“Catholics and the Meredith March in Mississippi”

By

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On June 16, 1966, civil rights activist Stokely Carmichael, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), told a rally after his release from jail in Greenwood, Mississippi: “This is the twenty-seventh time I have been arrested. I ain’t going to jail no more. We been saying freedom for six years and we ain’t got nothin’. What we get to start saying now is Black Power!” Spoken during the Meredith Mississippi Freedom March, Carmichael’s oft-repeated call ensured the march’s lasting association with Black Power, which many white journalists, who seized on Carmichael’s more sensational comments about burning down Mississippi courthouses rather than his emphasis on black voter registration and collective political mobilization, typically associated with anti-white racism and violence. Black Power and the Meredith March seemed in stark contrast to the Selma, Alabama, protests of a year earlier for voting rights that had helped achieve the Voting Rights Act. In response to an appeal from Martin Luther King Jr., hundreds of mostly white clergy and laity of all faiths, including more than 900 Catholics, had gone to Selma in 1965 mostly from the north, and march organizers had placed some of the fifty-six nuns who went conspicuously toward or in the front ranks of the protesters. By contrast, far fewer whites participated in the Meredith March, and the march did not appeal to people of conscience to converge on Mississippi in a public display of sympathy and support until its final day.¹

Catholics, however, played a supporting role throughout the Meredith March. Their contribution received brief or, more usually, no acknowledgement from contemporary reporters, or later historians of Catholicism or civil rights, despite a growing body of work, especially since the millennium, about Catholic support for
and participation in efforts to achieve racial equality. Historians of Catholicism and
civil rights have concentrated on the North, Selma and a few other southern locales,
including studies by Danny Collum and Paul T. Murray on Natchez and Greenwood,
Mississippi, respectively. Their focal point has often been the contributions of
exceptional Catholic individuals, mostly clergy but also some laity, acting, or
exercising leadership, on their own initiative. By focusing on the Meredith March,
this article provides further evidence that Catholic participation in the southern civil
rights movement continued beyond Selma and what historian Peniel E. Joseph calls
the “heroic period” of the movement that ended in 1965. It also demonstrates that
Catholic involvement in the Mississippi civil rights struggle was greater and more
connected than historians have recognized and explores the complex response of the
Catholic Church to that struggle. The Diocese of Natchez did not endorse the march,
but it did not try to stop religious priests, that is members of religious orders which
operated some churches, missions and charitable institutions in the state, from
assisting the march, and they, like the National Catholic Conference for Interracial
Justice (NCCIJ), played a supporting role, along with members of the Memphis and
Little Rock Catholic interracial councils and a few priests from outside Mississippi.
Some diocesan priests and nuns also attended the march’s final rally in Jackson, along
with some Catholic clergy and a nun from outside the state.2

As it had done earlier in Selma, the NCCIJ took the major responsibility for
organizing and coordinating Catholic involvement in the Meredith March. Operating
from headquarters in Chicago, the NCCIJ, an organization of Catholic clergy and laity
established in 1960 with the approval of the American Catholic hierarchy, was
committed to desegregation and racial equality. Although not an official Church
agency, the conference received support from many bishops, including some in the
South. At their annual meeting just two years earlier, the American Catholic bishops had condemned racial discrimination and segregation, and called for their gradual elimination. However, the statement issued on their behalf by the administrative board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference did not discuss segregation in Catholic schools, churches and other institutions, and it was not binding on ordinaries, that is, bishops who exercised authority over a diocese and were virtually autonomous. To further the achievement of its goals, the NCCIJ encouraged the formation of Catholic interracial councils in dioceses across the country. By 1965, there were 112 councils, 24 of them in the South. In supporting the Meredith March in Mississippi, the NCCIJ was helping to fulfil the direction for the Church outlined by the Second Vatican Council, held in Rome between 1962 and 1965, of alerting Catholics “to the demands of social justice” and engaging with the world’s problems.3

Established in New Orleans in 1961, the NCCIJ’s Southern Field Service (SFS), like the NCCIJ, preceded the council but took inspiration from it. The SFS sought to persuade Catholic bishops in the South and southwest to overturn racial discrimination and segregation in Catholic churches, schools, hospitals and other Catholic institutions that were prevalent in many dioceses, especially, but not exclusively, in the Deep South. The SFS fostered the growth of Catholic interracial councils, which could be established only with the consent of the local bishop, and it urged councils to pressure their prelates to work for racial equality in both Church and secular society. A few southern bishops, such as Archbishop Thomas J. Toolen of Mobile, a diocese that encompassed Alabama and the Florida panhandle, refused to work with the SFS, but several others, among them Archbishop Robert. E. Lucey of San Antonio, were supportive.4
The NCCIJ and SFS took inspiration from rejections of racism and racial discrimination by the Vatican and the American Catholic hierarchy. The Vatican had accepted the establishment of separate black Catholic institutions in the South in the late nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century by ordinaries and religious orders, operating in dioceses with the permission of their bishops, as a practical means of evangelizing and serving African Americans within the confined of a segregated society. However, responding to Nazi and Fascist racism, Pope Pius X condemned racism in the 1930s, and the Vatican began appointing ordinaries in the United States vetted to ensure their opposition to racism and segregation. His successor Pope Pius XII issued an encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi (Mystical Body of Christ) in 1943 that referred to the Church’s “divinely-given unity – by which all men of every race are united to Christ in the bond of brotherhood.” The pontiff declared that God “has taught us not only to have love for those of a different nation and a different race, but to love even our enemies.”

Despite these teachings, Rome, cognizant of local conditions, permitted ordinaries to desegregate Catholic institutions when and as they saw fit in the light of local conditions, leading to variations between dioceses. While some southern Catholic dioceses outside the Deep South began parochial school desegregation in the 1950s, it did not begin in the Deep South until 1962, when the archdioceses of Atlanta and New Orleans acted after public school desegregation had already begun in their dioceses under federal court order. Other Deep South ordinaries tied parochial school desegregation to the beginning of federal court mandated public school desegregation in their dioceses between 1963 and 1965. They were also encouraged to act by Pope John XXII’s encyclical Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth), issued in April 1963, which
declared that “racial discrimination can in no way be justified” and affirmed the duty of people to claim their rights.⁶

In common with many other Deep South Catholic bishops, Bishop Richard O. Gerow Natchez-Jackson, whose diocese covered all of Mississippi and included 60,329 white and 7,097 African American Catholics in 1963, took a guarded, cautious approach and had a strained and sometimes fractured relationship with the SFS. Born in Mobile, Alabama, in 1885, Gerow had grown up in a segregated society. Installed as bishop in 1924, he presided over the growth of separate white and African American Catholic schools, churches and other institutions. He believed that separate institutions, especially schools, were essential to reach and convert African Americans, but he was also acutely conscious that most whites in the state, including most white Catholics, were segregationists. Until 1963, he avoided public discussion of segregation and racism, but he, nevertheless, disciplined white Catholic churches that refused African Americans admission to services, although most black Catholics attended black Catholic missions and churches.⁷

