JUSTICE, INTEGRITY AND MORAL COMMUNITY: DO PARENTS OWE IT TO THEIR CHILDREN TO BRING THEM UP AS GOOD GLOBAL CLIMATE CITIZENS?

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This paper asks whether parents owe it to their children to bring them up as good global climate citizens. Four arguments are considered, with increasing success: that there are social disadvantages to immoral behaviour; that moral integrity is required for a full human life; that the capacity for such integrity is so needed; and that the duty is demanded by the life-shaping parent-child relationship and the fact that parents have climate justice duties. Given this, enabling and motivating one's child to respond to climate change is part of valuing that child as a future member of the same global moral community as oneself.

I

The duty to bring up one's child as a good global climate citizen has two elements. A parent might facilitate her child's becoming a good global climate citizen by educating him about harmful global climate change and the collective moral failure involved, explaining her own efforts morally to respond and not rendering him over-dependent on fossil fuels. Going further, she might promote his becoming a good global climate citizen by actively motivating him, for example by involving him in her own moral response. This paper seeks to defend both of these.

Given limited space, starting assumptions are drawn from established literatures. I assume that parents (including adoptive parents) have certain duties to their children: to meet their physical and emotional needs in childhood, including providing any 'intrinsic goods of childhood' (Brennan 2014, p. 35), and to prepare them for adulthood in their community. This includes educating them and cultivating the capacities for a full or flourishing human life (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 62-66; Noggle 2002). The parent-child relationship is itself important to both ends (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 71-76; Betzler 2015, p. 65).

I also assume that present and future human suffering caused by climate change constitutes a collective moral failure, generating shared or 'weakly collective' (Cripps 2013, p. 3) duties to prevent or redress it. This can be defended negatively via a collectivised no-harm principle or positively via a duty to organise to protect basic human interests if possible at reasonable cost to the duty-bearers (Cripps 2013, pp. 48-51, 66-77; Goodin 1985, pp. 134-41; Shue 1980, pp. 35-64). Effective collective action would assign climate justice duties to individuals. However, individuals also have moral duties in the absence of a coherent collective scheme. These can also be referred to as climate justice duties (Caney 2014, pp. 134-5). They might be fulfilled by promoting collective action, minimising individual emissions or aiding victims directly. It remains

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1 The facilitation/promotion distinction is borrowed from the debate on cultivating autonomy (Brighouse 2002a, pp. 66-82).
2 One duty might be to limit the number of children one has, given the link between population and climate change (Conly 2015). This would not undermine the current argument. The duty to have no
open for debate which should be prioritised and how this varies across individuals (Cripps 2013, pp. 141-50; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; Broome 2012, pp. 73-4; Baatz 2014; Garvey 2011).

Against this background, the extent of the argument can be clarified. I am not defending a duty to give one’s child a ‘deep green’ comprehensive conception of the good: one assigning intrinsic moral significance to the survival of non-humans or ecosystems (Caldicott 1986; Royston 1988). Moreover, my target is relatively affluent parents. As with many duties, considerations of demandingness are relevant. For the very badly off, it may be unreasonably costly to bring up one’s children as good global climate citizens.

Further, while age-sensitivity is crucial, the duty makes some demands even on parents of very young children. Clearly, it is inappropriate to show a three year-old pictures of drought victims or expect him to grasp the collective moral predicament. This is a matter partly of emotional and cognitive readiness, partly of not undermining the early innocence that some take to be an intrinsic childhood good (Macleod 2015, pp. 59-60). However, lifestyle habits and ideological commitments can be acquired from early on and there is evidence that moral development begins in very young children (Dunn 2014; Vaish and Tomasello 2014).

Finally, a duty to bring children up as good global climate citizens might be derived directly from the duties owed by the affluent to the victims of climate change, given the need to involve the next generation. This is not the focus of this paper. Instead, I am concerned with what the parent owes her own child as a future moral agent.

