Abstract

The HTTPS ecosystem is the foundation on which Internet security is built. At the heart of this ecosystem is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which in turn uses the X.509 public-key infrastructure and numerous cryptographic constructions and algorithms. Unfortunately, this ecosystem is extremely brittle, with headline-grabbing attacks and emergency patches many times a year. We describe our ongoing efforts in Everest, a project that aims to build and deploy a verified version of TLS and other components of HTTPS, replacing the current infrastructure with proven, secure software.

Aiming both at full verification and usability, we conduct high-level code-based, game-playing proofs of security on cryptographic implementations that yield efficient, deployable code, at the level of C and assembly. Concretely, we use F*, a dependently typed language for programming, meta-programming, and proving at a high level, while relying on low-level DSLs embedded within
F* for programming low-level components when necessary for performance and, sometimes, side-channel resistance. To compose the pieces, we compile all our code to source-like C and assembly, suitable for deployment and integration with existing code bases, as well as audit by independent security experts.

Our main results so far include (1) the design of Low*, a subset of F* designed for C-like imperative programming but with high-level verification support, and KreMLin, a compiler that extracts Low* programs to C; (2) an implementation of the TLS-1.3 record layer in Low*, together with a proof of its concrete cryptographic security; (3) Vale, a new DSL for verified assembly language, and several optimized cryptographic primitives proven functionally correct and side-channel resistant. In an early deployment, all our verified software is integrated and deployed within libcurl, a widely used library of networking protocols.

1 Introduction

The Internet’s core security infrastructure is frighteningly brittle. As more and more services rely on encryption, security best practices urge developers to use standard, widely-used components like HTTPS and SSL (the latter is now standardized as TLS). As a result, the same pervasive components are used for securing communications on the Web and for VoIP, email, VPNs, and the IoT.

Unfortunately, these standard components are themselves often broken in many ways. Even before recent headline-grabbing attacks like HeartBleed\(^2\), FREAK\(^3\), and Logjam\(^4\) entire papers \([21, 10]\) were published just to summarize all of the academically “interesting” ways TLS implementations have been broken, without even getting into “boring” vulnerabilities like buffer overflows and other basic coding mistakes. This tide of flaws shows no signs of abating; in the year after those papers were published, 54 new CVE security advisories were published just for TLS. These flaws are frequently found and fixed in all of the widely used TLS implementations, as well as in the larger HTTPS ecosystem. They span a wide gamut including memory management mistakes, errors in protocol state machines, lax X.509 certificate parsing and validation, weak or badly implemented cryptographic algorithms, side channels, and even genuine design flaws\(^5\) in the standards. Furthermore, because many TLS implementations expose truly terrible APIs, HTTPS applications built on them regularly make devastating mistakes [12].

These persistent problems have generated sufficient industry concern that both Google and the OpenBSD project are building separate forks of OpenSSL (BoringSSL and LibreSSL, respectively) while Amazon is developing a brand new implementation (s2n). Many corporations have even joined the multi-million-dollar Core Infrastructure Initiative to support additional testing and security auditing of open-source projects, starting with OpenSSL.

\(^2\) https://heartbleed.com/
\(^3\) https://freakattack.com/
\(^4\) https://weakdh.org/
\(^5\) https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE
1.1 A Need for Verified Deployments Now

While the industry is taking incremental steps to try to stem the persistent tide of vulnerabilities, the programming-language community is uniquely positioned to definitively solve this problem. The science of software verification has progressed to a point where a large team of experts can reasonably expect to build a fully verified software stack, e.g., seL4 [16], Ironclad [14], and CertiKOS [13], with still more ambitious, broadly ranging efforts already underway (e.g., http://deepspec.org/). Yet, even when augmented with secure communication components like TLS, a fully verified stack would not meet today’s pressing needs, since a wholesale replacement of the software stack is not in the offing.

Improving the current software landscape requires both a dramatic shift in software development methodology and an incremental approach to the deployment of verified software. Everest is a new joint project between Microsoft Research and INRIA that aims to build verified software components and deploy them within the existing software ecosystem. Specifically, Everest develops new implementations of existing protocols and standards used for web communications. At a minimum, we prove our implementations functionally correct. Beyond functional correctness, we integrate cryptographic modeling and protocol analysis to prove, by reduction to computational assumptions on their core algorithms, that our implementations provide secure-channel abstractions between the communicating endpoints. Our verified code is implemented in F* [25, 1], a dependently typed programming language and proof assistant, and in several DSLs embedded within F*.

