The Performativity Turn in Tourism

Stephen A. Harwood, Dahlia El-Manstrly,
University of Edinburgh Business School,
University of Edinburgh,
Scotland, UK
stephen.harwood@ed.ac.uk, Dahlia.El-Manstrly@ed.ac.uk

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Abstract

‘Performativity’ and its associate ‘performative’, are terms which have recently permeated the tourism literature. However, it is unclear how these terms, in particular, performativity, are being used and what is meant in their use, leading to possible misunderstanding in their reading. This paper’s contribution is the provision of a clarification in usage based upon the study of how performativity has been used in a variety of different disciplines (e.g. anthropology, sociology, feminist theory and theatre studies). This analysis finishes with the examination of how the term has been used in tourism, focusing upon usage within the Annals of Tourism Research. It is concluded that there are five potential interpretations associated with usage, each emphasising different facets of the notion of performativity: transformation, enactment, being, negotiation and efficiency. This clarification should alert future users as to the manner in which their usage can be interpreted and thus allow them to signpost intentional usage so that interpretations are appropriate.

Keywords: performativity, performance, tourism, practice.

INTRODUCTION

Performativity is a term which is starting to pervade tourism literatures, exemplified by its growing presence in recent years in the Annals of Tourism Research. However, it is not a new term, either as a concept or a term. Indeed, performativity is argued to be:

“everywhere – in daily behavior, in the professions,… It is a term very difficult to pin down. The words ‘performative’ and ‘performativity’ have a wide range of meanings. Sometimes these words are used precisely. But more often they are used loosely to indicate something that is ‘like a performance’ without actually being a performance in the orthodox or formal sense” (Schechner, 2002: 110).

Generally speaking, it is a term that attempts to explain practices through the act of something being performed (e.g. how we engage with routines, how we utilise theorems, how we authenticate,). This draws upon John Austin’s (1975) conception that through an utterance something happens.

Performativity as a notion has followed different bifurcating streams of development. One early stream is within anthropology led by Finnegan (1969) and Tambiah (1973) drawing upon Austin. Within Sociology, particularly Science studies and the Sociology of Economics, Latour (1986), Callon (1998, 2007) and MacKenzie (2005) have provided a substantive development in the concept, which has been picked up by those with an interest in organisational routines (Feldman, 2000; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Theatre Studies offers a fresh stream with its orientation towards stage performances grounded in the works of Bateson (1955) and Goffman (1959). Likewise, Butler (1990) offers a view orientated to the embodiment of the individual. Within tourism, development tends to be grounded in theatre studies, with Goffman (1959) providing the grounding for MacCannell’s (1973) seminal paper of authenticity and the staged nature of tourism experiences. However, it is only since around 2010 that tourism interest in performativity and the performative appears to have attracted increasing interest, though this tends to relate to the theatrical view of performances, which has been a more enduring feature within tourism as illustrated by MacCannell (1987). Nevertheless, the shift in attention to performance prompted some to name this shift, the “performance turn” (Ren, 2011; Noy, 2008; Picken, 2010).

This cursory overview of these different streams of development gives substance to Schechner’s comment about the ubiquitous yet elusive nature of performativity. It is a term that is being used and transferred across disciplines, but with what meaning. The aim of this paper is to explore the manner in which the terms performativity and performative are being used in the different disciplinary streams in order to attempt a deconstruction of the different emphases of usage. By drawing attention to these different usages, the intention is to alert users to the potential for misunderstandings that might arise due to imprecise or selective usage of the
terms. The article is organized in two parts. The first provides a selective review of different conceptualizations and uses of the term across a range of disciplines. The second presents a brief discussion about these different conceptualisations and the implications.

THE UNFOLDING OF A CONCEPT

To understand the notion of performativity then the everyday use as captured by a reputable dictionary provides a good starting point.

An Oxford English Dictionary (OED) definition

The OED defines performativity as “The fact or quality of being performative (cf. performative adj.). Also: the fact or quality of performing”. Performative is itself defined as “Of or relating to performance; (Linguistics and Philos.) designating or relating to an utterance that effects an action by being spoken or by means of which the speaker performs a particular act”. A performance has a variety of definitions of which two dominant themes arise typified by: “Something performed or done; an action, act, deed, or operation” or “The action of performing a play, piece of music, ceremony, etc.; execution, interpretation”.

The reveals the distinction between the very general case of something that is done and the more specific case of something enacted as in a play, with the specific technical case of Austin’s performative utterance.

John Austin

In a series of lectures delivered in 1955, John L. Austin introduces the concept of a ‘performative utterance’ (1975: 6). In 1970, Austin remarks that “it is a new word and an ugly word, and perhaps it does not mean anything very much. But at any rate there is one thing in its favor, it is not a profound word” (Austin, 1970: 105). A performative utterance is that which, in its saying, is performed the invoked act (e.g. ‘I promise to’ or ‘you are now married’). With the saying something is done or performed. This is in contrast to ‘constative’ utterances which are statements which describe or report (e.g. ‘they are now married’). However, for the act to be valid, the utterance needs to place in appropriate circumstances, i.e. embedded in an accepted conventional procedure (Austin, 1975: 14); “in the case of stating truly or falsely, just as much as in the case of advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the utterance and its context are important” (ibid: 142). If there are any ‘indefinites’ then the act can be rendered void due to some flaw in the utterance or context of the utterance – there is a ‘misfire’, or when there is insincerity in the intent or context of the utterance – the conventional procedure is ‘abused’. The distinction is made between the act of saying (the performance of a locutionary act: e.g., asking a question, providing information), the act being performed in the saying (an illocutionary act: e.g. order, warn) and the intention or consequential effects in the saying (a perlocutionary act). All three acts are performing. However, the constative utterance is concerned with the locutionary aspects of what is said (i.e. its meaning), whereas the performative utterance is concerned with the illocutionary force (whether it is likely to be successful or felicitous). Austin argues that there is a need to “draw a line between an action we do (here an illocution) and its consequence” (ibid: 110). An illocutionary act has effect which is distinct from the consequences arising this effect.

These distinctions are illustrated. Austin suggests that “perhaps with mathematical formulas in physics books as examples of constatives, or with the issuing of simple executive orders or the giving of simple names, say, as examples of performatives” (ibid: 146). However, “in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both” (ibid: 147) It is argued that whilst there are special utterances which are performative (including orders and warnings), it is acknowledged that establishing whether an utterance is performative need not be clear: “when we state something or describe something or report something, we do perform an act which is every bit as much an act of ordering or warning” (Austin, 1970: 113), “saying anything at all is doing this or that – because of course it is always doing a good many different things” (ibid: 114).

