Introduction: Practicing Citizenship in Contemporary China

Sophia Woodman and Zhonghua Guo

Abstract: Citizenship in China—and elsewhere in the global South—has been perceived as either a distorted echo of the ‘real’ democratic version in Europe and North America, or an orientalized ‘other’ that defines what citizenship is not. In contrast, adopting a ‘connected histories’ perspective makes Chinese citizenship a constitutive part of a modernity that is still unfolding. Since the nineteenth century, concerns about citizenship have been central to debates about the building of state and society in China. Some of these concerns are echoed in key tensions related to the practices of citizenship in China today, particularly in three areas: a state preference for sedentarism and governing citizens in place vs. growing mobility, sometimes facilitated by the state; a perception that state-building and development requires a strong state vs. ideas and practices of participatory citizenship; and submission of the individual to the ‘collective’ (state, community, village, family etc.) vs. the rising salience of conceptions of self-development and self-making projects. Exploring manifestations of these tensions can contribute to thinking about citizenship beyond China, including the role of the local in forming citizenship orders; how individualization works in the absence of liberal individualism; and how ‘social citizenship’ is increasingly becoming a reward to ‘good citizens’, rather than a mechanism for achieving citizen equality.

Keywords: Chinese citizenship; orientalism; connected histories; social citizenship; individualization

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Citizenship is often conceptualized, explicitly or implicitly, as a product of Euro-American modernity that has travelled around the world, transforming states and societies in its wake. This special issue begins from the perspective that social and political struggles in China, or the ways the formal dimensions of citizenship as status have been defined there, cannot be considered as outside the frame of what citizenship means in modernity.

Some scholars have recently questioned the assumption that modernity originates in “the West.” One angle on this rethinking has been to show how citizenship did not displace empire—as the narrative of democratic transformation associated with the idea has assumed—but was entangled with imperial orders and colonial projects, and continues to be so (Isin 2015). Bhambra’s idea of “connected social science” advocates observing the way the global has always already implicated in the production of modernity in general (Bhambra 2014; Bhambra and Santos 2016), including concepts such as citizenship, both as a way of understanding the relation between states and citizens and the polity, but also as related to practices of claims-making and contention from below, associated with struggles for equality and recognition in and between states. Connectedness can be observed in the formal articulations of citizenship as status, with constitutions often being a vehicle for these at times when new orders of citizenship came to be institutionalized. Constitutions would appear to be embodiments of Euro-American modernity, yet as Holston shows in his examination of the way issues of race were incorporated into the French, American and Brazilian constitutions, these documents were produced through global connections, involving travel of people, concepts and texts that was never merely a one way flow (Holston 2008).

Two examples contribute to illustrating the points of connection in relation to China, as well as their elision in standard accounts of the development of citizenship. The first of these concerns “the woman question,” which, as many theorists have noted (see for example, Turner 1993; Fraser 1997; Lister 2003), has been central in struggles for what Balibar calls “equaliberty,” a critical component of the meaning of citizenship (2015). This question is often presented as a set of connected movements in Europe and North America that generated ideas about women’s rights and their citizenship that diffused to other places, displacing “traditional” notions with “modern” ideas. However, in fact the struggles in these other places were contemporaneous and part of a transnational ferment around questions of women’s rights in new citizenship orders.

Just as movements for recreating states and citizens roiled Europe and North America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the most radical of these inspired by socialist and anarchist ideas, so too in China advocates of such ideas argued about the meaning of the “modern” society, state and citizen, and of the place of women within them (Fogel and Zarrow 1997). A figure who embodies this connected sense of modernity is the anarcho-feminist writer He-Yin Zhen (1886-c1920), who has been rescued from relative obscurity by a recent book in which translations of her essays are published (Liu, Karl, and

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1 Reflecting her feminist commitments, He-Yin chose to combine the family names of both her parents as her own surname.
Like many of her coevals in Europe during the first years of the 20th century, she was inspired by transnationally circulating anarchist ideas, but deployed these to develop a systematic critique of the structures of domination that she saw in Chinese society as a capitalist economy was beginning to develop, particularly focusing on how the social construct of *nannü* (an idea analogous to gender, but long predating the development of this concept) underpinned it. During a sojourn in Japan, He-Yin was one of the editors of the journal *Tianyibao (Natural Justice Journal)* in which the first Chinese translation of the Communist Manifesto was published.

Despite her central role in the circulation of such crucial texts and her prescient critique of emerging capitalist forms of economy, He-Yin Zhen has been neglected as a key figure in the understanding of “the woman question” and its importance for struggles for modern citizenship in China (Liu, Karl, and Ko 2013), let alone in comprehending the connected character of feminist struggles around the globe. Instead, what constitutes the canon on citizenship (and women’s rights) has been determined by the hegemonic position of Europe, and later the United States. Graeber has shown that the idea of a common “Western civilization” associated with forms of citizenship and democracy linked to Greek and Roman antiquity was produced in US universities in the early part of the 20th century, and thus connected to imperial projects (Graeber 2013). Too often, ideal types of citizenship abstracted from the particularities of their origins (and from the kind of ideological projects Graeber outlines) continue to be deployed as constituting the “true” and “original” meanings of these terms.