Given this, a natural starting point is the widely accepted duty to develop one’s child’s general moral capacity, arguments for which might be extended to the climate change case. Two of these are examined: the social penalties argument, which appeals pragmatically to social punishments for immoral behaviour, and the moral integrity argument, which considers good moral behaviour necessary for a full or flourishing human life (sections II and III). Both are found wanting in the current context. However, I offer a variant on the second, the moral capacity argument, to defend a duty to facilitate one’s child becoming a good global climate citizen (section IV). I then take a different line (section V). The moral community/relationship argument appeals on the one hand to the parent’s climate justice duties and on the other to the significance of the parent-child relationship. Sections VI and VII deal with likely objections, including the claim that this duty would conflict with developing children’s capacity for autonomy.

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children is not defended. Moreover, it remains relevant what one owes to one’s children even if it was a violation of climate justice duties to have had them. However, an interesting related problem, not addressed here, is whether the affluent biological parent of a large family could or should explain climate duties to her third, fourth (and so on) children if this amounted to saying that they should not have been born.

The duty to develop one’s child’s general moral capacity might also be derived from duties to third persons. However, this is not the focus here.
According to the social penalties argument, immoral behaviour is practically disadvantageous. This has been variously expressed: ‘social institutions tend to reward moral behaviour’ (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p. 64; Noggle 2002, pp. 110-12) or children need a sense of justice to thrive in a society where their opportunities are constrained by collectively determined justice (Clayton 2006, pp. 110-12). Thus, the duty to develop moral capacity follows from the duty to enable one’s child to live a full adult life in his community.

However, if this is the only reason for developing one’s child’s moral capacity, the duty to bring up one’s child as a good global climate citizen does not follow. There are no ‘serious consequences’ (Brighouse 2002b, p. 42) of ignoring positive or collectively acquired negative duties to distant or future persons. Opportunities in affluent societies are not constrained by global or intergenerational justice. The argument extends only to giving one’s child a narrow nationalist morality: no serious individual harms, some positive duties to those with whom one shares both state and generation.

The argument might be amended to appeal to the chance that climate justice will be incorporated into social and institutional arrangements during current children’s lifetimes. However, this is by no means guaranteed. Moreover, collective action might focus disproportionately on protecting the next few generations of the global affluent, rather than institutionalise truly global moral duties. This would, in any case, be a limited argument as it would not require enabling children to bring about such collective implementation of climate justice.

Let us turn, then, to a different starting point: the requirements for a full (or what might variously be called a flourishing, a thriving or even a good) human life.

As human beings, we face the world from several perspectives (Cripps 2013, pp. 170-75; Nagel 1991, pp. 1-10). One is that of our own interests, ambitions and values. Another is that of our interpersonal relationships with other individuals. These give us central reasons – and, in the latter case, moral duties – to act in certain ways. However, we are also moral agents in a more impersonal sense. From that perspective, we have central reason to prevent, and not to cause, severe suffering by human beings. (For brevity, I will refer to this as the moral perspective.)

The moral integrity argument claims that a human life cannot be successful without success from the moral perspective: that moral integrity is necessary for a human life to go well. Moral integrity is here understood as living within moral boundaries (Dworkin 2000, p. 270). This argument is suggested by some in the parental duties literature (Brighouse 2002b, p. 42; Clayton 2006, p. 143)\(^4\) and makes the case for facilitating and promoting future moral behaviour as part of preparing children for

\(^4\) Writing with Swift, Brighouse is more equivocal (2014, p. 64).
adulthood. Given the link between climate change and human suffering, the argument would seem, if successful, to extend to a duty to bring up one's child up as a good global climate citizen.

However, the argument relies on a very controversial view of human interests. Given continued global suffering, claiming that future adults could not lead a full or thriving life without acting morally means accepting that most affluent lives are not fully flourishing even if those living them think they are. In the climate change case, it means accusing those who drive SUVs or lobby against fuel taxes not only of acting wrongly but also of acting against their own interests. The former I would uphold; the latter is highly problematic. In some cases, it amounts to overruling a considered, informed, judgements by individuals of what is in their own overall interest.

Instead, I will offer a less controversial argument starting from the same three-perspective view of human life. This appeals not to the need for moral integrity but to the need for the capacity for integrity in a broader sense. This includes but is not limited to moral integrity.

