Sport, austerity or choice in Scotland

Citation for published version:

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3366/scot.2018.0236

Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer

Document Version:
Peer reviewed version

Published In:
Scottish Affairs

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Sport, Austerity or Choice in Scotland: An Analysis of Direct Government Expenditure on Sport

Abstract

Sport in Scotland has been a devolved area of activity since 1999. This paper seeks to examine claims that direct government expenditure on Scottish sport has been influenced by United Kingdom (UK) government austerity measures. Direct Scottish Government expenditure on sport is allocated to the Scottish national sports agency, sportscotland. An analysis of expenditure between 2008 to 2018 is used as a basis for considering whether trends in Scottish sports expenditure have been influenced by UK austerity measures alone or whether such an explanation is too simplistic. The paper concludes by suggesting that direct government expenditure on sport in Scotland cannot be explained solely as a result of UK government austerity measures between 2008 and 2018.

Keywords: Scotland, sport, austerity, expenditure trends, choice, governments.

Introduction

The notion of austerity as a problematic informing the study of sport in Scotland is not new. Researchers have used it to contextualise the conditions in which sports provision has been curtailed and shaped. From studies of sport and parish life during the age of improvement (Jarvie, 1998); to the development of sporting playgrounds for the leisure classes during the Victorian period (Dewar, 1998; Jarvie, 1991; Ray, 2001); to a consideration of the barriers to participation by certain groups (Research Scotland, 2016); the changing landscape of sporting facilities (Haynes, 2014); the fragmentation of sports contribution to welfare provision (Reid and Lee, 2014); the role of sport during the 2014 Scottish Referendum (Jarvie, 2016a); the
implications of Brexit on Scottish sport (Jarvie, 2016b) or the curtailment of sport and leisure trusts to optimise local sports provision (Audit Scotland, 2008), it is clear the social, economic and political forces of austerity and the ways in which they impact upon different public spaces is an important issue. This is particularly true when there is danger as, Gil (2014) has warned, ‘of robbing young people of anticipated opportunities and prospects’. Scottish austerity claims need to be evidenced, supported and/or challenged.

The research presented in this article builds upon a sustained effort to question and influence the making of Scottish sports policy since at least 2008 (Adams and Morrow, 2017; Jarvie, 2016a; Jarvie and Burnett, 2000; Reid, 2009; Reid 2017). It adds to a programme of research that has systematically examined the consequences, opportunities and practice of devolved Scottish sporting policy (Jarvie and Thomson, 1999; Jarvie, 2016c; Jarvie, Murray and MacDonald 2017; Widdop, Cutts and Jarvie, 2016; Widdop and Jarvie, unpublished). Drawing upon Brammal’s (2016) warning about austerity politics this article questions whether UK Tory measures to address inequality and austerity are solely to blame for the current situation in Scotland. Writers such as Perman (2016) have observed, in relation to the 2016-2017 Scottish Budget, that the Scottish National Party (SNP) tried to blame the UK Government for Scotland’s hardships while at the same time running with a pretty shallow piece of semantics that presented a cut in local government funding as an increase in local government services.

It is worth, at the onset, being clear about what this article does and does not attempt to do. The core question asked is whether direct government expenditure on sport in Scotland has been impacted by austerity between 2008-2017. It interrogates direct government expenditure provided to the national sports agency, since 2008, as a basis for examining the claims that Scottish sport has been affected by austerity and austerity alone. While this article comments upon trends in local government expenditure on sport and recreation it does not attempt or
intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of local government expenditure on sport since 2008 - future follow up studies may do this.

The evidence base for this article has involved (a) an analysis of national sports agency expenditure on sport between 2008 and 2017 (b) interviews with key personnel who have overseen Scottish sporting expenditure during this period and (c) evidence drawn from newspaper accounts, sportscotland documents and Scottish Parliamentary Information Centre Evidence Briefing Papers (SPICe) between 2008-2017. It is the first study to both substantiate and question Scottish sport expenditure trends, implications and activity during a contemporary period of austerity in Scotland.

**Austerity and the Scottish Government.**

With an economic climate worsening from 2008, a Conservative Party-led coalition government assumed political leadership of the United Kingdom in May 2010. The headline fiscal approach to mitigate the impact of an economic downturn was a Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) that outlined severe funding cuts to public spending. This paved the way for successive UK led austerity measures and policies and anti-austerity responses from successive Scottish Governments (McKendrick, Mooney, Scott, Dickie and Hardy, 2016; Parnell, Millward and Spracklen, 2014).