Another example of often forgotten connections is the impact of Maoist thought on counterculture movements in the wake of the upheavals that began around the world in the late 1960s (Ross 2005; Lovell 2016). For theorists of contemporary citizenship, the rise of new social movements and of identity politics have been critical to what the term means today. But these accounts generally ignore the impact of events and ideas in China from their discussion of the genesis of these movements. As Ross argues, “Maoist precepts like self-criticism, youth revolt and consciousness raising have had a longer and more successful career in the West than in China itself” yet we are “barely aware” of these influences today (2005, 5–6, 8). The use of “consciousness raising groups” as a tool in second wave feminist groups in the 1970s is a case in point; these were connected both to a Maoist emphasis on changing subjectivity as a critical frontier for radical politics, and to specific techniques of “speaking bitterness” (*suku*) developed as a means for personal transformation in the Chinese revolution. Of course, as Ross notes, the sources of these ideas often came via their interpreters in the “West,” but that point also highlights the connected character of modernity, and of citizenship.

In contrast to such a connected view of the origins of contemporary citizenship orders, China has often come to figure as one of a number of “others” in the orientalism against which the character of the West is defined (Isin 2015; Z. Guo and Guo 2015). Thus, noting that Chinese citizens in the People’s Republic (1949-present) are constrained in terms of rights and democratic participation, Harris claims that citizenship in China is “an idea and practice
whose time has yet to come" (2002, 198). This view neglects the fact that both as a concept and in practice, citizenship has been central in the history of modern China, and continues to be so. Since the end of the 19th century, citizenship has not only been an essential theme in Chinese society and politics, but has also generated a distinctive set of citizenship concerns and practices (Fogel and Zarrow 1997; Culp 2007; Goldman and Perry 2002; Z. Guo and Guo 2015). Categories such as “society,” “citizen” and “nation” were critical elements in debates over how an emerging Chinese “nation” was to be formed in the wake of depredations of foreign powers who were attempting to “carve up China like a melon,” as well as later after the collapse of the imperial order, formalized with the 1911 republican “Xinhai Revolution” (Z. Guo 2015).

While the appearance of concerns about citizenship in China, as well as these other concepts, arrived in part through a “translated modernity” inflected by its specific modes of travel (Liu 1999; Z. Guo 2015), these concepts were refracted through a rich and varied tradition of statecraft with an extensive range of political concepts and approaches to governance. Although the most dominant of these traditions in the public justification of forms of imperial rule was Confucian, some scholars have argued that the legalist tradition—which underpins the formation of an imperial bureaucracy and the economic organization of the state—was actually more central to how imperial power was exercised. While an adequate history of the development of citizenship in the early modern and republican China is beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that the engagement with a complex and varied set of transnationally-circulating ideas of citizenship meshed with a syncretic and complex tradition articulating the role and form of the state and its engagement with its subjects, as well as a history of rebellions and social protest (see for example, Perry 2002; Goldman and Perry 2002; Hung 2013).

Rather than seeing Chinese reality as an “alternative modernity”—a term that, while a valuable corrective to the assumption that the source of modernity is Euro-American practice, still carries the implication that there is a “standard” or “ideal” form somewhere (Bhambra 2010)—the history and practices of Chinese citizenship are part of a connected modernity that is still unfolding. To date, however, few scholars writing about citizenship in the PRC period have approached this topic from the perspective of connected histories/social science, and this is one reason why relatively few have sought to apply citizenship as an analytical lens to examine practices in contemporary China, although this is now changing. By describing manifestations of citizenship practice in China today, this special issue illuminates some elements of citizenship’s modernity. This introduction cannot do justice to a connected history of citizenship that includes China, so we focus below on what we see as some of the key tensions that we observe in contemporary Chinese citizenship practice, and reflect briefly on the historical genealogy of those particular tensions.

**Why “practices”?**

As the title of this special issue indicates, the articles are less concerned with citizenship as status than with articulating sets of practices relating to processes through which the overall citizenship order is formed. Obviously these practices are performed in relation to institutional
arrangements, but we follow Lazar in considering citizenship as “a bundle of practices that constitute encounters between the state and citizens,” in particular concentrating on “the processes and practices that make someone a full member of a given community, rather than the end result in itself” (Lazar 2008, 5). We thus pay particular attention to how differently situated individuals and groups both engage with state institutions, and to what membership they imagine is possible for them in the particular contexts in which they find themselves (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). Such a view attends both to the formal dimensions of the institutional frameworks in and through which such practices are performed, but also to the “cultural politics” of systems of meaning and value that shape imaginaries and conditions of possibility for people’s citizenship claims (Sun 2012). Animated by a more anthropological and sociological turn in the study of citizenship, it attends to questions around scalar levels and sites of citizenship that bring into focus relationships between citizenships and states, cultures and politics (Neveu et al. 2011; Sassen 2006; Valverde 2010). Another version is the concept of “multidimensional citizenship” discussed by Xiong and Li in their article that brings in the personal, social, spatial and temporal aspects of citizenship practices, an approach that can be applied beyond the field of citizenship education where it originated.

