From traders to caliphs

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Abstract: When viewed prosopographically the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs as recorded within the Arabic genealogical literary tradition present us with a compelling insight into the evolution of the early Islamic polity. Following a brief outline of the methodology this paper will then extract the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons and use these data to illustrate trends in marriage behaviour over the course of their dynastic reign. This will then be compared to the marriage behaviour of two other cohorts: those of Muḥammad and the early Muslims, and those of the Quraysh of Muḥammad’s father’s generation. By comparing the behaviour of these three groups we will demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology, the accuracy of the source material and ultimately develop our narrative of Islamic history prior to the fall of the Umayyads.

Keywords: Marriage; social history; historiography; Late Antiquity; Quraysh; Umayyads

The idea that prosopographical approaches might tell us something new about the history of early Islam\(^1\) is long established; Leone Caetani began his *Onomasticon Arabicum* a century ago and the intervening years have witnessed a steady flow of

\(^1\) For the purposes of this paper ‘early Islam’ is defined as the period from Muḥammad’s birth to 750 CE.
prosopographical studies.\textsuperscript{2} Interest in this approach is in part due to the nature of the sources themselves (the historiographies record a lot of names) but it is also a reflection of the direction taken by the academic study of early Islamic history. The pertinent trend here is the widespread belief amongst modern scholars that our default position when reading the traditional historical sources should be one of scepticism when it comes to the question of whether or not these sources are telling us anything reliable about the events they recount. The appeal of prosopography in this context is that it can discern within these sources trends and patterns that would not have been visible to the historians who transmitted and recorded the information. Their invisibility to those best placed to manipulate them means that these data are more likely to have been the product of actual historical events rather than a byproduct of the historiographical forces that have so clearly left their impression on the narrative traditions as a whole.\textsuperscript{3}

But although the results of these efforts have on occasion been influential for the most part the approach has been beset with problems. Too often the ambition of the investigator has outstripped their ability to manage the data and the amount of time involved in gathering the datasets has frequently failed to repay the investment.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{2}‘Prosopography’ here is defined as ‘the study of the collective lives of a historical group’.

\textsuperscript{3}These strands can be seen coming together in 1980 when Patricia Crone argued that “early Islamic history has to be almost exclusively prosopographical” (emphasis hers). Patricia Crone, \textit{Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of the Islamic Polity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{4}For the \textit{Onomasticon}’s troubled history see Charles Müller, \textit{Onomasticon Arabicum-online: a Historical Survey}, 2012, http://onomasticon.irht.cnrs.fr/bundles/irhtoafront/pdf/The_Project.pdf (accessed 29 June 2015); more successful (yet somewhat controversial) early examples include
There are signs however that the situation is changing. A number of scholars in recent years have taken the prosopographical approach and been more successful in applying it to the Islamic sources; notable amongst these are Maxim Romanov, Teresa Bernheimer and Asad Ahmed whose publications – when added to the precursor works of Carl Petry, John Nawas, Salih Said Agha and Michael Ebstein – add up to something of a movement within the field of pre-modern Islamic history and it is into this context that the present study fits.\(^5\)

In a counterpart paper it was shown that we can take a single data-category (child-bearing marriages) from a single source and analyse it longitudinally to demonstrate trends in early Islamic history.\(^6\) These trends demonstrate remarkable concurrence with the broad historical narratives of early Islamic origins and this can only be explained through the accuracy of the source material and the efficacy of the methodology. This paper will extend this study to look at the same data on a smaller scale; this will provide further evidence for the accuracy of the source material and the potency of the methodology, but will also show us that we can use the same


\(^{6}\) “Statistical Approaches to the Rise of Concubinage in Islam”, in *Courtesans and Concubines*, eds. Matthew Gordon and Kathryn Hain (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming); the counterpart paper also contains a fuller explanation of the methodology.
methodology to look at intergenerational change. In addition to this, we will also seek to demonstrate another (and hitherto under-explored) benefit of mass-data approaches which is their ability to create data visualisations. These visualisations are not only useful for explaining complex ideas to non-specialist audiences, but they can also provoke further research directions that would otherwise have remained hidden.

