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Equal treatment, worker replacement and wage rigidity

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Abstract

We adapt the model of Menzio and Moen (2010) to consider a labour market with directed search in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages over time and in the face of shocks to labour productivity. To avoid worker replacement (which saves on the ex ante wage bill), they may choose a wage for new hires that is equally unresponsive to shocks. This leads to a large degree of downward rigidity in the wages of new hires, and magnifies the response of unemployment and vacancies to negative shocks. Our version of the Menzio-Moen model allows for the analysis of positive probability shocks in a tractable way. Moreover, we argue that the model provides a useful framework for analysing other sources of wage rigidity; for example adding asymmetric information can substantially enhance the rigidity and the responsiveness of unemployment and vacancies to productivity shocks.

JEL Codes: E32, J41

Keywords: Labour contracts, business cycle, unemployment, equal treatment, downward rigidity, cross-contract restrictions.

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1 Introduction

In this paper we develop a model in which wages of new hires are tied to wages of those of ongoing workers. The implication is that if there is a reason for ongoing wages to be rigid, this will be transmitted to the wages of new hires. And it is the that latter that is important for employment fluctuations.\(^1\)

We adapt the model of Menzio & Moen (2010), henceforth MM. In their paper overlapping generations of two-period lived firms interact with infinitely lived workers. We simplify the model to a two-period version that is more tractable for our purposes, but the basic ideas are as in their paper. Firms can commit to wage contracts, current and future, but not to employment. That is, they cannot commit not to layoff a worker. In particular, if the wage for new hires is below that of incumbents, the firm will have an incentive to replace its incumbents if it can find suitable applicants. Anticipating this, workers will have a preference for a contract in which wages of future hires are never below their own wages, so that the firm will have no incentive to attempt to replace them. It may then be that firms offer such contracts as the ex ante costs of hiring are lower by a sufficient amount to offset having to forgo the potential benefit of a lower wage for new hires in some future states. That is, it may be optimal to satisfy a “no replacement constraint” that requires that the wage for new hires is never below that of incumbents.\(^2\)

In adverse future states, because of the no replacement constraint, the firm will trade-off a desire to smooth the wages of workers in ongoing employment, with the benefits from cutting the wage for new entrants. Treated on their own merit, the latter would receive a lower wage, but this would take it below the optimal wage to be paid to incumbents. The upshot then is that there is a degree of downward wage rigidity. The opposite is not true however. In particularly good states there is no problem in paying a higher wage to new entrants than to incumbents, so the rigidity only operates in a downward direction.

Because the wage for new entrants is allocational, the downwardly rigid wage affects hiring, and increases the variability of both unemployment and vacancies in response to productivity shocks, a point made also by MM.

\(^1\) A recent paper which analyses this idea within the search-matching model is Gertler & Trigari (2009).

\(^2\) This type of argument was also made in Snell & Thomas (2010) in the context of a perfectly competitive labour market. MM’s model however concerns a frictional labour market, and we follow their approach. A related argument has been used in the insider-outsider literature; see Gottfries & Sjostrom (2000).
We also argue that this framework is useful for considering other models of wage rigidity. We consider making the period 2 state of nature observable only to the firm. In this case we show that wages may be fully rigid downwards, thus further amplifying the variability of unemployment and vacancies. Such simple non-contingent labour contracts are well documented (e.g., Oswald (1986), Blinder & Choi (1990), and see Malcomson (1997) for an excellent overview).

2 The Model

We adapt the model of MM and adopt their notation where possible. There are two periods \( t = 1, 2 \). We assume that each firm and worker lives for both periods with \( K \) firms and \( S \cdot K \) workers. Both \( K \) and \( S \) are large. We identify each firm with an entrepreneur who owns it. In each period a representative firm operates a decreasing returns technology producing a perishable good, with production function \( f(n; x) \), where \( n \) is the current number of workers employed at the firm, \( x \in X \) is a productivity shock observable at the start of the period, and \( f'' > 0, f''' < 0 \). (Hours per worker are not variable.) Current profits, not including job creation costs, are given by \( f(n; x) - wn \), where \( w \) denotes the (real) wage paid in the current period (assuming a uniform wage, which need not hold in period 2). We assume that \( x = x_0 \) is fixed at \( t = 1 \), but at \( t = 1 \), \( x \) is a random variable, common across firms, with finite support. Henceforth \( x \) without a subscript will refer to the second period productivity shock. Each worker has a per-period utility of consumption function \( v(c) \), \( v' > 0 \) and \( v'' < 0 \). Workers cannot borrow or save, so consume all their current income; we assume there is no discounting of the future by workers. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are risk-neutral, but they also have a zero discount rate.

A firm has a wage policy \( \sigma = (w_1, (w_{2i})_{i=1,2}) \) to which it commits, where \( i \) is the length of the worker’s tenure and \( w_{2i} \) may be random (state contingent); so at \( t = 1 \) workers are offered a wage contract \( (w_1, w_{22}) \) and period 2 hires are offered \( w_{21} \). (We also consider the case where there is no commitment to \( w_{21} \) later in the paper.) A worker who accepts a contract at \( t = 1 \) suffers exogenous separation from the firm at the end of the first period, with probability \( \delta \). In this case he will be in the same position as a worker who failed to gain employment in the first period; in the second period such unattached workers seek work.\(^3\) As in MM, employment is

\(^3\)MM assume that separated workers cannot work in the period immediately following separation.
assumed to be “at will”, so during the matching stage of the second period (after observing \(x\)) the firm can dismiss a worker without compensation, and a worker can quit without penalty. We assume that such workers remain unemployed in their second period. A worker who is unemployed in any period receives an income of \(b\).

