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Stuck in the Past? The Influence of a Leader’s Past Cultural Experience on Group Culture and Positive and Negative Group Deviance

Abstract:
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ABSTRACT

Extant research on the antecedents of cultures posits that cultures result from the internal and external changes experienced by the group (the functionality perspective) and from a group leader’s personal values and personality traits (the leader-trait perspective). The current study proposes another important, but neglected, antecedent of cultures: a leader’s past cultural experience. Specifically, we theorize that group leaders enact cultures based on their past cultural experiences, essentially transferring cultures from their former groups to their current groups. Two studies, one in the field (Study 1) and another in the laboratory (Study 2), reveal that the levels of cultural tightness in current groups are predicted by group leaders’ past experience with cultural tightness in their former groups in which they were followers. This relationship becomes stronger when the group leaders identified with or had longer tenure in their former groups. In addition, the cultural tightness that leaders transferred from their former groups to their current groups influences negative (counterproductive work behavior) and positive (promotive and prohibitive voice) forms of group deviance. The theoretical and managerial implications for leadership and culture are discussed.

Keywords: Cultural transfer, group cultures, cultural tightness, leadership, positive and negative deviance.

Where do group cultures come from? This basic question may be one of the toughest for both researchers and practitioners to answer because cultures are deeply entrenched in people’s minds and taken for granted. Once formed, cultures become, in Schein’s (2006) words, “nonnegotiable assumptions” that groups accept without question. Over time, groups gradually become less conscious of not only the origins of their cultures, but also the cultures per se. Nevertheless, cultures continuously offer implicit guidelines for how people should think, feel, and behave in groups. For example, cultures provide groups with ways of interpreting and judging others’ behaviors, resolving conflicts that arise from competing demands, managing social relationships, and organizing resources to accomplish collective goals (e.g., Gelfand, Leslie, Keller, & de Dreu, 2012; Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Gelfand, Raver, Nishii, Leslie, Lun, Lim et al., 2011; Haidt, 2013; Schein, 2006). Because group cultures have such important
organizational implications for the achievement of collective goals, researchers have sought ways to better understand and manage cultures by investigating their antecedents.

The culture literature contains two disparate perspectives on the antecedents of cultures: the functionality perspective and the leader-trait perspective. According to the functionality perspective, cultures help groups achieve internal integration and external adaptation by effectively addressing various problems that result from the changing contingencies faced by a group (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Schein, 2006). The primary assumption of this perspective is that groups pay attention to changing environments, accurately identify problems, generate a set of potential solutions to the problems, select effective solutions, and enact systems (e.g., work procedures, rules, norms, rituals, reward-punishment systems) that reflect the chosen solutions. Over time, such systems become a culture by continuously offering successful solutions. If groups observe another round of turbulence in their internal and/or external environments, they repeat this process. The leader-trait perspective argues that leaders may disproportionally influence cultures, and in doing so, they rely on their personal values and personality traits to shape group cultures (e.g., Berson, Oreg, & Dvir, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2012; Giberson, Resick, & Dickson, 2005; O’Reilly, Caldwell, Chatman, & Doerr, 2014). This is because leaders have the formal authority and social power to enact group cultures, which incentivizes group members to be attentive to and follow their leaders’ opinions and behaviors (Gelfand et al., 2012; Northouse, 2009; Yukl, 2010). In addition, people who are powerful (e.g., leaders who have control over important organizational resources such as pay, promotions, and job resources) tend to overweigh their personal preferences over other factors in their decision making (see for a review, Hirsh, Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
The primary objective of this research is to introduce another neglected, but important, antecedent of cultures: the past cultural experience of leaders. In line with the leader-trait perspective, we argue that leaders have a disproportional influence on group cultures based on their unique viewpoints. However, our research questions whether the scope of such viewpoints should be limited to leader traits. Leaders, by virtue of their roles as representatives of their groups, are required to take full responsibility for the failures and low performance of their groups (Northouse, 2009; Yukl, 2010). For this reason, when enacting group cultures, leaders are unlikely to solely rely on their traits and completely overlook the functionality of cultures.

Instead, we propose that leaders consider the functionality of cultures in a different way from what the functionality perspective suggests. That is, while seeking functional cultural solutions, leaders may pay more attention to their past cultural experiences, than to current contingencies.