Source material:

Our principle source for this study is the *Nasab Quraysh* of al-Zuabyrī (d. 851).\(^7\) This is ostensibly\(^8\) the genealogy of the Quraysh tribe who are traditionally defined as being the descendants of Fihr, who was born 11 generations before Muḥammad. A typical entry in this book looks like the following:

“ʿAbd Allāh al-Aṣghar (the younger) b. Wahb b. Zamʿa was born to a concubine (*umm walad*) ... his wife was Karīma bt. al-Miqdād b. ʿAmrū al-Bahrānī, whose mother was Ḍubāʿa bt. Zubayr b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. She (Karīma) gave birth to: al-Miqdād b. ʿAbd Allāh who had no descendants and was killed at the battle of Ḥarra; Wahb b. ʿAbd Allāh who had no descendants.

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\(^8\) This qualification is necessary because the author has clearly done some editing: his interest wanes as he approaches his own era; he includes many more men than women; there is a bias towards families based in the Ḥijāz; and he as ‘forgotten’ to mention some of his own relatives who were involved in an anti-ʿAbbāsid uprising.
and was killed at the battle of Ḥarra; and Yaʿqūb, Abū al-Hārith, Yazīd, and Zubayr, the sons of ‘Abd Allāh al-Aṣghar b. Wahb”.

Although this is one of the simpler entries we can already see that there is an enormous amount of information recorded within it: we have the maternal origin of the father as being a concubine; we have the tribal affiliation of his wife; we are told that two sons definitely had no progeny; and we are told in which battle they were killed. But for the purposes of this investigation we are only interested in one category, and that is the child-bearing marriage\(^\text{10}\) behaviour of the individuals recorded.

The selection of marriage behaviour is justified on a number of grounds. First, we have reason to believe it is accurate; child-bearing marriages produce large numbers of ‘stakeholders’ keen to maintain the memory of a particular union.\(^\text{11}\) Second,

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\(^\text{9}\) Al-Zubayrī, *Nasab Quraysh*, p. 228.

\(^\text{10}\) For the purposes of this paper a ‘marriage’ is a ‘child-bearing marriage’ unless otherwise stated.

marriages occurred over an extensive period of time which makes them suitable for longitudinal study. Finally, marriage is a useful data category because – as will be shown in this paper – it has the capacity to tell us something interesting about the Quraysh in the pre-ʿAbbāsid era.

By extracting the data from the *Nasab Quraysh* we end up with a database containing nearly 3,000 individuals for whom we know the nature of the relationship that brought them into existence. Thanks to Arabian naming practices we automatically know where the father fits into the genealogical tree; mothers can be a little more problematic but in most cases we can establish her tribal affiliation unless she is a concubine (*umm walad*).

This in itself shows us what a remarkable source the *Nasab Quraysh* is; to this author’s knowledge no other pre-modern historical source contains such a detailed wealth of marriage behaviour. But we can do more than establish the *Nasab Quraysh* as a historiographical curiosity – we can also show how the work can intersect with our existing scholarly narratives of Qurashī history from the second half of the sixth century to the end of the Umayyad dynasty. To do this however we must overcome the major hurdle that is dating.

Structuring the data

data within al-Zubayri’s work would therefore indicate that they are drawn directly from sources recorded while the unions in question were still well-remembered.
The *Nasab Quraysh* contains almost no dates of births, marriages or deaths.

Occasionally we can date a death to the unfortunate outcome of battle participation, but incidents of this type tend to be restricted to the conquest era and do not tell us what age the individual was when he died (which would be useful as an indicator of when the parental union was active).

