Intergovernmentalists in the Commision: Foxes in the Henhouse?

Renaud Dehousse and Andrew Thompson

Abstract

Contrary to the dominant view in the scholarly literature on European institutions, where the European Commission is generally described as a unitary actor whose acts are primarily influenced by a political agenda and/or considerations of self-interest, this article argues that a variety of opinions coexist within the Commission staff. Based on the largest attitudinal survey ever conducted on Commission officials, it documents the existence of a sizeable minority of intergovernmentalists and analyzes their attitude towards the institution they serve and their views on its place in the integration process.

Keywords

Commission, Community method, supranationalism, intergovernmentalism

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If the presence of forces hostile to integration in the European Parliament or occasionally in the Council of ministers is not a new phenomenon, as documented in other contributions to this special issue, studies of the Commission to date have not brought to the fore a similar phenomenon at that level. In the scholarly literature on European institutions, the European Commission is generally viewed as an actor whose acts are primarily influenced by a vision of the integration process or by considerations of self-interest. Even when its powers are limited, it is said to act as a ‘purposeful opportunist’ in order to expand its influence (Cram, 1993); it has also been accused of resorting to tactics of policy-making by subterfuge (Héritier, 1997) or even of seeking forms of integration by stealth, desired neither by the member states of the Union nor by its citizens (Majone, 2005). To some extent at least, this can be viewed as a by-product of the original role assigned to that institution, which differs in several important respects from that of the secretariats of more classical international organizations. As every student of European integration knows, the Commission has been endowed with discretionary powers in the field of policy-making and of policy enforcement. The treaty invites it to act independently from external pressures; so does its official institutional ideology, the ‘Community method’ (CM), designed by the founders of the EU (Dehousse, 2011) and to which the Commission leadership systematically pays lip service (Barroso, 2011).

Given its institutional brief, it would seem natural to expect the Commission to behave in a unitary fashion in order to serve the ‘general interest’, as required by the European Union (EU) Treaty. Neo-functionalists expected it to push steadily in favour of more integration, like its forerunner the ECSC High Authority (Haas, 1958). Indeed, it has regularly done so, albeit with variable success (see e.g. Drake, 2000). In an earlier study, based on the largest attitudinal survey ever conducted on Commission officials, we have documented the existence amongst its officials of widespread adhesion to a classic view of the Commission’s role, despite the adverse conditions to which it has been exposed since the Maastricht Treaty: Over 60 per cent of respondents were found to support the idea that the Community method remains the best operating code in today’s Union (Dehousse and Thompson, 2012). However, it has also been shown that a variety of ‘images of Europe’ coexist within the Commission
(Hooghe, 2010). Of course, unlike the Parliament or the Council of ministers, it is not a representative body; even nationality concerns can play a role in the selection of its officials. The former being mostly recruited through a competitive selection process (concours), one would be surprised to discover widespread Euroscepticism, i.e. outright hostility to European integration, amongst them. Yet, in the course of the above-mentioned study, we were surprised to find out that a sizeable number of officials appear to adhere to an alternative view of integration, in which the Member states, rather than the Commission are supposed to be the key players in the EU policy process. The presence within the Commission of intergovernmentalists (IG), whose views appear to be in direct contrast with the ‘official’ creed of the institution, and with the dominant understanding of its role, is per se an interesting, counter-intuitive, phenomenon. In this article, we intend to offer a closer analysis of this group of Commission officials. Our goal is twofold: first we want to understand who these intergovernmentalists are and what are the elements that influence the worldview they defend (section 2); second, we will try to explore in further detail the views they may have on the operation of the Commission, on its past and on its future (Section 3). We will also discuss the meaning of their presence in the Commission, in a period characterized by an overall growth of intergovernmentalism in the Union. Are they to be regarded as potential agents of the national governments in the EU executive – foxes in the henhouse? Before doing so, however, we will offer a rapid description of the EUCIQ survey, on which our analysis rests (section 1).

The EUCIQ Survey

The European Commission in Question (EUCIQ) project aimed to develop new knowledge of an organisation that has undergone considerable administrative and compositional changes over the last few years, subsequent to major reforms of administrative management (the Kinnock reforms) and recruitment procedures, and to the 2004 enlargement. The project entailed an analysis of its composition, structures and organization, compared with developments in public administrations elsewhere.