IV

The moral capacity argument has two versions. The stronger version claims that the capacity (understanding and ability) for moral integrity is needed for a full human life. This is because all human beings are moral agents, whether or not they choose to act as such. The claim is less controversial than that underlying the moral integrity argument. It is less problematic to question someone’s own judgement on how well their life has gone if they lacked the knowledge or ability to undertake something widely regarded as valuable and so did not make a free, informed decision not to do so. The weaker version – still sufficient for much of the argument – appeals to the significant likelihood that any given individual will become motivated by the moral perspective, to the extent that her values and plan of life demand moral integrity. Parents have a duty to develop their child’s moral capacity because they cannot reasonably assume that this will not happen.

In either case, the duty defended is to facilitate moral behaviour. However, a further step is required to defend facilitating becoming a good global climate citizen. Why not turn out one’s children with a general moral capacity and leave it to them to apply it to climate change? Because, I suggest, there are aspects of fulfilling climate justice duties that require specific preparation.

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5 It might be claimed that either moral capacity or motivation need not be actively ‘developed’ since it is to some degree innate (Vaish and Tomasello 2014, pp. 283-4; Wynn and Bloom 2014; Rawls 1971, pp. 401-3). I do not enlarge on this since the parental duties literature assumes a role for parental influence. However, even if some level of capacity or motivation were innate, the knowledge and ability to apply this in a social and especially a global or intergenerational context would not automatically follow.

6 Dworkin bites this bullet (2000, pp. 265-7).

7 A significant literature in the capabilities approach makes a parallel point (e.g. Nussbaum 2000, pp. 86-96).
Firstly, suffering caused by climate change is not immediately visible to the global affluent: it takes place in different parts of the world and in future generations. Thus, grasping the moral situation requires some knowledge of this likely harm and how it results from, and could be prevented by, combined human actions.

Secondly, responding morally to climate change requires skills beyond the acts and omissions associated with individual-to-individual duties. This is not simply a matter of extrapolating from the ‘Don’t hit your sister, that’s naughty’ or ‘She’s sad, be nice to her’ that we drum into our children from toddlerhood. The individual needs to understand the collective situation, see his own place in it and use his judgement on whether and how best to promote collective change. He needs global citizenship skills.

Thirdly, not only do current societies not penalise failure to fulfil moral duties to those distant in time or space, socio-psychological ‘blocking’ mechanisms make them less likely to be fulfilled. This is well documented in general and in the climate change case (Lichtenberg 2004; Norgaard 2011; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan, and Jaeger 2001). Enabling one’s child to act as a good global climate citizen involves giving him the insight to identify and see past such blocks.

Fourthly, this paper has so far understood moral integrity as living within moral boundaries. However, integrity might be understood more broadly: as having the central aims, interests, and values of one’s life broadly in line (Cripps 2013, pp. 180-95; Williams 1973, pp. 93-119). For those who motivated by all three human perspectives, central, pervasive conflict between them can be hard to live with. (Consider the child of slave owners, brought up ideologically committed to and reliant on slavery, who later comes to appreciate the its moral wrongness.8) This is so much the case that parents plausibly owe it to their children to spare them such conflict if they can. In the current context, this means not committing one’s child ideologically to a way of life incompatible with climate justice. It also means preventing his becoming so reliant on fossil fuels that he would struggle to secure central interests without them (e.g. through addiction to high speed, long distance travel).9

A further point can be made specific to the climate justice case. Climate change may well harm the children and grandchildren of current children (IPCC 2014b, pp. 21-23). Thus not only the moral perspective but also the interpersonal one could clash with the future adult’s own interests and values if he is not brought up as a good global climate citizen.