The proposed solution to this difficulty is to look at the data generationally. This is possible because the data points are all (by definition) connected to men who are related to a common ancestor and we can use this to create generational cohorts from the mass of data. The numbering in this schema is structured around the figure Quṣayy b. Kilāb who, according to the traditional historical narrative, established the Quraysh in Mecca and is our Generation 0.12 Muḥammad, therefore, would be Generation 5 (his lineage being Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd Muṭṭalib b. Hāshim b. ‘Abd Manāf b. Quṣayy). If a Qurashī is not descended from Quṣayy we simply go back to their shared ancestor and count from there. For example, Abū Bakr’s shared ancestor with Quṣayy is Murra and as Murra is Quṣayy’s grandfather this means Abū Bakr is of Generation 5. This is illustrated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Lineage 1</th>
<th>Lineage 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Murra</td>
<td>Murra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 The selection of Quṣayy rather than Muḥammad is for clarity because any discussion of the Prophet’s era would lead to numerous references to -1s, 0s and 1s which can be confusing when embedded in text.
It is important to note that although the two men are separated from their common ancestor by seven generations, they still fall within the same generational cohort.

This argument for the accuracy of the genealogical data is maintained when we look at some other prominent early Muslims:

Table 2: Generational distances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Degree of separation</th>
<th>Estimated years separation from common ancestor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Alī b. Abū Ṭālib</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ṭalḥa b. ‘Ubayd Allāh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[13\] This calculation assumes a generational distance of 30 years; this is a problematic figure but is based on our best current studies (Shuichi Matsumura and Peter Forster, “Generation Time and Effective Population Size in Polar Eskimos”, *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 275/1642 (2008): 1501–1508)).
With this generational structuring in place, we can visualise the marriage data diachronically. The graph below illustrates the number of children born by generation and differentiates between children born of concubines and those born of free women:¹⁴

Graph 1: Total children born vs. children born of concubines

This graph shows us that the emergence of slave women as the mothers of Qurashi children coincides begins in Generation 3 and peaks with the cohorts of men who were involved in the Arab conquests. In the absence of any evidence that

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¹⁴ When discussing concubines we are forced to discuss numbers of children born rather than number of child-bearing unions; this is because the *Nasab Quraysh* frequently gives us lists of children born to a particular man and states only that they were born to ‘concubines’. This is not the case with free women who are always named and explicitly linked to their progeny.
historiographical distortion could have created this concurrence, the link between the historical narrative and the statistical analysis proves that at least some elements of the marriage data within the *Nasab Quraysh* are accurate and that the generational structuring as proposed above works successfully.\(^{15}\)

**Marriages of the *Nasab Quraysh***

With our arguments in place for the veracity of the data, and equipped with a robust means of temporally structuring these data, we are now in a position to look at a more complex type of marriage beyond the concubine/freewoman distinction – namely marriages differentiated by the tribal origins of the wives. It will quickly be seen that even adding a small amount of information to this basic data category adds multiple layers of complications and as such we will progress carefully by focusing on small cohorts of marriages. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to fully explore the complexities of the marriages in relation to our methodology which will hopefully prove useful for future investigations using prosopographical approaches; the small size of the cohorts does however mean that the resulting findings should be considered as indicative rather than conclusive.

Our starting point here is the final point of the counterpart paper which looked at the 56 child-bearing marriages made by the Umayyad caliphs and their sons over a span of four generations. It showed that as the family progressed through time the number

\(^{15}\) This is discussed in greater detail in “Statistical Approaches”. 
of children produced by concubines increased over time from under 10 percent of all children fathered by the first generation of caliphs to nearly 60 percent in the generation of their great-grandsons. Concurrent with this increasing exogamy however there was increasing endogamy when they married Arab women; of the 29 marriages by the final two generations of Umayyad caliphs and their sons 25 were made to Umayyad women and only two were to Arab women from outside the Quraysh. In the first two generations however, of the 27 marriages only six were made to Umayyad women. Of the remainder, 15 were to other Qurashī brides and a further six to non-Qurashī Arab women.