The study included a set of approaches that are relatively distinctive in the study of the European Union. Firstly, the primary interest was in the Commission as a whole, rather than a specific focus on one or two aspects of the organisation. Although this did not rule out
specific analyses on particular topics, it allowed for a more holistic understanding of the
organisation from the perspective of those who work in it. Secondly, the disciplinary
perspective was primarily based on the theories and literature of public administration, rather
than the hitherto-fore focus of many researchers on the role or influence of the Commission as
a political actor. Thirdly, the Commission was looked at in a comparative perspective with
national bureaucracies, rather than assuming it is unique and of its own making, whilst
allowing for certain distinctive attributes, such as its role as policy-maker. Fourthly, one of
the project’s main features was the attention paid to the people who work in the organisation
in a policy-related role. Finally, the project led to the production of a set of primary datasets,
which allowed analysis of data that have been created to meet the specific objectives of this
research, rather than having undue reliance on secondary data created for a different purpose.

Given the aim asking identical questions to a range of officials within the Commission, both
to a representative cross-section of the whole organisation and to specific elite sub-groups, for
the purposes of generalisation and explanation, surveys were the appropriate research
strategy. In order to sample officials across the whole of the Commission, in Brussels and
Luxembourg, an on-line, self-completion questionnaire was used. This enabled enhancement
of the reach of the survey and minimised the potential errors of data input and coding, whilst
offering a convenient and relatively simple format to encourage a high response rate. Given
the highly educated workforce use ICT in their everyday activities to communicate, the choice
of this medium did not appear susceptible to deterring potential respondents from
participating. In addition to the advantages listed above, this mode of delivery could be
facilitated by the Commission through its internal email address list, thus (almost)
guaranteeing a precise contact point for each survey respondent.

The work in designing the questionnaire was carried out by the research team, based on
previous surveys of the Commission and other administrations. The questionnaire included
sections on respondents’ socio-demographic features, their educational and career
backgrounds, their attitudes (including political philosophy), and their perceptions of their
roles with the Commission. It also contained questions relating to their views on the internal
operations of the organisation; the roles and relationships between Cabinets, the Secretary
General and the Directorates General; the effects of enlargement from 15 to 27 member
states; and the impact of the Kinnock reforms on the efficiency, effectiveness, staff morale
and general working of the organisation, as well as on their broader views on the
Commission’s role in EU policy-making. These questions form the backbone of the analysis presented in the remainder of this article.

A decision was made to benefit from the expertise of a commercial internet survey company, YouGov, whose clients are typically in the public sector. This expertise lay in their experience of designing on-line surveys and questionnaires, including both the form of the measurement instrument and the control parameters of its implementation in the field. The on-line survey was launched in September 2008 and was open for a period of two months.

Table 1 shows the population, target sample and achieved sample for the on-line survey of all Commission officials in the policy-related AD staff in 39 Directorates General, plus members of the Cabinets. It is interesting to note that approximately 40 per cent of each group responded, apart from the Cabinet members, for whom the response rate was just over a quarter.

Table 1  Population and sample sizes for the on-line survey of Commission officials in Brussels and Luxembourg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Group</th>
<th>Population Size</th>
<th>Target Sample Size</th>
<th>Achieved Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet members</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Managers (DG/DDG/Directors)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisers / Assistants to Directors General</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Managers (HoU)</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Administrators / Administrators</td>
<td>12964</td>
<td>2855</td>
<td>1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others / not declared</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,730</td>
<td>4621</td>
<td>1901</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Approximate percentages, excluding ‘others/not declared’

The EUCIQ survey has shown that there is still wide support within the Commission for a vision of the EU in which it is supposed to be playing a key role, without being hindered too much by national governments or the EP. Amongst the respondents there was strong (79 per cent) opposition to the idea that the member states’ grip over decision-making should be tolerated and, notwithstanding the widespread supremacy of the parliamentary democracy
model in Europe, a sizable majority (57.8 per cent) was of the opinion that the European Parliament should not be given a right of legislative initiative. When it comes to the Commission’s own place in the EU system, the classical view still held firmly. While just over half accepted that policy management and coordination occupy a growing place in the institution’s task, an overwhelming majority (79.8 per cent, with over 40 per cent holding the view strongly) declared themselves opposed to the idea that it should primarily focus on managerial duties. Nearly two thirds were even convinced that the Commission’s role as policy initiator is gaining more importance as a result of enlargement.

