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Large Systemic Banks and Fractional Reserve Banking, Intractable Dilemmas in Search of Effective Solutions

Emilios Avgouleas*

1 Introduction

Banks have been a ubiquitous feature of economic life since at least the eighteenth century and well before neoclassical economics incorporated capital in its growth models, chiefly though J. M. Keynes’s writings. In modern times the concept of availability of capital has been updated, or even stretched, to be closely associated with the concept of financial sector development and attendant levels of access to (external) finance. Yet, while the value of an enlarged financial

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The best example is the Bank of Scotland, part of the Lloyds Group today, which was established in Edinburgh in 1695 with the purpose of conducting commercial banking operations. For the history of the Bank of Scotland that set up as a rival to the Bank of England albeit with different focus as the former was established to manage government debt see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_of_Scotland.

For a collection of the most important research substantiating the role of finance in economic growth see A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine (eds, Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development (MIT Press, 2003). It seems that the findings of the cited studies in the MIT volume were not as instructive as those researchers made us believe and in their own subsequent writings they have themselves admitted that the indicators they used were very crude.
sector remains disputed, given its perennial fragility due to its preponderance to generate booms and bursts. The economic and social utility of a savings-based economy is not. This is not just the experience of older societies but even more so it is a widespread and largely unchallenged – probably because it is true – assumption of modern societies.

For example, one of the least mentioned utilities of savings-based economies is that banking (and capital markets) operating in a competitive environment and outside government interventions on their lending decisions and other capital allocation decisions can facilitate individuals’ economic and social mobility. Affording individuals or small enterprises access to credit and savings services that might not have been available otherwise, whether by means of mainstream banking, or community banking, or even microfinance schemes, can help mobilize individuals’ or communities’ creative talents. Moreover granting to the poor access to saving accounts facilitates their forward planning and to some extent alleviates any future short-term income shocks that may experience (e.g., unemployment), making them more proactive and

and it is still unclear which of the key properties of the financial system provide the best measure of its development and contribution to economic growth. See for a summary of the findings and conclusions of contemporary financial development research see M. Cihak, A. Demirguc-Kunt et al., “Measuring Financial Development” VOX column, 25 April 2013, available at www.voxeu.org/article/measuring-financial-development.


entrepreneurial. These benefits accrue to societies in addition to those flowing from the ability of the financial system to finance long-term development or infrastructure projects with strong social utility.

Arguably, financial sector development is not a goal in itself; it is rather a means to an end. Yet in the past thirty years financial markets have developed into a thick and complex web of claims and counterclaims, tradable assets, and risks. The transformation that banks have undergone in the past three decades has made the struggle to keep them safe, ever harder, and more challenging.

Whether operating under the principle of limited or unlimited liability, on a purely domestic or international basis, as mainstream lenders or as part of complex organizations, within a free banking environment or under the protective “wings” of the lender of last resort, banks have never been straightforward creatures. They normally operate on the basis of a fractional reserve system, trading on the basis of a large multiple over shareholders’ equity and only keeping small reserves against their liabilities, that is, money entrusted (lent) to them by depositors and bondholders. Fractional reserve banking presupposes a strong amount of trust in the safety of individual banks and the stability of the entire financial system. But such confidence can easily evaporate either because of trouble within a bank or developments in other parts of the

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financial system or even outside the financial system in the wider national and international economy.

The pace of bank business transformation has been unprecedented in the past three decades. This is a period that roughly coincides with global trade liberalisation, and effective and rapid communications, normally defined as the era of globalisation. This era in global banking has two distinct phases, the period between 1990 and 2008 and the period post-2008. During the first phase the biggest banks gradually moved to a purely multifunctional–universal bank model and global geographic coverage of operations, as banks became increasingly transnational.

The second phase is exclusively defined by a tidal wave of regulatory reforms at the national, regional, and global level. One of the most important consequences of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was that, due to the threat of systemic disruption, it became impossible to tolerate the failure of even medium-sized investment banks, like Lehman Brothers. National treasuries had to put together expensive bail-out plans in order to rescue severely undercapitalized banks in crisis, from going bankrupt and thus reinforcing a vicious chain effect of panic, contagion, and instability. Some of these bailouts proved very expensive, though the final cost was not the same in all jurisdictions. Ensuing reforms have aimed at remedying the perceived causes of the GFC and prevent the reoccurrence of a crisis of such magnitude.

The notion of market discipline aiding financial stability in the financial sector is sometimes stretched to a breaking point for two all-pervasive reasons. First, shareholders normally care little for financial stability threats and much more about their returns on equity.

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(ROE). Secondly, most modern financial institutions are too complex to be properly subjected to the rigours of market discipline. Even when shareholders and creditors have the right incentives to be effective monitors, balance sheet complexity will remain a challenging obstacle. Moreover, any reliance on market discipline acting as a restraint to the operations of large and/or interconnected banks entirely evaporated, reinforcing moral hazard (normally called too-big-to-fail (TBTF)).

This chapter intends to provide a balanced, all-encompassing, and in-depth discussion of the social utility of big banks in a fractional reserve banking system in the post-2008 context utilizing a very wide array of empirical and theoretical works. It will, thus, discuss the dilemmas surrounding the famed demolition of the TBTF bank in the postreform era. To this effect, the chapter will explain that while well calibrated structural reforms and special resolution regimes can certainly help to alleviate the TBTF problem in the banking sector, they will not eliminate it. At the same time, implementation of the suggested alternative of full-reserve, limited-purpose, or narrow-banking models would, practice, create more problems than it would solve.

Arguably, until the present model of fractional reserve banking is radically overhauled, mostly through effective regulatory systems and structural reforms that refocus global finance on long-term growth objectives, societies may have to provide a form of fiscal backstop to big (mostly ring-fenced or separated) commercial banks. This may be the social cost that has to be paid for the benefit of fractional reserve banking. It ought not to be confused with the abuses surrounding the TBTF subsidy in the pre-2008 era.

This chapter is divided in five sections. The first section is the present introduction. The second section will discuss the historical emergence of the multifunctional banks, also called megabanks, as the dominant model of bank organisation. The third section will provide an in-depth evaluation of the costs and benefits of large multifunctional (TBTF) banks with special reference the economics of bank organisation and the TBTF subsidy utilising an extensive range of empirical and theoretical studies. To this effect, the section will provide a balanced discussion of the risks and challenges posed by the existence of large multifunctional banks, which, in the absence of an effective structural regulation and a failure proof resolution framework is bound to be TBTF. The fourth section provides a critical evaluation of the remedial regulatory and policy reforms that have already been implemented or are under way to deal with the TBTF problem. It will also discuss the Kotlikoff and Kay proposals for a full reserve (narrow – limited purpose) banking system. Section V provides the conclusion.