An anthropological perspective

Anthropological interest in Austin’s ‘performative utterance’ has been stimulated by Finnegan (1969) (Ray, 1973). Finnegan’s application to understand how utterances both reveal the nature of and maintain the social relationships and rituals within the Limba peoples of Sierra Leone. In this non-literate society, where there are no written documents, the spoken form assumes a legal force of its own, which is buttressed by an audience, who “act as both witness and assessors” (ibid: 548) and through the performance, thus reaffirm social relationships. The emphasis is on what is done and the ‘frame of action’ that constitutes the setting in which
saying the words have meaning. Finnegan extends her discussion to discuss religious utterances and acts, questioning their expressive or symbolic interpretation, to argue for a performatory interpretation: a prayer of sacrifice is an act, “a request for aid or forgiveness; at the same time he is expecting that the one(s) addressed will recognise their side of the relationship, ‘accept’ the plea and answer it; and he is also asserting a continuing relationship between speaker and audience, living and dead” (ibid: 550).

Tambiah (1973), in an attempt to understand the meaning and role of words in rituals, draws upon Austin’s performatory utterance, and in doing so, acknowledges being influenced by Finnegan (1969). A ritual is defined as “a complex of words and actions (including the manipulation of objects)” (Tambiah, 1968: 184). Tambiah (1973) explains “we can say that ritual acts and magical rites are of the ‘illocutionary’ or ‘performatory’ sort, which simply by virtue of being enacted (under the appropriate conditions) achieve a change of state, or do something effective (e.g. an installation ceremony undergone by the candidate makes him a ‘chief’). This performative aspect of the rite should be distinguished from its locutionary (referential, information-carrying) and perlocutionary (consequences for the participants) features” (ibid: 221). This informs that the performatory aspect can be in the form of either words (utterances, spells) or actions (manipulation of objects), with both combining “to form an amalgam which is the magical or ritual act” (ibid: 223). Moreover, if an infelicity is to be avoided then the ritual must follow “a conventional procedure properly enacted only by authorized person” (ibid: 223), that even if the desired magical effect did not result, “belief in the efficacy of the system itself was not thereby assailed” (ibid: 224), convention was not compromised.

This early anthropological perspective follows in the footsteps Austin’s original conceptualisation, being illustrated with the example of how a ritual can be interpreted as a performatory act. However, this perspective has been complemented with developments in other disciplines.

The sociological perspective

The sociological uptake of the term performativity has developed in a variety of ways. Barry Barnes (1982) (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003), drew upon Austin’s ‘performatory utterance to explore the performative nature of speech acts in social interactions. This revealed the self-referential and self-validating nature of these interactions. However, its uptake by Latour and Callon from the perspective of Actor Network Theory have led to alternative perspectives.

Bruno Latour (1986) possibly provides the most detailed insight into the notion of performatory after Austin, when he introduces the concept of performativity and its contraposition ostensivity to explain the nature of society, but without reference to their derivation. His argument commences with a discussion about power and the distinction between having power in practice and having power in theory (by status). Power is “a composition made by many people” (ibid: 265); is the effect (not cause) of the collective action of those who choose obey, though does not explain this behavior. This focus upon collective action draws attention to definitions and conceptualizations of society, of which Latour proposes two views, which is “practical and revisable” (performatory) and that which “can be determined once and for all” (ostensive) (ibid: 264). This distinction invokes the notion of ‘ultimate truth’ in contrast to what can be changed. This is elaborated upon in Table 1. The performative view involves negotiation in which everyone is involved in the “intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting” (ibid: 273).

Andrew Pickering (1994) draws upon Latour’s notion of performatory to make the distinction between a representational idiom and performative idiom. The representational idiom typifies the conventional view how science is done, which privileges human agency and which is orientated to the “production of representations of nature, facts and theories” (ibid: 413). This contrasts to the performative idiom, which recognizes the agency of not only humans but also of the things in the material world. The performative idiom incorporates the representational idiom, recognizing that “science does produce knowledge and representations, but it also recognizes the material and social dimensions of science, and tries to get all of these strata into focus at once” (ibid: 414). Practice or doing is a transformatory struggle (‘mangle’) involving all the agencies.

A perhaps not dissimilar view of the notion of performatory is presented by Michel Callon. Callon introduces the term performatory to explain the “‘performatory’ role of the sciences – and hence also of economics and sociology” (Callon, 1998b: 244); core is the idea that “economics, in the broad sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions (Latour, 1987)(Callon, 1994)” (Callon 1998a: 2). Whilst Callon is explicit about his use of performation: “the capacity of economics in the performing (or what I call ‘performance’) of the economy” (ibid: 23), the sense in which the term is being used is vague, though suggests a transformatory effect.
Ostensive definition of society
1. In principle it is possible to discover properties which are typical of life in society and could explain the social link and its evolution, though in practice they might be difficult to detect.
2. Social actors, whatever their size, are in the society defined above; even if they are active, as their name indicates, their activity is restricted since they are only parts of a larger society.
3. The actors in society are useful informants for those who seek the principles that hold society together (see 1), but, since they are simply parts of society (see 2), actors are only informants and should not be relied upon too much because they never see the whole picture.
4. With the proper methodology, social scientists can sort out the actors’ opinions, beliefs, illusions and behaviour to discover the properties typical of life in society (see 1) and piece together the whole picture.

Performative definition of society
1. It is impossible in principle to define the list of properties that would be typical of life in society although in practice it is possible to do so.
2. Actors, whatever their size, define in practice what society is, what it is made of, what is the whole and what are the parts – both for themselves and for others.
3. No assumption is necessary about whether or not any actor knows more or less than any other actor. The ‘whole picture’ is what is at stake in the practical definitions made by actors.
4. Social scientists raise the same questions as any other actors (see 2) and find different practical ways of enforcing their definition of what society is about.

In this framework, controversies on what society is about cannot be eliminated to let the scientists unfold the whole picture… controversies are part and parcel of the very definition of the social bond… ‘What links us together?’ is not answerable in principle, but in practice… Society is not the referent of an ostensive definition… Rather it is performed through everyone’s efforts to define it… This shift from principle to practice allows us to treat the vague notion of power not as a cause of people’s behaviour but as the consequence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting…

Table 1 Ostensive and Performative (from “The Powers of Association”, Latour, 1986:272-273)

Reflection upon the insights provided by these early proponents of the term performative and associated terms, highlights that each use the terms in a manner, distinctive yet not necessarily unrelated but nevertheless open to debate about the meaning implied. Irrespective, a subsequent stream of thinking has emerged developing these concepts and drawing upon these earlier works. Prominent are developments in the sociology of economics and technology.

