Unsettling Bargains?

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The programme is addressing three broad research questions relating to political settlements:

1. How do different types of political settlement emerge, and what are the actors, institutions, resources, and practices that shape them?

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3. How, and with what interventions, can external actors change political settlements?

The PSRP involves a consortium of five organisations:

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**Executive Summary**

This research report considers the relationship between power-sharing arrangements in peace agreements and equality of women in public life. In particular it examines:

- asserted tensions between power-sharing and equality for women
- whether these tensions are born out in peace agreement provision

The report draws on a new peace agreement database: the Peace Agreement Access tool PA-X, which will shortly be available at www.peaceagreements.org. In particular it uses a dataset from PA-X (see power-sharing data in tables Appendix one), together with gender quota data from Quota Project (www.quotaproject.org/).

The report observes that:

- Power-sharing remains attractive as a conflict-resolution technique because it offers a technique of power-splitting, politically, territorially and militarily, which is capable of providing a compromise to parties engage in violent conflict. These are elite pacts which have the potential for stabilising political conflict by opening up the central governance arrangements to be more inclusive, but also have the potential for leaving untouched or even making worse other forms of exclusion, notably that of women. Power-sharing arrangements therefore have to be engaged with by women and those seeking women’s equality in peace processes.

- Power-sharing arrangements also find some root in group-based approaches equality rights standards which focus on equality of outcome – a focus that also supports provision for ‘special temporary measures’ for women, for example in the form of legislative quotas, and the idea of UNSC Resolution 1325 that peace processes should include ‘a gender perspective’ also points to the need to use processes and peace agreements to advance equality outcomes for women.

- While there is case study evidence of ways in which peace process provision for power-sharing works to the detriment of women, there has been little sustained empirical work on this relationship.

- There is a need for more sustained engagement of the women, peace and security agenda with power-sharing arrangements.

- Conceptually while power-sharing arrangements have standard liberal objections which are shared by women and by feminist scholars, these need to be understood against the backdrop of the difficulty and desirability of majoritarian liberal arrangements for divided societies and for women.
- At present there is little guidance on how to reconcile power-sharing and women’s rights, and little exploration on the connections between group rights for the dominant conflict groups, and group rights focused on women.

**Data produced for the report shows that:**

- Power-sharing arrangements typically make some provision for women indicating that there is no automatic assumption by negotiators or parties to the conflict that inclusion of women in executives and legislatures is de-stabilising of power-sharing arrangements. In particular
  - Peace agreement provision shows that commitments to power-sharing are more often than not coupled with some type of provision for women, either in the form of provisions for specific legislative inclusion and quotas, and/or in the form of gender-specific human rights protection.
  - Both for peace agreements using power-sharing which provide for women’s participation and equality, and for those which do not, legislative quotas are often provided for in subsequent electoral systems.
  - In the few cases, where neither the peace agreement structure nor the subsequent electoral framework provided for inclusion of women of any type, the numbers of women represented in legislatures was unusually low (Côte D’Ivoire (11% women); Haiti (4% women); Lebanon (3% women), although at least two of these situations are also cases of wider ‘state failure’.

- It may be that both transitions from one regime to another, bargains focused on group participation, and internationalisation of peace processes, create an opportunity for successfully arguing for group measures aimed at women.

- Little is known empirically as to how provision for women plays out in practice, or their experience of power-sharing agreements in terms of broader equality and socio-economic struggle. Such as case study work as exists, indicates that women do find it difficult to continue to negotiate inclusion in such arrangements, and face problems that are distinct from the problems of majoritarian liberal democratic political structures.

**The report recommends that:**

1. Political power-sharing arrangements based on group identities, or integrating government and opposition political and military elites, should build in power-sharing for women with clear representation of and gender balance of executives and legislatures required, and implemented through electoral laws.

2. Political power-sharing provision should where possible consider using liberal models of power-sharing that seek to avoid rigidly prescriptive criteria for how groups are defined and locate power-sharing within a human rights framework which pays particular attention to women’s rights.

3. More consideration should be given to the inclusion of women and gender perspectives that the pre-negotiation stage of a peace process where broad commitments are often
made to inclusive governments, or the desirability of governments of national unity, as this is often when pathways are set and where specific reference to gender balance and a commitment to women’s equality and women’s rights is important to ensuring that power-sharing governments pay adequate attention to inclusion of women.

4. Evidence indicates that establishing power-sharing with no reference to women, and no subsequent provision for electoral quotas leads to unusually and unacceptably low numbers of women in legislatures, and this situation should be avoided.

5. Even where political power-sharing has been established with little to no reference to women’s participation and women’s rights, electoral quotas appear to be possible to achieve and make a real difference to participation of women and levels of women in legislatures. Electoral assistance bodies, peace building operations and those involved in implementation of peace agreements should be aware that there will be clear opportunities and often political will to include gender quotas as part of the detail of how new legislatures and even executives, are established.

6. As previous research has indicated, attention needs to be paid to the type of electoral system and the sanctions in place for non-compliance as affecting the outcome of gender quotas in terms of numbers of women elected, as well as to the nature of the quota itself.

7. Good practice on political power-sharing and inclusion of women should be shared.

8. Understanding and predicting how different power-sharing models will allocate seats, ministries and power, is difficult and involves technical analysis. Where political power-sharing is being considered by participants in peace processes, good quality technical assistance on election models and the ways in which power-sharing can take place concurrently with quotas for women should be given to women and women’s organisations so that women are assisted in formulating proposals.

9. Territorial power-sharing should include clear protection for women’s rights and participation at the sub-national level. Attention should be paid to the relationship between women’s rights and local customs laws, and references in the peace agreement, legislation or constitutions, to traditional laws.

10. Military power-sharing should focus not just on merging armies and command structures, but also putting in place rights protections and mechanisms, civilian and democratic accountability, and ensuring representation of women throughout.

11. Military power-sharing involving reconfiguration of forces and lines of control, should pay attention to the use and location of fire arms, with the aim of accounting for them and reducing them.

12. Economic power-sharing arrangements should pay attention to the status of women, and the ways in which wealth-sharing arrangements, will be tied to delivery of broader socio-economic goods to women.

13. Further research on women’s experience of power-sharing should be supported.
14. Further research on the outcome of power-sharing arrangements on stable political settlements should be supported.
Unsettling Bargains?
Power-sharing and the Inclusion of Women in peace negotiations

1. Introduction

Conflict resolution processes in intra-state conflict from 1990 to the current day have overwhelmingly attempted to institutionalise compromises between contenders for power in the form of power-sharing. Forms of political, territorial, military and economic power-sharing have been almost invariably put in place as a result of peace settlements addressing violent conflict. These agreements have responded to competition over power and territory, by providing a new ‘power-map’ for how power is to be held and exercised which aims to include political-military elites formerly excluded from power. They do this by bringing warring parties into joint governance in the heart of the state’s political, legal and military structures.

These bargains are unsettling: they enable and empower those people most at the heart of the conflict in the new political dispensation, at the expense of some of the social equality and justice demands of wider civil society, including women. Although the relationship of power-sharing arrangements to the inclusion of women remains relatively unexplored, a small literature has been relatively critical of current power-sharing bargains as negative for women’s equality. This literature in brief, shows feminist concern over power-sharing and in particular political power-sharing or consociationalism, because it can:

1 See the over 600 peace agreements, and discussions of their arrangements in Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacifatoria, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 105-123.
3 For one of the most thoughtful and theorised accounts of the relationship see Siobhan Byrne and Allison McCulloch, ‘Gender, Representation and Power-sharing in Post-Conflict Institutions’, International Peacekeeping Vol 19(5) (2012) 565-580. See also, Bernadette C.
- reify the political divisions it aims to transcend to the detriment of any transformative agenda – including the transformative agendas of women

- worse still, further empower forms of patriarchal identity (such as nationalism) in ways which in fact lead to regression for women’s rights and empowerment

- be difficult to implement meaning that all progress, including any gender gains secured through the peace process and peace agreement fall with it

However, power-sharing arrangements are prevalent because they offer a technique of power-splitting, politically, territorially, economically and militarily, which is capable of providing a compromise to parties engage in violent conflict, they therefore have to be engaged with by women in peace processes. Often women encounter arguments that these pacts are necessary to ending the conflict, and there may even be resistance to opening up inclusion to groups wider than the military-political elites at the heart of the conflict, for fear that it will destabilise any elite pact-making. In essence these arguments amount to the claim that opening up peace settlements might unsettle the bargains crucial to any end to conflict.

Although power-sharing arrangements are an almost invariable tool of conflict resolution, and the women, peace and security agenda through UN Security Council Resolutions talks about the need for effective participation and equality of women, so far there is little guidance for women as regards how to navigate power-sharing negotiations and outcomes.

This report responds to what I suggest is an urgent need to develop clearer conceptual thinking as to the relationship of women’s equality to power-sharing in the peace and security field. It also responds to a need to work towards more systematic empirical evaluation of the relationship. At present the relationship is driven somewhat by ‘mantras’. These include on one side, the mantra that limited elite pacts are necessary for state-building and ‘stability’ and that other forms of ‘inclusion’ must be set aside, temporarily if not indefinitely, for a peace process to be successful. On the other side the mantra that power-sharing is ‘bad’ for women or incompatible with women’s equality and public participation, relies on the implicit claim that there is a better way of doing things.

The report contributes a preliminary attempt to interrogate both these mantras, conceptually and with some new initial data that examines power-sharing provision, and provision for equality for women in peace agreements. The report attempts an initial mapping of the questions important to policy makers and attempts to address the stability v inclusion debate. In conclusion it sets out some preliminary recommendations for how the women, peace and security agenda should be developed to address power-sharing dilemmas more effectively.

Part II. What is power-sharing, when is it used, and what are its risks for women?

Power-sharing: Baseline definitions

The term power-sharing covers a wide variety of political arrangements for sharing power, each of which have different potential impacts on equality of women. Any appraisal of the relationship of women to power-sharing is complicated by the complexity and diversity of contemporary power-sharing arrangements, and the difficulty of finding a coherent core to the term ‘power-sharing’ which is used to cover a range of different political, territorial and military divisions of power.

At its most basic level, the term attaches to political arrangements that aim to produce joint government between groups, with the lowest common denominator for the label being that it attaches to attempts to move beyond straightforward majoritarian government towards some form of group accommodation. As such, quotas or set-aside places for women in legislatures, or public bodies based on a commitment to ‘effective participation’ would constitute a form of power-sharing, although these measures are seldom talked about using this language.

A full discussion of how the label can most sensibly be used is beyond the scope of this article, as a rich and extensive literature attests. However, it is possible to outline the types of arrangement clearly often attracting the label ‘power-sharing’, so as to identify the different possible impacts they may have on the equality and participation of women.