At the start of each period (in period 2, after \(x\) is observed), search and matching occur. We assume directed search (see Moen (1997) for the seminal paper in this area, and also Acemoglu & Shimer (1999), and Rudanko (2009)). We follow MM in the following. Briefly, an unemployed worker can apply for one job at a single firm each period. We rule out on-the-job search, so that at \(t = 2\) a worker cannot apply for a job if he is already employed. We identify the ‘type’ of a job with the utility \(V\) a successful applicant gets from it. The application succeeds with probability \(p(\theta (V))\), where \(\theta (V)\), ‘the expected queue length for the job,’ is the ratio of applicants to jobs of type \(V\). (The determination of \(\theta (V)\) is discussed below.) The function \(p(\cdot)\) is assumed to be strictly decreasing, differentiable and such that \(p(0) = 1\), \(p(\infty) = 0\). Correspondingly the firm fills a job of type \(V\) with probability \(q(\theta (V))\) where \(q(\cdot)\) is strictly increasing, and satisfies \(q(0) = 0\) and \(q(\infty) = 1\). Moreover, denoting the elasticity of \(q\) wrt \(\theta\) by \(\epsilon_q (\theta)\), \(\epsilon_q (\theta) / (1 - \epsilon_q (\theta))\) is assumed to be a decreasing function of \(\theta\).\(^4\) At \(t = 2\), unemployed workers can apply for jobs that are already filled; if there is a successful applicant, the firm can, by at will contracting, choose whether to replace the incumbent or not. If \(w_{21} \geq w_{22}\) firms will have no incentive to do this, but for \(w_{21} < w_{22}\) the incentive exists and in this case a filled job is as attractive as an unfilled one from the point of view of an applicant. In the latter case, then, to the extent that the matching process succeeds in selecting a successful applicant, the incumbent is at risk of losing her position.

Simultaneously with committing to a wage policy at the start of \(t = 1\), firms choose how many new jobs \(\pi_i\) to create in period \(i = 1, 2\), at a cost of \(k > 0\) per job; \(\pi_2\) can depend on \(x\). Unfilled jobs from the first period ‘die’ at the end of the period, along with filled jobs in which exogenous separation occurred (little depends on this). The implication is that employment at the firm in period \(i\) will increase by \(q(\theta (V))\pi_i\).

Our model differs from MM in the following principal respects. First, our workers are two-period lived rather than infinitely lived, and we have a two-period horizon. Secondly, rather than having firms of fixed size (number of jobs) with constant productivity per filled job and free entry of firms, we suppose that there are a fixed number of firms, each with a decreasing returns to scale technology. The

\(^4\)MM point out that many standard matching processes satisfy these assumptions.
supply of jobs then varies not with variations in the number of firms entering the market, but with the choice of firms about how many jobs (or "vacancies") to create each period. The fixed cost per job created replaces MM’s assumption of a fixed cost incurred per firm that enters.

Let $Z_1$ be the lifetime utility of a worker at the search stage, and $Z_2(x)$ that of a worker at $t = 2$ searching for work in state $x$. ($Z_1$ and $Z_2$ are the endogenous variables determining the economic environment facing the firm.) Define $Z = (Z_1, (Z_2(x))_{x \in X})$. The value to a worker at $t = 1$ from being employed by a firm with wage policy $\sigma$ then is

$$V_1(\sigma; Z) := v(w_1) + E[\delta Z_2(x) + (1 - \delta)v(w_22(x))]$$

if the worker only faces a separation risk, where $E$ denotes expectation. On the other hand, if replacement occurs in some states, that is, if $w_{21} < w_{22}$, then in such states the term inside the square brackets must be replaced by

$$\delta Z_2(x) + (1 - \delta)q(\theta_2)v(b) + (1 - \delta)(1 - q(\theta_2))v(w_22(x)),$$

where $\theta_2 = \theta_2(w_{21}, Z_2(x))$ (defined below) is the queue length in that state for a firm offering $w_{21}$. This reflects the additional risk $q(\theta_2)$ to a surviving worker of being replaced by a successful applicant.\(^5\)

\(^5\)To avoid complicating the exposition, we shall ignore the possibility that at the optimal period 2 wage, the firm would prefer to dismiss some of its incumbents. This would arise if $w_{22} > f'(1 - \delta)n_1(x)$. Likewise, we assume that $w_{22} \geq b$, or otherwise it would be in the interests of the worker to quit. In our simulations, parameters are chosen such that neither scenario arises.
Let $U_1$ be the lifetime utility of a worker at $t = 1$ who fails to get a job:

$$U_1(Z) = v(b) + E[Z_2(x)],$$

as currently the worker receives $b$ and is able to search next period, Given $U_1$ and $Z_1$, the expected queue length for a job offering $V_1$ is assumed to satisfy:

$$\theta_1(V_1, Z_1, U_1) = \begin{cases} \theta : p(\theta)V_1 + (1 - p(\theta))U_1 = Z_1, & \text{if } V_1 > Z_1 \\ 0, & \text{if } V_1 \leq Z_1 \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

The idea is that if the value of the job to a successful applicant, $V_1$, is greater than the value of search, $Z_1$, the expected queue length is driven up to the point where workers are indifferent between applying for the job and searching somewhere else, and vice versa. The expected queue length for the job will be zero if the value of the job is less than (or equal to) the value of search.