Sociology of economics

The performative nature of economics appears to be grounded in Callon’s The Laws of the Markets (1998) within which Callon (1998a & 1998b) are to be found. The development of this argument continues with an early paper by Donald MacKenzie, coauthored with Yuval Millo (2003), which is the first of a series of publications on the theme, but in which “we explore performativity” (ibid, 108). This explicitly acknowledges its grounding in Austin’s ‘performatve utterance’ making reference to Barnes (1983). Moreover, it critiques Callon (1998) on the basis that “most of the studies collected in Callon (1998) are not informed directly by performativity” (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003: 108). It concludes that “economic theory crystalized in concepts and devices can indeed be performative, even if not (as emphasized above) in any simple sense of self-fulfilling prophecy, but as the outcome of a conflictual, embedded process.” (ibid: 140). Theory is performed as an embedded feature of practice.

In a response, MacKenzie (2005) states that “To claim that economics is performative is to argue that it does things, rather than simply describing (with greater or lesser degrees of accuracy) an external reality that is not affected by economics.” (ibid: 1). Moreover, that the notion of performativity, which he referred to as ‘Austenian performativity’, “was better called ‘Barnesian performativity’, because the invocation of Austin could be read as suggesting that the performativity of economics was a linguistic matter.” (ibid: 2), whereas it invoked practice in a social context; that the conditions of felicity are this social context. Four ‘versions’ of the concept of performativity are presented, each addressing a specific aspect of the interaction between theory and practice:
- **Generic:** theory, model, procedure, etc. is used in practice; whilst MacKenzie argues that the meaning of this version is self-evident, its meaning is perhaps most clearly invoked in the sentence “Performativity in this sense points to the fact that the categories of social life (gender is the prototype) are not self-standing, ‘natural’, or to be taken as given, but are the result of endless performances by human beings and (an actor-network theorist such as Callon would add) by non-human entities and artefacts as well” (MacKenzie, 2005:5) (i.e. can be interpreted in terms of how theories depict what happens, in other words are descriptions or explanations).

- **Effective:** how practical use of theory has effect on shaping practice (i.e. can be interpreted as transformative).

- **Barnsian:** the special case of effective performativity of how practice becomes more like its depiction – theory (i.e. adjusts to model)

- **Counter-performativity:** the special case of how the practice of theory deviates from theory.

Moreover, MacKenzie draws attention to Austin’s notion of felicity and to Bourdieu’s insight into the conditions or context in which felicities are valid:

“To analyze performative utterances using only linguistic philosophy is (as Didier 2004, p. 1, also suggests) to treat them as “magic.” The “conditions of felicity” of a performative utterance “are social conditions,” as Bourdieu (1991, p. 73) rightly points out. Only by analyzing these conditions can we understand the difference between the successful performance when a member of the Royal Family names a ship the Queen Elizabeth and the unsuccessful performance when a shipyard worker seeks to name it the Mr Stalin (Austin 1962, p. 23 [cf. Austin, 1975]).” (MacKenzie, 2005: 26).

Performativity and its versions provide devices to explain the interplay between theory and practice, acknowledging the conditions which validate the performances or what is done.

In the introduction to a collection of essays on the performativity of economics (Mackenzie (2007), MacKenzie acknowledges that “the notion of ‘performativity’ is therefore, a complex one and needs to be unfolded in its many varieties” (ibid: 6); that “to identify the varieties of performativity is difficult” (ibid: 7). Each of the chapters explores different aspects from different perspectives. For example, Garcia-Parpet (2007) reveals how the traditional market dynamics for strawberry producers in a French locality was replaced by an electronic market-place underpinned by notions of the ‘perfect market’.

Didier (2007) questions whether agricultural statistics are performatives in US agricultural markets. Statistics are descriptions, whilst describing is “a specific kind of transformation of the object described” (ibid: 282). The aggregation of raw data, through an intricate process, produces a new element, the average which, in becoming, establishes the ‘normal condition’. This ‘normal condition’, in turn, is taken up by people (i.e. has an effect on human behaviour). Statistics do have a transformative effect. However, statistics is argued not to be performative: “performance tends to simplify the relation to theory and practice alone” (ibid: 305). Rather, statistics is an ‘expression’; “statistics express certain characteristics of their objects” (ibid: 304). The notion of expression is defined as “doing something, making some previously nonexistent properties stand out, and the important word here is doing/making, for expression does something to makes something of the objects expressed” (ibid: 304). This view is complemented by that of Mirowski & Nik-Khah (2007) which critiques the notion that economics theory is performative. Instead, it is argued that the complexity that characterizes economic theory as well as practice, in particular, the role of the various institutional and corporate stakeholders, cannot be reduced to a simple notion of performativity.

Callon (2007), in the last chapter, argues that “A discourse is indeed performative…, if it contributes to the construction of the reality that it describes, but we need to go further than that…” (ibid: 316). He examines the notion of performative, commencing with its conceptualization by Austin. This denies the representative (description) function of language, instead that “all utterances are performative (or illocutionary)” (ibid: 318). Moreover, “performativity is not about creating but about making happen” (ibid: 327). This is extended to science with the claim that “scientific theories, models and statements… are performative” (i.e. constitutive of the realities they describe) (ibid: 318). MacKenzie’s (2005) argument in support of the performativity of economics is described as “the gradual actualization of the world of the formula… The actualization process is a long sequence of trial and error, reconformation and reformulations. But what makes this process possible is the performative dimension of the statements and the trials that they allow” (ibid: 320). Callon’s discussion continues to explore a variety of issues. One issue relates to the link between performativity and performance and Goffman’s distinction between front- and back-stage Two views of the actor are presented, one which distinguishes between the public face (public identity) and the private interior (private identity), the other which draws upon authors such as Butler, that there is no back-stage, that identities are constructed through the performance. However, Callon critiques these views, by exposing their tendency to neglect the corporeal or socio-technical. This raises the notion of **agencements**, the configuration of elements required to actualize a statement (D’Adderio, 2011). Different statements require different agencements, thus a struggle may ensue.
between statements, a struggle between *agencements*. Moreover, economics is the result of a collective effort, and thus involves collective performance or co-performance over time, with past performances being establishing as legacies in the present. Whilst this does not exhaust Callon’s contribution, it draws attention to a fresh interpretation of the notion of the performative

**A perspective from theatre studies**

The notion of performance is intrinsic to theatre studies, but conceptually it has its roots in anthropology, in particular the works of Bateson (1955) and Goffman (1959). Bateson (1955) draws attention to the many levels of abstraction of communication, that messages remain intrinsic to the frames within which they are composed. Goffman (1959) examines the manner in which individuals present themselves or perform in the presence of others. A performance is defined as “all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants” (ibid: 15). This implies an audience. Indeed Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1999) in her account of how food is performative draws attention not only to the doing and the everyday context of doing (i.e. the appropriateness of behaviours) but also to the showing or display. This condition of an audience is used by Goffman to explore the distinction between the front, open to the audience, and a backstage, this distinction being developed in MacCannell’s (1973) seminal paper on authenticity. For Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1999) the “independent arts that we know today” (ibid: 26) are characterized by distinct specialized genres, each having a selective appeal to specific senses: “not until the various components of such event (music, dance, drama, food, sculpture, painting) were separated and specialized did they become sense-specific art forms in dedicated spaces (theatre, auditorium, museum, gallery), with distinct protocols for structuring attention and perception” (ibid: 26). Performance in the arts domain is a multifarious and differentiated act both spatially and conventionally grounded.