Clergy and nuns from religious orders, mostly based outside the South, operated and staffed black Catholic churches, missions and schools in the diocese. The orders were mostly white, such as the Society of St. Joseph of the Sacred Heart (Josephites), the Missionary Servants of the Most Holy Trinity (M.S.Ss.T.), the Franciscan Friars (O.F.M.) and the Holy Ghost Missionary Sisters, but they also included the Oblate Sisters of Providence, a black order of nuns based in Baltimore, and the Society of the Divine Word (S.V.D.), which had a seminary, St. Augustine’s, in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, that accepted black applicants. An inherently cautious man, Gerow was unwilling to desegregate Catholic schools ahead of secular
desegregation, fearful that either action would arouse white segregationist opposition, divide white Catholics, and reinvigorate engrained anti-Catholicism in Mississippi.\textsuperscript{8}

Soon after its formation, the SFS’s director Henry Cabirac Jr., a white former New Orleans businessman, established contact with Auxiliary Bishop Joseph B. Brunini of Natchez-Jackson and sympathetic black and white clergy and laity in the state. A Mississippian, born in Vicksburg in 1909, Brunini introduced Cabirac to other interested Catholics. Cabirac also wrote to African American Catholics in the state, mostly on the Gulf Coast, where their numbers were most concentrated. He made contact too with the civil rights movement in Mississippi and met Aaron Henry, state president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), who was a Methodist. Despite interest from Brunini, Cabirac was unable to generate sufficient support among Mississippi Catholics for establishing a Catholic interracial council. Instead, at Brunini’s request, Cabirac launched “a quiet educational program [on race relations] among a few people” of “good will” in Jackson. In keeping with Brunini’s caution and concern not to bring down segregationist wrath on the Church, Cabirac conducted the program without publicity.\textsuperscript{9}

Unknown to the chancery, Cabirac engaged in a letter writing campaign in which he encouraged sympathetic white and African American Catholics to urge black Catholic parents to seek to register their children at white Catholic high schools and, if refused, to complain to Gerow. Unable to generate a response from black Catholic parents, in 1963 Cabirac, who had joined the NAACP, enlisted Medgar Evers, field secretary of the Mississippi NAACP, to ask Catholic NAACP members along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, where a black Catholic high school had been closed, to meet with Cabirac about desegregating Catholic high schools. Whether through
Evers’s intercession or by his own efforts, Cabirac eventually made contact with Gilbert R. Mason, president of the Biloxi NACCP and a Missionary Baptist, who arranged a meeting in Biloxi with black Catholics on June 16, during which “two or three” of them agreed to try to register their children at a white Catholic school.10

The meeting occurred four days after Evers’s assassination outside his Jackson home by segregationist Bryon de la Beckwith. Evers’s murder led Gerow to speak out publicly on race relations for the first time. The bishop deplored the murder and called on “our leaders and men of good will of both races to find some common ground on which to build a civic order based on human dignity and a concept of justice under God’s law” and for recognition of “the legitimate grievances of the Negro population.” On June 19, Gerow wrote to his pastors in recognition of the increasing number of civil rights protests in the country that seemed to embody Pacem in Terris’s call for the oppressed to claim their rights: “This race problem which now confronts our state and our country is … fundamentally a moral problem. The question is not one of granting concessions but of recognizing rights.” Gerow’s newfound willingness to speak out on race seemed to offer an opportunity for the SFS.11

However, Gerow reacted angrily after Cabirac held a meeting with fifty African American Catholics in Mississippi City on the Gulf Coast a week later, following which between fifteen and twenty of them tried unsuccessfully to register their children at white Catholic schools. In July, Gerow wrote to Cabirac, “I resent your coming into the Diocese and giving talks without consulting myself” and instructed him “to stay out of Mississippi.” Although Cabirac complied, initially he continued to write to African American Catholic leaders urging them to ask black Catholics to try to register their children in white Catholic schools and pressure
Gerow to act. The bishop remained unwilling to desegregate Catholic schools ahead of secular change, or to attempt to form a Catholic interracial council. Gerow explained to NCCIJ executive director Mathew Ahmann that he favored a “wise policy” between what he considered to be “two extremes – one extreme speaking of the mixing of the races as ‘never’; the other extreme says ‘everything now.’” After meeting with Ahmann and later Cabirac, in January 1964 Gerow lifted his ban on Cabirac and the SFS working in the diocese.\(^\text{12}\)

In September 1964, Gerow desegregated the first grade of Catholic schools to coincide with the beginning of federal court-ordered desegregation of the first grade of public schools in Biloxi, Carthage, Clarksdale and Jackson. As desegregation applied only to Catholic students and 65 percent of black children in Catholic schools were not Catholic, Gerow’s order had little impact. Three black Catholic children registered in two formerly white Catholic schools. Token change continued a year later, when the bishop desegregated all grades. Acting with his usual caution, Gerow instructed his diocesan priests not to participate in the civil rights movement or comment on racial issues, and, in 1964, he ordered six Oklahoma priests who had volunteered for the civil rights movement’s Mississippi Summer Project, a program of voter registration, freedom schools and community centers, to return home.\(^\text{13}\)

Although Gerow remained wary of the SFS, there seemed to be a promise of a fresh start in 1964 when John P. “Jack” Sisson replaced Cabirac, who had resigned to become director of the Human Relations Department in Phoenix, Arizona. Although born in Milwaukee in 1926, Sisson had been raised in the South, mostly in Pensacola, Florida, Florida. Sisson attempted to forge a new relationship with the chancery, but he noted in November 1965 that Gerow still remained “suspicious of us.”\(^\text{14}\)
Neither Gerow, Sisson, the NCCIJ nor the race relations agencies of Protestant denominations responded when James Meredith, the man who had desegregated the University of Mississippi in 1962, announced in May 1966 that he would soon begin a 220 mile march from Memphis, Tennessee, to Jackson, Mississippi. A maverick, unaffiliated with any civil rights organization, Meredith hoped his quixotic march would encourage hundreds of thousands of eligible but unregistered African Americans in Mississippi to overcome “fear” and register to vote. Although intended as a solo march, Meredith indicated that he would allow other men to join him independently if they wished to, although few did and the major civil rights groups ignored the march.¹⁵

On June 6, the march’s second day, Aubrey James Norvell, an unemployed white man from Memphis, shot and injured Meredith south of Hernando, Mississippi. A member of the Catholic Human Relations Council of Memphis (CHRCM) was among the reporters who were present when the shooting occurred, after which Meredith was taken to and hospitalized in Memphis. Floyd McKissick, the national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, and Martin Luther King, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), went to Memphis, visited Meredith, and, with his consent, promptly resumed the march. They also established a headquarters in south Memphis at Centenary Methodist Church, which was pastored by James Lawson, who had written SNCC’s founding statement in 1960 and also worked with the SCLC.¹⁶

