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The imaginaries of the Eurasian Union: discursive construction of post-Soviet transnationality in Russia and Kazakhstan

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Abstract: Couched in the critical discourse studies perspective and developing the notion of political imaginary, this article explores the imaginaries of the transnational integration project of the Eurasian Union that are produced in elite discourses in its two key states, Russia and Kazakhstan. The corpus used comprises transcripts of the two states’ parliamentary discussions and speeches by presidents Putin and Nazarbaev. The article focuses on meaning construction through the discursive types, strategies, and topoi employed in the discourses of the new Union, and the linguistic forms called upon for their articulation. Two discursive strands narrating the Eurasian Union are singled out – the technocratic and the romantic, the latter being especially potent for identity-building capacity and the production of imaginaries. The article concludes that the object of integration emerging from the two constituent political agents’ collective imagination appears fluid and incoherent both within and between the two states.

Keywords: political discourse, Eurasian Economic Union, imaginary, Russia, Kazakhstan

1 Introduction: the Eurasian Union as a transnational imaginary

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the Russian keywords coined to denote what remained was the term prostranstvo ‘space’. Applied to the territories of the former constituent republics, in Russian discourses the word encapsulated a sense of rupture, a sharpened spatial awareness, and a suspicion of emerging separate entities.

In Giddens’s words, “the emptying out of [...] space [...] provides the very basis for [its] recombination” (1991: 17). The post-Soviet interpretation of space calls upon imagination to draw and redraw state boundaries, to reapply

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meanings to territories, and to renegotiate the sense of belonging. This is manifested not only in the practices of building new nation-states, but also in the series of reintegration attempts, including the recent and most ambitious project, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), formed in January 2015 and currently including Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the most recent addition, Kyrgyzstan.

This article aims to explore the imaginaries of the Eurasian Union, produced by elite discourses in its two most crucial states, Russia – the EAEU’s driving force and a Eurasian state itself (in that it spans the two continents), and the Union’s major fully Asian constituent, Kazakhstan. It poses a number of related questions: Do these imaginaries present a coherent vision of the Union, and what key meanings are attributed to it? If the vision is not coherent, then in which fields do the emerging imaginaries coincide and in which do they compete and conflict? What are the discursive types, strategies, and topoi employed in the discourses of the new Union, and what linguistic forms are called upon for their articulation? Finally, how do the meanings attributed to the Eurasian Union interact with and inform the construction of the identities of its inhabitants?

To answer these questions I draw on a corpus of elite discourses produced between October 2011 and May 2015, starting with Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign, in which he announced the Eurasian integration as the central objective of his term. The corpus comprises two types of discursive data: political speeches by the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan (Vladimir Putin and Nursultan Nazarbaev) and transcripts of the sessions related to the issue of the EAEU in the two state parliaments – the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Mazhilis of Kazakhstan.

The article’s approach shares the constructivist and postmodern perspective that, like nations, transnational associations are imagined and constructed through discourses and that the powerful elites have a major role in this process. It is positioned with respect to two main and overlapping theoretical strands. The first relates to the role of the political imaginary in the attribution of social meanings on the national and transnational planes (Anderson 1983; Castoriadis 1987 [1975]; Appadurai 1996; Bottici and Challand 2013; Bottici 2014; Ryazanova-Clarke 2014). For Castoriadis (1987 [1975]: 227), “reality, language, values [...] in each society specify, in each case, in their particular mode of being, the organization of the world [...] related to the social imaginary significations instituted by the

1 In Russia “Eurasian Economic Union” and “Eurasian Union” are used interchangeably, often to mean the whole process of the Union’s evolution.
2 Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU on 12 August 2015.
society in question”. Bottici (2014: 3) adds that the political imaginary includes a capacity to produce images independently of the “reality” of the represented, and that the boundary between the real and the imagined is blurred.

Secondly, this study is couched in the critical discourse studies perspectives on political language, and takes account of work that highlights the fact that, in the context of integration projects such as the European Union, discursively constructed meanings of spaces are linked to the renegotiation of national and transnational identities (Wodak and Weiss 2005; Mole 2007; Wodak 2007; Krzyżanowski 2010; Strath 2010; Carta and Morin 2014; Wodak and Boukala 2015). As Giddens (1991: 20) argues, beyond the dynamics of new linkages, globalization produces “the context of the thoroughgoing reflexivity [...] of modernity”, meaning that transnational integration can become a lens through which to better understand how both local and global senses are formed and interrelate. The micro-tools of the discursively constructed social meanings, imaginaries, and, ultimately, identities are conceived as argumentation strategies and rhetorical topoi that have specific linguistic forms of articulation as outlined by Walton (2005; 2008), Wodak et al. (2009), and, in relation to the representation of social actors and actions, van Leeuwen (1996; 2008).

The article identifies two types of imaginaries of the Eurasian Union – the technocratic and the romantic – and analyses the romantic stream in more detail. It argues that the elite discourses in both Russia and Kazakhstan appear to be conflicting and fluid both within and between the Eurasian constituents.