Theories of bounded rationality (Gersick & Hackman, 1990; March & Simon, 1958) and the career history literature (Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009; Higgins, 2005; Marquis & Tílsik, 2013) help support our view. They suggest that people have a limited cognitive capacity, which disincentivizes careful analyses of the problems at hand and thorough searches for solutions from scratch. Thus, people are inclined to rely on learned solutions from the past with a firm belief that old solutions will also effectively resolve new problems. Drawing on these theories, this research proposes that leaders may create group cultures based on a limited search for cultural solutions that they have acquired in the past. Therefore, the cultures enacted by leaders resemble the cultures in the groups where they obtained their past cultural experience – essentially transferring the cultural traits from the former groups to the current groups. We test this cultural transfer hypothesis using the concept of cultural tightness, which refers to a group’s shared
perception concerning the extent to which a group has many strictly enforced norms (Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011).

In addition to contributing to our understanding of the antecedents of cultures, the current research investigates the key behavioral consequences of transferred cultural tightness for groups. We argue that cultural tightness, which is created by group leaders based on their past cultural experience, reduces both positive (promotive and prohibitive voice behaviors) and negative (counterproductive work behavior) forms of group deviance. In tight cultures, groups have a number of strongly reinforced norms that clearly define boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. They readily punish deviance using a variety of means such as negative comments, peer pressure, and social ostracism. Therefore, members in tight cultures feel compelled against deviating from norms. This is so even if the deviance is intended to benefit groups (e.g., voice) because the pervasiveness of strong norms and conformity pressures cause group members to find any type of deviance less cognitively approachable (Gelfand, Harrington, & Jackson, 2017; Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011). In contrast, loose cultures have fewer norms and more lenient reinforcement. Members in loose cultures interpret group norms in various ways, which allows them to display heterogeneous and counternormative opinions and behaviors with little fear of repercussion (Gelfand et al., 2017; Gelfand et al., 2006). Therefore, we expect that the transferred cultural tightness from leaders’ past cultural experience is likely to reduce both positive and negative group deviance.

We test our hypotheses in two studies – one field survey and one laboratory experiment. The multi-method approach makes it possible to replicate the findings across two different research contexts and to demonstrate both internal and external validities. Our theory and empirical findings provide important contributions to the knowledge of cultures and leadership in
groups. Relying on a diverse set of theories – including the functionality and leader-trait perspectives of culture formation, bounded rationality, and career history – we introduce cultural transfer by group leaders as a novel process of group culture formation that has not been previously investigated. By doing so, our research offers new insights into the importance of leadership in group culture formation and the way in which group leaders make heuristic decisions when enacting their groups’ cultures. In addition, the current research provides theories and empirical evidence regarding both the antecedents and consequences of cultural tightness at the group level. Together, these contributions push the boundaries of both the culture and leadership literatures by examining how group leaders create their groups’ cultures as well as the behavioral implications of those cultures (Gelfand et al., 2017; Gelfand et al., 2006).

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Group Cultural Tightness

Group cultures vary in tightness, which refers to the shared perception among group members regarding the extent to which the group has many strictly enforced norms (Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011). Normally stemming from a strong need for coordination to survive in challenging work environments, culturally tight groups stipulate many prescriptions and norms for what are considered acceptable and unacceptable behaviors, and they vigorously reinforce the norms (Gelfand et al., 2011; Harrington & Gelfand, 2014). Members of tight cultures tend to perceive and experience shared norms that emphasize order, predictability, and control. They also have a strong sense of felt accountability, or “the subjective experience that one’s actions are subject to evaluation and that there are potential punishments based on these evaluations” (Gelfand et al., 2006: 1229). In contrast, culturally loose groups have greater
tolerance for a variety of alternative expressions of norms and a lack of formality, order, and
discipline (Gelfand et al., 2006). They enable members to freely exercise their own preferences.

This research focuses on cultural tightness as a representative cultural concept to
investigate antecedents and consequences of group cultures for two reasons. First, cultural
tightness is particularly relevant to organizational research because it reflects the process of
group norming – setting and reinforcing norms – which is one of the most important group
processes (Bandura, 2001; Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). Second,
cultural tightness is a well-established cultural concept that has strong explanatory power in
predicting behaviors. For example, Gelfand and her colleagues (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2017;
Gelfand et al., 2011; Gelfand, Severance, Lee, Bruss, Lun, Abdel-Latif et al., 2015; Harrington
& Gelfand, 2014) found that members in tight (versus loose) cultures are more (versus less)
likely to regulate their behavior, demonstrate prevention-focused (versus promotion-focused)
behaviors, and adopt a more adaptive (versus innovative) approach in deriving organizational
solutions, and tend to be less (versus more) creative in their jobs (see for a further review,
Gelfand et al., 2006). Furthermore, such predictive validity of cultural tightness has been
consistently shown in several different social contexts (e.g., 33 nations in Gelfand et al., 2011).
Given its relevance to organizational research and its considerable explanatory power in
predicting human behavior, cultural tightness is particularly germane for studying group cultures
in the workplace.