The moral capacity argument has defended facilitating, but not necessarily promoting, one’s child becoming a good global climate citizen.10 This prompts a challenge: is

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8 Analogy adapted from Macleod (2010, pp. 147).
9 Mitigating climate change effectively requires zero emissions by the end of the century (IPCC 2014a, p. 18).
10 An alternative argument, not discussed here, is that it impinges on one’s future moral integrity to live, as a child, a life which would be immoral if lived by an adult. Thus, parents should actively involve their child in lifestyle changes made to fulfil climate justice duties. However, this goes well beyond the accepted view of moral accountability as requiring agency and avoidability. (For a related discussion on vegetarianism, see Butt (Unpublished).)
facilitation possible in practice without promotion? Probably not: in educating her child about the moral failures of climate change, the parent is likely to motivate him to respond.\textsuperscript{11} Given an original aim of defending both facilitation and promotion, it is not a problem for the argument if I have defended the former with the latter as a near-inevitable side effect. However, it could make the argument more vulnerable to concerns about autonomy. This will be addressed in section VII.

\textbf{V}

The moral community/relationship argument starts with two observations: parents themselves have climate justice duties\textsuperscript{12} and parents and children have a peculiarly significant, life-shaping relationship. As the relationship contributes crucially to the child’s well-being and development, parents plausibly owe their children a certain quality of relationship (insofar as their own efforts can secure this). A case has been made for ‘familial relationship goods’: shared activities involving intimacy and mutual identification (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p. 110). However, it is also necessary not to undermine the relationship in a central way, for example by destroying trust. An extreme case would be a parent who ticked all the boxes in terms of quality time together, education, etcetera, but was revealed as living a double life with another family.

From this starting point, the argument has two components, the latter reinforcing the former, and can take two versions: one defending only facilitation, the other also promotion.

In fulfilling her moral duties, the parent acknowledges her place in the community of moral agents. In fulfilling climate justice duties, she identifies herself as a member of a global and intergenerational moral community: those entitled to at least basic moral consideration and required to show it to one another, by virtue of common humanity. The parent also knows that she is in an asymmetrically influential relationship with her child. Given this, someone who brings her child up as a good global climate citizen – teaches him about climate change, discusses her own response with him and enables and encourages him to respond – acknowledges that child as a future member of the same global moral community and prepares him to act as such.

If she does not, something is missing from the relationship. This, I suggest, is a kind of respect: that necessary component of a truly human relationship. Respect for a child does not, of course, include all the elements of respect for an adult. It does not give the same weight to the individual’s own judgement. However, respect more generally involves properly valuing someone as a fellow human being. This includes valuing them as a moral agent or, in this case, future moral agent. In failing to help her child to understand and pursue the goals that she pursues as a moral agent, the parent is failing fully to acknowledge and value him as both her child, on whose development she has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Brighouse (2002a, p. 80-82) addresses parallel concerns about facilitating autonomy.
\item \textsuperscript{12} This does not make my argument relevant only to parents already fulfilling such duties. To those who do not, the claim is that they \textit{should} fulfil them (subject to caveats in section VIII) and, having done so, that they would acquire this further duty.
\end{itemize}
a perhaps unequalled influence, and a future member of the same moral community as herself.\textsuperscript{13} This milder version of the argument defends facilitating one’s child becoming a good global climate citizen. On the stronger version, more is required: actively motivating one’s child to act as such, including by involving him in one’s own fulfilment of climate justice duties. The claim is that this, too, is required properly to value him as a future fellow member of the global moral community, given the asymmetric relationship.

Bringing up one’s child to fulfil climate justice duties is distinct from many other ways in which parents might, or might not, enable and motivate him to pursue the same activities as themselves. The relationship, however intimate, does not necessitate cultivating a passion for Manchester United, mountain biking or chess (so long as \textit{some} mutually valued shared activities are undertaken). However, considering the child as a future member of the global moral community, parental failure to prepare him to respond morally to climate change is akin to not teaching him the language of the country in which they both live.

To reinforce the point, consider how this failure could undermine the relationship in the child’s eyes. Through her actions and inactions, the parent sends the following implicit message: ‘Yes, I am attempting morally to respond to climate change. This is because I identify myself as a member of a global moral community with a duty to respond appropriately to the serious suffering of human beings. I know I have a near-unique influence on your options and prospects but I don’t see the need to help you to play your part in that community. It doesn’t matter to me whether you respond appropriately to moral need.’ Compare this with the unproblematic way in which the mountain biker might tell her child: ‘This is just something I’m into. That doesn’t mean you need to do it.’ The young child could not appreciate this distinction but the adolescent or young adult very possibly would.

