Installation view of Rapid Construction in the USA exhibition at the House of the Architects, Moscow, March 1945. Published in Prefabricated Homes, 1946.
USA/USSR: Architecture and War

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On March 15, 1945, a week after Germany began its final offensive of World War II in the oilfields of Hungary, Soviet architects, engineers, and students flocked to an exhibition at the House of the Architects in Moscow. They found images of prefabricated houses, descriptions of heating and plumbing utilities, samples of building materials, and proposals for the radical reform of residential construction after the end of the war. All of the material presented in Moscow was drawn from American sources, and the show itself was a gift from an American institution: the Museum of Modern Art.

Soviet engineers and architects welcomed this timely exhibition. According to one report, “it met an acute need felt in the tremendous rehabilitation program in war damaged areas, in the housing construction required for tens of millions [of] people rendered homeless by the war.” Another observer ascribed global significance to the event: “I welcome this very interesting exhibition as the first step in the great work of rehabilitating peacetime housing construction all over the world.” This display of American building seemed to provide solutions to many of the problems facing Soviet architects on the eve of reconstruction.

If the responses of Soviet architects to this exhibition are to be taken seriously—and they should be—a set of interlocking questions presents itself. Why were American techniques so highly valued in Moscow in 1945? How are we to interpret this relationship between architects in the USSR and their American colleagues? What was at stake in this exchange for Soviet professionals? How, finally, did the evident goodwill between American and Soviet architects in 1945 devolve into the antagonism of Cold War ideologies by the end of the decade?

Events such as this exhibition invite us to reassess the state of Soviet architectural culture in the 1940s. Soviet architecture from the 1930s to the early 1950s—the era of high Stalinism—is often considered to be a negative, monumental response to the avant-garde experiments of the 1920s. “Socialist Realism,” as one commentator has written, “put the torch, once and forever, to the humanistic nostalgias and semantic utopias that lay at the very heart of the avant-garde groups.” Yet to make the demise of avant-garde utopias
the measure of subsequent practice in the USSR is to obscure our view of Soviet architecture’s complexity. Similarly, attempts to interpret Soviet architecture through the analytical concept of totalitarianism risk overstating architecture’s instrumentalization by party politics. My concern is not to restate the fate of avant-garde utopias in a state socialist regime but to reevaluate the dynamics of Soviet architecture in light of hitherto undocumented events and relationships. This reevaluation presents Soviet architects as participants in an international field of architectural ideas during Stalin’s “Great Patriotic War.”

The territorial and theoretical dislocations precipitated by World War II require an approach that is sensitive to new alliances and positions within Soviet architectural culture. Without this sensitivity we cannot appreciate the wartime relationship between the United States and the USSR. As allies in the conflict, the two countries sought both to defeat a common enemy and to imagine a common future. The two countries entered into a necessary, if opportunistic, alliance after Germany invaded the Soviet Union and Hitler declared war on the United States. In American-Soviet relations apprehension turned to appreciation as the United States supplied material aid to the USSR through the lend-lease program. Framed by this grand alliance, Soviet interest in American architecture acquired greater depth and intensity during the conflict. Political coalitions and programs of architectural research proceeded in concert.

Soviet architects and planners believed that the path of postwar modernization in the USSR would run parallel to that of the United States, and they attentively studied American developments. As American industry expanded to produce military supplies and equipment, government funds supported research and construction programs to house defense workers. Legislation such as the Lanham Act of 1940 allocated millions of dollars for residential construction. Prefabrication and new, nondeficit building materials promised to reduce construction costs and increase output. At sites around the country private enterprise and federal agencies collaborated on the rapid construction of defense housing. The degree of mass production achieved by the American building industry offered Soviet architects a productive model of architectural efficiency that could be adapted to large-scale planning and implementation.

In the period between the USSR’s entry into the war in 1941 and the onset of the ideological crackdown known as Zhdanovism in late 1946, Soviet architects reformulated the tasks of their discipline. Of crucial importance in this process was the emergence of the small, detached house as a problem of architectural design. This building type acquired double significance: it both
redirected architectural thinking from the monumentality characteristic of the 1930s to modest residential design, and it formed the basis for a productive dialogue with American architects on construction, planning, and building materials. Mass production—not of apartment buildings, but of small houses—became a primary issue in the USSR, and Soviet architects, engineers, and planners fused Americanism and progressive design into a persuasive wartime ideology. This ideology was not imposed from above by the Communist Party but emerged from a congruence of political and professional interests in American-Soviet friendship and wartime modernization.

Professionals recognized that the problems facing architects in each country—questions of prefabrication, settlement planning, and the mass production of building materials—were similar. In this convergence of architectural thought, the opposition between distinct political regimes was offset by a belief in a shared utopian project—what Susan Buck-Morss has described as “the utopian dream that industrial modernity could and would provide happiness for the masses.” But this open dialogue between American and Soviet architects collapsed as World War II ended and the Cold War began. An ideology of socialist specificity now eclipsed the internationalism of the Soviet architectural profession. Thus, by the end of the 1940s ideologues such as M.P. Tsapenko strained to differentiate Soviet and American practice, declaring “the superiority of Soviet architecture over the architectural poverty of the bourgeois world” to be “absolute and beyond question.”