It is not necessary to provide a year on year commentary to establish the fact that the Scottish Government has consistently highlighted austerity as being the key driver in UK Government spending cuts that have impinged directly on Scotland. Successive Scottish Government finance secretaries have prioritised the term when introducing and/or explaining Scottish finances. The following are merely illustrative of this fact:
July 2014:

In the months prior to the 2014 Scottish referendum vote the then Cabinet Secretary for Scottish Finance, John Swinney stated that:

*A yes vote on September 18 would allow Scotland to set different priorities for public spending and that Scottish independence means no to austerity* (Brooks, 2014).

He went on:

*The Scottish Government would provide a “credible and sustainable alternative to the current UK Government’s fiscal strategy* (Brooks, 2014).

November 2015

In November 2015 Swinney responded to the UK Chancellor’s budget by saying:

*Osbourne seeks austerity out of choice not necessity. My agenda is one of fairness* (Swinney, 2015:1)

He added:

*For our part, the Scottish Government will continue to do all we can within our means to protect the Scottish people from this ongoing austerity programme and we will continue to pressure the UK Government to rethink these cuts* (Swinney, 2015:1).

December 2015

Talking to Common Space, one month later, the same Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) referred to a nine year period of UK Government budget cuts by stating that:
Between 2010 and 2019 the funding available to Scotland will have shrunk by 12.5 per cent in real terms. The chancellor has imposed real terms cuts on Scotland every year from now until 2020 and more than a billion pounds of those cuts are still to come between now and the end of the decade (Common Space, 14 December 2015).

December 2016

As successor to John Swinney, Derek Mackay continued in the same vein. Introducing the Scottish Parliament to the draft budget for 2017-18, Mackay reported:

*The Scottish Government has long since argued that the UK Government’s austerity programme is damaging* (Scottish Government 2016:3).

*Let me be clear, I will not pass the costs of UK austerity on to the household budgets of the lowest-income taxpayer.* (Scottish Government 2016:2).

October 2017

Speaking ahead of an October 2017 meeting of the Finance Ministers for the devolved administrations, the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Finance and the Constitution argued:

*While we have done what we can to mitigate the worst effects of UK Government austerity, the continued and sustained real terms reductions in our budget makes this increasingly difficult* (Scottish Government 2017:1).

*The UK Government needs to abandon their obsession with austerity. The policy has failed and it is time to stimulate the economy by investing in this country’s future* (Scottish Government 2017:1).
Finally, when introducing the draft 2018-19 budget Mackay continued to frame the introduction to the budget in austerity terms, arguing that:

*Austerity and uncertainty is damaging the UK economy, with a knock-on effect on public finances. The pound has fallen, inflation has risen, and growth forecasts have been downgraded* (Mackay 2017).

Yet, despite the prominence given to the term by Scottish Finance Ministers, the notion of austerity in Scotland is something that escapes precise definition. Its vagueness is its political allure, for it can mean anything Scottish politicians want it to mean – the reality of everyday life, the need to have more control, and or a phase of development that can be compared to other ‘tough times’. It can have social, economic and political implications. The notion of austerity has arguably become one of the central political debates within and beyond Scotland. Far too often it is portrayed as being politically neutral and yet the social, economic and political consequences of austerity are far from neutral in the lives of the people that are affected by austerity or anti-austerity policies, measures and consequences. Take, for example, the link between Scottish austerity, poverty and inequality that has been evidenced, for example, in the work of McKendrick (2016) and Bell (2015).

A bi-polar divide that sees Scottish and UK Government choices purely in terms of austerity versus anti-austerity, London –v- Edinburgh or some other polarised view fails to be sensitive to the reality that choices are still made, opportunities can be created or missed and that the inequality gap between rich and poor applies as much to Scotland as it does other part of the UK. Studies by Beatty and Fothergill (2013; 2015) showed that the impact of welfare changes
in Scotland is geographically differentiated with local authorities such as Glasgow, Inverclyde, Dundee and North Ayrshire being affected the most while Shetland, Aberdeenshire and East Dunbartonshire are affected the least. Studies by Bell and Eiser (2014) caution against equating poverty purely with areas of multiple deprivation since poverty exists both within areas of multiple deprivation but also areas of affluence. Scotland is not alone as Di Muzio (2015:2) alludes to the notion that ‘the majority of the planet’s inhabitants experience varying degrees of austerity, indignity and exploitation in their daily lives’. On the other hand, Oxfam (2016) concluded that a global inequality crisis is reaching new heights as the richest 1% now have more wealth than the rest of the world combined while Goldin (2013) has argued that bad governance by governments has led to an increasing number of divided nations.