Given the complex, multi-layered character of the Chinese state—which combines both a centralizing, dominant one-party form of governance with a highly decentralized system in which local governments have enormous scope for exercise of significant discretion in administration, as well as autonomous regulatory powers—such a focus on practices helps to bring into focus the diversity of how citizenship works in different contexts in contemporary China. Accounts of citizenship as status in China have tended to overstate the role of the central state and its effects, neglecting the disaggregated character of the Chinese state, and the ways that the citizenship order is formed through complex interactions between parts of the state. This is made particularly clear in Guo and Liang’s discussion of citizenship for migrant “peasant workers” in the city of Dongguan in south China, but is evident in various ways in all the articles in the special issue. An obvious manifestation of this complexity is the zoning of the territory of the PRC into realms with formally different citizenship regimes, including the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, but also Special Economic Zones such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, and areas exercising “ethnic regional autonomy” such as Tibet and Xinjiang (Ghai 1997; Ghai and Woodman 2013, 2009).

The enormous diversity of China and its citizenship practices means that we certainly cannot claim to present a comprehensive picture of them in this special issue, but rather a series of snapshots that illuminate what we think are some of the most critical angles for thinking through emerging citizenship practice in China today. The focus of the articles in this special issue is predominantly urban rather than rural, although most involve some relation between the two worlds. While partial, this concentration reflects the urbanizing character of China as a whole—urbanization is happening at an incredibly rapid rate (see for example, Chan 2014). It is also related to the fact that the urban—particularly as exemplified by the key metropolitan areas, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou—has become a symbol of a pervasive desire for modern life and membership in “advanced” communities. The sensibility and experience of an emerging urban middle class has become the hegemonic representation of...
the good life, and of the valuable citizen, inevitably bound up with consumption practices that connect these citizens to imaginaries of global modernity (Sun 2012; J. Zhang 2016; Thornton 2010). Notably, this hegemonic vision is promoted by an ostensibly “socialist” state, through policies on politics, media, housing, education and so on, summed up in the official objective of achieving “xiaokang” (small comfort) for society. This is the backdrop against which individual citizens seek to engage in their own life projects, and situate themselves in relation to prevailing social norms of the “good citizen.”

This backdrop and our focus on practices reveals the extent to which exclusion of individuals and groups from full membership in China today is as much a social as a political or institutional feature of the citizenship order. This social grounding is often occluded due to scholarship’s concentration on the authoritarian character of the Chinese political system. As Balibar writes, acculturation and education are often mechanisms that seek the assimilation of those deemed fit for citizenship in a way that puts others who do not measure up—even when they are formally citizens—outside the community formed by this dominant cultural order (Balibar 2015). As he points out, here the stake is “citizenship as access” rather than “citizenship as status,” and the terms of inclusion are generated not through formal elements such as legal regimes, but through socially-enforced norms of what sort of people belong, often based on naturalized criteria that become part of what those included consider common sense (Balibar 2015, 74). Boundaries of inclusion are policed by cultural norms and rely as much on everyday social interactions as on the active intervention of state institutions. Such considerations make a focus on practices essential to understanding citizenship orders in China and beyond.

Themes of the special issue
In short, there are a multitude of practices in contemporary Chinese society that implicate issues of citizenship. In this special issue, we focus on areas that we argue represent central puzzles about the dynamics of citizenship in China today and its directions of future travel. Specifically, we concentrate on three manifestations of the most striking tensions in contemporary Chinese citizenship, notably, first, the state’s preference for a citizenship order based on sedentarism, most evident in the hukou household registration system, and the increasing mobility in Chinese society; second, the conflicts between authoritarian modes of governance on the one hand, and an increasingly contentious society that also incorporates forms of grassroots democracy and civic engagement on the other; and third, the contrast between the emphasis in both Chinese state and society on political and social conformity (often perceived as reflecting a cultural norm of “collectivism”) and increasing individualization, manifested in self-making projects of various types. We choose these three angles of view in part because they are reflective of long-standing tensions that have been at the centre of debates and struggles over the form of the modern Chinese state and society, and the relation of these to citizens and citizenship practices (Fogel and Zarrow 1997; Z. Guo and Guo 2015). Below we briefly outline why these aspects are central to the landscape of contemporary citizenship, noting some of their earlier historical manifestations, and showing how they are addressed in the articles in this special issue.
Our first question asks: how is citizenship affected by mobility in a regulatory and cultural environment that consistently favours sedentarism, most notably articulated through the *hukou* household registration system that attaches individuals’ citizenship to specific places? This tension is evidently an aspect of a broader global environment where state preferences for mobility and sedentarism, and normative perspectives on both, have been variable over time (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). Looking at China, we consider the tension between a state preference for sedentarism and locating citizens in place, and a society that is increasingly mobile, both internally and transnationally (Nyíri 2010). To give some extent of the scale of internal migration, in recent years, about one fifth of China’s population were counted as “migrants,” defined as being away from their place of *hukou* registration for six months or more (for recent reviews of statistics and literature, see Liang, Li, and Ma 2014; Liang 2016). This mobility is not only an individual or family matter, but is also facilitated and even promoted by the state in various ways, such as via the education system (discussed briefly in Woodman in this special issue), in the form of resettlement of populations and through organized schemes for transnational labour mobility (Nyíri 2010; Xiang 2012).