After verification, in support of incremental deployment, our code is extracted by verified tools to C and assembly, and compiled further by off-the-shelf C compilers (e.g., gcc and clang, but also, at a performance cost, verified compilers like CompCert [18]) and composed with adapters that interface our verified code with existing software components, like the web browsers, servers and other communication software shown in the Figure 1. Being only as strong as its weakest component, software systems that include verified Everest code may not be impervious to attack; yet, any attack such a system suffers will be attributable to a flaw in a component outside Everest, while simple, critical systems may be within reach of full verification with a reasonable marginal effort.
1.2 Structure of this Paper

Everest is a work in progress – we present an overview of the methodology we have used so far. Our main guiding principle is to provide low-level, efficient implementations of various protocol standards by extracting them from fresh code, programmed and verified at a high-level of abstraction. This principle applies best for relatively small and complex code, such as a secure protocol stack.

To this end, in §2, we present Low*, an embedded sub-language of F* geared towards programming against a C-like memory model, while specifying and proving these programs within F*’s dependent type theory. Low* programs are extracted to C by a new tool called KreMLin: although we have yet to verify the implementation of KreMLin, we have formally modeled its translation and proved on paper that it preserves the functionality of programs to the level of CompCert’s Clight. We have also showed that compilation from Low* to Clight does not introduce any side-channels due to memory access patterns.

In §3, we sketch several examples of verified code and their specifications in Low*, showing how we state and prove memory safety, functional correctness, and cryptographic security.

In §4, we discuss a few strands of ongoing work. This includes the design of VALE, a new DSL for verified assembly language programming and its use in producing even lower level, efficient, functionally correct implementations of the AES and SHA256 algorithms whose performance is on par with OpenSSL, the mostly widely used implementation. We also discuss an early deployment of Everest software as a drop-in replacement for TLS in libcurl, and its use from within a command-line git client.

Finally, §5 presents some parting thoughts, covering some opportunities and challenges.

For more technical details, we refer the reader to three recent papers describing our verification of the TLS-1.3 record layer [6]; the design and implementation of Low* and KreMLin [5]; and the design and implementation of VALE [9].
Libraries for low-level programming within F*. At its core, F* is a purely functional language to which effects like state are added programmatically using monads. We instantiate the state monad of F* to use a CompCert-like structured memory model [18, 19] that separates the stack and the heap, supporting transient allocation on the stack, and allocating and freeing individual reference cells on the heap – this is not the “big array of bytes” model systems programmers sometimes use. The heap is organized into disjoint logical regions, which enables stating separation properties necessary for modular, stateful verification. On top of this, we program a library of buffers – C-style arrays passed by reference – with support for pointer arithmetic and referring to only part of an array. By virtue of F* typing, our libraries and all their well-typed clients are guaranteed to be memory safe, e.g., they never access out-of-bounds or deallocated memory.

Designing Low*, a subset of F* easily compiled to C. We intend to give Low* programmers precise control over the performance profile of the generated C code. As much as possible, we aim for the programmer to have control even over the syntactic structure of the target C code, to facilitate its review by security experts unfamiliar with F*. As such, to a first approximation, Low* programs are F* programs well-typed in the state monad described above, which, after all their computationally irrelevant (ghost) parts have been erased, must satisfy several requirements. Specifically, the code (1) must be first order, to prevent the need to allocate closures in C; (2) must not perform any implicit allocations; (3) must not use recursive datatypes, since these would have to be compiled using additional indirections to C structs; and (4) must be monomorphic, since C does not support polymorphism directly. We emphasize that these restrictions apply only to computationally relevant code: proofs and specifications are free to use arbitrary higher-order, dependently typed F*.

A dual interpretation of Low*, via compilation to OCaml or Clight. Low* programs interoperate naturally with other F* programs, and precise specifications of Low* and F* code are intermingled when proving properties of their combination. As usual in F*, programs are type-checked and compiled to OCaml for execution, after erasing computationally irrelevant parts of a program, e.g., proofs and specifications, using a process similar to Coq’s extraction mechanism [20]. Importantly, Low* programs have a second, equivalent but more efficient semantics via compilation to C, with a predictable performance model including manual memory management – this is implemented by KreMLin, a new compiler from the Low* subset of F* to C.

Justifying its dual interpretation as a subset of F* and a subset of C, we give a translation from Low*, via two intermediate languages, to CompCert’s Clight [8] and show that it preserves trace equivalence with respect to the original F* semantics of the program. In addition to ensuring that the functional behavior of a program is preserved, our trace equivalence also guarantees that the compiler does not introduce unexpected side-channels due to memory access patterns, at least until it reaches Clight – a useful sanity check for cryptographic code.