For a worker at $t = 2$ the value from being employed at the wage $w_{21}$ is $v(w_{21})$, so the expected queue length for period 2 firms and workers for a job with wage $w_{21}$ is

$$\theta_2(w_{21}, Z_2) = \begin{cases} \theta : p(\theta)v(w_{21}) + (1 - p(\theta))v(b) = Z_2, & \text{if } v(w_{21}) > Z_2 \\ 0, & \text{if } v(w_{21}) \leq Z_2 \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

Assuming that incumbents are not replaced in period 2, a firm’s profit is:

$$F(\sigma; \overline{n}_1(\overline{n}_2(x))_{x \in X}; Z) = (f(n_1; x_0) - w_1n_1 - k\overline{n}_1) + E[(f((1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2; x) - w_{22}(1 - \delta)n_1 - w_{21}n_2 - k\overline{n}_2)]$$

where $n_i$ is the number of new hires in period $i$, and is given by $n_i = q(\theta_i)\overline{n}_i$, $i = 1, 2$, where $\theta_i$ depends on $\sigma$ as given by $\theta_1(V_1(\sigma, Z), Z_1, U_1(Z))$ in (1) and $\theta_2(w_{21}, Z_2(x))$ in (2) above. Otherwise, in any state where replacement occurs, the expression for second period profit is replaced by

$$f((1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2; x) - w_{22}(1 - q(\theta_2))(1 - \delta)n_1 - w_{21}(n_2 + q(\theta_2)(1 - \delta)n_1) - k\overline{n}_2,$$

where $q(\theta_2)(1 - \delta)n_1$ is the number of incumbents who are replaced by new hires, and $n_2 = q(\theta_2)\overline{n}_2$ is the number of new hires into newly created jobs.

**Competitive Search Equilibrium**

We define an equilibrium

**Definition 1** A symmetric stationary competitive search equilibrium consists of search values $Z_1, (Z_2(x))_{x \in X}$, and a wage policy $\sigma$ and job creation plan $(\overline{n}_1, (\overline{n}_2(x))_{x \in X})$ with the following properties:
(i) Profit maximization: For all \((\sigma'; \pi_1', (\pi_2' (x))_{x \in X})\),

\[ F((\sigma; \pi_1, (\pi_2 (x))_{x \in X}); Z) \geq F (\sigma'; \pi_1', (\pi_2' (x))_{x \in X}; Z); \]

and

(ii) Consistency: \(\theta_1 (V_1 (\sigma, Z), Z_1, U_1) = S/\pi_1\), and, for all \(x\), if \(w_{21} \geq w_{22}\) (no replacement occurs), \(\theta_2 (w_{21}, Z_2 (x)) = S_2/\pi_2 (x)\) where \(S_2 = ((1 - p (S/\pi_1)) + \delta p (S/\pi_1)) S\) is the number of old workers (per firm) seeking work in period 2, while if \(w_{21} < w_{22}\) (replacement occurs) \(\theta_2 (w_{21} (x), Z_2 (x)) = S_2/ (\pi_2 (x) + (1 - \delta) q (S/\pi_1) \pi_1)\).

### 2.0.1 No replacement in state \(x\)

We start by characterizing an optimal policy assuming that in state \(x\), \(w_{21} \geq w_{22}\). We will deal with the issue of whether this is optimal below, that is whether a policy with \(w_{21} < w_{22}\) might yield higher profits. We proceed heuristically.\(^6\) In period 2 in any state \(x\), given \(n_1\) and \(w_1\), following MM it can be shown that the firm must locally maximize profits plus weighted incumbent utility.\(^7\) In particular, given it is optimal not to replace, it must maximize

\[ f ((1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2; x) - w_{22} (1 - \delta)n_1 - w_{21} n_2 - k\pi_2 + \]

\[ (1/v' (w_1)) n_1 ((1 - \delta) v (w_{22}) + \delta Z_2 (x)), \quad (3) \]

with respect to \(\pi_2, w_{21}, w_{22}, w_{21} \geq w_{22}\), where \(n_2 = q (\theta (w_{21}, Z_2 (x))) \pi_2 =: \bar{q} (w_{21}, x) \pi_2\). We write \(\bar{q} \equiv \partial \bar{q}/\partial w_{21}\). Note that the last term in (3) includes the continuation utility of an incumbent, taking into account the separation possibility, and multiplied by the number of incumbents. The intuition here is that any change which affects the utility of the firm’s old workers can be offset by a change in the first period wage, leaving \(V_1\) unchanged (and hence \(n_1\)). Multiplying the utility change through by the inverse of first period marginal utility then converts it (for a small

\(^6\)The following necessary conditions are derived formally in the Appendix by considering the two-period problem. Alternatively, it can be directly established that (3) below must hold at a local maximum subject to \(w_{21} \geq w_{22}\).

