What I tell you three times is true: lawful residence and equal treatment after Dano

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ABSTRACT

This comment examines three recent judgments of the Court of Justice – Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto, and Commission v. UK – that further develop the connection between lawful residence in a host state and EU equal treatment rights, a critical legal premise of the Dano judgment. It demonstrates that this line of case law blurs legal concepts and legal statuses – social assistance and social benefits, for example; also citizens looking for work, those who have worked previously but no longer do, and those who need to rely on Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 to establish lawful residence in the host state. It aims overall to contribute to debates about quality of law; about the quality of EU citizenship and free movement law in a substantive sense; but also about how EU law is made, applied and revised.

Keywords: European Union citizenship; free movement; lawful residence; social benefits; social security

* ‘Just the place for a Snark!’ the Bellman cried,
As he landed his crew with care;
Supporting each man on the top of the tide
By a finger entwined in his hair.
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true’

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§1. INTRODUCTION

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in *Dano* on 11 November 2014. Its finding that a Member State is not precluded from excluding nationals of other Member States from entitlement to social assistance when they do not have a right to reside there raised two significant questions. First, the concept of lawful residence – essential for the purposes of claiming a right to equal treatment with host state nationals – was tied firmly in this judgment to the conditions established by Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38. But it was not clear whether an EU citizen residing lawfully on another basis – whether, for example, based on national law or EU law – could still ground a right to equal treatment in primary EU law (Articles 18 and 21 TFEU). Second, while the Court confirmed that an individual assessment of the financial circumstances of the claimant should be undertaken to establish as a question of fact whether or not he or she possessed sufficient resources to satisfy the requirement of ‘sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence’ codified in Article 7(1)(b) of the Directive, a proportionality-driven assessment of the impact of exclusion from entitlement in each claimant’s particular case was not required. Might other ‘categories’ of claimants be therefore similarly and legitimately excluded from entitlement under national legislation or was the *Dano* rationale instead tied inherently to the interest of ‘prevent[ing] economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of subsistence’, noting that it was also established as a matter of fact by the referring court in that case that the claimant was ‘not seeking employment and that she did not enter Germany in order to work’?

The judgment in *Dano* provoked ‘an unusual stir’ that questioned the intended scope of the Court’s reasoning and the implications of its choices. However, a clearer understanding of ‘social assistance’ – a crucial term used in several provisions of

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4 E.g. Case C-480/08 *Teixeira*, EU:C:2010:83.
5 Case C-333/13 *Dano*, para. 80.
6 Contrary to the position in previous case law e.g. Case C-413/99 *Baumbast*, EU:C:2002:493, para. 91–93.
7 Case C-333/13 *Dano*, para. 76.
8 Ibid., para. 66.
Directive 2004/38 – was established, since the Court repeated the definition that it had recently provided in Brey, that is

all assistance schemes established by the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local level, to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs and those of his family and who by reason of that fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public finances of the host Member State which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State.11

Importantly, the Court seemed to suggest that the exclusions from entitlement to social assistance provided for in Directive 2004/38 worked not just in parallel with but above the system developed for coordination of social security under Regulation 883/2004.12 Additionally, in an earlier line of case law, it distinguished ‘[b]enefits of a financial nature which, independently of their status under national law, are intended to facilitate access to the labour market’.13 EU citizens seeking work in a host state could not be excluded from entitlement to this type of benefit even though Article 24(2) of the Directive explicitly excluded them from entitlement to social assistance. However, the difference between both types of benefit in substance had not been determined.

In a relatively short timeframe, the Court had the opportunity to add three further links to this particular ‘judicial chain’14 – Alimanovic,15 García-Nieto,16 and Commission v. UK.17 Fundamentally, questions about which EU citizens should be supported in host states, to what extent, and for how long are necessary to ask. As questions of policy, they have become fused with broader uncertainties about the worth of extending solidarity beyond state borders, and with broader debates on migration that are too often conducted in a toxic haze. As questions of law, they are less worked through than they need to be.

Reflecting on the recent case law developments, this comment seeks primarily to contribute to debates about a concern for quality of law – the quality of EU citizenship

11 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 61, 63, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, EU:C:2013:565, para. 61. See also, Recitals 10, 16 and 21 of the Preamble and Articles 7, 8, 12, 13, 14 and 24 of Directive 2004/38.
15 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597.
16 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto, EU:C:2016:114.
and free movement law in a substantive sense; but also about how EU law is made, applied and revised. It examines the implications of Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v. UK for the different kinds of citizen-claimants involved in each case – the findings of which concern those looking for work, those who have worked previously but no longer do, and those who need to rely on Article 7(1)(b) to establish lawful residence in the host state. It also reflects – somewhat less abstractly than might have been the case before the recent ‘Brexit’ shock and the European Council negotiations that preceded it – on the rules that apply to those who have moved to another state and are working or self-employed there. Ironically, while the commitment to equal treatment for EU workers in host states undoubtedly influenced the permissive foundations of EU citizenship law, limits restraining the latter may now be feeding back to revised thinking about the former.

§2. THE CASES

A. ALIMANOVIC

Ms Alimanovic and her three children are Swedish nationals, though the children were born in Germany in the 1990s. The family left Germany in 1999 but re-entered in 2010. For less than one year, that is from June 2010 until May 2011, Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter both worked in short-term positions. From 1 December 2011, when they were neither working nor self-employed, they received non-contributory subsistence benefits as beneficiaries fit for work under the applicable national rules; Ms Alimanovic also received non-contributory subsistence benefits for her two younger children. However, payment of all benefits was suspended after 31 May 2012. The referring court regarded Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter as jobseekers, meaning that their entitlement to subsistence benefits was precluded under the applicable national rules; Ms Alimanovic also

The first question concerned the nature of the benefits at issue. Neither the definition of social assistance nor its legal autonomy vis-à-vis Regulation 883/2004 as established in Brey and confirmed in Dano had revealed whether or how the concept overlapped with

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18 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 34 and 40.
19 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 2.
benefits ‘intended to facilitate access to the labour market’ – which fall outside the scope of the derogation from equal treatment prescribed by Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 and which must, in consequence, be granted to jobseekers from other Member States when granted to home state nationals as a matter of equal treatment. The Court adopted the reasoning of Advocate General Wathelet on this point, guiding the referring court towards examining the ‘predominant function of the benefits at issue’ – if that is found

in fact to cover the minimum subsistence costs necessary to lead a life in keeping with human dignity [then] those benefits cannot be characterised as benefits of a financial nature which are intended to facilitate access to the labour market of a Member State [but] must be regarded as ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38.\(^\text{20}\)

Second, confirming \textit{Dano}, the Court reiterated that entitlement to social assistance on the premise of equal treatment requires that the claimant’s ‘residence in the territory of the host Member State complies with the conditions of Directive 2004/38’.\(^\text{21}\) On the facts of the present case, the Court examined whether Ms Alimanovic and/or her eldest daughter could establish residence on the basis of either Article 7(3) or Article 14(4)(b) of the Directive. Article 7(3) sets out when Union citizens who are no longer working or self-employed can retain that status and thereby claim lawful residence under Article 7(1)(a). But Article 7(3)(b) requires that the citizen has worked for more than one year, ruling out, just, its relevance for the claimants in this case. Article 7(3)(c) states that citizens who had worked for less than one year retain worker status for six months – precisely the point at which payment of subsistence benefits was suspended in this case.