By tracing the contours of one consequential hypothesis—namely, that American models of mass-produced housing possessed multivalent significance for Soviet architects during World War II—we can reevaluate the postwar relationship between the two countries. The story of this little-known wartime relationship between architects in the United States and the USSR complements the familiar Cold War narrative of antagonism between American and Soviet architectural cultures. Analyzing this wartime relationship reveals a second dimension to the Soviet campaign against American architecture of the late 1940s: these attacks were not only politically motivated affronts to a new international rival; they were also exercises in ideological reversal. Until we recognize the significance of the wartime ideology of cooperation between American and Soviet architects, we will fail to understand the content and urgency of the postwar ideology of antagonism.
For although Cold War cultural politics enforced mutual estrangement, Soviet architects ultimately dissolved relations with their American counterparts not because the two groups had little in common but because their concerns had become all too similar.

World War II did not arrest architects’ work; it reformulated architecture’s tasks. When German forces attacked the USSR, the Union of Soviet Architects issued an appeal to all its members, reminding them that “the success of the war is decided not only on the front, but also in the rear.” During the initial phase of the war architects inspected and built bunkers, initiated industrial camouflage campaigns, and repaired damaged buildings. Yet architects’ wartime responsibilities changed dramatically as the Soviet government relocated industrial operations from the western front to the eastern interior.

The Soviet Council on evacuation was formally established in June 1941. Designed as a strategy to keep enemy forces from capturing valuable industrial operations close to the front, the Soviet evacuation effort had tremendous architectural consequences. Moving equipment and workers from one region to another required the resettlement of enormous populations. One official in the People’s Commissariat of the Aviation Industry claimed that the evacuation of just one engine plant required the dismantling of some 3,000 to 5,000 units of equipment and the transportation of up to 50,000 workers and their families.

A significant consequence of the evacuation to the east was the reemergence of the small, detached house as a primary architectural theme. “The most important architectural problem of our time,” stated an editorial in Arkhitektura SSSR (Architecture of the USSR) “is the problem of low-rise residential construction.” Conditions in evacuated settlements required the use of locally available building materials such as plaster and adobe, while pressing needs for housing promoted the development of elementary prefabrication techniques. These and other factors made low-rise construction the most economical form of building in the East. Although the conflict gave new importance to this building type, it was by no means new to the Soviet Union. Some of the first projects for the Soviet city, such as Nikolai Markovnikov’s Sokol settlement in Moscow, were based on the principles of the garden city movement and were composed of detached houses. But while architects such as Leonid Vesnin, Mikhail Barsch, and Moisei Ginzburg had either built or promoted low-rise structures during the 1920s, the 1935
plan for the reconstruction of Moscow directed architects’ attention toward the architecture of the metropolis and away from the low-density periphery. Yet when Soviet architects revisited the problem of the detached house during World War II, they drew not upon the Russian garden city movement and the long tradition of “dacha” settlements but on American techniques of mass production.

In the relatively liberal cultural climate of the war, many Soviet architects coupled their interest in American developments with self-critical introspection. In order to understand where Soviet architecture was going, it was necessary to assess where it had been. Records of so-called creative discussions of contemporary architecture held at the Moscow House of the Architects document a remarkable conflation of professional self-criticism and Americanism during the war years. This conflation, which was supported by the politics of alliance with the United States, destabilized methods of architectural thought and opened a space to chart a new path for Soviet architecture.

In one of these “creative discussions” Karo Alabian combined a critical appraisal of Soviet architecture’s development since the 1920s with a clear call for the incorporation of American architectural advances into contemporary practice. Alabian had risen to prominence in the 1920s as a vociferous critic of Moscow’s avant-garde architectural groups. He secured influence within the Soviet architectural profession through intrigue and ruthless political maneuvering, ultimately becoming the secretary of the Union of Soviet Architects—a position that wielded considerable power. Until now little has been known about Alabian’s activities during World War II. Serving as the vice president of the Academy of Architecture and acting as the chairman of the architectural section of the All-Union Organization for Cultural Relations Abroad (VOKS), Alabian emerged as an ardent supporter of reform and internationalism within Soviet architecture during the war years.

At the “creative discussion” of August 10, 1943, Alabian criticized many aspects of Soviet architectural practice, but his chief concern was the debilitating political climate of the architectural profession at the outset of the 1930s. The most significant problem within the profession, he claimed, “was a sort of leveling [nivelirovka] of creative directions in Soviet architecture. . . . This leveling [nivelirovka] of all currents in architecture, in my opinion, did not further, but rather impeded our creative growth.” This “leveling” was the forced dissolution of independent architectural organizations in April 1932 and the subsequent creation of the Union of Soviet Architects as the sole organ of the profession. According to Alabian, the experimental nature
of wartime construction presented one possible way out of this professional cul-de-sac. “We must,” he continued, “broadly implement the achievements that we have in our experimental laboratories and the practical knowledge that is available in America, in particular in the field of wartime construction.” 25 Coming from the secretary of the Union of Soviet Architects, this proposal for architectural renewal through experimentation and appropriation of American techniques carried great weight.