Concociationalism

Most frequently associated with the term power-sharing, and sometimes treated as synonymous with it, is ‘concociationalism’ as understood and set out by Arendt Lijphart and refined by O’Leary.4 Consociational arrangements are often understood as having four classic elements, first, coalition government (with parties from different segments of society in coalition in executives), proportionality in the voting system and public sector), minority veto, and segmental group autonomy (conceptual or territorial).5 Consociational arrangements have engendered much debate and discussion, critically for our purposes, in three areas.6

First, debate has centred on whether these arrangements are fair. Do they contravene concepts of liberal democracy in entrenching group identities to the cost of individual rights – including the equality rights of women? Or are they are in fact a form of ‘principled’ realism which recognise the salience of group identities and power in the political settlement, and attempt to construct legitimate and even democratic structures around them?

5 Id.
6 O’Leary id, provides a good overview of these debates.
Second, debate has centred on whether consociational mechanisms are effective. Do they create workable arrangements, whether they make ethnic conflicts better or worse? Do they enable group identities to be managed and transcended or reinforce and solidify them?

Third, debate has centred on what attributes of the classic conception of consociations are really essential to the concept, and to what extent it can be modified to address some of the main criticisms. Are grand coalitions necessary or can power-sharing use other forms of executive power sharing? Can liberal forms of consociationalism rather than ‘corporate consociationalism’, be identified and preferred which leave some room to individual rights and the inclusion of other groups, and leave some room for ethnic and national identities to be de-defined and transformed?

To a large extent critical discussion of the relationship of women to power-sharing as outlined above, can largely be understood to revolve around these questions of effectiveness, justice, and appropriate technique. These are essentially liberal feminist criticisms which are similarly positioned to the ‘liberal critique’ of power-sharing more generally (even though they are not always made in explicitly liberal terms). Like liberal critics, feminist critics tend to view the types of nationalist or ethnic identity that are catered to and even institutionalised by power-sharing arrangements, as problematic for women. Yet, feminists in other contexts and from more critical perspectives have also criticised the de-gendered identity of the person at the centre of liberalism’s ‘original position’ which drives the political structures of the liberal state.7 In practice feminist scholars have often found liberalism’s supposed neutrality between different identities problematic in obscuring the types of ways in which the different political and social situation of disadvantaged groups – including women – need to be specifically addressed if equality is to be achieved. Moreover, liberal feminist critics are rooted in their own ‘standpoint’, and need to acknowledge that in practice women seeking to influence peace processes to deliver inclusion and equality, often come with multiple identities, and often see their equality claims as women as tied up with other equality claims in complicated ways, whether as national minorities or indigenous persons.8

Integrationism or Centrepetalism

Sometimes also framed as a form of power-sharing is consociationalism’s main contender, ‘integrationism’ or ‘centrepetalism’, associated with Horowitz, and also developed and addressed by Sisk and Reilly.9 This type of mechanism builds on the critique of consociationalism as institutionalizing group participation rooted in problematic conflict identities, and as such can also be presented as an alternative to that form of power-sharing.

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While retaining a focus on inter-group accommodation, integrationism attempts to design political institutions that avoid specifying forms of group participation in decision-making, in favour of mechanisms and policies aimed at encouraging voluntary cross-ethnic cooperation. These mechanisms and policies include inducements for inter-ethnic cooperation prior to election, such as electoral laws that effectively promote pre-election electoral coalitions through vote-pooling, or innovative forms of dispersing power territorially, or by placing political emphasis on cross-cutting cleavages and ensuring fair allocation of resources.

At one end of the spectrum the policies involved can involve little more than anti-discrimination law and commitments to multicultural liberalism not unusual in most liberal states. At the other end of the spectrum, to the extent that such polices acknowledge the presence and determining nature of group identities for example, through forms of group-based territorial division and novel forms of electoral system, or specified proportionality, they may be understood as a power-sharing variant. Ultimately, whether the system is viewed as having a power-sharing dimension in any meaningful sense will depend on the system’s design, and one’s view of how broadly the term ‘power-sharing’ can be used intelligibly.

Integrationism might seem to sit more comfortably with women’s rights, steering as it attempts to, a middle course between liberalism’s individuality and consociationalism’s group approach. At the softer ‘anti-discrimination’ end of the spectrum, integrationism might seem to offer a way to reconcile liberalism with measures which target groups as groups – an approach which supports not just forms of ethnic accommodation, but forms of affirmative action for women. Moreover, integrationism’s commitment to premising political and territorial power-sharing divisions explicitly on ethnic criteria, might seem a more attractive approach to women keen to ultimately transcend and even dismantle these divisions.

However, in practice softer forms of group accommodation are often insufficient to persuade groups engaged in violent conflict, to set it aside in favour of participation in the formal political settlement. As integrationism moves towards a greater group rights in an attempt to displace violent political claims through enabling group accommodation, it carries some of the same risks to the equality and individual rights of others forms of political power-sharing such as consociationalism. For example, attempts to design electoral structures to create incentives to group cooperation may cut across attempts to design electoral systems that aim to increase the participation of women. Moreover, because it attempts not to base political structures overtly on identity categories, integrationism can be less transparent than consociationalism in how it hands power to ethnic or national groupings. So, for example, a federal model designed to look like a simple devolution of power of any federal system, but in reality gerrymandered to ensure ethnic self-rule has a transparency cost. As a result it may obscure the need to build in specific protections for women, who may be left vulnerable in the devolution of power to what is in essence an ethnically defined territory, but not acknowledged as such.

**Territorial Power-sharing**

Some forms of consociationalism and integrationism use territorial divisions of power to share power between competing groups. Territorial divisions and allocations of power such as forms of federalism, confederalism, regional devolution of power, can all operate to disaggregate power from central majoritarian or dominant ethnic capture. These arrangements focus on accommodating groups by dividing power between central government and sub-state regional (or even civic) government so as to achieve a form of power sharing between different pluri-
national or ethnic groupings because they predominate in particular geographic areas. These arrangements can constitute a part of the broader political power-sharing package.

However, some arrangements rely purely on territorial division to divide power and create forms of group self-rule. These arrangements too are often understood to disaggregate power as a form of power-sharing. For example, in Bougainville an island in Papua New Guinea a separatist conflict was managed through devolving most power to autonomous island structures, with relevant ‘centralised’ powers relating to the island, such as over maritime boundaries and treaties, to be exercised by central government only in consultation and cooperation with the islanders.10

Autonomy has been prevalent in agreements reached between governments and their indigenous peoples, not least because they reflect not just the accommodation of a particular culture or identity, but a profound connection between that identify and a historical connection with particular areas of land.11 In these arrangements the autonomy is not part of a broader devolution of power to regions, but specific to the group in question and responsive to their self-determination claims. The political arrangements in essence focus on separation: the delimiting of powers between region and centre, so that many of attributes of statehood are given to the devolved area, and little role contemplated for the region in central government.

Territorial divisions of power can be attractive to women because they empower government closer to local communities and political civil society spaces in which women are often better represented than in the formal national political sphere. However, they too carry clear gender equality risks. Women can find themselves within national, religious or racial mini-states who have regressive and misogynist social agendas that can emerge unchecked as central to the sub-state concept of belonging. Sub-state territorial entities may resist state-wide human rights measures because they re-introduce the power of the central state into the region.

**Military Power-sharing**

In their review of the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements, Hartzell and Hoddie argue that power-sharing is most successful when split across four different types of power-sharing: political, territorial, military and economic.12 Political and territorial power-sharing involve rules for splitting power in political decision-making, and territorial governance respectively, as discussed. Economic power-sharing involves ‘the distribution among groups of economic resources controlled or mandated by the state’,13 and almost by implication involves political power-sharing of some type, although a standalone rules for distribution of resources may be developed.14 This will not be considered further.

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13 Id.

14 Although may of course be specific economic allocation agreements, see eg. Framework Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pere-Interim and Interim Periods between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s
Military power-sharing involves ‘[r]ules regarding the distribution of the state’s coercive power among the warring parties’. This appears to mean provisions for merged armies, joint command structures, and the increase of democratic and civilian control and scaling back of policing roles. All of these measures aim to constrain the political power and ‘capture’ of formerly autonomous self-organizing military blocks. However, political power-sharing can also have a military power-sharing dimension given the overlap between military and political leadership in many conflict.

Military power-sharing potentially raises distinct human rights and equality concerns for women, relating to the way in which it legitimises both state and non-state actors who have been responsible for conflict atrocities and also for the ways in which it leaves military structures as dominant in what are meant to be societies focused on peace and democracy. Military power-sharing can leave non-state actors better trained and resourced with weapons in the event of a deal’s collapse, while failing to dismantle the military’s capacity to be a central part of the political power-map can mean that the peace agreement merely returns them to barracks temporarily, to re-emerge and take power again later. Or military power-sharing may involve training and arming former combatants and state forces, who may therefore be even more deadly should the peace process collapse.

**Complex power-sharing**

While power-sharing can be analysed in terms of different models, in practice power-sharing arrangements rarely equate with the ‘pure’ typologies of political scientists. Contemporary settlements aimed at the sharing of political power, as Weller and Wolff term involve ‘complex power-sharing’ which draws eclectically from the models above, to fashion many permutations of power-sharing mechanisms. Thus, some of Horowitz’s integrationist devices are used in conjunction with more consociational-type mechanisms; partial forms of consociationalism are used; territorial forms of self-government are overlayed with consociationalism at the level of the central government; or consociationalism is provided also at the levels of sub-unit governance; while military power-sharing can be combined with any permutation or form the key arena in which power is to be shared.

Further complicating this already complex picture, are functional and temporal variations in power-sharing arrangements, in terms of what the political goals of these arrangements are and how long they are contemplated to last. Consociational power sharing can be established as an indefinite mechanism of government designed to achieve group accommodation in pursuit of a form of political equality (eg Northern Ireland); it can be used as an explicitly short-term time-limited transitional mechanism (eg South Africa); or a way of managing a disputed election provision, perhaps coupled with a process of constitutional revision (eg Kenya); it can be a tool...
for international actors to fashioning some sort of interim constitutional structure, to play a part in transitional governance and development of the new constitution (eg Iraq and Afghanistan). Territorial power-sharing can be used to deliver a permanent form of self-governance and a land claim entitlement to an indigenous or minority group (eg Canada); or used together with consociationalism which might be necessary to get buy-in to central state government (eg Bosnia and Herzegovina). Often power-sharing will perform several functions, its functions often being contested among parties and the international community, with its temporal limits being left unspecified and unclear.  

Complicating Complex Power Sharing

In conflict situations, additional dimensions to power-sharing have received little acknowledgement as such in political science literature on the matter, but significantly complicate it further. First, legislative chambers – particularly transitional ones prior to elections, but sometimes also permanent ones post election - often include members of civil society, the army or a range of people other than elected politicians, and sometimes there are even attempts to create civic fora, with some type of governance role. This provision for civil society inclusion can be temporary or indefinite. Again, this opens up a concept of power-sharing that runs beyond a strict notion of electoral proportionality and representative democracy, to include a notion of the legitimacy of participative democracy. Often the inclusion of civil society actors has a dividend for women, who typically find themselves under-represented in the formal political sphere, but can be equally or even over-represented in civil society. Indeed, as we will see, some power-sharing arrangements also build in quotas for women as part of their group approach.