### 2 Configurations of reintegration

The post-Soviet reappointment of territory proved to be conflicted and unfixed, as dislocation exposed the underlying fluidity and malleability of the spatial valorization of nationhood (Bassin 2012: 554). Crossing paths with efforts to build sovereign nationhoods, the supranational flows of imaginaries (Appadurai 1996) disrupted emerging national imagined communities (Anderson 1983) and affected the meanings attributed to various “holding-together” (Libman and Vinokurov 2012) configurations.

The Russian yearning for reintegration is increasingly defined by the notion of collective trauma caused by the collapse of Russia’s powerful empire (Oushakine 2009; Suslov 2012; 2013; Kalinin 2015). As the Putin era progressed, official Russian discourse began to construct a narrative of trauma, associating the end of the Soviet Union with loss and mourning for the departed territories (Suslov 2013: 376). Thus in his (2005) Address to the
Federal Assembly, Putin reinterpreted the fall of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” and a “real drama for the Russian people” (Putin 2005). This arguably was a turning point that marked the official licence for the mass articulation of both traumatic memories and spatial anxiety. The compensation offered by the state was soon to come in the form of mental reimaginations and remappings with the specific purpose “to enable Russia to occupy a central place [...] in the center of the Eurasian landmass” (Suslov 2012: 576).

The revival of Russia’s interest in post-Soviet reintegration was among the central matters of such mental reinterpretation (Hoffman 2012: 2). Although the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) emerged on the same day that the old Soviet Union was signed off to oblivion, for a long time Russia had no clear policy for dealing with it. While the CIS states were growing increasingly diverse and Russia’s relations with some of them were turning sour, Putin’s new doctrine became oriented towards developing alternative and more modern formats of regional integration. Following a number of interim ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful reintegration projects, the Customs Union (2010) and its most recent incarnation, the Eurasian Economic Union, emerged. It was deemed to be qualitatively different from the earlier initiatives and to demonstrate Russia’s unflinching new global assertiveness (Libman and Vinokurov 2012; Dutkiewicz and Sakwa 2015).

Launched in January 2015, the EAEU project was presented to the public as not just a common economic zone, but one of civilizational importance, comprising common information, education, and political systems headed up by a Eurasian parliament (Duma 26 September 2014). Proponents of the pragmatic “inclusive Eurasionism” approach posit that the organization has great potential to develop into a common powerhouse of staggering scale: having a combined GDP of $2.2 trillion, 3.2% of the world’s total (Evraziiskii Ékonomicheskii Soiuz 2015), the partners boast a total oil production of 13 million barrels a day (and 90 billion in reserves), the world’s largest reserves of gas, and a population of 175 million (Dutkiewicz 2015: 1). Unlike the trauma theory of reintegration, these observers argue that the trend is inscribed in the current world integrative processes and that “Eurasia [...] can be redefined in [...] spatial, ‘supra-territorial’

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3 8 December 1991.
4 Attempts at integration with various participants included the Union State of Russia and Belarus (1997), GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, 1997), the Eurasian Economic Community (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, 2000), and the Single Economic Space (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 2003). For more details, see Libman and Vinokurov (2012).
or ‘transnational’ terms, so it ‘does not belong‘ to and is not ‘embodied by’ any particular state” (Dutkiewicz 2015: 5).

Other analysts are less impressed, arguing that in comparison to the leading world players (China, the United States, and the European Union), Russia’s economy has a weaker gravitational pull for its neighbours, and that since the formation of the Customs Union, trade between the states has actually decreased (Popescu 2014: 12). Popescu (2014) and Hill and Lo (2013) claim that the explanation for the fervent Russia-led quest for the Eurasian Union lies not in economics, but elsewhere, specifically within the order of the political imaginary that Russia propels. Russia’s purpose, they posit, is geopolitical and ideological; it aims to redraft the post-1945 world order and to position itself as an independent centre of world power entitled to control its “spheres of interest”.

Although they argue from a valid political-imaginary perspective, none of the above authors provides insight into how the imaginary is actually constructed. Expanding on their arguments, the rest of this article gives a detailed account of how the imaginary referred to as the Eurasian Economic Union is articulated in the discourses within and across the Union’s two key countries, Russia and Kazakhstan. After outlining the two main types of imaginary, I will focus on the fields that emerged as the most salient in my analysis of the discursive data: the categorization of the EAEU; the attribution of qualities; the representation of the “other”; and the representation of borders.