III Emergence of the Megabank Model

A Introductory Remarks

Outside Continental Europe, chiefly Switzerland and Germany, the business model of financial conglomeration that is best manifested by megabanks emerged as late as the 1990s as a result of three factors. First, financial innovation both eroded the traditional boundaries between commercial and investment banking, as a host of derivatives products and financing techniques could be used by both kinds of institutions and created a strong movement towards disintermediation. The latter meant that profit margins became ever thinner for traditional lenders that did not normally engage in capital market activities. At the same time, investment
banks needed an ever larger capital and funding base in order to compete successfully under the new conditions. That larger capital and funding base could be ensured through the merger of an investment bank with a lending institution. Such mergers were seen at the time as the apex of capital optimization in the banking sector; investment banking would bring higher profit margins and commercial banking the wide, cheap, and safe funding basis ensured through acceptance of retail and commercial deposits.

The second reason was the global, and possibly misguided, trend toward financial liberalization, which lied at the heart of economic globalisation, together with trade liberalization. International financial liberalization was achieved through the abolition of national controls over cross-border capital flows and of restrictions over foreign entry to domestic financial services markets. Globalization, in turn, presented big banks and their public regulators with two important challenges: first, how to build big institutions that could compete successfully at the global stage, and, second, by which means this global industry could be regulated? The latter was achieved through the nearly universal endorsement of the prudential regulation standards issued in the last two decades by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).

The third reason was deregulation of the financial services industry in the western world. First, in the United Kingdom, where, unlike the United States, segregation between commercial and investment banking institutions was informal, so called “big bang” of 27 October 1986

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meant the disappearance of traditional stock jobbers. This created a chain reaction, which gradually led to the acquisition of most of the traditional discount houses and merchant banks, either by foreign competitors or large UK commercial banks. The latter meant a huge shift of business culture for the big UK banks, which eventually culminated to the disastrous acquisitions and business policies followed by the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Halifax Bank of Scotland two decades later.

Repealing Glass-Steagall

The United States had in place the last relics of depression era legislation, so called Glass-Steagall Act until 1999. The core sections of the Banking Act of 1933, which referred to banks’ securities operations and were defined as the Glass-Steagall Act, were sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. Section 16, as amended by the Banking Act of 1935, generally prohibited Federal Reserve member banks from purchasing securities for their own account. Sections 16 and 21 also forbade deposit-taking institutions from engaging in the business of “issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stock, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities”, except holdings of U.S. treasury bills and other public sector debt obligations. The Act (section 20) also prohibited member banks from affiliating with a company “engaged principally” in the “issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other


securities”. In fact, cognizant of the scope for conflicts of interest section 32 prohibited a member bank from having interlocking directorships or close officer or employee relationships with a firm “principally engaged” in securities underwriting and distribution, even if there was no common ownership or corporate affiliation between the commercial bank and the investment company.

By the time of its formal repeal in 1999, Glass-Steagall type restrictions had been seriously eroded, especially as regards the ability of commercial banks to acquire securities affiliates, and the trend towards megamergers between financial services institutions had already set in. Considerable effort was put into debunking the historical underpinnings of the Glass-Steagall Act and to showing that the risks and abuses were not as great as its proponents claimed. Yet, the pressure to repeal Glass Steagall did not originate from investment banks but it was more commercial banks’ desire to acquire a slice in lucrative securities underwritings to boost their income.

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13 For example, in June 1988 the U.S. Supreme Court (by denying certiorari) upheld a lower court’s ruling accepting the Federal Reserve Board’s April 1987 approval for member banks to affiliate with companies underwriting commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and securities backed by mortgages and consumer debts, as long as the affiliate does not principally engage in those activities.

14 For example, G. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking (New York, OUP, 1990).
But since mid-1990s the motives for the repeal of the act had become even more sinister and mostly referred to serious gains in terms of stock prices that accrued to megamergers, especially those hailed by “learned” market analyst as augmenting income in the long-term and creating massive economies of scale especially on the sell side. This trend was culminated in the merger of Citicorp (a banking company) with Travellers, a financial conglomerate with several insurance subsidiaries and the securities firm (Salomon Smith Barney) to produce Citigroup. This merger preceded and probably “coerced” the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act. It was followed by the subsequent merger of JP Morgan with Chase Manhattan in 2000. These mergers made megabanks a menacing reality both to competitors and consumers and the financial system.


For the timeline of long efforts to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act and an uncorroborated estimate of the cost of lobbying for the final repeal of the Act in 1999 see Editorial, “The Long Demise of Glass-Stegall, A chronology tracing the life of the Glass-Steagall Act, from its passage in 1933 to its death throes in the 1990s, and how Citigroup’s Sandy Weill dealt the coup de grâce”. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html.


The figures that this consolidation represented in the United States are staggering: “More than 5,400 mergers took place in the U.S. banking industry from 1990 to 2005, involving more than $5.0 trillion in banking assets. In seventy-four of those mergers, both the acquiring bank and the target bank had assets exceeding $10 billion. As a consequence of the bank merger wave, the share of U.S. banking assets held
The EU “Levels” the Playing Field

The same drive toward deregulation, by means, in this case, of harmonization legislation with the explicit intent of levelling the playing field between continental European universal banking and the informally segregated model operated in Britain and in some other EU member states, meant that EU legislation actively promoted the universal bank model. Thus, it fostered the creation of several megabanks in the United Kingdom and rest of Europe, though of a size much smaller than that of their U.S. counterparts.

Liberalization and the dismantling of barriers between commercial and investment banking also meant a large number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, creating large complex financial conglomerates with very strong international business, asset, and deposit base. A major EU measure, ostensibly designed to counteract market risks associated with securities and other activities, was the Capital Adequacy Directive (the CAD). In fact the CAD had as

by the ten largest banks more than doubled, rising from twenty-five percent in 1990 to fifty-five percent in 2005. The three largest U.S. banks – Citigroup, Bank of America (BoFA) and JP Morgan Chase (Chase) – expanded rapidly after 1990, and each bank held more than $1.5 trillion of assets at the end of 2007. Wachovia, the fourth largest U.S. bank, also grew rapidly, and its assets exceeded $780 billion at the end of 2007. Ibid. pp. 975–976. (notes omitted).

The chief example of such EU legislation is the Second Banking Directive 89/646/EEC [1989] OJ L 386/1, replaced by Directive 2006/48/EC [2006] OJ L 177/1 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions. The Second Banking Directive allowed deposit-taking European Banks to also engage in the kind of investment market activities that were usually reserved, at least outside of Germany, for securities firms and non-deposit taking investment banks.

For the full discussion see R. Cranston, Principles of Banking Law (OUP, 2nd ed., 2002), chapter 3.

much to do with competitive concerns as with addressing problems of risk. There was much criticism of this approach for protecting the universal bank from competition from nonbank securities firms.