Second, in the contemporary peace process power-sharing often involves also sharing of power between domestic and international actors rather than just among domestic actors alone. The example of Bosnia illustrates: an international Office of the High Representative was given authority to interpret and implement the agreement (and later substantial legislative power) while all major institutions from constitutional court to human rights commission to the central bank, were to have specified numbers of Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats, but also of internationals, effectively internationalizing what are normally domestic institutions. This ‘hybridization’ of post-settlement domestic state institutions is a relatively common feature of complex power-sharing arrangements. From one point of view, the participation of international actors in state institutions can be understood as an extension of the mediation function of international organizations: these actors are often articulated to be in essence ‘ethnic reconcilers’ and perhaps

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17 Cf. Stef Vandeginste, ‘Power-sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error, 44(3) (2009) Africa Spectrum at 63, noting both different functions of different power-sharing mechanisms at different times, and a level of contestation about the direction of the current mechanism.
19 Cf ‘Debating Consociational Politics’ (arguing that international dimension has been under-considered but focusing more on forms of bi-nationalism that accommodate external self-determination claims than international supervision).
21 For discussion of this hybridization see Bell On the Law of Peace 175-195.
also ‘tutors’ of good institutional practice, whose role is to underwrite and support fairness in local decision-making.

However, by participating in hybridized state institutions, international actors can also be understood as part-and-parcel of the power-sharing arrangement: another party, with its own set of interests with whom power is to be shared. This perspective has human rights and equality consequences, about which women may be ambivalent. While international actors may be important to ensuring human rights protections, and a liberal bent to power-sharing arrangements, international organisations can also be responsible for human rights violations, and abuse their ‘share’ of power – and allegations of sexual violence have been at the centre of such charges of abuse of power. Often it is difficult for local actors and women to hold international actors accountable for equality and human rights violations.

When and how is power-sharing used and with what success?

Power-sharing is so ubiquitous as a conflict resolution device because it enables power to be ‘split’ more than shared, and so provides a vehicle for compromise between the absolutist claims to power and territory that drive violent conflict. However, this approach to conflict resolution is really one of conflict management: in a deep sense it ‘translates’ the conflict into political structures, and ideally a less violent form, rather than eliminating it. There are different drivers for power-sharing, which push to different models in different types of conflict and conflict resolution process, and these tied up with a degree of regional variation.

**Self-determination / secession conflicts.** In self-determination disputes complex forms of political and territorial power-sharing are often used to in essence ‘split power’ between contending groups to reach some form of compromise between the status quo of the existing state, and secession of a part of the state. While often formally affirming the territorial integrity of the state, complex power-sharing arrangements operate in essence to re-configure the state’s power-map, by devolving forms of self-government often coupled with power-sharing arrangements relating to regions which give minorities heightened representation in the central government structures. Rather than ‘resolving’ the conflict, these power-sharing arrangements operate much more as a form of ‘principle realism’ that acknowledges the salience of group identities and builds them into the political settlement that then operates as a relatively unsettled on-going conflict resolution mechanism. Peace agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Northern Ireland, illustrate these types of ‘solution’ and the way in which the political settlement instituted in essence translated the conflict into the formal political institutions.

**Authoritarian or ideological conflicts.** These conflicts have tended to rely less on territorial and political power-sharing than on forms of military power-sharing which attempt to reduce the ‘capture’ of the military and the conflicted state’s monopoly on the use of force, by one political grouping. These arrangements are often coupled with more traditional forms of liberal democratic renewal, which attempt to institute liberal democracy as the vehicle for on-going conflict resolution. Critically, this renewal process typically involves giving rebel groups some sort of access to political institutions, often in the form of assistance to organise as a political party, and sometimes also with reserve seats in the legislature and, crucially integrating them in the military. Peace processes in Guatemala, Colombia and Mozambique illustrate. In the peace

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processes of Latin America, the military’s capacity for recapturing the state was further limited by mechanisms of democratic accountability and vetting processes. This has not, however, been the only power-sharing model. Sometimes authoritarian/ideological disputes have seen a measure of transitional political power-sharing with consociational dimensions, to enable a transition from authoritarian regime to democratic one in the form of transitional governments of national unity. Peace agreements in El Salvador, and in South Africa, used forms of transitional power-sharing to transfer power from old regime, to new dispensation.

**Democratic dead-lock power-sharing.** Finally, more recently, power-sharing has been instituted beyond the strict ‘peace settlement’ context in Kenya and Zimbabwe in particular, but also mooted in Côte D’Ivoire, as a tool for managing the conflict associated with the refusal of incumbents to accept electoral outcomes which deposed them. Here forms of power-sharing intended as ‘transitional’ have enabled the incumbent regime to stay in power by sharing power with the new electoral winners, while an institutional transformation of the state is attempted – not always successfully. This use of power-sharing is predominant in Africa where political power-sharing in the form of transitional governments of national unity has been used to manage a range attempts to transition to elections and democratic politics (see further tables below).

**Western-democratic power-sharing.** Along-side these three conflict resolution uses of different forms of power-sharing, it is worth noting that power-sharing is not unique to conflict societies and post-conflict political, territorial and military structures. Complex power-sharing arrangements have both become ubiquitous across the globe. Long-standing power-sharing arrangements have remained in place, in places such as Belgium, albeit often with tensions and pressure to revise. Adding to these are new power-sharing arrangements rising from moves by Western liberal democratic states to accommodate historically dispossessed groups. Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, have conceded territorial autonomy to indigenous groups, providing mechanisms of self-government often using the language of self-determination. These autonomy arrangements can be considered a form of territorial power-sharing and have been propelled under pressure of successful group land claims by indigenous or aboriginal peoples in domestic courts. In short, a form of international and global institutionalisation of ‘group rights’ or ‘multicultural liberalism’ as able to accommodate rather than assimilate marginalised groups, has taken hold globally. Indeed, the idea of ‘special

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temporary measures’ for women (such as quotas in legislatures where women are under-represented) as compatible with international human rights law, itself owes much to this rise as discussed below.

**How successful have these pacts been in ending conflict?** This question is difficult to answer. The science of ‘quantifying’ success and failure of power-sharing pacts is still evolving. A key problem has been the lack of comprehensive underlying dataset of all power-sharing pacts, lack of clarity as to what is considered ‘power-sharing’, and little capacity to measure ‘success’ beyond examining deaths in conflict.

While it is useful to think of different forms of power-sharing, running together quite different ways of dividing power – politically, geographically and militarily, means that research tells us little as to which type of arrangements are more successful. Studies have been made of subsections of agreements and conflicts, which have led to somewhat contradictory results. Nonetheless, on the whole these studies confirm the ubiquity of power-sharing arrangements, and suggest that when one moves beyond political power-sharing to include also territorial and military power-sharing, then most conflicts use power-sharing to resolve their conflicts.

Quantitative studies suggest that:

- power-sharing in contrast to other aspects of peace agreement, is implemented quickly, generally within one year. So in terms of success defined as ‘commitments in the peace settlement which are implemented’ power-sharing pacts are successful25

- that negotiated settlements and power-sharing arrangements do not necessarily correlate with an end to conflict, or subsequent holding of elections, indicating a lack of success26

- that human rights measures in power-sharing arrangements are frequent and deserve more attention as a determinant of peaceful outcomes27

- there is good evidence that even when ‘successful’ the quality and geographic ‘reach’ of the peace produced by these settlements is often low, and that violence against women tends to continue albeit in mutated forms28

Evidence for the ‘success’ or otherwise of power-sharing is therefore somewhat patchy and contradictory, perhaps due to lack of consistency in how the term is used, which makes data difficult to compare.

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Part II: Why Women Need to Talk About Power-sharing

Power-sharing arrangements emerging as deals between powerful actors at the heart of waging the war often remain deeply unsettling. Despite this, where these actors represent in some sense ethnic or national groupings, the proliferation of power-sharing mechanisms also bears some relationship to the equality standards of international human rights law. Specialist human rights provision for national minorities, indigenous peoples and even women, appears to point to a need to permit, and even promote or require, certain forms of power-sharing as a means of ensuring the effective participation, of groups that majoritarian political systems often under-represent. Human rights bodies appear to permit and even promote quotas for women, even where domestic or other regional equality standards view them as problematic. UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) requires that a gender perspective be adopted in negotiating peace agreements, specifically with regard to ‘[m]easures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary’ and participation of women more broadly (paragraph 8). While not requiring political powersharing as consociationalism, these measures establish a measure of political power-sharing more broadly understood, in that they move from majoritarian notions of proportionality to proportionality based on group identity. Yet so far, there has been little guidance on how the potentially competing imperatives to group and individual equality, can be made to work together.

Women and feminist analysis also needs to be somewhat wary of how criticism of power-sharing plays into a broader set of dynamics, many of which women will be just as uncomfortable as with power-sharing itself. Power-sharing arrangements while popular with mediators, elsewhere are under attack. Power-sharing arrangements are being subjected to adjudication by courts, in what can be viewed as part of a general trend towards juristocracy, that is, judicial empowerment with respect to how the business of government is conducted. Proposed power-sharing arrangements can be the subject of domestic constitutional challenge, often on the basis of a violation of the constitution’s rights provisions. These arrangements receive attention from human rights treaty enforcement bodies and are the subject of judgement in international human rights courts.

The peace agreement era that generated so many power-sharing innovations has entered a new phase characterized by international scepticism and increased international intervention, which may even be a phase of demise. Mediated peace settlements are no longer looked upon as end points of negotiations and permanent contracts for a new constitutional order. Rather they are viewed increasingly as ‘road-maps’ towards a constitutional destination that remains contested. International organizations contemplate that they will likely remain involved in complex

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29 See, Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press) for an extensive discussion of the ways in which group accommodation has been shaped and shaped international law. See also Bell *On the Law of Peace* at 218-238.

31 See eg Sejadić and Finci v Bosnia & Herzegovina, ECtHR Application Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06 (22 December 2009)

32 See, Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke ‘Peace Agreements of Pieces of Paper’ *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59 (2010) 941 which found that there is some slowing down of peace agreement practice.
implementation projects, and this involvement tends to be built into the agreement’s framework as implementation will take on-going efforts.

Against this backdrop of the need for ongoing development and implementation of peace agreement commitments, human rights review of settlement arrangements has taken on increased significance. Often international human rights bodies and courts promote or require traditional individualistic understandings of human rights and equality and a move away from group-based solutions as a signifier of ‘normalization’ and a formal benchmark for international exit strategies from conflict jurisdictions. At this particular point in time, contemporary international human rights law’s approach to equality appears to find itself at a cross-roads between individual rights and group accommodation. The result is a patchwork of inconsistent court decisions and treaty body conclusions, and mixed messages emanating from international organizations which promote both power-sharing and human rights and equality standards – a situation that leaves ‘special measures’ for women, somewhat caught in the middle and vulnerable. The move towards a US-style equal protection analysis that views group rights with suspicion is likely to negatively impact on result-oriented attempts to increase women’s participation as a unfortunate by-product of opposition to power-sharing.