These figures were used in the counterpart paper to place the Umayyad marriages in the wider context of increasing concubinage within the Islamic polity; it was argued that the forces that engendered increasing exogamy (i.e. concubinage) were the same that instigated increasing endogamy (i.e. cousin marriage). But as concubinage is intimately linked with the influx of slave women that came with the first Arab invasions it can tell us little about marriage behaviour before Islam. In order to complete this part of the picture we will therefore compare the 56 full marriages of the Umayyads and their sons with those made by earlier generations to see if here too we can discern further trends within the data. If these trends can be illustrated it will be further evidence of the quality of the *nasab* data and the efficacy of the methodology; it will also place Umayyad caliphal marriage in the context of the pre-Islamic and Prophetic Ḥijāz.
In order to do this the marriage behaviour of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons will be compared to those of two earlier cohorts that made roughly the same number of marriages. The first cohort investigated in terms of chronology will be that of the fourth generation male descendants of Quṣayy (i.e. the men of Muḥammad’s father’s generation and those of Umayya’s sons) and is intended to give us a snapshot of marriage as it occurred amongst the Quraysh before the arrival of Islam. By extracting every child-bearing union made by these men to a woman of known tribal affiliation we end up with a database comprising 53 marriages.

The second cohort consists of the men at the heart of the Islamic project in its formative years: Muḥammad, the first four caliphs, and the Companions Talḥa, Zubayr, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf and Saʿd b. Abū Waqqās (according to the traditional historical sources these latter four were potential caliphs thanks to their appointment to ʿUmar’s shūra). The Nasab Quraysh preserves 52 child-bearing marriages made by this group to women of known tribal groupings. This cohort is intended to indicate how the arrival of Islam changed the patterns of Qurashī marriage.

Our final cohort consists of the aforementioned marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons. The number of marriages undertaken by this group is similar to those of the other two cohorts (56) but extends over a far longer period in time (four generations). This should not be an issue as our purpose here is to put the
marriages into wider context; like-for-like claims will hence only be made with reference to necessary caveats.

Marriages will be grouped into three categories; Lineal, non-Lineal and non-Qurashī. ‘Lineal’ refers to a marriage made by a man with a woman from the same segment of the Quraysh (this could be defined as ‘cousin marriage’); ‘Non-Lineal’ refers to a marriage made by a man to a Qurashī woman outwith his segment; and ‘non-Qurashī’ refers to a marriage made to a woman from a non-Qurashī tribe. Given that tribal segments emerge and disappear over time, what is meant by the ‘Lineal’ and ‘Non-Lineal’ categories must be explained for each cohort.

Cohort 1: The pre-Islamic Quraysh

This cohort includes all the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy who are recorded in the Nasab Quraysh as having had children with named women. Only one individual had children with concubines – this was ‘Abbās b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib (Muḥammad’s uncle and ancestor of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty). This makes sense when we consider that he outlived his nephew Muḥammad by over 20 years which would have given him access to the first wave of slave women coming from the Arab conquests. ‘Lineal’ in this category includes all women who were descended from Quṣayy. The dataset of child-bearing marriages yields the table below:

Table 3: Cohort 1 marriages
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All wives of known tribal affiliation</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Qurashī</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lineal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohort 2: Prominent early Muslims

This dataset incorporates: the childbearing marriages of Muḥammad; the childbearing marriages of the first four caliphs (Abū Bakr, ‘Umar b. Khaṭṭāb, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān and Alī b. Abū Ṭālib); and the child-bearing marriages of the four men who were reputedly appointed to the shūra established by the caliph ʿUmar to select his successor from amongst their number (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf, Ṭalḥa b. ‘Ubayd Allāh, Zubayr b. ‘Awwām, and Saʿd b. Abū Waqqās). These latter eight men were all early converts from the Meccan period, and were either caliphs or could potentially have been caliphs. They are hence intended to represent the behaviour of the inner-circle of the Prophetic polity.