The SFS contacted the CHRCM soon after Meredith’s shooting, which sent flowers to his hospital bedside. On June 8, Sisson went to Memphis and “set up headquarters in the Lorraine Motel where all the march leadership was staying.” Sisson reported to the NCCIJ that he was “at the Memphis March headquarters when
it was established at Centenary Methodist Church, and attended the early strategy meeting at the Lorraine Motel,” where he “was of the few white persons present.” Roy Wilkins, executive director of the national NAACP, and Whitney M. Young Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, arrived in Memphis willing to add their organizations to the list of march sponsors. They also joined the other national leaders in addressing a mass meeting at Centenary Methodist Church.17

A contingent of the Deacons for Defense and Justice, an armed group founded in Jonesboro, Louisiana in 1964, arrived in Memphis ready to protect the marchers. Carmichael, supported by McKissick, wanted the Deacons involved, and he also wanted to emphasize black participation and keep whites from controlling the march. King, for his part, sought to ensure that the march would be nonviolent, interracial and welcome white participation. The three leaders reached a compromise under which the Deacons provided protection, and the march was open to whites. Supported by Young, Wilkins argued that the march should focus on supporting passage of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s civil rights bill, which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and included measures to end racial discrimination in state and federal juries, widen federal jurisdiction regarding crimes of racial violence, and broaden the U.S. Justice Department’s authority to instigate school desegregation lawsuits. Carmichael proposed a march manifesto that attacked the Johnson administration’s civil rights record, and he also wanted the march to include voter registration. Carmichael launched into a vituperative verbal attack on Wilkins and Young, dismissing them as Johnson’s lackeys. Sisson reported to the NCCIJ that “Tensions over the March’s direction were very severe.” Wilkins and Young refused to sign the manifesto or participate in the march.18
King, Carmichael, McKissick, Charles Evers, who had returned to Mississippi from Chicago in 1963 and replaced his slain brother as the state NAACP’s field secretary, the Delta Ministry, a National Council of Churches (NCC) project to alleviate poverty and assist Mississippi’s African American poor primarily in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta, and the Madison County Movement in Mississippi signed the manifesto of what the now entitled Meredith Mississippi Freedom March. The manifesto indicted Lyndon Johnson for failing to enforce “existing federal law to protect the rights of all Americans.” It also called for the strengthening of civil rights laws to ensure African Americans fair representation on southern juries and in law enforcement; the dispatch of federal registrars to “all 600 Deep South counties to register disenfranchised Negroes”; and the adoption of a federal budget that would enable impoverished African Americans to make “their own destinies.” Claiming his name had been forged on the document, Evers repudiated the manifesto, which he said, echoing Wilkins, was “too critical of President Johnson.”

Sisson noted that “At first, national leaders did not consult Mississippi leaders; eventually, because of local pressure, it was agreed that national staff persons would enter towns off the march route to hold rallies, stimulate voter registration and promote participation in the march.” The Delta Ministry, in particular, pressed for it to emphasize voter registration and divert its path through part of the Delta, which had a large mostly unregistered African American population. Sisson reported that “Many Catholics who had marched at Selma last year (or who wished they had) inquired about whether they should come to Mississippi.” Although King had made “a national call for people to come” to the state soon after his arrival in Memphis after Meredith’s shooting, Sisson observed that “The joint March leadership did not want them [white clergy and laity] ‘on the road’ and would not accept an offer even to
bring in experienced voter-registration workers.” King succeeded in ensuring that the
march was interracial, but Carmichael and McKissick had, for their part, made sure
that the Meredith March would not replicate the Selma protests and bring in hundreds
of whites from the North and the major faiths.20

Historian Adam Goudsouzian estimates that “Between towns on Highway 51,
whites composed somewhere between 15 and 30 percent of the marchers.” Most of
them stayed for short periods and some were clergy, who came on their own initiative.
For example, the Reverend Duncan Howlett, pastor of All Souls Unitarian
Universalist Church, Washington, D.C., marched and arranged for some other clergy
to participate. A small number from the Catholic Interracial Council of Little Rock
also marched, and an integrated group of CHRCM members, including Father Edwin
J. Wallin, C.S.P., a chaplain at Memphis State University who was originally from
New York City, marched intermittently at the outset. The CHRCM worked with
Sisson to provide office help for the march headquarters, rooms for the protesters, and
cars to ferry marchers between their accommodation and the march route. Sisson
“spent some time marching” during the first week “but worked mainly to support the
headquarters staff, scout the March area, judge the temper of local officials, and
exchange information with newsmen and the few U.S. officials on the scene.”
Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson promised to protect the marchers and deployed
the Highway Patrol. The federal government kept a watching brief, sending John
Doar, an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department, to observe and mediate between local enforcement and march leaders.
As well as keeping in touch with federal officials in the U.S. Justice Department and
the Community Relations Service, Sisson kept the chancery of the Diocese of
Natchez-Jackson informed about the march.21
Although there was still no Catholic interracial council in Mississippi with which he could work, Sisson established a working relationship with Monsignor James McGough, the chancellor of the Diocese of Natchez-Jackson. Gerow, however, maintained his customary caution and kept a public silence about Meredith’s shooting and the march. CHRCM members tried to contact Coadjutor Bishop Joseph A. Durick of the Diocese of Nashville, which covered all of Tennessee, to ask him to send condolences to Meredith, but they were unable to reach the bishop who was on retreat. Sisson believed that had Durick sent a message, the circumspect “Gerow would have sent a similar message.” In contrast to Toolen, who had told clergy and nuns not to come into his diocese and join the Selma protests in 1965 and then condemned those who did, McGough told Sisson that Gerow “had given his approval for clergy and religious to come in from outside the diocese to join the march, but wanted them to check in with the Chancery,” which by June 23 gave “blanket permission for all outside priests.” In all, between ten and fifteen Catholic priests eventually participated in the march. However, Gerow remained “undecided about … permitting his own priests and religious in the March proper.”