Moreover, as noted earlier, criticism of power-sharing must also factor-in some sort of assessment of the relative equality opportunities of alternative models of conflict resolution. Liberal democracy, however desirable as an abstract concept, has deficits in terms of fairness where group identities are powerful determinants of election outcomes, and moreover, has been the subject of much feminist criticism as being incompatible with any transformative approach to women’s equality. Liberal democracy stands charged with being rooted in patriarchal structures, which its central premise of neutrality means it has difficulty in recognising and challenging. Traditional liberal democracy has opposed quotas for women and other forms of affirmative action and as a result, Western liberal democracies such as the UK and the US, which have largely refused to institutionalise representative politics, have below average representation of women in political institutions and public life more generally. Moreover, often liberal democracy cannot be easily imposed on ethnically divided societies in any case, and fails to offer incentives to conflict protagonists to move from violence.

Failure to address the relationship of women to power-sharing in either the women, peace and security agenda, and indeed in the academic literature, leaves many women seeking to influence peace negotiations disempowered as regards shaping what will be the centre-piece of any peace negotiation. If women are to intervene effectively to shape the equality outcome of the peace process, they must understand:

- when and why power-sharing emerges as the centre-piece of a peace negotiation?

- what the costs of different types of power-sharing arrangement are likely to be for women?

- what options are available within the power-sharing suite of ‘techniques’ which might mitigate some of those costs?

33 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia & Herzegovina 2009.
34 Kymlikca Multicultural Odysseys.
- how to address arguments of a stability v inclusion trade-off in which attempts to open up power-sharing pacts to forms of gender inclusion are alleged to be unhelpfully disruptive to elite pacts

- the consequences of opposing power-sharing for any attempt to advocate and institutionalise measures which focus on ‘equality of result’ for women, such as legislative quotas

What follows is an initial contribution to addressing these issues using preliminary analysis on how peace processes and their agreements have dealt with both power-sharing and equality for women. The analysis uses data on peace agreements taken from the author’s on-going development of a peace agreement tool PA-X (Peace Agreement Access tool) to evaluate some of the above dilemmas.

In particular I use this data to ask:

- what types of power-sharing arrangements have been at the heart of peace settlement terms, and
- what has been their relationship to institutional provision for women?

**When and how do peace negotiations produce power-sharing arrangements?**

The collection and analysis of peace agreements contained in PA-X shows that between 1990 and 2015, over 1160 peace agreements have been signed in around 102 conflicts, some jurisdictions having had several conflicts. As these figures illustrate, most of the conflict resolution processes – even relatively successful processes - have had multiple agreements signed dealing with those conflicts. Peace agreement documentary trails indicate that the signing of an agreement is never a once-off ‘event’, but rather that a peace process has moments of agreement, which shape and define the on-going political bargaining process over access to power, that typically results in further agreements.

If one includes in the definition of power-sharing political, territorial, military and forms of economic power-sharing, then virtually all the conflict resolution attempts in intrastate conflict involve power-sharing. However, to provide more focused analysis this report concentrates on forms of political power-sharing which involve at least partial consociationalism, as in the form of executive coalition, and/or some proportional representation in legislatures (although often in the immediate aftermath of conflict these are not elected but are appointed by the parties signing the agreement and/or international actors).

From analysis of the content of these agreements, agreements in 48 conflicts (42 %) had some sort of political power-sharing. Agreements in 41 conflicts provided for clear political power-sharing involving executive coalition in principle or in practice, or a level of strong proportionality in legislatures and decision-making, as listed in tables 1 and 2. A further 7 involved a lesser form of power-sharing through set aside or reserved seats for the representatives of armed opposition groups in legislatures as listed in table 3. In some conflicts

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35 Producing figures of peace agreements committing to power-sharing makes less sense if conducted across the entire database, as this includes pre-negotiation agreements and implementation agreements which deal with discrete issues, and so one would not always expect power-sharing to figure.
these were coupled with measures which aim to enable rebel groups to transform into political groups capable of gaining power through elections rather than force (see Colombia).

Where are women in power-sharing agreements?

Out of the 41 processes with agreements providing for political power-sharing involving executive coalitions or substantial group proportionality in the legislature, only 13 (33% of those political power-sharing conflicts), did not make any significant provision or mention of women: peace agreements in Afghanistan in the 1990s; Central African Republic, Côte D’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kenya; Lebanon; Mauritania; Niger; Palestine (between Fatah and Hamas); Rwanda and Tajikistan (table 1). In these agreements some form of power-sharing executive was committed to, without any reference to women (of any sort).

Interestingly, however, when this set of conflicts is compared with data on gender quotas, it shows that even in the 13 power-sharing processes that had no reference to women, for the seven of these processes for which information on elections and gender quotas was available, four had legislative quotas for women with regard to legislatures. These quotas translated on the whole into both high and low levels of women’s participation (Kenya (65% women); Mauritania (25% women); Niger (13% women); Rwanda (64% women – although it should be noted that the power-sharing arrangements have in essence been replaced)). Without exception, however, conflicts with power-sharing that had neither reference to women in peace agreements, nor legislative quotas subsequently had very low levels of women’s participation (Côte D’Ivoire (11% women); Haiti (4% women); Lebanon (3% women)).

The figures are too small to provide a statistical assessment, but nonetheless, this data provides some evidence that peace agreement provision on power-sharing can usefully be supplemented with electoral quotas at a later stage, even when not committed to in the Agreement, and that these quotas are not seen as destabilising of the power-sharing agreements. However, the data also indicates that power-sharing arrangements with no reference to women and no subsequent legislative quotas often lead to very low levels of participation. Some caution must be expressed, however, that this apparent link could rather reflect other endogeneity factors relating to the types of conflict and the subsequent success or otherwise of the legislature, which have attracted bald statements of power-sharing.

Agreements in 28 other conflicts (20% of those conflicts involving power-sharing) featured complex power-sharing arrangements with consociational dimensions and made explicit provision for women. These peace agreements generally made provision in one of two ways.

First, agreements in 16 conflicts (39% of those conflicts involving power-sharing) provided for some type of commitment to participation of women in legislatures and governments. Agreements in Afghanistan (contemporary), Bangladesh (Chittagong Hills Tract), Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Madagascar, Maldives, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka

36 Agreements in Central African Republic and in Cote D’Ivoire had the word ‘women’ in their texts, but in the case of Cote D’Ivoire it was with reference to men being able to get citizenship who had Ivorian wives, and in the case of Central African Republic, it was the use of the word ‘women’ with reference to a provision on both men and women entering a spirit of reconciliation and so was evaluated to be merely a use of gender-neutral language. In Haiti, while there was no reference in the peace agreement, a subsequent constitution made provision for electoral quotas for women.
Other agreements that did not provide for quotas or representation of women alongside their power-sharing mechanism, provided for women’s rights, often in a context of some sort of overarching human rights framework. Agreements in (Bosnia Herzegovina, and its sub-state Bosnian-Croat Federation; Chad; Comoros/Anjouan; Kosovo; Mexico/Chiapas; Nepal; Northern Ireland; Darfur/Sudan; South Africa) made provision for women’s rights.37 These comprise 10 out of 41 or 24% of conflicts involving power-sharing. Here, provision for women’s rights can still be understood as part of the consociational mechanism rather than apart from it. These human rights frameworks operate as part of a more ‘liberal’ dimension to the power-sharing arrangement, often intended to ameliorate its corporate dimensions. O’Leary has argued that liberal consociationalism which splices group rights measures with strong protection for individual rights, responds to many of the criticisms of corporate consociationalism as creating immutable power-blocks composed of static national, racial or ethnic groupings.38 Human rights measures can be understood as themselves a mechanism for further disaggregating power because they limit its exercise. While the provision in many of these agreements for women’s equality was not strong, it is nonetheless significant. The women’s rights provision in Dayton, and the in the Washington Agreement looks rather meagre amounting to a mere reference to the incorporation of CEDAW and the Married Women’s Convention. Yet, this provision has to be understood as part of the incorporation of thirteen human rights conventions, which were understood to locate the Dayton Peace Agreement power-sharing arrangements in a wider commitment to liberal values, with the institutions of liberalism intended to provide a vehicle to ‘un-wind’ ethnic divisions over time. In fact, this was a hugely optimistic and unrealistic reading of the liberal democratic ‘hand’ international implementers had dealt themselves.

Where consociational mechanisms set out in peace agreements have later been institutionalised domestically in ‘peace agreement’ constitutions, these constitutions have often included a robust human rights framework with extensive provision for women’s rights, for example interim and permanent constitutions produced out of peace negotiations in South Africa, the Comoros, Zimbabwe, and Nepal all of which are notable for their gender provision.

Again, if one turns from examining just the peace agreement provision to consider also the type of electoral system that is put in place after a power-sharing is signed, the results are interesting. As regards conflicts and peace agreements which made provision for both power-sharing and women’s participation in governments and/or legislatures, all but one for which information was available (Liberia) subsequently provided for legislative quotas for women. As regards those that provided for rights-based power-sharing the information on quotas was too patchy (many of

37 The three agreements had provision for women, which addressed women’s reconstruction needs, rather than providing for women’s representation or rights (Angola/Cabinda, Sierra Leone and South Sudan).
38 O’Leary ‘Debating Consociational Politics’.
these agreements involved sub-state power-sharing, for which no reliable electoral information was available).

On the whole, therefore, out of the 41 conflicts providing for political power-sharing for which information was available (26 conflicts), 21 or 80% provided for legislative quotas for women. Again the figures are too small for statistical conclusion, and no real correlation between power-sharing and quotas can be established. Nonetheless, it can again be said that legislative quotas are often implemented post a power-sharing pact, and this provides some evidence that they are not understood to be inconsistent with past political power-sharing provision. The reasons for this would have to be further investigated, but may include:

- that commitments to gender quotas are often easier to secure in the context of a fundamental change to the political system, such as occurs through a peace agreement 39
- that resistance to quotas for women is less where the entire system of government is constructed around other forms of quota in any case. It is difficult to sustain principled objection to quotas for women, or argue that women will somehow be present in legislatures or executives on a less meritorious basis than men, when quotas form the basis for which men are on the executive and legislature
- that peace processes brought internationalisation and external electoral assistance which promoted use of gender quotas in subsequent electoral system design 40
- that the symbolic institutionalisation of one form of inclusion leads to greater citizen mobilization for other forms of inclusion, including that of gender 41

Summary of Findings

In summary this review of peace agreement provision for political power-sharing and women shows that:

- Power-sharing arrangements typically make some provision for women indicating that there is no automatic assumption by negotiators or parties to the conflict that inclusion of women in executives and legislatures is de-stabilising of power-sharing arrangements.
- Peace agreement provision shows that commitments to power-sharing are more often than not coupled with some type of provision for women, either in the form of provisions for specific legislative inclusion and quotas, and/or in the form of gender-specific human rights protection.
- Both for peace agreements using power-sharing which provide for women’s participation and equality, and those which do not, often use legislative quotas for gender representation in subsequent elections.