\(^7\)MM introduce a sunspot into their model, and this allows the firm to randomize between replacement and no-replacement. They can then show that an equivalent of (3) must be maximized across replacement/no replacement regimes and derive analytical sufficient conditions for no-replacement to be optimal. We could follow a similar approach here, but as we are able to compute numerical solutions straightforwardly the solution can be checked directly. Moreover the restriction to contracts dependent only on the productivity shock simplifies the presentation.
change) to the first period wage saving per worker. If this was not satisfied then profits can be increased.

There are two cases to consider:

(A) If the “no replacement constraint” $w_{21} \geq w_{22}$ is not binding, then differentiating (3) with respect to $w_{22}$,

$$
(1 - \delta)n_1 = n_1 (1/v'(w_1)) \left( (1 - \delta) v'(w_{22}) \right),
$$

so that $w_1 = w_{22}$. Intuitively the firm should stabilize the wages of the first period hires if there is no cost to doing this. In this case, also differentiating with respect to $w_{21}$, we get

$$
 f' \left( (1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2; x \right) q' \pi_2 - w_{21} q' \pi_2 - q \pi_2 = 0,
$$

and simplifying:

$$
 f' (n) \tilde{q}' - w_{21} \tilde{q}' - q = 0,
$$

where $n \equiv (1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2$. Finally, differentiating with respect to $\pi_2$,

$$
 f' (n) = w_{21} + k/q.
$$

We can combine these latter two to get

$$
 q^2 (\tilde{q}')^{-1} = k.
$$

Intuitively, in order to increase employment by one unit, the firm could open $1/q$ jobs at a cost of $k/q$. Alternatively a wage increase of $1/(\pi_2 \tilde{q}')$, holding the number of jobs constant, accomplishes the same thing by increasing the probability each existing job is filled, at a cost of $q \pi_2 \times 1/(\pi_2 \tilde{q}') = q/\tilde{q}'$. The two must be equal in equilibrium.

In the proof of Proposition 1 it is shown that (7) can be solved to give a positively sloped locus of values for $n_2$ and $w_{21}$ compatible with equilibrium. This locus defines an upward sloping ‘quasi-supply’ curve of labor: when equilibrium $n_2$ is higher, it is harder to fill each job because the labor market is tighter ($\theta_2$ is lower, so $k/q (\theta_2)$ is higher); this makes wage increases more attractive as a way of filling jobs than creating jobs, so $w_{21}$ rises until the two methods cost the same. This locus is independent of the profitability of filling a job. We refer to this as the commitment quasi-supply curve. It corresponds to the solution to the first-order conditions in the case where firms can commit not to replace incumbent workers, and thus ignores the no-replacement constraint $w_{21} \geq w_{22}$. (The two coincide in this
case because the constraint is not binding by assumption.) Combining this with the
downward sloping (6), which is a standard labor demand equation, where the unit
cost of increasing employment \( k/q (\theta_2) \) is added to the wage (itself increasing as \( n_2 \)
increases),\(^8\) yields a unique equilibrium for each productivity shock whenever the
no-replacement constraint does not bind. Denote the solution of (6) and (7) by
\((w_{C1}^C(x, w_1, n_1), n_{C2}^C(x, w_1, n_1))\), where the \( C \)—superscript indicates that this is the
solution to the FOCs in the case of commitment.

Since in this case, \( w_{21} \geq w_{22} = w_1 \), we conclude that the intersection of (6) and
(7) occurs at or above \( w_1 \).

(B) If on the other hand \( w_{21} \geq w_{22} \) is binding at the optimum, the intersection
of (6) and (7) occurs at a wage below \( w_1 \) but the wage can be shown to be above
\( w_{C21}^C(x, w_1, n_1) \), while employment is below \( n_{C2}^C(x, w_1, n_1) \). In the proof it is shown
that \( k < q^2 / q' \). The unit cost of increasing employment through creating extra jobs,
\( k/q \), is lower than that through increasing wages, \( q^2 / q' \) but it would not pay to cut
wages and increase jobs as the wage cut has a negative externality on incumbents’
price smoothing. More intuitively, if productivity is low enough that the equilibrium
hiring wage under commitment \( w_{C21}^C \) would be below \( w_1 \), then the no-replacement
constraint would be violated (recall that \( w_{C22}^C = w_1 \)). To satisfy the constraint, \( w_{22} \)
must be cut, which is costly as it reduces wage smoothing so firms are less willing
to let wages fall. The quasi-labor-supply curve is thus flatter below \( w_1 \).

Consequently, taking as given \( w_1 \), we can plot a no-commitment quasi-supply
curve in \( w_{21} - n_2 \) space, which coincides with the commitment one above \( w_1 \), but
below \( w_1 \) the curve lies above the commitment curve. Equilibrium occurs at the
intersection with the labor demand curve. As \( x \) varies, the latter curve is shifted.
In the figure, a situation where the crossing point occurs below \( w_1 \) is illustrated.
The equilibrium values are at point A, rather than at the commitment solution.\(^9\)
If \( x \) is sufficiently high that the intersection occurs above \( w_1 \), then the equilibrium
will be at the commitment solution, \((w_{21}^C(x, w_1, n_1), n_{2}^C(x, w_1, n_1))\). The proposition
summarizes the discussion.