Altogether, these responses might be read as a confirmation of wide support for the old Community method, in which the Commission has to pull the ropes of EU policy-making by bridging the gap between the rival interests of national governments and the viewpoints of the Council and the Parliament. However, as indicated above, the survey has also revealed the existence within the Commission staff of views that appear to be in direct contrast with the majority standpoint.

Who are the Commission Intergovernmentalists?

Asked who should be the central players in the EU, a number of respondents to the online survey indicated this leadership role belonged to the member states, rather than to the Commission or the European Parliament. This provides a subset of 152 officials (8.2 per cent) of the total (weighted) sample of 1846, which we label Commission intergovernmentalists.

Who are these people and what are the variables that may affect their attitude? Earlier work has shown that officials’ views on EU governance are generally influenced by their nationality (Hooghe, 2001). Indeed, this appears to be confirmed by our data, which shows there are significant variations from one nationality to the other. Support for the intergovernmentalist view is more than twice higher than average among Irish (20 per cent), British, Latvians and Slovaks (about 23 per cent each). Within the intergovernmentalist group, the British contingent is by far the largest: on their own, British officials account for almost one fifth (19.3 per cent) of the that group, whereas they represent only about 5 per cent of the total number of Commission officials.
Some clichés find confirmation in our data: British, Danes and Swedes appear more concerned about states’ rights than, say, Italians, Greeks and Belgians. Making sense of these differences is difficult. Size does not appear to be a decisive factor: there are large and small states among the countries whose officials appear most ‘state minded’, as well as among supporters of the Community method. Given the weakness of support for the intergovernmentalist view amongst Belgians, Dutch, or (to a lesser degree) Germans, it would be far-fetched to speak of a North-South cleavage. Likewise, it cannot be argued that the length of membership in the Union is a decisive factor: Figure 2 shows that successive enlargements have had an impact in addition to the first one. Whereas officials from first enlargement countries are more likely to show a receptiveness to the intergovernmentalist view, the same is not true for their colleagues in Central and Eastern European countries. Indeed, contrary to widespread expectations, there is little difference between officials from EU 15 countries and their colleagues from EU 12 countries in that respect.

The importance of nationality factors is highlighted by the relative weak explanatory contribution of other variables. Thus, one might have thought that officials’ functions in the Commission influence their views on the issue at hand. Yet this does not find a confirmation in our data. True, there are differences between directorate-generals (DG). As shown in Figure 3., there are six DGs significantly below the overall mean: support for intergovernmentalism appears three times stronger in the European anti-fraud office (OLAF) than in the MARKT directorate-general (internal market and services). In general terms, intergovernmentalism appears weak in areas where the EU is endowed with clearly
established powers of its own, such as competition or trade policies. Yet when one tries to group directorate-generals by types of activity that dominate their area (legislative, spending or regulatory; internal or external), the differences appear insignificant. Policies may structure politics, as Lowi (1972) has argued, but they do not appear to exert a decisive influence on the policy views nurtured by Commission officials, though caution is required here due to the small sample sizes within each DG.

--Figure 3 about here--

Similarly, while seniority shows some interesting variation, the differences are not significant, either from the overall mean or from each other, as seen in Figure 4. Length of service shows no relationship either.

-- figure 4 about here --

In order to identify the possible confounding effect of age on seniority and length of service, we have analysed the age cohorts in relation to the level of support of intergovernmentalism (Figure 5). There is indeed a weak relationship, such that the youngest are least likely to be IGs and significantly less likely than the 46-55 age-group⁴. However, the various age groups do not differ significantly from the overall mean, and age provides less than 5 per cent explanation ⁵.