The assertion that policy decisions and choices in Scotland can be explained in purely austerity and anti-austerity terms is something that needs to be further tested across a range of devolved areas of activity. Sport provides one such area of devolved activity and it is to an analysis of direct government funding for sport in Scotland that this study now turns to.

**Direct Government Funding for Sport in a Devolved Context**

Sport in Scotland has been a devolved area of activity since the Scottish Parliament reconvened in May 1999. The Scottish Sports Council was established by Royal Charter in 1972 for the purposes of ‘fostering the knowledge and practice of sport and physical recreation among the public at large and the provision of facilities therefore’. On the 1st of July 1999 the Scottish Sports Council adopted the trading name of sportscotland. It is financed mainly by grant in aid borne on the vote of the Scottish Government Health and Wellbeing Directorate. It receives other Scottish Government funding and under the National Lottery Act of 1993 and
distributes lottery funding connected to sport in Scotland. Sportscotland is recognised as the national sports agency for sport in Scotland acting as a non-departmental public body responsible through ministers to the Scottish Parliament.

The Scottish budget is determined through a combination of three main elements; block grant funding through Her Majesty’s treasury; forecasts of receipts generated by taxes devolved to Scotland through the Scotland Act 2012 and 2016 and the planned use of available devolved borrowing powers. The 2017-18 budget set out for the first time the Scottish Government’s proposals for income tax in Scotland under powers devolved through the Scotland Act 2016. Arguably, the entire budget is often framed as an SNP administration doing the best to empower communities and protect the environment in the aftermath of a decision to leave the European Union and / or the impact of UK imposed austerity.

The money allocated to sport within the Health and Sport budget goes directly to the national sports agency which has the unenviable task of utilising this to lever other funds to deliver government objectives. The sports budget is divided into two sections: (a) sport and legacy, and (b) physical activity. This reflects both a resource and capital allocation. The sports budget sets out to enable a vision of Scotland where more people are more active, more often (Scottish Government 2016:36). It sits within an Active Scotland Outcomes Framework underpinned by a commitment to equality. Specific stated outcomes to be achieved over this period of government administration are:

- 200 Community Sports Hubs by 2020 with 50% based in schools
- Targeting areas of deprivation to ensure increased opportunities to lead an active lifestyle
• A New National Performance Centre for Sport (opened in October 2016)
• A New National Para Sports facility
• A network of regional sports centres
• £300,000 per annum Gender Equality in Sport Fund
• An Equality in Sport and Physical Activity Forum

(Scottish Government 2016:36)

A new plan and sportscotland expenditure for 2014-15

In the aftermath of a successful 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games the national sports agency created a new corporate plan for the period 2015-2019 and a new model of delivery for sport was introduced. This was structured around funding for: partnerships, schools and education, clubs and communities, performance sport, people, places and also sportscotland as an organisation. Figure 1 below illustrates resource allocation in each area of activity for the year 2014-15.

[INSERT FIGURE ONE HERE]

Figure 1 Sportscotland resource distribution for 2014/15 (sportscotland 2015a)

The sportscotland corporate plan for 2015-2019 emphasised that the next four years would build upon previous success with highlights presented as including the 2012 Summer Olympics and Paralympics, the 2014 Winter Olympics and Paralympics, and the 2014 Commonwealth Games. All of these were seen to have a positive impact on the public’s perception of the role and relevance of sport for them and their communities. The level of engagement and awareness raised through the Olympic Torch Relay and Queen’s Baton Relay has, according to the plan
been spectacular. Medal winning performances by record numbers of athletes, particularly para and female athletes, have challenged perceptions about sport and provide ‘sportscotland with a strong platform for development and focus’ (sportscotland 2015-2019 Corporate Plan: 2016c:5)

The sportscotland mission set out in the 2015-19 Corporate plan remains the same, namely, to build a world class sporting system for everyone in Scotland, where world class is seen as an expression of an aspiration and ambition to be the best ‘we can be at all levels of sport’. Its vision is a Scotland where sport is a way of life, where sport is at the heart of Scottish society and has a positive impact on people and communities sport’ (sportscotland 2015-19 Corporate Plan:2016c:10).