Article 14(4)(b) provides that an expulsion measure may not be adopted against a Union citizen or their family members where the Union citizen

entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek employment. In this case, the Union citizens and their family members may not be expelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged.\(^\text{22}\)

The Court confirmed that Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter could establish a right to reside in Germany on that basis, and therefore come within the scope of equal treatment to social assistance in principle.\(^\text{23}\) However, the Court stated that ‘[i]t follows from the express reference in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 to Article 14(4)(b) thereof

\[^{20}\text{Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 45–46 (emphasis added); referring to the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 66–71.}\]

\[^{21}\text{Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 49, citing Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 69.}\]

\[^{22}\text{The test in this provision draws from the judgment in Case C-292/89 Antonissen, EU:C:1991:8 where the Court connected residence rights for jobseekers to Article 45 TFEU.}\]

\[^{23}\text{Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 57.}\]
that the host Member State may refuse to grant any social assistance to a Union citizen whose right of residence is based solely on that latter provision.\textsuperscript{24}

Finally, the Court addressed the ambiguity remaining after \textit{Dano} about when a host state should (or need not) undertake assessments of individual circumstances, finding that

although the Court has held that Directive 2004/38 requires a Member State to take account of the individual situation of the person concerned before it adopts an expulsion measure or finds that the residence of that person is placing an unreasonable burden on its social assistance system (…) no such individual assessment is necessary in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{B. GARCIA-NIETO}

The key differences between \textit{Alimanovic} and \textit{Garcia-Nieto} are that, in the latter case, the claimants were first-time jobseekers and the disputed entitlement to non-contributory subsistence benefits concerned the first three months of residence. Ms Garcia-Nieto is a Spanish national who moved to Germany with her daughter in April 2012. She registered as a jobseeker on 1 June and began work as a kitchen assistant soon afterwards, receiving a salary from 1 July. Her partner, Mr Peña Cuevas, and his son arrived on 23 June, all four living initially with Ms Garcia-Nieto’s mother. On 30 July, the family applied for subsistence benefits – these were granted with the exception of benefits for Mr Peña Cuevas and his son for August and September, neither of whom were ‘family members’ of Ms Garcia-Nieto within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Directive.\textsuperscript{26} National rules excluded Mr Peña Cuevas from entitlement to the benefits on the basis that he had resided in Germany for less than three months and was neither a worker nor self-employed at that time.

Unsurprisingly, the Court repeated the main findings from \textit{Alimanovic} – here, lawful residence was connected to Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/38\textsuperscript{27} while, again, the explicit derogation from equal treatment was found in Article 24(2) (‘the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence’). On the question of individual assessment, the Court remarked that ‘if such an assessment is not necessary in the case of a citizen seeking employment who no longer has the status of “worker”, the same applies \textit{a fortiori} to persons who are in a situation

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., para. 58.
\item\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., para. 59; citing Case C-140/12 \textit{Brey}, para. 64, 69 and 78.
\item\textsuperscript{26} Ms Garcia-Nieto and Mr Peña Cuevas were not married and therefore not ‘spouses’ as per Article 2(2); his son was not therefore the direct descendant of Ms Garcia-Nieto’s spouse.
\item\textsuperscript{27} Case C-299/14 \textit{Garcia-Nieto}, para. 41. Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that ‘Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period of up to three months without any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport’.
\end{itemize}
such as that of Mr Peña Cuevas. Further distinguishing citizens who carry out an economic activity in the host state, and addressing the relationship between Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 883/2004, the Court concluded that ‘there is nothing to prevent such benefits being refused to nationals of other Member States who do not have the status of workers or self-employed persons or persons who retain such status during the first three months of residence in the host Member State’. But what actually prevents – or conversely might not prevent – such refusal for workers or self-employed persons is returned to below.

C. COMMISSION v. UK

The pre-litigation procedure that led to these proceedings commenced in 2008, based on ‘numerous complaints from nationals of other Member States resident in the United Kingdom that the competent United Kingdom authorities had refused to grant them certain social benefits on the ground that they did not have a right to reside in that Member State’.

The Commission refined the scope of its action to focus on conditions regulating the payment of child benefit and child tax credit, and to challenge the compatibility with EU equal treatment obligations of the requirement in national rules that a person claiming these benefits had to satisfy a right to reside test. Regulation 883/2004 establishes a ‘habitual residence’ test for the payment of social security benefits; through criteria developed further in legislation and in case law, this is a factual ‘centre of interests’ test, the purpose of which is to determine the Member State of responsibility in the complicated mission of social security coordination.

Additionally, Article 4 of the Regulation provides that ‘[u]nless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof’. The Commission argued that by requiring a right to reside – lawful residence – for persons claiming child benefit and child tax credit, UK rules add a condition not provided for in Regulation 883/2004. In its view, the determination of habitual residence ‘cannot be influenced by the provisions of Article 7 of Directive 2004/38’. Alternatively, the Commission contended that the lawful residence condition

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28 Ibid., para. 48.
29 Ibid., para. 51, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 44 and Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 83.
30 See Section 3.B.2. below.
31 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 21.
33 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, EU:C:2015:666, para. 21. In the same paragraph, the Advocate General notes the Commission’s caution against a result in which application of the UK right to reside test could mean that ‘no Member State will be obliged to
‗results in direct, or at least indirect, discrimination, prohibited by Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004‘.34

The legal context of this case differs from the case law on legal residence that preceded it in one significant respect. In Brey, Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto, the benefits in question were classified as special non-contributory benefits. The Court recognized that these benefits were provided for in Regulation 883/2004 but it super-imposed its definition of social assistance for the purposes of Directive 2004/38 over that legal framework. However, in Commission v. UK, as confirmed by the Court, the two benefits in question ‘have the objective of helping to cover family expenses and are funded not from recipients’ contributions but from compulsory taxation‘; according to established case law, ‘benefits which are granted automatically to families that meet certain objective criteria relating in particular to their size, income and capital resources, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, and which are intended to meet family expenses must be regarded as social security benefits’35 – that is, they are not also classifiable as social assistance benefits in the understanding of that term derived from Brey and the line of cases that followed it. In fact, the families in Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto all received comparable child benefits in Germany and this was not contested in any of the three cases by the competent national authorities.

Addressing the first part of the Commission’s argument, the Court disagreed that Regulation 883/2004 must be the sole source of conditions determining eligibility for social security benefits. The Court accepted that the Regulation

is intended not only to prevent the concurrent application of a number of national legislative systems to a given situation and the complications which may ensue, but also to ensure that persons covered by that regulation are not left without social security cover because there is no legislation which is applicable to them.36

However, it also found that the relevant provision of the Regulation ‘is not intended to lay down the conditions creating the right to social security benefits‘, meaning that ‘[i]t is in principle for the legislation of each Member State to lay down those conditions‘.37 Since the Regulation is all about the coordination of national social security schemes, the Court inferred that the measure ‘thus allows different schemes to continue to exist, creating different claims on different institutions against which the claimant possesses

pay certain family allowances to the persons concerned, despite the fact that the latter live in a Member State and have dependent children‘. The facts in Dano provide a useful illustration of when that might be the case.

34 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 74.
35 Ibid., para. 55 and 60; see also, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 46.
36 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 64.
37 Ibid., para. 65, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 41 and Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 89.
direct rights by virtue either of national law alone or of national law supplemented, where necessary, by EU law.\textsuperscript{38}

Without any discussion of the fact that the benefits at issue are not social assistance benefits,\textsuperscript{39} the Court then cited Brey and Dano to conclude that ‘there is nothing to prevent, in principle, the grant of social benefits to Union citizens who are not economically active being made subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfil the conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the host Member State’.\textsuperscript{40} However, inserting the Directive’s tiers of citizenship, which are premised on degree of economic activity undertaken (or not), into the Regulation has been strongly criticized.\textsuperscript{41} Using the Directive to override the scope of the Regulation in this way also calls into question the reasoning applied in cases such as Teixeira, which are premised precisely on a separation between the personal scope (Directive) and material scope (Regulation 492/2011) of claims about entitlement to benefits.\textsuperscript{42} And it raises questions about how much further the reach of the Directive might penetrate into other dimensions of material scope – including claims made by those working or self-employed in a host state, something that will be returned to below (Section 3.B.).