-- Fig 5 about here --

In line with Liesbet Hooghe’s 2001 findings, we expected those who have worked in a national administration prior to joining the EU bureaucracy to find it more difficult to support a system characterised by a clear transfer of authority to the supranational level. This found a confirmation, although not a particularly strong one, in our data. The mean proportions are 11.0 per cent for intergovernmentalism among officials with a prior experience in the national public service and and 6.4 per cent for the others, a difference of nearly 5 per cent (95%CI: 1.8 to 7.3 per cent)⁶.
Finally, turning to the weight of ideas, we tried to map officials’ philosophical beliefs by asking them to posit themselves on a 0 to 10 scale along two axes: economic philosophy (government v. market) and social-cultural philosophy (liberal v. conservative). As shown in Figure 6 and 7, intergovermentalists are slightly more to the right (5.73) than the non-IG group (5.46), and the same is true for socio-cultural beliefs (3.87 for IGs, 3.64 for non IGs). This echoes our earlier findings, which had shown supporters of the Community method to be slightly more pro-government and more libertarian than other officials (Dehousse and Thompson, 2012). In both cases, however, the difference is not significant.

--Fig 6 and 7 about here --

Whereas, on the whole, the impact of the left-right cleavage does not appear to be decisive, ideological concerns of another kind seems to have greater explanatory power. One of the questions in the EUCIQ survey related to the motivations that have led respondents to undertake a career in the European Commission. Whilst amongst the intergovernmentalists 53 per cent made reference to a commitment to Europe as a major motivation, the percentage climbed to 73 for the non-IG group.

By building these various possible explanations of support for intergovernmentalism into a multivariate analysis using binary logistic multi-level modelling of individuals nested within countries, we are able to identify the key variables. In a previous analysis we used the country-level predictor variables of multi-level governance and protestantism (proportion of the population), which were found to be correlated with support for the Community Method amongst Commission officials (Dehousse and Thompson, 2012). In the present case, the analysis shows that there is no discernible remaining variation between the countries. This allows use of a binary logistic regression formulation instead, in which variables have been included in a hierarchical process of the individuals’ variables first, followed by the country variables. This approach reveals the relative contribution of each level of variables to the explanation of the dependent variable (intergovernmentalism), as shown in the changes from model 1 to model 2 in Table 2.

At the individual level, which offers about two-thirds of the explanation, the strongest predictor is commitment to Europe as a reason for joining the Commission, which reduces the odds of being an IG member by 57 per cent, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, prior working in a national administration increases the odds of being an IG member by 67
per cent, although exhibiting low precision. At the country level, the proportion of protestants provides the strongest (if imprecise) prediction, increasing the odds of being an IG member by almost two per cent amongst Commission officials for each percent increase in the national proportion, followed by the score on the index of multilevel governance, where for each scale point increase in the multi-level governance index, the odds of being an IG member decrease by 2 per cent.
### Table 2  Personal and national characteristics supporting intergovernmentalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to Europe (ref cat: no)</td>
<td>-0.926</td>
<td>30.43***</td>
<td>0.396 (0.285:0.551)</td>
<td>-0.842</td>
<td>24.177***</td>
<td>0.431 (0.308:0.603)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous career in national civil service (ref cat: no)</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>14.13***</td>
<td>1.876 (1.351:2.604)</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>9.134**</td>
<td>1.674 (1.199:2.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism (proportion)</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>15.444***</td>
<td>2.950 (1.720:5.059)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of multi-level governance</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>4.503*</td>
<td>0.980 (0.961:0.998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in -2LL</td>
<td>43.79***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64.82***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosmer and Lemeshow test (sig)</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$ (unweighted)</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

### 3. Integovernmentalist Views on Integration

Adopting a different perspective, we then attempted to identify to what extent a self-definition as an intergovernmentalist affects the views of the officials in question. Do members of our IG group hold different views from other officials on the evolution of the
Union? What is their assessment of the impact of enlargement, or that of the Kinnock reforms, on the functioning of the Commission? Secondly, what preferences do they have as regards the future of the EU? What is, according to them, the most desirable distribution of authority between the EU and its member states or between the institutions? In answering these and related questions, we now consider support for intergovernmentalism as the independent variable to see how well it explains differences in attitude or belief.