### 3 The discursive construction of the Eurasian Union

#### 3.1 The technocratic and the romantic imaginaries

The examination of the Russian and Kazakhstani elite discourses points to both states placing a set of neoliberal arguments at the core of the Eurasian

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5 Similarly, but on a larger theoretical scale, Chris Hann (2016) in his work developing a new paradigm for sociocultural anthropology, proposes an admittedly utopian vision in which Russia and Kazakhstan are entrusted to be the pivots for Eurasia to come into being as a new type of civilization: “Power holders in Moscow and Astana are […] well placed to initiate an Ausgleich for the entire supercontinent. The basic principles would be those of inclusive citizenship and the mixed economy. […] In this way the peoples of Eurasia, comprising some three quarters of the population of the globe, would transcend the collective-action problems that have dogged humanity all along and have reached critical proportions in a world of more than 7 billion inhabitants. The new institutions of Eurasian political and economic unity would not repeat the errors of ‘Fortress Europe’ but form the prelude to a genuine world society and government, based on a globally embedded human economy.”
Union project, such as “economic growth and prosperity for all member states”, “an increase in competitive industries”, and “an increase in the total GDP and trade with third countries and unions”. However, rather than producing a homogeneous portrayal of the Eurasian Union on the basis of these arguments, the discourses demonstrate two rhetorically differing streams underlying varied visions of the Union, identified here as the technocratic and the romantic. Elements of these streams may be mixed in the language of a particular political actor, but in the majority of situations one or the other dominates.

Example (1) demonstrates the two imaginaries. It is an excerpt from a dialogue in the Duma between deputy Kolomeitsev and the head of the Eurasian Economic Committee Collegium, Khristenko:

(1) Kolomeitsev: Are you planning in future to create a supra-national currency so that we do not link in future to the empty dollar and euro (‘daby ne priviazvat’sia dal’she k pustomu dollaru i evro’)?

Khristenko: The legal foundation used today and created by the Eurasian Economic Union, or to put it more precisely, by its formation treaty, does not propose any currency union. That is the next phase, the next step of the economic integration, which is not yet reflected in the law. ... 2025 has been fixed for a decision on the common financial regulator.

(Duma 26 September 2014)

In his question Kolomeitsev imagines the EAEU as a financial world centre. To categorize his in-group (“we”) endowed with this quality, he contrasts it to the negatively characterized out-group – the European West – by metonymically depicting all agents through their currencies. Despite the fact that the introduction of a common currency for the Union is not under discussion, he creates a fiction – a counterfactual Eurasian currency of overwhelming potency. He articulates this, first, through an implicit contrast between this non-existent currency on the one hand and the dollar and euro on the other. Second, he qualifies both Western currencies as “empty”, thereby emphasizing the purported weakness and unreliability of both currencies and, by a metonymical association, the states they represent.

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6 These categories form the key indicators on the EUEA’s official web page; see www.eaeunion.org/#about-info, accessed 4 February 2016.
7 All translations from Russian in both Russian and Kazakhstani sets of data are by the present author. Emphasis has been added in all cases.
Khristenko’s extended and technical reply is set in legalistic and economic jargon. He says, implicitly rebutting Kolomeitsev, that there is no Eurasian currency union and it will not be on the horizon for the next ten years. His mechanical, emphatically unemotional alternative imaginary pictures the Eurasian Economic Union through the *topos of law*, as a transnational bureaucratic system based on rules and regulations. He searches for precision in his wording and inscribes the future of the EAEU in long-term targets and objectives, the path to which is divided into clearly defined stages that he over-lexicalizes by using the lexemes *faza* (‘phase’) and *stupen’* (‘step’, ‘stage’).

Having their roots in the age-old types of rhetoric that the Greeks identified as *mythos* and *logos*, the two imaginaries of the Eurasian Union emerging from the Duma dialogue are in contestation. Kolomeitsev’s contribution displays features of the romantic imaginary, while that by Khristenko represents the technocratic discourse stream. In our corpus, this first stream favours vision over logic or the coherence of ideas, is rich in images and tropes, and often assumes an affective tone. It is often counterfactual, projected into the future, and especially rich in identity-building capacity. Conversely, the technocratic discourse stream is factual and logical, tends to relate to the present or to concrete plans and roadmaps and their specific implementation, concerns practicalities, and operates in the specialized bureaucratic and technical vocabularies of the economic, legal, customs, and other domains. While Kolomeitsev’s Union builds a boundary between itself and the West and diminishes the West by rendering its currencies worthless, Khristenko’s Union fights no battles; it is a clockwork bureaucracy based on treaties and legally defined processes that take place in managed stages. His technocratic vision seems to be averse to the simplistic and divisive imagery that readily constructs the conflicting in- and out-groups.

In the Russian discourses explored in this article, the romantic stream appears to be dominant in both the Duma and presidential narratives of the Eurasian Union. Let us draw a representative sample from the crucial Duma debate on 26 September 2014 on the topic of ratification of the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union. Of those, eight contributions by three speakers (2,097 words or 34.2% of the text) were dominated by technocratic language, while fifteen interventions by fourteen speakers (3,465 words, or 56.6% of the text) were romantic-dominant. A sample of three of Putin’s speeches related to the EUEA (3,624 words in total) show that 25.6% of his discourse falls into the technocratic category, while 74.4% can be categorized as romantic.