From the perspective of performativity and the stage, Austin (1975) regards the actor on the stage as infelicitous and not performative: “a performative utterance will, for example, be *in a peculiar way* hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy… All this we are excluding from consideration” (ibid: 22); that a citation was not performative. However, in reply, Derrida (1972) commented that “isn’t it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, ‘non-serious, citation (on stage, in a poem, or in a soliloquy) is the determined modification of a general citationality – or rather, a general iterability – without which there would not be even a ‘successful’ performance?” (ibid: 17). He invokes that all utterances have been used before. Moreover,

“And if one maintains that such ordinary language, or the ordinary circumstances of language, excludes a general citationality or iterability, does that not mean that the “ordinariness” in question-the thing and the notion-shelter a lure, the teleological lure of consciousness (whose motivations, indestructible necessity, and systematic effects would be subject to analysis)? Above all, this essential absence of intending the actuality of utterance, this structural unconsciousness, if you like, prohibits any saturation of the context” (ibid: 18),

that if ordinary utterances are inimicable, then this invites questions about intent, whilst the performativity of or the lack of intent underpinning an utterance leads to endless possibilities for new contexts (c.f. Shepherd & Wallis, 2004; Parker & Sedgwick, 1995). Parker & Sedgwick (1995) comment that “it’s the aptitude of the explicit performance for mobilizing and epitomizing such transformative effect on interlocutionary space that makes it almost irresistible… to associate it with theatrical performance. And to associate it, by the same token, with political activism, or with ritual” (ibid: 13). The transformative effect of that which is enacted

This notion of the reuse of past utterances is extended to behaviours. Schechner (2002) states that “all behavior is restored behavior” (ibid: 28), that people, perhaps unconsciously, engage in behaviours that are not new, but are “recombinations of already behaved behaviors” (ibid: 28), that how one behaves is related to how others behave: “the ways one performs one’s selves are connected to the ways people perform in dramas, dances, and rituals… Rituals, games, and the performances of everyday life are authored by the collective ‘Anonymous’ or the ‘Tradition’.” (ibid: 28). Moreover, Schechner makes the distinction between that which is ‘a performance and that viewed ‘as’ a performance; the former being a performance “when historical and social context convention, usage and tradition say it is” (ibid: 30), whereas “just about anything can be studied as ‘performance’.” (ibid: 30). Likewise, Schechner makes the distinction between stage actors who “enact roles composed by others” (i.e. pretend) and performers of everyday life, who do not pretend, but are engaged in the daily activities of whatever needs to be done in, whatever role they serve (e.g. parent, employee, hobbyist, tourist). But this raises the question of what role is being played: is it the real ‘me’ (Schechner, 2002). However this opens up another argument which is beyond the scope of this paper.
**A perspective from feminist theory**

Judith Butler (1990) in her discussion about gender, introduces the concept of performative: “that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be” (ibid: 25). It is through fabricated acts / gestures that the essence or identity is realised; “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (ibid: 25). It is these acts / gestures that are performative, they construct meaning / identity; “consider gender, for instance, as a corporeal style, an ‘act’, as it were, which is both intentional and performative, where ‘performatives’ suggests a dramatic and contingent construction of meaning” (ibid: 139). Rephrased, the “internal core or substance” of the person produces (fabricates) an effect that is evident “on the surface of the body” (ibid: 136), to be is achieved by what is done. Moreover, such fabrications / performances are sustained over time through repetition, “that gender reality is created through sustained social performances” (Butler, 1990: 141).

However, this internal core is itself “an effect and function of a decidedly public and social discourse, the public regulation of fantasy through the surface politics of the body” (ibid: 136); attention is drawn to the socially constructed and regulated nature of gender. “this repetition is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established; it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation” (Butler, 1988: 526).

In sum, it is through performance the essence is made evident; performative is the simultaneous and ongoing construction of meaning / identity through acts / gestures, though this may be fabricated to create an illusion of compliance to regulatory demands.

**An organizational studies perspective**

Within the organizational studies domain, two aligned streams of development have emerged which have examined the performative nature of routines. The first is that of Feldman (2000) and Feldman & Pentland (2003) and the second is that of D’Adderio (2008).

Feldman (2000) draws upon Latour’s (1986) use of the concepts of ‘ostensive’ and ‘performative’ to make the distinction between what exists in principle and what emerges through practice. This is developed in Feldman & Pentland (2003); “We adopt language proposed by Latour (1986) in his analysis of power, in which he pointed out that power exists both in principle and in practice. He referred to the former as the ostensive aspect of power and the latter as the performative aspect.” (ibid: 100). Translating this to the explanation of routines they elaborate: “The ostensive aspect is the ideal or schematic form of a routine. It is the abstract, generalized idea of the routine, or the routine in principle. The performative aspect of the routine consists of specific actions, by specific people, in specific places and times. It is the routine in practice” (ibid: 101). Moreover, “the performative aspect of routines can best be understood as inherently improvisational. Even routines that have been engaged in by the same people many times need to be adjusted to changing contexts” (ibid: 102). They liken their interpretation to the performance of music: “the ostensive part is like the musical score, while the performative part is the actual performance” (ibid: 102). The ostensive and performative are mutually shaping. The ostensive can be a reference point to guide actions, or against which to assess or account for action, or to make sense of activity; it is a feature of management control. In contrast, the performative relates to the “creation, maintenance, and modification of the ostensive aspect” (ibid: 107) of routines. Ostensivity is the conceptualization of the performative (i.e. practice). Together, these concepts provides “a vocabulary for describing the parts of organizational routines and their relationships” (ibid:111) as well as explaining both their stability and change