Central in this nexus of sedentarism vs. mobility has been the *hukou* household registration system. While the registration of population originated in imperial China, although its implementation was highly variable in different dynastic eras, and was adopted in varying forms in other East Asian states, its contemporary form has been an essential component of the state organization of society in the PRC. It is important to note here that this was not an ID card or internal passport, as used in the Soviet Union—although both these have had an influence on the development of the PRC system in different periods, Soviet practice in the 1950s and ID card systems more recently—but a registration by household in which details of each individual were recorded. In the late 1950s, the communist government enacted regulations governing *hukou* registration that distinguished households (and the individuals within them) as “agricultural” and “non-agricultural,” not based on the occupations of the persons registered, but the location of their registered residence in a specific location designated as rural or urban respectively (see for example, Cheng and Selden 1997; Chan and Buckingham 2008; Wang 2005). The *hukou* does not only divide the population into two categories, but also creates an association of persons with the named places of their registration, a linkage which remains very difficult to change. It is also associated with a cultural framework that associates the “rural” with “backward” and “traditional” ways of life (Cohen 1993), and the urban with the “modern” and “advanced.” Since the 1950s, strict numerical limits have been placed on formal mobility through so-called “hukou transfer.” For example, Guangzhou, a massive metropolis with a population of approximately 13 million in 2014, had a quota that year for only 3,000 persons to formally relocate their *hukou* into the city through the kind of points system described in Guo and Liang. This quota had risen to 6,000 by 2016. In the post-Mao era, the power to determine quotas for *hukou* transfer has increasingly been devolved to municipal authorities, which have also developed their own regulatory regimes regarding the local operation of the *hukou* system (Young 2013; Nyíri 2010). Some of the variation in these local regimes is described in the articles in this issue by

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2 The most comprehensive treatment is in Wang 2005; but see also chapter on internal migration in Nyíri 2010.
Guo and Liang, which describes points systems for obtaining local *hukou*, and by Woodman, which discusses other avenues for settlement, such as through being identified as a “talent” that the city would like to incorporate.

But the *hukou* system is not the only source of the sedentarism/mobility tension; cultural logics and social and political forms of governance also contribute. Localities and place-based identities have been central historically and today in the Chinese imaginary, and the formation of citizenship through local society has been an important logic of modern projects of state making (Duara 2000; Feuchtwang 2004; B. Goodman 1995; Tsin 1997). Articulating a broader concern to form the units of a new national society and polity through local iterations, communist leader Mao Zedong called for a “great union of the masses [to be] based on small union of the masses” (cited in B. Goodman 1995). The good society was historically seen as sedentary, but mobility has always been part of Chinese history as well, whether as related to imperial expansion or to settling new frontiers during the PRC era (Nyíri 2010; Feuchtwang 2004).

Such cultural and historical logics combine with the contemporary manifestations of the *hukou* system to create a variety of forms of “differentiated citizenship”. One aspect of such differentiation results from “localized citizenship”, as specific frameworks and mechanisms for delivery of social policy are largely formulated at subnational level by provincial and municipal governments, which are the main providers of welfare and education (Carrillo and Duckett 2011; Woodman 2016; Shi 2012). The resulting proliferation of regulatory regimes and policy frameworks makes the forms of local citizenship relatively opaque to people who are “outsiders” to a particular region, a feature magnified by cultural norms that emphasize place-based identity. This localized character of citizenship means that for most people establishing formal citizenship in a new place is difficult, if not impossible.

The question of citizenship for Chinese rural-to-urban migrants (*nongmin gong*) has been one of the most frequent topics in which the citizenship concept has been used in relation to contemporary China, highlighting the exclusion of these migrants from full citizenship in the places they have moved to for work or to trade (Solinger 1999; Wu 2010; L. Zhang and Wang 2010; T. Guo 2014; Jakimów 2012). According to the official statistics, in 2015, more than 274 million people were away from their place of *hukou* registration for six months or more. The pieces in this special issue adopt new angles on migration questions. Guo and Liang consider how local authorities have sought to reduce pressures from migrant workers for social inclusion by adopting schemes to grant urban citizenship in particular cities to migrants on a selective basis through a “points-based” system for *hukou* transfer, and how such schemes are changing the overall citizenship order. Woodman looks at migration dynamics beyond the scope of rural-to-urban migrant workers, including neglected inter-urban migrants of varying social status to outline a picture of how the local and national states both constrain and facilitate migration, leading to forms of differential citizenship. Xiong and Li show how citizenship education conducted by NGOs and aimed at migrant children may overcome the social exclusion these young people face in the urban areas where their parents work. Ding examines how sex workers from rural China deploy their youth and gendered strategies to
create a life for themselves in cities of the Pearl River Delta. Yang describes the effects on
the civic consciousness and identity of Tibetan young people who, through state sponsored
educational migration, are sent to school in the Chinese heartland. All these case studies
highlight the point that “seeing the outside world” has become something of a slogan for the
young generation in the PRC today. The scope of what this means for differently situated
young people is variable, and depends on imaginaries of the possible horizons of mobility, as
well as institutional frameworks for citizenship as status.