*The impact of recession on sport*

The national sports agency warned against the impact of recession on sport in Scotland as early as 2009 (sportscotland 2009). The implications of the recession were that economic downturn would (a) impact on corporate sponsorship of sport in Scotland and local authority capital investment programmes and (b) lead to a decline in consumer spending and a rise in rates of volunteering. Furthermore, a possible decline of 0.5% in the Department of Culture, Media and Sport Lottery projections from 2009-10 would have a knock on effect for the funding levered into Scotland (sportscotland, 2009). In November 2008 the then Cabinet Secretary for Finance, John Swinney, stated his concern about UK Government efficiency savings and the probable effect on the Scottish budget which would be passed on to local authorities, also that non-statutory services such as sport and leisure were likely to feel the impact of these cuts (BBC News, 24 November 2008). Gratton (2012) and other economic consultants pointed out that previous economic recessions had not affected sports participation rates.
Scottish Government funding in unequal sports worlds

Government funding for sport in Scotland is made up of three funding streams (i) Grant in Aid (GIA) from the Scottish Government; (ii) General Fund (GF) for sport from the Scottish Government and (iii) UK National Lottery Funding (NLF) allocated to sport in Scotland and distributed by the national sports agency. GIA funding includes both a capital and revenue stream. The difference between GF and GIA derives mainly from ‘other Scottish Government funds’ that may be allocated or withdrawn from sport and are within the gift of government ministers outwith the Health and Sport portfolio. Examples include: Cash Back funding for communities which is within the gift of the Justice Minister and is funded from monies procured from the receipt and successful prosecution of crime, (£4.9 million from Cash Back money meant that funding was particularly high in 2012/13 just before the 2014 Commonwealth Games), a Top Up Swim allocation awarded in 2011 to Scottish swimming but then stopped in 2015 and a Scottish Government General Fund to invest in the 2014 Commonwealth Games 2014. The third stream allocated through sportscotland is UK NLF which is the Scottish allocation of resource from lottery funding.

When asked about the stability of spending for sport in Scotland a senior sportscotland official commented:

it has not been stable and that’s largely because capital funding fluctuates radically. We have had additional funding from Cash Back, additional funding for the Commonwealth Games and so it has gone up and down- We have just had our budget cut by about 12-13% whereas other national bodies were only cut by 3%

(Interview 1: 11 June 2016)
When asked if the Commonwealth Games helped to cushion the impact of austerity another senior sportscotland official replied:

Yes, absolutely- for instance an extra £6 million was released at the tail end of the Commonwealth Games

(Interview 2: 11 June July 2016)

The 2017-18 Scottish Budget for 2017-18 was the first Scottish budget to be influenced by the new Fiscal Framework established by the passing of The 2016 Scotland Act. The material responsibility and opportunity provided through this change meant that the choices open to the Scottish Parliament increased as a result of having further devolved powers, including increased tax raising powers, being devolved to Holyrood. Yet the language of austerity remained to the fore when Scottish government ministers attempted to explain the enactment of the new powers.

Having explained how some £3billion of available resource was to be allocated in 2017-18 the Scottish Government concluded:

the budget empowers and supports local communities and the vision of a fairer Scotland that is more prosperous and in which every individual has the chance to take control and act on the ambitions they have for their own lives and for their communities (Scottish Government 2016:11).

The vision of a Scotland where more people are more active more often, underpinned by the
Active Scotland Outcomes Framework and its commitment to equality, is not backed up in terms of expenditure. Scottish sport has arguably always been determined by power and privilege. Reducing the allocation of funding through the Scottish Government budget only serves to further exclude the poor. Sport used to reach into areas of multiple-deprivation in ways that other areas of social policy could not. An interview with a Scottish ex-international footballer is an example of a time when both a previous recession and football co-existed and hints at how football helped some people:

Football was in my boyhood, a form of escape from the estate, the recession or when no money was around- there were few cars and street football was rife

(Interview 3: 10 October 2016)

According to research conducted by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation nearly one in five Scots lives below the poverty line (Humphries, 2016: 19). The sad thing about all of this is that sport used to be a proven pathway of social mobility but reducing, or even maintaining status quo, public funding for sport runs the risk of widening further a social class divide in Scotland where cost and access to funds means that consumption of sport becomes the preserve of a leisure middle class (Jarvie and Birnbacher 2016).