III. “Unbundling” the TBTF Bank Conundrum

A. Introductory Remarks

It is widely argued that the reason for the oligopolistic and highly concentrated structure of banking markets is that bigger institutions enjoy funding advantages. As explained later this assertion is largely true and also amounts to a clear distortion of competition. At the same time, it is not clear how detrimental is the impact of these distortions on customer welfare. Either way in order to unpick the different elements of the TBTF bank conundrum we best consider first how these banks became TBTF. The rationales for the historical trend toward repeal of legislation that controlled conglomeration and to some extent size have already been discussed. However, it would be unreasonable to assume that the push toward conglomeration was disconnected from


two key shareholder concerns: first, organizational advantages, that is, attainment of economies of scale and scope, and, secondly, capital optimization, namely, maximization of ROE.

In the case of TBTF banks the aforementioned shareholder considerations are inextricably linked to the well-documented funding advantage that TBTF banks enjoy, so-called TBTF subsidy. Thus, in the next few paragraphs I, first, discuss claims and counterclaims in relation to the social utility of TBTF banks. Then, I turn, with the aid of contemporary empirical studies, to discuss the nature of the TBTF subsidy, and the validity of economies of scale and scope assumptions about TBTF banks and the impact of TBTF banks on competition. In this context, I also look at the role of ROE optimization by means of increased leverage of what essentially were failure proof organizations.

Benefits and Disutilities of TBTF Banks

The universal banking model acquired strong supporters among the economics profession in the 1990s and 2000s. It was argued that permitting banks to conduct securities and insurance activities presented several advantages: (a) exploitation of economies of scale and scope in gathering and processing information about firms, (b) risk diversification, (c) building a diversified base of activities leads to a more stable source of income and thus more stable banks, and (d) building reputation capital with clients, and increasing the franchise value of banks and

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thereby augment incentives for banks to behave prudently.\textsuperscript{25} Also it was suggested that restricting the kind of activities a bank may undertake hinders bank development\textsuperscript{26} and thus economic growth.

Arguably, greater diversification of earnings may be associated with more stable, safer, and ultimately more valuable financial institutions. The lower the correlations among the cash-flows from a firm’s various financial intermediation activities, the greater the benefits of diversification.\textsuperscript{27} In principle this should have produced higher credit quality and higher debt ratings (lower bankruptcy risk), therefore lower cost of capital than faced by narrower, more focused firms. Likewise, greater earnings stability should bolster share prices. Key to the business of banking is risk processing and absorption. And confidence in a bank requires it to be safe. Diversification is then needed to be able to absorb risks augmenting bank safety.

But the recent crisis has proven beyond doubt that these welfare gains did not materialize. I postulate that this is due to three reasons none of which is directly related to the TBTF subsidy that will be discussed in the ensuing paragraphs: (a) TBTF banks suffered severe agency

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002), \textit{supra} note 23, pp 31–32.
\item Saunders and Walter (2011).
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\end{footnotesize}
problems; (b) homogenization induced by rational herding and externally imposed capital regulations; and (c) cultural changes.

Agency problems within TBTF banks are caused by three factors. First, shareholders have quite different objectives to those of creditors who will absorb the cost of bank bankruptcy, independently or in addition to any taxpayer costs. Secondly, adverse compensation incentives made bank employees aggressive risk seekers. Thirdly, complexity was a very strong barrier for shareholders or creditors who would be willing to exercise market discipline. Fourthly, lax capital regulations and lack of leverage checks, created incentives to massively expand bank balance sheets through reckless lending, not just in order to inflate profits and pay packages but also for job retention and career advancement purposes. The cumulative impact of agency problems, complexity, and herding was that TBTF multifunctional

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1 See E. Avgouleas, *Governance of Global Financial Markets, the Law, the Economics, the Politics* (CUP, 2012), chapters 2 and 3.


5 Avgouleas and Cullen, Excessive Leverage (2014/5).
banks eventually became, apart from a systemic threat, a serious financial system governance and integrity risk.

Management’s and shareholders’ opportunistic behavior and a marked shift in organizational ethics and culture, which degraded the role of proper risk controls and risk divisions within the bank, and inherent complexity within the multifunctional bank business model eventually meant that TBTF multifunctional banks became very hard to manage and regulate. This assumption explains why TBTF (multifunctional) banks have been at the heart of most contemporary financial scandals, whether it is with respect to rotten advice given to consumers and investors in the context of the subprime crash or the LIBOR and Forex markets’ ringing or alleged money laundering.

The Parliamentary Report on the failure of the HBOS characteristically notes: “The risk function in HBOS was a cardinal area of weakness in the bank…” The degradation of the risk function was an important factor in explaining why the high-risk activities of the Corporate, International, and Treasury Divisions were not properly analyzed or checked at the highest levels within the bank. (Para 64). The weaknesses of group risk in HBOS were “a matter of design, not accident… (Para 65)” (emphasis added). Parliamentary Report 2013, supra note 31.

Ibid. at Para 53.


The trend toward homogeneization, on the other hand, had two potent sources. The first was capital regulations, which provided ample opportunity for regulatory arbitrage inducing symmetric (gaming) behavior by big banks to minimize capital retention. The second was the use of similar risk measurements and risk mitigation techniques, the latter also based on Basel standards. The cumulative effect of regulatory and industry harmonization of capital and risk measurement techniques was homogenization of different business divisions’ income streams, which became dependent on the same markets (e.g., housing) even if the markets and the products sold were much different (e.g., cash mortgages, ABS, CDOs, or CDSs over the ABS). Eventually, all multifunctional banks adopted a “follow the leader” strategy, making them very vulnerable to the first change in the financial winds in 2007, that is, the subprime mortgage crisis.

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A third explanation is a shift in the culture and ethics of the industry that was possibly due to the “contamination” of big commercial banks by the operating and management style of investment banks that led to weakened risk management controls and a persistent focus on ROE. Not a direct consequence of conglomeration but indicative of the casual attitude to risk that it created was the excessive use by banks of asset securitization and the adoption of the hazardous originate-to-distribute model, which meant that megabanks were the principal promoters of subprime mortgages and the key drivers behind their growth to disastrous levels. The notion that risk could be endlessly diversified through “originate-to-distribute” led to a serious relaxation of credit risk controls by originator banks.

Apart from the havoc wreaked on global financial stability and economic welfare by badly shaken TBTF banks during the 2008 turmoil, another major welfare loss that may be attributed to conglomeration is that the financial system did not innovate in a way that would enhance growth and manage household risks. Instead financial innovation was driven by tax and regulatory arbitrage and obfuscated bank balance sheets undermining market discipline and

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Footnotes:


2 For a discussion of the impact of this shift in cultural attitudes in the banking industry see in this volume W. Blair, “Reconceptualizing the Role of Standards in Supporting Financial Regulation”, this volume, Chapter 21; R. Buckley, “The Changing Nature of Banking and Why it Matters”, this volume, Chapter 2.


Having more or less explained the rationale for size and conglomeration in banking markets I turn now to examine whether such arguments hold true on the basis of economic theory (economics of the bank industrial organization) and empirical studies.