A) Power Change in the Union

From the outset, clear differences appear in the two groups’ vision of the evolution of the Union. Whereas almost three quarters of the non-IG group (74.8 per cent) disagree strongly or tend to disagree with the idea that the Commission is stronger today than ever before, the same percentage goes down to 55.5 for intergovernmentalists. As can be seen in Figure 8, those who see the Commission as having gained strength are twice as many in the latter group (15.3 per cent) as in the former (7.6 per cent). On the whole, the Commission appears stronger (or at least less weak) in the eyes of IGs.

-- FIG 8 ABOUT HERE --

Asked to whom the Commission might have lost power, the two groups diverge again. Whereas almost two thirds of the non-IGs believe it has lost ground to the national capitals, this view is supported by 47.3 percent of intergovernmentalists only (Figure 9). In contrast, there is no major difference as regards the European Parliament, which is viewed by both groups as having gained political clout.

- FIG 9 ABOUT HERE –

What are the elements which are deemed to be linked to this evolution? We explored three types of factors which might have affected the Commission’s position in the EU institutional setting: enlargement, which has long been expected to complicate relations with
the Council as well as the internal organization of the Commission; administrative reform, often described as imposed on the institution, and changes in the Commission leadership.

The EUCIQ survey has found that enlargement is regarded as a disruptive element by a majority of officials: about three quarters of the respondents agree that a 27 member college makes coordination more difficult. There was no major disagreement between the supporters of the Community method and intergovernmentalists (73 per cent in agreement) on this assessment. Likewise, over 60 per cent of our total sample held that enlargement weakened the esprit de corps within the Commission, or that its consequences on officials’ career development were not handled equitably. Once again, the IG group are barely different over this issue, with 58 per cent of this opinion.

Concerning administrative reform, our respondents are fairly critical of what has been achieved. While they are fairly uncertain as regards the impact of recent reforms, only minorities appear convinced that they (23.3 per cent) or their unit (29.2 per cent) have become more efficient. Negative assessments tend to dominate: personnel management has not improved (49.7 per cent); resources are not better matched to policy priorities (48.0 per cent); almost two thirds of our respondents consider that the new tools have been applied in a formalistic way and over 70 per cent that they have led to more red tape. There is only one point, the situation of women, where there is a clear majority (58.2 per cent) who believe that the situation has been improved. But there are no major differences between IGs and non-IGs in relation to those issues. In other words, their assessment of the Commission’s loss of authority does not seem to have been prompted by their view of the recent administrative reforms.

Finally, we analyzed respondents’ appraisal of the performance of various presidents and we observe clear differences of opinion at this level. The Santer and Prodi Commission came in for the most criticism, arguing that they were weak in relation to setting policy agendas, managing the “house” effectively and defending the Commission in the EU system. While there was no major difference between our two groups, the situation is different as regards the Barroso I Commission: 45 per cent of the non-IG group (47 per cent for supporters of the Community method) were of the opinion that it was fairly or very weak in defending the Commission in the EU system, an assessment that was shared by fewer than 30 per cent of intergovernmentalists (Figure 10). In contrast, both groups concur on a more
balanced assessment of its ability to effectively manage the Commission or to set the Union’s political agenda.

Interestingly, while there is an overwhelming positive assessment of the Delors Commission, the IG group are less sanguine about this Commission defending the Commission in Europe (10 per cent) than the non-IG group (2 percent)\textsuperscript{14}.

\textit{B) Views about the Future}

Intergovernmentalism being one vision of how the EU system should operate, it would make sense to expect its supporters to hold distinct views as to how European governance should evolve in the future. However, reality appears to be somewhat more complex. First, contrary to what one might think, our intergovernmentalists are not adverse to the idea of further transfers of powers to the EU level. Asked to locate their desired distribution of authority on a ten point scale between the member states (0) and the Union (10), they appear to agree with non-IGs on the hierarchy of priorities, with competition, trade, agriculture and the environment appearing as EU competences \textit{par excellence}. More surprisingly, they indicate that they would welcome further transfers of authority to the European level in several areas (with the notable exception of agriculture where, like an overwhelming majority of Commission officials, they would favour a degree of decentralization). As can be seen in Figure 11, they would even be prepared to accept a stronger European role in areas traditionally regarded as key aspects of state sovereignty such as social policy or foreign and security policy. It is worthy of note that in every single policy area, the support for Europeanization is significantly lower among IGs than among other officials.\textsuperscript{15} However, when considering the difference between actual and desired authority, there are no discernible gaps in relation to competition or trade. The maximum differences are of 1.24 scale points for foreign and security policies,\textsuperscript{16} 1.22 points for social policy\textsuperscript{17} and 1.13 points for police and judicial cooperation\textsuperscript{18}.
Intergovernmentalists also have a distinct view on EU governance. Unlike other officials, who are fairly divided on this issue, they are resolutely opposed to the idea that the Commission should one day become the government of Europe: as shown in Figure 12, 76.1 per cent of them declare to be opposed to this evolution (against 39.4 percent in the non-IG group).