41 Caul Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer ‘Engaging Citizens’.
- In the few cases, where neither the peace agreement structure nor the subsequent electoral framework provided for inclusion of women of any type, the numbers of women represented in legislatures was unusually low (Côte D'Ivoire (11% women); Haiti (4% women); Lebanon (3% women).

- Little is known empirically as to how provision for women plays out in practice, or how power-sharing agreements affect broader equality and socio-economic struggles. Such as case study work as exists, indicates that women do find it difficult to continue to negotiated inclusion in such arrangements, and face problems that are distinct from the problems of majoritarian liberal democratic political structures.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

UNSC Resolution 1325 and its successors contemplate that negotiated settlements will be used to end conflict, and advocate that a ‘gender perspective’ is adopted in peace agreements, and that women are included in peace negotiations (paragraph 8). As long as negotiated settlements to conflict are here to stay then power-sharing compromises are here to stay. Negotiated settlements, whatever their undesirable elements are for women, often are more desirable than either the alternatives: continued violent conflict, or military international intervention. These arrangements focus on the need for pacts between military-political elites, as a central requirement of stability and reduction in violence. While the pacts may be very unsettling to women, and indeed to others who support inclusive democratic politics, imposing more straightforward forms of liberal democracy is often not possible and some element of group accommodation is often desirable in divided societies as a matter of equality and legitimacy, as well as stability. Responses to power-sharing by women cannot take place in the abstract but must respond to the relative merits or demerits of the available alternatives, if they are to remain more than the wilderness cry of the dispossessed. Accessing power on a basis of equality involves engaging with power-brokering dynamics.

The conceptual analysis and data set out above suggests the following recommendations for design of power-sharing arrangements.

- Political power-sharing arrangements based on group identities, or integrating government and opposition political and military elites, should build in power-sharing for women with clear representation of and gender balance of executives and legislatures required and implemented through electoral laws.

- Political power-sharing provision should where possible consider using liberal models of power-sharing that seek to avoid rigidly prescriptive criteria for how groups are defined and locate power-sharing within a human rights framework which pays particular attention to women’s rights.

- At pre-negotiation stages of negotiating settlements to conflict where broad commitments are made to inclusive governments, or the desirability of governments of national unity, consideration should be given to including specific reference to gender balance and a commitment to women’s equality and women’s rights, as these agreements tend to set the frame for later negotiations.
Evidence indicates that establishing power-sharing with no reference to women, and no subsequent provision for electoral quotas leads to unusually and unacceptably low numbers of women in legislatures. This situation should be avoided.

Even where political power-sharing has been established with little to no reference to women’s participation and women’s rights, electoral quotas appear to be possible to achieve and make a big different to participation of women. Assistance bodies, and those involved in implementation should be aware that there will be clear opportunities and often will to include gender quotas as part of the detail of how new legislatures and even executives, are established.

As previous research has indicated, attention needs to be paid to the type of electoral system and the sanctions in place for non-compliance as affecting the outcome in terms of numbers of women elected, as well as the nature of the quota itself.

Good practice on political power-sharing and inclusion of women should be shared.

Where political power-sharing is being considered by participants in peace processes, good quality technical assistance on election models and the ways in which power-sharing can take place concurrently with quotas for women, should be given to women and women’s organisations so that women are assisted in formulating proposals.

Territorial power-sharing should include clear protection for women’s rights and participation at the sub-national level. Attention should be paid to the relationship between women’s rights and local customs laws, and references in the peace agreement to traditional laws.

Military power-sharing should focus not just on merging armies and command structures, but also putting in place rights protections and mechanisms, civilian and democratic accountability, and ensuring representation of women throughout.

Military power-sharing should pay attention to the use and location of fire arms, with the aim of accounting for them and reducing them.

Further research on women’s experience of power-sharing should be supported.

Further research on the outcome of power-sharing arrangements on stable political settlements should be supported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Power-sharing</th>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>Gender Quotas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Provision for a involvement of the Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain et de l’Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement in the restructuring of the state ‘in a spirit of reconciliation and conformity with the provisions of the Constitution’. As above.</td>
<td>Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine et les Mouvements Politico-Militaires Centrafricains désignés ci après : Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD), Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC), Union des Forces Démocratique pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) 21/06/2008, Accord de Paix entre le Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine et les Mouvements Politico-Militaires ci-après designés: FDPC et UFDR (Syrte Agreement) 02/02/2007 (as above with parties of this agreement)</td>
<td>No information available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote D’Ivoire</td>
<td>Transitional Power-sharing (note lack of provision for women took place, despite UN SC Resolution 1721 (2006) provision (article 18) which: ‘Encourages the Prime Minister to seek, as appropriate, the active involvement of civil society in moving the peace process forward, and urges the Ivorian parties, the High Representative for the Elections together with UNOCI to take account of the rights and resources of women and of gender considerations as set out in resolution 1325 (2000) as cross-cutting issues in the implementation of the peace process including through the consultations with local and international women’s groups’ (p. 4))</td>
<td>Premier accord complémentaire à l’accord politique de Ouagadougou, 27/03/2007, Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Cote d’Ivoire (‘Pretoria I’), 06/04/2005, Accra III Agreement on Cote d’Ivoire, 30/07/2004, Accord Accra II (Ghana) sur la Crise en Cote d’Ivoire (French) 07/03/2003, Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 23/01/2003</td>
<td>No legislative quotas (one party has voluntary quota), Reserved seats, Women: 11% (2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Agreement/Act</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Transitional Power-sharing</td>
<td>Accord de Paris 27/09/1993</td>
<td>No information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Transitional Power-sharing</td>
<td>Protocol of agreement between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Prime Minister- Designate René Théodore under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) 25/02/1992</td>
<td>Legislative quotas lower and upper house, The Constitution as amended in 2012 recognizes the principle of a minimum quota of 30% for women at all levels, especially in public life (Article 17.1). The Constitution further requires that all laws related to political parties, their structures and functional mechanisms need to reserve minimum 30% of positions for women (Article 30.1.1). Two round system Women: 4% (2010 – election prior to quota)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Power-sharing Model</td>
<td>Agreement/Document</td>
<td>Women Representation</td>
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</table>
| Lebanon           | Indefinite specified power-sharing | Doha Agreement on the Results of the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference 21/05/2008  
Le Document d'Entente Mutuelle Entre le Hezbollah et le Courant Patriotique Libre 06/02/2006 | No legislated or voluntary quotas  
Block vote  
Women: 3% (2009)  
(Note: proposal now submitted to promote the participation of women in municipal councils in proportional numbers according to the principle of equality between the sexes). |
| Mauritania        | Transitional Power-sharing | Accord cadre de Dakar entre les trois grands pôles politiques mauritaniens 03/06/2009 | Legislated quotas for lower and upper house and sub-nationally.  
Women: 25% (2013) |
| Niger             | Transitional Power-sharing | Accord établissant une paix définitive entre le Gouvernement de la République du Niger et l'Organisation de la Resistance Armée 15.04/1995  
Accord de Paix entre le Gouvernement de la République du Niger et la Coordination de la Resistance Armée (Ouagadougou Accord) | Legislated quotas for lower and upper house and sub-nationally.  
List PR  
Women: 13% (2011) |
| Palestine (Fatah and Hamas) | Indefinite power-sharing | Agreement between Fatah and Hamas 03/05/2011 | Information not available |
Legislated quotas for lower and upper house and sub-nationally and voluntary quotas.  
List PR  
Women: 64% (2013) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Agreements/Protocols</th>
<th>Information status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Indefinite Power-sharing</td>
<td>Protocol on Political Issues 18/05/1997</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
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<td>The Bishkek Memorandum 18/05/1997</td>
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<td>Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation 21/02/1997</td>
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<td>Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation 21/02/1997</td>
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<td>Protocol on the Main Functions and Powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation 23/12/1996</td>
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<td>Protocol on the fundamental Principles for establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikstan 17/08/1995</td>
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Table 2: Conflicts with power-sharing and provision for women together with information on electoral quotas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Agmt and Power-sharing</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Quotas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (contemporary)</td>
<td>Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions ('Bonn Agreement') 05/12/2001 (transitional power-sharing in Emergency Loya Jirga, paving way to ‘broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government’)</td>
<td>Preamble: Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not intended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time, III. Interim Administration III.A.3. The Chairman, the Vice Chairmen and other members of the Interim Administration have been selected by the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, as listed in Annex IV to this agreement. The selection has been made on the basis of professional competence and personal integrity from lists submitted by the participants in the UN Talks, with due regard to the ethnic, geographic and religious composition of Afghanistan and to the importance of the participation of women. III.C.2 [...] The Special Independent Commission will ensure that due attention is paid to the representation in the Emergency Loya Jirga of a significant number of women as well as all other segments of the Afghan population.[...] V.4. The Interim Authority and the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga will ensure the participation of women as well as the equitable representation of all ethnic and religious communities in the Interim Administration and the Emergency Loya Jirga. Vice Chair and Women Affairs, offices held together</td>
<td>Upper and lower house quotas. Single non-transferable vote Women: 28% (2010) According to Article 83 of the 2004 Constitution, 68 of the 249 total seats (27%) in the Lower House (Wolesi Jirga) are reserved for women, comprising at least 2 women for each of the 34 provinces of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola/Cabinda Province</td>
<td>Assembleia Nacional, Resolucao No 27-A/06 (Memorandum of Peace and Understanding in Cabinda Province) 01/08/2006 (integration of ex-Front for the Liberation of Cabind in Cabinda Forum for Dialogue, ANEXO 2/7 DO ANEXO7 Estatuo Especial da Provincia de Cabinda ... TITULO II Governo de Provincia de Cabinda ... CAPITULO III Competencias Especiais do Governo Provincial de Ambito Geral</td>
<td>Angola-wide information. Lower house legislated quotas (none at sub-national level) List PR Women: 34% (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to dialogue on a Government of Unity and Reconciliation.

ARTIGO 15º
(Competencias de natureza economica e social)

....
i) assegurar o apoio ao desenvolvimento das funções específicas das famílias e promover a igualdade de oportunidades para as mulheres no âmbito social y laboral.

....
CAPITULO IX
Vice-Governadores

ARTIGO 42º
(Competencia)

2. Ao Vice-Governador para o sector social e de organizacão compete coadjuvar o Governador Provincial na coordenação e execução das tarefas ligadas as seguintes áreas:

d) justica, família e promoção da mulher, comunicação social, administração publica, emprego e segurança social, ciência e tecnologia;

Bangladesh/Chittagong Hills Tract

Agreement between the National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts Constituted by the Government and The Parbatty Chattagram Janasanghati Samity 02/12/1997 (establishing a power-sharing government at the Hill Council level, itself also a form of territorial power-sharing)

B) (Kha) CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL/ HILL DISTRICT COUNCIL

4. a) There shall be 3 (three) seats for women in each of the Hill District Councils. One third (1/3) of these seats shall be for non-tribals.