\section{Economics of Industrial Organization and the TBTF Bank}

Saunders and Walter note that, on the basis industrial economics theory, “the structural form of firms pursuing economic activity should follow the dictates of institutional comparative advantage. If there are significant economies of scale that can be exploited, it will be reflected in firm size”\footnote{A. Saunders and I. Walter, “Financial Architecture, Systemic Risk, and Universal Banking”, 26 Fin. Markets and Portfolio Mgt 39–59 (2012), p. 48.}. If there are significant economies of scope that can be exploited – either in terms of costs or revenues – it will be reflected in the range of activities in which successful firms are engaged. In principle, if productive linkages can be built across geographies or client segments or business lines, it too will be reflected in the breadth and geographic scope of the underlying drivers of the structure of financial intermediaries.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 41–49.} Namely, in a pure market-driven context, optimum institutional structure is driven by the production functions of financial intermediaries, on the one hand, and preference functions of end users, on the other. Thus, in theory, distortions
in markets for financial intermediation in the form of taxes, explicit or implicit subsidies, and regulatory constraints will alter structural optimization and create efficiency losses in the financial system.

(i). **Building Size: The Economies of Scale Assumption**

In terms of revealed preferences banks present a paradox compared to other forms of business organization: they prefer to combine many different activities instead of focusing on maximization of competitive advantage. This paradox also distinguishes banks from other financial services firms, for example nonbanking financial institutions like mutual funds and finance companies. The latter often choose to specialize and therefore are much more transparent. Adjusting for scale and operating efficiency the range of activities engaged in by financial intermediaries can have both cost and revenue benefits. Sources of scale and scope economies include the following:

i. Information technology-related economies

ii. Reputation and marketing/brand name-related benefits

iii. (Financial) Innovation-related economies

iv. Diversification benefits

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Ibid.

Ibid. p. 50.

Information technology-related economies particularly refer to back-office efficiencies and distribution network-related benefits, at the same time transaction processing offers distinct scale economies. Information technology developments facilitate an increasing array of financial products and services to be offered through the same distribution network, and thus allow for cross selling. Reputation and brand name or marketing-related economies might be present in the joint marketing of products to customers.

On the basis of the foregone discussion, economies of scale within financial conglomerates should have been an undisputable fact. Yet the empirical evidence is as contradictory as the theoretical literature is straightforward. Scale and scope economies in banking have been studied extensively. In general, studies are divided into those which are agnostic, strongly positive, or strongly negative. The result of earlier studies was that economies of scale were exhausted at relatively small-size banks (under ten billion USD in

\[^{51}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{52}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{53}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{54}\text{A. N. Berger, R. S. Demsetz and P. E. Strahan, “The Consolidation of the financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences and Implications for the Future”, 23 Journal of Banking and Finance 135–194 (1999), concluded that, in general, the empirical evidence cannot readily identify substantial economies of scale or scope.}\]
Yet more recent studies point at more persistent scale economies. Wheelock and Wilson (2009) and Feng and Serletis (2010) find increasing returns to scale.

These more recent studies use a different methodology, correcting to some extent possible flaws in earlier studies, but more importantly they utilize more advanced IT technology and wider availability of data, given how much more transparent banks have become since 2008. This is important because it is unclear if earlier researchers had access to information about efficiencies and profitability of individual business division within banks, figures that all big bank management prefers to obfuscate. To this effect, and challenging earlier assumptions, the most recent studies show that size in banking is linked to economies of scale in a variety of contexts and especially improves banks operating costs, understood as noninterest costs like

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For an excellent discussion of these studies see Boot, supra note 50, pp. 23–26.


employee remuneration, cost of premises, IT infrastructure etc. Naturally, evidence of economies of scale is higher in efficiently run versus inefficient banks, exhibiting the value of good and sensible management.

(ii) Conglomeration and Economies of Scope

Unlike most success stories in financial services where focus tends to reap supracompetitive rewards, for example, Goldman Sachs, Euroclear, Blackstone, banks tend to diversify the scope of their activities. As explained earlier, this is in part in order to diversify sources of income. But this is not the only purpose. In the period before 2008 it was consistently argued that conglomeration in the financial sector was motivated by and presented distinct economies of scope. According to Saunders and Walter, “revenue economies of scope in financial intermediation arise when the all-in cost to the buyer of multiple financial services from a single supplier is less than the cost of purchasing them from separate suppliers. This includes search, 

\[\text{It is suggested that quantitatively a 10 per cent increase in assets is associated with 0.3 to 0.6 per cent decline in noninterest expense scaled by income or assets, depending on specification. A. Kovner, J. Vickery and L. Zhou, “Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating Costs?”, 20(2) Federal Reserve Bank of Economic Policy Review, March 2014, 1–44, pp. 221–22. The authors of the aforementioned study have found evidence that lower operating costs are a source of scale economies because large banks spread overheads associated with IT and accounting systems and marketing over a larger asset or revenue base. Id. pp. 2, 12–18, 21 with extensive tables. It is the present author’s view that such detailed studies would not have been possible to prior to 2008. In addition the authors of the aforementioned study are researchers based in the NY Fed, which means they had access to an extensive range of unpublished (nonconfidential) data than authors of earlier studies.}\]

\[\text{Hughes and Mester, supra note 59.}\]
monitoring, and contracting costs”. Financial intermediaries that are diversified could achieve cost reductions by cross-selling as well as selling a broader rather than narrower range of products. At the same time, shared IT platforms, client database, branch networks, as well as data mining constitute a fixed cost that be spread better in a bigger organization.

Accordingly, like economies of scale, cost-related scope economies should be directly observable in production functions of financial services suppliers and in aggregate performance measures. Yet, unlike the mixed to positive picture offered by the aforementioned studies on the relationship between bank size and economies of scale, most empirical studies have failed to find significant cost economies of scope in the banking, insurance or securities industries. On the contrary, there is evidence of diseconomies of scope, which emanate from three sources: new product costs, the diversification discount, and organization complexity that leads to inefficient management and regulatory supervision.

Significant cost-scope economies or diseconomies should be reflected on investor valuations of financial intermediaries and these valuations should, in principle, be an important

Saunders and Walter, supra note 46, p. 51.

Ibid.

For a very comprehensive overview of these studies see Boot, supra note 50, pp. 24–26.

For example, it has been observed that when financial services firms add new product lines and the product range widens, unit-costs seem to go up and not down. Ibid.

The most common meaning of this term is that due to conglomerate’s opaque balance sheets and complex business activities capital markets value the whole of the business less than the sum of its parts. This is in line with corporate finance theory that tells us that investors can choose to diversify and that this does not need to be done at the firm level.
factor (alongside financial stability and consumer welfare) in choosing optimal institutional structures in banking. Yet a strong line of studies point to the opposite direction revealing the existence of a persistent discount in valuations of financial conglomerates. The more recent studies, starting with Laeven and Levine (2007) confirm the existence of a diversification discount in banks that combine lending and nonlending financial services, mostly reflecting potential agency problems and inefficiencies associated with cross-subsidies. Schmid and Walter (2009) confirm the Laeven and Levine (2007) results, and verify that this discount is indeed caused by diversification, and not by inefficiencies that already existed before the diversification.

Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) showed that the interrelation between activities within the conglomerate is of crucial importance. Diversified firms can trade at a premium if the dispersion between activities is low. High dispersion induces inefficiencies, which add credence to the hypothesis that focus adds value to the business of banking. Evidence from capital markets’ reaction to financial sector mergers reinforces this view. DeLong (2001) examined shareholder

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Both studies, using large data panels, have attempted to ascertain whether or not functional diversification is value enhancing or value destroying in the financial services sector and estimate the value-reduction effect at about 20%. Ibid.

gains from focused versus diversifying bank mergers in the United States between 1988 and
1995. Focused mergers, in terms of kind of activity undertaken by the merger firms and
geographic dispersion, were found to result in a positive effect on the immediate
postannouncement share prices. Activity- diversifying mergers had no positive announcement
effects.

The consequences of the rise in agency costs in financial conglomerates have been
evident in the already discussed Libor, FX rigging, and money-laundering scandals. Impossible
to manage and too complex to regulate banking conglomerates turned into a constant integrity
and efficiency risk for the financial system. While the spotlight has fallen on rotten cultures and
ethics within the “chastened” banks, banking conglomerates were likely to encounter several of
the revealed abuses, even in the absence of infractions of ethical standards. Simply put, the
broader the range of financial firm activities, in the presence of imperfect information, the
greater the probability that the firm will encounter conflicts of interest.

Agency costs due to complexity that conglomereration brings means that sooner or later
business lines’ diversification will destroy shareholder and franchise value through a marked rise
in agency costs and inefficient use of capital. Namely, conglomerates tend to use capital
inefficiently and this is independently of the colossal conduct costs that the scandals discussed
earlier brought about in the form of payment billions of dollars in regulatory fines and other

\[^{71}\text{G. DeLong, “Stockholder Gains from Focusing versus Diversifying Bank Mergers”, 59 Journal of}
\text{Financial Economics 221–242 (2001).}\]

\[^{72}\text{Ibid. In the author’s view these results may indicate the presence of scale rather than scope economies}
\text{in banking.}\]
sanctions. Managerial discretion to engage in value-reducing projects, cross-subsidization of marginal or loss-making projects that drain resources from healthy businesses, misalignments in incentives between central and divisional managers seem to be as responsible. In addition, as Boot accurately argues that conglomeration proved an excellent technique to bury trade-related losses in the group balance sheet and it was, thus, mostly favored by senior bank management that came from the investment banking side.

These findings make shareholder preference for conglomeration, or, at least, no resistance to, it even more puzzling. I argue that there is a twofold explanation for this seeming departure from shareholder self-interest maximization. First, conglomeration renders the biggest parts of the financial group TBTF, incentivizing, thus, shareholders to seek leverage and take advantage of the TBTF subsidy. Secondly shareholder preference for/nonresistance to conglomeration in the financial sector may be evidence of the prevalence of bounded rationality even within sophisticated capital market actors.

A very good study by the LSE Bank conduct costs project run by R. McCormick has indicated that conduct costs for the ten world-leading banks in the period between 2008–2012 have neared 150 billion GBP. See for the requisite table the period between 2008–2012 [http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/conductcosts/bank-conduct-costs-results/](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/conductcosts/bank-conduct-costs-results/).


The bulk of value erosion in conglomerates is usually attributed to overinvestment in marginally profitable activities and cross-subsidization. Id.

Boot, supra note 50, pp. 16–20.

In the present author’s view Bob Diamond’s ascent to the top of Barclays PLC is only one instance of proven domination of senior management jobs in big universal banks by investment bankers in the 2000s.
The TBTF Subsidy and Bank Competition

Evidence of the TBTF Subsidy

In general, big systemic banks, so-called too-big-to-fail banks enjoy a strong advantage in terms of costs of funding, which smaller institutions do not. There have been numerous quantitative studies of the “subsidy” provided by the implicit government bail-out guarantee to the larger banks that are too-big-to-fail. The first in a line of several such studies was by Andy Haldane who made the bold claim that direct and indirect state subsidies to big banks amounted to 25 percent of world GDP. This was followed by several others providing similar conclusions, for example, Ueda and Weder-Di Mauro, 2011; Li et al. 2011, with the latest authoritative study finding that the funding discount enjoyed by TBTF banks could rise to as high as (-)1.21 percent (Santos, 2014). The TBTF funding subsidy constitutes a clear distortion of competition.

A. G. Haldane, “On Being the Right Size”, Institute of Economic Affairs, 21 Beesley Lecture, 25 October 2012, p. 4 et seq., available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech615.pdf In fact, Haldane argues that any economies of scale in TBTF banks comes due to the funding advantage ensured by the TBTF subsidy. However, the Kovner et al. study cited in note 57 earlier, which found strong evidence of economies of scale in big banks, measured noninterest operating costs.


Taking advantage of lower funding costs, larger banks can cut margins aggressively, offering new clients better lending terms, to edge out smaller competitors (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011), a clear distortion in terms of playing field. Yet it is unclear if this is the sole or even the main reason for the very high levels of concentration experienced by banking markets in most major economies where banking products and services are offered by a small group of very large banks. Thus, I provide below a more in-depth analysis of issues of competition in the banking sector.

(ii). Bank Competition and Systemic Stability: How Much Competition Is Too Much?

As explained earlier, the banking industry has been building size for at least two decades and the recent forced mergers and acquisitions, in order to avoid bank collapses, have only intensified this phenomenon. It is, however, unclear whether banking markets present highly oligopolistic structures because banking is an industry that offers its services more efficiently through large-size institutions, or because regulatory controls and licensing requirements are so expensive as to deter new entrants from entering the market, especially in the market for retail banking services where the margins for profit can be quite low.

There are two basic hypotheses in the literature on the relationship between financial stability and competition: the franchise value paradigm (competition-fragility view) and the risk-shifting hypothesis (competition-stability view). The competition- fragility view contends that

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\[2\] For analytical discussion of the two hypotheses see M. López-Puertas Lamy, “Commercial banks versus Stakeholder banks: Same business, same risks, same rules?”, mimeo, 2012, pp. 3–6, available at
an increase in competition will hurt bank stability by eroding the franchise value. Based on empirical findings and theoretical simulations these studies postulate that less competitive banking systems are less fragile because the numerous lending opportunities, high profits, capital ratios, and charter values of incumbent banks make them better placed to withstand demand- or supply-side shocks, and provide disincentives for excessive risk taking.

The competition-stability view holds that competition leads to less fragility, because the market power of banks results in higher interest rates for customers, making it more difficult for them to repay loans. The market power of banks results in higher interest rates for customers, making it more difficult for them to repay loans, increasing the possibility of loan default and increasing risk for bank portfolios, making the financial system less stable.

Most recently, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) suggest a nonlinear relationship between bank competition and financial stability, arguing that heightened competition may reduce a borrower’s probability of default (referred to as the risk-shifting effect), but it may also reduce interest payments from performing loans, which serve as a buffer to cover loan losses (referred to as the margin effect). They find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between

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Ibid.