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9 The rest of the words related to the procedure.
The data from Kazakhstan elites confirm the production of the same two discursive streams, albeit with local variation. The technocratic stream is strongly favoured in the Mazhilis corpus, characterizing somewhere between 90 and 100% of the transcripts. Consider Example (2) on the topic of the Customs Service, which is notably crafted in bureaucratic jargon:

(2) One of the determining directions in the development of the Customs Service is the change of focus in the activities from fiscal duties to the control-and-assistance function.
(Mazhilis 26 September 2013)

This characteristic may be partly due to the fact that the available transcripts of the Mazhilis sessions do not record live debates as in the case of the Russian Duma. They are records of the Governmental Hour,\(^\text{10}\) and consist of the texts of a main paper and a co-paper presented during the Governmental Hour and minutes of decisions taken. The Mazhilis data contain no papers related to the general aspects of the Eurasian Union; rather, the path to the EUEA is implemented through matter-of-fact adjustments of local laws and regulations made in response to decisions passed at the transnational level. As Example (2) shows, the texts delivered are primarily neutral in tone, fact-based, and replete with technical language.

The speeches of the president of Kazakhstan, however, stand in stark contrast to the measured Mazhilis texts. In a sample of Nazarbaev’s three speeches (5,012 words in total), 15.9% of his discourse tends to be technocratic, while 84.1% veers towards the romantic imaginary. In the rest of this article I will focus on the romantic streams, for which there is quantitative evidence of predominance in the majority of discursive domains studied.

3.2 Visions of the EEU in the romantic discursive streams

3.2.1 Categorization of the common space: “mighty” in Russia

The vision of the EAEU pictured in the Russian elite romantic discursive stream is highly ambitious: the formation of the Union will do no less than define the twenty-first century and “form the layout of the geopolitical continents” (Putin 2013). Its “geopolitical scope” is overwhelming – envisaged as integration on the “cultural”, “military”, “political”, and even “civilizational” planes (Putin 2013). It is not surprising that the EAEU emerges in the discourse as a body defined by

\(^{10}\) Governmental Hour (Pravitel’stvennyi chas) is a session at which Mazhilis deputies discuss current and topical issues with the representatives from the executive branch.
strength and vigour. The attribute moshchnyi ‘mighty’ is one of the key qualifiers in the Duma discourse. Deputies call the Union “a mighty regional economic union”, a result of “mighty integration”, “a mighty project in the geopolitical sense”, “a mighty player in the world economic space of the twenty-first century”, and “a super-mighty supra-national union” (Duma 26 September 2014).

The topos of strength seems to underline the topos of advantage achieved by “close, mutually beneficial cooperation” (Putin 2011). The explanation that the benefit of being together lies in a combination of strengths to produce an ever stronger whole that is more than the sum of its parts is presented as a common-sense naturalized truth: “The combination of the natural resources, capital, and strong human resources will allow the Eurasian Union to be competitive” (Putin 2011).

The strength attributed to the Eurasian Union has a further purpose. The EAEU is imagined as a locus of geopolitical attractions and repulsions, where the major world forces are doomed to clash, revealing their true intentions and allegiances. As Example (1) has shown, the strategy of the “ideological square”, that is, positive self- and negative other-characterization (Van Dijk 1998: 267), is continuously employed to frame what is seen as the major geopolitical challenge to the Union. The might of the Eurasian Union is emphasized through its depiction vis à vis other world powers by means of the discursive metaphors of a victorious conqueror of spaces. Consider Example (3), in which the subject of the economy is articulated through the use of conflict framing metaphors drawn from the domains of games, competition, and the military:

(3) Deputy Slutskii: The Eurasian Union will be one of the mightiest players (‘budet odnim iz moshchnykh igrokov’) in the world economic space in the twenty-first century; it will start its fast and forceful march across the Eurasian continent (‘nachinaet svoe bystroe, forsirovannoe shestvie po Evraziiskomu kontinentu’).

(Duma 26 September 2014)

Here the Duma deputy represents the EAEU and its members’ transnational identity through the player metaphor, qualified by the superlative “mightiest”, imagining the Union to be involved in a daring game or battle of world giants. The Eurasian subject “forcefully marches” across the continent: this phrase constructs the image of an army taking an adversary’s territory. The expanses of the Eurasian continent are presumably borderless, as they are readily available to be marched on. This image creates ambiguity as to which territories of the Eurasian continent are included in the march and whether Kazakhstan is marching together with Russia over its own territory or over the territories of the neighbouring states.
3.2.2 Categorization of the common space: “mighty” in Kazakhstan

The imagination of Russia’s Asian partner echoes Russia in picturing the Eurasian Union as strong and mighty; however, the social meanings it produces are rather different. For example, in Nazarbaev’s 2011 speech the attribute moshchnyi is also frequent, being used seven times, but it predominantly modifies nouns related to productive concepts. He calls upon the “might” of the Union to evoke notions of inclusiveness and prosperity; it is a creative force, not a confrontational one. For Kazakhstani elites, the “might” that characterizes the EAEU is emphatically economic – the Union is “economically mighty, stable and advantageous for all”, and “a mighty union” “with a GDP of around $2 trillion” (Nazarbaev 2011). In addition, Nazarbaev imagines the common space through the trope of a technological revolution which for him is a path to prosperity: it is “a territory of innovations and a mighty technological breakthrough” (Nazarbaev 2011). Finally, the might of the Union is imagined through the inclusive botanical metaphor of protsvetanie (‘flourishing’) – he calls it “a powerful stimulus for the flourishing of all our peoples” (Nazarbaev 2011).