Sport still has the potential to reach into areas of multiple deprivation. Yet the funding earmarked for 2017-18 runs the danger of failing to reduce the sports inequality gap. Direct Scottish Government funding allocated to sportscotland for 2017-18 amounted to 0.14% of total government expenditure. The allocation of funding for sport in the aftermath of the 2014 Commonwealth Games gives out the wrong political messages. It is also illustrative of a lack of understanding around the potential of sporting outcomes at a time when The United Nations
has emboldened the sporting mandate by giving it a place within its 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016). Furthermore, the situation would be even bleaker but for the allocation of UK NLF to Scottish sport, distributed by the national sports agency. This contradicts the idea that austerity in sport in Scotland is a direct consequence of reduced UK funding made available for Scottish sport. Such an observation still holds true despite a decline in UK National Lottery income because people are not buying as many tickets (Wade, 2017:15).

The world of Scottish sport is one of inequality as much as opportunity. The choices for some were undoubtedly affected by a delayed impact of austerity on sport brought about by the Scottish Government’s choices around resource allocation in the run up to the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Those living in Scotland, as elsewhere, are not free agents living in a social world in which sporting options and opportunities are unaffected by such choices. There are no guarantees that sport is accessible to all. The face of sporting governance through Scottish Governing Bodies remains almost entirely white. The 2016 Equalities and Sport Research report on Scotland painted a picture in which men participated more than women; disabled people were less active; Pakistani adults were less likely to participate in sport; people of Muslim faith were least likely to take part in sport; Roman Catholics showed a slightly lower sports participation rate than average and a clear drop of emerges after the age of 45 (Research Scotland, 2016). The choices available to people in Scotland will be affected by the choice to drastically reduce Scottish Government expenditure on sport after 2015.

*Trends in Scottish Government funding for sport*

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Fig 2 Scottish Government Funding for Sport since 2015-16

(Hudson and O’Donnell, 2015; Sportscotland, 2015a, 2016a, Scottish Government, 2016, 2017b see note 2)

The total proposed spending plan for Scotland in 2017-18 amounted to £31.4 billion of which £13.1 billion (41.7%) is allocated to Health and Sport. This represents a modest cash increase but a decline in percentage terms from the £12.9 billion (42.5 %) of the overall £30.4 billion allocated for 2016/17. The allocation of resource for sport through the Health and Sport budget has reduced year on year from £71.8m in 2015-16 to £45.6m in 2016-17 to £42.4m for 2017-18. Within the 2017-18 allocation the budget is divided into two categories: sport and legacy, and physical activity. Physical activity funding remained static at £3.3m between 2015-16 and 2017-18. Sport and legacy funding has fallen by 42.9% between 2015-16 and 2017-18.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]

Fig 3: Scottish Government Funding for sport since 2008

(Interview 1 2016; Interview 2 2016; Sportscotland 2009a; 20010a; 2011a; 2012a; 2013a; 2014a; 2015a; 2016a)

Figure 3 charts Scottish Government Funding for sport between 2007 and 2017. As indicated earlier all direct Scottish Government funding for sport goes directly to the national sports agency. Scottish Government Funding for sport fell dramatically between 2015 and 2016 mainly due to the removal of capital funds between the two periods. As previously alluded to,
Hudson and O’Donnell (2015) point out that the allocation of funding in real terms fell by 36.5% between 2015-16 and 2016-17 with the £71.8 million allocated in 2015-16 falling to £45.6 million in 2016-17.

Scottish Government’s funding for sportscotland between 2008 and 2017 reached its lowest level, since the SNP administration came to power, of (£31.9 million) in 2017.

[INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE]

Figures 4 and 5 – Capital and Revenue Funding for Sport 2011-2017

(Interview 1 2016; Interview 2 2016; Sportscotland 2009a; 20010a; 2011a; 2012a; 2013a; 2014a; 2015a; 2016a)

Figures 4 and 5 separate capital GIA and revenue GIA funding allocation. Capital funding for Sport fell to £2 million in 2016-17 compared to a high of £15.7 million in 2012-13 in the run up to the Glasgow Commonwealth Games. The amount of revenue funding also fluctuated between 2011 and 2016-17 reaching a high of £33.7 million in 2015-16.

The 2014 Commonwealth Games and subtle phasing of major capital expenditure perhaps help to mask funding cracks in the creation of a world class sports system. The creation of major capital builds such as Oriam, the £30m plus National Performance Centre and the £16m plus National Para Sports centre have helped to conceal the real impact of austerity on Scottish sport brought about by Scottish Government choices. That is to say that prior to 2014 higher levels
of investment could be seen to have delayed the onset of austerity in sporting expenditure terms while the atmosphere of the Friendly Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games may also have helped to conceal a mood of austerity as Scotland basked momentarily in the sunshine of a sunny smiling Glasgow during the 2014 Commonwealth Games.