**Proposition 1** Suppose replacement does not occur in state \( x \). Then (a) if equi-

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\(^8\)As \( n_2 \) increases, we must have \( p(\theta) \) increasing as \( n_2 = p(\theta) S_2 \) and hence \( \theta \) has fallen as \( p' < 0 \); thus \( q(\theta) \) falls by \( q' > 0 \).

\(^9\)If commitment was allowed in such a state, unless the state has negligible probability, then the equilibrium two-period contract may be different, that is, \( w_1 \) and \( n_1 \) may differ. The proposition
concerns the implied values of \( w_{21}^C \) and \( n_{2}^C \) in a hypothetical equilibrium which has the same period
1 values.
librium hiring wages in period 2 are below period 1 wages, \( w_{21} < w_1 \), the wage is higher and employment is lower than they would be in that state if firms were able to commit, that is, \( w_{21} > w_{21}^C (x; w_1, n_1) \) and \( n_2 < n_2^C (x; w_1, n_1) \); moreover \( w_{22} = w_{21} < w_1 \). Otherwise (b) wages and employment are at the commitment levels: \( w_{21}^{NC} (x; w_1, n_1) = w_{21}^C (x; w_1, n_1) \) and \( n_2^{NC} (x; w_1, n_1) = n_2^C (x; w_1, n_1) \), with \( w_{22}^{NC} (x; w_1, n_1) = w_1 \). Case (a) occurs when the labor demand curve intersects the commitment quasi-supply curve below \( w_1 \); otherwise case (b) occurs.

**Proof.** We derive necessary conditions by considering the following Lagrangean, assuming an interior solution and assuming that there is no replacement in state \( x \). We give the appropriate expression if there is no undercutting in period 2 in any state; otherwise an analogous argument applies (if there is replacement in some state \( x' \neq x \) it modifies the expectation term in (8) and (11) but they cancel).

\[
\begin{align*}
(f (\bar{q}_1 (V_1) \pi_1) - w_1 \bar{q}_1 (V_1) \pi_1 - k \pi_1) & + \\
E_{x'} [(f ((1 - \delta)\bar{q}_1 (V_1) \pi_1 + \bar{q} (w_{21}, x') \pi_2; x') - w_{22} (1 - \delta)\bar{q}_1 (V_1) \pi_1 - w_{21} \bar{q} (w_{21}, x') \pi_2 - k \pi_2)] & + E_{x'} [\lambda_{x'} (w_{21} - w_{22})],
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \bar{q}_1 (V_1) \) is defined analogously to \( \bar{q} (w_{21}, x) \), \( \lambda_{x'} \) is the multiplier on the \( w_{21} \geq w_{22} \) constraint in state \( x' \) and recall \( V_1 = v (w_1) + E [\delta Z_2 (x') + (1 - \delta) v (w_{22} (x'))] \).

This leads to the FOCs:

\[
\bar{q}_1' v' (w_1) \pi_1 (f' (n_1) - w_1 + E_{x'} [f' (n; x') (1 - \delta) - w_{22} (x') (1 - \delta)]) - \bar{q}_1 (V_1) \pi_1 = 0 \quad (8)
\]
\( f' (n; x) \tilde{q} (w_{21}, x) - w_{21} \tilde{q} (w_{21}, x) - k = 0 \) \hspace{1cm} (9)

\( f' (n; x) \tilde{q} \overline{\pi}_2 - \tilde{q} (w_{21}, x) \overline{\pi}_2 - w_{21} \tilde{q} \overline{\pi}_2 + \lambda_x = 0 \) \hspace{1cm} (10)

\( \tilde{q}' v' (w_{22} (x)) (1 - \delta) \overline{\pi}_1 (f' (n_1) - w_1 +

E_{x'}[ f' (n; x') (1 - \delta) - w_{22} (x') (1 - \delta)] - \lambda_x - (1 - \delta) \tilde{q}_1 (V_1) \overline{\pi}_1 = 0 \) \hspace{1cm} (11)

together with the complementary slackness conditions. Note that (9) implies (6) in the text.

From (8) and (11),

\[
\frac{v' (w_1)}{v' (w_{22})} \left( q_1 + \frac{\lambda_x}{\overline{\pi}_1 (1 - \delta)} \right) = q_1. \tag{12}
\]

Using this to eliminate \( \lambda_x \) in (10):

\[ f' (n; x) \tilde{q} \overline{\pi}_2 - \tilde{q} (w_{21}, x) \overline{\pi}_2 - w_{21} \tilde{q} \overline{\pi}_2 + q_1 \overline{\pi}_1 (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{v' (w_{22})}{v' (w_1)} - 1 \right) = 0. \tag{13}
\]

There are two cases.