Andrei Burov, one of the most articulate members of the Soviet architectural profession, further developed these ideas in his influential essay “On the Path to a New Russian Architecture” of 1943. In the 1920s Burov had been a star student at the revolutionary art school VKhUTEMAS. Thereafter he was briefly a member of the constructivist architectural organization OSA (the Union of Contemporary Architects). During the 1930s Burov participated in the reconstruction of Moscow through the construction of several apartment buildings, each of which synthesized new building technologies with historical form. 26 During World War II he demonstrated his abilities as a theorist and critic of architecture.

Burov’s wartime assessment of Soviet architectural practice remains unparalleled in its wit. Mocking what he considered the dominant method of architectural design among Soviet architects, Burov parodied the routine pictorialism of the creative process:

Take a piece of paper and, in this order, write down the following: 1) cheerfulness, 2) industriousness, 3) mastery of past heritage, 4) national form, 5) socialist content, 6) synthesis of the arts, etc. When you have drawn your design, lay the paper on a table and look it over. Then take a red pencil and see how you have done.

1. Cheerfulness? Check—the building is white. Make check mark.
2. Industriousness? Check—all 200 flats, all windows, stairs, and doors are exactly the same. Check mark.
3. Heritage? Check—there is a Renaissance cornice. Check mark.
4. National form? Check—there are Russian window surrounds (or Azerbijani if the building is in Baku). Check mark.
5. Socialist content? Check. For whom is the house intended? For our Soviet people, and thus we have an emblem. Check mark.
6. Synthesis? Check. The sculptures wear coats or shorts, depending on the climate. Check mark. 27

Architecture had become a hackneyed profession in the Soviet Union.
“Overburdened with historical deposits” that impeded the “will to the new,” the work of Soviet architects seemed out of joint with contemporary technology and creative experiment.28

Burov, like Alabian, proposed that American architecture held promising lessons for problems confronting Soviet practice. “In America new architectural ideas—freed from the nihilism of proselytes and arising from industry—have begun to show the first sprouts of new organic architectural forms.”29 Burov called for the implementation of American planning and construction practices in the USSR: “The surest and most progressive type of construction in the near future will be one- and two-story houses.”30 The American low-rise settlement was an antidote to the “colonies of amoebas” that Soviet high-rise buildings had produced. Yet, for the lessons of America’s “organic architectural forms” to have any effect, a fundamental reorientation of Soviet architectural training would have to take place. According to Burov, Soviet architects “constantly studied palaces and temples, and the ordinary apartment houses that they later built began to take on the forms of palaces and temples, leaving absolutely no artistic means of expression for palaces.”31 If architects were to proceed from the war on a “path to a new Russian architecture,” they would have to shift their working methods “from a conception of the unique to a conception of the mass.”32

At a plenary meeting of the Union of Soviet Architects in late 1943 Burov proposed that Soviet architects effect a revolution in housing not only by learning from American precedents but through the direct purchase of American technology. A top priority had to be “the acquisition from the USA of a series of factories for the production of prefabricated low-rise houses from ready-made components; a complex of factories that produces everything necessary—from the foundations to the door handles.”33 The type of technology transfer Burov proposed was not unprecedented. In the late 1920s the Soviet Union had effectively imported America’s industrial architecture by contracting Albert Kahn to construct a series of factories throughout the USSR.34 Burov had been a part of the Soviet commission that traveled to Detroit to broker the deal with Kahn, so he well understood the tactics of technology transfer that the Soviet government could exercise.35 Progressive architecture, he argued, could be bought.

The revisionist program supported by Alabian and Burov was not unique.
Many Soviet architects looked to American low-rise housing construction as a source of renewal, and innovations from the United States were widely publicized in the USSR. Alabian even edited a series of books about the “lessons of residential construction in the USA” for the Academy of Architecture’s publishing house. These handbooks detailed American construction, design, and planning for the Soviet professional audience. In the preface to Roman Khiger’s book Maloetazhnye doma v SShA (Low-Rise Houses in USA), Alabian noted that “American wartime construction and, in particular, residential construction, which developed into the industrial and semi-industrial erection of settlements of low-rise houses, has special significance for us.”

The interest of Soviet architects in the work of their American counterparts was genuine and was supported by new vectors of exchange between the two countries. American participation in the early phase of the war came in the form of generous lend-lease agreements that granted material aid to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Lend-lease brought American know-how as well as equipment, supplies, and raw materials to the UK and the USSR. The relationship between architects in America and in the Soviet Union was particularly strong. Supported by both governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the effort to aid Russian architects with American techniques for postwar reconstruction was approached with unprecedented optimism.