Meanwhile, in Commission v. UK, the Court disagreed with the Commission’s argument that the right to reside test distorted the Regulation’s habitual residence test; it is instead ‘a substantive condition which economically inactive persons must meet in order to be eligible for the social benefits at issue’.\textsuperscript{43} However, that finding does bridge to the Commission’s alternative argument, since the Court accepted that ‘a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect nationals of other Member States more than nationals of

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., para. 67.

\textsuperscript{39}Compare Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 64. This question is returned to in more detail below.

\textsuperscript{40}Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 68.

\textsuperscript{41}E.g. M. Cousins, ‘The baseless fabric of this vision: EU citizenship, the right to reside and EU law’, 23 Journal of Social Security Law (2016), p. 104: ‘The reference to economically inactive persons makes sense in the context of Directive 2004/38 if one assumes that it is a shorthand for persons who do not have a right to reside as workers (and/or perhaps as jobseekers). However, it makes no sense at all in the context of Regulation 883/2004 which has its own different scope ratione personae’.

\textsuperscript{42}Case C-480/08 Teixeira, para. 59: ‘if Article [10] of Regulation [492/2011] were to be interpreted as being limited, since the entry into force of Directive 2004/38, to conferring the right to equal treatment with regard to access to education without providing for any right of residence for the children of migrant workers, maintaining it would appear superfluous after the entry into force of that directive. Article 24(1) of the directive provides that all Union citizens residing in the territory of the host Member State are to enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that State within the scope of the Treaty, and it has been held that access to education falls within the scope of European Union law’. Regulation No. 492/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, [2011] OJ L 141/1.

\textsuperscript{43}Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 72.
the host state and there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage.\textsuperscript{44}

Turning then to the question of justification, the Commission had accepted that ‘a Member State may wish to ensure that there is a genuine link between the person claiming the benefit and the competent Member State’ – however, for social security benefits, it restated that ‘it is Regulation 883/2004 itself which establishes the means of testing whether such a genuine link exists (in this particular case, by applying the habitual residence criterion), and the Member States may make no changes to its provisions and add no supplementary conditions’.\textsuperscript{45} But the Court’s position on justification follows on from its leniency on that very question, concluding that

the need to protect the finances of the host Member State justifies in principle the possibility of checking whether residence is lawful when a social benefit is granted in particular to persons from other Member States who are not economically active, as such grant could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be accorded by that State.\textsuperscript{46}

Finally, in its evaluation of the proportionality of the condition, the Court agreed with the Advocate General that verification of lawful residence invokes Article 14(2) of the Directive, which provides: ‘[i]n specific cases where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her family members satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if these conditions are fulfilled. This verification shall not be carried out systematically’. The Court was satisfied that UK procedures complied with these criteria, finding that

the checking of compliance with the conditions laid down by Directive 2004/38 for existence of a right of residence is not carried out systematically and consequently is not contrary to the requirements of Article 14(2) of the directive. It is only in the event of doubt that the United Kingdom authorities effect the verification necessary to determine whether the claimant satisfies the conditions laid down by Directive 2004/38, in particular those set out in Article 7, and, therefore, whether he has a right to reside lawfully in United Kingdom territory, for the purposes of the directive.\textsuperscript{47}

\section{Comment}

\textit{Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto} and \textit{Commission v. UK} entrench the basic \textit{Dano} position on equal treatment for EU citizens: their right not to be discriminated against in a host state

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., para. 77, citing Case C-73/08 \textit{Bressol}, EU:C:2010:181, para. 41. The question of whether the discrimination at issue was direct or indirect is considered further below.

\textsuperscript{45} Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 \textit{Commission v. UK}, para. 24.

\textsuperscript{46} Case C-308/14 \textit{Commission v. UK}, para. 80, citing case law including Case C-140/12 \textit{Brey}, para. 61 and Case C-333/13 \textit{Dano}, para. 63.

\textsuperscript{47} Case C-308/14 \textit{Commission v. UK}, para. 84.
is connected to Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38, which is conditioned by a right to reside in that state, which is in turn conditioned by other relevant provisions of the Directive. It therefore seems far less likely that an applicant residing lawfully in a host state solely under national law (Martínez Sala) or another stream of EU law (Teixeira) could succeed – for ‘[t]he palette of [Directive-compliant] situations is clearly more restrained than that of situations coming “within the scope of application of the Treaties” which trigger the application of Article 18 TFEU’. The conditions established in the Directive are thus conferred with legal but also normative eminence in citizenship law, the implications of which will now be examined in more detail. The discussion first looks in more detail at how the fundamental free movement premises of discrimination, justification and proportionality played out in the recent case law. The relationship between the Directive and other sources of EU law – both primary and secondary – is then considered.

A. LAWFUL RESIDENCE, EQUAL TREATMENT AND DIRECTIVE 2004/38

1. The nature of the discrimination

All three cases concerned differential treatment between home and host state nationals, but Commission v. UK raised an interesting question about the nature of discriminatory treatment concerning EU nationals. As mentioned above, we saw that ‘the Commission contended that the lawful residence condition results in direct, or at least indirect, discrimination, prohibited by Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004’. The Court considered that the contested national condition amounted to indirect discrimination, since it is ‘intrinsically liable to affect nationals of other Member States more than nationals of the host state and there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage’. But what did the Commission try to argue in terms of direct discrimination, and why? In essence, it stated ‘that the right to reside test constitutes direct discrimination based on nationality, given that it involves a condition that applies only to foreign nationals because United Kingdom nationals who are resident in the United Kingdom satisfy it automatically’.51


49 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 74 (emphasis added).

50 Ibid., para. 77.

51 Ibid., para. 35.
The Commission referenced the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in *Bressol* to support this part of its claim. In that case, the Advocate General raised for debate the sometimes obscure dividing line between direct and indirect discrimination – drawing from case law on sex discrimination, she considered not just criteria explicitly framed as such, but also ‘*necessarily linked to a characteristic indissociable from sex*’. By analogy, ‘discrimination can be considered to be direct where the difference in treatment is based on a criterion which is either explicitly that of nationality or necessarily linked to a characteristic indissociable from nationality’. The right to reside condition contested in *Commission v. UK* clearly meets that test ‘because UK nationals resident in the United Kingdom automatically fulfil it’. O’Brien presents the reality here very clearly:

UK nationals do not ‘more easily satisfy’ the test; they do not ‘more often than not’ satisfy the test – they *always and automatically* satisfy the test and so are excused from meeting the condition. Only EU nationals must provide evidence of a right to reside. Only EU nationals can be excluded from entitlement due to economic inactivity.

However, despite having emphasized the need to distinguish the right to reside condition in the national rules from the habitual residence criterion in Regulation 883/2004, the Court in fact blended the two once again in its reasoning on this point, finding that the UK rules generate unequal treatment between UK nationals and nationals of other states since ‘such a residence condition is more easily satisfied by United Kingdom nationals, who more often than not are habitually resident in the United Kingdom, than by nationals of other Member States, whose residence, by contrast, is generally in a Member State other than the United Kingdom’.

