Metropolitan Policing Agendas in Britain: Divergent Tendencies in a Fragmenting State?

Adam Edwards, Sophie Chambers, Nick Fyfe & Alistair Henry

1. Introduction

This chapter draws on case study research into governing arrangements and agendas in Bristol, Cardiff, London and Edinburgh to question assumptions about the interplay of global and local social relations, elsewhere referred to as ‘glocalisation’ (Swyngedouw, 1997), in driving metropolitan policing agendas in Britain. It has been argued this interplay generates greater sub-national variegation in broader processes of social and economic change, as city-regions thrive or struggle to adapt in a world system characterised by the greater mobility of capital, labour, goods and services across national borders (Sassen, 2001; Massey, 2004; Moulaert et al, 2007; Warwick Commission, 2012). In turn it is argued, not least by institutions of the European Union, that this mobility can weaken the sovereign powers of nation states, including their capacity to ensure internal security within their own borders, and consequently necessitates transnational responses to transnational threats (European Commission, 2015). However, allied arguments about the establishment of a ‘transnational state system’ (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2011) and related ‘post-national state formations’ (Jessop, 2004), seem premature given the current resurgence of nationalist political movements in Europe. The most obvious expression of this, of fundamental concern for the subject matter of this chapter, is the outcome of the UK referendum on membership of the European Union, held on 23rd June 2016, in favour of leaving. Whether the vote for so-called ‘Brexit’ is actually accepted by the UK Parliament and, if so, what kind of nation state emerges from the subsequent and prolonged renegotiation of the UK’s international relations, including its commitment to policing and judicial cooperation in Europe, this development re-emphasises the continued analytical importance of nation-state power, a theme that has also been pursued in recent accounts of sovereignty and the national security state (Lea and Stenson, 2007; Hallsworth and Lea, 2011; Stenson, 2012).

The chapter uses the cases of metropolitan policing agendas in Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh and London to question how the differential insertion of city-regions into this world system might generate divergent trajectories for policing, for example the particular policing problems that capitals, as contrasted with regional cities, encounter as the focal points for national and international protest as well as mundane problems of crime and civil unrest. It also uses contrasts and comparisons of governing arrangements and policy agendas for policing in these four city-
regions to question the presumption that glocalisation necessarily generates greater sub-national variegation or whether, insofar as meaningful divergences exist, they are better explained as contingencies, particularly of the political agency of key actors such as police chiefs, elected mayors and, in England and Wales, the recently established Police and Crime Commissioners.

The chapter contrasts this presumption with two countervailing arguments. Firstly, that irrespective of any governing arrangements devolving policy-making for metropolitan policing to sub-national authorities, policing agendas are converging, as authorities copy one another’s responses to commonly perceived problems, such as organised crime, terrorism, migration and social cohesion. Secondly, that nation states retain considerable influence over the trajectories of local governance within their sovereign territory and that insofar as any divergences can be identified across Europe these are better understood in terms of inter-national rather than intra-national comparisons.

Addressing these countervailing arguments necessitates some engagement with the meaning of nation state power in the United Kingdom and its role in shaping policing. To this end, certain particularities of the constitutional-legal settlement in the United Kingdom need to be acknowledged, including the ongoing process of devolving political authority to the constituent nations of the Union and, within England and Wales, to sub-national actors such as the directly elected mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners. In this context, pressures for greater self-determination within the four constituent nations of the ‘United Kingdom’ render abstract concepts of the national security state problematic. Following the devolution of powers to these constituent nations, commencing in the late-1990s with the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, the United Kingdom is better conceptualised as a fragmenting, if not a Federalising, state rather than a coherent unitary political actor. Grounds for thinking about the fragmentation of the UK include the composition of the Brexit vote, which was primarily concentrated in provincial England and Wales, whereas voters in Scotland and Northern Ireland voted overwhelmingly to remain within the European Union. In turn this provoked Nicola Sturgeon, the First Minister of the Scottish Parliament and leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), to argue the case for another referendum on Scottish independence from the United Kingdom, claiming this was now back on the agenda less than two years since the last vote, which the Scottish independence movement narrowly lost.

Further peculiarities in the constitution of the United Kingdom complicate simple references to nation-state power, especially in relationship to policing. Scotland has always had its own legal
system and separate governing arrangements for policing and criminal justice to those of England and Wales. In turn governing arrangements for policing and criminal justice in Northern Ireland have evolved separately and in reaction to the particular conditions generated by the long-standing conflict between unionists and Irish republicans and by the subsequent peace process. Yet a further layer of complexity exists as a consequence of devolution in Wales where some competencies for contemporary policing, including the role of schools, health authorities and local government working together in multi-agency ‘partnerships’ for ‘community safety’\(^1\), have been devolved to the Welsh Government whilst others, specifically relating to the police, the courts and the management of offenders by probation and prison services have not. Finally, in part as a response to the anomalies of this earlier phase of devolution, in particular the absence of a specifically English assembly within the UK, a number of ‘devolution deals’ have been made with city-regional authorities in England, in particular the pilot case of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA), which include responsibility for the strategic leadership of policing. It will be argued that opportunities arise for sub-national discretion and political agency in setting metropolitan policing agendas precisely as a consequence of this constitutional mess, itself a product of an unstable compromise to retain the integrity of the United Kingdom. In this sense it may seem counter-intuitive to respond to pressures for fragmentation with constitutional reforms that devolve rather than reassert nation state power but in this regard various devolution deals within and between the constituent nations of the UK can be understood as a means of averting the collapse of the UK into secessionist conflicts. Fragmentation is one thing, secession is another. In promoting the former to avoid the latter, however, new circuits of power are established which can facilitate divergent policing agendas.

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\(^1\) Multi-agency partnerships for community safety are not specific to Wales, although they explain the particular interest in, and influence over, policing by the Welsh Government even though police and criminal justice policy-making is not, as yet, devolved to Wales. Initially these partnerships evolved on an ad hoc basis throughout England and Wales and in Scotland as a consequence of forward-looking, innovative, local authorities and chief constables who voluntarily co-operated as a means of tackling problems of crime and civil unrest through preventive interventions not just reactive criminal law enforcement. Such was the perceived success of this approach that forming multi-agency partnerships became a statutory duty, placed on all local authorities and police services in England and Wales, by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. During this ‘national mandatory period’, public policing was statutorily required to be an exercise in partnership between the police, local authorities and other ‘responsible authorities’, in particular health, fire and rescue, and offender management services and something that could not, therefore, be reduced simply to the actions of the (state) police. Gilling et al (2013) argue that this period has since been superseded by the ‘new localism’ promoted by the Coalition Government, 2010 – 2015, and the Conservative administration elected in 2015. In this period responsible authorities have been freed from detailed performance management by national government in England and Wales (but not in Scotland, see below) and invited to formulate their own partnership approach but have also had their resources severely reduced in line with the ‘austerity programme’ pursued by these administrations.
2. Comparing metropolitan policing agendas in the context of devolution

The vote in favour of ‘Brexit’ occurred during the final drafting of this chapter and, whilst it is clearly too early to ascertain what the implications will be, it is an exemplar of the kind of national politics discussed in other recent accounts of policing change (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011; Lea and Stenson, 2007; Stenson, 2012), particularly given the prominence of policing, immigration and national sovereignty in the Leave campaign. Even so, there is an important difference between the de jure, constitutional-legal, powers claimed by nationalist politics and the de facto powers of nation states to govern within their territories. Transnational challenges that are unlikely to respect territorial boundaries, whilst fundamentally shaping or disrupting social order within them, abound notably those facilitated by the internet and the proliferation of digital communications. In any case, what, in post-Brexit conditions, will constitute the UK’s territory for internal security? In addition to rekindling calls for a referendum on Scottish Independence, Brexit has disrupted the peace process in Northern Ireland, given the prospect of re-establishing a land border between the six counties of the North and the Republic of Ireland.