The Architects’ Committee of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF) was the most active architectural organization to promote collaboration between the United States and the USSR during the war years. The NCASF emerged from more radical American-Soviet friendship movements of the 1930s. After its establishment in 1942, the NCASF became the primary nongovernmental facilitator of American-Soviet cultural exchange. The organization initiated a broad range of programs designed to foster mutual understanding between the two countries. The promotion of architectural exchange was but one aspect of the NCASF’s work. After preliminary negotiations with the NCASF, the Architects’ Committee was formed early in the winter of 1943 in New York City. Harvey Wiley Corbett, the prominent New York architect, was named chair of the Architects’ Committee. By the end of 1944 the Committee had outlined its aims in a statement of purpose: first, to initiate an exchange of building and planning information between the two countries; second, to acquaint American architects and engineers with the requirements of the Soviet building
industry; third, to familiarize Soviet specialists with American building developments; and fourth, to create “understanding and friendship” between professionals in the USA and the USSR.41

The Committee’s first major achievement was the shipment of an exhibition of American building techniques to Moscow in late 1944. This show was an extract of the Museum of Modern Art’s (MoMA) exhibition U.S. Housing in War and Peace. Assembled on behalf of the Office of War Information, MoMA’s exhibition was intended to present American wartime construction to the Royal Institute of British Architects, but copies of the show ultimately were circulated elsewhere.42 Whereas Australia and South Africa received duplicates of the entire exhibition, the Soviet Union received only the portion of the show devoted to wartime building technologies, which had been organized by Vernon DeMars, a vice-chairman of the Architects’ Committee of the NCASF.43 The techniques presented to the Soviet audience ranged from onsite assembly, such as the precut packages offered by Sears-Roebuck, to Buckminster Fuller’s Dymaxion Deployment Unit and the innovative designs of the General Housing Corporation by Walter Gropius and Konrad Wachsmann.44

The exhibition opened under the title “Rapid Construction in the USA” in Moscow in March 1945 to a warm reception. As president of the Architectural Section of VOKS, Karo Alabian delivered a brief speech during the vernissage at the House of the Architects. Emphasizing the international scope of the problem of reconstruction, he noted that “it is natural that Soviet architects and builders have a lively interest in the valuable lessons of their American colleagues, whose achievements in this area undoubtedly have exerted a positive effect.”45 Photographs of the exhibition show groups of Soviet architects huddled intently around displays of mechanical systems and balloon frame construction. According to a report published in the VOKS Bulletin, “the exhibition attracted a great deal of attention and was viewed by several thousands of people.”46 The architect Nikolai Kolli wrote in the guest book that “this exhibition is of tremendous practical significance. It graphically demonstrates the possibilities that new types of construction and new materials offer the architect.”47 For David Arkin, the subject of the show was “of great importance,” and the exhibit as a whole was “another aspect of the friendly cooperation between America and the Soviet Union in the field of creative effort.”48 The exhibition and the responses it elicited demonstrate that in early 1945 Soviet and American professionals imagined a future of collaboration on the architectural front.
The NCASF sought to promote the spirit of collaboration on American soil as well. The American-Soviet Building Conference, held in May 1945 in New York City, was the largest event organized by the Architects’ Committee.

Assembling nearly two hundred and fifty American architects and some fifty Soviet participants, the conference was devoted to problems of building industry organization, prefabrication, industrial construction, and mechanical systems of the small house. Among the American participants were members of the Architects’ Committee such as Simon Breines, Serge Chermayeff, and Herman H. Field. The Soviet panelists were drawn not from the high-profile circle of individuals in Moscow but from the staff architects and engineers of the New York–based Soviet Purchasing Commission.

The session devoted to prefabrication techniques was the largest of the conference, and the statements made by Soviet panel members expressed official aims with candor. Responding to a question about Soviet interest in prefabricated houses, Mr. Dobrynin of the Soviet Purchasing Commission noted that although prefabrication in the USSR was still in its infancy he expected it to grow dramatically after the war’s end. Dobrynin claimed that the Soviet Purchasing Commission had explored the possibility of buying American technology outright: “We stated to the Government of the United States that we wish to purchase eighteen new combined prefabricated home plants, each of which will consist of a sawmill, woodworking plant, plywood plant and assembly plant. These plants must produce about one hundred thousand houses yearly.” Dobrynin was proposing a transfer of industry from the United States to Russia on a scale that would have matched the technical aid and know-how sent to the USSR at the outset of the first five-year plan, the Soviet Union’s drive for industrialization that began in the late 1920s. Although a purchase of this scale probably did not take place, the Soviet Purchasing Commission’s stated desire to import technology and equipment from the United States demonstrates that interest in American architectural achievements extended well into the upper echelons of Soviet bureaucracy.