Some members of religious orders who worked among African Americans in Mississippi were sympathetic, and keen, to help the march when contacted by Sisson. Within days of its resumption under national civil rights leadership, Father Luke Mikschl, M.S.Ss.T., a Minnesotan who, along with the Franciscan Sisters of Perpetual Adoration, St. Rose Convent, La Crosse, Wisconsin, operated the Holy Child Jesus Mission in Canton secured Gerow’s permission to host the marchers when they arrived in the town. Father Walter (Meinrad) Smigiel, O.F.M., a Detroit native who pastored St. Benedict the Moor Church in Indianola and had established the biracial
Indianola Improvement Association in 1964, also obtained the bishop’s agreement to invite King to speak on his church’s grounds.\textsuperscript{23}

On June 14, Ahmann wrote to the leaders of the NCCIJ’s interracial councils seeking to raise funds for the march, which he requested, in the spirit of ecumenical cooperation encouraged by the Second Vatican Council, they send to the NCC’s Commission on Religion and Race that was also supporting the march. He urged councils to support the march manifesto by contacting “Congress by wire, letter and in person to strengthen and get the pending [civil rights] bill passed.” Ahmann approvingly quoted the NCC’s view that Black Power was “not a rejection of white people or white support” but rather “a conviction that the Negro must present his own concerns, programs and plans for his own economic, political and social relationship to his inheritance in our nation.”\textsuperscript{24}

Ahmann’s appeal demonstrated that the idea of Black Power preceded Carmichael’s famous rallying cry for it in Greenwood two days later. Some SNCC workers had already begun to adopt Black Power, and Carmichael, elected as SNCC’s chairman in May 1966, had worked with the Lowndes County Freedom Organization in Alabama that had called for “Black Power for Black People” and run candidates for local office. Working in advance teams along the march route, SNCC worker Willie Ricks used Black Power to generate interest and support. Ricks informed Carmichael that black Mississippians had enthusiastically embraced the slogan and urged him to proclaim it.\textsuperscript{25}

When the marchers reached the Delta town of Greenwood, Father Nathaniel R. Machesky, O.F.M., who had pastored St. Francis of Assisi mission for African Americans, since its opening in 1950, offered them his grounds to pitch their tents. Like many other of the priests from religious orders who staffed black Catholic
churches in Mississippi, Machesky was a northerner and had been raised in Detroit. Sympathetic to racial equality, he served as the spiritual adviser to Pax Christi, an interracial secular institute of Catholic women, mostly from the North who ran the St. Francis Center, opened in 1952. The center provided its 2,000 African American members with a dispensary, education programs, affordable clothing, a credit union, and a newspaper. In March 1963, Cabirac contacted Machesky to enquire about conditions in Greenwood and, in November, Machesky invited him to conduct a workshop for staff at the mission and Pax Christi. Cabirac asked Machesky to obtain Gerow’s permission, which the bishop, maintaining his ban on Cabirac, refused. After succeeding Cabirac, Sisson maintained the SFS’s contact with Machesky and visited him in 1964.  

Sisson also consulted him in Greenwood on June 13, 1966, three days before the Meredith March arrived in the town. Machesky warned him that racial tensions were very high. In response, Sisson “relayed this information to [the] Community Relations Service and the Justice Dept., who sent men over in advance of the march reaching Greenwood.” Preferring to pitch their tents at Stone Street Elementary School in the center of black community, the march leaders declined Machesky’s offer to use his mission’s grounds. Long resistant to the civil rights movement, and emboldened further by Governor Johnson’s decision to reduce protection for the march when it entered the Delta because he said it had “turned into a voter registration campaign,” the town’s authorities refused to let the marchers use the school. On June 16, police arrested and jailed Carmichael and two others from an advance team for trespass as they attempted to pitch a tent at the school in defiance. Concerned by rising tension after the arrests, the police allowed the marchers to put their tents up in a public park. Machesky paid the bail of Carmichael and those
arrested with him in the belief, Sisson wrote, that “the tensions would be less with
Carmichael out of jail than in.” Local resident Bill Virden concurred and recalled that
“If he [Machesky] hadn’t done it, it [Greenwood] would have burned to the ground.”
After his release from jail, Carmichael, encouraged by Ricks, called for Black Power
at a march rally. Local whites subsequently harassed Machesky and other members
of his parish because he had provided bail.27

After Greenwood, the march continued on through the Delta. However, King,
a SCLC contingent, and a group of twenty people from the Meredith March went to
Philadelphia, Neshoba County, for a march and memorial to mark the second
anniversary of the murder of three civil rights activists by Ku Klux Klansmen there on
June 21. They joined two hundred others in a march to the Neshoba County
courthouse, where a white mob of three hundred hostile whites awaited them. Deputy
sheriff Cecil Price, who had been indicted for the federal crime of depriving the
murdered civil rights workers of their civil rights and had remained in post pending
trial, was at the courthouse. King made a speech in which he declared: “I believe in
my heart that the murderers are somewhere around me at this moment.” Someone in
the crowd of whites responded, “They’re right behind you.” Price, who would be
convicted a year later for involvement in the murders, smirked as he stood behind
King, who finished his speech among jeers from whites who threw firecrackers and
cherry bombs. As the marchers retraced their steps down Main Street, the white
crowd launched a barrage of objects at them. A fist fight broke out between whites
and blacks, but the police did not intervene to stop the violence until a large group of
whites appeared carrying a range of weapons. Appalled by the violence, King vowed
to return.28
Although Carmichael and McKissick had successfully resisted King’s attempt at the start of the Meredith March to transform it into a Selma style mass protest with a nationwide appeal to clergy and sympathizers across the nation, they now supported King in making a “call for clergy and citizens in all walks of life” to come to Mississippi for the last stage of the march, an eight mile walk from Tougaloo College to the state capitol grounds in Jackson for the closing rally. Mathew Ahmann responded by sending a wire endorsing the appeal to all of the NCCIJ’s member councils. During the march’s final week, Sisson “spent a good bit of time talking with priests all over the country (Minneapolis, Washington, Memphis, San Antonio, Pittsburgh, etc.) about coming to the March.”

King rejoined the Meredith March in Indianola. With Father Smigiel’s agreement, St. Benedict the Moor Church in Indianola hosted a large night time rally, but by this time King had already left for a rally in Yazoo City, where he followed Rick’s call for self-defense with an appeal for nonviolence. After Greenwood, King later recalled, “there was fierce competition between those who were wedded to the Black Power slogan and those wedded to Freedom Now,” the usual call of the civil rights movement. “Speakers on each side,” King remembered, “sought desperately to get the crowds to chant their slogan the loudest.” Concerned by “this widening split in our ranks,” King called a meeting with Carmichael and McKissick in an effort to resolve the issue. The meeting occurred on June 22 in the parish house of St. Francis of Assisi, a Catholic church in Yazoo City.