C) (Ga) THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REGIONAL COUNCIL

3. The Council shall be formed with 22(twenty-two) members including the Chairman. Two-thirds of the members shall be elected from among the tribals. The Council shall determine its procedure of functioning. Composition of the Council shall be as follows: Chairman 1 Members Tribal 12 Members Tribal (women) 2 Members non-tribal 6 Members non-tribal (women) 1 Among the tribal members 5 persons shall be elected from the Chakma tribe, 3 persons from the Marma tribe, 2 persons from the Tripura tribe, 1 person from the Murung and Tanchangya tribes and 1 person from the Lusai, Bawm, Pankho, Khumi, Chak and Khiyang tribes Among the non-tribal members 2 persons shall be

Legislated quotas at lower house and sub-national level.

First past the post

20% (2014)

According to Article 9 of the Fundamental Principles of State Policy of the Constitution of Bangladesh, and through the Local Governmental (Union Parishad) Act of 1997, 3 directly-elected seats are reserved for women in the
be elected from each district. Among the tribal women members 1 woman shall be elected from the Chakma tribe and 1 woman from other tribes.

4. Three seats shall be reserved for women in the Council, one-third of which will be non-tribal.

|------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) 21/11/1995 (full consociational power-sharing between Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, with territorial autonomy)
- Legislated quotas lower house.
- List PR
- Women: 21% (2014)

Bosnia-Croatia

- Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton 10/11/1995 (full consociational power-sharing between Bosniacs and Croats at the sub-national level, with further territorial devolution of power)
- Article 1.7.b. No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Entity citizenship arbitrarily or so as to leave him or her stateless. No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Entity citizenship on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
- Article II.4. Non-Discrimination. The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in this Article or in the international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution shall be secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
- Annex 1, ADDITIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS TO BE APPLIED IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA includes
- 4. 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women

No sub-regional information available
<p>| Burundi | Accord de Partage de Pouvoir au Burundi (full consociational power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis, with set aside places for Twa and Women) | Article 8 addresses the imperative of gender equality. Article 13 L'Assemblée nationale est composée de 60% de députés Hutus, de 40% de députés Tutsi et de 3 députés de l'ethnie Twa, avec un minimum de 30% de députés étant des femmes. Article 14 Afin d'assurer que l'équilibre ethnique et de genre spécifié dans l'Accord d'Arusha pour la Paix et la Réconciliation de l'an 2000 se réalise, le mécanisme de cooptation sera utilisé pour adresser un déséquilibre qui peut résulter des élections. Article 15 Le Sénat est constitué sur la base de représentation à 50/50% de Hutus et de Tutsis et de trois sénateurs de l'ethnie Twa, avec un minimum de 30% de sénateurs étant des femmes. | Legislated quotas, lower house, upper house, sub-national level List PR 32% (2010) 2005 constitution institutionalises power-sharing and quota for women |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 28/08/2000 (general principles for power-sharing)</td>
<td>Extensive provision for women’s representation and rights including: prohibition of sexual and gender-based violence; general principle that the state will be founded inter alia on ‘equality between women and men’; principles and measures relating to exclusion of women; gender balance informing reform of defence and security; gender balance on commission of national reconciliation; extensive constitutional principles relating to gender equality; gender representation in the judiciary; particular regard to women in reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie 02/12/2002 (Provides for the establishment of a power-sharing system within the framework of an inclusive Transitional Government, with CNDD-FDD taking part in the power-sharing arrangements).</td>
<td>Article 19  L'administration de l'état est composée d'une telle façon qu'elle est représentative de la nation burundaise, reflétant la diversité de ses composantes, y compris les questions de genre et d'ethnicté.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Article II 1.7 The cessation of all acts of violence against the population, any act of vengeance, summary executions, torture, harassment, detention or persecution of civilians based on their ethnic origin, religious beliefs or political affiliation, arming of civilians, use of child soldiers, sexual violence and sponsoring and encouraging terrorists or genocidal ideologies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement/Conference</td>
<td>Article</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement Embodying a Convention on Governance between the Forces for Democratic Change and the Political Parties of the Opposition 10/09/1994 (commits to a form of shared government)</td>
<td>Article 32.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>(p.12) 6. DES DISPOSITIONS FINALES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros / Anjouan</td>
<td>Preamble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Article 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Agreement/Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accord) (provided for consociational arrangement between Albanian and Serbian Kosovars, not signed but framework subsequently)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extensive provision for women, including commitments to ‘participation of women at all levels of responsibility, taking into account the criteria of competence, credibility and integrity, in a spirit of national reconciliation’.

III - TRANSITION PRINCIPLES
1. To guarantee a peaceful transition, the Parties shall participate in the political administration of the country during the period of transition. The institutions that will be set up during the transition shall ensure appropriate representation of the eleven provinces of the country and of the different tendencies within the political and social forces. In particular, provision shall be made for appropriate representation of women at all levels of responsibility.

Annex I: The Division of Responsibilities
A. The Government
2. The transitional government shall be composed of the following Ministries:
   [...]  
   Women's and Family Affairs  
   [...]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Women’s Rights</th>
<th>Other Relevant Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties 18/08/1999 (transitional power-sharing with proportional legislature and executive). Final Communiqué of the All-Liberia National Conference, Virginia, Liberia 18/04/1991 (Government of National unity formed by the government)</td>
<td>Fairly extensive provision for women providing for: women’s membership of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, including representation of Women’s Organisations (and other civic society organisations), the Electoral Reform Commission, recommendations by female lawyers for new judicial appointments, and rehabilitation, reconstruction and development consideration of women, with gender balance in programme implementation responsibilities.</td>
<td>Listed as attending Interest Group: Women Development Association of Liberia</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No legislated quotas any level. First past the post Women: 11% (2011) In the “Guidelines relating to the registration of political parties and independent candidates” of January 2005, there was a gender quota provision that mandated the political parties and coalition of political parties to have a 30% women candidates in their electoral lists. In the amended law of March 2011 no gender quota provision is included. “In the national election on 11 October 2011, of 925 candidates, 105 were women, including 87 candidates for the House of Representatives, 12 candidates for the Senate, and 6 candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency. This represents approximately 11 percent of all candidates (Carter Center-Fall 2011).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Document Title</td>
<td>Article Details</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage: The Constitutional Declaration (Transitional power-sharing in Interim Provision Authority, drawn proportionately from local councils)</td>
<td>Article (5) The family is the basis of society and shall be entitled to protection by the State. The State shall also protect and encourage marriage. The State shall guarantee the protection of motherhood, childhood and the elderly. The State shall take care of children, youth and the handicapped. Article (21) It shall be impermissible for any member of the Interim Transitional National Council to assume any executive public office. It shall also be impermissible to combine the membership of the National Council with the membership of the Local Council. A member may neither be appointed in a Board of Directors of any company nor may he contribute to obligations made by the government or made by one of the public institutions. Further, during the term of his membership, the member, his wife or his sons may not buy or rent any State property or lease or sell to or barter with the State any of his own property, or conclude a contract with the State in his capacity as obligator, supplier or contractor.</td>
<td>Legislated quotas lower house and sub-national level. Parallel 15% (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar - Commitments by Malagasy Political Stakeholders 13/09/2011 (Transitional Government of National Unity provided for (National Union Transitional Government), with signatories to the ‘roadmap’ to provide a list of candidates.)</td>
<td>In the formation of the Transitional Government, the President of the Transition and the consensus Prime Minister shall ensure a fair an equitable distribution of portfolios, whilst adhering to the criteria of political affiliation, gender representation and regional balance.’ (I.6, p. 1). For the enlargement of the composition of other transitional institutions, like the Transitional Congress (CT), the High Transitional Council (CST) and the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), Malagasy political stakeholders who are parties to this Roadmap shall be invited to submit a list of public figures, from which the President of the Transition shall appoint the members of these institutions. In appointing the members of these institutions, the President of the Transition undertakes to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of positions, whilst adhering to the criteria of political affiliation, gender representation, regional balance and balanced sharing among the Malagasy political stakeholders who are signatories to this Roadmap so as to ensure the smooth running of the Transition. (I.7, p. 2).</td>
<td>No information available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Maldives  | Roadmap for a possible way forward 16/02/2012 (Political Parties invited to come together to form a | III. Governance  
• Appropriate representation of women will be ensured in the Government of National Unity. | No information available |
### IV. Priority Tasks of the Government of National Unity

- The government of National Unity will ensure the uninterrupted provision of public services. It will continue to pay special attention to the rights of women and children, and to the needs and interests of the vulnerable, as is required by the constitution.

### SITUATION, RIGHTS AND CULTURE OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN

Analyzed from the viewpoint of indigenous women from Chiapas, the problem of rights demands an end to silent voices and secular oblivion. To do away with the latter it is necessary to act on both national as well as State legislation in order to guarantee their fundamental rights as human beings and as indigenous people.

- Incorporate political rights into legislation, as well as respect for indigenous practices and customs, respecting the dignity and human rights of indigenous women.
- Within the constitutional framework of autonomy, recognize the specific rights of the indigenous woman.
- Guarantee the labor rights of indigenous workers, particularly those in vulnerable conditions such as domestic work or temporary jobs.
- Review and update the penalties imposed by current legislation for sexual crimes, harassment against women, and intra-family violence.
- For the indigenous women and children of Chiapas, guarantee the right to health care, education and culture, nutrition, a dignified dwelling, basic services, and the right to participate in educational projects leading to a deserving integral development by allowing the contribution of indigenous women and designed for their particular needs.
- Compliance with the international pacts and conventions which have been entered into by the Mexican government. Of particular importance here is Convention 169 of the ILO, the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights referring to the elimination of any form of discrimination against women, and the Agreement of the World Conference on Population and Development referring to the health and reproductive rights of women as long as these do not

| Mexico/Chiapas | Actions and Measures for Chiapas Joint Commitments and Proposals from the State and Federal Governments, and the EZLN 16/02/1996 (provides for reform to ensure proportional participation of indigenous peoples in municipal council as well as in local congress) | Legislated quotas lower house, upper house, and sub-national level Mixed member proportional system Women: 27% (2012) |
Commitments for Chiapas by the State and Federal Governments and the EZLN under Paragraph 1.3 of the Rules of Procedure 16/02/1996 (similar)

Joint Declaration that the Federal Government and the EZLN shall submit to National Debating and Decision-making Bodies 16/02/1996 (similar)

J

Joint Proposals that the Federal Government and the EZLN contravene the basic principles of the General Constitution of the Republic. 

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

- Recognition and respect must be given to the right to wear traditional indigenous dress in all spheres of public life, particularly in the case of children and young people of both sexes in a school environment.

Part I

- The establishment of the right of, and applicable mechanisms for, indigenous women to participate, on an equal footing with men, in all matters dealing with the governance and development of indigenous peoples and to enjoy priority intervention in the economic, educational, and health-care projects specific to them.

COMMITMENTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

- Part I. The establishment of the right of, and applicable mechanisms for, indigenous women to participate, on an equal footing with men, in all matters dealing with the governance and development of indigenous peoples and to enjoy priority intervention in the economic, educational, and health-care projects specific to them.