VI

This section and the next deal with two objections. Both challenge the conclusion that parents should promote their children becoming good global climate citizens. However, I cannot retreat from them by upholding only a facilitation duty: as noted above, the two are probably inseparable in practice.

The first objection criticises the moral community/relationship argument for taking parents’ climate justice duties as the background against which to establish their parental duties. In fact, it claims, it is widely held that the reverse holds: parents can

\textsuperscript{13} Bou-\textsuperscript{H}abib (2014) argues that the parent who flouts general moral duties to confer special advantage on her child fails to value that child properly because she cannot value her for her individual worth whilst acting incompatibly with recognising that of others. The claim here is narrower: the parent cannot simultaneously perform her moral duties, appreciate the significance of the parent-child relationship and properly value her child as a future fully fledged human being, without cultivating and promoting his moral capacity.
permissibly do the best for their children before worrying about duties to distant strangers.\textsuperscript{14} Given this, we should compare two scenarios:

(A) Parents fulfil their climate justice duties and so acquire duties to bring children up as good global climate citizens.
(B) Parents do not fulfil their climate justice duties.

The objector argues that A is worse for the child because, despite some individual efforts, effective collective-level climate justice may not happen. Thus, a child motivated to pursue it could face a lifetime of frustration. As many people are not so motivated, she could also face social exclusion. Thus, the parent isn’t required to fulfil her climate justice duties and the further duty does not follow.

This objection fails.\textsuperscript{15} In rejecting it, however, it is helpful to break it into two versions drawing on the difference between securing one’s child a reasonably good childhood and opportunities, and continually boosting his prospects beyond this.\textsuperscript{16}

(i) Parents should opt for scenario B because A would put the child below the threshold for a reasonably good life.
(ii) Although children need not fall below the threshold even in A, their lives would be harder than under B. Thus, parents can still legitimately opt for B.

On version i, the premise can be rejected. There is no reason to regard motivation to act morally on climate change as incompatible with a good human life. Even with uncertain prospects for collective action, the parent is not signing her child up to an isolated life committed exclusively to some esoteric and implausible end. She is enabling him to understand the moral wrongness of the collective situation – something many people do appreciate – and encouraging him, among other things he may do, to respond to it: an ambition around which communities are already being built.

On version ii, there are two responses. The explicit premise can be challenged: the claim that it is worse to be morally motivated to respond to climate change than not. Collective moral failure can make life harder for those who are morally motivated (Cripps 2013, pp. 170-96). However, building on section IV, conflict between the moral and personal perspectives should be reduced by being brought up as a good global climate citizen. The child will have less vested interest in climate injustice. At the least, there is reason to think that someone able and motivated to be a good global climate citizen would be better off than someone lacking even the capacity. Moreover, the moral perspective is not the only one at stake: current children are likely to have strong interpersonal reasons for climate action.

\textsuperscript{14} It would be more controversial to suggest that parents can permissibly prioritise duties to their children over individual negative duties. However, individual participation in collective harms may be more like failures of positive duties in this respect (Cripps 2013, pp. 155-57).

\textsuperscript{15} This response builds on recent work on legitimate parental partiality (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 115-48; Macleod 2010, 2002).

\textsuperscript{16} ‘Good’ is used to set the bar higher than ‘adequate’ or ‘decent’.
However, the objection would fail even if the explicit premise held. This is because of a morally problematic implicit premise. Consider the following three claims.

(1) Parental duties up to some threshold level take priority over global or climate justice duties.
(2) Other things being equal, parents have a duty to make their child’s life better rather than significantly worse even above that threshold.
(3) The duty in 2 can also be prioritised over global or climate justice duties.

Version ii of the objection relies on claim 3 but this does not follow from its more plausible predecessors. There is nothing in the significance of the parent-child relationship or the needs of the child to justify unlimited license for parents to ignore the serious suffering of others. Thus, it is permissible to factor parents’ climate justice duties into the discussion, provided this is compatible with the threshold level duty. I have argued that it is, so the objection fails.