If understanding the powers and analytical significance of metropolitan policing, including the very existence of distinctive sub-national policing agendas, entails an understanding of the relationship of these agendas to ‘national’ policy-making, what constitutes national policy in the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’? The full title of this constitutional-legal settlement indicates its complexity, a product, in turn, of the ongoing political conflicts and compromises between the historic nations of England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales which, in their latest phase, can be traced back to the various devolution agreements of the late-1990s. Specifically in relation to policing policy, this complexity has three key dimensions that set the context for the case studies discussed later: the asymmetrical devolution of powers, the process of centralisation pursued in Scotland, and the purported decentralisation of policy-making in England and Wales given the establishment of the elected Police and Crime Commissioners covering 41 constabularies (state police forces) in England and Wales, the adoption of this role by the elected mayor for London and, prospectively, by other elected mayors in newly established city regions. For the analytical purposes of this edited collection and given the very distinctive experience of policing during and following the conflict in Northern Ireland, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the comparison of metropolitan policing in Britain.

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2 For a comparison of policing in the UK and Eire, see (Gilling et al, 2013) for a recent reviews of policing in Northern Ireland see Topping (2016) and Ellison and O’Reilly (2008).
As discussed in the introduction to this edited volume, the second phase of the Policing European Metropolises Project defines the objects of comparison as the formulation of policy agendas for metropolitan policing. It does this in order to establish any convergent and divergent trends in the strategic priorities of metropolitan policing and to question the very existence of sub-national policing agendas. In England and Wales, this comparative task has been simplified following the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, which provided for the election of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in each constabulary area who have the statutory duty to set the strategic priorities and allocate funding for policing in their areas (Edwards and Prins, 2014). To this end, each PCC is required to formulate and publish a Police and Crime Plan covering their four year term of office. Whilst these plans provide an initial empirical focus for investigating metropolitan policing agendas, the Plans cover entire constabulary areas which include within them several districts or boroughs which are the basic units of municipal government in England and Wales. In effect the PCCs introduced a regional tier of government in which several boroughs compete for prioritisation on the relevant PCC’s agenda. As a consequence, further case study research has been undertaken to clarify the relationship of the Plans to the policing agendas for Cardiff, the capital of Wales and largest city within the region covered by the PCC for South Wales, and Bristol, the largest city in the region covered by the PCC for Avon and Somerset in the South West of England.

In London the situation is different as the elected Mayor undertakes the statutory obligations of the PCCs including the publication of the Police and Crime Plan for Greater London by the Mayor’s Office for Police and Crime (MOPAC). As with other PCCs, MOPAC are obliged to engage in public consultations about their proposed Plans, which although variable in quality and content, also provide an important source of empirical data on policing policy and politics (Edwards and Prins, 2014: 72). The statutory obligation for PCCs to consult the public about their Plans was a key factor in the 2010-15 Coalition Government’s ‘Big Society’ Agenda, aiming to devolve power to the local level and to better engage the public in policy-making, particularly in an era of austerity and controversial decisions about cuts to expenditure on public services.

Explaining the distinctiveness of Policing governance in London requires further clarification of the peculiarities of constitutional power in the UK. Until the election of the Mayor for London in 2000 there were no directly elected mayors in England or Wales, instead mayors performed a ceremonial, non-party political, role. The case for directly elected mayors gained momentum during the 1990s amongst those wishing to enhance the strategic leadership of local government in social and economic affairs and to improve the democratic accountability of that leadership to local electorates who, research suggests, often don’t know who their local elected representatives are, what governing programmes they are pursuing or whom to contact should they...
wish to complain. In this context it is argued that directly elected mayors provide a clear, responsive and accountable focus for local political and economic leadership (Warwick Commission, 2012). Opinion remains divided, however, over the strengths and limitations of this more ‘presidential’ style of government relative to the more collective, albeit complicated and obscure, ‘leader and cabinet-based’ structure of local government that currently persists in most local authorities in England and in all local authorities in Wales. However, such was the perceived need for strategic leadership across the region of Greater London that a directly elected Mayor was established by the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and the first incumbent of this office, Ken Livingstone, was subsequently elected in 2000. It is important to emphasise that directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) are, in effect, regional political actors overseeing the strategic direction of policing across a whole police service area which will encompass a number of local authorities. Indeed, as discussed in the case studies in this chapter, one of the key tensions driving the politics of metropolitan policing is between these regional actors and the various local authorities that fall within their administration. In the case of Greater London the office of elected Mayor pre-dated the establishment of the PCCs in 2012 and so the capacity for strategic leadership of the Metropolitan Police Service already existed without duplicating it through the establishment of a Police and Crime Commissioner for Greater London. Hence, the office of the Mayor of London assumed the strategic responsibilities for policing that, elsewhere in England and Wales were given to the PCCs.

At the time of writing, the incumbent Conservative UK Government had expressed its intention to extend the London model of city-regional governance to other places. To this end it passed the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 which provides for the establishment of directly elected mayors in regions of combined local authorities. This Act also empowers the UK Government to agree devolution deals with a combined city-regional authority that include responsibility for policing. Where such deals are reached, as they have been with the establishment of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA), responsibility for policing will transfer from the relevant PCC to any newly elected city-regional mayor. Although the provisions of this Act are generic it is expected they will, in the first instance, apply to the ‘Core Cities Group’3 of large urban conurbations in the UK, including Bristol and Cardiff. The first devolution deal to be negotiated has been with the GMCA, the Mayor for which will be directly elected in May 2017. This emerging geometry of city-regional power provides the political conditions both for distinctive and divergent governing ‘regimes’ which may maintain the conventional prioritisation of criminal justice responses to security threats, ‘develop’ this agenda augmenting law enforcement with forms of risk management or else ‘reform’ or ‘transform’ this conventional agenda through the promotion of alternative, restorative and social, justice policies (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). This new geometry also has the prospect of intensifying ‘civic boosterism’ including the competition for resources within and between combined authorities and with other areas of local governance in the UK, in particular rural areas and smaller towns which some fear will be neglected as a consequence of this increasing metropolitan emphasis (BBC News, 2015).