Boyd and De Nicoló, infra note 88.

Ibid.
competition (measured by the number of banks) and bank stability. In highly concentrated markets, the risk-shifting effect dominates and more competition reduces bank risk, while in very competitive markets the margin effect dominates, and increased competition erodes bank franchise value and hence increases risk.

Overall empirical evidence with respect to whether competition enhances or reduces bank stability is mixed. While some researchers find that the risk of bank failure increases in less competitive markets, others find that risk decreases with a rise in the market power of incumbent banks. Berger et al. (2009), using a variety of risk and competition measures from twenty-three countries, provide limited support to both the competition-fragility and competition-stability views. Specifically, they find that market power increases credit risk, but banks with more market power face less risk, overall, which also is in accord with the conclusions of the Jimenez et al. study.

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The view that “too much” competition could undermine instead of fostering financial stability is clearly upheld by IMF experts:\[91\] “Limited competition and strong regulation, which limits banking activities and requires banks to have more equity (i.e., shareholder funds) and more secure investments, can lead to a more secure banking system”.

Ratnovski accurately postulates that this is due to problems of corporate governance. Shareholders face inverse incentives, as they normally wish to pursue profitability at the expense of safety and creditors, turning thus into weak corporate monitors.\[92\] Moreover, complexity of bank business provides yet another obstacle to strengthening shareholders’ role as monitors\[93\] and it may be also an obstacle to shareholders’ pushing for more competition if they do not have an accurate picture of which part of the bank’s business has the highest potential.

Experience shows that Canada and Australia, which were among the least-affected countries by the GFC, were dominated by very few big banks, due to previous crises and older rounds of banking sector consolidation, which increased bank resilience.\[94\] It is disputed, however,

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\[92\] Ibid.

\[93\] See also Avgouleas and Cullen, supra note 7.

that these oligopolies made markets less competitive especially when it came to pricing consumer products. For example, a 2013 IMF paper on the matter shows Australia and Canada presenting medium intensity levels of competition.\footnote{Ratnovski, supra note 91.}

But these observations ought not to be taken too far and up to the point that consumer welfare is detrimentally affected. They just mean that measures to increase competition in banking presuppose that the banking system is already robust to ameliorate any systemic stability impact that enhanced competition may have. As explained in the Vickers Report the banking industry in the United Kingdom (and in other countries) presents higher levels of concentration after the crisis than before, given the merger of major commercial banks in the aftermath of the crisis (e.g., Lloyds Bank with Halifax Bank of Scotland).\footnote{Independent Commission on Banking, “Final Report – Recommendations”, September 2011, p. 16–18 and chapters 6–8, available at \url{https://hmt-sanctions.s3.amazonaws.com/ICB\%20final\%20report/ICB\%2520Final\%2520Report\%5B1\%5D.pdf}.} This ought to be a matter of concern for regulators because the concentration of retail accounts has reached such a level as to restrict consumer choice.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 154–156.} More recently, the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority has conducted a review of the industry and reached some “damning” conclusions.\footnote{The CMA found that: “Essential parts of the UK retail banking sector lack effective competition and do not meet the needs of personal consumers or small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)”. CMA, “CMA consulting on provisional decision to launch an in-depth investigation”, 18 July 2014, \url{www.gov.uk/government/news/personal-current-accounts-and-small-business-banking-not-working-well-for-customers}.} CMA is now

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Ratnovski, supra note 91.}
\item \footnote{Ibid. pp. 154–156.}
\item \footnote{The CMA found that: “Essential parts of the UK retail banking sector lack effective competition and do not meet the needs of personal consumers or small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)”. CMA, “CMA consulting on provisional decision to launch an in-depth investigation”, 18 July 2014, \url{www.gov.uk/government/news/personal-current-accounts-and-small-business-banking-not-working-well-for-customers}.}
\end{itemize}
moving toward a “root and branch” review of the conditions of competition in the UK banking industry.

(iii) Capital Structure “Optimization” and Excessive Leverage

There is ample evidence to show that funding advantages allowed TBTF institutions to expand their balance sheets through leverage and there is sufficient evidence to show that too-big-to-fail banks are prone to take much riskier assets than other banks. It is, however, unclear whether in the absence of leverage restrictions, elimination of TBTF subsidy will radically alter bank management behavior. While Admati, Hellwig, and others accurately point out that bankers are addicted to leverage and they have also overlooked an important element. Shareholder pressure on bank management to build leverage and thus maximize ROE may be the only survival and career-advancement strategy even for the most prudent of bank managers if their competitors are doing the same. I have written on this matter elsewhere and the discussion has


Admati and Hellwig, supra note 29.

Avgouleas and Cullen, Excessive Leverage (2014/5).
been upheld and furthered by the Financial Times in a recent editorial, so no more will be said here.

**Was Glass Steagall Successful?**

While the arguments of its critics proved to have shaky foundations, the financial stability benefits of Glass Steagall have been beyond much doubt. Apart from the crisis in the Savings & Loans sector of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which saw 747 thrift failures (out of 3,234) but did not in the end infect systemic financial institutions covered by the Act, the U.S. financial sector suffered no major crisis during the life of the Act. During the same period the United States saw the failure of only one systemic institution, the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company in 1984.

At the same time, it is hypothesized that the Act, by adding focus, which led to creating high level skills and impetus in the search of new revenues, was, in part, responsible for the progressive dominance of U.S. investment banks in rapidly evolving offshore and onshore capital markets worldwide. The gradual liberalization and integration of global markets since the 1970s also meant that American securities firms progressively dominated the competitiveness tables edging out European universal banking behemoths and their Asian counterparts, which

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103 M. Arnold, “Tale of Two Banks Exposes Pay as Wrong Target of Critics – UK’s Co-op is opposite extreme to Wells Fargo of US”, *FT*, 14 April 2014, available at [www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9a41d96-c3e1-11e3-a8e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3C5WYP7K](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9a41d96-c3e1-11e3-a8e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3C5WYP7K).

had traditionally enjoyed intimate relationships with domestic corporates and governments.\textsuperscript{105} Glass Stegall is also credited the impetus for the development of “global buy-side” markets, comprising insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutional investors, by U.S. investment banks that provided buy-side participants with new investment alternatives. It is validly assumed that had Glass Steagall not been in place after 1933, the lack of competitive pressure would have affected the global competitiveness and drive to innovate that U.S. investment banks subsequently showed, especially after the mid-1970s.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that the true impetus to amend and eventually repeal the Act did not come from the SEC regulated broker-dealer sector but rather it was the through pressure by large U.S. commercial banks\textsuperscript{106} whose participation in global capital markets and especially in the lucrative securities underwriting market was restricted even after the 1956 amendments, which allowed commercial banks to maintain a limited purpose securities subsidiary. Commercial banks, which already competed “vigorously with investment banks in government bond, foreign exchange, and other traded markets as well as corporate advisories” argued that Glass Steagall restrictions on their securities activities placed them at a competitive disadvantage. Namely, the principal factor behind the disastrous repeal of Glass Steagall was greedy commercial bank shareholders rather than a nefarious Wall Street conspiracy.

