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WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILD LABOR?

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Abstract

There is broad agreement that child labor is wrong and should be eliminated. This chapter examines the three main moral objections to child labor and considers their limitations: harm-based objections, objections from failing to benefit children, and objections from exploitation. Harm-based objections struggle with baselines for comparison and difficulties with Non-Identity problems. Even if child labor is not harmful, it may be wrong because it prevents children from enjoying other benefits, such as schooling. However, is schooling necessarily more beneficial for children than work? Some kinds of child labor may not be harmful, and may benefit children, but they may still be wrong because exploitative. I consider some ways to address exploitative child labor, inspired by campaigns led by child-workers. The chapter ends with a surprising conclusion that challenges the broad consensus with which we began: we may have duties to promote child labor.
Introduction

Is child labor morally wrong? Your initial response might be: “Yes, of course.” Perhaps you take the view that child labor is wrong because it is harmful. However, this clear moral intuition may be quickly qualified when we consider the practical problems of abolishing child labor. On the one hand, we know that simply abolishing child labor may, at least in the short-term, make many children worse-off. Much child labor is motivated by necessities of poverty. Simply eliminating it would make many poor children poorer. On the other hand, we would probably admit that some work might be good for children. Work that is safe and fulfilling may benefit children in lots of different ways. So, on reflection, if asked “is child labor wrong?” a more considered response might be: “Yes, when it is harmful. We should only permit work that benefits children.”

If these thoughts capture your moral intuitions about child labor, you are in good company. Most international organizations and moral philosophers working on child labor take a similar view. I do not disagree with this moral outlook on child labor, but I will explain why I think it is incomplete. In particular, I will explain why harm-based objections to child labor are more problematic than appears at first sight: they have problems establishing baselines for comparison, and they quickly run into Non-Identity problems. The dominant focus on harm-based objections has meant other important moral considerations regarding child labor are neglected. Although many objections to child labor appear to be harm-based, I will suggest they are in fact concerned with duties to benefit children by replacing child labor with something better, usually schooling. Failing to provide a benefit is a different kind of wrong from committing a harm, and it is worth getting this straight in our thinking about child labor. Most crucially, neither considerations of harm nor failing to benefit exhaust the moral objections to child labor. Many children perform work that is not harmful, and from
which they derive some benefit, but which we find morally troubling. This is because it is exploitative. Objections to exploitative child labor need to be distinguished clearly from harm and failing-to-benefit objections. If I am right that there are (at least) three different kinds of objections to child labor (harm, failing-to-benefit, and exploitation) we find a surprise: we have a duty to promote child labor.

1. What’s the Harm of Child Labor?
The dominant view of harm regards a person as harmed if they are worse off because something happened compared to if it had not happened. This is usually called the comparative counterfactual view of harm.\textsuperscript{2} Harm is a matter of comparing one state of the world in which something happened against another in which it did not. Is a child worse off if they grow up in a society in which they need to work instead of growing up in society in which they do not?

Some kinds of work are almost always harmful: work that injures or makes children unwell, perhaps due to hazardous conditions or toxic materials, or work that is debasing or criminal, such as sex-work, drug-trafficking, or bonded-labor (where children are unfree to leave until a debt is repaid through work).\textsuperscript{3} There is broad international agreement that these “worst forms” of child labor should be abolished with greatest urgency.\textsuperscript{4} Happily, this is the minority of work done by children, and it seems to be declining.\textsuperscript{5}

Harm based arguments give us a clear basis on which to object morally to the “worst forms” of child labor. But there are many more children working in conditions where the harm is unclear. Consider a child who works in agriculture or textile manufacturing, or in a service job such as shining shoes or in a laundry. The work may be basically safe but might involve long-hours and be low-paid. The child may depend on the income to support themselves and their family, and this work might be better than any available alternative.
Many such children may be worse-off if prevented from working. Does this mean that any child labor that is better than not working is not harmful and so not wrong? Not necessarily.