Thus by mid-1945 the relationship between American and Soviet architectural professions had achieved an unprecedented degree of normalization. The exhibition of American architecture presented in Moscow and the American-Soviet building conference were only the most dramatic events in this relationship that bound professions in each country together. Such events manifested the potential opportunities for architecture in a political...
climate in which a common enemy united the United States and the USSR. After a few short but intense years of American-Soviet exchange and collaboration, professionals in each country could advance their similarities, allowing their differences to fade from view. For the first time Soviet and American architects seemed to be facing the same problems and were engaged in a common project.

But what were the tangible results of this American-Soviet friendship? Although this relationship had become productive, it was not a relationship of causality but of parallel interests. During the war Soviet architects adopted diverse approaches to low-rise construction, none of which can be traced directly back to American formal models. As early as October 1942 architects in Sverdlovsk and Nizhny Tagil had begun producing panels of laminated plaster for use in the housing industry. By February 1944, factories in the Urals had begun producing wooden panels and building details for modest, pitch-roof houses for Stalingrad’s reconstructed neighborhoods. While the provinces attempted to rationalize construction, Moscow architects drew on Russian national traditions. In the settlement of Kostino near Moscow, Boris Barkhin constructed more than eighty-five log houses, each fitted with carved wooden details reminiscent of traditional Russian applied art. Although these developments demonstrate the revival of interest in low-rise housing during the war, they hardly betray any American influence.

The most significant results of American-Soviet wartime cooperation were programmatic in nature. The Commission for Scientific-Technical Problems of Construction within the Academy of Architecture, organized in August 1944 by Karo Alabian, formalized Soviet research on American building technology. According to Alabian, this commission was created “to evaluate the level of our building technology in comparison with the level of building technology in the USA and to assemble proposals for the radical improvement of construction.” The Commission’s primary tasks, in the words of one participant, were to demonstrate that Soviet architects stood before “a radical revolution in the field of technology” and to present a plan for the
reorganization of the building industry to the Soviet government.\textsuperscript{56}

The commission submitted its recommendations to the Soviet government in a lengthy report in 1945.\textsuperscript{57} This report called for a general reorientation of the Soviet building industry toward the mass production of building materials and prefabricated elements. Recognizing that the Soviet building industry had admirably adapted to wartime conditions, the commission nevertheless maintained that most construction remained amateurish and crude. “The building industry of the USSR,” the commission found, “continues to this very moment to be a backward [otstaiushchii] branch of the national economy and is lagging far behind the mighty building industry of the USA.”\textsuperscript{58}

This was particularly apparent in the field of mass-produced housing. The commission proposed the construction of a network of woodworking plants and the establishment of a laboratory for experimental building technologies within the Academy of Architecture to correct the situation. According to Karo Alabian, the commission’s report was effective. “A special government commission,” he later wrote, “drew up the comprehensive decree on the five-year plan for the development of the building industry of the USSR based on this work.”\textsuperscript{59} Through the work of Alabian’s commission, therefore, the benchmarks of American production were inscribed within the Soviet planning apparatus. A mass of organizational data on the American house-building industry, not any particular architectural style or formal solution, was assimilated by Soviet architects and engineers and adapted to their own future requirements.

The construction program of the first postwar five-year plan (1946–1950) promised to expand Soviet wartime research through the creation of a new branch of industry for the mass production of prefabricated houses.\textsuperscript{60} Twenty new factories devoted to wooden construction and fourteen devoted to metal and ferro concrete construction were to be created on Russian territory alone. The journal \textit{Arkhitектура i строительство} (Architecture and Construction) projected that “each day fifteen houses, complete with built-in furniture, will come off the conveyor of each factory.”\textsuperscript{61}

Experimental prototypes for the prefabrication of small houses in the Soviet Union appeared as early as 1946.\textsuperscript{62} Under the guidance of the architect
F. Lazovskii, the woodworking complex at Karacharovo, an industrial district southeast of Moscow, developed a prototype for use in settlements and suburbs in Russia’s central regions.\(^6\) In 1947 a model residential district was erected in Bolshevo, a Moscow suburb, using Boris Barkhin’s TsV-1a series panel house, which was put into mass production by 1949.\(^6\) The most technologically sophisticated prototype was the AD5-1 series that the Academy of Architecture produced with furnishings and radiant heating.\(^6\) Thus, although the production figures projected by planners typically were hyperbolic, the Soviet building industry did heavily invest in the mass production of small, detached houses after the war.

By the late-1940s Soviet architects and engineers were no longer just calling for the mass production of small houses but were testing the limits of the Soviet building industry. In 1949 one commentator claimed that “with each year the growth of factory-produced housing [zavodskoe domostroenie] will contribute more and more to the betterment of living conditions for working people and will obtain an ever greater influence on the architectural appearance of districts, towns, and entire cities.”\(^6\) The prefabrication of small houses, which had formed the basis for wartime collaboration between the United States and the USSR, was poised to become a major feature of the national economy and a motor for the reconstruction of towns across the Soviet Union.