3.3 The Western Other

3.3.1 Russia

The Russian elites constantly discuss the Eurasian Union against the backdrop of what is understood as “geopolitics”, within the paradigm of the EAEU–West relations ambiguously represented both as a partnership and as a hostile relationship. Putin frequently indicates that the evolving EAEU looks up to the EU as its model. The topos of similarity is salient, and the spirit and form of the EU are described as an “inspiration”. It is claimed that the standards for goods and services in the new Union would be brought in line with those of Europe, and the projected common visa and migration policies are a “creative permutation of the Schengen Agreement”. Evoking the ideas of Eurasianism, which conceives of Russia as a super-ethnos, an amalgam of European and Asian cultures, Putin imagines the

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11 Eurasianism relates to several strands of Russian conservative ideology which, at its core, promotes a view that Russia is the centre of the entity called Eurasia – a third continent which connects East and West. It originated among Russian émigré circles in Paris, Prague and Berlin in the 1920s. In the Soviet Union a Marxist version of the Eurasian idea was developed by Lev Gumilev. Eurasianist thought has enjoyed a revival in post-Soviet Russia, emerging in the form of the neo-Eurasianist teachings of Aleksandr Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin, who advocate extreme nationalism and anti-Westernism. Neo-Eurasianism is used by the Kremlin to lend credibility to Russia’s
Eurasian Union as a connector for the European continent. He portrays the EAEU as a “powerful” and “effective” “supranational” link “between Europe and the dynamic Asian-Pacific region”. Moreover, the Eurasian Union is represented as a way-station on the path to further integration – the integration into Europe: by Putin’s logic, “entrance in the Eurasian Union […] will allow each of the participants to integrate into Europe faster and from a much stronger position” (Putin 2011).

This portrayal is nevertheless contested by the depiction of Europe and the West through the strategy of other-representation. This model emphasizes everything that is negative about the out-group (Van Dijk 1998; Wodak 2011), and Putin uses the topos of contrast to build dissimilarity between the EAEU and the EU. For example, he stresses that it took the EU 40 years to reach a “full-blooded union” and, by way of contrast, qualifies the Eurasian Union as “more dynamic”. Another negative characteristic of the EU is presented through a metalinguistic argument. The fact that Europe is multilingual and representatives of the various member states may speak their own language is represented as a “bureaucratic” logjam during which “one could kick the bucket (‘sdokhnut’ mozhno’) while waiting until each of the speakers finishes”. In contrast, Putin describes as an “advantage” the Eurasian Union practice of using Russian as the accepted language of transnational communication (Putin 2012).

Moreover, anti-Westernism has become an increasingly openly voiced and regular trope to define the Russia-dominated Asian expanses. In Example (4) – an answer at a press conference in 2014 – Putin comes up with a narrative in which social actors are defined through metaphorical symbolization (Van Leeuwen 2008),12 depicting Russia as a bear protecting its Asian territory – the taiga.

(4) Sometimes I am thinking: perhaps our bear should sit quietly, stop chasing piglets and young pigs across the taiga and eat instead berries and honey. Perhaps they will leave him in peace? They will not, because they will always aim at putting the bear on a chain. And as soon as they manage to put him on a chain, they will tear out his teeth and claws. In our present-day understanding, these are the forces of nuclear deterrence. As soon as, God forbid, this happens and the bear is not required any more, they will lay their hands on the taiga.

(Putin 2014)

departure from the European model of development and to its doctrine of territorial expansionism. For more details, see Laruelle (2004); Shekhovtsov (2009); Bassin (2015).

12 In van Leeuwen’s terms, symbolization is a specific case of overdetermination, a narrative in which social actors are represented as taking part at the same time in more than one social practice. In symbolization, “a ‘fictional’ social actor or a group of social actors stands for actors or groups in non-fictional social practices” (van Leeuwen 2008: 48).
In excerpt (4), explicit reference to the othered West is suppressed (Van Leeuwen 1996) through the use of impersonal forms of the third person plural (ostaviat ‘they will leave’, vyrvut ‘they will tear out’). In fact, this is a “euphemistic fallacy” used to expose the falsity of the subject. Employing the stereotypical symbol of Russia – the bear – and the Eurasian geographies of the taiga, Putin pictures two possible bear behaviours: the vegetarian pacifist bear, ostensibly desired by the Other, and the militant, land-protecting bear that, for him, represents the true Russian identity. In a topos of horror Putin describes what happens if the Russian bear changes his behaviour to the one preferred by Russia’s nemesis. The bear, symbolizing the national body of Russia, is graphically depicted as violated, mutilated, and deprived of its dignity, while the aggressive forces treacherously take over the Russian Eurasian land and all of its natural resources.