*UK national lottery funding and sportscotland’s total resource*

[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]

Figure 6 NLF for Sport 2008-2017

(Interview 1 2016; Interview 2 2016; Sportscotland 2009b; 2009b; 20010b; 2011b; 2012b; 2013b; 2014b; Sporscotland 2015b; 2016b)

Figure 6 shows the amount of UK NLF funding since the financial year 2007-8. Scotland has done quite well out of its share of UK NLF for sport. The evidence on UK funding for sport in Scotland allows for the suggestion that it has helped to cushion the effect of the Scottish Government’s spending choices which have seen progressive cuts to a relatively small sport budget after 2015. NLF has gained importance within the Scottish sports funding portfolio. For example, the share of lottery funding to sportscotland’s overall expenditure has increased to around 50%. Yet even NLF funding has declined post 2015. It is difficult to predict future trends in NLF since it is dependent on a number of factors including the number of people buying national lottery tickets. There is also the potential impact of Brexit should it lead to a
second Scottish Independence Referendum around the time of the next Scottish Government General elections.

[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE]

Figure 7 – Total resource distributed through sportscotland

(The total resources distributed through sportscotland have generally increased up until 2015-16 and thereafter decreased sharply. Figure 7 shows the overall resources distributed through sportscotland between 2007 and 2017. It becomes evident that resources distributed through sportscotland increased between 2007-08 and 2015-16. While the NLF has contributed considerably to this trend, it has failed to fully compensate for public spending cuts after 2015-16. NLF and funding for the 2014 Commonwealth Games have helped to cushion overall reductions of Scottish Government funding under a period of SNP administration. A period during which UK Government austerity policies have been presented as a key factor that have influenced Scottish Government choices.

Nevertheless, the Games are over, the legacy facilities completed and NLF remains dependent on the number of people buying lottery tickets. Together this leads to a high degree of uncertainty for future sport funding in Scotland. The Scottish Government’s 2017-18 budget expenditure plans showed that austerity has not ended yet. Quite the contrary, it might be
suggested that, austerity in the sports sector has been delayed with future developments remaining unclear. At a time when the language and mood of austerity may be shifting - the latest British Social Attitudes survey showed that just under half the of the UK population supported higher taxes and shifts in public spending (Financial Times, 2017:8) - it is doubtful if grassroots sports will be cushioned from the impact of a fall of almost £300m in the sums raised by Camelot for good causes in the latest financial year (Hellen, 2017:14). In terms of Scottish Government protectionism, sport is not afforded the same degree of protection as the Arts. The increase in grant in aid afforded to Creative Scotland in 2018 saw a 21.2% increase (Wade, 2017:15).

**Austerity, Myth and Choice**

The interplay of Scottish and UK policy and politics, of devolved and reserved powers continues to influence the landscape around which Scottish and UK claims around austerity and the consequences are fought over and contested. The Scottish dimensions of the austerity debate reflect the ongoing and Scotland-specific political environment (Mooney, 2016a). There is no doubt that austerity has been an important aspect of the Scottish Government’s political rhetoric. It is common to hear, in Scotland, that harsh austerity measures imposed by a Conservative or UK Government are the reason why Scotland cannot do enough in sector a or sector b. Running alongside this is the claim that any increased control over its own spending levers would allow Scotland to do better. Yet austerity and austerity alone is not the sole explanation for the rise and fall in direct government expenditure on Scottish sport. The evidence provided above alludes to the fact that in one primarily devolved area of budget expenditure in Scotland certain choices have been made within the powers made available to the Scottish Government. The extent to which sport is an important or relatively unimportant aspect of Scottish Government expenditure is a matter of choice. The degree to which direct
government expenditure on Scottish sport both increased and decreased between 2008 and 2017 resulted in part from choices made by the Scottish Government. The fact that a significant fall in the level of direct expenditure attached to Scottish sport emerged after 2015 is not explained by austerity alone.