‘Lineal’ marriages in this category refers to marriages within the segment of the Quraysh which the husband belongs to. So for Abū Bakr and Ṭalha this would be a marriage within Taym b. Murra; for ‘Umar it would be a marriage within ‘Adī b. Kaʿb;
for Saʿd b. Abū Waqqās and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān it would be within Zuhra; and for Muḥammad, ‘Alī and Zubayr it would be marriage to other descendants of Quṣayy.16

Table 4: Cohort 2 marriages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Arab wives of known tribal affiliation</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Qurashiū</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lineal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohort 3: The Umayyad caliphs and their sons

16 This latter category was of course not a recognised grouping of the Quraysh at the time of the Prophet and it may be objected that ‘Alī and Muḥammad should more accurately be considered part of Hāshim. The issue with defining lineage at this granularity however is that sub-groups of this size appeared and disappeared in line with politics and could potentially be the constructs of later historians; although we might be relatively secure with Hāshim we may not be so confident with similar sized groups in other parts of the Quraysh. We must also make an effort to equalise the size of the various sub-groups otherwise we may think certain men are marrying out at a higher rate than normal for socio-political reasons when the actual cause is the small number of women available to them.
This final cohort consists of the child-bearing marriages of those men that made it to the political summit of Islamic society during the Umayyad period. For this cohort ‘Lineal’ refers to marriages made with Umayyad women (e.g. women descended from Umayya b. ‘Abd Shams) while ‘Non-Lineal’ refers to marriages made with women from any other Qurashī segment.

Table 4: Cohort 3 marriages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife’s tribal affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All wives of known tribal affiliation</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Qurashī</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lineal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis

Looking at the three cohorts side-by-side we can see how marriage patterns evolved from the pre-Prophetic era to the time of the ʿAbbāsid revolution:

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17 The inclusion of sons is defensible given the power the caliphs would have had over the marriages of their children. See Kecia Ali, *Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 32.
Table 5: Comparison of marriages across Cohorts 1, 2 and 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife affiliation</th>
<th>Cohort 1</th>
<th>Cohort 2</th>
<th>Cohort 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Qurashi</td>
<td>43.40%</td>
<td>63.46%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lineal</td>
<td>26.42%</td>
<td>21.15%</td>
<td>30.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineal</td>
<td>30.19%</td>
<td>15.39%</td>
<td>55.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from this preliminary analysis that the category of marriages that fluctuates the least is the ‘Non-Lineal’; i.e. marriages made to Qurashi women from outside the particular marriage segment of the husband. It is somewhat higher in the Umayyad period with 17 marriages made to non-Umayyad Qurashi (though four of these are descendants of ‘Abd Shams, the father of Umayya). The smallest number of marriages to Non-Lineal Quraysh are made in the Prophetic period which may seem a surprise given that these nine men came from four different segments and the marital links between the men has often been noted. While this is indeed true it needs to be placed in the context that these men married a lot of other women too; of the 52 child-bearing marriages they made to Arab women the *Nasab Quraysh* records only six that were made to other members of the cohort.

It is instead exogamy that is the most striking element of the Prophetic cohort’s marriage behaviour, with nearly two thirds of their child-bearing marriages being made to women who were not Qurashi and - when compared to the behaviour of their father’s generation - it appears that this was at the expense of marrying women
from their own lineages. This exogamy becomes all the more noteworthy when we contrast it with the marriage behaviour of the Umayyads amongst whom marriage to non-Qurashī women becomes incredibly infrequent.

Like concubinage, trends of marriages to non-Qurashī women track the broad historical narrative. The increase we see in the Prophetic cohort corresponds to historical reports of their ostracisation from the Quraysh (which included a marriage ban) and their new ideology with respects to what constituted a tribe (namely one delineated by profession of Islam rather than ancestry). The decline we see in the Umayyad period is also clearly linked to the emergence of an increasingly distant elite that no longer needed to marry into the leading families of the Islamic project in order to maintain their authority; we correspondingly see an increase in the number of deracinated women being brought in from outside the Muslim world (e.g. concubines). These changes confirm the findings of the counterpart investigation into concubinage; the transition from tribal kingdom to Islamic empire was not swept in with the ʿAbbāsids but part of an evolutionary development with which the Umayyad dynasty had long been engaging.