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{105} Ibid. Saunders and Walter accurately note: “By the early 1990s American investment banks basically dominated their industry worldwide, with a market share approaching 75% in terms of transactions volume. As a consequence, investment banking developed into one of the top U.S. export industries”. Id.
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\footnotesize\textsuperscript{106} Saunders and Walter name as the principal agitators Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan and Citicorp. Saunders and Walter (2011), pp. 45–47.
\end{flushright}
Summary of Findings

The presence of significant economies of scale associated with bank size are not a sufficient reason to allow banks to expand their balance sheets, normally though leverage, to the point that they threaten financial stability. But even if there is a trade-off between efficiencies-driven bank size and financial stability, the studies discussed earlier showed no evidence of any efficiencies attained through conglomeration. On the contrary, as Glass Steagall’s impact on the competitiveness of the U.S. investment banking sector and the examples of important financial services firms like Blackrock, Euroclear, and large hedge funds have shown, focus pays off in banking as in most other industries. In contrast, conglomeration, in the name of unproved income diversification, seems to bring intolerable costs. These include the diversification discount and over-stretching management and regulatory ability to the point that universal bank behemoths become a constant social and financial stability risk.

Moreover, all evidence points to the direction that systemic risk cannot be contained in large diversified banks. On the contrary a number of studies, e.g., Richardson, Smith, and Walter (2010) conclude that “expansion to multiple functions – the LCFI (large, complex financial institution) model – produces greater systematic risk”. Their conclusion echoes an extensive line of studies pointing to the same direction, including more recently De Jonghe (2010) and

[108] Ibid.
theoretical work by Wagner (2010). It follows that, in the absence, of any strong evidence in favour of conglomerate formation, structural reform is a good way to respond to interconnectedness in financial markets. This is an issue that I will further discuss in the next section.

**IV. Dealing with the TBTF Bank**

**A. Special Resolution Regimes and Structural Reform**

Implementation of special resolution schemes and structural reform rather than enhanced competition have been the main prongs of government and regulators’ approach to resolving the TBTF problem. Special resolution regimes for financial institutions, in general, as is the case with the EU Bank Resolution Directive, or just for systemically important institutions, as is the case with the Dodd Frank OLA, target TBTF moral hazard from two very important routes.

First, by removing legal obstacles to resolution, by means of derogation from general company and insolvency law safeguards and procedures, and by minimizing the risk of contagion, special resolution regimes purportedly secure the orderly failure of a TBTF bank, without damaging confidence in the financial system or disrupting the provision of essential payment and other services by the failing institution. Secondly, through the use of bail-in clauses, special resolution regimes attempt to force TBTF bank funders (shareholders & creditors) to internalize the risk of failure of systemic banks, namely, to curb the externalities caused by

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11 One of the Act’s explicit aims, as stated in its preamble, is: “to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”. Thus, under section 204(a) (1) of the Dodd Frank Act creditors and shareholders bear all the losses of the financial company that has entered OLA.
risk-seeking banks. It is expected that such bail-in regimes will make bank shareholders and more importantly creditors better corporate monitors minimizing excessive risk seeking. ¹¹²

Structural reform, on the other hand, has, in general, taken two forms. First, the Vickers model that seeks to both shelter (ring-fence) the commercial banking part of the group from risks arising in the investment banking part of the group and battle interconnectedness, due to limitations it imposes on the activities the ring-fenced bank can undertake. ¹¹³ The commercial banking subsidiary will remain part of the group subject to strict corporate governance safeguards. The second model (the Volcker Rule) amounts to an outright restriction on licensed commercial bank groups to engage in proprietary trading and shadow banking activities, namely, the riskiest parts of investment banking business. Thus, the Volcker Rule (s. 619 of the Dodd Frank Act) includes a ban on “proprietary trading” and “investing” and “sponsoring” a “covered fund”, a term that extends to a variety of shadow banking vehicles and beyond. A banking entity “invests” in a “covered fund” if it acquires or retains any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in a hedge fund or a private equity fund.

Both Volcker rule and Vickers separation models present some distinct advantages when it comes to battling interconnectedness. In addition, revised Basel capital and liquidity


¹¹³ The best example is the UK’s new ring fencing regime based on the recommendation of the Vickers Report which were implemented by means of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, c. 33.
requirements are bound to add further resilience and insert a more long-term perspective in the funding sources of commercial banks.

Yet structural reform may not resolve, on its own, the TBTF conundrum. While structural separation of different forms of banking is essential for financial stability yet the optimum model is rather elusive. For example, both the Vickers and Volcker models of structural separation are characteristically discomforted by the most challenging part of banking: wholesale lending. Also the circumstances surrounding the already discussed repeal of Glass Steagall and the EU “level the playing field” legislation have shown how vulnerable is structural legislation to political economy risks. There is always the possibility that due to groupthink or regulatory capture, driven by industry self-interest, one day politicians will turn back the clock to recent structural reforms and conglomeration and financial stability risk will re-emerge.

Finally, fractional reserve banking works on trust and any important endogenous or exogenous shock is capable of triggering a panic, in the absence of fiscal backstops. To this effect a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative full reserve banking and of the two best-known models of narrow/limited purpose banking, both proposed by prominent economists, is very apposite here.

**Full Reserve Narrow/Limited Purpose Banking**

Chamley, Kotlikoff, and Polemarhakis have argued that “[b]anks collapse for one reason – they are leveraged. Hence, limiting proprietary information, that is, providing much more disclosure and transparency, and eliminating leverage are the key to having a stable, well-functioning
financial system”. Thus Kotlikoff and Chamley have proposed a full reserve alternative. The essence of their proposal is that all limited liability financial intermediaries should be treated identically, regardless of organizational form. Namely, all commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity funds, credit unions would have to operate as mutual fund holding companies that issue 100 percent equity-financed open- and closed-end mutual funds. Total lack of leverage would mean that different institutions and the financial system as whole would never fail. Shadow banking vehicles will be allowed to

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117 Their proposal has been summarized as follows:

1. All financial companies protected by limited liability can market just one thing – mutual funds.
2. Mutual funds are not allowed to borrow, explicitly or implicitly, and, thus, can never fail.
3. Cash mutual funds, which are permitted to hold only cash, are used for the payment system.
4. Cash mutual funds are the only mutual funds backed to the buck.
5. Tontine-type mutual funds are used to allocate idiosyncratic risk.
6. Pari-mutuel mutual funds are used to allocate aggregate risk via direct or derivate betting.
7. The Federal Financial Authority (FFA) hires private companies working only for it to verify, appraise, rate, custody, and disclose, in real time, all securities held by mutual funds.
8. Mutual funds buy and sell FFA-processed and disclosed securities at auction. This ensures that issuers of securities, be they households or firms, receive the highest price for their paper. Chamley et al. (2012).
carry leverage but as they would be unlimited liability entities, any losses would fall on their owners.