Our second question is, how do participatory forms of citizenship operate within an
authoritarian state structure? Here we examine the dynamics of participation in a context
where democratic representation is not considered a primary value and critical debates and
deliberation in public are not encouraged, except within highly circumscribed spheres
(Woodman 2015). This tension has been a central concern of scholars of social movements
and the growth of civil society in China, who have examined how citizens act to make claims
on the state and its resources, observing a range of mechanisms through which claims are
made, including appeals to law and policy (often invoking the centre against the localities)
which have been termed “rightful resistance” or “resistance according to law” (see for
example, O’Brien and Li 2006; O’Brien 2008; Diamant, Lubman, and O’Brien 2005).
Researchers have noted the paradox of a resilient authoritarian state that presides over an
increasingly contentious society in which extra-institutional claims-making has become daily
fare (Chen 2012; Lee and Zhang 2013).

Just as in other parts of the world, over the past 200 years, political thinkers and activists in
China have engaged in intense debates over the relative importance of establishing a “strong
state” as a mechanism for cohesion in the face of colonial projects, and later a vehicle for
national development, and the value of a citizen politics based on democratic participation
(Fogel and Zarrow 1997; Z. Guo and Guo 2015). Such debates have also arisen periodically
in the PRC, at times in relation to factional political struggles inside the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), but also culminating in moments of intense contention on the streets in 1956-7,
1966-8, 1976, 1979 and 1989 and 2008. This history calls into question the claim that
democratic participation has not been central to contemporary Chinese politics—as
aspiration, it has played a critical role.

That is not to say that forms of democratic representation and participation have not been
important in how political citizenship has evolved in the PRC, particularly in the post-Mao era.
While much attention to formal democratic arrangements in China has centred on China’s
village elections and village self-governance (see for example, He 2007; O’Brien and Han
2009; O’Brien 2002), much less has been paid to parallel developments in urban areas. In
their article, Xia and Guan consider how urban homeowners have sought to carve out space
for autonomous political action to protect their property rights, with a particular focus on
practice in Beijing. They also note how these efforts are going beyond the residential
neighborhoods where they originate, often in disputes with developers and their agents who
have failed to deliver what they promised when people bought their properties, to city-wide
and even cross-regional networks through which homeowner activists share strategies and support each other in efforts to hold property developers and local governments to account.

Crucially, these homeowners use intersections between the law and markets as a site for their organizing efforts. As in what O’Brien and Li have termed “rightful resistance” that draws on state policies and regulations for justification (O’Brien and Li 2006; O’Brien 2013), Xia and Guan’s work shows how the combination of the development of housing markets and structures for their regulation, along with broader logics of “self-governance” promoted by the state, can create niches for the emergence of independent activism. Ironically, however, such activism is inherently limited by its concern with rights relating to property and consumption that may effectively reinforce a sense of China’s emerging “middle class” as being primarily concerned with protecting its own entitlements (Wasserstrom 2009; J. Zhang 2016; Crabb 2010), rather than broader questions of “equaliberty.” The “civic sphere” emerging in homeowner networks may thus be seen as parallel to distinctions traced by Chatterjee in India between an orderly “bourgeois” civil politics and the disorderly “political society” of claims on the state from those at the margins (2004).

Such a perception is reinforced by two contributions that consider how the political engagement and structural exclusion of very different marginal groups are managed. Xiong and Li’s article on citizenship education in Shanghai shows how an NGO that works closely with local government seeks to foster values of autonomy, choice and deliberation among the children of rural-to-urban migrant parents as a solution to their exclusion from the entitlements of citizenship in the city, particularly access to high quality state-sponsored education. But the NGO avoids discussing the structural origins of these children’s disadvantage, and seeks individual solutions to their systemic exclusion. Similarly, Yang’s article describes how young Tibetans brought to study in boarding schools in some of China’s major cities are taught values of harmony and ethnic togetherness in an institutional environment that constantly reinforces the perception that their ethnic background makes them inherently dangerous and unmanageable. In this process, ironically young Tibetans learn to deploy the state’s language of inclusion as justifications for promoting their own culture and language, including in protests against efforts to downgrade the importance of Tibetan language teaching in their home regions, as Yang discusses.