Although Soviet architects and engineers continued to develop models for the mass production of small houses into the late 1940s, the wartime conflation of Americanism and progressive design would be systematically dismantled before the end of the decade. When the United States and the USSR emerged from the war as international competitors, the professional relationships between Soviet and American architects came into conflict with the rising ideology of socialist isolationism. Politics and architecture slipped out of joint. Polarized by the cultural logic of the nascent Cold War, Soviet architects disputed the relevance of American models of mass housing and openly proclaimed the architectural poverty of the small house in the USA.

In an article published in mid-1949, the architect Pavel Blokhin claimed that “any contradiction between the tasks of architecture and the industrialization of residential construction is foreign to the new branch of socialist
industry—the Soviet prefabrication of houses [sovetskoe zavodskoe domostroenie]." This was a fundamental difference between Soviet and American methods:

In the United States of America, where prefabricated housing pursues primarily commercial aims, where industry and art are alienated from the interests of workers, the insurmountable break between the art of architecture and industrial house-building occurred long ago. This break becomes more profound with the full degeneration of American architecture, with the many formalist perversions that are peculiar to decadent bourgeois art.

Blokhin’s aim was to cast the project for mass-produced small houses as a distinctly Soviet endeavor. American precedents, which had dominated Soviet discussions of the housing question during and immediately after the war, were now systematically expelled from Soviet architectural discourse. Blokhin’s anti-Americanism reflected twin developments in Soviet politics and ideology after 1946: Zhdanovism and anticosmopolitanism. Zhdanovism refers to the ideological crackdown initiated by the Central Committee Secretary Andrei Zhdanov in late 1946. In a bid for power within the Communist Party, Zhdanov launched a campaign against wartime laxity in questions of ideology. Beginning in the field of literature with an August 1946 party decree on the journals Leningrad and Zvezda, Zhdanovism was a phenomenon that aimed to eradicate “ideologically harmful” elements from Soviet culture. This ideological realignment culminated in Zhdanov’s announcement of his “two camp” theory at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947. Responding to Winston Churchill’s March 1946 speech announcing the construction of an “Iron Curtain” and the offer of Marshal Plan funding for the reconstruction of Europe, Zhdanov proclaimed that the world was divided into imperialist and anti-imperialist camps. By early 1949 the ideology of anti-internationalism culminated in the so-called anticosmopolitanism campaign within Soviet politics and culture. Although Zhdanovism and anticosmopolitanism were distinct phenomena, they each
contributed to an atmosphere of ideological polarization and anti-Americanism in the USSR at the outset of the Cold War.\footnote{71}

When Zhdanov divided the world in two, Soviet architects were compelled to adjust to the new political circumstances. The ideological laxity that had permitted American-Soviet collaboration was gone, and the Soviet architectural profession would have to restate its aims in the language of the new political climate. A first response to Zhdanovism was to underline the importance of urban planning as the defining characteristic of socialist architecture. “One of the most important qualities which differentiates Soviet architecture from the architecture of the past and from the architecture of the contemporary West,” read an editorial in *Arkhitektura SSSR*, “is the leading role of the urbanist basis in all fields of architectural activity.”\footnote{72} This new emphasis on the superiority of Soviet urban planning led to the public criticism of the urban theories advanced by Frank Lloyd Wright, Eliel Saarinen, and José Luis Sert.\footnote{73} American urbanism was recast as the negative projection of Soviet practice.

The next phase of the anticosmopolitanism campaign culminated in what the American architectural critic Peter Blake has called the “Soviet Architecture Purge.” In late 1948 a campaign against the Academy of Architecture of the USSR was initiated because of the allegedly “pro-Western, pro-American and general cosmopolitan outlook of its leading members.”\footnote{74} Andrei Burov was among the first architects to be censured in 1948. Burov’s enthusiasm for America’s “new organic forms” had now become dangerous. In the pages of *Pravda*, the newspaper of the Communist Party, Aleksandr Vlasov, then the chief architect of Kiev, initiated a public campaign against “pro-Western” sentiments among members of the Academy of Architecture and vehemently criticized Burov’s pro-American position. Burov’s statements were, according to Vlasov, “a glaring expression of the antinational ideology of neoconstructivism, an example of the servile worship of the decadent art of architecture in America, a slander on Soviet art and on our building industry.”\footnote{75} In this abrupt reversal of ideological coordinates, nationalism replaced internationalism as a guiding principle of Soviet practice.

An article by G. Kris’ko published several months later in *Pravda* continued to attack the academy for fostering “pro-Western” sentiments. This time...
the architect and writer Roman Khiger was criticized for his publications about American housing and planning techniques during World War II. In 1947 the Academy of Architecture had accepted Khiger’s wartime research as a dissertation entitled “Lessons of Settlement Planning and Residential Construction in the USA.” Kris’ko claimed that Khiger’s work was essentially anti-Soviet in its “pro-Western” orientation: “Bowing before the bourgeois West, Khiger appears in his ‘works’ as a fierce propagandist of bourgeois constructivism.” Worst of all, the acceptance of Khiger’s dissertation was just a symptom of the fact that the academic council of the Academy of Architecture had become a haven for a “group of groveling cosmopolitans.”