Full reserve limited purpose banking is not without its own intractable problems. For example, how would full reserve limited purpose banks defend themselves from a depositor flight when competing “shadow banks” offer reasonable and safely higher interest, while they are themselves constrained to do so by the fact that their reserves would be fully invested in low yielding instruments? Moreover, not all “shadow banks” will be the same. What if imprudent depositors start chasing illusionary high returns from Chinese type investment trusts, rendering unregulated retail shadow banks the order of the day. Of course, Kotlikoff et al. note that shadow banking entities will have to be unlimited liability vehicles. However, this, in effect, means very little. Will regulators be able to check if owners’ equity is enough to cover the shadow banks’ liabilities? If yes then the “shadow banks” are now “regulated banks” in some jurisdictions. Then how are we supposed to avoid – disastrous in this case – regulatory arbitrage by shadow banks in the absence of a global regulatory system and a global regulator, which may be politically unfeasible for some time?

Professor Kay has suggested a different form of full reserve narrow banking. This would involve the spinoff of big bank’s proprietary trading business, because this business differs only in scale from their treasury operations, which are both necessary and legitimate. As a result, Kay proposed a division between narrow banks accepting retail deposits, which should preferably be invested in risk-free government bonds and would only provide payment and other

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utility banking services and all other financial business. The latter could be deregulated and freed from microprudential regulation.

Professor Kay’s model also presented intractable difficulties. First, under the Kay model most forms of lending that could create an asset bubble such as mortgage or big business lending would be conducted by the unregulated or quasiregulated sector, perpetuating the risks that led to the global financial crisis, such as the too-big-to-fail problem. Also, leaving risky lending to the unregulated sector would mean that unequipped financing vehicles would have to assume risks that commercial banks are much better equipped to handle.

Another loophole of Kay’s model is the constantly fluctuating state of sovereign bond markets. As the Asian and Eurozone crises have shown, these assets are as unsafe as any. In addition, there may be inadequate supply of such instruments to cover the entire stock of insured deposits in any given country, as is the case with the United Kingdom.

Arguably, there is no way around either problem, and Kay’s suggestion for the government to issue additional gilts to on-lend to narrow banks “would essentially mean the nationalization” of credit risk. Finally, Kay’s model is even more vulnerable to unlicensed competitors (e.g., money market funds) offering higher interest rates to existing and potential depositors as the suggested narrow banks’ assets would attract the traditionally lower sovereign bond yields rather than the superior corporate bond interest rates.

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Kay suggested that funds for these activities would be raised from wholesale markets, securitisations and own capital, instead of retail deposits. Ibid.

Yet, what is discussed earlier does not mean that the introduction of narrow banking vehicles, which combine both equity and debt financing through the capital markets, in parts of the financial system, would be out of place. On the contrary, especially when it comes to credit markets like mortgage lending, where leverage has a massive impact on the real economy, and a feedback effect on financial stability, due to the volatility of housing markets, if their rates were competitive, such narrow banking vehicles would remove a very substantial source of instability from the financial system.

V. Conclusion

Saunders and Walter have observed that in a pure market context, optimum institutional structure in the financial sector should be driven by the production functions of financial intermediaries and the preferences of end users. In practice financial institutions become larger or smaller, broader or narrower than what is optimal for the intermediation tasks to be performed. This is mostly due to distortions in markets for financial intermediation in the form of taxes, explicit or implicit subsidies, and regulatory constraints. Two prominent such distortions are the TBTF subsidy and the preferential tax treatment of debt that affects the structure of bank capital. Lots of questions had been left unaddressed for a long time. Is bigger better? Is broader better? Both


Ibid.

questions have no easy answers. We need to consider them in the context of financial stability, client welfare, shareholder value, regulatory effectiveness, and oversocial utility.

Issues of financial stability and consumer welfare ought to be addressed first. As explained earlier there are strong arguments against excessive competition in the banking sector, as margins could be eroded leading to reckless risk taking. As regards consumer welfare, a good example is the TBTF subsidy. This amounts to abuse of stronger competitive position. So in theory there ought to be welfare losses emanating from the discussed funding cost squeeze on competition. While these are still to be measured, it may also be the case that the TBTF subsidy translates into gains for consumers, as banks pass on their funding advantage to their customers, primarily in the shape of lower interest rates. In addition, the subsidy makes TBTF banks more attractive to capital market investors and thus easier to raise fresh capital. Therefore, whether bigger and broader is better in banking has no easy answers, notwithstanding the all-pervasive issue of moral hazard and the ever present threat of shifting the burden of imprudent bank management to the taxpayers via expensive bailouts.

TBTF banks were rightly castigated as the main culprits of the GFC and attempts to put an end to them and thus to public bailouts are properly guided from a public-interest perspective.

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125 Both points are intellectual loans from a previous paper I authored jointly with Charles Goodhart and he deserves most of the credit for raising them.

Moreover, the preservation of fractional reserve banking faces colossal challenges beyond the possibility of a run. The quest for optimal bank organization and ending the TBTF problem may not be separated from the fact that such banks operate on the basis of a fractional reserve system that may require fiscal backstops to eliminate the possibility of multiple runs. By offering a clear model of limited purpose banking, Kotlikoff, Kay and others have highlighted leverage as the problem. However, as explained already, full reserve limited purpose/narrow banking model is fraught with intractable problems itself. These refer to the economics and mechanics of credit supply being very vulnerable to both predatory and bona fide competitors offering better rates. Accordingly, it is the duty of epistemic and regulatory communities to identify one or a number of optimal structural models, which ought to also target the boundary problem and foster long-term growth. Higher capital requirements and especially leverage controls have lots of potential to make banks more stable and the establishment of tailor-made resolution regimes amounts to a significant step to avert the panic that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

Nonetheless, assumptions about the power of post-2008 resolution regimes to internalize the cost of bank failures, eliminating TBTF moral hazard and attendant competitive distortions,

See also D. Schoenmaker, “A Fiscal Backstop to the Banking System”, Duisenberg School of Finance Mimeo, June 2014.

An excellent exposition of the border problem is offered in C. Goodhart, “How Should We Regulate the Financial Sector?”, in A. Turner et al., The Future of Finance and the Theory that Underpins It (LSE, 2010), chapter 5, pp. 176–179.

contain a considerable amount of wishful thinking, until proven otherwise. Especially in the context of big international bank resolution, limited fiscal backstops will remain, under different guises. Perhaps this limited fiscal prop on ring-fenced or segregated banks is the cost that society is asked to pay for the benefit of fractional reserve banking. And this will probably remain the case until another organizational form emerged, which would replace fractional reserve banks as providers of liquidity (virtually) on demand and would answer, at the same time, most of the questions raised so far regarding financial stability, competition, and consumer welfare. Hopefully, any such model would bring within the regulatory umbrella, even in part, shadow-banking activities and would accentuate the importance of long-term growth finance for financial stability.

Avgouleas and Goodhart, supra note 112.