Advocate General Cruz Villalón articulated the crux of the dilemma when he noted that ‘difference in treatment as regards the right of residence is inherent in the system and, to a certain extent, inevitable: by definition, a national of a Member State cannot be denied a right of residence in that State’. The ‘system’ that can be inferred here is that established by Directive 2004/38; since the Advocate General went on to reference the unequal treatment that Article 24(2) of this measure allows for in the context of social assistance. But, EU free movement law still places (legal) value on distinguishing between different kinds of unequal treatment. In *Bressol*, Advocate General Sharpston argued in essence that some rules, in their effects, are as close to direct discrimination as you can

52 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-73/08 *Bressol*, EU:C:2009:396, para. 52 (emphasis in original).
53 Ibid., para. 53.
54 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 *Commission v. UK*, para. 22; see similarly, Case C-308/14 *Commission v. UK*, para. 35 and Section 2 of the UK Immigration Act 1971.
56 Case C-308/14 *Commission v. UK*, para. 78.
57 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 *Commission v. UK*, para. 75.
get without labelling it as such explicitly. In that case and in *Commission v. UK*, the Court declined to transpose to free movement law the more nuanced template applied in sex discrimination law, which allows for this kind of complexity to be recognized. By citing its judgment, and not the Opinion, in *Bressol*, the Court opted, without further discussion, for the less severe outcome – less severe in the sense that the main legal consequence that flows from classification as indirect discrimination concerns the open-ended range of public interests that a state can then seek to defend.

### 2. Justification and proportionality

In the judgment in *Commission v. UK* – and since the defendant state was not confined to the limited Treaty grounds on which direct discrimination might be forgiven – the Court ruled that

> the need to protect the finances of the host Member State justifies in principle the possibility of checking whether residence is lawful when a social benefit is granted in particular to persons from other Member States who are not economically active, as such grant could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be accorded by that State.\(^{58}\)

The line of case law that the Court then cited in support of this point shows the low-key yet profoundly significant evolution of how the public finance defence has been handled in free movement law. This development can be traced through the Court’s own references. First, concern for the protection of public finances was acknowledged but balanced against – and presented overall as – a citizen-centred argument in *Grzelczyk* that ‘beneficiaries of the right of residence must not become an unreasonable burden on the public finances of the host Member State. Directive 93/96 (…) thus accepts a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States, particularly if the difficulties which a beneficiary of the right of residence encounters are temporary’.\(^{59}\) However, subsequently, we can observe both a more generalized version of that principle in *Bidar* and also a shift in the expression of it more accommodating of the interests of the state (‘although the Member States must, in the organisation and application of their social assistance systems, show a certain degree of financial solidarity with nationals of other Member States (…) it is permissible for a Member State to ensure that the grant of assistance to cover the maintenance costs of students from other Member States does not become an unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State’).\(^{60}\) Now, the public finance defence features centrally in the definition of social

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58 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 80.
59 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 44.
60 Case C-209/03 Bidar, EU:C:2005:169, para. 56.
assistance per se in *Brey*[^61] and *Dano*[^62] – ‘to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs and those of his family and who by reason of that fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public finances of the host Member State which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State’[^63].

In *Alimanovic*, the Court reiterated the related point from *Dano* that it is a stated objective of Directive 2004/38 to '[prevent] Union citizens who are nationals of other Member States from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State'.[^64] It is widely observed that this approach subdued other objectives also plainly articulated in the preamble as well as recalibrating, more generally, the diminution of solidarity borders that was either (depending on your view of the progress of integration) reflected or more consciously attempted by the Court in *Grzelczyk*.[^66] The line between apparently forbidden justification grounds based on purely economic reasons, on the one hand, and permitted justification grounds expressed in the language of public finance yet protecting broader aims and activities, on the other, is a difficult one to draw.[^67] However, in the reactions to date to *Alimanovic* and *Commission v. UK*, the more practical dimension of demonstrating the problem for public finances has attracted particular criticism. Two related issues stand out in this context – the softness of proportionality scrutiny that results from the confirmed move to systemic impact rather than individual circumstances assessment; and the prevalence of presumptions over proof.

As mentioned above, we saw that the Court expressly ruled out in *Alimanovic* the need for an assessment of the individual burden placed on the defendant state’s welfare system. Advocate General Wathelet had presented an alternative argument. While acknowledging that the ‘loss of the status of worker seems to be an appropriate, albeit restrictive, transposition of Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38’, he then considered that ‘its automatic consequences for entitlement to subsistence benefits under SGB II seem...’

[^61]: Case C-140/12 *Brey*, para. 61.
[^62]: Case C-333/13 *Dano*, para. 63.
[^63]: Ibid. and Case C-140/12 *Brey*, para. 61.
[^64]: Case C-67/14 *Alimanovic*, para. 50, citing Case C-333/13 *Dano*, para. 74. See also, Recital 10 of the preamble to Directive 2004/38.
[^65]: Compare for example, Case C-434/09 *McCarthy*, EU:C:2011:277, para. 28: ‘With regard to Directive 2004/38, the Court has already had occasion to point out that it aims to facilitate the exercise of the primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States that is conferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty and that it aims in particular to strengthen that right’.
to go beyond the general system established by that directive’. On that basis, and in a ‘remarkable effort to fit the reasoning in Dano with the findings in judgments predating it’, he suggested that

it is important that the competent authorities of the host Member State, when examining the application of a Union citizen, economically inactive and in a situation like that of Ms Alimanovic and her daughter Sonita, take into account, inter alia, not only the amount and regularity of the income received by the citizen of the Union, but also the period during which the benefit applied for is likely to be granted to them.

He then drew from the Court’s case law on how a real link with the host state might be demonstrated, which ‘ought to prevent automatic exclusion from those benefits’. In particular, drawing from the judgment in Prete, he recalled that demonstrating a real link to the labour market also includes personal factors, such as family circumstances, as well as labour market criteria, such as ‘[h]aving worked in the past, or even the fact of having found a new job after applying for the grant of social assistance’.

However, the Court provided three reasons for its decision to the contrary. First, since the Directive establishes a ‘gradual system’ concerning retention of the status of worker, that measure ‘itself takes into consideration various factors characterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance and, in particular, the duration of the exercise of any economic activity’. However, that statement just makes no sense – a ‘gradual system’ established by legislation cannot take into consideration ‘various factors characterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance’. Neither does it take into account ‘the duration of the exercise of any economic activity’ in each individual situation. It establishes instead a general – and not an individual – framework, one that is based on fixed time-points rather than more flexible qualitative criteria. The genuine confusion for national authorities caused by these kinds of guidelines does have to be acknowledged as a concern when more qualitative criteria are used, and this is returned to under the second point below. But the ‘gradual system’ put in place by the Directive cannot explain the softer guidance issued in consideration of the Breys – who

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68 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 103, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 77 (emphasis added).
70 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 103, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 78–79.
71 Ibid., para. 107.
72 Ibid., para. 111, citing Case C-367/11 Prete, EU:C:2012:668. See similarly, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, EU:C:2015:366, para. 79–90. Supporting this ‘distinction between first time jobseekers (who are excluded from social assistance) and jobseekers who have already lived and worked in the host society (who cannot be automatically excluded)’, see also, A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1013–1014.
73 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 60.
had barely arrived in Austria from Germany when their social assistance claim was lodged. Consider, in contrast, the Alimanovic facts:

all three children were born [in the host State]; the family had lived there in the past for a considerable amount of time; they returned in 2010 apparently with the intention to settle; Ms Alimanovic and her daughter had already joined the workforce in Germany, which showed that they were willing and capable of entering into an employment relationship. Such factors were not and could not be taken into account by the Directive, which focuses on ‘the duration of the exercise of any economic activity’.74

If it is time to move on from the long-established approach75 to proportionality in citizenship law – one that examines not just the appropriateness and necessity of the legal provision, but of its impact when applied in individual cases –, then suggesting that the same task is or even could be performed by a legislative measure adds nothing useful to that debate.