The grammatically oblique depiction of the West in Putin’s parable portrays the West as a not-to-be-trusted wolf in sheep’s clothing. To ridicule the bear pandering to the West, Putin uses multiple diminutives such as mishka ‘bear + dim’, spokoinen’ko ‘calmly + dim’, porosiata ‘piglets + dim’, iagodki (‘berries + dim’), medok (‘honey + dim’). Produced at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis, this portrayal of the West as a cunning enemy evokes the registers of Cold War discourses and legitimizes Russia’s own confrontational stance towards the outside world.

In an even more extreme case of defining the EAEU through confrontation with the West, the relationship is described through metaphors of death and murder:

(5) Deputy Didenko: The Eurasian Union is a murderer of the European Union (‘ubitsa Evrosoiua’)! [...]. For us it is clear that Europe is dying (‘Evropa umiraet’) in the spiritual sense and that its economic sunset (‘èconomicheskii zakat’) is not far away. The sole economic alternative for all sensible leaders of the countries (‘dlia vsekh zdravomysliashchikh rukovoditelei stran’) [...] is of course the Eurasian Union.

(Duma 26 September 2014)

The topoi of “obviousness” – a device often used to forestall disagreement (Walton 2005: 261) – and “common sense” (“it is clear”, “of course”) allow Didenko, without providing any evidence, discursively to banish Europe and hail the EAEU.

In Russia’s political imagination, the West has traditionally served as the key significant other against which Russian identity has been continuously constructed (Neumann 1996; Ryazanova-Clarke 2012). Explaining this from the post-colonial perspective, Morozov writes that Russia assumes a subalter position in the current international system and constantly looks upon itself through the
Western vantage point: “Being a perfect case for subaltern Eurocentrism, Russia has not only colonised itself on behalf of the capitalist core but also internalised the hegemonic outlook to the extent where the negation of the West becomes the only possible platform for Russia’s claims to the status of the alternative modernity” (Morozov 2015: 161). This dual vision of the “mirror image of the West” (Morozov 2015: 161) has become a shared social meaning between the Russian national identity and the proposed Eurasian transnational identity.

3.3.2 Kazakhstan

The Kazakhstani elite discourse represents the West as either a part of the in-group or a significant out-group held up as a positive model of attainment. Similar to Russian narratives, for Nazarbaev the EAEU means geographical expansion. But the leader of a great landmass dreams of “externalizing the internal” as he imagines his territory stretching as far as the oceans and the seas, ultimately reaching out to the West, not contesting it:

(6) Together [...] we have created the Eurasian Economic Union. In this way we solve a large geo-economic puzzle (‘geoëkonomicheskuiu zadachu’) – we ensure for ourselves the most cost-efficient access to the global sea routes. In effect this becomes our large internal market, with access, via our partners in the EAEU, to three oceans and thirteen seas (‘k 3-m okeanam i 13-ti moriam’).

(Nazarbaev 2015)

Contrary to Russia’s obsession with the term “geopolitical”, Nazarbaev stresses “geo-economic” concerns and counter-imagines the EAEU as a body that has no grudges or enemies. Emphasizing the economic nature of the Union, Kazakhstan’s discourse consistently uses the term “Eurasian Economic Union”, in contrast to the Russians’ frequent use of “Eurasian Union”, signalling that it refrains from imagining integration beyond the economic. After deep worries created by Russia’s role in the crisis in Ukraine, Kazakhstan also dropped the topic of monetary integration (Laruelle 2015). Furthermore, Nazarbaev sees the Union as some kind of test of Kazakhstan’s possibilities to get into global economic “clubs”. In Example (7), his hierarchy of values is framed by football and road metaphors through which he describes his country’s business aspirations:

(7) For our producers, the EAEU is a qualifying round on the road to world competition (‘iavliaetsia otborochnym ètapom k mirovomu sorevnovaniiu’) within the framework of the WTO.
Thus, the EAEU emerges from the Kazakhstani discourse as an organization with a pragmatic purpose: beyond providing immediate economic gain, it is seen as a stepping stone towards Kazakhstan’s global economic engagement. The metaphor of the EAEU as a qualifying round for bigger, more significant world games shows that the Union is rather a means to an end, a gateway to the West that opens Kazakhstan up to world markets.