We can imagine a world in which a child is compensated for the income lost through giving up work. Now we are faced with a comparison between the child growing up in a world where they work for long hours for low-pay or growing up in a world where they do not work but they enjoy the same income. There are in fact many such programs that compensate families for income lost through preventing their children from working. These schemes are an example of a counterfactual to a world in which children work for income due to poverty. If we make this comparison, the comparative counterfactual view of harm seems to explain what is wrong with the great majority of work done by children: even children who do not do the “worst forms” of child labor are harmed by work, as they would be better off with no work and no loss of income. Even with no other change in their circumstances they would likely have more time, more energy, and so would be better off. But the comparative counterfactual account of harm stumbles in explaining properly that this kind of child labor is harmful, and it struggles to identify who is harmed by this kind of child labor. The first problem involves comparative-baselines; the second problem involves non-identity. I will look at each in turn.

In order to illuminate the problem of baselines in comparative counterfactual views of harmful child labor, it is useful to introduce a distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. The difference and relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory in political philosophy is quite vexed, but at least part of the difference seems to consist in recognizing different purposes of theorizing. Are we trying to explain what is right or wrong, or good or bad, about some political arrangement? It can be useful to make certain assumptions if this is our goal, such as “let’s assume everyone follows the rules, and let’s assume people know enough to understand the options before them properly, etc.” This helps makes the moral evaluation
of complicated political arrangements easier if we simplify and hold constant important complexities. We may have a different purpose though, which is to understand what we should do to make the world a better place (more just, equal, democratic or whatever). If we are interested in this problem, we need to know the degree to which people are likely to follow different rules, or how likely people are to make a rational decision given the complexity of the information, amongst many other things. How does the comparative counterfactual view of the harm of child labor fare in either of these roles?

Let’s take the explanatory, more ideal-theory role, of the comparative counterfactual view of harm: a world in which children work is worse than a world in which they do not and they lose no income from not working. What is the appropriate baseline for comparison? Is it the income received by the child? If so, then on this comparative counterfactual view a child may be not-harmed by not-working if they receive compensation. This explains the wrong-because-harmful nature of arrangements that allow children to work versus those that compensate children directly for not working. But most children’s income is not kept to themselves; it is included in a combined family income. So this suggests we should change the baseline to family income, and not an individual child’s income. But family income is not a suitable baseline either. Income is only one dimension that affects the relationship between family well-being and work. Much work done by children is done alongside their family, often at home, where work and care are often intermingled. This suggests our baseline should include the effect on caring relationships. If a child is absent from work, and so unable to give or receive care, this may incur greater costs on parents who provide care to children while working. This may create additional caring “costs” for other members of the family. Will other family members, perhaps older non-working relatives, have to provide care? Will some form of paid care be required? It is unclear what the balance of harms to wider family life is in these comparative counterfactuals. This is partly because of the problems of defining
a baseline involving income and care for both individuals and families. These are examples of the problems of comparative counterfactuals in explaining the harm of child labor in ideal theory due to the obscurity of the relevant baselines of comparison. If we understand harm from a comparative counterfactual point of view, and if we cannot establish an appropriate baseline for comparing counterfactuals regarding child labor, then we cannot explain the harmfulness of child labor.

Perhaps the comparative counterfactual view of harm fares better in guiding our comparison of different practical arrangements regarding child labor; that is, from a more non-ideal point of view? Let’s begin again with the original baseline that seemed to work well in explaining the harm of child labor: a world in which children work compared to a world in which they do not work and lose no income. If around 165 million children are working around the globe currently, it will take an unprecedented effort to ensure no child is harmed through loss of earnings from abstaining from child labor. We are not likely to make the world less harmful if we try to abolish child labor according to this baseline, and no-one seriously suggests so. What should we take as our more practical baseline?

The most practical approach might involve tackling the root of the problem: poverty. The structural elimination of poverty likely involves long-term reforms such as improving education to increase the value of production and consumption. Higher value production and consumption tends to lead to a rise in prices and wages through growth. Such structural reforms may include requiring children to attend school rather than work. As children are eliminated from the labor-market, adult wages should rise, thus also helping reduce poverty. So the practical comparisons should be between worlds in which there is a progressive shift towards children spending more time at school and less time at work. But school is often more harmful than work whether we consider baselines of individual child or family well-being.
Schooling in countries with substantial poverty and child labor is normally costly. If we choose the income received by an individual child as our comparative baseline, a child is likely to incur additional costs through substituting schooling for working. These include the opportunity costs of failing to learn practical skills through work that may have positive labor market value at the expense of gaining school credentials for which there may be little market value (Krafft, 2017). Even if the quality of schooling is good, this does not imply that the value of the credentials earned is high. This depends on numerous factors including the demand for the credential, and the ability of families and employers to access credit to invest in education and higher-value production. Increasing schooling alone is often insufficient to shift an economy away from poverty to high-value growth (Baland & Robinson, 2000).