As Yazoo City was on the march route, Sisson had earlier contacted the church’s pastor Father John W. Kist, S.V.D., who offered to let the marchers’ pitch their tents on church grounds. After the events in Greenwood, Kist withdrew his offer because Sisson reported, “he felt that the parish would suffer or that the pressures on
him would be more than he could stand.” However, Kist reconsidered and “the
marchers stayed on his grounds.” The SFS “arranged for someone to go and stay with
him if trouble developed.”31

The march leaders and their staff conferred in Kist’s parish house living room
for five hours. While in agreement that blacks needed political power, King called for
abandoning the Black Power slogan, which he told Carmichael and McKissick,
“would confuse our allies, isolate the Negro community and give many prejudiced
whites, who might otherwise be ashamed of their anti-Negro feeling, a ready excuse
for self-justification” and imply “black domination rather than black equality.”
Carmichael and McKissick were not persuaded by King’s arguments, but they
accepted King’s compromise suggestion that the march leaders avoid chanting either
Black Power or Freedom Now during the remainder of the march to Jackson.
Nevertheless, marchers and supporters continued to chant their favored slogans.32

The NCCIJ had responded positively to Black Power before Carmichael’s
rallying cry for its adoption on his release from jail in Greenwood had brought it
widespread media attention. The conference and the SFS subsequently became
concerned, like King, by Black Power’s divisiveness and by its more militant, and
increasingly vocal, exponents during the march. Militants supported black
nationalism, objected to the presence of white marchers, and sometimes chanted “Hey
hey, what do you know, honky got to go.” The NCCIJ shared King’s vision of
building an interracial society, shorn of racism. In response to Carmichael’s
championing of Black Power, Ahmann explained that “we tried to work so as to
strengthen Dr. King’s leadership,” and the NCCIJ began to raise money directly “to
help SCLC meet the March expenses.”33
Less than two months after the march, Sisson wrote approvingly that “it was Dr. King’s charisma, the SCLC organization and a willingness to accept financial responsibility that kept the March together, gave it direction, maintained its non-violent character and assured its full impact, nationally and in Mississippi.” Sisson also claimed that most African American Mississippians rejected Black Power. He reported to the NCCIJ: “Another factor contributing to the orderly nature of the March was the generally negative reaction of Mississippi Negroes to the ‘black power’ cry of several March leaders. Local Negro leaders had experience enough to know that they did not have the power to challenge white structures and that they would be thrown back on their own resources when the March ended.”

The response of black Mississippians to Black Power was more enthusiastic and complex than Sisson believed. Accustomed to working with those committed to the integrationist goal of creating a beloved community and, like the NCCIJ, sharing their vision, Sisson seemed unable to appreciate the appeal of Black Power for many African Americans. Sisson and the NCCIJ largely worked with middle class white and African American leaders and Catholics and had limited exposure to, and understanding of, the interests and aspirations of many African American Mississippians from outside of those ranks. Focused primarily on a support role for the march and liaising with the chancery and federal officials, Sisson also spent little time marching and observing the response of African Americans along its route.

Despite being a seasoned civil rights organizer in the Deep South, Carmichael had himself at first disbelieved Ricks when told that African Americans workers along the march route were readily joining in with Ricks’s call for Black Power. After observing their enthusiastic response to Ricks himself, Carmichael had decided to incorporate Black Power into his Greenwood speech. Historian John Dittmer
explains that “many blacks along the march route were drawn to the slogan and to Carmichael’s fiery denunciations of a caste system that had oppressed them for generations. Yet they also revered Dr. King and continued to flock to the roadsides to catch a glimpse of their hero. Black Mississippians did not want to be forced to choose between the two men.”

In 1967, Joyce Ladner, who had grown up in Hattiesburg, Mississippi and joined SNCC while a sociology student at Tougaloo College, found “varying degrees of acceptance of the slogan among Mississippi Negroes,” although she acknowledged that some of them rejected it altogether. Ladner found that “many Negro activists in Mississippi had immediately embraced the black power slogan -- because of the already widely-held belief that power was [emphasis in the original] an effective tool for obtaining demands from the ruling elite in Mississippi,” and because they believed that efforts to achieve integration had failed to bring significant change in black lives.

Ladner interviewed thirty Black Power activists in the state. She differentiated between two-thirds of them who were “local,” meaning “long-term residents” who were generally “uneducated, unskilled adults” and the remainder, half of them from the North, who were “cosmopolitan” and mostly young “urbane, educated” newcomers. Cosmopolitans, Ladner argued, “conceived of black power in highly philosophical terms – as an ideology” of blackness that connected them with “other colored peoples of the world.” Although no less militant, locals were “committed to concrete economic and political programs.” The difference between them was that “cosmopolitans – to varying degrees – endorse such programs but actually have made little effort to realize them.” Unaware of or unconcerned by differences among the
march organizers, many black Mississippians in the Delta enthusiastically welcomed
the march and attended its rallies when it reached their localities.37

Following the violence in Philadelphia and conscious that the Meredith March
was about to reach Canton, where authorities had taken a hard line against the local
civil rights movement, the NCCIJ attempted, with the chancery’s permission, on June
23 to contact fifteen priests from outside the Diocese of Natchez-Jackson to “come in
as mediators.” The conference was able to recruit only three: Father Wallin, who had
participated at the start of the Meredith March; Father Sherrill Smith, a Chicago
native who was the Archdiocese of San Antonio’s director of social action and pastor
of St. Peter Claver Church in San Antonio; and Father William M. Lewers, C.S.C., a
Kansas City, Missouri, born law professor at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana,
who was spending the summer in Jackson as a supply pastor at Holy Family Church.
Sisson diverted Wallin and a group of Protestant clergy, who had come down with
him from Memphis for the Meredith March, to Philadelphia. The NCCIJ sent Smith
and Lewers to Canton, along with James J. McGuire, the SFS’s associate director.38

Mikschl and Father Patrick Moran, who pastored a white Catholic church in
Canton, offered their assistance to the local authorities regarding the march but
received no response. Mikschl told the NCCIJ that he, nevertheless, did not expect
any trouble in Canton, and he remained willing to allow the marchers to camp on his
church’s grounds if they requested it. On June 23, King arrived in Canton ahead of
the marchers. Hosted by Mikschl and Brothers Maurus and Aaron, M.S.Ss.T., from
Camden, Mississippi, King visited Holy Child Jesus Mission, which hosted one of the
eighteen centers in Mississippi for Operation STAR (Systematic Training and
Redevelopment), an adult basic education, vocational training and job placement
program sponsored by the Diocese of Natchez-Jackson with $458,000 of diocesan and
$6,963,800 of federal funds. Although open to the poor regardless of race, most STAR trainees were African American.\textsuperscript{39}

When 200 marchers arrived in Canton later that evening and marched to the courthouse, over 1,000 local African Americans awaited them. Although local officials had earlier refused permission for the marchers to camp at McNeal Elementary School for Negroes, Carmichael led a march to the school from the courthouse, during which the crowd swelled to 3,500. Although the police did not intervene to stop tents being delivered, the Mississippi Highway Patrol appeared, heavily armed and wearing riot helmets. Some of the crowd dispersed, but 2,500 people remained as organizers began laying out the tents. Standing on top of a truck, Carmichael announced “The time for running has come to an end.” King followed him by appealing for nonviolence and vowed that “If necessary, we are willing to fill up all the jails in Mississippi.” When officials announced that anyone erecting tents would be arrested, Carmichael led the crowd in chanting “Pitch the tents.” As the tents began to go up, highway patrolmen donned gas masks. Father Richard T. McSorley, S.J., a professor at Georgetown University, who was one of the marchers, asked the watching John Doar, “Isn’t there something you can do?” Doar replied, “What can I do? Neither side will give an inch.” The troopers fired tear gas into the crowd and clubbed people at random with rifles and nightsticks, until the school grounds were cleared. Those attacked included Father John Pader, a Catholic priest from Chicago, who was hit by a state trooper’s shotgun butt.\textsuperscript{40}

In response to the attack, Mikschl went to the school with Brother Aaron. They arrived as the tear gas was lifting and those who could were reassembling to march to Asbury Methodist Church, a black church located across the street from the Holy Child Jesus Mission. Mikschl recalled:
At this point, I decided we must become directly involved. The injured were brought to the convent while Mr. [James] Draper of the Community Relations Service asked if all could use our grounds. I readily consented. We checked with Dr. King, Rev. J. McCree, Madison County’s ‘Mr. Civil Rights,’ and others, and all agreed this was most necessary, as hundreds were already outside the small church.