The situation is again quite different in Scotland. Just as PCCs were being established locally throughout England and Wales, Scotland underwent a quite divergent process of reform, the drivers of which were less about local democracy and more about good governance and economic efficiency (Fyfe and Henry, 2013). The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 amalgamated Scotland’s eight regional police forces into a single Police Service for Scotland, now named Police Scotland, which came into being on 1 April 2013. Powers previously associated with local Police Boards around funding, strategic policy development, and the appointment and dismissal of senior ranks were centralized at a national level with the establishment of the Scottish Police Authority (SPA). However, the 2012 Act did give statutory force to the importance of ‘local policing’, although without ever defining what this phrase means, by maintaining two key links with local government, both of which are relevant to any consideration of emergent policing strategies or agendas specific to the City of Edinburgh. On the one hand Local Scrutiny and Engagement Committees (replacing the Police Boards but not themselves defined in the legislation itself) were established by each of the 32 local authorities in Scotland, with a direct link to a Local Area Commander in Police Scotland to be consulted on the drafting of Local Police Plans reflecting local interests (which is required in the legislation). Police Scotland has since been structured into 14 Divisions with a Divisional Commander at the rank of Chief Superintendent, some of which serve multiple local authorities (see Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). However, the Edinburgh Division of Police Scotland is coterminous with Edinburgh City Council making agreed plans and policies a good approximation of such at the city level. The second local government link was the maintenance of Police Scotland’s statutory duty to participate in Community Planning, the model of local partnership working formally established in Scotland in 2003. Although Community Planning covers the governance of public services more generally, the strategic policies and agendas of the Edinburgh City Partnership potentially provide further insight into how Edinburgh seeks to negotiate current challenges of urban governance. Given the advent of these new governing arrangements for policing, it is possible to clarify and justify the scope of applicability, objects and predicates for comparing metropolitan policing agendas across the constituent national contexts of Britain.

2.1. Scope of applicability

As Sztompka (1990) notes, defining the logic and foci of comparative research is a theoretically-driven exercise. As the title to this chapter suggests, the logic of comparing policing agendas in
Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh and London is to question whether the increasing devolution of governing competencies has resulted in any major divergence in policing agendas. The decentralisation of governing arrangements through devolution, which commenced in earnest during the UK New Labour administration (1997 – 2010), has been complemented in England by the ‘new localism’ advocated by the UK Coalition Government (2010 – 2015), which emphasises the rights of municipal authorities to set their own policy agendas but also their responsibilities for finding the resources for these agendas in an era of ‘austere’ public expenditure. As noted above, the new localism has been intensified by the Conservative administration elected in 2015 through the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. It is in the context of this constitutional change that the UK, once a highly centralised, unitary, polity is becoming an increasingly decentralised and fragmented state. However, within the devolved region of Scotland, Westminster’s wider policy of decentralisation is less in evidence. Here, policing exemplifies a divergent tendency towards the greater centralisation of public administration under the strong direction of the Scottish Government at Holyrood. A key component of this centralisation is the use of ‘single outcome agreements’ by the Scottish Government to define the priorities of the police and other public authorities and to relate the provision of increasingly stringent budgets to compliance with these priorities. There is somewhat of a tension, however, between this process of centralisation and the establishment of the Scottish Cities Alliance, in 2011 to promote Scottish city-regions as engines of economic development and social well-being.

Apropos the introduction to this edited volume and its discussion of multiple, over-lapping, internal security fields, the UK ‘security field’ is shared by all four particular metropolises selected for comparison here. Specifically, the UK field is a primary focus for policy responses to serious and organised crime and for counter-terrorism. Whilst metropolises, particularly the capitals of the constituent nations of the UK, are both lucrative and symbolic targets for serious crime and terrorism, these are perceived in the UK National Intelligence Model for policing, to be threats that

4 The UK National Intelligence Model (NIM) was first introduced by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in 2000 and endorsed by both the Association of Chief Police Officers for England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO) and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) (see NCIS, 2000). Subsequently NCIS, which provided intelligence support to police services in ACPO and ACPOS on matters of transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and regional, cross-police service, threats, such as football hooliganism, was replaced by the Serious Organised Crime Agency in 2006 which, in turn, was replaced by the UK National Crime Agency in 2013. Also, in 2013 ACPOS was disbanded following the establishment of the single national Police Service of Scotland, entitled, ‘Police Scotland’. Whilst this institutional and constitutional reform reflects the very tensions and processes of fragmentation that are the focus of this chapter, the NIM remains in use as a conceptual framework which policing policy-makers can use to distinguish between, and subsequently prioritise, threats that are primarily local (Level 1) from those that are regional and necessitate co-operation between different policing agencies (Level 2) and those which are transnational, including terrorism (Level 3). Much of the current politics of policing in the UK, including that of metropolitan policing, reflects disputes over
have a transnational dimension that cannot be adequately addressed by metropolitan authorities. Even so, Cardiff has, at least rhetorically, distinguished its policing and crime control agenda from that pursued in England. There is a purported ‘Dragonisation’ of policing which defines a distinctively Welsh security field (Edwards and Hughes, 2009) of policies for volume crime and disorder reduction, most obviously in approaches to youth offending. It is argued, for example, that the All Wales Youth Offending Strategy reflects the determination of the Welsh Government to define youth crime as a problem of social justice, of failures on behalf of the state to adequately extend to young people their entitlements to health, education and employment, as distinct from the ‘low trust’ and punitive politics of youth justice that is perceived by some to prevail in England (Drakeford, 2010).

Similarly to Wales, in Scotland both the political rhetoric of the SNP government since 2007 and the pre-existing institutional design of the Children’s Hearings system formally present youth crime and associated inequalities as primarily issues of social justice. In the specific case of policing the aforementioned 2012 Act also adopts a progressive tone in setting out the purposes of the police in Scotland around issues of securing community well-being and engagement through working in partnership with others (s32). So the language of social justice certainly does seem to have some political currency in the Scottish security field at present, even if it does not necessarily shape actual practice in either youth justice or policing (McAra, 2014).

Within the English security field, however, London is such an exceptional policing context given its status as a ‘global city’ (Edwards and Prins, 2014), that an understanding of any English effect on metropolitan policing agendas also requires the study of provincial cities. In this regard, Bristol was selected because it has, in the past, been regarded as a locality with commensurate policing and crime problems to those of Cardiff, as contrasted with the higher magnitude of problems encountered in the big English conurbations such as the West Midlands, Greater Manchester and Merseyside. Finally, these metropolises also inhabit the EU security field but in ways which reflect the very particular and post-Brexit conditions of the UK’s membership of the European Union. So, these cities are all subject to the major, unanticipated, legal migration of EU citizens, notably from Eastern and Central European countries following the Eastward expansion of the EU in 2004 and

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5 A reference to the national symbol of Wales, Y Ddraig Goch, ‘The Red Dragon’.
2007, but they are not a part of the Schengen Agreement Area of cross border freedom of movement. This, it has been argued, is a major contrast with the security challenges which confronted the Parisian authorities, ahead of the terrorist attack on Friday 13th November 2015, as a consequence of the ease of movement of the attackers across the French and Belgian borders within the Schengen Area (see 3.2., below).