- Part II. It is proposed that the Congress of the Union should recognize, in the
agree to remit to the National Debating and Decision-Making Bodies in accordance with paragraph 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure 16/02/1996 (similar)

constitutional and political amendments they reach, the right of indigenous women to participate, on an equal footing with men, at all levels of government as well as in the development of the indigenous peoples.

6. It is proposed that the Congress of the Union and the legislatures of the nation’s states, in recognition of indigenous autonomy and for the determination of its levels, should take into consideration the main rights enshrined therein, with the establishment of the mechanisms needed to ensure their free exercise. Said rights include, primarily, the following:

b. obtaining recognition for their internal systems of governance as they apply to regulation and punishment, provided they do not infringe constitutional guarantees or human rights, particularly those applicable to women;

III.

5. The satisfaction of basic needs. The State must promote mechanisms to guarantee indigenous peoples conditions that will allow them to take satisfactory charge of their food, health, housing, and, at the very least, an adequate level of well-being. Social policy must promote priority programs to improve health and nutritional standards among the children of indigenous peoples; it must also support, on an egalitarian basis, the training of women, expanding their participation in the organization and development of the family and the community. Priority must be given to the involvement of indigenous women in decisions regarding projects for economic, political, social, and cultural development.

7. Protection for indigenous migrants. The State must promote specific social policies to protect indigenous migrants, both within the nation’s borders and beyond them, with inter-institutional actions to support women’s education and work and children’s and young people’s health and education; in rural areas, these policies must coordinate between the zones that provide agricultural laborers and those that make use of them.

V.

1. The essential starting point for the establishment of a new relationship
between the indigenous peoples and the State is the construction of a new legal framework in the nation and in its states. The constitutional amendments recognizing the indigenous peoples’ rights must be reached by means of a creative legislative spirit, forging new policies and offering real solutions to their social problems. We therefore propose that these amendments should contain, among others, the following general elements:

d. Legislating on the rights of indigenous men and women to have representatives within legislative bodies, particularly the Congress of the Union and the state legislatures, incorporating new guidelines for the demarcation of the electoral districts covering indigenous peoples and communities, and allowing elections to be held in accordance with the applicable legislation.

e. Legislating on the rights of indigenous peoples to elect their authorities and exercise power in accordance with their own rules within their spheres of autonomy, and guaranteeing participation by women under conditions of equality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Document/Agreement</th>
<th>Rights and Obligations</th>
<th>Methodology/Proportionality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Nepal Interim Constitution 15/01/2007 (Power-sharing alluded to in providing for legislature and executive to be formed 'on basis of political understanding', with Presidential and Prime Ministerial appointments if no understanding reached. Full proportionality for the Constituent Assembly which is main political body provided for). Decisions of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) - Maoist Summit Meeting 08/11/2006 (provides for proportionality in the interim legislature)</td>
<td>Extensive provision for women, with regard to: citizenship; right to equality and non-discrimination; employment and social security; property rights; reproductive and health rights. Participation of women (and others) is extensively built into the obligations, directive principles and polices of the state (Part 4). Provision for representation of women in the Constituent Assembly and in the Army; and in political-economic-social transformation and conflict management.</td>
<td>Legislated quotas lower house, sub-national level. Parallel Women: 29% (2014) Under Article 63 (3) of the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly shall be comprised of 240 members elected from each of the 240 single-member constituencies with the first-past-the-post system, 335 members elected from political parties through the list proportional representation system and legislative quotas lower house, sub-national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Hillsborough Castle Agreement 05/02/2010 (ongoing implementation of power-sharing)</td>
<td>'Consideration of a women's prison, which is fit for purpose and meets international obligations and best practice.' (p. 7).</td>
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</table>
|                  | The Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations (Good Friday or Belfast Agreement) 0/04/1998 | Rights, Safeguard and Equality of Opportunity
Human Rights
1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular: [inter |
|                  |                                                                                   | 26 members appointed by the Council of Ministers. Women must constitute at least 33% of candidates for the first-past-the-post system and the proportional representation system combined (Article 63 (5)). |
| Local Peace Council and its Procedure-2006 01/09/2006 (provides for a local peace council, with representation of the Seven Political Parties in it) | Chapter III, Article 9.c. While deciding the list of candidates, the political parties shall ensure proportional representation of disadvantaged communities and regions, Madheshis (the Terai communities), women, low-caste groups and other communities. Article 10.a. In order to end discriminations based on class, ethnicity, language, gender, culture, religion and region and to deconstruct the current centralised and unitary structure, the state shall be restructured in an inclusive, democratic and forward looking manner. |
|                  | 3. Formation of the Council
3.1 A district level Peace Council shall be formed in districts.
3.2 The Council shall be formed at the initiatives of the district level all-party mechanism.
3.3 The Local Peace Council shall be inclusive in nature with the representation of Seven Political Parties that are in Government, other parties having representation in the parliament, women, professional organizations, civil society, social organization, indigenous and ethnic groups, disabled persons, Dalits, Madhesi and the victims of the conflict as well. Moreover, representatives of the CPN (Maoists) shall also be included on the basis of consensus. |
<p>|                  | 26 members appointed by the Council of Ministers. Women must constitute at least 33% of candidates for the first-past-the-post system and the proportional representation system combined (Article 63 (5)). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Agreement/Protocol</th>
<th>Article/Clause</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>(consociational government for Northern Ireland)</td>
<td>alia] - the right of women to full and equal political participation. (p. 18)</td>
<td>Economic, Social and Cultural Issues 1. Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government will pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life. (p. 20).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) (Lome Agreement) 07/07/1999 (Provision to convert RUF into a political party and enable them to hold public office, also provides for cabinet positions in a Government of National Unity, with RUF leader Foday Sankoh given Chairmanship role in Commission for the management of strategic resources.</td>
<td>Part V, Humanitarian, Human Rights, and Socio-Economic Issues Article XXVIII, Post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone.</td>
<td>Sub-national level quotas at local government level of Ward Development Committees First past the post Women: 12% (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Protocol Establishing the Somali New Federal Parliament 22/06/2012 (see also Protocol Establishing the Technical Selection Committee (22/06/2012)) (Provision for regional group-based selection of New Federal Parliament by a technical committee made up</td>
<td>Article 3, New Federal Parliament Members (p. 3) 3.1. The House of the People shall comprise 225 members of whom at least 30 percent must be women. 3.5. The Traditional Leaders, supported by the Technical Selection Committee who vets nominees, and in consultation with their clans and with different sectors of Somali civil society, including religious leaders, intellectuals, youth, women, and business people, shall select the members of the New Federal</td>
<td>Legislated quotas lower house. Electoral system in transition Women: 14% (2012) Garowe Principles I (2011) and Garowe Principles II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol Establishing the Somali National Constituent Assembly 22/06/2012</td>
<td>Provision for representiveness in Constituent Assembly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision on the High Level Committee Djibouti Agreement 25/11/2008</td>
<td>Provisions relating to strengthening cooperation on the Government of Unity, with provision for proportionality</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic 29/01/2004</td>
<td>Provides for clan membership and proportionality in Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
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</table>

- Parliament from among persons whom the Technical Selection Committee has vetted.

- Article 4, National Constituent Assembly Members
  4.1. The National Constituent Assembly shall comprise 825 delegates of whom at least 30% must be women.
  4.3. Collectively, the National Constituent Assembly must generally reflect the composition of Somali society, including youth and women, religious scholars and traditional elders (except those involved in selecting the NCA), business people, professionals, scholars, and the Diaspora.

Establishes: An intention by the Parties to reach out to those who are outside the process as well as members of the civil society, including women and the business community, and the Diaspora. Seventy-five additional seats in the Parliament will be reserved to that end.

- ARTICLE 26, SOCIAL WELFARE.
  The Government shall guarantee public social welfare as follows:
  a) It shall be the responsibility of the Government to protect and provide public health, safe motherhood, childcare and control communicable diseases;
  b) Welfare of persons with disabilities, orphans, widows, heroes who contributed and fought in defence of the country and aged persons;
  c) The Government shall encourage the establishment of the Civil Society and social development institutions for the public, that is to say, NGOs, women, youth, students, human rights and professional organizations;
  i) The Government shall create a positive environment for women to participate effectively in economic, social and political life of the society;

- ARTICLE 29, THE COMPOSITION OF PARLIAMENT.
  The Transitional Federal Parliament of the Somali Republic shall consist of Two
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Legislation Status</th>
</tr>
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</table>
(1) There shall be a Commission on Gender Equality, which shall consist of a chairperson and such number of members as may be determined by an Act of Parliament.  
(2) The Commission shall consist of persons who are fit and proper for appointment, South African citizens and broadly representative of the South African community.  
(3) The object of the Commission shall be to promote gender equality and to advise and to make recommendations to Parliament or any other legislature with regard to any laws or proposed legislation which affects gender equality and the status of women. | Legislated quotas sub-national level  
List PR  
Women 41% (2014) |
| South Sudan  | Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements Towards Resolution of the Crises in South Sudan 25/08/2014 (Establishes Transitional Government of National Unity) | V. Agreed Principles: Humanitarian Concerns  
...  
26. Agree to urgently institute programmes of relief, repatriation, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees, and in particular, provide programmes for war/conflict affected persons (children, orphans, women, widows, war wounded, etc.), including reconstruction of war-affected areas, the terms and scope of which shall be negotiated by the stakeholders in the negotiations; | Legislated quotas lower house, upper house, sub-national level  
In transition  
Women: 27% (2011) |
| Sri Lanka    | Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) (A very partial agreement dealing with post-Tsunami reconstruction, which provided for power-sharing between LTTE and Government of Sri Lanka in 1. Structure  
(b) The High-Level Committee, the Regional Committee and the District Committees shall discharge of their functions in such a manner as to address the concerns of all persons in the Tsunami Disaster Zone (the “TDZ”, as defined below) and shall do so without discrimination against any person on grounds such as ethnic origin, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, social origin, birth or other status.  
6. Regional Committee  
c. Composition  
iv. The Regional Committee shall have a proper gender balance. | No legislated quotas  
List PR  
Women 6% (2010) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Agreement Details</th>
<th>Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Sudan - Darfur | Framework Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in Darfur between the Government of Sudan and the LJM 18/03/2010 (Power-sharing established as principle) | 1. General Principles  
(2) Reaffirmation of democracy, political pluralism, freedom, the maintenance of a vibrant and dynamic civil society, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the freedom of the press, the accountability and transparency of state institutions, and justice and equality for all regardless of ethnicity, religion, belief and gender as the basis for the effective participation of all Sudanese citizens in the management of their own affairs and decision-making processes at all levels of governance;  
(3) Recognition of citizenship as the basis for political and civil rights and duties and rejection of discrimination based on religion, belief, ethnicity, gender or any other reasons; |

6. Role of Civil Society.  
Agreement on the importance of the role of civil society in the peace process and the necessity to establish mechanisms for general participation, in particular by civil society to ensure that the views, voice, needs, rights of women, youth, displaced people, refugees and vulnerable groups are reflected in the negotiations. To secure support of the political parties and the public for the peace process and the ensuing agreement to achieve a durable peace. |