Staff from the Medical Committee for Human Rights and nuns from the Franciscan Sisters of Perpetual Adoration looked after twenty-one injured people in the convent. Between 400 and 500 hundred slept on the auditorium floor of the Holy Child Jesus Mission and others outside on its lawns. In the early hours of the morning, arson destroyed St. Joachim’s School in Carthage, a STAR center that had been subject to a dynamite attack in April. Later than morning, Father John Prater, a Servite based in Chicago and Father McSorley, who had slept at the rectory along with some of the male demonstrators, celebrated Mass with a few of the marchers and the Sisters.41

McSorley, a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, native, had marched at Selma in 1965. He had driven down with some students to join the Meredith March after hearing King’s early appeal for volunteers on television. He recalled, “We walked twenty miles a day and then slept overnight in two large tents, one for men and one for women.” When King asked the day after the troopers’ attack at Canton for people to accompany him to Philadelphia, sixty miles away, McSorley was among the one hundred volunteers, who drove across the state in a convoy of twenty cars.42

Wallin also arrived in Philadelphia. Although there is no evidence that his efforts at mediation were responsible, on this occasion, unlike three days before, the march passed off largely peacefully because, warned of possible federal intervention by John Doar if violence occurred, state and local authorities deployed highway patrolmen and police to contain a crowd of between 1,500 and 2,000 jeering whites and protect the marchers. McSorley participated in a mile long march to the courthouse, where King and Carmichael addressed the marchers, who sang “God
Bless America.” King ended with a prayer and led the marchers back through town. Law enforcement officers lined the route. McSorley saw a policeman ram his club into the ribs of an African American man, who was marching next to him. The priest dissuaded the man, who swung his arm at the policeman, from further retaliating by saying “Remember what King asked of us, nonviolent response.” As the marching columns spread more widely on entering the black neighborhood, a white man tried to drive his car into the marchers, who hurriedly divided into two columns and escaped injury. Police stopped the car and arrested the driver and his passenger. The driver of the car that McSorley was travelling back to Canton in decided not to wait for the convoy because one of the passengers needed to make a flight. A group of whites pursued them in what became an eighty mile an hour car chase, until their pursuers eventually gave up unable to catch them, and they returned to Canton in the evening. Back in Canton, McSorley told Mikschl, “Father, I was ready to die. A better way, I can’t think of - a priest witnessing for justice.”

While McSorley was in Philadelphia, Prater was one of forty-five volunteers who followed Albert Turner of the SCLC in an eight mile march from Canton along Highway 51. Prater did not walk any further but many decided to march a further ten miles to Tougaloo College before taking cars back to Canton that evening. By then, Smith, Lewers and McGuire had arrived in Canton, where they concluded that Mikschl had “helped save the town” from a riot by allowing the demonstrators to use his mission’s facilities and grounds. While Mikschl’s action certainly aided the marchers, the decisions of the march leaders played a far greater role by managing and positively channelling black anger. Between 700 and 800 people crowded into the auditorium of Holy Child Jesus Mission that night, where march leaders announced there would be a boycott of downtown businesses and a
work stoppage for one day. King also announced a night march, in which 600 people paraded through Canton peacefully.\textsuperscript{45}

According to Goudsouzian, the march leaders also decided that the demonstrators would return to McNeal Elementary School for Negroes and pitch their tents. However, Catholic sources tell a different story. Mikschl’s contemporary account stated that march leaders had not reached a decision on the night of June 23. Jim McGuire noted that during the early evening of June 24, Jim Draper asked for a meeting with the NCCIJ mediating team, who suggested a compromise with city officials in which “the marchers be permitted to use the school grounds without pitching the tent[s].” Draper called Doar who accepted the idea and contacted Mayor Stanley Matthews. Lewers sat in on a strategy meeting of march leaders, and state and local civil rights leaders in the home of local merchant George Washington and concluded that most “were looking for a compromise.” However, Carmichael wanted to pitch the tents at the school, although the tents remained under the control of highway patrolmen who guarded the school ready to repel any attempt to enter its grounds. King sided with local civil rights leaders who favored negotiating with the city to avoid further violence and had declared that they would not accept march leaders telling them what to do.\textsuperscript{46}

The agreement reached with the city, which Goudsouzian credits to city authorities, was based on the compromise originated by the NCCIJ team. Under its terms, the marchers would hold a meeting at the school grounds that night but make camp elsewhere. Under pressure from boycotted merchants, state officials and Justice Department staff, at 9:15pm city leaders accepted the deal negotiated by a delegation of local black leaders. That night, the Highway Patrol withdrew from the school and permitted a rally on its grounds at 10.00pm, at which Ralph Abernathy, vice president
of the SCLC, told the demonstrators that the tents had been sent on to Tougaloo College. After the rally, the marchers, who had not been notified beforehand of the agreement and had expected to pitch their tents at the school, returned dejectedly to stay a second night at Holy Child Jesus Mission. Back in the mission’s auditorium, Carmichael ripped into the compromise. James Lawson told him that putting tents up at the school would only have brought another vicious attack, and that Carmichael had to respect the wishes of local black leaders.47

Governor Johnson phoned Gerow the next day to thank him for the Catholic Church’s help in preventing another tragedy in Canton. The NCCIJ sent Mikschl $250 for costs incurred in feeding the marchers and later sent additional funds to cover other expenses. Mikschl reported that “the Sisters and girls teaching summer school here fed literally hundreds – milk, coolade, sandwiches and soup. It made a deep impression on all as they worked long into the morning hours.”48