KreMLin, a compiler from Low* to C. Our formal model guides the implementation of KreMLin, a new tool that emits C code from Low*. Although the implementation of KreMLin is not verified yet, we plan to verify its main translation phased based on our formal model in the near future. KreMLin is designed to emit well-formatted, idiomatic C code suitable for manual review and audit by independent security experts unfamiliar with our verification methodology. The resulting C programs can be compiled with CompCert.
for greatest assurance, and with mainstream C compilers, including GCC and Clang, for greatest performance. We have used KreMLin to extract to C the 20,000+ lines of Low* code we have written so far.

Our formal results cover the translation of standalone Low* programs to C, proving that execution in C preserves the original F* semantics of the Low* program. More pragmatically, we have built several cryptographic libraries in Low*, compiled them to ABI-compatible C, allowing them to be used as drop-in replacements for existing libraries in C or any other language. The performance of our verified code after KreMLin extraction is comparable to existing (unverified) cryptographic libraries in C.

3 Proving Cryptographic Implementations in Low*

In this section, we sketch a few simple fragments of code from HACL*, a high-assurance cryptographic library programmed and verified in Low* and used in our verified implementation of the TLS-1.3 record layer. First, we illustrate functional correctness properties proven of an efficient implementation of the Poly1305 Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm [2]. Then, we discuss our model of game-based cryptography in F* and its use in proving security of the main authenticated encryption construction used in TLS-1.3.

3.1 Functional Correctness of Poly1305

Arithmetic for the Poly1305 MAC algorithm is performed modulo the prime $2^{130} - 5$, i.e., the algorithm works in the finite field $GF(2^{130} - 5)$. To specify modular arithmetic in this field in F*, we make use of refinement types, as shown below.

```
val p = 2^130 - 5 (* the prime order of the field *)
type elem = n:nat {n < p} (* abstract field element *)
let (+) (x y : elem) : elem = (x + y) % p (* field addition *)
let (*) (x y : elem) : elem = (x * y) % p (* field multiplication *)
```

This code uses F* infinite-precision natural numbers (nat) to define the prime order $p$ of the field and the type of field elements, elem, inhabited by natural numbers $n$ smaller than $p$. It also defines two infix operators for addition and multiplication in the field in terms of arithmetic on nat. Their result is annotated with elem, to indicate that these operations return field elements. The F* typechecker automatically checks that the result is in the field; it would report an error if, for example, we omitted the reduction modulo $p$. These operations are convenient to specify polynomial computations but are much too inefficient for deployable code.

Instead, typical 32-bit implementations of Poly1305 represent field elements as mutable arrays of five unsigned 32-bit integers, each holding 26 bits. This representation evenly spreads out the bits across the integers, so that carries during arithmetic operations can be delayed. It also enables an efficient modulo operation for $p$.

We show below an excerpt of the interface of our lower-level verified implementation, relying on the definitions above to specify their correctness. The type repr defines the representation of field elements as buffers (mutable arrays) of five 32-bit integers. It is marked as abstract, to protect the representation invariant from the rest of the code.
Table 1 Performance in CPU cycles: 64-bit HACL*, 64-bit Sodium (pure C, no assembly), 64-bit OpenSSL (pure C, no assembly). All code was compiled using gcc -O3 optimized and run on a 64-bit Intel Xeon CPU E5-1630. Results are averaged over 1000 measurements, each processing a random block of $2^{14}$ bytes; Curve25519 was averaged over 1000 random key-pairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>HACL*</th>
<th>Sodium</th>
<th>OpenSSL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ChaCha20</td>
<td>6.17 cy/B</td>
<td>6.97 cy/B</td>
<td>8.04 cy/B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salsa20</td>
<td>6.34 cy/B</td>
<td>8.44 cy/B</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poly1305</td>
<td>2.07 cy/B</td>
<td>2.48 cy/B</td>
<td>2.16 cy/B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curve25519</td>
<td>157k cy/mul</td>
<td>162k cy/mul</td>
<td>359k cy/mul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Functions are declared with a series of argument types (separated by $\rightarrow$) ending with an effect and a return type (e.g., Ghost elem, ST unit, etc.). Functions may have logical pre- and post-conditions that refer to their arguments, their result, and their effects on the memory. If they access buffers, they typically have a pre-condition requiring their caller to prove that the buffers are live in the current memory.