D’Adderio (2008) draws upon Callon’s and MacKenzie’s interpretation of performativity to examine the notion of the performativity of routines: “a performative view where rule-following is characterised as a typically emergent, distributed and artefact-mediated activity” (ibid: 774). Performativity relates to how models or theories “transform the settings that they describe” (ibid: 774) (i.e. they perform or alter). D’Adderio suggests that there are two extreme forms of performativity of a theory: prescription (“a very strong instance of performativity: automatic reproduction, pure repetition, no more recalcitrance, recurrent events”, ibid: 775) and rejection (“full demise, rejection or disuse”, ibid: 776). D’Adderio (2008) concludes that “formal, artefactual representations of routines (rules and SOPs) do not solely “guide” performances… but they are performed” (ibid: 783), but in a manner which allows for both their compliant execution and their adaptation. This leads to a view of performativity, whereby the distinction is made between performance which “refers to uncertain situations where there is dynamic adaptation, while prescription refers to automatic reproduction and pure repetition” (ibid: 786). D’Adderio appears to use the terms performativity, performance and performance in the same sense, whereby performativity relates to how SOPs, for example, transform what is done, drawing
attention to the interplay between people, artifact and what is done. In a subsequent paper D’Adderio (2011) draws attention to the distinction between routine-in-theory (procedure) and routine-in-practice (performance). The performative aspect of a routine is its practice.

The tourism uptake

The notion of ‘performativity’ appears to be a relatively new concept within the tourism domain. Indeed, Valtonen & Viejola (2011) propose that there is a paradigmatic shift in how agency in tourism is conceptualized, exemplified by “the shift from the gaze to the body... from authenticity to performatively...,” and from representations to everyday habits and practices” (ibid: 176). The emphasis is shifting towards attention upon what is done.

The emergence of performativity is illustrated in a search within the Annals of Tourism Research for articles containing the terms ‘performativity’ and ‘performative’. Most articles have been published since 2010 (Table 2). The search on the word ‘performativity’ revealed 27 articles which contained the word, though these included articles where the term was in the title of a reference rather than in the body of the text. A search on the associated term ‘performative’ revealed 44 articles, of which there were 14 articles common to both searches.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>pre-2005</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 The number of articles published in the Annals of Tourism Research for the given terms

The expectation was that use of these terms would be orientated towards meanings associated with Austin’s ‘performative utterance’. However, an analysis revealed a different picture. Articles making use of ‘performative’, without the term ‘performativity’, tended to use the term without any explanation of its meaning, this being inferred from its association in discussions where tourism was viewed as a performance: the “paradigmatic ‘performance turn’” (Noy, 2008: 510), the “metaphor of tourism as a form of performance” (Tussyadiah & Zach, 2012: 781), “the embodied performances, practices and processes of the tourist experience” (Scarles, 2010: 909). Noy (2008) explains “The term ‘performance’ reflects an approach that sees tourists’ behaviors as meaningful social roles that are both carried out and evaluated publicly. Performances are formative behaviors that conform to, confirm, or challenge social norms, as well as the institutions, power relations and identities that these norms support” (ibid: 510). Several authors attribute the origin of the performance turn to Goffman (1959) (Mordue, 2005; Hyde & Olesen, 2011).

