996, which replaced the model of regional two-tier government with thirty-two unitary authorities meant that even the administrative logic behind the creation of the eight regional police forces was effectively lost, although they retained their cultural identities for a further twenty years. The political context that led to the creation of Police Scotland was certainly historically unique—as a policy opportunity that resulted from increased devolution and the election of an SNP government—although, like earlier proposals for reform, it was grounded in arguments about the need for economy and ever-greater efficiency.\textsuperscript{106} As this article has shown, the rapidity with which the single service was created was also completely unprecedented, given the procrastination and slow burn that characterised the move towards amalgamation across the previous 150 years.

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\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[1] The eight legacy forces were: Central Scotland, Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Grampian, Lothian and Borders, Northern, Strathclyde, and Tayside.
\end{itemize}

5 Early figures exclude Orkney and Shetland who were outside of the provisions of the 1857 Police (Scotland) Act, and hence state inspection and grants, until 1938 (Orkney) and 1940 (Shetland).


9 Parliamentary Papers [PP], 1852-3, XXXVI.161, 345, *Second Report from the Select Committee on Police: together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, and appendix.,* 105, Q. 3960.

10 *Caledonian Mercury*, 29 Mar. 1834, 3.


13 In March 1846 the murder of Midlothian constable, Richard Pace, by a large group of navvies employed on the building of railway lines revealed the impotency of the police who, even with the assistance of twenty-five Edinburgh City police officers, could not quell the disturbances or identify the killer. See *Kelso Chronicle*, 6 Mar. 1846, 6. In contrast in July 1848, when List had received intelligence that navvies were planning to riot in the small village of Stow, he assembled twenty-one officers, including nine men from the City police, who charged at the navvies ‘with such resolution and effect as to put their opponents to flight’. See *Border Advertiser*, 21 Jul. 1848, 3.

14 *Second Report and Minutes*, 107, Q. 3987.

15 Ibid, 105, Q. 3959.

16 Ibid., 105, Q. 3962.

17 Ibid., 106, Q. 3970.

18 *Scotsman*, 14 Sept. 1853, 4.


Police (Scotland) Act, 1857, 20 and 21 Vict. c. 72, 688.

Ibid.

Ibid., 686.


Ibid., 4.

Barrie, Police in the Age of Improvement, 184.


PP, 1880, XXXIV.461, Police Scotland. Report of the Inspector of Constabulary for the year ending 15 Mar. 1880, 3. Annan had two police officers and was unable to deal with anything but the most minor offences or limited disturbance; Annan joined with Dumfries-shire in 1881. See Martin Stallion and D. S. Wall, The British Police. Police forces and chief officers, 1829-2000 (Gateshead, 1999), 41.

PP, 1900, XL (Cd 121), Police Scotland. Report of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary of Scotland for the year ending 31 Dec. 1899, iii.


Munro had been a career soldier before becoming a professional policemen (like many county chief constables), having served in the Indian (Madras) Army before his appointment as Chief Constable of the Isle of Man in 1874 and then for the combined counties of Midlothian and West Lothian (then Edinburghshire and Linlithgowshire) in 1878, moving to become the HMICS in 1884. See Alexander Mackenzie, History of the Munros of Fowlis (Inverness, 1898), 198-9.


Cameron, ‘Internal policing’, 439.

Edinburgh, National Records of Scotland [NRS], HH55/78 (Police Services General files): confidential proposals by HMI for a general reorganisation as a government force, Munro to the Under-Secretary for Scotland, 15 Aug. 1886.

NRS, HH55/78: Munro to the Under-Secretary for Scotland, 28 Nov. 1886.


Ibid.


PP, 1933-34, XXIV (Cmd 4463), Police Consolidation (Scotland) Committee Report, s. 14, p. 8.

Ibid.


It should also be noted that Zetland County Police and Lerwick Burgh Police agreed to amalgamate in 1940 (leading to the formation of Zetland Constabulary) as part of the arrangements for the extension of the 1857 Police (Scotland) Act to Shetland, accepted as necessary given wartime conditions. The amalgamation was promoted and encouraged by John Watson, Sheriff Principal for Caithness, Orkney and Shetland as well as by the Scottish Office. Complaints were nevertheless expressed by the members of the burgh council regarding the
financial contribution the Scottish Office expected it to make, which they viewed as disproportionate in
comparison to the county. Although amalgamation with other counties was also discussed, it was ruled out at
this time. See Parliamentary Debates [Parl. Debs.], 5th ser., vol. 338, col. 164, 5 Jul. 1938; vol. 342, col. 1799,


48 Ibid., 168; T.A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales (London, 1967); R. D. Ingleton, The
Gentlemen at War (Maidstone, 1994).