In what follows, using the concept of cultural tightness, we present our theory and
hypotheses that a group leader’s past cultural experience influences the cultures and outcomes of
the leader’s group. Specifically, we hypothesize that group leaders transfer their past cultural
experience to their own groups such that their past experience with the cultural tightness in their
former groups is positively related to the cultural tightness of the groups where the leaders currently lead (Hypothesis 1). The transfer of cultural tightness is stronger when the leaders have internalized their past cultural experience through high identification with (Hypothesis 2) or long tenure in (Hypothesis 3) their former groups. Further, we investigate the consequences – positive and negative forms of group deviances – of the transferred cultural tightness (Hypothesis 4). Lastly, we examine how the indirect relationships between the leaders’ past cultural experience and the group outcomes through the cultural tightness of the current groups are moderated by identification and tenure (moderated mediation; Hypothesis 5). Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical model.

Extant Theories and Research on Antecedents of Group Cultures

The culture literature contains two distinctive perspectives that provide unique insights regarding antecedents of cultures – the functionality perspective and the leader-trait perspective. The functionality perspective argues that internal and external changes predict cultures (Schein, 2006). Internal and external changes generate new problems, and cultures adapt to such changes by incorporating effective solutions to the problems. In other words, cultures – defined as a set of collective solutions to problems faced by groups (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) – help groups successfully resolve the problems at hand. By doing so, cultures help groups achieve both internal integration and external adaptation (Schein, 2006). For successful internal adaptation, groups accurately identify internal problems (e.g., group members’ diverse needs; task and relational conflicts within groups) and address them by setting up proper systems or a set of solutions (Taggar & Ellis, 2007). For successful external adaptation,
new problems that arise from external changes (e.g., changes in customer needs; a new policy set by higher institutions; an introduction of new technology), search for a set of possible solutions, and select effective solutions (Hughes, 1993). Over time, those solutions become cultures that continuously help groups resolve problems. The functionality perspective thus suggests that the cultures maintained are those that are most suited to group success, or at the very least, the survival of the group. For instance, if a group diagnoses that external situations (e.g., ecological or human threats that require greater coordination) require a tight group culture, the group will seek to enact a tight culture. In contrast, if a group recognizes that a high level of discretion for group members to carry out their tasks is more effective for goal achievement (e.g., creative tasks), the group will enact fewer rules and norms and leniently enforce them; this represents a loose culture (Harrington & Gelfand, 2014).

The second stream of research on antecedents of cultures – the leader-trait perspective – argues that cultures in a group may be a function of a leader’s personal values and personality traits (e.g., Berson et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2012; Giberson et al., 2005). This perspective argues that the “true origins of culture can be found in the fundamental dispositions (idiosyncratic values, personality, and behavior) of the organization’s leaders” (O’Reilly et al., 2014: 597) for three reasons. First, leader traits cause leaders to demonstrate consistent patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior, which become “a salient source of information about the normative order” for the group (O’Reilly et al., 2014: 598). Second, leaders are in positions where they can realize their personal values, personality traits, and preferences in group cultures. The leadership role offers them the formal authority and power to establish a variety of procedures, routines, rituals, rules, and reward-punishment systems, all of which significantly influence employee collective mindsets and behaviors (Yukl, 2010). Third, as they hold
substantial social power, leaders tend to pay less attention to and be less constrained by situational contingencies in their decision making, but they rely heavily on their personal preferences (see for a review, Hirsh et al., 2011; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

In support of these arguments, researchers have found that leader traits predict cultures. For example, in their study of the Big-Five personality traits of leaders, O’Reilly et al. (2014) found that when leaders had personality traits such as openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness, cultures became more adaptive, more detail-oriented, and less results-oriented, respectively. Giberson et al. (2005) also found that leaders’ Big-Five personality traits explained a significant amount of variance (21%) of aggregated measures of the Big-Five cultures. Similarly, Berson et al. (2008) found that a leader’s self-directive, security, and benevolence values were associated with innovation-oriented cultures, bureaucratic cultures, and supportive cultures, respectively. Lastly, Gelfand et al. (2012) conducted a study in 159 branches of a large bank in the United States and found that managers’ collaborative, dominating, and avoidance conflict management behaviors were positively related to collaborative, dominating, and avoidance conflict cultures, respectively, in the branches.