Until this point we have proceeded with deliberate caution by focusing on the broadest of marriage categories and most uncontroversial of historical events. The result has been a striking degree of correlation given the novelty of the methodology and the problematic nature of the source material. This provides further argument that the *Nasab Quraysh* is a uniquely useful source and - when analysed
prosopographically - can give us an account of marriage trends as they actually occurred amongst the Quraysh before the end of the Umayyad dynasty.  

This provides us with a platform to begin looking at more complicated relationships and also gives us the confidence to suggest bolder reformulations of the standard narrative of early Islamic history. There are myriad ways in which this can be done, but in the remainder of this paper we will explore just one further approach; the nature of the marriages that the Quraysh made to non-Qurashī Arab women. By focusing on the geography of these relationships it will be shown how the mass-data approach can be connected to individual marriage decisions and in the process provide a compelling insight into how the arrival of Islam transformed the social relationships of the Quraysh.

Non-Qurashī marriage and geography

Our focus here will be on the marriages made by the men of the three cohorts with non-Qurashī women. We have seen above that the proportion of child-bearing marriages made to women of this type fluctuates, and that this can be linked to historical circumstance; it was (in relation to what came before) high amongst the early Muslims of the Prophetic era and low amongst the members of the caliphal

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18 The records fall precipitously after this point; as mentioned above, al-Zubayrī has very little interest in the marriage behaviour of the generations closest to his own.
family in the Umayyad era. We will now consider evidence indicating that historical context had an influence on the tribal origin of the non-Qurashī bride.

The problem here is that tribal affiliations are fluid; even discounting outright forgery, a tribesperson could claim any one of several affiliations simply by selecting the relevant ancestor.\(^\text{19}\) This makes it highly problematic for the modern scholar to establish trends in behaviour because we can also – like the genealogists themselves – select the lineage group that best serves our interests. For instance, if we wished to show continuity in marriage behaviour we could go higher up the lineage to establish that a certain group only married with Yemeni tribes (for instance) and in so doing disguise a large amount of diversity. Conversely, if we go down the lineage we can show far less consistent marriage behaviour and use this to argue for a fluidity in terms of inter-tribal relationships.

But to abandon the notion of tribal belonging outright would be – as Lawrence Conrad puts it in a similar context – “excessive”.\(^\text{20}\) We will instead frame the following around Meier and Büssov’s elegantly minimalist definition of the word ‘tribe’:

The corresponding Arabic terms, especially qabīla and ʿashīra, are now widely understood to refer to social groups that claim descent from a common male

\(^{19}\) For a fascinating example of how differing tribal affiliations can exist simultaneously across different generations of the same family (in this case father-son-grandson) see Lancaster, *Rwala Bedouin Today*, pp. 27-28.

ancestor and are connected with a specific territory at a particular time but
that are not politically united. Solidarity within and beyond a specific group,
internal hierarchies, and the role of its leaders—men referred to mainly as
\textit{shaykh} or \textit{raʾīs}—can only be described for specific contexts, not in a general
way.\textsuperscript{21}

In the table and maps below it will be demonstrated that within the specific context of
marriage amongst the Late Antique Quraysh, tribal affiliations as suggested within
the historical texts can be turned into accessible visualisations that confirm some
elements of what we already know of the narratives of the pre-ʿAbbāsid Quraysh
while challenging others. It is again emphasised that these findings are indicative
rather than conclusive but caution is necessary given the novelty of the
methodology.