However, there is a weak adherence to a vision of the Commission as mere faithful servants of national interests: 60.3 per cent of IG respondents reject the idea of having one commissioner per member state (against 67 per cent in the non-IG group) and an overwhelming majority (86 per cent) holds the view that services should support the politically-agreed positions of the college. Regarding state-based considerations, there is not a significant difference between the groups over the need to distribute posts on a geographical basis, albeit IGs showing more support for the idea, with 42.8 per cent of IGs agreeing, against 34.9 per cent of the others. Managing dossiers of special interest to an official’s country does show more concern from IGs, with 42.3 per cent feeling it is problematic against 32.4 per cent of the others, although it is marginally insignificant.

Finally, their support for states’ leadership does not lead Commission intergovernmentalists into a view of a reduced importance of the Commission. Some 60 per cent of them (59.5 per cent of IGs, against 65.7 for the non-IG group) are of the opinion that enlargement has increased the importance of the Commission’s role in policy initiation. Nor are they more opposed than other Commission officials to the idea of sharing legislative initiative with the European Parliament. Figure 13 shows that there is only a marginal difference between our two groups on this issue, with more difference being displayed within each group. On the whole, opposition prevails, which can probably be attributed to the central importance attached to the Commission’s right of initiative in the dominant discourse on EU policy-making.
Conclusion: Foxes in the Henhouse?

Our survey has brought to the fore the existence within the European Commission of a sizeable group of officials whose views are closer to a standard intergovernmentalist view on integration than to the official, pro-Community method, discourse of the institution. Like all intergovernmentalists, those officials are eager to preserve states’ leadership and powers in the Union and they appear reluctant to see the Commission’s role further enhanced (though not necessarily to a stronger Union presence in several areas). They can be found in nearly every directorate-general, at all levels of the hierarchy, and the coherence of the views they defend makes it unlikely that our cluster is a mere statistical artefact. This finding, like those of other contributions to this special issue, warns us against the dangers of monolithic readings of institutions’ preferences. Almost unavoidably, alternative worldviews and political preferences can be expected to co-exist in large organizations such as the Commission.

At a broader political level, what is the meaning of the presence, within an institution that was long regarded as the ‘engine of integration’, of a group committed to preserve states’ rights and influence, in a period characterized by a relative weakness of the Commission and a strong assertiveness on the side of national capitals (Puetter, 2011)?

Two considerations seem to be in order here. First, given the absence of points of comparison, it is impossible to document whether, and to what extent, support for intergovernmentalism has evolved with the decline of the Commission in the post-Maastricht years. However, our data on enlargement strongly suggest it is not a novel feature: as shown in Figure 3, as far as intergovernmentalism is concerned, the most relevant enlargement was that to the British Isles and Denmark in 1973. Said otherwise, there is no evidence of a significant growth in the number of intergovernmentalists in the Commission.

Secondly, in many respects, the group of officials covered by our survey is remarkable in its hybrid character. Its members tend to be less critical of the situation of the Commission and less severe with the current leadership than supporters of the Community method, possibly because the current situation is closer to their ideal. At the same time, their concern for member states’ rights notwithstanding, Commission intergovernmentalists’ views appear informed by their activity within a supranational institution. They are concerned about their institution’s autonomy with respect to national capitals and willing to contemplate further
transfers of authority to the EU, even across ‘red lines’ drawn by some governments in areas like social policy or security policy. Thus, to the extent that they may be regarded as foxes in the henhouse, it is far from sure that they will get along well with other foxes in national capitals.
Figures