Replacing child labor with compulsory schooling may be more harmful to individual children.

We might assume that adult wages would rise if they performed the same labor as the now-schooled children, as there would be less supply for a constant demand for labor. So if we take family well-being as our baseline, increased adult wages may mitigate costs of compulsory schooling. But there is no necessary connection between adult wages and the supply of child labor into non-related work. This only applies in conditions where adults’ and children’s work is “substitutable” and not complementary. Schooling can simply reduce the supply of children’s labor for the type of work done by children, leaving adult wages unaffected. Consequently, even if we take family well-being as our baseline, increased schooling often results in greater harms. The comparative counterfactual account of the harm of child labor struggles to guide our choices between more or less harmful practical arrangements regarding child labor.

The comparative counterfactual view of harm struggles to explain that child labor is harmful due to its trouble with baselines. It also struggles to explain who is harmed by child
labor. This is particularly clear if we concentrate on the non-ideal role of the comparative counterfactual view of harm: its role in helping us choose practical arrangements to govern child labor. Let’s imagine a world in which the big problems with baselines have been solved, and we have found a way to reduce harmful child labor through increased schooling. In this world, over several generations, children leave the labor market and mostly attend school (as happened, for instance, in the UK during the nineteenth-century where child labor was replaced by compulsory schooling). This world is progressively very different compared to a world in which this policy has not been followed. Family life is different, indeed, families are likely to be different as patterns of fertility are affected by the changed economic circumstances of children being less economically active. These two worlds are populated by different people. We are comparing two worlds over time. In one, child labor is progressively replaced by schooling, and child Alice grows up to have a child Beth, who has a child Clara, who has a child Dawn. In the other world, where child labor persists, child Alice grows up to have a child Ben, who has a child Charlie, who has a child Danny. If we compare these two worlds, can we say that Danny is harmed compared to Dawn because he works, whereas Dawn does not? Not easily, because though Danny exists in a world with child labor and no schooling, at least Danny exists (and let’s assume his existence is perfectly good enough for him to get value from life). If the world was one of schooling and no work, Danny would not exist. We cannot say that Danny is harmed in a world with child labor, because without child labor, Danny would not exist. This is of course a version of the Non-Identity problem, associated famously with Parfit (Parfit, 1984, pt. IV). The Non-Identity problem affects the comparative counterfactual view of harmful child labor as soon as we recognise that reducing child labor will take several generations. Those who argue we should gradually replace child labor with schooling owe us an explanation of how child labor can be harmful to someone who would not exist without it.
It is clear that the widely-held comparative counterfactual view of harm explains that the worst forms of child labor are harmful and should be abolished. However, the comparative counterfactual view provides less clarity regarding the harmfulness of the most common form of child labor: safe work done by most children to increase their income in conditions of poverty. The comparative counterfactual view struggles to explain that this kind of labor is harmful due to problems comparing it with both ideal or non-ideal baselines. It also encounters the perplexity of Non-Identity problems when taken as a basis for long-term policies to reduce child labor in favour of alternatives such as schooling. The comparative counterfactual view struggles to explain who is harmed by failing to abolish child labor across several generations. Harm-based objections to child labor seem more limited than we might have first thought.

2. *Must Children Benefit?*

If you have a headache, and I play loud music, I harm you. If you have a headache, and I decide not to give you some of my painkillers, I fail to benefit you. You are no worse off after my failing to give you the benefit of my painkillers, so I have not harmed you. But I have failed to benefit you. Harming and failing to benefit are different. We normally take wrongs done through harm as more serious than wrongs done through failing to benefit. Many of our moral concerns with child labor become muddled between preventing harm and failing to benefit. It is important for us to be clear about the difference.