The marchers left Canton on the morning of Saturday June 25 and walked to Tougaloo College, their final staging post before the march ended in Jackson. That night, African American and white celebrities entertained a crowd of 10,000 at the college, with soul singer James Brown generating the greatest response. Mikschl recalled, “Father McSorley and I attended the rally that night again. Sitting on the grass that night, one felt very close to the masses of humanity struggling for racial justice.” The team the NCCIJ had sent to Mississippi also went to the evening rally and were joined by Sister Mary Peter (Margaret Ellen) Traxler, S.S.N.D., a Minnesotan on the staff of the NCCIJ’s Department of Educational Services, and Curtis Heaston, the NCCIJ’s associate director of employment services. Sister Mary Peter, who had marched in the Selma protests in 1965, wanted to join the next day’s march to Jackson, but Gerow opposed the idea.49
At 11.00am Sunday morning, about 1,700 people began the march from Tougaloo College, including Father Smith, who had also marched at Selma, and at least eight other priests from outside the diocese. Evincing his customary caution, Gerow decided at noon that none of his diocesan priests should march or go to the rally. However, the bishop’s decision, McGuire later reported, “was not communicated officially to diocesan personnel,” probably because it came too late to be disseminated. Four priests and eight nuns based in Mississippi attended the rally, along with five seminarians who were working in the state for the summer. After “delicate negotiations with the diocese,” Sister Mary Peter joined the march when it reached the outskirts of Jackson and became the only nun to have marched. Sisson joined the march for the final three blocks.50

The Holy Child Jesus Mission maintained its association with the march. Mikschl wrote, “Sunday, four Sisters, the four girls [who taught in the mission’s summer school], and one of our own [African American] Catholic girls, and myself attended the Jackson rally of 16,000.” Reminiscent of the media in Selma a year earlier, “Again,” Mikschl observed, “the TV camera ‘zoomed in’ on the Sisters in the white habits in the crowds.” More than 90 percent of those at the rally, estimated at between 10,000 and 16,000 people, were African American Mississippians, which made the presence of the white nuns even more conspicuous. By contrast, most of the Selma marchers had come from outside Alabama and overwhelmingly from the North.51

Although the attendance in Jackson was impressive, the march did not persuade either President Johnson or Congress to strengthen the civil rights bill, which later fell victim to a filibuster in the United States Senate, or meet the other demands in the march’s manifesto. Stung by the manifesto’s criticisms and
increasingly preoccupied with Vietnam, the Johnson administration had been indifferent to appeals for federal protection following the violence in Philadelphia and Canton, even though the latter, Dimmer notes, “equaled in ferocity the assault on the marchers at the Selma bridge a year earlier.”

The march both revealed and exacerbated fissures within the civil rights movement. Overriding King’s objections, the other march leaders denied Charles Evers’s request to speak at the final rally because he had maintained his refusal to sign the march manifesto, despite joining the march in Greenwood, calling on NAACP branches to assist it, and working with Jackson officials to determine the march’s route into the capitol. After he agreed to sign the manifesto, march leaders permitted Whitney M. Young Jr. to speak at the closing rally. King concluded after the march that that he could not work with SNCC again. Carmichael continued to alternate between calm, reasoned expositions about the need for independent black political mobilization and power, and more incendiary rhetoric that, seized upon by a largely hostile white media, accentuated divisions within the movement, and alienated some white supporters and sympathizers. Both SNCC and CORE adopted Black Power, and later, under new leadership, they expelled or sidelined whites.

The final rally in Jackson had again seen rival SNCC and SCLC groups engage in competing chants of “Black Power” and “Freedom Now,” but as Dittmer notes, “the overwhelmingly black audience cheered all the speakers,” especially James Meredith who remained as enigmatic as ever, and was far less concerned about ideological differences between the march organizers. Ten thousand African American Mississippians had walked for part of the march, which, along with federal registrars, had succeeded in registering 4,007 African Americans along its route. White supremacy remained entrenched in Mississippi politics, but, in subsequent
years, a growing black electorate resulting from implementation of the Voting Rights Act would elect African Americans to office, end race-baiting in elections, and exert some influence on state and local politics.\textsuperscript{54}

The march benefitted the SFS and the NCCIJ. By maintaining contact with the chancery, Sisson helped to overcome Gerow’s reservations about the SFS and the NCCIJ, which, for their part, appreciated the bishop’s acquiescence in their efforts to assist the march. Four days after the march ended, Ahmann, who estimated that fifteen Catholic interracial councils had been “directly involved in [supporting the march in] some official way” with donations or volunteers, wrote that “officials in the Diocese of Mississippi [Natchez-Jackson] were most understanding of our role. In addition in contrast to Alabama [meaning Toolen during the Selma protests of 1965], priests calling the Chancery Office to check on the feeling there, were told that whether or not they entered the state to take part in the March ‘was a matter of their individual conscience’ and that the Bishop would be glad if they would just notify him if they were coming.”\textsuperscript{55}

Sisson built on his frequent contacts during the march with Monsignor McGough, whom he now considered to be “a strong ally,” to organize a meeting on July 7 at the chancery “to evaluate the diocese’s involvement and NCCIJ’s involvement in the Mississippi March.” Twenty priests attended, most of them based in Mississippi and members of religious orders that served African Americans. However, the diocese had no African American diocesan priests and only one of the religious priests at the meeting, Father Charles Dixon Burns, S.V.D., a native Mississippian, was black. Gerow was present for the first half of the meeting. After his departure, the Mississippi-based priests voted in favor of recommendations that would permit priests in the diocese “to participate in protest marches” and nuns “in
direct action programme exclusive of marches”; the holding of conferences and a workshop for clergy on race relations; the establishment of a Diocesan Human Relations Commission; pulpit exchanges between black and white pastors; and, more realistically given that Burns was the sole black priest in the diocese, also between pastors of African American and pastors of white parishes.56

The recommendations were subject to Gerow’s approval, but the elderly bishop relinquished the running of the diocese to Brunini as apostolic administrator on July 11. In August, McGuire visited Brunini and found him “favorably inclined” toward the recommendations but unwilling to “commit himself in any way on them.” McGuire informed Ahmann that Brunini’s “attitude regarding race relations and the Church’s witness in this regard is not as firm or as deep as that of Bishop Gerow.” McGuire believed that it was Brunini’s “native Mississippi background” that made him “paternalistic” toward African Americans. However, Brunini partially implemented the recommendations, such as holding a Human Relations Institute for clergy in African American parishes, and he maintained cordial relations with the SFS. When the NCCIJ considered closing the SFS in 1967 because of financial difficulties, Brunini made a donation and praised the SFS’s involvement in the Meredith March, which had “enabled the Chancery to have a clear assessment of the situation.” The SFS survived on this occasion, but two years later continued budgetary problems brought its closure and ended an important source of encouragement and support for Catholics in the state who were sympathetic to or engaged in the civil rights struggle.57