VII

The second objection is as follows. Parents are thought to have a duty to develop their children’s capacity for autonomy as part of preparing them for adulthood (Brighouse 2002a, pp. 66-82; Betzler 2015; Brighouse and Swift 2006, pp. 164-68). This is plausible. Indeed, respect for the child as future fully-fledged human being, stressed in section V, demands it. However, it puts well documented obstacles in the path of religious or cultural upbringing (Brighouse 2002a, pp. 83-111; Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 168-73; Clayton 2006, pp. 87-123; Clayton 2012; Callan 2002; Noggle 2002, pp. 113-15; Feinberg 1980, pp. 131-38). Various limits have been proposed, for example allowing value-sharing activities where necessary for intimacy goods but only so long as the child’s future ability to revise his views is protected (Brighouse and Swift 2006, pp. 149-74). How, then, can parents justify shaping children’s values by raising them as good global climate citizens?

I have two responses to this objection, both starting from the same point: in terms of bringing one’s child simply to accept any moral claim, the duty defended here is very limited. It is limited to the minimal claim that it is a moral failure collectively or individually to cause or (subject to a reasonable cost condition) fail to prevent serious human suffering.

Firstly, bringing up one’s child as a good global climate citizen is compatible with – even conducive to – developing skills for autonomy. On perhaps the most influential account, being autonomous is ‘being part author of one’s own life’. Individuals need adequate long and short-term options, mental capacities and freedom from coercion and manipulation (Raz 1986, pp. 369-78). Thus, parents must enable their children to

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17 I will discuss this as a duty to facilitate autonomy but parallel points would apply if the duty were to promote it.
18 Note that the autonomy objection is not usually taken to overcome the duty to develop one’s child’s general moral capacity (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p. 151; McLaughlin 1984, p. 81).
think and reflect rationally, revise even their own considered views, and engage critically but constructively with those of others (Archard 2010, p. 158; Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 63-4, 164-68; Noggle 2002, p. 105).

Unlike that minority of religious parents who reject aspects of scientific education for their child (S. M. 2014; Feinberg 1980, pp. 131-38), bringing someone up as a good global climate citizen does not involve isolating him from rival views or rational debate. Rather, it requires making him aware of the overwhelming scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change (Doran and Zimmerman 2009).

Moreover, educating one’s children need not mean ‘laying down the law’. A more Socratic approach is available and, in this case, particularly appropriate. Beyond the minimal moral view above, it remains up for debate what exactly being a good global climate citizen involves: whether individuals should prioritise promoting collective action (and at what level), cutting their own emissions or aiding victims, and how this varies with individual circumstances. Thus, the parent must not only explain what she is doing and involve her child in that, but also discuss other options and encourage him to use exercise moral judgement.

Secondly, the parent imparting the minimal moral view to her child is not imparting a comprehensive conception of the good.¹⁹ Parents may come to endorse the duty to bring their children up as good global climate citizens through comprehensive views, whether religious doctrines or views assigning moral significance to the non-human world. However, the case for the duty does not depend on this. The claim is that parents should impart a moral assertion so minimal that it could form common ground across different comprehensive conceptions of the good. These conceptions would have only to be ‘reasonable’ in the sense of accepting that all human beings are entitled to basic moral consideration.²⁰

In practice, the principles underlying the minimal view are uncontroversial. Virtually no-one would deny the prohibition on serious harm while minimal positive duties are accepted even by some ‘nationalist’ global justice theorists (Nagel 2005, p. 130-32; Blake 2002, p. 259). The collectivised versions follow so intuitively from the individual versions that, anecdotally, I was often asked ‘Isn’t that obvious?’ when explaining to non-philosophers my efforts to collectivise them. Moreover, climate duties could be defended on either of these collectivised principles.