Let’s remember that most child labor is not of the “worst-forms” which are clearly harmful and which we should try to eliminate. Most child labor might be arduous, but it is often less harmful than not working, for the reasons set out above. We may not have a duty to eliminate most of the child labor that occurs around the world today if we are concerned solely with reducing harm. This is because harm-based arguments may only lead to duties to eliminate child labor in a rather narrow range of cases: cases where the harm is unequivocal.
(worst-forms of child labor), or where we are able to overcome obscurities about comparative baselines or conundrums about Non-Identity. However, we may have other duties towards children who work: duties to provide a benefit. The difference between duties against harming and duties to provide a benefit is important. The difference is especially important if duties based on harm do limited work in either explaining the wrongness of child labor or in guiding our decisions about how we should address the issue of child labor practically.

Many campaigners around child labor proclaim slogans such as: ‘stop child labor, school is the best place to work!’ Such slogans might be good for campaigning, but they are not so good for thinking carefully about the morality of child labor. This is because they easily confuse duties we might have to end child labor because it is bad for children in some way with duties we might have to promote benefits for children, such as schooling. However, they do express what seems a common-sense intuition: children benefit from schooling, and schooling should replace work. Even if work is not harmful to children, we might wrong children by failing to provide them with the benefit of schooling. However, there are two problems with the view that we have a duty to promote children’s development through replacing work with schooling. First, it is unclear that development is a benefit, and second is unclear that schooling is a benefit. Let’s look in turn at the problems with viewing development and schooling as benefits.

Many take it as given that children benefit from development. Childhood is seen as a stage of life defined by the gradual acquisition of the capacities that characterise adulthood. Though commonplace, this view is controversial. Critics of the “developmental” or “deficit” view of childhood disagree that childhood is a stage of life that is characterised a lack of qualities we associate with adulthood (Farson, 1978; Holt, 1974). Such critics may accept that children are significantly dependent on and vulnerable to others in today’s Western societies. But they argue this is a product of our wrongful treatment of children. Preventing
children from working may be a significant cause of children’s dependence and immaturity. Children’s need for development may be a symptom of treating children wrongly. There are no doubt various responses to this objection available to those who wish to argue in favour of the benefit of development. But few make them. Pointing out this problem at least invites those who assume that development is a benefit to set out and defend the argument more fully than is typical currently.

The claim that schooling is a benefit faces at least two compelling challenges. First, we should clarify whether we are claiming that schooling or education is beneficial to children, because they are quite different. If we simply take education to mean growth in understanding and ability, there is little doubt that this is beneficial for everyone, not simply children. But schooling is not education. If we understand “schooling” as the experience of being at school, we quickly notice that the experience of being at school involves a lot more than education. It often involves, amongst many other things, promoting democratic values, cultivating civic virtue, or providing the “goods of childhood” etc.13 We may choose to define all these as “education” in the broadest sense. But if we do take a broad view of education, then we must also accept that education takes place beyond the school: at home; in extra-schooling lessons perhaps involving sport, arts, or languages; or even, for many children, at work. So the first problem faced by the argument that we have a duty to benefit students by promoting their development through schooling, is to make clear whether it is schooling, or education, that is the benefit we owe children.

The second problem faced by the argument that we have a duty to benefit students by promoting development through schooling is that schooling may provide no benefit. As we saw earlier, schooling is often costly and subsequently harmful to children. It may not provide beneficial education, perhaps because the quality is poor (Guarcello & Rosati, 2007; Rammohan, 2000; Rossi & Rosati, 2007). But even if we can ensure that no child is harmed
by going to school it is not clear that it is beneficial. School may be less useful at providing the benefits of education, and more useful at reproducing existing social inequalities (Bowles & Gintis, 2013; Willis, 2000). We may have a duty to provide the benefit of education to children, but this may lead us to promote education beyond schooling. It may in fact lead us to a duty to abolish schooling, and to promoting the benefit of education elsewhere (Illich, 1983). If we have a duty to benefit children, it is not clear that this duty means we should replace work with schooling.

I have argued that it is important to distinguish harm-based from failure-to-benefit objections to child labor. As we look at each of these different kinds of objections more carefully we find numerous difficulties. Many of these difficulties may be remedied, but this work is yet to be done by those concerned with the morality of child labor. Even if these problems are resolved so that we can use harm-based and failing-to-benefit objections to child labor more confidently, a further problem remains. There are many cases where child-workers are not harmed and where they derive some benefit from their work. Is this work morally acceptable? Not necessarily, but to show this we need to be clear about a third and different objection to child labor. Once we understand this third kind of objection to child labor, we also find we may have a duty to promote child labor.