Extensive provision for power-sharing address women’s human rights, effective representation in nominations to the power-sharing government, and in national assembly and national civil service. Provisions on gender and wealth-sharing. Protection for women from gender-based violence. |

Preamble:  
5. Stressing our commitment to respect international humanitarian law and |

Legislated quotas lower house  
Parallel  
Women 25% (2010) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict in Darfur 05/07/2005  (power-sharing and wealth-sharing to be agreed)</th>
<th>promote and protect human rights, including the rights of women and children, as part of the efforts to address the prevailing situation in Darfur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 3. Citizenship is the basis for civil and political rights and duties, including the freedom of expression and association for all Sudanese. No Sudanese shall be discriminated against on the basis of religion, belief, ethnicity, gender or for any other reason. This shall be incorporated into the National Constitution. (p. 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sudan – Eastern Sudan  
Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement 19/06/2006  (General provision for ‘effective participation’ with provision for allocation of ministerial positions to different groups, and proportionality in other institutions) | CHAPTER ONE, POLITICAL ISSUES: GOVERNANCE AND POWER |
| Article 1.  
7. Women shall be fairly represented in all government institutions at all levels and their equal and effective participation ensured. |
| Article 7  
19. Special measures shall be taken to ensure the participation of women in all institutions at all levels of government. |
| Article 8  
The Council of Ministers  
23. Prior to the elections, and with a view to reflecting the need for unity and inclusiveness, the GoS shall ensure effective representation of the people Eastern Sudan, including the Eastern Sudan Front, as follows: (c) Special effort shall be made to ensure that women are represented in these nominations. |
| Article 9  
The National Assembly  
24. Prior to the elections and with a view to reflecting the need for unity and inclusiveness the GoS shall ensure the representation of Eastern Sudanese in the National Assembly, including the Eastern Front. In this regard, not less than eight seats shall be allocated to nominees of the Eastern Sudan Front. It is highly recommended that some of the nominees be women. |
| Chapter 2, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES |
| Article 22 | 75. The following shall be the fundamental objectives of development in Eastern Sudan:  
(k) Ensuring that all the development programs address the specific needs of women; |
|---|---|
| Chapter 4 | Article 33  
140. All the stakeholders, including community and traditional leaders, political parties, civil society organizations, trade unions, professionals, religious leaders, business leaders, and members of the diaspora shall participate in the CC ESPA. There shall be adequate and effective representation of women and youth. |
Two civil society organisations participated in the meeting.  
(p. 1) Conformément aux vingt deux engagements souscrits le 14 avril 2004 par le Gouvernement de la République Togolaise à l’issue des consultations avec l’Union Européenne et dans le but de consolider la démocratie, le réconciliation nationale et la paix sociale, le Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais,… le Gouvernement ainsi que deux organisations de la société civile : le Groupe de Réflexion et d’Action Femme. Démocratie et Développement (GF2D), le Réseau des Femmes Africaines Ministres et Parlementaires (REFAMP/T) se sont réunis à Lomé …  
(p.2) I. La mise en place d’une nouvelle Assemblée Nationale à l’issue d’un processus électorale transparent, juste et démocratique  
…  
1.2. – Ces élections se dérouleront conformément aux dispositions définies par consensus dans le cadre électoral relativement aux points suivants :  
…  
- quota des candidatures féminines ;  
(p. 6) 1.2.11 – Quota des candidatures féminines  
Les Parties prenantes au Dialogue se sont engagées à œuvrer en vue d’assurer la représentation équitable des femmes dans les processus électoraux et dans la vie politique nationale.  
Legislated quotas lower house.  
List PR  
Women 15%; 2013 |
Dans cette optique, elles encouragent les partis politiques à s’imposer un minimum de candidatures féminines aux élections.
(p.7) 1.2.12. – Financement des partis politiques
…
Le Gouvernement décidera des mesures incitatives à la participation des femmes à la vie politique.

Annex II
De la feuille de route du Gouvernement d’Union Nationale
Outre ses attributions constitutionnelles classiques, le Gouvernement aura pour tâches prioritaires :
…
- de prendre des mesures incitatives à la participation des femmes à la vie politiques :

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Uganda

Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the LRA/M (vague provision on integrating all Ugandans into ‘governance’ with provision for Equal Opportunities Commission to design a system)

C. PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS

2.1.b. The composition of Government shall be broadly representative of the national character gender and social diversity of the country. (p. 3)
2.1.f. The Government shall take affirmative action in favour of groups marginalised on the basis of gender, age, disability or any other reason created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of redressing imbalances which may exist against them. (p. 4)

5.0 Ensuring equal opportunities

The Parties agree that the recently enacted Equal Opportunities Law, shall be used to ensure equal treatment of all groups within Uganda; specifically, the elimination of inequalities and discrimination against any individual or group of persons on the ground of ethnic origin, social or economic standing, gender, disability, or political opinion. (p. 5)

E. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH AND NORTH EASTERN UGANDA

12. Vulnerable Groups

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Legislated quotas lower house, sub-national level
First past the post
Women: 35% (2011)
| Yemen | Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process in Yemen in Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 05/12/2011 (Transitional Government of National Unity) | Part II  
II.18. The early presidential elections shall be held in accordance with the following provisions:  
II.18.b.[..] Any citizen, male or female, who has attained the legal age for voting and can establish as much on the basis of an official document such as a birth certificate or national identity card, shall have the right to vote on the basis of that document;  
Part III  
III.10.a. Each party shall account for 50 per cent of nominees for the government of national unity, and due consideration shall be given to the representation of women. With regard to the distribution of portfolios, one of the two parties shall prepare two lists of ministries and transmit them to the other party, which shall have the right to choose one of the lists.  
Part IV  
IV.20. With the beginning of the second transitional phase, the President-elect and the government of national unity shall convene a comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue for all forces and political actors, including youth, the Southern Movement, the Houthis, other political parties, civil society representatives and women. Women must be represented in all participating groups.  
IV.21. The Conference shall discuss the following issues:  
IV.21.g. The adoption of legal and other means to strengthen the protection and rights of vulnerable groups, including children, as well as the advancement of women; | No information available |
Part VI.
VI.26. Women shall appropriately represented in all of the institutions referred to in this Mechanism.

| Zimbabwe | Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Formations, on Resolving the Challenges Facing Zimbabwe 15/09/2008 (formal consociational power-sharing) | Extensive provision for women including: access to and control of land; equal treatment; youth provision; humanitarian and food assistance without discrimination on basis of sex. Acknowledges the need for gender parity in government, and ‘the need to appoint women to strategic Cabinet posts’. Gender considerations also to be given to make-up of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee of the Agreement | Legislated quotas lower house, upper house and sub-national level First past the post Women: 31% (2013) (New Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 adopts reserve seats for women) |

| Colombia | A range of agreements with different guerrilla groups in the 1990s provided for assistance for demobilised movements, and some political provision to assist them to stand in elections, including creation of special electoral constituencies, and/or a set in the National Assembly. In 1991 the Colombian Constitution was a |
| Table 3: Integration of non-state armed opponents into legislatures, through set-aside places or other similar provision showing electoral quotas | There was little reference to women in the agreements themselves, however the Colombian Constitution had both provision for set-aside places for indigenous persons and extensive treatment of women’s rights and issues. | Legislated quotas lower house, upper house, sub-national List PR Women: 20% (2014) |
| India/Bodoland | Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council (territorial power-sharing, but with provision for representation in the executive from across groups and castes in the territory). | 4. Status of Bodoland Territorial Council
4.2. A provision will be made in para 2(1) of the Sixth Schedule for increasing the number of members for BTC up to 46 out of which 30 will be reserved for Scheduled Tribes, 5 for non-tribal communities, 5 open for all communities and 6 to be nominated by Governor of Assam from the unrepresented communities for BTC area of which at least two should be women. Nominated members will have the same rights and privileges as other members, including voting rights. Election from the 40 constituencies of BTC shall be on the basis of adult franchise. The term of the elected members of BTC shall be for 5 years. | No information available |
| India/Darjeeling | The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (Amendment) Act 1994) 20/03/20 (Underlying act provides for a Hill Council with 2/3 elected from local populations and 1/3 nominated by the Government. This act includes a general commitment that: The Government may provide for due representation of minorities, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, while nominating the remaining councillors). | Amendment of section 5
(a) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section will be substituted: -7
(3) The Government may provide for due representation of minorities, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, while nominating the remaining Councillors | No information available |
1. Amnesty
1.1 [...] In accordance with national and international law, the Amnesty does not cover war crimes, crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, including sexual violence, recruitment of child soldiers and other massive violations of human rights. | No information available |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>‘Government agrees to consider favourably any request by M23 to transform itself into a political party and the agreement provides for social reintegration of M23 members, (Annex 1, item 4(8. National Reconciliation and Justice 8.4 [...] The Government shall ensure that prosecutions for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers are initiated against any presumed author thereof. Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of March 23 at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue (Annex 2): 8. National Reconciliation and Justice 8.2 The M23 agrees that, given the atrocities and other massive violations of human rights perpetrated in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and with a view to putting an end to impunity, prosecutions for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers shall be initiated against any presumed author thereof. (p. 4) Annex A, Transitional Security Arrangements 28. Planning of the cantonment shall take into consideration the desirable characteristics for a cantonment site, taking into account of the specific needs of the M23's female combatants. (p. 5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Le Accord de Paix et de reconciliation nationale 26/12/1994 (transformation of groups into ‘political domains’)</td>
<td>No provision for women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>New York Agreement 25/09/1992 (a form of transitional representation for former combatants in the legislative assembly, to try to recruit women, but main peace agreement subsequently provided: Chapter II, National Civil Police II.7.D.b. A publicity campaign to promote the recruitment of new personnel for the National Civil Police shall be designed and implemented as soon as possible. Special consideration shall be given to the recruitment of women.</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>The Managua Protocol on Disarmament 30/05/1990</td>
<td>(demobilized combatants to be appointed to ministries dealing with ex-combatants, and government undertakes to let ex-combatants participate in local government, and to assist them to re-integrate). The Toncontin Agreement 23/03/1990 (A Transition Committee to implement the agreements will be composed of members of the Government and the Nicaraguan resistance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Article 1.d.** The resistance is urged to submit immediately a list of widows and orphans, so that the Nicaraguan Social Security and Welfare Institute can include them in its budget and they can receive the monthly pensions to which they are entitled.

**Article 10**
In compliance with the Toncontin Agreement and its addendum, the resistance hereby ratifies its undertaking to demobilise and lay down its arms by 10 June 1990 at the latest. To that end, the resistance undertakes to demobilize at least 100 combatants each day in each zone as from this date. Furthermore, in honour of Mother's Day, a considerable number of the combatants of the Nicaraguan resistance shall be demobilized.

**Second.** As an expression of just recognition of the patriotic work of the Nicaraguan resistance, it is necessary to assist the injured orphans and widows, the innocent victims of the armed struggle. To that end it undertakes to take measures to ensure the rehabilitation and social reintegration of those affected as soon as Mrs. Violeta Barrios de Chamorro assumes office. They will also be entitled to the corresponding monthly pensions. (p. 1)