Scottish austerity claims need to continue to be evidenced, supported and or challenged. Mooney (2016a), Roy (2017) and Perman (2016) provide three recent additions to the critique of a Scottish Government as the peddlers of myth. The myth of Scottish society as progressive, as a social democratic inspired state and which is pro-welfare, are some of the most obvious narratives that have accompanied the anti-austerity story. Armstrong-Walter (2016) has argued that one of the most recurring myths is the tendency to assume that people in Scotland are more enlightened when it comes to addressing poverty. Against claims that the Scottish state is being rolled back is the prospect that the Scottish Government is intervening more and more in the lives of the most impoverished, in the ability of local authorities to respond to need and in the capacity of organisations to provide real resources of hope for those on the margins of Scottish society and indeed Scottish sport (Mooney, 2016a; Jarvie; 2015; Eisenstadt, 2016). While Eisenstadt might not share the view that histories and accounts of divided societies have been written at the expense of those on the margins she did, rather alarmingly, point out in the Shifting the Curve report that Scotland does not as yet have the evidence base to know what works for young people (Eisenstadt, 2017:2).

The judgements of both UK and Scottish financial and political leaders is often breathtakingly narrow in the sense that the economic consequences of austerity and the choices made often obscure broader social consequences (Sen,2015). The moral appeal of austerity is deceptively high, if it hurts, it must be doing some good but it’s effectiveness as a tool to control economies
has been questioned by a number of nations. Cuts in important public welfare services and the choices that are made around what to protect and what not to protect have all too often been seen to be undermine a real social commitment to reducing inequality, tackling poverty and maintaining welfare services. The blame for such a situation has been placed at the feet of both successive UK and Scottish government administrations since the financial recession of 2008. Decision-making without public discussion – standard practice in the making of many European policies – is not only undemocratic, but also inefficient in terms of generating reasoned practical solutions and public-buy in to the direction of travel proposed by austerity and anti-austerity measures, London and Edinburgh choices and a lack of evidence and conviction around the real social outcomes that can be delivered through sport.

In February 2017 The Edinburgh Evening News ran a story about the council’s decision to sell off an 8 pitch football facility in Portobello (Pringle, 2017). This is a story that is becoming more common across Scotland. Concern over the loss of public spaces or the plethora of signs that say ‘No ball games here’ is symbolically important for a number of reasons (Jarvie, 2015:4) The decline of open public spaces for sport represents a loss far deeper than any nostalgia for ways of the past. These spaces for sport are often favourite places to meet, to talk, and to feel part of a broader whole. The provision of public spaces for safe sport is often seen to be of secondary importance as planners still rip through neighbourhoods to accommodate the car or protect the use of the car over children’s play (Goodwin, 2016:1).

Between September and November 2017 the implications of the Barclay Review of Non-Domestic Rates on sport and leisure services in Scotland were the subject of heated debate (Scottish Parliament Minutes of November 29th 2017). The removal of charitable relief from local authority arm’s length external organisations (ALEO’S) threatened the provision of sport
and leisure services in all of Scotland’s 32 local authorities. The creation of the Barclay Review was instigated by Derek Mackay (MSP) and had their not been a U-turn on the proposal the logic of the proposals would have resulted in local authorities paying business rates on local authority sport and leisure services which would have led to many of the services being withdrawn and facilities closed.

It is easy to dismiss safe public spaces as something only the wealthy can afford but take a look at many of the bustling parts of the world – from the markets of Africa and Asia to the street corners of Europe and North America – and you may find it is the poor who depend on open, safe public spaces the most. The former mayor of Bogota, Enrique Penalosa made public spaces the centre piece of his administration creating or refurbishing 1,200 parks and playgrounds, establishing 186 miles of bike trails, building 13 libraries. He asserted that public spaces were not a frivolity but that a society where people of all income levels meet in public spaces is more integrated, socially and healthier (Project for public spaces, 2016).

Spaces for public sport are part of the public realm, provide an opportunity for everyone to experience the very best of what sport has to offer and can be a vital resource in the making of communities. The argument that sees sport as a space where forms of common life can be forged has still to be won. Previous forms of common life might have been forged around churches, trade unions and membership of groups. Yet, many of the institutions that provide the space to foster common life are in decline (Yates, 2016). At the same time, the need to forge an aspirant public realm through activities such as sport remains crucial (Jowell, 2005). Any decline in public funding for non-statutory forms of activity, such as sport, can potentially have a detrimental impact upon the capacity and capability to rebuild public spaces at a time when countries are increasingly divided, diverse, experiencing low levels of trust and high
levels of inequality.