A. If \( \lambda_x = 0 \), then from (12) \( w_1 = w_{22} \), and (13) implies (5) in the text and hence (7). We characterize points which satisfy (7). For clarity, we let \( \tilde{w}_{21} \) and \( \tilde{\theta}_2 \) denote the individual firm’s values. Then

\[
\tilde{q}' = \frac{dq}{d\tilde{\theta}_2} \frac{d\tilde{\theta}_2}{d\tilde{w}_{21}} |_{\tilde{z}_2 \text{ constant}} .
\]

From (2),

\[
\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_2}{d\tilde{w}_{21}} |_{\tilde{z}_2 \text{ constant}} = - \frac{pn' (w_{21})}{\frac{dp}{d\tilde{\theta}_2} (v (w_{21}) - v (b))} ,
\]

and differentiating \( q = p \cdot \theta_2 \) to eliminate \( \frac{dp}{d\tilde{\theta}_2} \), we get

\[
\tilde{q}' = - \frac{dq}{d\tilde{\theta}_2} \left( \frac{dq}{d\tilde{\theta}_2} - p \right) \left( v (w_{21}) - v (b) \right) .
\]

After rearrangement,

\[
\frac{q^2}{\tilde{q}'} = q^2 \frac{1 - \frac{\tilde{\theta}_2 dq}{dq}}{\tilde{\theta}_2 \frac{dq}{d\tilde{\theta}_2}} \frac{v (w_{21}) - v (b)}{v' (w_{21})} .
\]

From our assumption on \( q \), \( q^2 \) is increasing in \( \theta_2 \), and the second term in the product is also increasing in \( \theta_2 \) (it is the inverse of \( q (\theta) \epsilon_q (\theta) / (1 - \epsilon_q (\theta)) \)) while the final
term is increasing in \( w_{21} \). Thus the locus of values of \( \theta_2 \) and \( w_{21} \) such that (7) holds is negatively sloped. Recall that \( n_2 = p (\theta_2) S_2 \), and as \( p' < 0 \), there is a one-to-one negative relationship between \( n_2 \) and \( \theta_2 \). So (7) can be solved to give a positively sloped locus of values for \( n_2 \) and \( w_{21} \) compatible with equilibrium.

Next, (9) is negatively sloped in \( n_2 - w_{21} \) space by \( f'' < 0 \) and \( q (\theta_2) = q (p^{-1} (n_2 / S_2)) \), \( q' > 0 \), \( p' < 0 \). Therefore \( (w_{21}, n_2) \) is at the unique intersection point, denoted by \((w_{21}^C (x; w_1, n_1), n_2^C (x; w_1, n_1))\) in the text. Since \( w_{21} \geq w_1 \) implies \( \lambda_x = 0 \) (see next line), this establishes claim (b).

\[ (1 - \delta) n_1 - (f' (n)) q' \pi_2 - w_{21} q' \pi_2 - q \pi_2 = n_1 \left( \frac{1}{v'(w_1)} \right) ((1 - \delta) v' (w_{21})). \]  

(14)  

(This also follows from differentiating (3) with respect to \( w_{21} \) after setting \( w_{21} = w_{22} \).) Thus, eliminating \( f' \) using (9), and using \( n_2 = q \pi_2 \),  

\[ 1 + \frac{(1 - kq'/q^2) n_2}{n_1 (1 - \delta)} = \frac{v'(w_{21}^{1})}{v'(w_1)}. \]  

(15)  

so that as \( w_{21} < w_1 \), \( kq'/q^2 < 1 \), i.e., \( k < q^2/q' \). Holding \( n_2 \) (and hence \( \theta_2 \)) constant, \( q^2/q' \) is increasing in \( w_{21} \), so the locus of points \((n_2, w_{21})\) satisfying (15) must lie above—\( w_{21} \) is higher—that defined by (7). At \( w_{21} = w_1 \) we have \( kq'/q^2 = 1 \), so the two loci coincide. Thus the downward sloping (9) must intersect (15) at a higher wage and a lower value for \( n_2 \) than it would intersect (7). This establishes claim (a).

Since \( \lambda_x > 0 \) if and only if \( w_{21} < w_1 \), the final claim of the proposition follows.

\[ \blacksquare \]

2.0.2 Replacement in state \( x \)

If replacement occurs, again the firm must locally maximize profits plus weighted incumbent utility:

\[
\begin{align*}
&f \left( (1 - \delta) n_1 + n_2; x \right) - w_{22} (1 - \delta) (1 - q) n_1 - w_{21} (q (1 - \delta) n_1 + n_2) - k \pi_2 \\
&+ n_1 \left( \frac{1}{v'(w_1)} \right) ((1 - \delta) (1 - q) v(w_{22}) + \delta Z_2 + (1 - \delta) q v(b)),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \pi_2 \) is again the number of new jobs created, and \( n_2 = q (\theta (w_{21}, Z_2 (x))) \pi_2 \). Then differentiating with respect to \( w_{22} \),

\[ (1 - \delta)(1 - q)n_1 = n_1 \left( \frac{1}{v'(w_1)} \right) ((1 - \delta) (1 - q) v' (w_{22})), \]  

(16)
so that $w_1 = w_{22}$, as expected. Intuitively the firm should stabilize the wages of the first period hires as there is no cost to doing this—given the replacement probability is independent of $w_{22}$. Differentiating with respect to $w_{21}$ we get

\[
f' (n; x) q' \pi_2 - w_{21} q' ((1 - \delta) n_1 + \pi_2) \quad \begin{array}{c}
q \left((1 - \delta) n_1 + \pi_2\right) + \\
n_1 \left(1/v' (w_1)\right) (1 - \delta) (q') (v (b) - v (w_{22})) = 0
\end{array}
\] (17)

where the latter term is the extra cost of compensating more replaced workers for their loss of utility whereas previously we got

\[
f' (n; x) q' \pi_2 - w_{21} q' \pi_2 - q \pi_2 = 0
\]

and differentiating with respect to $\pi_2$,

\[
f' (n; x) q = w_{21} q + k.
\] (19)