The campaign against allegedly “pro-Western” sentiments had significant effects on Soviet architectural culture. Administrative positions within the Union of Soviet Architects were redistributed, and the academy’s leadership was reshuffled. But, as Elena Zubkova has pointed out, purges in the postwar era cannot be equated with the public violence of the Great Terror of 1937–38, when hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were summarily sentenced for political crimes. Repression in the late 1940s targeted the elite. In the field of architecture, only the most prominent members of the profession were accused of cosmopolitanism and of “bowing to the bourgeois West.” Others, who had expressed similar “pro-Western” sympathies, continued to work effectively within the profession.

In the late 1940s significant positions in the Soviet prefabrication industry were occupied by architects and engineers who had been committed to Americanism during the war but who nevertheless survived the “Soviet Architecture Purge” unscathed. Several of these figures assembled at a conference on the prefabrication of wooden houses, held in March 1949 at the Moscow House of the Architects. At this event P. Novozhilov, the director of the Central Administration for Standardized House-Building (Glavstandartdom), and Paul Ershov, the head engineer of Glavstandartdom, each discussed the rapid acceleration of the organization’s production capacity. Neither Novozhilov nor Ershov had been particularly influential in Soviet architectural discourse, but both had worked for the Soviet Purchasing Commission during World War II, and each had participated in the Soviet-American Building Conference organized by the NCASF in New York City. That Novozhilov and Ershov survived the anticosmopolitan outburst unscathed illustrates the uneven nature of the campaign. Perhaps these technical professionals were too valuable to lose to an ideological crackdown, or perhaps their relationship to American architecture was not considered significant. Either way, their leadership in the Soviet prefabrication industry after 1949 demonstrates continuities between the wartime enthusiasm for
American techniques and the postwar campaign for Soviet isolationism in the building industry.

Despite these lingering continuities, the anticosmopolitan campaign was an attempt to dismantle all professional relationships between American and Soviet architects. These relationships had to be symbolically purged in order to complete Soviet architecture’s realignment with the new political line of anti-imperialist nationalism. In this the campaign was largely successful: Khiger, Burov, Alabian, and the Academy of Architecture received public condemnation. To praise the achievements of American architecture—as even Soviet officials had done during the war—could now spell the end of a career. This had become a dangerous form of architectural treason.

Yet amid the barrage of scathing words directed at allegedly “pro-Western” architects, the basic topic of exchange between the United States and the USSR—the architecture of the small, mass-produced house—was never called into question. Soviet architects never rejected this building type on ideological grounds. On the contrary, they asserted the true, Soviet identity of the small, prefabricated house through another form of ideological reversal. Whereas Roman Khiger wrote in 1944 that “the bold experimentation, organization, and architectural merits,” of the mass-produced house in the United States made it “a worthy and able competitor to the skyscraper,” only five years later Pavel Blokhin would proclaim that “the prefabricated house is a material realization of deep Soviet humanism and an expression of the Stalinist concern for people.”83 Humanized and Stalinized, this building type emerged from the anticosmopolitanism campaign not as a lingering reminder of wartime enthusiasm for American construction but as a fully assimilated element of socialist industry.

By 1949, therefore, the Soviet architectural profession’s relationship to the American mass-produced small house had come full circle. During the war this building type was the basis for professional relationships between the United States and the USSR, but by end of the 1940s it had become a critical point of distinction. The atmosphere of collaboration supported by the American-Soviet wartime alliance evaporated with the rise of Zhdanovism and anticosmopolitanism. What remained were a series of programs—including the five-year plan for the development of the building industry—and designs for the mass production of small houses that had been developed
in dialogue with American precedents. The ensuing architectural purge censured the promoters of Americanism, but it did not fundamentally change the direction of the Soviet building industry. The Soviet small house survived the ideological crackdown of the late 1940s, but it did so in an ideologically transfigured form: it was now said to be the embodiment of a “deep Soviet humanism.” As the world was divided into two camps, a haze of denunciations and chauvinistic assertions obscured the American-Soviet relationship that had fostered the development of the Soviet prefabricated house. The veiling is understandable because in the cultural climate of the late 1940s, when promoting “pro-Western” positions was tantamount to treason, this ideological haze was the primary tool available to the Soviet architectural profession as it came to terms with the Communist Party’s new political agenda. Yet behind this veil endured a concern not that exposure to American concepts and techniques had stunted the growth of Soviet architecture but that this American-Soviet friendship had proved to be all too productive.
Notes
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All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

3. For a discussion of the Soviet reconstruction effort, see Alessandro De Magistris, “USSR, the Other Reconstruction,” Rassegna 15, no. 54 (1993): 76–83.
8. Throughout the 1930s Soviet architects successfully experimented with the prefabrication of apartment houses using large, precast concrete blocks. Apartment buildings made of large concrete panels became ubiquitous in the era of Khrushchev’s “thaw.” The mass-produced small house links these two moments in the extended history of prefabrication in the USSR.