Their involvement in the Meredith March encouraged some priests to take a more active role in the civil rights movement, providing further evidence of the contribution of Catholic priests to the civil rights struggle in Mississippi. In August,
Mikschl joined the Canton NAACP and became a board member. Kist spent two and a half months helping to organize the NAACP in Yazoo County, which soon recruited 150 members. In December, Evers presented a charter to the Yazoo City branch. Kist served as membership chairman and, within a year, the county had 1,004 NAACP members. In December 1967, Machesky, serving as “chief tactician,” worked with two African American Methodist ministers to organize a two-year boycott of Greenwood that led the hiring of black clerks and other improvements. However, these white Catholic priests were all members of religious orders, which gave them greater freedom to act than diocesan priests who were answerable to the diocese’s bishop rather than an order’s superiors, and they ministered to African Americans, not segregationist whites.58

White priests of white Catholic churches in Mississippi generally did not become involved in civil rights activities, deterred by, when they did not share, the segregationist convictions of most of their parishioners and anxious not to alienate or divide their flocks or be reprimanded by their cautious bishop. Sympathetic priests may also have feared ostracism. After the Greenwood boycott ended in December 1969 and the Greenwood civil rights movement declined, Machesky continued to suffer rejection from a white community he had once been close to. Consequently, he avoided downtown and retreated to his mission before being transferred in 1981 to Charleston, Mississippi.59

Although far fewer in number and less conspicuous than in the Selma protests of 1965, Catholics played a supporting part in the Meredith March that was part of a wider Catholic contribution to the southern civil rights movement and racial change in Mississippi and the region that historians are beginning to uncover. The march, and the wish of some Catholic clergy to participate, posed particular problems for Bishop
Gerow, just as the Selma protests had done for Archbishop Toolen a year earlier. But Gerow proved more amenable than Toolen. Gerow was well aware that most white Catholics in his diocese, like other white Mississippians, were segregationists, who were not reconciled to racial change. At the same time, the bishop sought to bring his diocese into line with Catholic teachings on race. He took a cautious approach to desegregating Catholic institutions, and caution also informed his approach to the Meredith March. Gerow quietly sanctioned Catholic clergy coming into the state to support the march and, also without publicity, he permitted priests from religious orders and nuns who worked in African American parishes in Mississippi to assist the marchers. But, after some indecision, he would not countenance diocesan priests, who served the diocese’s white churches, marching, concerned that such a public stand would alienate white Catholics, divide the Church, and bring segregationist retribution from those outside it. The march was Gerow’s last involvement with the civil rights movement. Soon after, he handed over the administration of the diocese to Brunini, who would succeed him as Bishop in December 1967 at a time when Mississippi was still only beginning to be changed by the black struggle for equality.60

Influenced by a series of annual summer riots by African Americans in urban areas outside the South that began in 1964 and by the advent of Black Power, the NCCIJ increasingly concentrated on urban poverty, mostly in the industrial North. At its annual convention in 1967, the NCCIJ focused on “The Church and the Urban Crisis” and a year later on “Black Power and the White Church.” The development of Black Power, which maintained that black people needed to speak for themselves and determine the course of their struggle for justice, likely contributed to Mathew Ahmann’s decision in July 1968 to resign from the NCCIJ. His wife Margaret later recalled, “I think basically he thought, ‘A black man needs to run this.’” The
appointment of an African American successor, James T. Harris, Jr., who had no previous connection to the organization, suggested that the NCCIJ had also reached that conclusion.61

In Mississippi, widely acknowledged as one of the most resistant states to desegregation and where Black Power first received national attention, several white Catholic priests from religious orders continued to work with, and were often at the center of, NAACP chapters. Besides Kist and Mikschl in the Delta, they included Josephite priests Philip J. McLoone on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and Father William J. Morrissey, who was vice president of the Adams County NAACP. Their efforts bear testimony to the longevity of the civil rights movement that continued beyond 1965 and also, like the Meredith March, to the underappreciated contribution of Catholics to the movement in Mississippi.62

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November 1966, Norvell plead guilty to assault and battery with intent to kill and received a five year sentence.

In 1960s, Mississippians were unregistered, but the figure was more likely to have been around 300,000 because of 120,000 registrations in the first eight months after the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 (third and fourth quotations), folder 4, box 6, series 11, NCCIJR.

15 At his trial in November 1966, Norvell plead guilty to assault and battery with intent to kill and received a five year sentence. Washington Post, November 22, 1966.

19 Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 37-41, 90-91; Dittmer, Local People, 392-94; Carson, In Struggle, 207-208; Peniel E. Joseph, Stokely: A Life (New York: Basic Civitas, 2014), 107-108; King, Where Do We Go from Here, 31-32; New York Times, June 8, 12, 1966; “Report of the Director of the Southern Field Service August, 1966,” August 3, 1966, 2 (quotation). Historians disagree about Carmichael’s position. Goudsouzian claims that Carmichael sought only to ensure that African Americans controlled the march, Carson that Carmichael thought that “white participation should be deemphasized,” and Dittmer that Carmichael wanted to exclude whites entirely from the march. Joseph’s biography of Carmichael does not address the issue. Recollections are more in agreement. According to King, Carmichael thought “that the dominant appeal should be made for black participation.” SNCC staff member Cleveland Sellers similarly recalled that Carmichael “argued that the march should deemphasize white participation, [and] that it should be used to highlight the need for independent, black political units.” Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 38; Carson, In Struggle, 207; Dittmer, Local People, 393; King, Where Do We Go from Here, 32; Cleveland Sellers with Robert Terrell, The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant and the Life and Death of SNCC (Jackson and London: University Press of Mississippi, 19990 [1973]), 162.


24 Memorandum, Matt Ahmann to “Council Presidents and Chairmen and Chaplains; Board of Directors; Key Contacts,” “Meredith Mississippi March,” June 14, 1966, folder 11, box 8, series 34, NCCIJR.

25 Carson, In Struggle, 200, 208-209; Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 142 (quotation).


27 Memorandum, Jack [Sisson] to Matt [Ahmann], “Meredith Mississippi Freedom March, June 6-26, 1966 (Jim sent a separate report of his activities from June 22 to June 28),” June 30, 1966, 3 (first quotation), 5 (third quotation); Washington Post, June 17, 1966; New York Times, June 17, 1966 (second quotation); Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 133-34, 136, 139-43; Murray, “Father Nathaniel and the Greenwood Movement,” 286 (fourth quotation); Mathew Ahmann to Nathaniel Machesky, June 21, 1966, folder 1, box 12, series 33, NCCIJR.


30 King, Where Do We Go from Here, 34-35 (first quotation on p. 34; second quotation on pp. 34-35; third quotation on p. 35); Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 179.


32 King, Where Do We Go from Here, 34-36 (quotations on p. 36); Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 182-83.


35 Carson, In Struggle, 209-210; Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 142-43; Dittmer, Local People, 397-98 (quotation).


37 Ibid., 132-54 (first through fifth quotations on p. 135; sixth quotation on p. 139; seventh quotation on p. 140; eighth and ninth eleventh quotations on p. 144).


“Mississippi Riot Averted” (quotation); Mikschl, “Holy Childhood Mission and the Mississippi Freedom March,” 107; Goudsouzian, Down to the Crossroads, 203-204.