Second, the Court also emphasised in Alimanovic that the clarity offered by following the criteria set down in both the relevant national rules and Article 7(3)(c) of the Directive ‘guarantee[s] a significant level of legal certainty and transparency in the context of the award of social assistance by way of basic provision, while complying with the principle of proportionality’.76 As indicated just above, this rationale is far more convincing, having particular regard to the implementation of rights challenge facing national authorities. Nevertheless, a first quality of law problem, concerning the case law produced, is that, as also indicated above, the Court did not deal directly with its own previous case law – case law that had consistently pushed the individual assessment approach notwithstanding its practical weaknesses. Something changed after Brey; but that change has not been explained. A related risk is that, as we saw also in the discussion on direct/indirect discrimination, apparently simpler solutions cover rather than deal with the fact that the philosophy and the practice of free movement have become increasingly complicated. For example, while plainly acknowledging the difficulties and problems that fuzzier individual assessment tests do provoke, Iliopoulou-Penot equally cautions that aiming to reduce the problem through the turn that began in Dano but became much more overt in Alimanovic ‘might leave a dangerous imprint on the proper functioning of a general principle, which until now seemed inherent in the judicial application of norms of constitutional status’.77 However, it must also be pointed out that quality of law expectations apply to the drafting of the Directive too; and to reviewing it when some problematic ambiguities, gaps and problems are demonstrated very plainly through recurring case law instances.

76 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 61.
Third, the Court acknowledged that

the assistance awarded to a single applicant can scarcely be described as an ‘unreasonable burden’ for a Member State, within the meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive 2004/38. However, while an individual claim might not place the Member State concerned under an unreasonable burden, the accumulation of all the individual claims which would be submitted to it would be bound to do so.\footnote{78}{Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 62.}

On this point, we see a dangerous victory for presumption – ‘all the individual claims which \textit{would} be submitted to it’ – in contrast to the point made in \textit{Brey} that

in order to \textit{ascertain more precisely} the extent of the burden which that grant would place on the national social assistance system, it may be relevant, as the Commission argued at the hearing, to determine the proportion of the beneficiaries of that benefit who are Union citizens in receipt of a retirement pension in another Member State.\footnote{79}{Case C-140/12 \textit{Brey}, para. 78 (emphasis added).}

The problem with presumption is that it feeds right into the tendency towards exaggeration already too dominant in debates about free movement; in \textit{Garcia-Nieto}, even Advocate General Wathelet remarked that ‘granting entitlement to social assistance to Union citizens who are not required to have sufficient means of subsistence could result in relocation en masse liable to create an unreasonable burden on national social security systems’.\footnote{80}{Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-299/14 \textit{Garcia-Nieto}, para. 71.}

In contrast, O’Brien rightly calls for both the procedures and standards of proof evident more generally in free movement law to (continue to) play a part in citizenship case law too: ‘while politically potent, the mere mention of public finances on its own should not close down all argument. Some actual (not abstract) threat to public finances ought to be shown, in light of the evidence that fears of EU national benefit tourists are misplaced’.\footnote{81}{C. O’Brien, 53 \textit{CMLRev.} (2016), forthcoming.}

Here, Iliopoulou-Penot links the more problematic ‘indulgence’ of the Court as regards ‘the “cumulative effect” assertion in \textit{Alimanovic}\footnote{82}{A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 \textit{CMLRev.} (2016), p. 1027–1028.}} to the cryptic Commission declaration that it had been provided with ‘information’ showing that ‘the type of exceptional situation that the proposed safeguard mechanism is intended to cover exists in the United Kingdom today’ with respect to the so-called emergency brake proposed as a pre-referendum concession, which will be returned to below (Section 3.B.2.).\footnote{83}{Declaration of the European Commission on the Safeguard Mechanism referred to in paragraph 2(b) of Section D of the Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, February 2016; but presenting evidence to the opposite effect, including from the Commission itself, see C. O’Brien, ‘Cameron’s renegotiation and the burying of the balance of competencies review’, \textit{The UK in a Changing...}}}
The Court’s judgment in *Commission v. UK* also illustrates another side of softened proportionality review. It can be recalled that the Court focused not on the proportionality of the right to reside condition per se but on how it was applied.\(^84\) From that perspective, it in turn placed considerable emphasis on the fact that verification of lawful residence was compliant in its view with Article 14(2) of the Directive; in particular, it was practised ‘[i]n specific cases, where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his family members satisfy the conditions’ for lawful residence established by the Directive.\(^85\) The Court continued that data provided by a person claiming child benefit or child tax credit would reveal whether or not there is a right to reside in the United Kingdom, *those data being checked subsequently by the authorities* responsible for granting the benefit concerned. It is *only in specific cases* that claimants are *required to prove* that they in fact enjoy a right to reside lawfully in United Kingdom territory, as declared by them in the claim form.\(^86\)

The Court therefore concluded that checking for compliance with lawful residence was ‘not carried out systematically and consequently is not contrary to the requirements of Article 14(2) of the directive’.\(^87\)

Dismantling that analysis as ‘nonsense’, Cousins responds: ‘it is clear that there *is* systematic verification of the right to reside in every case – it is only the *degree* of verification which varies. Unsurprisingly, the UK authorities do not further verify a right to reside where it is clear that a claimant has such a right’.\(^88\) O’Brien further criticizes the reversal of the burden of proof effected by the judgment.\(^89\) The Court recalled that ‘the Commission (…) has the task of proving the existence of the alleged infringement and of providing the Court with the evidence necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out’ – but continued that the Commission had ‘not provided evidence or arguments showing that such checking does not satisfy the conditions of proportionality, that it is not appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective of protecting public finances or that it goes beyond what is necessary to attain that

\(^84\) For criticism of this point of conflation, see e.g. C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming: ‘It is the condition, not the checks, that is the main problem, and it is the condition that must be justified once it has been shown to be discriminatory. The checks are a separate, though important issue’.

\(^85\) Case C-308/14 *Commission v. UK*, para. 82.

\(^86\) Ibid., para. 83 (emphasis added).

\(^87\) Ibid., para. 84.


\(^89\) C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming: ‘the Court decided that it was the Commission’s responsibility to show that the checks were disproportionate, were not appropriate, or went beyond what was necessary. This is a problematic reversal of the burden of proof, and requires the Commission to provide information that is in possession of the UK’.
Here, the Court conflates proof of infringement with substantiation of defence. This and the morphing of justification and proportionality requirements more generally expose a series of quality of law problems in a substantive sense.

A final question concerns the consequences that might arise if it is found that a person claiming social benefits does not have a right to reside in the host state. None of the relevant public authorities had brought the disputes to the threshold of deportation in *Dano* or its three successor cases to date. After *Dano*, this practice raised questions about the responsibilities of states for citizens who became ‘tolerated’ in their territories but not supported there as a result. In *Commission v. UK*, Advocate General Cruz Villalón indicated quite clearly the direction in which he felt such responsibility lies:

> any finding by the national authorities that that Union citizen does not have a right of residence under that directive because he does not fulfil the requirements set out therein, regardless of whether this would carry an expulsion measure and despite the fact that it is merely declaratory, is ‘a decision [restricting] free movement of Union citizens’ within the meaning of Article 15(1) of that directive, which, as laid down in that provision, has the effect of activating the guarantees provided for in Articles 30 and 31 thereof.