In summary, we have taken major constitutional reform in the UK since the late-1990s as the temporal scope of our comparison, to consider the proposition that such reform will facilitate divergence in metropolitan policing agendas and, therefore, opportunities for learning from this divergence in understanding how else UK metropolises can be policed. We have also defined the applicable scope of comparison in terms of the various internal security fields these metropolises inhabit as a consequence of their particular location in overlapping EU, UK, English, Scottish and Welsh contexts of policing. The concern with these multiple, overlapping, internal security fields is also driven by a theoretical assumption, that the particular configuration of these fields will facilitate divergence in policing agendas given the ways in which metropolitan, national and European security fields interact and how these can alter the standing conditions and dispositions of policing agendas (see ‘scope of predicates’, below). A rival proposition, however, is that the interaction of these different security fields will facilitate increased convergence in policing agendas akin to the thesis that organisations tend to copy the most successful in their field as a means of maximising their own success and minimising the risks of failure and reputational damage associated with radical innovation, that of so called ‘mimetic institutional isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In turn, this is akin to McAra’s (2006) account of the apparent contradiction between devolution in Scotland and the pursuit, by the Labour Party administration during the first Scottish Parliaments post-Devolution, of policing and criminal justice policies much closer to those pursued at that time by the New Labour administration in England, a process McAra describes as ‘de-Tartanisation’. It is through this comparative logic of seeking uniqueness in metropolitan policing agendas and failing to find it, that convergence can be established.

2.2. Scope of objects

As also noted in the introduction to this edited collection, the comparative work undertaken for the second phase of the Policing European Metropolises Project delimits the objects of analysis to:

- ‘public’ policing (not commercial, voluntary or informal);
- ‘policy formulation’ (not implementation or evaluation of outcomes); that is

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6 An analogy with the distinctively Scottish ‘Tartan’ cloth.
• ‘strategic’ and concerned with medium-term planning and agenda-setting (not operational policing).

This is not to deny the significance of these other objects for comparison but to privilege, in the first instance, a concern with the capacity of metropolitan authorities to set their own policing agendas before any further research into the capacity of metropolitan actors to translate these agendas into practice is undertaken. In some instances, such as the regional Police and Crime Plans formulated by the PCCs, there is an obvious empirical focus for comparison. In others, further case study research is required to elicit municipal-level policing agendas, as in the ‘What Matters’ strategy for governing Cardiff from 2010-2020, which is formulated by an ‘integrated partnership board’ of all the authorities responsible for delivering public or statutory services in that metropolis, including the police, and which identifies strategic priorities for policing as part of its ‘Safer and Cohesive Communities workstream’.

Further material is also available on the thinking, consultation and arguments behind the formulation of these agendas as registered in the minutes of key decision-making arenas, such as municipal authority ‘oversight and scrutiny committees’, which are charged with scrutinising the formulation, implementation and outcomes of policing agendas, and Police and Crime Panels which provide an opportunity to hold PCC’s to account for their priorities and performance. These decision-making arenas are part of the complex apparatus of the ‘partnership approach’ to policing and crime reduction which has, since the mid-1980s formally extended responsibility for policing in England and Wales beyond the (state) police to other responsible authorities (Hughes, 2007). The methodological corollary of this shift to multi-agency policing is that metropolitan policing agendas are set by partnership boards in concert with PCCs rather than by senior police officers and it is the decision-making arenas of partnerships that provide a key empirical focus for comparative research (Edwards and Prins, 2014: 72).

2.3. Scope of predicates
Understanding policy formulation implies a theory of power and, in these terms, our comparison has employed concepts from Clegg’s (1989) ‘circuits of power’ framework. This proceeds from the basic assumption that power is a strategic relation, in Machiavelli’s sense of a campaign that needs to be won through the careful negotiation of alliances, rather than a possession, epitomised in Hobbes’ image of Leviathan’s sword, which is held and wielded by some over others. In these terms, what is of interest is the ‘standing conditions’ of the negotiation in which causal power is exercised and how
certain agents (‘A’s’) get others (‘B’s’) to do things they otherwise wouldn’t. These conditions set out the means and resources available to certain policy actors, for example the constitutional-legal powers that PCCs and the Mayor of London have to set the strategic priorities and allocate funding for policing in their constabulary areas, the electoral mandate they have to set certain priorities rather than others, their dependence on the organisational capacities and intelligence of municipal authorities, including the police, needed to realise strategic goals and so forth.

In turn, however, understanding this circuit of causal power cannot be divorced from the circuit of ‘dispositional’ power, all those meanings and membership categories that define governing programmes and obviate alternatives, setting the rules of negotiation within particular standing conditions. Most notably in policing the categories of warfare and criminal justice have dominated public policy priorities in, for example, the wars on drugs, terror, delinquency, even ‘incivility’ and ‘anti-social behaviour’. More recently the language of ‘risk management’, augmenting failing criminal justice strategies, has assumed a greater prominence epitomised in the hegemony of pragmatic, situational, crime prevention initiatives that have proliferated in metropolitan policing in Britain. It is argued the dispositions of ‘punitive display’ and mundane risk management have obviated or ‘eclipsed’ (Garland, 1997) longer-standing social democratic dispositions. And yet, as noted above, the language of social justice underpins much of the policing agenda for youth crime in the Scottish and Welsh contexts and, in Wales, the allied rejection of anti-social behaviour orders, child curfews and other draconian methods of enforcement as policy priorities (Edwards and Hughes, 2008). To subsume this within some over-determinant authoritarian agenda would be to ignore a significant divergence in policy talk and decisions traducing, in turn, the political competition that continues to produce variegated policing agendas and therefore insight into the success of policing alternatives. Analytically this is important because the recognition of alternative agendas identifies sources of innovation and further questions for comparative analysis: what, for example, are the conditions for social justice agendas that disrupt the predominance of criminal justice and risk management?

Posing this question provokes a concern with Clegg’s final, ‘facilitative’, circuit of power, the innovations in technologies of production and discipline that can disrupt or reproduce particular policing agendas. Most obviously, in the contemporary contexts of metropolitan policing in Europe, there are the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crises affecting a number of European countries including the UK. The latter subsequently which embarked upon an ‘austerity’ programme of severe cutbacks in public expenditure, including reductions of 20-
30% in spending on policing (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). A concern with facilitative power provokes further questions about the impact of austerity on the disruption or further reproduction of deep rooted, but relatively expensive, criminal justice dispositions in policing. It also provokes questions about the impact of other ‘exogenous shocks’ on entrenched policing dispositions, such as the migration crisis of summer 2015, the threat of transnational terrorism as witnessed in the attack on Paris in November 2015 and innovations in digital technologies of production and discipline, such as the surveillant powers of ‘Big Data’ (Edwards, 2016) that may facilitate ‘smarter’ criminal justice and risk management agendas or promote the case for social and economic policy responses to metropolitan policing problems.

3. Comparing policing policy agendas in Bristol, Cardiff, London and Edinburgh
These concepts of causal, dispositional and facilitative power can be used, in turn, to clarify processes of convergence or divergence in metropolitan policing agendas and are used here to organise and precis the discussion of policing agendas in Bristol, Cardiff, London and Edinburgh. Given the strong affinities in the governing arrangements for policing in Bristol and Cardiff, it is useful to discuss these in tandem before a consideration of the London and Edinburgh cases.

3.1. Bristol and Cardiff
As noted above, a principal reform to local policing governance in England and Wales, and therefore the ‘standing conditions’ of metropolitan policing, is the establishment of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 in each of the police force areas outside of London. The main responsibilities of the PCCs are to allocate the force budget, set the strategic direction and policy priorities for policing and to hold the Chief Constable to account.