The examination of how the city of Dongguan has responded to generalized unrest in the region among migrant “peasant workers” over their exclusion from social rights in the city in the article by Guo and Liang points out that non-institutional participation can have effects on the policy-making process. In this case, the central government acted to require that local governments provide such workers with access to certain rights of local citizenship, particularly education for their children. But the article also highlights how, in a context where political participation of these migrants (and others) is constrained, the policy outcomes end up diverging from the needs of the migrants, since what they mean in practice is determined not by public dialogue, but by interaction between governments at different levels.
Our third question for this special issue is, how can individualized projects of self-making and self-development as forms of cultural citizenship be articulated within an environment that frames the “good citizen” as one who conforms to hegemonic “socialist” norms that prioritize the development of a “collective” defined by the state? China has not been immune to the discourses of autonomy and self-development circulating in the transnational sphere (Soysal 2015). Yet these discourses and frameworks circulate in an environment in which the state plays a strong role in seeking to channel the aspirations and desires of citizens to articulate with the overall project of achieving “wealth and power” for China. Yan points out how the Chinese state in both Maoist and post-Mao periods has contributed to the “individualization” of citizens, while emphasizing that “individualization” should not be equated with an “individualism” grounded in liberal notions of freedom and autonomy (Y. Yan 2009, 2010). This complicates the often repeated trope contrasting “collectivist” Chinese society with “individualist” American and European ones.

This overall trend towards individualization occurs in a context in which conformist social and political norms play a strong role in structuring the terms of self-making projects. In his pioneering work on Chinese society, sociologist Fei Xiaotong analyzed Chinese social structure in contrast to an ideal type of the individualized West (Fei 1992). Basing his analysis on what he considered the structure of Chinese peasant society, he developed the concept of the “differential mode of association” (chaxu geju), in which each individual is at the centre of a web of particularistic relations. While the upheavals of modern Chinese history have wrought enormous transformations in social life—with current rapid urbanization continuing this trend—elements of Fei’s analysis remain salient to understanding patterns of Chinese sociality and the way people practice their citizenship today. One key element is the continuing relevance of particularistic “guanxi” (social connections) in shaping the social fields in which self-making and self-development occur. As Qi highlights, guanxi is the basis of a specific form of collectivism that grounds action within a relational network of “long-term relationships which operate through trust, mutual obligation and reciprocity” (2013, 321). It is important to note that such a collectivism may or may not align with the aims of the “categorical collectivism” promoted by the state (Qi 2013). Such a perspective foregrounds the social dimensions of the contexts in which individuals and groups practice their citizenship, as well as the potential conflicts between different collectivities in shaping norms of the “good citizen.”

Practices around consumption and education are central in the projects of self-making and self-development discussed in this special issue. Both are oriented to state goals—in the case of consumption, to economic development, as mentioned above, and in the case of education, to the aim of improving the “quality” (suzhi) of the population. However, it is essentially the market rather than the state that determines access to spaces and modes of consumption that enable certain desired markers of urban citizenship, although systemic and growing inequalities between regions and classes structure the chances of achieving such resources in patterned ways that are strongly related to state structures, such as the hukou system. Essentially, a form of what has been called “ius pecuniae” (see for example, Shachar and Hirschl 2014) as a basis for citizenship has been emerging in China, in which those with
money to purchase property and other assets can buy in to local citizenship in various ways, as Woodman discusses in her article.

The notion of the citizen as consumer has become increasingly central in the development of the “socialist market economy” in China’s post-Mao reform era. While this pattern is certainly similar to the way middle class concerns and the obsession with “stimulating domestic demand” drive state policies in the global north, in China such a shift has been actively engineered by the state. There has been a gradual shift away from citizen as producer, embodied by the figure of the worker in the state-owned enterprise (J. Li 2015; Friedman and Lee 2010), towards the explicit promotion by the state of the “stable middle,” embodied by the middle-class home-owning urbanite (C. Li 2010; D. S. G. Goodman 2014, 2008). In cultural terms, this hegemonic “good citizen” contributes to the development of a wealthy and powerful nation through his/her consumption practices and success in a highly competitive education system (Sun 2012; J. Zhang 2016; Thornton 2010). These shifts partly explain the relative degree of political space that homeowners have carved out for their political projects, as in Guan and Xia’s article. Other authors have highlighted the ways such middle class subjects are accorded a privileged role in exercising self-governance, whether on an individual or institutional level (Tomba 2014, 2009; Bray 2006).

But for those at the margins—such as rural-to-urban migrants—consumption can become a site for exercise of an autonomy and agency so often denied to them as a result of the institutional and cultural barriers they face to full citizenship. For the “xiaojies” (literally, “misses,” a term now strongly identified with women who sell sexual services), women originally from rural China who are seeking “modern” lives in the metropolis described in Ding’s article, the only choice for a sense of inclusion is cultural, self-made and everyday. Facing pervasive cultural, social and institutional discrimination, these women see consumption as a means of transforming themselves from rural migrants to urban sophisticates. The relatively high incomes xiaojies can generate through sex work mean that in comparison to other migrant workers they have the resources to “buy in” to urban visions of appropriate femininity and citizenship. Even if they cannot be citizens in the cities where they live in an institutional sense, they can “pass” as such in urban social life. An intriguing contrast can be made with the courtship practices of male rural-to-urban migrants who seek to emulate urbanized masculinities that emphasize a male power based on conspicuous consumption and achievement of status at work, but find themselves unable to compete due to their low incomes (Choi and Peng 2016).