If findings on lawful residence are required to be formalized in all cases in this way, how many – in reality – would not proceed to the next step of an expulsion measure? After all, if the administrative machinery of the state is already engaged, continuing down the trajectory does not seem as burdensome as having stopped at refusing the benefit in the first place. Perhaps then we are entering a phase of ‘tolerance no more’, which may be a fairer reflection and consequence of how citizenship law has developed – but maybe it is also fair to say that it does not seem very much like citizenship as a result.

**B. DIRECTIVE 2004/38 AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLES 18, 21 AND 45 TFEU**

The super-norm status conferred on Directive 2004/38 – and especially on the conditions set down in Article 7(1)(b), given that most national rules challenged to date restricted entitlement to social assistance and/or social benefits concern persons who are not engaged in work or self-employed – also raises tricky questions about the relationship between the rights conferred on citizens by Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, and of the different legislative measures adopted to give effect to these (different?) sets of primary rights. Three ways of conceiving that relationship might be relevant: the original, *parallel*

90 Case C-308/14 *Commission v. UK*, para. 85.
92 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 *Commission v. UK*, para. 95.
view on specific expression; the consequences of hybrid status; and a newer sense of specific expression superseded.

First, the original view on specific expression refers to the idea that freedom of movement for workers in Article 45 TFEU was deemed to be a specific expression of the right to reside and move freely conferred on citizens more generally by Article 21 TFEU. The principal consequence was that situations that fell within the scope of Article 45 were to be examined against that provision in the first instance, with consideration of Article 21 TFEU only being necessary if the case could not be resolved on that basis. This view suggested that Article 21 TFEU was a residual provision, called into being only when the economic freedoms were not otherwise triggered. However, second, in the case law on benefits payable to jobseekers, the Court fused the Treaty provisions together to construct ‘the hybrid system described in Collins’, that is

[i]n view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the interpretation in the case-law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article 45(2) [TFEU] – which expresses the fundamental principle of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article 18 TFEU – a benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member State.

Here, in contrast to the residual approach, Article 21 TFEU is blended with Article 45 TFEU; freedom of movement of workers is infused with a legal added value extracted from free movement as a citizenship right, to enhance the scope of equal treatment. Importantly, the solution developed in Collins could not have been achieved by using either provision alone.

But it is arguable that, third, post-Dano, the limitations signalled in Article 21 TFEU – which are laid down not just in the Treaties but also ‘by measures adopted to give them effect’ – now supersede other specific expressions of free movement rights. In what follows, the implications of this shift are first demonstrated through discussion of the interplay of secondary legislation as concerns the nature of the benefit at issue in recent case law. The implications of that reasoning for the rights of jobseekers and for the rights of migrant workers are then considered.

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93 See e.g. Case C-104/06 Commission v. Sweden, EU:C:2007:40, para. 15–16. See similarly, for services, Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz, EU:C:2007:492, para. 34: ‘it should be noted that Article 21 [TFEU], which lays down generally the right for every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in the provisions guaranteeing the freedom to provide services (...) If, therefore, the case in the main proceedings falls under Article [56 TFEU], it will not be necessary for the Court to rule on the interpretation of Article [21]’.


95 Case C-138/02 Collins, EU:C:2004:172, para. 63.
1. The nature of the benefit

The Court did have a classification question in Alimanovic, since it needed to determine what, more precisely, constituted a benefit intended to facilitate access to employment in a host state’s labour market. In his Opinion, it seems clear that Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer envisaged an inclusive interpretation:

the objective of the assistance must be analysed according to its results rather than according to the formal structure of the benefit (...) there may be ‘social assistance’ measures, as contemplated in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38, which promote integration into the labour market. In those circumstances, Collins demands that Article [45 TFEU] be applied and that social assistance be granted to persons seeking employment within the territory of the Union.96

The Court explicitly referred to his analysis in its judgment, confirming that ‘the objective of the benefit must be analysed according to its results and not according to its formal structure’.97 It noted too that national authorities should ‘not only (…) establish the existence of a real link with the labour market, but also to assess the constituent elements of that benefit, in particular its purposes and the conditions subject to which it is granted’.98

At the level of fact, financial assistance towards basic provision or housing has the ‘result’ of facilitating access to the labour market. Of course it does. In Alimanovic, Advocate General Wathelet acknowledged the ‘possibly mixed nature of the benefit on the classification of the measure (that is to say, the case in which the benefit in question possesses both features relating to social assistance and features relating to integration into the labour market)’.99 However, we saw above that the Court ultimately followed his ‘predominant function’ method, which results in a more restrictive outcome when coupled with the Brey functional definition of social assistance.100 The nature of the benefit question in Alimanovic thus involved a choice at the level of interpretation of concepts. What complicated the picture much further in Commission v. UK concerns the codification of choices in secondary legislation. As noted above, one problem links back to how the Alimanovic/Garcia-Nieto reasoning on social assistance benefits was transposed to social security benefits without comment or explanation.101 To compound that problem, questions about determining the nature of the benefit at issue exposed an ambiguity about how different pieces of secondary legislation work together.

96 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-22/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, para. 57 (emphasis in original).
97 Case C-22/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, para. 42.
98 Ibid., para. 41.
99 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 53.
100 See Section 2.A. above.
101 See Section 2.C. above.
In his Opinion, Advocate General Cruz Villalón, having acknowledged that ‘the purpose of Regulation 883/2004 is to coordinate Member States’ social security systems in order to guarantee that the right to free movement of persons may be exercised effectively’ went on to state that the Regulation

lays down a series of common principles which the social security legislation of all the Member States must observe and which, together with the system of conflict of laws rules it contains, ensure that persons exercising their right to free movement and residence within the Union will not be adversely treated by the various national systems because they have exercised that right. One of those common principles is the principle of equal treatment under Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 which, for the specific area of social security, embodies the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality which is applicable to all EU law under Article 18 TFEU.102

He also acknowledged that ‘whilst Directive 2004/38 takes account of the need to have recourse to social assistance benefits in the context of the lawfulness of residence, it is silent regarding social security benefits such as those at issue in this case’.103 That part of the analysis accorded with the submissions of the Commission.

However, the turn of argument then pursued changed the resolution of the dispute completely, and the reasoning applied could have implications far beyond the specifics of this case. The steps in the legal argument are critical. The Advocate General first stated that Article 18(1) TFEU prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein’; next, he pointed to the ‘measures adopted to give them effect’ part of Article 21(1). For the avoidance of any doubt, he referred also to the ‘limited nature’ of the freedom to move and reside as a Charter right, since, ‘[i]n accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, those rights are to be applied under the conditions and within the limits defined by the Treaties’.104 From a general starting point that ‘the EU legal order could hardly consist of a multiplicity of entirely separate compartments’, special emphasis was then placed on the fact that Directive 2004/38 had been adopted ‘[w]ith a view to remedying this sector-by-sector, piecemeal approach to the right of free movement and residence and facilitating the exercise of this right’.105 Extrapolating a claim to legal hierarchy for the Directive on that basis, he concluded:

I cannot agree with the Commission’s assertion that ‘the concept of residence in Regulation No 883/2004 (…) is not subject to any legal preconditions’ (…). [If] EU law subjects the exercise of freedom of movement and residence to certain limitations and conditions, embodied in

102 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 49. (emphasis added).
103 Ibid., para. 64.
104 Ibid., para. 69.
105 Recital 4 of Directive 2004/38/EC.
particular in Directive 2004/38, it seems clear that the provisions of Regulation No 883/2004 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to neutralise the conditions and limitations accompanying the grant and proclamation of that freedom.  