The table below lays out the tribal origin of the non-Qurashī wives who married into
the three cohorts outlined above. Where disambiguation is needed this is provided in
brackets:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Tribe}\textsuperscript{22} & \textbf{Pre-Islamic Cohort} & \textbf{Early Islamic Cohort} & \textbf{Umayyad Cohort} \\
\hline
\textbf{Kināna} & 5 & 3 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Exogamous non-Qurashī marriages of Cohorts 1, 2 and 3}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{21} Astrid Meier and Johann Büssow, “ʿAnaza”, in \textit{EP}.

\textsuperscript{22} Tribal affiliations are based on groupings suggested in the \textit{Nasab Quraysh}.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thaqīf</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Āmir b. Ṣa’sa’a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuzā’a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaym</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aws</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudhayl</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamīm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakr b. Wā’il</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taghlib b. Wā’il</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalb</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazāra</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murra (of Ghaṭafān)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khath’am</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asad b. Khuzayma</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māzin (of Qays Aylān)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himyār</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrā’</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hārith (of Khazraj)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

23 These marriages are both to the same individual.
This table provides further insight into the nature of the marriages made by the second cohort; it is not simply the case that the first converts are marrying outside the Quraysh more frequently than the men of their fathers’ generation but that the women in question are from a wider pool of tribes. The early Islamic cohort married into a total of 20 tribes compared to their fathers’ ten, and 16 of the marriages made by the first Muslims were to tribes that the earlier cohort had never married into.

Another indicator can be seen at the top of the table where the five tribes into which Cohort 1 married most frequently accounted for 18 of their child-bearing unions while in the Prophetic era these same five tribes account for only seven of the marriages.

Again, this fits in with what we suspect from the pre-existing narrative that the emergence of Islam dislocated the early converts from the alliances of their fathers’ generation and opened up the potential for new tribal alliances as the Islamic movement became more successful.

With the tribal origins of the wives in place we can now consider the geography of marriage patterns by linking the relationships to the locations of the tribes as recorded in the historical narratives. This is obviously controversial given what we know of the reliability of the traditional sources and while Fred Donner has made arguments for the general accuracy of the geography, the linking of this geography to marriage behaviour is a major test of his conclusions.24

The following maps illustrate how the distribution of marriage behaviour differs between Cohorts 1 and 2 by attaching volume markers indicating the number of marriages within the region associated with each tribe:\(^{25}\)

Map 1: Geographical origins of non-Qurashī marriages made by Cohort 1

Map 2: Geographical origins of non-Qurashī marriages made by Cohort 2

This visual representation does not have to be map-based; the following graph shows the frequency of marriage for Cohorts 1 and 2 against the distance from Mecca:\(^{26}\)

Graph 2: Marriage frequency by distance of tribe from Mecca

\(^{25}\) The sources for this geographic information are the relevant entry for each tribe within the Encyclopaedia of Islam; the pull-out map in D.S. Margoliouth's Mohammed and the Rise of Islam, (New York: Putnam, 1905); and TAVO map B VII 1: Das islamische Arabien bis zum Tode des Propheten (632/11h) by Ulrich Rebstock, 1987.

\(^{26}\) There is obviously an issue here concerning the hijra, many of Cohort 2’s marriages would have been made while they were in Medina. But even if we did have the data available for which marriage took place in which city it would not drastically alter the visualisation here; the abstraction is therefore an acceptable one.
The maps and graph correlate with the broad outline of the narrative of Islamic origins in the same way as the tables above them do; they show that the arrival of Islam and the establishment of an empire had profound effects on the way the Quraysh married. The women the early Muslims married were not only from a wider range of tribes, but these tribes themselves were geographically more dispersed.