Self-making through consumption is not merely an individual matter, but connected to national and global imaginaries. Through their stories, Ding shows how xiaojies wish to be “modern, urban subjects” who participate in the modernization of the country through their efforts to fit into urban life and escape their rural origins. But at the same time, the xiaojies effectively subvert normativity in a variety of ways, despite their conformity with gendered norms. She describes this form of citizenship as “multi-layered, dynamic, desire-driven and action-oriented boundary-crossing practices.”
In contrast to the ability of the xiaojies to “buy in” to a semblance of belonging, despite their social and political exclusion, the access to citizenship conferred by education is perceived by many migrants as an insurmountable barrier to full citizenship, as Woodman discusses in her article. Education as a formal process and a way of attributing political, social and cultural value to citizens is and has been central to thinking about what citizenship means in modern China (Culp 2007; Murphy 2004; Kipnis 2011a). The cultivation of citizens through educational institutions and through political education has been a central concern of the CCP since its early days, and remains so today (Perry 2012; Kipnis 2011a). In the contemporary era, discourses of “quality” (suzhi) produced by the state and in society have been central in the evaluative aspects of both of these angles on education and citizenship (H. Yan 2003; Kipnis 2006; Jacka 2009; Sun 2009; Sigley 2009; Kipnis 2011b).

Both political and formal education are entwined in the case of the young Tibetans that Yang describes in her article. She shows how the boarding schools they attend seek to cultivate “safe citizens”: to ensure compliance on the level of the individual, and to guarantee the security of contested regions on China’s periphery, such as Tibet. Yang highlights the contradictory effects of these experiences of schooling. On one level these are produced through the interaction of the multiple social fields that shape the meaning of these institutions and their formal and informal rules. In the case of the young Tibetans Yang studied, these social fields comprise others like them, their home environment in Tibetan areas and the teachers, Han students and broader Han society in the host cities for these schools. While the boarding schools are explicitly designed as a means of including young Tibetans in the “Chinese race/nation,” a climate of pervasive mistrust and regimes of segregation paradoxically serve to reinforce in these young people a sense of Tibetan ethnic distinctiveness and pride, as well as a feeling of being at home in Tibetan areas, as opposed to the Han environment where Tibetans are repeatedly marked as belonging to a “backward” culture. The means of inclusion of these citizens thus results in their sense of exclusion from its terms.

Similar contradictory pressures are at play in the work of a Shanghai NGO to turn the children of migrant workers into “new citizens” through involving them in after school and weekend activities described in the contribution by Xiong and Li. Run by the NGO, these programmes are designed to supplement the deficiencies of educational provision for these children that flow from their status as outsiders to the local hukou system. These programmes encourage values of participation, autonomy and volunteering to cultivate qualities seen as necessary for these children to become citizens of a globalized city like Shanghai. Here a “Confucian” emphasis on cultivation meets transnationally circulating norms of the autonomous individual in constructing a-political, individualized solutions to the institutional exclusion of these migrant children through projects of self-development.

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3 The Chinese term, Zhonghua minzu, incorporates the sense of both nation and “race.” In a shift away from a previous emphasis on distinctions between “national” ethnic groups such as Han and Tibetan, since the 1990s, the state has sought to emphasize the inclusion of all minorities residing within the territory of the PRC into this umbrella category.
As the articles by Woodman and Guo and Liang highlight, for many migrant parents seeking high quality education for their children is a crucial consideration shaping their migration strategies, whether they move from rural to urban locations, or from one urban place to another. The context of a highly competitive education system with enormous regional inequalities in provision of educational resources shapes the conditions of possibility for these children. For Dongguan’s rural-to-urban migrant workers, being able to enroll their children in an urban public school is the top reason why they would seek to obtain a local hukou, the research by Guo and Liang found.

Finally, Woodman’s article highlights the ways in which education expressed in terms of “cultural quality” (wenhua suzhi)—which incorporates both formal qualifications and informal imaginaries of the characteristics required to access the full entitlements of local citizenship—is central to structuring the field of possibility for differently situated internal migrants in two cities, one coastal, one in the interior. Municipal governments make it easier for migrants with educational qualifications to obtain local citizenship, including access to local social security schemes and educational institutions for their children. Such conditions for membership are so routine as to hardly merit remark. In China, despite formal equality among citizens being enshrined in the Constitution, both national policies and local state regulations and practices mean that educational qualifications have a hegemonic position in evaluating the worth of citizens (Kipnis 2011a). The education system thus produces inequalities that are naturalized as an aspect of ostensibly meritocratic arrangements. As Woodman shows, in large part due to how education becomes a means of access to entitlements of local social citizenship, these benefits are most easily available to internal migrants who already occupy an advantaged social and economic position, rather than serving to equalize conditions among citizens.