By contrast, comprehensive views, deep green or otherwise, contain elements which could reasonably be rejected. Given this contrast, the duty to bring one’s child up as a

¹⁹ This response draws on (Clayton 2006, pp. 93-110, 42-3).
²⁰ This is a globalised but only minimally cosmopolitan understanding of the Rawlsian view that citizens need mutually reasonable common ground to live together given limited resources and different ambitions and comprehensive values. (Rawls 1993, pp. xxxvii-xlii). Thus, the duty here would pass Clayton’s test for legitimate exercise of parental authority – they could ‘defend their conduct in a manner that cannot reasonably be rejected by free and equal persons’ (2006, p. 112) – so long as those ‘free and equal persons’ are humanity as a whole. Clayton’s approach is state-orientated. However, the views may not be too far apart: he upholds a ‘minimal international morality’ and advocates educating children to lobby for a just foreign policy (2006, pp. 163-5).
good global climate citizen can be considered exempt (as deep green views would not be) from the requirement to make concessions to cultivating autonomy. This point might be made in either of two ways (Clayton 2006, pp. 142-3). On one, valuable autonomy is itself constrained by minimal morality: freedom to do wrong is not valuable (Raz 1986, pp. 378-81). On the other, there is genuine conflict between bringing one's child up as a good global climate citizen and giving him maximal autonomy. However, the duty to cultivate autonomy can legitimately be overridden to the limited extent necessary given the centrality of the minimal view for the moral agent and the fact that the two duties share a starting point: preparing the child for adult human life.

VIII

This paper has defended a duty to give one's child the ability and understanding for good global climate citizenship. This includes educating him about climate change and the collective moral failures involved, discussing one’s own moral response with him, cultivating his moral judgement and avoiding ideological or practical over-dependence on continued climate injustice. In practice, this will probably motivate him to respond morally to climate change. However, it has been more tentatively argued that his parents should actively encourage this, including by involving him in their fulfillment of climate justice duties.

In conclusion, two outstanding questions must be acknowledged: why climate change and why parents? Climate justice duties are not affluent individuals’ only moral duties, nor the only ones associated with global-level suffering. My argument might also apply to others. In some ways this versatility is an advantage. However, the point could be pressed as a challenge. If the parent could respond to human suffering in many ways and cannot, given demandingness considerations, be expected to do so in all of them, why should she prioritise climate justice? If she focuses instead on (say) global poverty, would not the moral community/relationship argument defend bringing up her child to respond to that instead?

Not necessarily. If there is no strong reason for prioritising climate justice duties, much of this paper still stands. However, the duty defended is to bring one’s child up as a good global citizen. The role for moral judgement comes, as it were, one level up: the parent should explain her own focus on global poverty or climate change but highlight other pressing challenges and encourage her child to use his own judgement on how to play his part in the global moral community. I would be content to have defended this. However, I have focused on climate justice duties because there are reasons for giving them special priority. A detailed account lies beyond this paper but, briefly, climate change has a peculiar practical urgency. Not only does it exacerbate many other global challenges but it will become exponentially worse without effective action in the next few decades (IPCC 2014a, pp. 16-19). Moreover, it counts as moral failure on positive or negative accounts of what we owe to one another as human beings. This gives it peculiar salience.
Finally, why are these parents’ duties? Should not the state educate children about climate justice? Very probably. Moreover, parents are not the only influence on their children’s moral development. Others include schools, peers, media, social media, other family members, and rival cultural influences outside the home (Carlo 2014, pp. 213-18; Goodnow 1997). However, it remains important to explore parents’ duties. Whoever bears primary responsibility for securing a child’s interests and opportunities – states, parents, all of us – it is plausible that parents should endeavour to fill the gap when provision is not made elsewhere. Moreover, there are some things only parents can do. A child’s early lifestyle is largely determined by them. They could also undermine schools’ efforts. (Imagine being taught climate science, then going home to be told that it is all nonsense.)

A further reason for focusing on parents was generated by the moral community/relationship argument. This emphasised the importance of moral education for the parent-child relationship which is key to childhood flourishing and future opportunities. As so often in the parenting debate (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 70-76; Schrag 2008, pp. 200-06), this is not simply a matter of certain things being done for the child but of them being done for him by his parents.21

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