But in another respect the maps illustrate something that we were less certain of in our current understanding of early Islamic history and that is the parochiality of the pre-Islamic Quraysh. The distribution we see in Map 1 does not look like the marriage behaviour of a pre-eminent Arab tribe or the masters of a far-flung trading empire (which is how they are often presented in both the traditional sources and in contemporary scholarship); it looks far more like the revisionist position of Patricia Crone who argued that Meccan trade should rather be understood as a West Arabian phenomenon.\textsuperscript{27} Although this position has been revised recently in light of evidence of the importance of the leather trade to the Roman Empire there is still no indication that this trade gave the Quraysh widespread influence anywhere outside the Ḥijāz.\textsuperscript{28} The marriage behaviour of Cohorts 2 and 3 by contrast look like that of truly dominant Arab tribes; in the case of the early Muslims it illustrates a geographic influence extending to Yemen, Iraq and Syria while in the case of the Umayyads


their imperial trappings meant they could begin to eschew marriage to non-Qurashī Arab women altogether.

What we also see in the visualisations is a divergence in the genealogical material when compared to the narrative histories. The extant histories of the ‘Abbāsid era normally presented pre-Islamic Mecca as an international city and turned the Quraysh into a people of trans-peninsular significance. But within this same material there is an alternative story of Muhammad as a member of a tribe of leather traders who occupied a minor shrine serving only surrounding tribes, and it is this narrative that is confirmed by the genealogical data. This alternate story may not have been unthinkable to historians in later centuries (bits of it did, after all, survive) but it was rhetorically unsatisfying; inflating the status of Muḥammad’s enemies not only flattered the Prophet’s achievements but also made the tale more entertaining.

Luckily for us this reshaping of history did not extend to the marriage behaviour preserved in the nasab tradition. The data from al-Zubayrī’s work show us that the pre-Islamic Quraysh almost exclusively married unremarkable tribes within a week’s travel of Mecca and it is in this data, reformulated into the visualisations above, that we see the Quraysh as they really were from their days as Hijāzī traders until their fall as Umayyad caliphs.²⁹

²⁹ Map 1 also refutes one of Patricia Crone contention that Muḥammad’s Mecca was situated much further to the north than its present location (Crone, Meccan Trade, pp. 162–165); the marriage distribution we see here clearly places the locus point of Quraysh marriage somewhere in the Central Ḥijāz and this has been established using methodologies Crone herself has espoused. Although Crone’s relocation of Mecca has never been a mainstream theory in academic circles it has unfortunately become more widespread in the public consciousness thanks to a popular historian’s misguided efforts to promote revisionist early Islamic
Conclusion

In the counterpart paper we showed that prosopographical methods could identify trends within a database of nearly 3,000 people the majority of whom lived over a 300 year period. These trends correlated with major events in Islamic history and as such gave support to the validity of the methodology.

In this paper we have shown that we get similar results when using much smaller datasets. The comparison between the three cohorts illustrates that there are significant fluctuations between the types of marriages that these men made and that these changes correlate with events as recorded in the traditional narrative sources. This provided us with a further support for the methodology and when applied to the geographical distribution of Arab tribes gave us a tantalising glimpse at the contribution that prosopographical approaches can provide our current understanding of early Islamic history.

It is important not to take this too far; the three cohorts are in no way presented as ‘samples’ of a larger dataset comprising Arabian society as a whole, or even Ḥijāzī society as a whole. The relationship between the trends they illustrate and the information recorded in the traditional narrative sources also needs further exploration; while we have here tried to refer only to the most uncontroversial of scholarship. In addition to interviews and articles in the press these views have been circulated in the form of a best-selling book (Tom Holland, In the Shadow of the Sword (London: Little, Brown, 2012), pp. 330-332) and a documentary film (Islam: The Untold Story, 2012, Channel 4).
early Islamic historical events this requires a degree of subjective judgement that not all historians would agree with.

What we can be certain of though is that we can justify further time spent generating datasets from the nasab tradition, analysing them for trends and then exploring their relationship with the traditional narrative sources. The marriage data seem robust at multiple levels to allow this and the generational structuring schema is fit for its current purpose. With these tools now at our disposal it is hoped that other scholars will use this framework to support their own work in teasing apart the source from the discourse of the Islamic historiographical tradition.