Each PCC in England and Wales has the statutory obligation to publish their priorities in a ‘Police and Crime Plan’, which can be reviewed and amended at any time. In Avon and Somerset and in South Wales, the police force areas in which Bristol and Cardiff are respectively situated, both PCCs publish an annual plan that covers their term of office (for example the first plan was 2013-2017, the second 2014-2017, and so on). However, there is a potential for conflict between force-wide priorities of the PCC and those set by the statutory partnerships in both Cardiff and Bristol, who have a role to ‘protect local communities from crime and help people feel safer’ (Crime and Disorder Act 1998). Composed of various responsible authorities, including, in addition to the police, local government, fire and rescue, health and probation services, the partnerships in both cities have strategies strongly related to policing. Cardiff Integrated Partnership Board has an objective of ensuring, ‘People in Cardiff are
safe and feel safe’ within their ‘What Matter’s Strategy’, which is the overall strategic plan for
governing the city between 2010 and 2020. In turn, the statutory partnership in Bristol, entitled, ‘Safer
Bristol’, has an objective of, ‘a city of strong and safe communities’ which also forms part of the city-
wide strategic plan, ‘Bristol 20:20’.

Scrutinising the actions of the statutory partnerships in each city is a Council based Oversight and
Scrutiny Committee. Prior to the election of PCCs the Cardiff Overview and Scrutiny Committee voiced
concerns that a PCC could disregard local community safety strategies.7 This concern was based on
the vague legislation outlining the powers of PCCs, and was said to be exacerbated by the fact that
the PCC would receive the funding from which to commission community safety projects that had
previously been managed by the partnerships themselves.8 This, it was argued by the Committee, has
the potential to undermine the capacity of partnerships to set their own agenda for community safety
and to generate conflict with the PCC’s regional agenda. Similar concerns were raised in Bristol and,
in the London context, between MOPAC and the community safety partnerships in each of the 32
London Boroughs constituting the Greater London region (see below).

A significant contrast in the standing conditions of metropolitan policing in the two cities is provided
by the Welsh Government and its interests in community safety in Cardiff and other Welsh localities.
Following its establishment in 1999 the Welsh Government has competencies in a number of the areas
covered by the responsible authorities in the statutory partnerships for community safety, in
particular local government and health services. Significantly and symbolically, community safety
policy-making is located in the Welsh Government’s Department for Local Government and Social
Justice, emphasising the Welsh Government’s promotion of social and economic policy responses to
problems of crime and civil unrest. A key vehicle for this approach has been the All Wales Youth
Offending Strategy. This emphasises the responsibilities of the state to ensure that the entitlements
that young people have to health, housing, education, training and employment opportunities are
effectively extended to all young people. In this social justice framework, youth offending is
understood primarily in terms of the failures of social and economic policy to effectively support the
young people in question rather than in terms of the risky behaviours these young people have chosen
to indulge in and for which they are, in the terms of criminal justice, culpable. In support of this
approach the Welsh Government has provided funds to community safety partnerships through its
Safer Communities Fund and its Substance Misuse Action Fund (Hughes et al, 2009). Since the

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7 Cardiff Overview and Scrutiny Committee meeting, 23rd October 2012
8 Following distribution by Welsh Government
Introduction of PCCs this funding has been substantially reduced, and has a narrower focus, renamed as the Youth Crime Prevention Fund, yet Welsh Government remain a key funding provider of community safety, including the provision of £16.8m for 500 additional Police and Community Support Officers (Chambers, 2016).

The influence of the Welsh government in these standing conditions of policing governance in Cardiff adds another potential source of tension between its social justice agenda, the strategic agenda of the PCCs and the priorities of Cardiff Council. However, these tensions may be as much about the competition for resources as they are about the dispositions, the kinds of policing problems and policy responses, which are prioritised. This certainly seems to be a key finding of case study research into the respective priorities of the PCCs in Avon and Somerset and South Wales and the community safety partnerships in Bristol and Cardiff (Chambers, 2016). This research identifies a striking convergence in the priorities given by all these actors to reducing domestic and sexual violence, promoting community cohesion, improving offender management, reducing first time entrants to the youth justice system and making people ‘feel safer’. Rather, the principal sources of tension occur over the competition for resources, in support of action on these shared priorities, amongst the various municipal authorities within the police force-wide areas covered by the PCCs. In Avon and Somerset, Bristol competes with five other local governments for a share of the PCC’s budget. In South Wales, Cardiff is one of seven local governments competing for PCC funds including Newport and Swansea, the other main cities in Wales, and the multiply deprived former mining towns in the South Wales valleys. This struggle for resources has been accentuated by the impact of the UK government’s austerity programme and the associated severe reductions in funding made available to the Welsh Government (which, unlike the Scottish Parliament, does not have tax raising powers and is consequently dependent on the UK government in London for core funding) and to local authorities in England and Wales. Over the period in which this austerity programme has been pursued, firstly by the UK Coalition Government in office from 2010 – 2015 and then by the Conservative Government elected in May 2015, local authority budgets have been cut by just over a third (Centre for Local Economic Strategies/Trades Union Congress, 2014: 2). Case study research into the consequences of these severe financial cuts for the community safety priorities pursued by Cardiff Integrated Partnership Board identifies a major reduction in governing capacity, to the point that the resources simply don’t exist to deliver on the rhetorical objectives of the city’s ‘What Matters’ strategy to establish Cardiff as a socially just and ‘restorative’ city. It is argued these cuts have not been compensated by the relatively limited budgets controlled by the PCC or even of the Welsh Government who initially sought to insulate Welsh local
government from the full impact of austerity budgets experienced by their English counterparts (Cartwright, 2016).

In summary, a comparison of the governing arrangements and policy agendas for policing in Bristol and Cardiff reveals a common preoccupation with volume crimes and issues of social cohesion, a significant contrast in the social justice disposition of community safety policy in Cardiff, primarily under the influence of the Welsh Government, but in both cities an acute struggle for resources to deliver policing policy agendas in a context of severe financial cuts imposed by the UK Government’s austere public expenditure policy.

3.2. London

In London, the responsibilities of the Police and Crime Commissioner are assumed by the directly elected Mayor. Given the other substantial duties of the Mayor of London, the practice has been to delegate these responsibilities to a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime (DMPC). This first occurred during the administration of Mayor Boris Johnson, of the Conservative Party, who first assumed responsibility for setting the strategic direction and budgeting of the Metropolitan Police Service for London in January 2012 and who appointed Stephen Greenhalgh as DMPC to lead the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC). In May 2016 the opposition Labour Party’s candidate, Sidiq Khan, was elected Mayor of London and, in turn, he appointed Sophie Linden as his DMPC. At the time of writing the new administration were in the process of composing their Police and Crime Plan but the cross-examination of Linden at her appointment hearing at a meeting of the Police and Crime Committee in City Hall on 9th June 2016 suggested a significant shift in the agenda from that pursued by the former Johnson/Greenhalgh administration. This former administration has been characterised as a ‘developmental regime’, augmenting a criminal justice agenda for policing London through measures aimed at managing the risks of offending and victimisation (Edwards and Prins, 2014). In contrast, Linden defined the broad principles of her agenda by arguing, ‘It’s about justice but also about pursuing social justice.’ Drawing upon her previous experience as Deputy Leader of Hackney Council, one of the 32 Borough Councils comprising the Greater London area covered by the Mayor’s city-wide administration, and her leadership of community safety policy in that Borough, Linden referenced her use of social and economic policy interventions to divert young people from gang-related violence, using youth services and non-governmental organisations as well as police and criminal justice agencies. The full articulation of this agenda must await the production of the new administration’s Police and Crime Plan for Khan and Linden’s four year term of office,

9 For a full webcast of this hearing, see: https://www.london.gov.uk/police-and-crime-committee-2016-06-09
through to 2020, but some of the tensions and challenges this agenda is likely to encounter can be clarified through reference to the experience of the previous Johnson/Greenhalgh administration.