We can combine these latter two to get

\[
(k/q) q' \pi_2 - w_{21} q' ((1 - \delta) n_1) + n_1 \left(1/v' (w_1)\right) (1 - \delta) (q') (v (b) - v (w_{22})) = q \left((1 - \delta) n_1 + \pi_2\right)
\] (20)

instead of

\[
k q'/q = q.
\] (21)

Note then that the RHS of (20), if we divide through by $\pi_2$, is bigger, while the LHS is smaller. Recall that $q^2 / q'$ is increasing in $\theta$ and $w_{21}$. Thus to reestablish equality we need to decrease $q^2 / q'$; that is at fixed $\theta$ we reduce $w_{21}$, so in $w_{21} - \theta$ space, the downward sloping locus must be shifted downward.

Given the tractability of the model, we proceed in our simulations by computing an equilibrium under the assumption that replacement is not optimal in any state. We then check whether replacement can improve profits. If this is true, we have an equilibrium but this does not logically rule out the possibility of an equilibrium with replacement existing at the same time.\footnote{Although in none of the simulations carried out has this occurred.}

### 2.1 Simulation

We report the following simulation. Suppose that the matching technology is given by $p(\theta) = M \theta^{\eta - 1}$, $q(\theta) = M \theta^\eta$, where $M = 1/10$ and $\eta = 1/2$ (this is the same specification used in MM). Further $v(c) = c^{0.5}$, $f(n) = x \log (n)$, $\delta = 0.2$; $k = 0.02$;
\( b = 0.2; \ S = 10; \) the period 1 deterministic state is \( x_0 = 11, \) while there are two possible states at \( t = 2 \) : \( x_l = 10, \ x_h = 12, \) probability\((x_l) = \text{probability}(x_h) = 0.5. \)

For these values, under commitment we find that \( w_{21}(x) < w_1 \) in both states (by a margin of 14\% in \( x_l) \). Wages vary by 12\% across the two states (expressed relative to \( w_{21}(x_l)\)). Without commitment the no replacement constraint binds in both states. Wage variation across the two states is under 6\%, hence lower, in line with Proposition 1. Unemployment varies by 21\% more in the no commitment case, and the change in vacancies is 17\% higher.

So, as anticipated, the lack of commitment leads to an amplification of the variability of unemployment and vacancies as productivity changes, although in our simulation the change is not too substantial.

### 3 Real Rigidity

#### 3.1 Asymmetric Information

So far we have seen that equal treatment leads to a measure of downward real rigidity. We now consider adding asymmetric information about the period 2 state \( x; \) and we argue that this may lead to a completely rigid period 2 wage for incumbents, and also for new hires for a range of adverse shocks. We will assume that in period 2 ongoing hires in a firm cannot observe \( x \) (nor \( z_2 \) so they cannot infer \( x)) \). Consequently, the contract cannot make the second period wage contingent on the state of nature. We assume further that a worker cannot observe the total employment or vacancies at the firm. This contrasts with earlier models in the asymmetric information implicit contracting literature in which labour supply is observable to workers (Chari 1983, Green & Kahn 1983, Grossman & Hart 1981) — in a single worker model as usually considered this is inevitable of course. In practice, however, the level of employment in a firm can be difficult to define precisely. For example, if the relevant employment level is at the plant, the firm may be able to move production to other companies or plants within the same company, making it difficult to condition on employment (as argued by Stiglitz (1986)).

These assumptions, when there is no commitment and if the solution satisfies the no replacement constraint, can lead to a form of contract that has a fixed period 2 wage and the employer unilaterally chooses the level of employment. Suppose there are two states at \( t = 2 \) and that we are in the region where the no replacement
constraint is binding in both states. If the wage varies with the state but is below the period 1 wage, the firm will always prefer to “announce” the state associated with the lowest wage. It benefits from paying a lower wage to its existing employees. In addition because the wage for new hires would optimally be set lower than the no-commitment wage, the firm would benefit from a lower wage just considering this group. So for both reasons period 2 profits increase as wages are reduced. Consequently the only incentive compatible contract has a non-contingent wage. Note that this logic may not apply if there are states in which the no replacement constraint does not bind. In this case the firm will prefer to have the new hire wage above that of the incumbent, so that the new hire wage is flexible upwards.