In contrast, are the 27 articles that mention the term ‘performativity’. An analysis of the occurrence and use of the term reveals a more complex picture (Table 3). Only two attempt to explain the concept (Diekmann & Hannan, 2012; Zhu, 2012) “the ways in which people know the world without knowing it, the multi-sensuous practices and experiences of everyday life that includes both representational and the non-representational” (Diekmann & Hannan, 2012: 1318), “where meanings and feelings are embodied through the ongoing interaction between individual agency and the external world” (Zhu, 2012: 1498). The majority of articles lack clarity as to how the term is being used, though its association with the terms performing and performances suggest that performativity is associated with that which is staged or enacted or performed. Five articles (Ayikoru, Tribe & Aireyal, 2009; Li, 2000; Pritchard, Morgan & Ateljevic, 2011; Ren et al, 2010; Richards, 2011) are not only unclear about usage, but any association with performance not established. Moreover, few explain the derivation of the terms. Three articles explicitly establish their association with performances by drawing upon MacCannell (1976). One article appears to be grounded in MacCannell (2001) and Nash (2000). Two (Zhu, 2012; Cohen & Cohen, 2012) ground their usage in Austin’s ‘performative utterance’. Four papers by Tribe (1997, 2002, 2006, 2010) ground the notion of performativity in Lyotard (1984) and the notion of maximum return for effort, though this usage is perhaps anomalous.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Study location and purpose</th>
<th>Use with examples</th>
<th>Derivation of understanding of performativity?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amoano</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>This utilizes both the terms performativity and performative as adverb and adjective to qualify but without explanation as to meaning: &quot;performativity hybridity&quot; (ibid: 1265), &quot;performative activity&quot; (ibid: 1270). It is used in association with performance as illustrated by: &quot;Such altered versions of a cultural performance need not be seen as 'an act of sacrilege' (Butler &amp; Hinch, 2007) but one of hybridity mixing traditional/modern, urban/rural&quot; (ibid: 1268).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayikoru, Tribe, &amp; Aireya</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Uses the term performativity repeatedly without explaining its meaning, which is difficult to infer from its use. The term performance is used in a measurement sense: &quot;performance indicators&quot; (ibid: 199).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohen &amp; Cohen</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>The word performativity is used four times and in association with performative: &quot;'performativity' can be deployed in two different senses: in 'cool' authentication it is typically an explicit 'performative speech act' (Austin, 1970, p. 242), whereas in 'hot' authentication it becomes, as implied in the use of the term by Knudsen and Waade (2010), a constitutive performative process.&quot; (ibid: 1298). In the former sense, it is typified by a declaration of authenticity. In the latter sense, it is associated with belief; 'belief strengthens the (ritual) performance, and the performance strengthens the' (ibid: 1301). Performativity in this latter sense invokes mechanisms which &quot;involve an imbrication of visitors in the attraction, the reiteration of emotive expressions through ritual practices of devotion and veneration, and their external manifestation in material symbols, such as offerings and inscriptions, which in turn serve to augment the &quot;hot&quot; authentication of the attraction&quot; (ibid: 1310).</td>
<td>Austin (1970), Knudsen and Waade (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’Hauteserre</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>There is no reference to either terms performativity of performative. However, there are references to performances and performing: &quot;New Caledonia becomes a theatrical stage for scripted performances by the local whites and privileged tourists&quot; (ibid: 387).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diekmann &amp; Hannan</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>The notion of performativity is central to this paper: &quot;by utilising the concept of performativity which allows us to think and explore ‘more than representationally’ about the engagement of tourists with India’s slum spaces&quot; (ibid: 1316). Moreover, performativity is on occasion used with the notion of a performance: &quot;tours are not merely performances but an enactment of the wider notion of performativity as the tourists look for past representations” (ibid: 1328). Performativity “is thus concerned with the ways in which people know the world without knowing it, the multi-sensual practices and experiences of everyday life that includes both representational and the non-representational” (ibid: 1318).</td>
<td>MacCannell (2001), Nash (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edensor</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>The words performativity and performative are each used once, but in association with the more frequent word ‘performance’ alongside the notion of stage and theatre: “performance is an interactive and contingent process: it succeeds according to the skill of the actors, the context within which it is performed, and the way in which it is interpreted by an audience” (ibid: 324). The use of the notion of tourism as performance acknowledges the many roles a tourist will enact on a vacation, with the location serving as the stage of a theatre, which in turn, influences the types of performances enacted.</td>
<td>Schutz, 1964), MacCannell (1976), Alder (1989), Butler (1990, 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Study location and purpose</td>
<td>Use with examples</td>
<td>Derivation of understanding of performativity?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hultman &amp; Hall</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>The word performativity is used once but in association with the more frequent word ‘performance’ which is defined as “place-making in action” (ibid: 561) and “the making of meaning in practice” (ibid: 564).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knox</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>The word performativity appears twice without revealing the sense being used but tends to be in association with the multiple use of the word performance, which is an aspect of authenticity: “Authenticity as an idea has historically relied on artifice, contrivance, and performance (in the narrowest sense of the word) as partners in various dualisms” (ibid: 259).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knudsen &amp; Rickley-Boyd</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>The word performativity is used one and performative twice, both in a sense that appears to relate to staged performances: “others since have recognized the performativity, the enacting not just masquing, of tourism sites” (ibid: 1253) and “tourism is increasingly theorized as a performance rather than a pilgrimage, gaze or ritual. In this formulation, the tourism site is viewed as a stage upon which tourists perform tourism” (ibid: 1253).</td>
<td>MacCannell (1976, 1999), Edensor (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larsen, Urry &amp; Axhausen</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>There is no reference to either terms performativity of performative. However, one of the conclusion is that “tourists should be seen as producers of social relations as much as they are passive consumers; and this relates more generally to the so-called ‘performance turn’ within tourism studies” (ibid: 259).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Canadian tourists in China.</td>
<td>The term performativity is presented at the end of the paper without explanation about its meaning: “One important characteristic of the postmodern condition is valuing knowledge in terms of its ‘performativity’, which emphasizes the optimizing of efficient performance by using the knowledge. This valuing of it and of its performativity suggests that there should be…” (ibid:879). Moreover, the notion of performance or performing is not presented..</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obrador</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>The word performative is used twice: “the performative character of home” (ibid: 410) and the “performative character of the family” (ibid: 413). This use is associated with the notion of performances and performing as illustrated in the statement “I want to look at the sort of homely feelings and idealizations of the family that are formed and performed on holiday” (ibid: 403).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pritchard, Morgan &amp; Ateljevic</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>The word performativity is presented within a quote, but without explanation. There is limited use of the notion of performance but as used by others.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Study location and purpose</td>
<td>Use with examples</td>
<td>Derivation of understanding of performativity?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ren</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>case-study</td>
<td>This paper examines how knowledge is produced in tourism research. The terms performativity and performative are mention one each, the former within a quote. The meaning is unclear but there is repeated reference to the notion of research being performed: “tourism knowledge is ordered, performed and materialised in various contexts” (ibid: 891)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ren</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>“Using insights from actor-network theory, this article introduces the notions of non-human agency and radical ontology to the realm of tourism research” (ibid: 858)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>The study “attempts to analyze and explain the developing relationship between tourism and creativity” (ibid: 1225)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards, Pritchard &amp; Morgan</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>This empirical study examines “tourism experiences of individuals with visual impairment” (ibid: 1097)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rickley-Boyd</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>This conceptual discussion examines the notion of authenticity drawing upon the work of Walter Benjamin; “This paper, therefore, aims to present a theoretical engagement with the authenticity literature in tourism studies that endorses the concept’s ability to bring the object, site and experience of tourism into one framework” (ibid: 270).</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rickley-Boyd &amp; Metro-Boyd</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Hungary, USA</td>
<td>This is an empirically grounded study which assesses the role of a destination’s background elements in shaping a tourist’s experience. The term performative is used three times, with one use as part of a quote. The term is used in association with the concept of performing or performances are not present.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarles</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>“This paper seeks to unpack the interplays of agency that emerge as locals being photographed negotiate the complexities of performing amongst larger, third party forces that exist within the wider global political economies and western tourist Mythologies” (ibid: 929)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>This paper examines how tourism studies can be conceptualized, offering “a comprehensive review of the epistemology of tourism and proposes a new model for its understanding” (ibid: 638)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Performativity Turn in Tourism
Stephen A. Harwood, Dahlia El-Manstry © 2012
Table 3: Derivation of understanding of performativity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Study location and purpose</th>
<th>Use with examples</th>
<th>Derivation of understanding of performativity?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>This paper “examines the extent to which there is congruence between the theorized world of tourism (the canon of its knowledge) and its phenomenal world” (ibid: 360).</td>
<td>Lyotard (1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>global</td>
<td>This empirically grounded paper critically analyse[s] tourism studies. This initially generates two objectives—an epistemological enquiry focussing on the nature and structure of the field and a sociological enquiry focussing on the culture and practices of academics (ibid: 7).</td>
<td>Lyotard (1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe, Xiao &amp; Chambers</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>The empirically grounded paper examines the articles submitted to a journal to understand the black box of knowledge generation through journal publication.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitt &amp; Duffy</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>“This article argues that tourism studies should pay closer attention to the ear and listening. To do so, the article engages in the exciting implications that a performative framework has for tourism studies when attention turns to how tourists listen” (ibid: 457).</td>
<td>Johnston (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>conceptual</td>
<td>“This paper explores how the dongba as the ritual practitioner perceives his authenticity during the marriage ceremony in the Naxi Wedding Courtyard in Lijiang, China” (ibid: abstract).</td>
<td>Austin (1975), Tambiah (1981)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Performativity Turn in Tourism
Stephen A. Harwood, Dahlia El-Manstrly © 2012
One inference from this analysis is that performativity and performative tend to be more associated with performance, perhaps as perceived within the theatre context rather than within the linguistic context as presented by Austin. Attention focuses less upon what is said rather being concerned with what is done by the actor, with such concepts as embodiment being ascribed to the actor, in this case the tourist. Embodiment is defined by Crouch (2000: 68) as “a process of experiencing, making sense, knowing through practice as a sensual human subject in the world”; it is a multi-sensual encounter in spatial surrounds though which meaning is changed.