The Greater London area covered by the Mayor of London’s administration is more of a region than a city, certainly when compared to the other capital cities in Britain and provincial English cities such as Bristol. It is also the largest metropolis in Europe with a population exceeding 8 million registered residents who, for the purposes of public administration, are served by 32 Borough administrations. The London Boroughs are district, rather than regional, level authorities equivalent in status to the city administrations of Bristol, Cardiff and Edinburgh and, for policing purposes, each have their own statutory community safety partnerships. These standing conditions for policing policy-making generate particular competitive tensions and interests. MOPAC sets the strategic direction and budgets for the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) across London but, beneath this city-wide strategy, the MPS works ‘in partnership’ with the Boroughs and with other authorities perceived to have a responsibility for community safety including health authorities, fire and rescue services and probation or offender management services. A major feature of the Johnson/Greenhalgh administration was the conflict which arose over MOPAC’s decision to set city-wide priorities irrespective of the particular concentration of problems in the different Boroughs (Edwards and Prins, 2014: 81-2).

Central to this administration’s Police and Crime Plan was the ‘20:20:20 Challenge’ to reduce, by 20%, seven priority crimes, ‘The MOPAC 7’ (violence with injury, robbery, burglary, theft of a motor vehicle, theft from a motor vehicle, theft from the person and vandalism), whilst simultaneously reducing public expenditure on policing by 20% and boosting public confidence in policing by 20%. A common reaction to this strategy amongst the Boroughs was epitomised in the London Borough of Southwark’s response to the public consultation over the 20:20:20 challenge. This Borough argued that Southwark accounted for the highest levels of knife crime in the city and, at the time, increasing rates of youth related crime and robbery against a backdrop of a London wide overall reduction in these crime rates. It was argued this more Borough-specific pattern was obscured by the use MOPAC made of aggregated, city-wide, data on the declining rates of crime to bolster their claim that it was possible to both reduce crime and expenditure on crime reduction by a fifth. In summary, this Borough argued, ‘The crime levels in Southwark, combined with its high density and footfall demand a much greater allocation of resources’ (cited in Edwards and Prins, 2014: 81).
This problem of tailoring policing to the particular contexts found within cities whilst pursuing city-wide policies is accentuated in London, given its particular position within the national, European and global security fields. As the capital of the UK and the principal centre of global financial services, it is a symbolic target for mass political demonstrations over the economic and foreign policies pursued by the UK government. The city has also been a target for political violence including the bombing campaign pursued by the Provisional Irish Republican Army prior to the Northern Ireland peace process and, more recently, the suicide bombing of the public transport system in July 2005 by critics of the UK’s foreign policy in the Middle East and, allegedly, to all those of the Muslim faith. In a valedictory video recorded prior to his participation in these bombings, Mohammad Sidique Khan argued, ‘Your democratically-elected governments continuously perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.’ (cited in Edwards and Prins, 2014: 77).

The ‘7/7’ bombings exemplify London’s particular vulnerability to the import of global security threats which necessarily stretch policing priorities and resources. In the policy argot of the National Police Intelligence Model (NIM) such terrorist incidents are defined as ‘Level 3’ threats which have an international dimension to them. Another Level 3 threat stretching policing priorities and resources is that of organised crime. Given its lucrative markets for illicit goods and services, from racketeering and unregulated gambling to prostitution and narcotics, the city has long been a magnet for criminal enterprises from the iconic ‘firms’ of the Kray and Richardson twins to the more mobile 'transnational’ enterprises of the present (Hobbs, 2013). In addition to the city’s role in hosting major international and national cultural and sporting events, such as the 2012 Olympic Games, policing in London is also stretched by ‘Level 2’ threats, which refer to inter-regional problems within the UK, primarily the distribution of narcotics. After Amsterdam, London is a principal focus for the wholesale markets in illicit drugs. From London these are then distributed to the other major wholesale drug centres in the UK, the West Midlands, Greater Manchester and Merseyside, before further distribution out to local drugs markets. Consequently, the MPS play a significant role in policing and seeking to disrupt this distribution chain, albeit at role that has been further complicated by the establishment of the UK National Crime Agency in 2013 with whom the MPS and other police services cooperate on Level 2 and 3 threats.

Simultaneously, however, policing in London is stretched by substantial ‘Level 1’ threats, the mundane volume personal and property crimes and ‘anti-social behaviour’ that preoccupy the public
and, more specifically, the electorate for the Mayor and for politicians in the 32 Boroughs. As indicated by Southwark Borough’s response to MOPAC’s Police and Crime Plan, patterns of victimisation and disadvantage vary enormously between Boroughs, including Borough-specific problems of gun, knife and gang-related crime (Hallsworth and Young, 2008) but also within them, reflecting the increasing social inequalities and allied relative deprivation in London. Commentary on the transiton of London’s economy from an industrial city to the ‘command centre’ for global financial services has catalogued the consequences of this for social polarisation in its labour and housing markets, the implications of this for social exclusion, particularly amongst the young, and the relationship of this inequality to patterns of mundane crime and civil unrest (Edwards and Prins, 2014; 75). Whilst the relationship between social class composition, (im)mobility in labour and housing markets and allied patterns of mundane crime and disorder is a well-established theme in studies of policing London (Cohen, 1979), the additional pressures on policing the city arising from its role in the greater transnational mobility of illicit as well as licit capital, labour, goods and services represents a new social condition intensifying the competing interests in prioritising Level 3, 2 or 1 threats.

These competing pressures confront Mayors of any political party and policing disposition in London. The developmental policing regime pursued by the Johnson/Greenhalgh administration was vulnerable to the criticism that it was degrading policing capacity in multiply deprived Boroughs, such as Southwark, with particularly challenging problems of mundane crime, a problem of capacity that had been exposed earlier in Johnson’s first term of office as Mayor during the city-wide riots of August 2011. Unlike previous bouts of major civil unrest in the city, as in Brixton in 1981 or Tottenham in 1985, in 2011 rioting was not contained within particular Boroughs but spread rapidly and was coordinated with the aid of mobile smart phones and social media services, effectively outflanking the police for the first 48hrs of the unrest (Guardian/LSE, 2012). Early signs are that the new, Khan/Linden administration intend to pursue a more transformative, social justice, agenda for policing which may result in a more nuanced tailoring of policing to Borough-specific contexts, possibly aided by innovations in the analysis of ‘big data’ and so-called ‘smart’ or ‘predictive’ policing (Edwards, 2017). However, the Khan/Linden administration will inherit an MPS degraded through 20% reductions in investment but also, and more critically for its social justice agenda, a local government system of Boroughs decimated by austere budget settlements since 2010. The practical realities of this enormous shock to public administration in London include the closure of out-of-school educational and leisure facilities for young people, the loss of whole cohorts of local civil servants with expertise in social and economic policy responses to crime and the consequent and
enormous pressure placed on the police as first and last line of defence against security threats. This has a direct bearing on the kinds of community-oriented policing strategies which are central to the social justice agenda and which, it is claimed, have been central to the successful anticipation and disruption of further acts of political violence in London as well as preventing ‘radicalisation’ and enhancing ‘community cohesion’. Following the series of terrorist incidents experienced in French cities in 2015 and 2016, there has been a certain tendency to favourably compare London’s greater resilience to similar attacks, post-7/7, and to explain this in terms of the capacity of policing in the UK capital to effectively connect Level 3 to Level 1 policy responses\textsuperscript{10}. It is, however, precisely this capacity to stretch policing in London across Level 3, 2 and 1 threats that is in jeopardy as a consequence of the developmental regime pursued by Johnson and Greenhalgh.