3. Is Child Labor Necessarily Exploitative?

Children often work alongside adults doing the same jobs, for example working in “chop shops” (restaurant/bars) in Ghana. Children and adults wash dishes, clean the premises, serve food, and help to prepare and cook the meals. The work is safe, and both children and adults benefit from the wages. But children are paid less for this work than adults, though there is no evidence adults are more productive (IPEC, 2007). If this work is not harmful, and if it provides the benefit of income for children, what could be wrong with it? It is wrong because it is exploitative.
Exploitation can occur even if it is not harmful, and even if it benefits the person exploited. In the case of the Ghanaian children working in “chop-shops”, the children are benefiting from their income, but the employers are taking unfair advantage of children by paying them less than a fair market price for their labor. This kind of exploitation seems a common feature of child labor: infamously, it led thousands of child-workers in Bolivia to organize into a trade union (UNATSBO) to campaign for end to unequal pay for the same work, no less than a minimum wage for any work, and for lowering the minimum legal age for work (Fontana & Grugel, 2015; Liebel, Meade, & Saadi, 2017). These child-activists argued that their work was the least harmful and most beneficial option before them, but that it was exploitative. How should we respond to cases such as this? It is crucial to distinguish the wrong of exploitative child labor from the wrongs of harmful child labor and the wrongs of failing-to-benefit children. Without this distinction we are unable to understand that even if work does not harm children, and in fact benefits them, it may still be wrong.

The concern with exploitation seems to motivate Satz’s argument that child labor is an intrinsically noxious market because children have weak agency and are in asymmetric relations of knowledge and power with adults (Satz, 2010, pp. 155–170). Non-exploitative child labor seems impossible as children are always likely to be treated worse than adults in the labor market due to their vulnerability. This might be the strongest objection to child labor with the widest implications. Even if much child labor is not harmful, and even it provides some benefit, it is always likely to be exploitative given children’s vulnerability. It should therefore be eliminated. An interesting response to this problem emerged from the children involved with UNATSBO. They were aware that lowering the legal age for child labor may lead to greater exploitation due to the increased vulnerability of younger children working. But they also claimed that even young vulnerable children had an important interest in non-exploitative work. They proposed that although many children might be incapable of
preventing their own exploitation, official representatives of children’s interests could protect children on their behalf. This model of representatives protecting children’s interests complements developments internationally to protect children’s independent interests given the difficulties they often have in protecting their interests themselves. Children’s Commissioners, or Ombudsmen, are now widely established (Flekkøy, 2002). They represent children’s interests, often with statutory power.\textsuperscript{16} If children are likely to be in a vulnerable position in labor-markets, and therefore open to exploitation, we may have duties to protect vulnerable children from such exploitation (Goodin, 1985). So, even if we agree with Satz that children are intrinsically at risk of exploitation due to their weak agency and asymmetries of knowledge and power, this does not mean we necessarily have a duty to eliminate markets in child labor. We may be able to protect vulnerable children from exploitation through institutions such as Commissioners. These may offer ways to fulfil the ambitions of child-unionists in UNATSBO, and clarify that we have duties to end exploitative child labor, but not child labor itself.

We are now left with an interesting question that has a surprising answer. How should we regard child labor that is not harmful, that provides benefits, and is not exploitative? We might be surprised to find that we have no moral objection to this kind of child labor. Indeed, from the moral points of view we have considered here, we might be surprised to find that we have a duty to promote this kind of child labor. If we do not promote it, are we failing-to-benefit children? The qualification that child labor is wrong unless it benefits children is usually noted in philosophical discussions of child labor, but it is not explored in detail (Pierik & Houwerzijl, 2006, pp. 195–204; Satz, 2010, p. 168). The idea that child labor is permissible if it is beneficial might appear as a minor qualification given the scale of the moral problem of child labor. But this qualification is important for our moral duties regarding child labor. We may have duties to promote the benefit of non-harmful, non-
exploitative child labor. If we do not promote this child labor we are wronging children by failing to benefit them. At the very least, this suggests that we need to look more closely at the range of moral duties we have regarding child labor. Perhaps we should pay more attention to the possible moral value of work for children, and our duties to promote rightful child labor. More practically, this might also mean that we have to look more carefully at our practical choices regarding consumption and international development. Ethical consumption might mean both avoiding consuming goods produced through wrongful child labor and choosing to consume goods made through rightful child labor. Ethical development might mean investing in child labor unions so that they are empowered to improve working conditions and resist exploitation or providing “child labor commissioners” to prevent exploitative child labor. These conclusions suggest we might need to ask a different question about child labor: rather than asking “is child labor morally wrong?”, we should ask “what are the rights and wrongs of child labor?”