To illustrate, Edensor (2000) uses the metaphor of performance to understand the practices that constitute the process of tourism. This is grounded in the view that all social life is performative, with tourism being an aspect of this. Tourism “as a range of performances” (ibid: 341) is enacted at sites which can be viewed as stages. The discussion of the different facets of these performances draws attention to their “interactive and contingent” nature (ibid: 324), the manner in which they are managed and the norms / conventions which performances may be expected to conform to. Edensor identifies three different dimensions to performance: spatial and temporal dimensions which bound the stage on which enactments occur, the social and spatial regulation of the stage (e.g. how the stage is managed, how movement is choreographed) and the accomplishment of the performance itself with regard to the desired / expected outcome (immersion of distanciation), both from the perspective of the actors and the intended audience. Edensor distinguishes between space and performance, proposing that “the form of space, its organization, materiality, and aesthetic and sensual qualities can influence the kinds of performances that tourists undertake, although not in any predictable and deterministic fashion” (ibid: 327).

Space can be usefully idealized as either enclavic or heterogeneous spaces; the former provides a purified and regulated domain designed for tourists (e.g. self-contained holiday resort), whilst the latter is a multifunctional unpredictable domain, with inherent risks, which the tourist shares with others (e.g. residents). In terms of performances within these spaces, these may be ritualized (i.e. adheres to conventions), improvised (e.g. guided by but not necessarily complying with conventions) or unbounded (e.g. where there is an absence of guidance about convention). From a movement perspective, Edensor notes that “In much tourism, the body moves in accordance with the directions suggested by tour guides and set design” (ibid: 339). Tourists as performers are choreographed in terms of how they move within particular settings, the extent varying according to the choice of maneuvers permitted. During a holiday, the tourist may encounter different settings and thereby enact different roles. Indeed, Hyde & Olensen (2011) reveal how the tourist packs for a holiday and in doing so, through the packed costumes / props, constructs a self-identity for anticipated performances in the new setting.

Edensor (2000) illustrates the performative nature of the tourist in a setting which is metaphorically explained in terms of a stage. This tourist focus contrasts with the performances of those inhabiting the location. Mordue (2005) examines “how the heritage city of York in northeast England is performed, evaluated, and contested” (ibid: 179) by three groups of stakeholders (local people, tourists and brokers). The performance metaphor is developed to reveal how ‘embodied performances’ are enacted by actors, a process which involves discourse through which actors author what is done “to create and contest places as ‘performative events’” (ibid: 180), using narrative. For example, training awards provide a control of the performances of both front-line actors and their employers, thereby proving a control of the tourism product. In another study, Scarles (2012) examines how residents exploit an opportunity to perform for tourists who wish to photograph them. As empowered actors they negotiate with tourists, thereby gaining economic benefit and reinforcing or locking in local identity, but in doing so incorporate momentary intimacy and pleasure in the encounter.

One interesting application of performativity is to the concept of authenticity (Knudsen & Waade, 2010; Cohen & Cohen, 2012; Zhu, 2012). This notion of performativity is influenced by the works of Butler (1990) and Gade & Jerslev (2005). Knudsen & Waade (2010) introduce the concept of ‘performative authenticity’ which they state “is not so much about the performance and the plays, as such, but rather that the performative as a theoretical concept in which presentational realism and reflexivity is related to one another” (ibid: 13). It concerns not only “that we do and perform places by our actions and behaviours, but that places are something we authenticate through our emotional / affective / sensuous relatedness to them” (ibid: 12-13). It is a “relational quality attributed to something out of an encounter” (ibid: 13). It is a complex dynamic between the object of attention and perceptions, involving all senses, cognition, including imagination, and also emotions. Whilst everything experienced is real, the issue is whether what is experienced is the result of a real and authentic production or performance. This might be interpreted here as the simultaneous and complex interplay between concept and action in which concept reflexively shapes practice. Cohen & Cohen (2012) develop this by examining the process of authentication, distinguishing between the performativity underpinning notions of ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ authentication. In the former, “authentication is an immanent, reiterative, informal performative process of creating, preserving and reinforcing an object’s, site’s or event’s authenticity” (ibid: 1300). It is subjective, emotional and grounded in belief. In contrast, ‘cool’ authenticity invokes Austin’s performative act whereby “the authenticity of an object, site, event, custom, role or person is declared to be original, genuine or
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis reveals the widespread, multifarious use of the terms of performativity and performative, often in association with the terms performance or perform. Whether it is a dictionary definition, or use within a specific discipline, there is a range of meanings associated with the term performativity, creating potential for misunderstanding and confusion.

Whilst Austin (1975) draws attention to the doing aspects of speech in contrast to its information carrying characteristics, Austin concludes that all speech has a performative function – it does something, even if it is mere description. The anthropological perspective proffered by Finnegane (1969) highlights the importance of performativity as a concept to explain how a traditional society with an oral tradition functions. Speech has force in terms of what it does and binds individuals to, strengthened with its audience, thereby reinforcing the relations within not only social but religious contexts. Indeed, the ritual (Tambiah, 1973) reveals the complex interplay between words (utterances) and actions (use of objects), each being transformational by virtue of the enactment. The notion of performance assumes that the performance complies with convention and is performed by legitimate actors. If not then it is void or infelicitous. The legitimacy of actors is perhaps through training with initiation / graduation transforming the learner into an artiste. The act and the transformation that takes place is surmised to be instantaneous, whilst its effects can be long-lasting or permanent.

This view contrasts with the more generalized view of performativity presented through the sociology lens (Latour, 1986; Callon, 1998; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003), that of a transformation, not instantaneous, but emerging through the complex interplay among all actors over time. This interplay among actors is one of ongoing reflection, negotiation and enrolment, through which each situation is defined, redefined and changed. The transformation is emergent and over time. This emphasis is upon the interactions among an assemblage of people and artifacts and how over time practices emerge, evolve then disappear. MacKenzie’s (2005) exposition, provides an insight into to how performativity takes place. This explanation is based upon the distinction between theory and practice; whether theory describes practice or shapes practice or whether practice becomes more like theory or deviates from theory. However, this is problematic. Whilst for MacKenzie theory can be performative, this is not the case for Austin’ who states that “mathematical formulas in physics books as examples of constatives” (Austin, 1975: 146), it being argued here that a formula is a special case of theory. Likewise Didier (2007) does not consider statistics as performative, though they can have an effect through how they are interpreted. They express specific characteristics about their objects; they are descriptions.