3.3. Edinburgh

As the capital city of Scotland, Edinburgh is home to the Scottish Parliament and the government buildings, offices, international consulates, an international airport, and financial services headquarters associated with this status. This alone ensures that Edinburgh is often the chosen venue of political marches and events that require to be stewarded, notwithstanding the ongoing security needs of such institutions. It is also a capital city that thrives on the dynamism of attracting distinct transient populations through it on a seasonal basis. It hosts high profile international arts and sciences festivals – The Edinburgh International Festival and the Edinburgh Fringe being the most significant – that bring around a quarter of a million visitors to the city for the late summer months. Three Universities mean that the city is also home to a substantial, relatively transient and diverse population of students for large parts of the year, a population that also helps to sustain a vibrant night-time economy. Under the surface of this image of Edinburgh as lively and prosperous it is also shaped by inequality and disadvantage, containing some of the most deprived neighbourhoods in the country (see: HMICS, 2015 for a useful overview of the challenges of policing Edinburgh).

The standing conditions, dispositions, and facilitative powers shaping the metropolitan policing agenda for Edinburgh are made in the context of the recent (2013) reforms to the policing of Scotland. In terms of standing conditions, Edinburgh (like other local authorities) has a Local Policing Plan as required under the police reform legislation which must be drawn up by the local police commander in consultation with local partners and approved by the local council (the police reform

\textsuperscript{10} See \textit{Independent}, ‘Paris attacks analysis: what more can the authorities do to protect the British public?’, Sunday 15\textsuperscript{th} November 2015, see: \url{http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/paris-attacks-how-britain-is-responding-to-prevent-a-similar-atrocity-on-uk-soil-a6735606.html}, accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} August 2016.
legislation is silent on what would happen if the Local Policing Plan was not approved). In addition, the policing environment is also shaped by the strategic work carried out through the Edinburgh Partnership with which the police retain a statutory obligation to participate. These standing conditions within which actors negotiate a discernible Edinburgh vision of policing and security have been much affected by the creation of Police Scotland, although the arrangements have recently been reviewed by the Chair of the Scottish Police Authority given wider concerns about the emerging tensions between centralism and localism within the new policing landscape (Scottish Police Authority, 2016). As briefly noted, the 2012 Act might be seen as embodying contradictory impulses towards local policing.

On the one hand, the Act has placed local policing on a statutory footing emphasising its importance within the new national structure (chapter 7 of the Act) and set a context for an approach to local policing by setting out normative policing principles (with deliberate echoes of the Peelian principles of policing drawn up for London’s Metropolitan Police of 1829) that offer a narrative of policing based on partnership working, community well-being and focused on measures to prevent harm, crime and disorder (para.32). On the other hand the Act has reconfigured the police relationship with local government as a consultative one, moving powers over finance and the appointment and dismissal of senior ranks to the Scottish Police Authority, a central governance body covering the whole of Scotland. In addition, responsibility for overall policing strategy in Scotland now lies jointly with the Scottish Police Authority and the executive team within Police Scotland. One consequence of this has been growing public and political unease about the asymmetrical power relations between ‘central’ and ‘local’ institutionalised within the new policing arrangements which has been exemplified by the experience of Edinburgh. The first six months of the new national police force saw the abolition of Edinburgh’s specialist housebreaking unit (because of a national strategic decision to lower the priority given to property crime in order to focus on inter-personal violence), greater use of enforcement powers in relation to the city’s saunas (used by the sex industry), and a 100% increase in the recorded use of stop and search, all developments seen as running counter to the pre-reform policing approach in the city and as illustrative of Police Scotland, and not the Edinburgh Division, setting the agenda in terms of priorities and policing styles.

These developments speak directly to the broader issues of dispositional and facilitative power within contemporary Scottish policing. In terms of dispositional power, Police Scotland has been keen to assert an identity strongly oriented towards policing as crime-fighting and law enforcement.
This was clearly signaled in a public lecture delivered by the chief constable’s less than 6 months into his new role. Although he spoke very positively about partnership, emphasising that ‘Partnership is not under threat from Police Scotland’, in defining more precisely the role of the police in such partnerships, the chief constable made clear his view about the police mission, asserting that ‘We are not a solutions agency, we are a restraint agency. We can control behaviour, we can rarely change it. ... I will insist that we remember our unique area, the unique selling point that we should have is that we are an enforcement agency’ (House, 2013: 9). The operation carried out by the new national force on saunas in Edinburgh exemplified this thinking and prompted the Convenor of the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee to observe that these raids provided ‘quite a dramatic example of the fears that local policing—which seemed to be succeeding in a different way in a different place—was being overridden by a national attitude that came from the top’. This view was endorsed by one of Police Scotland’s most senior officers who noted that ‘The sauna raids in Edinburgh challenged a way of policing that had existed for a decade or more in terms of style and methods. The new policy pursued by Police Scotland challenged the approach that police had taken there which was about tolerance and harm minimisation’ (The Scotsman, 2014).

This exercise of dispositional power by Police Scotland, allowing it to impose a national policing agenda of crime-fighting and law enforcement in Edinburgh, has been underpinned by two ‘facilitative’ mechanisms. The first has been the creation of a national police itself, an innovation which has over turned nearly 200 years of local, municipal policing in Scotland and which was driven explicitly by the financial crisis of 2008. The ensuing cuts to public spending prompted the Scottish Government to search for a financially sustainable policing model, resulting in the decision to merge the country’s eight local forces to create a single police service and therefore allow a centralization of power over the policing of local areas. The second facilitative mechanism has been the introduction of a performance regime within the national police force based around a set of key enforcement-focused indicators. With strong parallels with the Compstat performance technologies deployed in New York City in the 1980s, Police Scotland has adopted a model of performance management in which a local police commander in Edinburgh must focus their resources on targets set centrally by the force executive. The consequence has been spiraling rates of ‘stop and search’ and the marginalization of ‘softer’ policing approaches, such as partnership working and other engagement activities, not readily accommodated within quantitatively based performance metrics. Thus, although the Edinburgh Division has clearly made efforts to reflect particular local concerns any articulation of a distinctive ‘Edinburgh approach’ to policing has been significantly constrained
by the broader policing environment within Scotland that has allowed much greater central influence over local policing.