The idea of the Directive’s limitations and conditions setting preconditions – over and above any other legislative provisions connected to free movement – is a critical interpretative step. The prohibition on discrimination expressed in Article 4 of the Regulation is sidelined as the expression of a ‘common principle’ that is ‘applicable to all EU law under Article 18 TFEU’. Directive 2004/38 is confirmed all the more as the beginning and end of citizenship rights – their floor and their ceiling, as Spaventa puts it. Then noting variable references to ‘social benefits’ and ‘social assistance’ in Brey, Dano and Alimanovic, the Advocate General concluded that ‘there is nothing in those judgments to indicate that such findings apply exclusively to the social assistance benefits or the special non-contributory cash benefits with which those cases were concerned and not to other social benefits’.

We saw above that the Court’s treatment of these questions was far briefer but also apparently different. It emphasized more the coordination objective of the Regulation than the consolidation objective of the Directive. But the endpoint was the same: ‘there is nothing to prevent, in principle, the grant of social benefits to Union citizens who are not economically active being made subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfil the conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the host Member State’. This interpretation diminishes the Regulation at one level, since it enabled the strapping on of a lawful residence test from the Directive to the habitual residence test in the Regulation – even if the Court treated the two regulatory spaces as simply different. However, in contrast to the precondition reasoning applied by the Advocate General, the Court did not displace the prohibition on discrimination captured by Article 4 of the Regulation. Instead, the Court acknowledged an indirectly restrictive breach of it. But here, it did accept the Directive’s expression of lawful residence conditions as a justifiable discriminatory limit on the Regulation’s operation, leading O’Brien to note the irony that claimants ‘might only gain protection from discrimination if they have already

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106 Ibid., para. 72 and 73(emphasis added); see similarly, para. 77: ‘any difference in treatment between UK nationals and nationals of other Member States occurs at a stage before that of the practical application of Article 4 of Regulation No. 883/2004, and does not therefore affect its applicability in principle’.


109 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 74.

110 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 68.
passed a discriminatory test'.\textsuperscript{111} Both the Opinion and the judgment therefore affirm the super-norm reach of the Directive and, more specifically, its Article 7 conditions on lawful residence. Also, it may be recalled that the Court had ruled in \textit{Dano} that ‘whilst Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38 and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 reiterate the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, Article 24(2) of that directive contains a derogation from the principle of non-discrimination’.\textsuperscript{112} However, that different interpretative approaches were applied to arrive at the same endpoint may yet have considerable implications, as restrictions on equal treatment move further into the formerly sacred space of economic activity.

2. \textit{Implications for the free movement of workers}

The circumstances in \textit{Alimanovic} represented a difficult middle ground between citizens who are not, or are not yet, economically active and citizens who meet the definition of worker under EU law, since the claimants had undertaken economic activity in the host state but not of sufficient duration to comply with the criteria laid down in Directive 2004/28 for retention of worker status.\textsuperscript{113} However, that definition is, more generally, acknowledged to set a low threshold of contribution to the host state in contrast to the high threshold of equal treatment then triggered. It is therefore surprising that the Court did not consider whether Ms Alimanovic or her eldest daughter might have rights under Article 45 TFEU directly.\textsuperscript{114} It had determined in \textit{Saint Prix} that the criteria listed in Article 7(3) for the retention of worker status are not exhaustive, enabling it to secure continuity of worker status for a woman who stopped work for pregnancy and childbirth.\textsuperscript{115}

While greater consistency of approach to the role of primary rights is needed, it was perhaps easier for the Court to extract protection directly from Article 45 TFEU for a criterion not contemplated at all by the Directive than for the criteria that \textit{are} included there for former workers. It is perhaps also worth considering the sting in the \textit{Saint Prix} judgment tail: where a former worker has been employed in a host State for more than one year, entitlement to social assistance on the premise of equal treatment with nationals of that state seems to be open-ended; but in \textit{Saint Prix}, the Court attached a condition about returning to work ‘within a reasonable period’.\textsuperscript{116} Perhaps that dimension of Article 45 TFEU could yet influence the interpretation of Article 7(3) of the Directive as well.

\begin{itemize}
\item[112] Case C-333/13 \textit{Dano}, para. 64 (emphasis added).
\item[113] E.g. Case C-46/12 \textit{N}, EU:C:2013:97, para. 40 and 42, i.e. a person performing ‘services for and under the direction of another person, in return for which he receives remuneration’ and pursuing ‘effective and genuine activities which are not on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary’.
\item[114] See e.g. A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev (2016), p. 1018.
\item[116] Ibid., para. 41.
\end{itemize}
To date, equal treatment for migrant workers as regards entitlement to social benefits rests on Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011, which provides very plainly that a worker from another state ‘shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers’. Additionally, the Court has interpreted ‘social and tax advantages’ very broadly: ‘in view of the equality of treatment which the provision seeks to achieve, the substantive area of application must be delineated so as to include all social and tax advantages, whether or not attached to the contract of employment’. The Court also confirmed that so long as its threshold definition of work was reached, the worker was then entitled to social assistance on the same basis as nationals of the host state. Jobseekers were originally deemed not to come within the scope of Article 7(2) of the Regulation. However, despite the ‘objective difference’ between workers and those seeking work, we saw that Collins created a ‘hybrid system’ whereby, through the coupling of Articles 21 and 45 TFEU: ‘[t]he interpretation of the scope of the principle of equal treatment in relation to access to employment must reflect this development, as compared with the interpretation followed in Lebon’. Moreover, the Court went on to refer to the jobseekers allowance at issue in Collins as a social advantage with reference to Article 7(2) of the Regulation. But if the recent case law considered in this comment has moved us beyond original specific expression and hybrid analyses of the relationship between Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, towards a superseding of Treaty rights and also of conditions expressed in legislation other than Directive 2004/38, could this have implications for citizens who are working or self-employed in a host state?

In the context of examining economic justifications for free movement restrictions, Spaventa outlines the basic logic that has long protected equal treatment for migrant workers:

EU economic migrants might draw on host State welfare provision, but they also pay into it through general and ad hoc contribution. It is for this reason that economic justifications cannot be relied upon in the internal market: protectionism is to be eradicated, not encouraged.
She also expresses the converse implication: that the conditions requiring citizens not pursuing economic activity to be self-sufficient in order to reside lawfully in the host state are therefore legitimate, as are the economic considerations underpinning them.\textsuperscript{124}

Thus, it is not that workers do not have to meet the condition of lawful residence in the host State at all; but that working there satisfies it because Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive does not place any requirement of self-sufficiency on workers. In reality though, the Court’s approach to economic justifications has, as acknowledged by Spaventa, become far more fragile. As Davies explains,

\begin{quote}
\text{[t]he assumption that those in employment are self-sufficient is not reflected in many European societies, where significant parts of the labour force may rely on support varying from subsidized housing and medical care to tax breaks and income top-ups.}\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

The Court has itself moved towards a more explicit articulation of the qualitative as well as the functional integration link that work provides to the host state in the context of equal treatment claims. In this trend, Giubboni identifies seeds of ‘an interpretative reorientation, or detour’ that could, if consolidated further, ‘undermine (...) the unconditional right for migrant workers to have access to all the social benefits guaranteed by the host country’\textsuperscript{126} Two examples allow us to test how and to what extent recent case law might reach into equal treatment for migrant workers: first, the limitation in Article 24(2) of the Directive that no social assistance is payable during the first three months of residence; and second, the phased entitlement to in-work benefits proposed as part of the political settlement for UK membership of the EU negotiated in February 2016.