New angles on citizenship
All the articles in this special issue contribute to answering the question: what are the terms in which membership is both conceived and practiced for citizens in China today? Inevitably this implicates both the dominant forms of citizenship as constituted through state institutions and cultural forms of community, and the struggles of those who contest them from the margins. Through the various answers the authors pose to this question in the course of their studies of specific practices, we point to several novel angles for thinking about citizenship more generally.

The first of these is a view from the local that highlights the contribution of local membership in the formation of citizenship orders, and how locating citizens in place—both in terms of formal and informal institutions—is crucial to how citizenship can be practiced. A number of scholars have already drawn attention to some features of such dynamics (Neveu et al. 2011; Valverde 2010; Wincott 2009), but the China case emphasizes the need for a focus on the role of locality and place in sorting citizens and their entitlements, both in relation to formal institutions and regulatory regimes, and the social characteristics of specific places. Kipnis discusses “emplacement” as a way of understanding how the parameters of the pervasive desire for higher education among Chinese parents and young people are realized in particular
locations (2011a). The concept of emplacement seeks to capture how policies and practices intersect in localities to form distinct iterations of a particular phenomenon. This is a feature of citizenship orders that could be more systematically studied.

The role of localities in forming conditions of possibility for citizenship is highlighted by contention around questions of citizenship in China, which calls into question a simplistic antinomy between “authoritarian” and “democratic” states. While the Chinese state exhibits many features of authoritarian rule—extensive censorship and political imprisonment for example—state institutions and policies also provide contexts for deliberative processes and claims-making practices among Chinese citizens (Woodman 2016). While such practices only rarely result in changes in policy, the local state frequently responds to trouble-making tactics by savvy citizens by finding ad hoc solutions to their grievances, in large part due to a mandate from the central government to forestall the spread of contentious politics in the streets (Chen 2012; Lee and Zhang 2013). This is an example of the complex interactions between different scalar levels of the state in the formation of citizenship, a feature that is apparent in states that are formally democratic as well (see for example, Heller and Evans 2010).

Another angle is the extent to which social citizenship is becoming a “reward” rather than a mechanism for achieving equality through universalized citizenship entitlements (Ong 1999). The various articles in this special issue on internal migrants highlight the complexity of interactions between scales of government in relation to such questions, with central policy frameworks, local government conditions and relative degrees of responsiveness to contentious claims-making contributing to what is offered and to whom in different parts of the country. “Differentiated citizenship” is an emerging form that relates to technologies of zoning, hierarchies of places and the imaginaries and strategies of migrants themselves, and is echoed in many ways in trends in transnational migration. Indeed, the articles in this special issue emphasize the value of deconstructing the artificial boundaries in scholarly thinking between internal and transnational migration. An example is the use of points systems for immigration in Chinese cities discussed in Guo and Liang that originated in regimes for regulating immigration in countries such as Canada and Australia.

A third point of departure is thinking about individualization—and self-making projects—as components of citizenship orders that reject “individualism” as a value. The China case shows how individual projects of “self-development” can fit into hegemonic schemes of value oriented to achieving state goals and fitting citizens into loosely defined state projects that are increasingly articulated with those of market actors. Thus the nexus of education and consumption becomes critical to achieving valued forms of citizenship that connect to state projects around the formation of a “middle class” that is seen both as the driver of national and local economic development and the hegemonic figure of cultural value (Sun 2012). Of course state and market are not the only sources of such projects, as they also draw on broader transnational forces. Again, such citizenship logics are best viewed through the lens of a connected approach to modernity that attends to transnationally circulating discourses as well as how they are instantiated in particular contexts (Kipnis 2011a).
As is the case elsewhere, citizenship is always an unfinished and contentious matter, an order that is never settled but a site of struggle (Isin 2002; Balibar 2015). These contests may be more or less overt or underground, and may not even be constituted as antagonistic (Isin 2002). Indeed, in the articles in this special issue, one theme that emerges is the extent to which existing frameworks of inclusion and exclusion remain unchallenged and unquestioned. These findings cannot be merely explained by the power of a dominant state—although that is of course important—but are also the product of hegemonic cultural schemas that make existing arrangements seem natural and uncontestable, as Balibar suggests (2015). Given the cultural upheavals that China has undergone over the last 150 years, and the rapid social and economic changes of the last 40 years in particular, this degree of cultural consensus around “access to citizenship” seems unlikely, to say the least. One angle on understanding this lack of contestation over the cultural norms that underpin the citizenship order is to return to the connected character of the contemporary world, and the global character of features such as differential citizenship, the hegemonic position of middle classes and the unquestioned role of education in legitimating citizenship inequalities. From this vantage point, the practices in China analyzed in this special issue point to many intersections with trends in citizenship elsewhere in the world, and thus potential starting places for studying citizenship in new ways.

References