**Conclusion**

There is long-standing and wide-spread moral concern about child labor, but very limited philosophical analysis of the problem. I have tried to set out systematically the nature of the dominant moral arguments regarding child labor and have argued that we should distinguish more clearly between comparative counterfactual harm-based objections, failing-to-benefit objections, and exploitation-based objections. Each of these types of objections to child labor may offer valuable moral insights. But they need further development. The harm-based objections need to address problems with comparative baselines and puzzles about Non-Identity; failing-to-benefit objections need to establish that development through schooling is beneficial for children; exploitation objections need to explain if exploitation is a necessary part of child labor markets due to children’s weaker position compared to adults, or if non-exploitative child labor is possible. There are many more outstanding questions regarding the
morality of child labor than I have addressed here. These include important questions regarding the effects of gender, race, and age differences on the rights and wrongs of child labor. Much more philosophical attention is needed for us to be able to answer: “what’s wrong with child labor?”

Further Reading


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Biographical Note

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1 A distinction is often made between child labor (which is regarded as morally problematic) and child-work (which is regarded as permissible), for example: (Pierik & Houwerzijl, 2006, p. 195). However, this distinction is rejected by others: (Bourdillon, Levison, Myers, & White, 2010). I agree with those that find it unhelpful, so use child labor to refer to all forms of work done by children.

2 For a helpful introduction to different views of harm, see (Hanser, 2013). I leave aside competing versions such as the temporal comparative and the non-comparative versions. They raise important issues for understanding the harm of child labor, but need more detailed consideration than possible here. For an interesting discussion of different accounts of harm and childhood specifically, see (Jonas, 2016).

3 It is of course possible that some children doing this work would be even worse off without it, but for most children caught in this kind of work almost any alternative would make them better-off.

4 This motivates wide adoption of the international convention ILO 182 which focuses on abolishing the “worst forms” of child labor: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327:NO

5 In 2012 (the latest international data available) 85 million children are estimated to be involved in this ‘worst forms’ of child labor, a decrease from 115 million in 2008, and 170 million in 2000. Child labor more broadly is also said to be in decline from around 245 million in 2000 to around 168 million in 2012: (Diallo, Etienne, & Mehran, 2013).

6 These schemes are an example of a counterfactual to a world in which children work for income due to poverty. These schemes normally compensate families for a child’s loss of earnings if a child attends school, so they are usually called “conditional cash transfers.” In these cases, the cash the family receives acts as both compensation for loss of earnings and incentive to provide the potential benefit of schooling. The functions of compensating for a loss and incentivizing for a benefit are separable though. To help us understand how a child may be harmed through work, I will concentrate on the (artificial) comparison of a child working for income in conditions of poverty with a child not working and being compensated for loss of income with no additional benefit beyond not working, such as schooling.

7 For an introduction to some of the main issues in this broad-ranging debate, see (Valentini, 2012).

8 For an investigation of the complexity of costing care in family life, see (Folbre, 2010)

9 The question of whether children and adults’ labor is substitutable or complimentary is debated by economists, for a sense of the issues see (Basu & Van, 1998; Bhukuth & Ballet, 2006)

10 for example, see (Shiffrin, 1999)

11 This slogan is used by the prominent campaign organization Stop Child Labor: http://www.stopchildlabor.eu. The sentiment is shared widely by anti-child labor campaign groups.

12 See (Pierik & Houwerzijl, 2006, p. 198; Satz, 2010, p. 157)

13 For example (Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1999; Macleod, 2016)
The nature of exploitation is contested: for useful overviews see (Sample, 2003; Wertheimer & Zwolinski, 2015). I cannot consider the various positions here, so adopt a broad notion that is hopefully intuitive, which involves one party, A, taking unfair advantage of another, B, due to some kind of vulnerability of A.

A similar argument is made by (Pierik & Houwerzijl, 2006, p. 202)

For a justification of the representation of children’s interests see (Goodin, 2003, p. 218).

References