4. Convergent or divergent agendas?

In the light of these case studies it is possible to reach some conclusions about the existence and significance of divergent tendencies in metropolitan policing agendas in Britain. The predicates we have used for comparing agendas in Bristol, Cardiff, London and Edinburgh, those of the circuits of power, reveal a significant divergence in the standing conditions and dispositions of policing agendas in these city-regions. They also suggest that major external shocks to the policing policy environment in Britain, including devolution, austerity and potential withdrawal from the European Union, facilitate a further intensification of the ‘local reality’ of metropolitan policing whilst disrupting the meaning and efficacy of sovereign power and its projection through a national security state. By way of conclusion our thesis on divergence can be summarised in terms of these three circuits of causal, dispositional and facilitative power.

PCCs and the Mayor of London clearly have the power to cause shifts in policing agendas notwithstanding resistance from the statutory community safety partnerships within their regional administrations. However, this political agency is exercised within certain standing conditions that constrain and enable the capacity of these actors to formulate and defend their agendas. These conditions include a constitutional-legal framework which, following the establishment of the PCCs and as part of the UK Government’s broader city-regions programme, now explicitly devolves strategic leadership of policing to directly elected policy-makers. These conditions also include the tensions between the local, regional and transnational policing priorities identified in the UK National Intelligence Model (NIM). In these terms divergence in policy agendas reflects the specific configuration of local, regional and transnational problems confronting a global city like London as contrasted with the other capital cities of Britain and provincial cities like Bristol. It could be argued these actors fail to act on the discretion given to them by various devolution deals as they choose, instead, the risk averse option of copying others’ ‘best practice’. The critical issue is whether these powers and liabilities are comprehended and acted upon by policy-makers. The failure to act upon context-specific challenges can be a product both of centralised performance management, compelling local authorities to prioritise problems which have limited local relevance, and of the impulse to copy in which the plagiarism of other metropolitan policing agendas appeals to those with limited resources or no inclination to formulate their own bespoke policies. These policy drivers may result in a convergence of policy agendas amongst the less resourceful or imaginative but they
shouldn’t blind social scientists to the specificity of metropolitan policing. In questioning the rival thesis of policy convergence we have found it useful to consider the effects of dispositional power.

Policing dispositions, specifically the meanings and membership categories which integrate actors into, and exclude others from, particular policy agendas, help to clarify tendencies toward convergence or divergence. The implications of our case studies suggest that devolution has witnessed convergence, as in the ‘de-Tartanisation’ of youth justice in Scotland during the early years of the Scottish Parliament, but also its re-Tartanisation’ following the electoral success of the Scottish National Party. It has also been argued that the consistent leadership of the Welsh Government by the Labour Party has facilitated an explicit social justice agenda for responding to youth crime and a related rejection of anti-social behaviour orders. The latter have been dismissed by the Welsh Government as a form of ‘low-trust’ governance that may have prevailed in some of the English city regions, most notoriously in Greater Manchester, but which is antipathetic to the more inclusive agenda for safer communities that has been promoted by the Labour administration in Wales (Edwards and Hughes, 2008; Drakeford, 2010). Our case studies also identify divergent tendencies amongst city-regional policing agendas, such as the developmental agenda in Bristol, that under the new PCC has prioritised criminal justice and risk management responses to volume crimes and public disorder, and the transformative agenda in Cardiff, that has prioritised social and economic policy responses and investment in restorative justice for safer and cohesive communities. As noted, our case studies also registered a significant shift in London from a developmental to a transformative policing agenda following the election of the Khan/Linden administration.

A comparative understanding of the stabilisation or disruption of these agendas requires further research to investigate any ‘implementation gaps’ between the formulation and outcomes of policing agendas ‘in action’ (see Edwards, Devroe and Ponsaers, this volume). Research into Cardiff’s agenda for community safety suggests, however, that its dependence on funding from the UK Government left it vulnerable to the severe reductions in public expenditure imposed by this Government through its austerity programme and this, in turn, subverted the implementation of Cardiff’s social justice agenda. This experience reinforces a key insight of the circuits of power framework that rival centres of political authority are nonetheless inter-dependent and cannot, certainly in advanced liberal democracies, unilaterally command their will to be done. The implication of this is that where rival authorities fail to bargain and negotiate they are liable to disrupt each other’s’ objectives. As such, the UK Government may have facilitated the formulation of a social justice agenda in Cardiff through its various devolution deals, first with the Welsh
Government and subsequently with authorities in the Cardiff city-region, only to then disrupt this agenda through withdrawal of the financial support required for its implementation.

The power to disrupt is nonetheless qualitatively different from the power to project policy agendas and, in this regard, the UK Government’s own security agenda requires the active support of the various authorities with whom it has struck devolution deals. This has been less of a problem for recent UK Government administrations who have, since the election of the Coalition Government in 2010, pursued a policy of aggressively restructuring public administration in an attempt to reduce its size and capacities for social intervention whilst simultaneously devolving responsibility for governance to various sub-national actors, ‘the new localism’, and also to private citizens and their voluntary associations, ‘the Big Society’. As argued in an earlier reflection on this restructuring, the principal implication for policing is the abandonment of vulnerable populations to various forms of predatory self-governance rather than any further enhancement of an authoritarian, national, security state (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). Again, this experience of abandonment is liable to be highly uneven, reflecting inequalities in policing capacity between relatively prosperous city-regions with wealthier tax bases and those that have been in long-term economic decline and which are disproportionately dependent on the very public services that have been radically reduced through the austerity programme.

These divergent tendencies are likely to be further intensified by Brexit and, should it come to pass, the actual withdrawal of the UK from membership of the European Union. Withdrawal from the EU and, consequently, access to its regional development funds also puts the viability of thriving city-regions into doubt, unless they can all successfully re-integrate themselves into the wider global economy without the economic stimulus of participation in the European single market. Such reintegration is likely to be more feasible for some city-regions, such as London, which are already integrated into the global economy, than others, such as Cardiff or Bristol, whose fortunes have been more closely tied to the European Union. This, to return to the starting-point of our argument, is the fundamental implication of processes of ‘glocalisation’: they subvert national sovereign power to govern localities whilst privileging the fortunes of certain city-regions at the cost of others.

The implication of this for policing is that metropolitan-specific configurations of local, regional and transnational security will intensify whether or not policy-makers acknowledge and respond to these with appropriately tailored policy agendas. For advocates of Brexit, it is precisely the capacity to ‘take back control’ of borders and thus control the import and export of illicit as well as licit capital,
labour, goods and services that makes withdrawal from the EU appealing. In the Brexit imagination, withdrawal from the EU facilitates the reconstitution of a powerful national sovereignty that could, from the perspective of British social democracy, be used to ‘re-balance’ the national economy in ways that reduce the predominance of finance capital in London and the South East of England and the gross, criminogenic, social inequalities within and between city-regions that has accompanied this political-economy. However, amongst the advocates of Brexit, this kind of social democratic isolationism has been a minority voice whilst the more powerful refrain, certainly of the current Conservative UK Government, is that Britain ‘remains open for business’. Logically, this implies the exposure of British city-regions to even more intensive global market competition and thus even greater social inequality. In this scenario configurations of local, regional and transnational security threats are liable to become even more unevenly experienced and metropolitan-specific than at present, further emphasising the analytical importance of comparing the politics of security in city-regions.
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