Consider instead the nature of the contract with these informational assumptions but with commitment (not to replace) on the part of the firm. The firm then will offer a non-contingent contract to period 1 hires (equal to \( w_1 \)), but would be unrestricted in offering the optimal hiring wage to period 2 workers. Since a stable wage for incumbents is optimal, the solution will be identical to the commitment solution considered earlier. Without commitment, though, as just argued, if the solution satisfies the no replacement constraint, then the fact that wages are non contingent has direct implications for hires. On the other hand if in any state \( x \) the solution violates the no replacement constraint, the new hire wage is set optimally. As before, assuming that incumbents are not replaced in period 2, a firm’s profit is:

\[
F(\sigma; \pi_1, (\pi_2 (x))_{x \in X}; Z) = (f(n_1) - w_1 n_1 - k\pi_1) + E[F_x]
\]

where \( F_x \) is period 2 profits in state \( x \) and is given by either

\[
F^{NR}_x (\sigma; \pi_1, \pi_2 (x); Z) := (f ((1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2; x) - w_22(1 - \delta)n_1 - w_21n_2 - k\pi_2)
\]

if no replacement occurs (again \( n_i \) is the number of new hires in period \( i \), and is given by \( n_i = q(\theta_i)\pi_i \), \( i = 1, 2 \), where \( \theta_i \) depends on \( \sigma \) as given by \( \theta_1(V_1(\sigma, Z), Z_1, U_1(Z)) \) in (1) and \( \theta_2(w_{21}, Z_2(x)) \) in (2) above) or if replacement occurs, the expression for second period profit in state \( x \) is given by

\[
F^R_x (\sigma; \pi_1, \pi_2 (x); Z) := f ((1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2; x) - w_22(1 - q(\theta_2))(1 - \delta)n_1 - w_22(n_2 + q(\theta_2)(1 - \delta)n_1 - k\pi_2),
\]

where as before \( q(\theta_2)(1 - \delta)n_1 \) is the number of incumbents who are replaced by new hires, and \( n_2 = q(\theta_2)\pi_2 \) is the number of new hires into newly created jobs.
\[(\sigma; \bar{n}_1, (\bar{n}_2 (x))_{x \in X}) \text{ maximises } F((\sigma; \bar{n}_1, (\bar{n}_2 (x))_{x \in X}); Z) \text{ subject to the incentive compatibility constraints}^{11}\]

\[F^{NR}_x (\sigma; \bar{n}_1, \bar{n}_2 (x); Z) \geq \max_{x', \bar{n}_2'} \{(f ((1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2'; x) - w_{22} (x')(1 - \delta)n_1 - w_{21} (x')n_2' - k\bar{n}_2')\}\]

and

\[F^R_x (\sigma; \bar{n}_1, \bar{n}_2 (x); Z) \geq \max_{x', \bar{n}_2'} \{f ((1 - \delta)n_1 + n_2'; x) - w_{22} (x')(1 - q (\theta_2))(1 - \delta)n_1 - w_{21} (x')(n_2' + q (\theta_2) (1 - \delta)n_1 - k\bar{n}_2'),\]

where \(n_2' = q (\theta_2)\bar{n}_2'\) and \(\theta_2 = \theta_2 (w_{21} (x'), Z_2 (x))\).

We can establish the following. Suppose that under certainty the no replacement constraint strictly binds. Then there is a perturbation of this model with two different states such that equilibrium period 2 wages are constant. This is illustrated below:

### 3.1.1 Simulation

We use the same values as before. For these values the optimal contract specifies a constant wage \((w_{21} (x_l) = w_{22} (x_l) = w_{21} (x_h) = w_{22} (x_h))\) 7\% below \(w_1\). This increases unemployment variability by 45\% relative to the commitment model, and vacancy variability by 46\%.

### 3.2 Near Rationality

In this subsection we want to argue that the additional costs of imposing some additional real rigidity will be small in this environment, and moreover that the this model provides a framework for analysing how rigid wages in ongoing wage contracts is transmitted to new hires. Suppose that the productivity shock turns out to be close but not identical to what was expected. Consider first the case where there is

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11This ignores the possibility that in a no replacement state the firm can announce a state \(x'\) in which replacement occurs, and vice versa, but we have suppressed the additional inequalities to avoid too cumbersome a presentation. Likewise these ex post (after the period 2 state is observed) constraints are necessary, but since \(n_1\) is also unobservable then the IC constraints should be expressed in terms of an ex ante constraint which requires that should the firm deviate at date 1 and in any date two states it cannot increase its discounted profit. The simulations use the ex ante constraint.
commitment (not to replace incumbents). In this case, the cost of not anticipating this state will be minimal considering only the incumbent worker situation, since a rigid real wage is desirable in any case. Likewise, since the firm has no reason to commit to its wage for period 2 hires, it can simply reoptimize when it observes the current state. If however the firm has precommitted to \( w_{22} \) it may suffer some loss relative to a fully contingent situation because it is not choosing \( w_{22} \) optimally, but this would still be second-order by the usual argument given the frictional labour market.

Suppose instead that there is no commitment (not to replace incumbents) and the period 2 shock is such that the no replacement constraint is binding, as in Proposition 1. In this case a slight deviation from the anticipated shock leads to a cost because the wage ideally should vary with the shock, although not by very much as we have seen. So the cost from not having a contingent wage would be expected to be small, even relative to the second-order effect in the commitment case.

We check this in the example considered above. We consider for both the commitment and no commitment cases, equilibria where contracts are restricted to being non-contingent, despite a 20% difference in the (multiplicative) period 2 shock. In both cases we then compute the change in profits if, starting in the

![Figure 1: A rigid wage under asymmetric information](image-url)
respective equilibrium, a firm moves to a contingent (commitment or no-commitment respectively) contract. In line with the intuition just given we find that the change in profit in the no commitment case is indeed smaller, less than half.

References