51 Ibid., H. M. Dudgeon to C. C. Cunningham, 13 Feb. 1942.


53 NRS, HH55/360, C. C. Cunningham to Mr Milne, 16 Mar. 1942; Shane Ewen, Fighting Fires. Creating the
British Fire service 1800-1978 (Basingstoke, 2010).


55 Ibid., news cutting from Inverness Courier and Advertiser, 17 Nov. 1942 (no page).

56 Ibid., news cutting from Inverness Courier and Advertiser, 20 Nov. 1942 (no page).


59 NRS, HH55/361.

60 Emsley, English Police, 169.


63 Ibid, minutes of meeting of Secretary of State for Scotland (Lord Rosebery) with Scottish Local Authority
Associations, 29 Jun. 1945.

64 Ibid, minutes and reports of consultative meetings, Jun. – Sept. 1945.

65 Scotsman, 10 Oct. 1946, 5.


67 Police (Scotland) Act 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6.

68 Ibid.

69 NRS, HH55/935: Police amalgamation schemes, progress of proposed schemes, 1948-50.

NRS, HH55/945: Police amalgamation schemes 1949-65, County of Ayr and Burghs of Ayr and Kilmarnock.

The full transcript of the enquiry can be found in NRS, HH55/946: Proceedings in inquiry into the proposed scheme regarding the amalgamation of the police forces of the County of Ayr, the Burgh of Ayr and the Burgh of Kilmarnock, 1949.

Ibid., 123-6.

Ibid., 127.

Ibid., 79-81.

Ibid., 175.


NRS, HH55/949: Police amalgamation schemes 1949-65, County of Ayr and Burghs of Ayr and Kilmarnock.

Ibid., memo written by C.C. Cunningham, 27 Dec. 1950.

NRS, HH55/951 Police amalgamation schemes 1946-49, County of Lanark and Burghs of Airdrie, Coatbridge, Hamilton, Motherwell and Wishaw.

Scotsman, 8 Apr. 1949, 3; NRS, HH55/951: news cutting from *Motherwell Times and Advertiser*, 29 April 1949 (no page).

Ibid., memo written by C.C. Cunningham, 27 Dec. 1950.

NRS, HH55/953: Police amalgamation schemes 1950-52, County of Lanark and Burghs of Airdrie, Coatbridge, Hamilton, Motherwell and Wishall.


Ibid.
Ibid., A. Meldrum, note on visit to Inverness, 17 May 1966, for inspection.


PP, 1967-8, XXX (Cmd 3695), Scottish Home and Health Department Police (Scotland) Act 1967. Report of inquiry in respect of the objection to the proposed compulsory amalgamation of the police areas of the counties of Caithness, Orkney and Zetland.


Southern Reporter, 27 Feb. 1975, 1. Steel claimed the Conservative manoeuvre was shaped by concerns about Labour dominance in the Lothians; the larger administrative area would balance this out.


NRS, HH55/959.


Glasgow City Archives, SR22/3/12 (Records of Strathclyde Police and its predecessors): Report by the administration committee to the working party of chief constables, 8 Mar. 1974. For example, Glasgow City reports, forms and books were to be used as a basis for standardisation as were its model for register and shoulder badge numbers.

Interviews were conducted by Neil Davidson with 40 former officers (17 from Northern Constabulary and 23 from Strathclyde Police) who had joined between 1945 and 1973. Transcripts have been deposited in the Archive of the Centre for Scottish Studies, University of Edinburgh. For further discussion see Davidson, Fleming, Jackson, Sparks and Smale, ‘Police and Community’.

There are strong parallels here with claims expressed in the media in 2014 that the rolling out of a ‘one-size fits all’ approach, including the presence of armed units in rural areas, was part of a process of ‘Strathclydisation’ of Police Scotland, through which methods and styles developed in the central belt were imposed on other areas. See for example, Herald, 21 Mar. 2014