3.4 Defining borders

3.4.1 Russia: “an imperial partnership”

In the imagination of Russian elites the EAEU is a space with fluid geographies and unstable or non-existent state borders. Musing about what the point in “all these unions” is, Putin states: “It is not pulling others into our orbit. The point is [...] that the borders become open” (Putin 2015). Starting from the “advantage” trope that the Union will enhance the living standards for all constituent states, Putin’s argument for open borders moves onto nativist and ethnic grounds:

(8) [W]hat difference does it make for us whether the Russian person (‘russkii chelovek’) lives on our territory or on the neighbour’s territory on the other side of the state border, provided he has opportunities to visit relatives freely, provided his standard of living is growing, and he feels he is not discriminated against, his rights are not encroached upon, he is not banned from speaking his native language (‘ne zapreshchait govorit na rodnom iazyke’)? [...] This is how our relations with Kazakhstan [...] are developing.

(Putin 2015)

Here, Putin creates an ambiguous category of “the Russian person” living “on the other side of the state border”, presumably a Kazakhstani citizen. The basis for qualifying such a person as Russian and not Kazakhstani is his or her ethnic and linguistic belonging. The conditional clauses (“provided...”) frame Putin’s slightly veiled strategy of claiming the right to have control over the well-being of Russian speakers living in the territory of other states of the Eurasian Union and, consequently, to intervene if the conditions are not met.

Thus in the Russian romantic imaginary stream, borders are both discursively erased and at the same time created by constructing trans-border categories of people, with regard to whom duties are distributed unevenly: for Kazakhstan to provide conditions, and for Russia to control its neighbour. Evidently, such a border delineation goes against the declaration of the homogeneous supranational EAEU identity and demonstrates that there is a hierarchy of belonging to the Union that privileges a Russo-centric hegemonic position.
This discursive construction of cross-border identities has proved to have implications for the existence of the Eurasian Union itself. After the Russo-Ukrainian crisis erupted, the Union was tested by the increasingly pronounced imperial trend in the Russian imaginary of regional integration. Not only was a clash of visions revealed, but the very survival of the EAEU was called into question. Thus, when on 29 June 2014, Putin was asked whether he was concerned about the violations of the rights of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, his coded reply turned to the topic of Kazakhstan’s statehood. Applying the topos of threat disguised as praise, Putin said that Kazakhstan’s leader had managed to “create a state on the territory where a state never existed”. This response shocked the Kazakhstani political class, who feared that the country, which has a predominantly ethnically Russian north, might become “the next Ukraine”. Nazarbaev himself responded with a sharp statement on national television, threatening to leave the Union: “If the rules set in the Agreement are not abided by, then it is within Kazakhstan’s rights to renege on its membership in the Eurasian Union. Astana will never be part of an organization that poses a threat to the independence of Kazakhstan” (Andreeva 2014).

The Duma discourse confirms the production of the imperial imaginary, as the terms “empire” and “imperial” have become increasingly and unabashedly common among Russian parliamentarians. For example, Deputy Didenko explains his Liberal Democratic faction’s support for the ratification of the EAEU treaty by saying that it supports “the imperial model of the state’s development (‘imperskie formy gosudarstvennogo razvitia’)” (Duma 26 September 2014). Nostalgia for the Soviet type of multinational unity is a constant Duma theme: deputies talk of it as a preferred path to Eurasian “transnationality”, a discourse in which the transnational and imperial become conflated. The strategies of demodernizing time, invoking the past, and conflating time and space are employed to discursively destruct borders and expand Russia’s influence:

(9) Deputy Degtiarev: It is obvious that the Russian language for centuries has facilitated the strengthening of the transnational links in a single multinational Russian state under different names: the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and today – the Eurasian Union.

(Duma 16 May 2014)

The Soviet Union is frequently invoked through the topoi of comparison and of the lovely idyllic place. Deputy Kolomeitsev, for example, wistfully observes that, had the Soviet Union remained, the number of people the EAEU could embrace would be much larger (Duma 18 January 2013). Another deputy,
Mitrofanov, argues that “now there is an opportunity through [...] the Customs Union quietly to restore in fact the USSR, but this will be the USSR-light (‘SSSR-lait’), a reduced version of the Soviet Union, and we should not be afraid of that” (Duma 5 June 2012).

While the state border with Kazakhstan is imagined from the Russian vantage point as transparent, those who cross it in the opposite direction appear to be less desirable visitors and are framed through other-representation. Duma discussions of Asian work migrants hardly distinguish migrant workers from Kazakhstan from other Asians, all of whom are placed in the category of half-tolerated gastarbeiter (‘guest workers’, from the German Gastarbeiter). The topos of danger and burden regularly occur in the Duma transcripts when deputies describe what the impact of migrants from Kazakhstan on the Russian labour market would be if the restrictions on labour movement were lifted:

(10) Deputy Fedotkin: According to various estimations, we already have now from twelve to fifteen million migrants, while the number of our own unemployed (‘svoikh bezrabotnykh’) among the indigenous population of Russia (‘sredi korennykh zhitelei Rossii’) is growing annually.