**Concluding Remarks**

Austerity politics focused on cutting welfare benefits and the public services on which those on lowest incomes rely, is damaging enough. However, when areas of public life that have been primarily under the control of the Scottish Government are also enhanced or diminished the explanation might also be seen to invoke an element of choice rather than any mono-causal explanation framed around the idea of austerity being imposed from Westminster. The social harm and stigmatization to which austerity contributes is not in question but aspects of Scottish society are prosperous, there is wealth as well as an equality gap in Scotland. The Scottish state and the UK state have both intervened in the lives of those on margins of society and both may have contributed to what Wacquant (2015:229) terms the rise of advanced marginality.

If we examine direct government expenditure on Scottish sport from a critical evidence based position, then the complexity surrounding the question of austerity is not as simple as any political bi-polar divide might at first suggest. There is a compelling case for questioning any orthodox understanding of austerity as being the single factor that has been and continues to impact upon Scottish Government choices about direct government expenditure on sport.

Those who have sought to imagine future possibilities for those living and experiencing the impact of austerity measures and mood have been clear to emphasise that people can work with seemingly incompatible beliefs and attachments as they aspire and hope for a better future for their children. The impact of spending cuts upon families, the dismantling of welfare disability allowances, the challenge of creating public spaces that create aspiration and hope, and the
excluding of those on the margins can all be seen as consequences of an atmosphere of austerity that continues to be experienced in parts of both Scotland and the UK when it comes to a question of sport. The choices that are made to ameliorate the experiences and mood of austerity in Scotland and the UK may differ slightly but these are choices that are primarily made in Scotland, by Scotland in a devolved area of activity. It may simply be that the social and cultural value of sport to the people of Scotland is not matched by the political choices made by ministers in terms of the direct funding given to Scottish sport through the Scottish budget. A 0.14% budget allocation for 2017-18 could be viewed as a poor return to an area that accounts for between 2 and 3% of Scottish GDP. (sportscotland, 2015).

Furthermore, when local authorities cut funding to sport and leisure trusts it only serves to open the door to private providers whose first priority is not those with the least amount of available money in their pockets. When national sports agency budgets are cut it is not the most affluent in Scottish society who are affected. Sport used to reach into areas of multiple-deprivation in ways that other areas of social policy could not and it still has the potential to do so. The National Para Sports Centre which was officially opened in August 2017 is progressive and groundbreaking. The potential of Community Sports Hubs for developing human capabilities is enormous and City deals could deliver Sporting Cities. The really brave and progressive thing would have been to have maintained, if not advanced, levels of high funding for sport and reap the social rewards and outcomes as a consequence.

The importance of sport as a space where forms of common life can be forged should not be underestimated but Scottish Government choices around direct government expenditure of sport have to fully grasp and fund the potential of sport for social change. It might be a bridge to far to suggest that access to safe public spaces for sport should be viewed as part of an
aspirant public realm in Scotland but it is critical to remain vigilant to the ways in which the implications of the ongoing politics of UK austerity, Scottish choice and even myth influence sports provision and policy in Scotland.

Notes

1. The authors are grateful for the feedback provided by the anonymous reviewers. The points made have been incorporated and the article has benefitted from the observations.

2. A change to the way that the Scottish draft budget for 2018-19 is presented means that it is impossible to compare sport and legacy and physical activity as in previous years. There is also no distinction made between DEL resource and DEL capital for sport in the 2018-19 budget.

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Appendix – Figures to be inserted in the document

**Figure 1** Sportscotland resource distribution for 2014/15 (sportscotland 2015a)

![Breakdown of Sportscotland's Expenditures 2014/15](image)

**Figure 2** Scottish Government Funding for Sport since 2015-16

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Level 3, £m</th>
<th>2015-16</th>
<th>2016-17</th>
<th>2017-18 draft budget</th>
<th>2018-19 draft budget</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sport &amp; Legacy</td>
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<td>42.3</td>
<td>39.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Activity</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEL Resource</td>
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<td>36.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEL Capital</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Scottish Government Funding for Sport since 2015-16
Figure 3: Scottish Government Funding for sport since 2008

[Graph showing Scottish Government Funding for Sport with data points and financial years from 2007-08 to 2017-18. Two categories are marked: SG General Fund and SG Grant-In-Aid (GIA).]

[Graph showing SG Capital Funding for Sport with data points and financial years from 2011-12 to 2017-18.]

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Figures 4 and 5 – Capital and Revenue Funding for Sport 2011-2017

Figure 6 NLF for Sport 2008-2017
Figure 7 – Total resource distributed through sportscotland