The term $m.[r]$ selects the contents of a buffer $r$ from a memory $m$; it is used in specifications only, as indicated by the Ghost effect annotation on the final arrow of its type on line 2. The multiply function is marked as ST, to indicate a stateful computation that may read, write and allocate state. In a computation type ST $a$ (requires pre) (ensures post), $a$ is the result type of the computation, pre is a predicate on the input state, and post is a relation between the input state, the result value, and the final state. ST computations are also guaranteed to not leak any memory. The specification of multiply requires that its arguments are live in the initial memory ($m$) and refer to non-overlapping regions of memory; it computes the product of its two arguments and overwrites $e_0$ with the result. Its post-condition states that the value of $e_0$ in the final memory is the field multiplication of its value in the initial memory with that of $e_1$, and that multiply does not modify any other existing memory location.

Implementing and proving that multiply meets its mathematical specification involves hundreds of lines of source code, including a custom, verified Bignum library in Low* [26]. Using this library, we implement poly1305_mac and prove it functionally correct.

```haskell
1  val poly1305_mac:
2  tag: nbytes 16ul $\rightarrow$
3  len:u32 $\rightarrow$ msg:nbytes len{disjoint tag msg} $\rightarrow$
4  key:nbytes 32ul{disjoint msg key $\land$ disjoint tag key} $\rightarrow$ ST unit
5  (requires (\lambda h -> msg $\in$ h $\land$ key $\in$ h $\land$ tag $\in$ h))
6  (ensures (\lambda h0_ h1 -> let r = Spec.clamp h0.[sub key 0ul 16ul] in
7       let s = h0.[sub key 16ul 16ul] in
8       modifies {tag} h0 h1 $\land$
9       h1.[tag] == Spec.mac_1305 (encode_bytes h0.[msg]) r s))
```

Its specification above states that the final value of the 16 byte tag ($h1.[tag]$) is the value of Spec.mac_1305, a polynomial of the message and the key encoded as field elements.

Performance of HACL*. Besides the Poly1305 MAC, HACL* provides functionally correct, side-channel resistant implementations of the ChaCha20 [22] and Salsa20 [4] ciphers, and multiplication on the Curve25519 elliptic curve [3].

After verification, F* types and specifications are erased during compilation and the compiled code only performs efficient low-level operations. Indeed, after extraction to C by KreMLin, our verified implementations are very slightly but consistently faster than unverified C implementations of the same primitives in libodium [24] and OpenSSL (Table 1).
3.2 Game-Based Cryptography

Going beyond functional correctness, we sketch how we use Low* to do security proofs in the standard model of cryptography, using “authenticated encryption with associated data” (AEAD) as a sample construction. AEAD is the main protection mechanism for the TLS record layer; it secures most Internet traffic.

AEAD has a generic security proof by reduction to two core functionalities: a stream cipher (such as ChaCha20) and a one-time-MAC (such as Poly1305). The cryptographic, game-based argument supposes that these two algorithms meet their intended ideal functionalities, e.g., that the cipher is indistinguishable from a random function. Idealization is not perfect, but is supposed to hold against computationally limited adversaries, except with small probabilities, say $\epsilon_{\text{ChaCha20}}$ and $\epsilon_{\text{Poly1305}}$. The argument then shows that the AEAD construction also meets its own ideal functionality, except with probability say $\epsilon_{\text{ChaCha20}} + \epsilon_{\text{Poly1305}}$.

To apply this security argument to our implementation of AEAD, we need to encode such assumptions. To this end, we supplement our real Low* code with ideal F* code. For example, ideal AEAD is programmed as follows:

- encryption generates a fresh random ciphertext, and it records it together with the encryption arguments in a log.
- decryption simply looks up an entry in the log that matches its arguments and returns the corresponding plaintext, or reports an error.

These functions capture both confidentiality (ciphertexts do not depend on plaintexts) and integrity (decryption only succeeds on ciphertexts output by encryption). Their behaviors are precisely captured by typing, using pre- and post-conditions about the ghost log shared between them, and abstract types to protect plaintexts and keys.

The abstract type of keys and the encryption function for idealizing AEAD is below:

```haskell
let encrypt (k: key) (n: nonce) (p: plain) (a: data) =
    if Flag.aead
        then let c = random_bytes cipher_len in k.log := (c, a, n, p) :: k.log; c
        else encrypt k.key n p a
```

A module Flag declares a set of abstract booleans (idealization flags) that precisely capture each cryptographic assumption. For every real functionality that we wish to idealize, we branch on the corresponding flag.