Figure 1. Nationality of intergovernmentalists

NB n=1822, with n≥18 for each nationality (except Luxembourg, n=6). The vertical bars represent the mean value by nationality and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. The lighter coloured bars at the lower end highlight which nationalities have support profiles that differ significantly below that of the overall mean, while the darker bar at the upper end reflects the nationality above the overall mean. The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence interval either side.
Figure 2. Impact of successive enlargements

NB n=1824. The vertical bars represent the mean value by date of accession and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. The lighter coloured bar highlights which accession wave has a support profiles that differs significantly below that of the overall mean, while the darker bar reflects the accession wave with a support profile above the overall mean. The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence interval either side.
NB: n=1654, excluding n<12 for any DG. The vertical bars represent the mean value by DG and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. The lighter coloured bars at the lower end highlights the DG which have support profiles that are significantly lower than that of the overall mean. The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence interval either side.
Figure 4. Intergovernmentalism and Seniority

NB n=1846. The vertical bars represent the mean value by level of seniority and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence interval either side.
Figure 5. Intergovernmentalism and Age

NB  n=1810. The vertical bars represent the mean value by age-group and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence interval either side.
Figure 6. Intergovernmentalism and Economic Policy

NB n=1784. The vertical bars represent the percentage at each scale point from 0 (a greater role for government) to 10 (a greater role for markets) and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 7. Intergovernmentalism and Socio-cultural Beliefs

NB  n=1785. The vertical bars represent the percentage at each scale point from 0 (more liberal) to 10 (more conservative) and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 8. Has the Commission Gained Strength?

The Commission is more powerful today than ever before

- Disagree
- Neutral
- Agree

n = 1519
Figure 9. Has the Commission lost power to national capitals?

n= 1524
Figure 10. The Performance of the Barroso Commission in Defending the Commission

n=1498
Figure 11. Desired Changes in the allocation of Authority

Mean difference: desired - actual

-0.76 0.57 0.36 0.51 1.95 1.62 1.69 2.62 3.07 2.73 3.75

Error bars: 95% CI

1574 ≤ n ≤ 1624
Figure 12. Support for the Commission as Government of the EU

Member states should be central players in EU
- Agree
- Do not agree

College as government of EU

Error bars: 95% CI

n=1718
Figure 13. Need to share legislative initiative with the European Parliament

Member states should be central players in EU

Agree
Do not agree

Commission to share legislative initiative with EU Parliament

n=1752
References


Héritier, Adrienne (1997) 'Policy-making by subterfuge: interest accommodation, innovation and substitute democratic legitimation in Europe - perspectives from distinctive policy areas', Journal of European Public Policy, 4: 2, 171 — 189


Endnotes

1 This presentation draws on data collected as part of “The European Commission in Question”, funded by the ESRC (grant no. RES-062-23-1188) and conducted by Michael Bauer, Sara Connolly, Renaud Dehousse, Liesbet Hooghe, Hussein Kassim, John Peterson, and Andrew Thompson. For further information, visit http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ.

2 In addition to the present authors, the research team included Hussein Kassim (Norwich), John Peterson (Edinburgh), Michael Bauer (Berlin), Sara Connolly (Norwich) and Liesbet Hooghe (Chapel Hill and Amsterdam). See Kassim et al. (2012) for an overview of the project’s findings.

3 The data were weighted to reflect the true population proportions within the Commission, based on seniority, gender, age/length of service, nationality, EU15/EU12 countries and DGs, using iterative proportional fitting. p<0.007.

4 Spearman’s rho=+0.073.

5 p<0.001; phi=0.08

6 p<0.001; phi=0.118

7 p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.124

8 p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.127

9 p=0.484

10 p=0.226

11 p=0.217

12 p<0.004; Cramer’s V = 0.086

13 p=0.006; Cramer’s V = 0.006

14 p<0.001 for every area, except environmental policy (p<0.01).

15 95% CI: 0.73 : 1.74.

16 95% CI: 0.81 : 1.62.

17 95% CI: 0.63 : 1.57

18 p=0.034; Cramer’s V = 0.079

19 p=0.211

20 p=0.068; Cramer’s V = 0.072