19. These transcripts are held by the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI), Moscow.


24. Despite his openness to self-criticism, Alabian did not address his crucial role in escalating the political stakes of architectural practice in the late 1920s and early 1930s. For more on Alabian’s role in this process see Hudson, 118–146.


33. A. Burov, “Iz vystupleniia arkhitkektora A. Burova na XI plenum Pravleniia SSA SSSR, 16 Avgusta 1943 g.,” in Iz istorii sovetskoi arkhitkektury 1941–1945 gg, 88.


35. On Burov’s involvement with the Cheliabinsk commission, see A. Burov, “Arkhitkektura sovremennoi ameriki,” Brigada khudozshnikov 5–6 (1931): 43–44; and A. Burov, “Iz pisem iz
Ameriki 1930 g.” in Andrei Konstantinovich Burov: Pis’ma, dnevnik, besedy s aspirantami, suzhdения sovremennikov, ed. Olga Ivanovna Rzhekhina and R.G. Burova (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1980), 25–42.

36. This series included: R. Khiger, Maloetazhnye doma v SShA; V.N. Gornov, Konstruktii maloetazhnykh domov v SShA; and R. Khiger, Planirovka poselkov v SShA. All books in the series were published in Moscow in 1944 by the Academy of Architecture.


42. “U.S. Housing in War and Peace,” in II. 1/7 1(8), Department of Circulating Exhibitions Records, Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York.


46. “Exhibition of Prefabricated Houses in the United States,” 76.

47. “Exhibition of Prefabricated Houses in the United States,” 76.


50. Cooper, 84.


54. See Iu. Shass, Arkhitektura zhilogo doma: Poselkovoe stroitel’stvo 1918–1948 godov
102

(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1951), 42–44; and
56. “Stenogramma zasedaniia Komissii po nauchno-tekhnicheskim problemam stroitel’stva
57. See K.S. Alabian, N.P. Bylinkin, A.V. Gorikov, A.A. Podlipskii, and I.V. Pevzner,
58. Alabian et al., L. 23.
62. See B.N. Vikhanski, “Opyt naia sborka zhilogo doma zavodskogo izgotovleniia,”
Arkhitектуra i stroitel’stvo 1, no. 5 (1946): 15–16; and A.S. Gintsberg, “Sbornoe zavodskoe
domostroenie v Leningrade,” Arkhitектуra i stroitel’stvo 1, no. 9 (1946): 11–14.
63. Shass, 63. In 1948 alone, the Karacharovo factory produced 1,650 such houses.
64. B. Barkhin, “Sbornyi dom tipa TsV-1a,” Arkhitектуra i stroitel’stvo 3, no. 9 (1948): 12–13;
and “Za daľ’neishii pod’em zavodskogo domostroeniia,” Arkhitектуra i stroitel’stvo 4, no. 3
65. S. Petrov, “Za vysokej standart derevianogo maloetazhnogo zavodskogo izgotovleniia,”
67. P.N. Blokhin, “Arkhitектуra zhilykh domov zavodskogo izgotovleniia,” Arkhitектура i
stroitel’stvo 4, no. 5 (1949): 11.
68. Blokhin, 11.
69. See Andrei Zhdanov, O mezhdunarodnom polozhenii: Doklad, sdelannoi na informatsiionnom soveshchaniia predstavitelii nekotorykh kompartii v Pol’she v kontse sentiabria 1947 g. (Moscow: OGIZ, 1947).
70. On Zhdanovism and anticosmopolitanism, see Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet
Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1982).
71. It should be noted that the anticosmopolitanism campaign had a veiled anti-Semitic
character. See Konstantin Azadovskii and Boris Egorov, “From Anti-Westernism to Anti-
Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of the ‘Anti-Cosmopolitan’ Campaigns on Soviet Culture,”
72. “Gradostroiteln‘naia osnova sovetskoi arkhitetectury,” Arkhitектура SSSR, Vypusk 15
(1947): 1. See also N. Bylinkin, “Gradostroiteln‘nye utopiia zapadnykh arkhitectorov,” Arkhitектура i
stroitel’stvo 2, no. 1 (1947): 14–16.
73. The following books were criticized for their “utopian” content in the Soviet press:
Frank Lloyd Wright, The Disappearing City (New York: W.F. Payson, 1932); Eliel Saarinen,
The City, Its Growth, Its Decay, Its Future (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1943);
and José Luis Sert, Can Our Cities Survive? An ABC of Urban Problems, Their Analysis, Their
75. Aleksandr Vlasov, “Naruzhnie voprosy sovetskoj zodchestva,” Pravda, 28 September
1948, 2.


79. Kris’ko, 3.


82. See Cooper.