(Duma 26 September 2014)

Here, Fedotkin recategorizes the Kazakhs coming to Russia as indistinguishable “migrants”, while their transnational identity as members of the Eurasian Union is erased. To legitimize his position he uses the strategy of the numbers game, citing statistics to refer to the millions of migrants already in Russia, and contrasts “migrants” to the “indigenous” and “our own” Russian population. Such categorizations feed into the right-wing narrative of body politics, by which entitlement to work is renationalized and essentialized, and the identity of the Russian in-group is constructed through the notions of the nation-state, culture, and territorial belonging (e.g., KhosraviNik 2010; Wodak et al. 2013).

### 3.4.2 Kazakhstan: “sacred borders”

Kazakhstan’s discourse of borders displays conflicting imaginaries: the free travel of goods, services, and people within the EAEU is seen as an advantage, while the national borders are defined as immutable, intractable, and enclosing a territory described in a high register as the “sacred Fatherland”. Moreover, Nazarbaev’s narrative of the EAEU intended for the domestic audience moves away altogether from the vision of the borderless Kazakhstan. According to him,
Our first treasured value is our sacred and dignified country – the Eternal State (‘nasha sviaschchennaia i dostoinaia strana - Mangilik El’). More than 14,000 kilometres of incontestable borders (‘besspownykh granits’) have welded together (‘spaiali’) our Fatherland into one monolith. These borders have become the boundaries of good neighbourhood with all the adjacent countries. (Nazarbaev 2013)

While Putin and his Russian parliamentarians are talking about the dissolution of the borders and the continuity of the Russian Empire, Kazakhstan is developing a national idea that projects decades into the future, encapsulated in the so-called “Strategy 2050” paper, in which the national borders have a particular prominence. The Strategy prescribes for every citizen of Kazakhstan several “treasured values”, first among which is a fundamental notion of the “eternal state”, officially referred to exclusively using the Kazakh-language designation Mangilik El, even in Russian-language documents (O poniatii 2014). The “eternity” of the Mangilik El derives from imagining the Kazakh state as a monolithic entity supported by the stability of fixed ("welded"), impenetrable borders. The conflict of visions is apparent, as the concept of borders encapsulated in Kazakhstan’s national identity discourse calls into question the Eurasian Union’s ambition regarding the space available for free movement of people, trade, and services. No doubt that this cline of imagination has something to do with the fact that the state of Kazakhstan is personified by Nazarbaev’s authoritarian regime (Fauve 2015; Laruelle 2015). The meaning of “permanence” is embodied in Nazarbaev himself, who has been the leader of Kazakhstan since 1989 and in 2010 was endowed with the additional permanent title Elbasy – “Father of the Nation”. As Laruelle (2015: 41) aptly notes, “[T]he state narrative about Kazakhstan as a transnationalized country is not going against nationhood but is an integral part of it, and the president’s personality encapsulates this connection” (emphasis in original).

Thus Kazakhstani narratives of the Eurasian Union reveal the deeply ingrained conflict between the path taken in the country to build a nation-state while at the same time constructing transnational meanings and identities. The topic of the Union is taken by Kazakhstan as a chance to imagine itself in the centre of an exciting global modernizing project; however, it is also increasingly called upon to assert and reinforce the privileging of the primordial over the transnational identity.

4 Conclusion

In the discourses explored, the Eurasian Union rises like a series of phantoms spanning the two continents. The object of integration emerging from the collective
imagination produced by political agents in the two member states appears to be fluid, while the narrative of the Eurasian Union comes across as incoherent both within each of the two states and between them. The extended space of Eurasia is filled with imaginaries that are both dynamic and contradictory, in which the rhetoric of transnational unity, based on the parity of the constituent states and on economic, political, and cultural benefits for all, clashes with the neo-imperial and neo-nativist discourses. In both Russia and Kazakhstan, two discursive streams – the technocratic and the romantic – produce competing images of the Union. One constructs it as a transnational bureaucratic mechanism operating according to rules and regulations; the other produces dramatic, colourful visions undergirding both national and transnational identities. Russia’s stance calls upon the idea of the Eurasian Union to stretch Russian identity beyond its territory and to invoke imperial “holding together” strategies. Furthermore, it reveals the strategies of enemy construction and legitimization of Russia’s aggressive behaviour at the “avant-garde of malevolent globalization” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014: 7). Images of the Eurasian Union marching across the continents, redrafting the world order and challenging its Western adversaries seem to evidence the weaponization of Russia’s imaginary.

From the Kazakhstani viewpoint, the narratives of the Eurasian Union appear to be as fluid and conflicting as those of Russia, but the salient social meanings are quite different. The Kazakhstani discourse does not construct a Western enemy; rather, it relocates Kazakhstan to the heart of world trade routes. Its more pragmatic and confined vision of the Union is encapsulated in the consistent use of the qualifier “economic” in its title, which may be interpreted as resistance to Russian neo-imperial advances. Further representations of the Union, however, are more inward looking and are coherent with the vigorous current trends in crafting an ethnic identity based on the unchangeable geographies of Kazakhstan. Finally, the rifts and slippages in Russian and Kazakhstani imaginaries that have been evidenced in this article indicate that the path to a cohesive, beneficial-to-all Eurasian Union will be rather long and contested.

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