This style of programming heavily relies on the normalization capabilities of F*. At verification time, flags are kept abstract, so that we verify both the real and ideal versions of the code. At extraction time, we reveal these booleans to be false. The F* normalizer then drops the then branch, and replaces the log field with (), meaning that both the high-level, list-manipulating code and corresponding type definitions are erased, leaving only low-level code from the else branch to be extracted.

Using this technique, we verify by typing e.g. that our AEAD code, when using any ideal cipher and one-time MAC, perfectly implements ideal AEAD. We also rely on typing to verify that our code complies with the pre-conditions of the intermediate proof steps. As a consequence of our proof, we are forced to establish various intensional properties of our code, e.g., that our code does not re-use nonces (a common cryptographic pitfall); that it has no buffer overruns (a common pitfall of low-level programming); etc.
4 Ongoing Work

4.1 Verified Assembly Language and Safe Interoperability with C

While Low⋆ and KreMLin provide reasonably efficient C-like implementations of cryptography, for the highest performance, cryptographic code often relies on complex hand-tuned assembly routines that are customized for individual hardware platforms. For this we have designed Vale, a new DSL that supports foundational, automated verification of high-performance assembly code. The Vale tool transforms annotated assembly programs into deeply embedded terms in a verification language, together with proofs that the terms meet their specifications. So far, we have used Dafny [17] as the embedding language for Vale and used this tool chain to verify the correctness and security of implementations of SHA-256 on x86 and ARM, Poly1305 on x64, and hardware-accelerated AES-CBC on x86. Several implementations meet or beat the performance of unverified, state-of-the-art cryptographic libraries.

In ongoing work, we have begun to use F ⋆ as the embedding language for Vale, and are mechanizing a formal model of interoperability between Low⋆ and Vale. By defining the deeply embedded semantics of Vale in F ⋆ as a Low⋆ interpreter for assembly language terms, we aim to show that invocations from C to assembly can be accounted for within a single semantics for both DSLs. A key challenge here is to reconcile Low⋆’s CompCert-like structured memory model with Vale’s “big array of bytes” view of memory.

4.2 An Early Deployment of Everest within libcurl

Emphasizing the incremental deployment of our verified code, we have integrated our verified TLS record layer extracted from Low⋆ to C, as well as Vale implementations in assembly, within a new version of miTLS [7], implemented in F ⋆, covering TLS-1.2 and TLS-1.3. Our eventual goal is for miTLS to be implemented entirely in the Low⋆ subset of F ⋆ and extracted solely to C, with functional correctness and security proofs. However, as of now, miTLS is only partially verified (the handshake being the main, remaining unverified component) and extracts to OCaml. However, already, by virtue of basic type safety, our partially verified version of miTLS provides safety against low-level attacks (e.g. HeartBleed) similar to other OCaml-based implementations of TLS [15].

Relying on OCaml’s foreign function interface, we integrate miTLS extracted to OCaml with the verified TLS record layer extracted to C-and-assembly. Dually, we provide C bindings for calling into a miTLS layer which handles the socket abstraction, fragmenting buffers, etc. The result is a libmitls.dll, which we integrate within libcurl, a popular open-source library, used pervasively in many tools. This early integration allows us to use our verified software from within popular command line tools, like git, providing immediate benefits.

5 Parting Thoughts

A significant novelty of our proposed work is that we aim to replace security-critical components of existing software with provably correct versions. Our careful choice of the problem domain is crucial: verified OS kernels and compilers can only succeed by replacing the software stack or development toolchain; verified, standardized, security protocols, and HTTPS and TLS in particular, can be deployed within the existing ecosystem, providing a large boost to software security at a small overall cost.

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With the emergence of TLS 1.3, most TLS implementers will rewrite their code from scratch, and the world will be faced with migrating towards brand new implementations. History tells us that widespread adoption of a new version of TLS may take almost an entire decade. Given a similar time line for the adoption of TLS 1.3, if we distribute Everest within 2–4 years in a form where the cost of switching to it is negligible, then we are optimistic that it stands a chance of widespread adoption.

Despite this once-in-a-decade opportunity, several challenges remain. How will verified code authored in advanced programming languages be maintained and evolved going forward? Distributing our code as well-documented, source-like C may help somewhat, but to evolve the code while maintaining verification guarantees will require continued support from the Everest team, as well as outreach and education. Will the software industry at large be able to appreciate the technical benefits of verified code? How can we empirically “prove” that verified software is better? One direction may be to deploy, standalone, small-TCB versions of Everest and to demonstrate it is resistant to practical attacks — this raises the possibility of deployments of Everest within fully verified stacks [16, 14, 13] or sandboxes [23].

References


Everest: Towards a Verified, Drop-in Replacement of HTTPS