To make sense of this dispute then perhaps the notion of force can contribute to this. Finnegane (1969) revealed how the force in an utterance gave rise to a transformation through the act of the utterance; in other words the utterance was performative. Whilst statistics are descriptions, a specific statistic announced monthly (e.g. the Consumer Prices Index as an indicator of inflation), may be performative in that it may transform people’s perceptions of the situation (e.g. that the situation is out of control), with consequential actions (e.g. stock market panic). Does a theory or formula have this force? If there is belief in a theory in a manner one believes in a ritual (Tambiah, 1973) perhaps weight can be given to accepting the performative nature of a theory or statistics. With a ritual, there is the belief that a specific action transforms (e.g. the act of Consecration transforms bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ). In this particular usage, it is difficult to support the notion that a theory is performative.

An alternative argument to support the performative nature of theory is the view of performativity as the complex interplay among actors. Performativity is ongoing reflection, negotiation and enrolment. Theory and practice are related through negotiation and the struggle to make both work, this involving “a long sequence of trial and error, reconfiguration and reformulations” (MacKenzie, 2005: 320). The performativity of the theory of economics is the struggle between theory and practice as they co-evolve and take on the characteristics of each other, against a backdrop of convention. It is through negotiation that meaning is constantly redefined. In many respects, this view of performativity is to be found in Butler’s (1990) perspective and how gender emerges in the struggle between concept of self and outward acts and gestures, within a social context of acceptability.
In contrast, a view expressed within the organizational studies domain, examines how the theory (or concept) – practice distinction explains the nature of organizational routines (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003), drawing upon Latour’s (1986) distinction between the ostensive (concept) and the performative (practice). The performative nature of routines is what is done in practice, which is distinct from conceptualized or abstracted understandings of routines (the ostensive aspect of routines). This distinction between concept and practice and how each shapes the other is more fully developed by D’Adderio (2008) who draws upon MacKenzie (2005) as well as introduces the notion of artifacts as intermediaries between rules and performances, whereby the ostensive aspects of routines (i.e., rules) are embedded in the artifacts as representations which inform the performative of routines (i.e., practice). Performativity is not associated with transformation in the sense of Austin’s utterance, nor in the manner in which identity emerges as suggested by Butler (1990). Routines are an ubiquitous feature of the work-place, but they have their own life-cycle, coming into being, adapting to changing circumstances, but within the stable context of the operational domain (Harwood, 2011). However, this is not a smooth process, but a struggle (Pickering, 1994). The use of performativity in this application helps explain this. Thus, it is suggested that performativity is about the perpetuation of routines in organizational contexts, with stability and adaptation being complementary characteristics of this perpetuation.

A different perspective is offered from theatrical studies and the notion of an enactment. Whilst Austin (1975) dismissed actor’s citations as infelicitous, Derrida (1972) counter-argues that there are no unique utterances and thus an actor’s citation is a special case of the ubiquitous reuse of utterances. However, it is to Goffman (1959) that the theatrical view of performativity derives its meaning drawing upon what is performed in front of an audience. The emphasis is upon the showing (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1999). This offers quite a different view of performativity to those presented above, locating performances on a visible stage, with a back-stage hidden from view, though privileged members of the audience may be invited backstage to glimpse at what goes on to accomplish what is enacted on the stage (MacCannell, 1973). The performance of the actors requires that there is an audience. This view of what a performance is, is contrasted with the everyday activities of daily life (Schechner, 2002), which in their doing, reveals aspects of who people are, shedding light on their identity. From this later perspective, Schechner argues that any activity can be viewed as a performance. Underpinning this distinction are the issues of pretence and role play. This suggests that people, as they shift from their everyday roles to the roles they engage when on holiday, may attempt to discover themselves – the authentic self (Wang, 1999). Alternatively may escape into a fantasy world typified by a visit to a Disney theme park. In both cases the tourist performs, but the nature of the performance is at variance. However, does one loose oneself entirely in one to the exclusion of the other, or is it more the case that at specific moments one becomes more prominent or dominates: the escapism in the thrill of the theme ride countered with the search for the something to eat (e.g. halal meat, or organic fruit) that is an expression of the self. Thus, whilst the review of the Annals of Tourism reveals a tendency for articles to use the terms performativity in association with performance and performing, the manner of their usage tend to be vague.

This review suggests five different usages of the terms performative and performativity.

The first is grounded in Austin’s ‘performative utterance’ (Austin, 1975) and is to be found in Finnegans (1969), Tambiah (1973), Callon, MacKenzie and D’Adderio. This invokes a transformation of some sort (cf. illocutionary act) which is distinct from the effects or consequences of the transformation (cf. perlocutionary act). This transformation may be due to a linguistic act, but also may take the form of a ritual (Tambiah, 1973). Irrespective it is grounded in a convention, rules or custom. MacKenzie presents a developed insight into this transformational view, making the distinction between theory and practice and whether theory transforms practice, practice becomes more like theory or whether practice diverges from theory.

The second relates to the ‘performance turn’ that characterizes studies of the tourist, which can be traced back to Goffman (1959). This relates to the theatrical perspective and invokes enactment by performers or actors of a role or script, as well as display for an audience. Performances involve pretence.

This contrasts with the more existential view of the tourist, whose performance is concerned with the search for one’s-self and being one-self (Wang, 1999; Schechner, 2002). This is related to Butler’s (1988, 1990) account of performativity. Acts / gestures are performative in that, through their sustained fabrication, meaning / identity is constructed or made evident. This view invokes the emergence of meaning through the performance.

The fourth is associated with Latour (1986) and is to be found in Pickering and Feldman & Pentland. It draws attention to the distinction between ostensive and performative, where the performative is to do with practices, whilst the ostensive is concerned conceptualizations. This usage emphasizes negotiation.
The fifth, which Tribe (1996, 2002, 2006, 2010) draws upon, is derived from Lyotard (1984). This is concerned with the conversion of inputs into outputs, which emphasizes efficiency.

These five interpretations of the notion of performativity reveal different emphases: transformation, enactment, being, negotiation and efficiency. These are not necessarily all the emphases possible and each are not necessarily exclusive of the other. Where accounts about usage are unclear, then misunderstandings are possible. This is clearly the case in the review of articles in the Annals of Tourism Research which has experienced an increase in the number of articles using the term performativity since 2010. Rickly-Boyd & Metro-Roland (2010) give a plausible explanation why this might be; it is “a reaction against the ‘tourist gaze’ and other representational approaches that privilege the eye and the viewer by arguing for new metaphors based more on agency—the being, doing, touching and seeing of tourism” (ibid: 1165). This shift from the representational to the performative resonates with that presented by Pickering (1994). However, the dilemma presented to readers concerns how this use of performativity is to be interpreted.

REFERENCES


The Performativity Turn in Tourism
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