On the first example, there is a presumption in the case law that the exclusion of entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence does not apply to workers. In Garcia-Nieto, the Court stated that ‘it follows from the express wording of [Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38] that the host Member State may refuse to grant persons other than workers, self-employed persons or those who retain that status any social assistance during the first three months of residence’.\textsuperscript{127} But there is no such ‘express wording’ in that provision. In accordance with Article 24(1) of the Directive, workers do reside lawfully in a host state ‘on the basis of this Directive’ simply because they are workers; that does not explain why the clear and unconditional derogation from equal treatment in Article 24(2) of the Directive – that ‘the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence’ – should not then apply to them.

\begin{footnotes}
\item 124 \text{Ibid.}
\item 125 \text{G. Davies, ‘Migrant Union citizens and social assistance: trying to be reasonable about self-sufficiency’, College of Europe Research Papers in Law 2 (2016), https://www.coleurope.eu/study/european-legal-studies/research-publications, p. 5.}
\item 126 \text{See S. Giubboni, 7 Perspectives on Federalism (2015), p. 15, discussing Case C-20/12 Giersch, para. 65.}
\item 127 \text{Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, para. 44 (emphasis added).}
\end{footnotes}
Turning to the second example, it was noted earlier that the February 2016 Conclusions included a proposed amendment to Regulation 492/2011 in the form of an emergency brake, outlined as an alert and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of inflow of workers from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time (...). A Member State (...) would notify the Commission and the Council that such an exceptional situation exists on a scale that affects essential aspects of its social security system, including the primary purpose of its in-work benefits system, or which leads to difficulties which are serious and liable to persist in its employment market or are putting an excessive pressure on the proper functioning of its public services. On a proposal from the Commission after having examined the notification and the reasons stated therein, the Council could authorise the Member State concerned to restrict access to non-contributory in-work benefits to the extent necessary. The Council would authorise that Member State to limit the access of newly arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefits for a total period of up to four years from the commencement of employment. The limitation should be graduated, from an initial complete exclusion but gradually increasing access to such benefits to take account of the growing connection of the worker with the labour market of the host Member State.\footnote{128}

Had this Decision come into effect, and the proposed amendment to Regulation 492/2011 proceeded in the directly discriminatory language in which it was framed (‘EU workers’), then noting the Court’s reluctance to deal with public interest justification and direct discrimination in Commission v. UK, the revised legislation was very unlikely to have survived a legal challenge. However, had the amendments been drafted more neutrally (that is, based on residence), the nature of the legal problem changes. How, in that case, would the relationship between Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, and between Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 492/2011, be managed?

Noting the clear transposition of economic justification to situations involving economic activity in the text of the Decision, refusal to listen to that public interest defence would have been one striking outcome. But observing how the public finance narrative has intensified towards state interests over time, as traced above, makes that unlikely. This brings us back to the distinction between the ascendancy conferred on Directive 2004/38 in recent case law, on the one hand, and how it was conferred, on the other. The originally protective status that the specific expression and hybrid interpretations wrapped around Article 45 TFEU (and Regulation 492/2011 in consequence) no longer seem sufficiently sturdy to withstand the kind of system envisaged by the 2016 Decision. But how far could the superseding of free movement of workers by the Directive actually be taken?

At the very least, it seems strange that the Decision did not explicitly require an amendment of Article 24(2) of the Directive at least, if not some alteration of Article 7(1)(a) also. Assuming that the EU legislature did in fact intend to amend Article 24(2), would

\footnote{128 See footnote 86 above.}
that be the end of the matter? Here is where the differing approaches of the Advocate General and Court in Commission v. UK could make a critical legal difference. If the logic of the Opinion were followed, then Directive 2004/38 would simply displace Articles 18 and 45 TFEU as a more specific expression of equal treatment. An appropriate amendment to the Directive's text would then be the end of the matter, subject to checks on proportionality – and even then, not entirely rigorous checks if the weak requirements on evidence and proof evident in Commission v. UK were followed.

However, in that case, the Court admitted consideration of the right to reside test in the first place since the Regulation was 'not intended to lay down the conditions creating the right to social security benefits'. Regulation 492/2011 is patently intended to lay down the conditions for equal treatment of workers. Does that change its relationship to Directive 2004/38, restoring the more conventional 'specific expression' route for examining any proposed amendments of the Regulation, that is, against Articles 18 and TFEU directly? But opening up the link between equal treatment and economic activity would still have tested both the limits of and philosophy underpinning what, post Dano, the Court has told us three more times is true – to claim equal treatment rights, lawful residence needs to be established only in accordance with what Directive 2004/38 says that lawful residence means. If some form of self-sufficiency requirement for workers and self-employed persons were included in Article 7 of that measure, then it could displace Article 7 of Regulation 492/2011.

Events have since overtaken the February 2016 Decision. But the problems – and the pressures – remain. Let us not forget that the UK initiating a discussion about limiting the free movement of workers is not really the key point; rather, it is that 27 other Member States wanted – or, at least, were ready – to do it.

§4. CONCLUSION

The decisions in Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v. UK do create a consistent line of jurisprudence with Dano, confirming the main premises of that judgment and also expanding them through application in different contexts. But then, the weaknesses of Dano from a quality of law perspective are compounded in consequence too. Commentary continues to question more broadly what kind of citizenship law is being shaped as a result. This comment does not seek to argue that a connection between lawful residence and equal treatment is per se unacceptable. But how that connection has been developed and applied does matter. In that respect, critiques of the part played

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129 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 65. However, for criticism of that finding too, see C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming.

by the Court persist. But even where the restrictive case law on lawful residence and social benefits is appreciated in the fraught context of crisis-ridden welfare politics, what remains more difficult to condone is the extent of the distortion of quality of law – of legal methodology and of systemic coherence – that has been practised to reach the case law outcomes. Quality of case law is also intrinsically tied to quality of the legislation that underpins it: Davies is right that the legislative responsibility to regulate free movement well is not being fulfilled.

How mobility is experienced has long outgrown the basic constructs developed for life at a very different time and in a very different world. The appealing simplicity of the framework of equal treatment law undoubtedly contributed to its rooting in the legal and political systems of Member States. But how we exercise free movement and how we define discrimination have changed entirely since the European Economic Community was first conceived. People lead more complicated cross-border lives, while the legal components of equal treatment and free movement have barely changed. The minimalist framework of free movement law compresses legal nuances, mashes distinct concerns together, and generates blunt legal solutions to very different practical problems. The law and legal institutions have become too remote from the facts on the ground. And the inherent connections between equal treatment in free movement and the ‘European project’ then become toxic, disaffection with the former inevitably bleeding into the latter.

In the 2016 negotiations, the UK Government presented the objective of ‘renegotiating’ free movement from a destructive starting point that sought the dismantling of rights in order to reduce them, and with no regard to the wider system of EU law or its role in grounding the Union. By contrast, let us invert the premises of the UK challenge into a constructive rethinking of equal treatment and free movement law – not to reduce rights, but to strengthen them. For now, recent case law on lawful residence exhibits the surprising extent to which what we might consider to be basic EU law – how legislative measures interact with each other, for example – is far less worked out than thought it was, in EU citizenship at least.

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