The main objective of our research is to find another important, but neglected, antecedent of cultures by drawing on the insights offered by the two perspectives. We take the view that group leaders, compared with any other factor, disproportionally influence group cultures based on their own viewpoints (in line with the leader-trait perspective). At the same time, we believe that leaders are likely to form such viewpoints not only by anchoring on their personal values and personality traits, but also by seeking ways to engage their groups in successful problem solving (in line with the functionality perspective). However, despite their consideration of the functionality of cultures, group leaders may not be able to enact group cultures that are
“objectively” functional. Instead, they may rely on the most accessible solutions they learned in the past with a “subjective,” but ungrounded, belief that those solutions will still be functional in the current situation. Schein (2006), one of the proposer of the functionality perspective, also acknowledged this possibility stating that “we do not develop new assumptions about each of these areas in every group or organization we join. Members of any new group will bring their own cultural learning from prior groups, from their education, and from their socialization into occupational communities” (p. 35). We elaborate upon this next.

**Cultural Transfer by Group Leaders**

Relying on the bounded rationality literature (Gersick & Hackman, 1990; March & Simon, 1958), we argue that group leaders are less likely to attempt to find objectively functional cultural solutions by analyzing internal and external changes; however, they are more likely to search for seemingly satisfactory ones by scanning their past cultural experiences. March and Simon (1958) were the first to suggest that when group leaders craft group cultures to resolve the problems faced by their groups, they begin the search process with familiar cultural solutions in mind. They draw on solutions that had been employed for similar problems in the past and apply them to problems in the present with a firm belief that the past solutions will still be effective. This is because they, like any other decision makers, have limited cognitive capacity to evaluate problems, generate several alternatives, assess each alternative against the problems, and select effective alternatives (March & Simon, 1958). Thus, group cultures are necessarily suboptimal or even ineffective in reality because when leaders are faced with a situation in which they should re-evaluate their assumptions, their selective perception and limited rationality incline them to apply outdated cultural solutions they learned in the past to current problems.
The theories and empirical evidence in the career history literature also support this argument. This literature suggests that employees’ cognitive schemas or scripts acquired from past work experiences in a former group or organization create cognitive and behavioral rigidities that carry over to a new group or organization (Dokko et al., 2009), and they interfere with employees’ ability and motivation to accurately evaluate a new situation (Dokko et al., 2009; Gioia & Poole, 1984). In a sample of mental health specialists, for example, Adkins (1995) found that past work experience led to workers’ overconfidence in their ability to do a job and inattentiveness to task-relevant cues in a new situation. Similarly, with a sample of call-center employees, Dokko et al. (2009) found that after accounting for knowledge and skill, past work experience negatively affected employee job outcomes because of cognitive and behavioral rigidities, norms from prior experiences that potentially conflict with the new employer’s expectations, and the misapplication of acquired skills.

By expanding these findings, researchers have also suggested the concept of career imprinting, which refers to a process where past work experience marks a set of motivations, cognitions, and behaviors that employees consistently experience and demonstrate throughout their work careers (see for a review, Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). This research has shown that employees’ past experience affects their assumptions about how work should be performed and creates expectations, knowledge, routines, and habits that are continuously perceived as useful in different organizational contexts (Higgins, 2005; Tilcsik, 2014). In her ethnographic study on the career imprinting of young executives in the biotechnology industry, Higgins (2005) found that early career cultural experiences affected their assumptions about how to lead and manage a firm in the long run. These studies showed that employees respond to changing environments based
upon past organizational experiences instead of beginning a new experience with a “blank slate,”
or tabula rasa (Adkins, 1995).

Taken together, given people’s bounded rationality, difficulty in shedding past experiences once they have been incorporated in a script, and their tendency to prefer familiar and well-learned solutions rather than adapting to new contingencies (see for a review, March & Simon, 1958; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013), we propose the cultural transfer hypothesis. We expect that leaders are likely to create group cultures based on the cultures they have experienced in the past. Specifically, we suggest that group leaders may come to assume that tight (loose) cultures are necessary for group success based on their past cultural experience of tight (loose) cultures in their former groups. For example, having experienced of a tight culture in a former group, a leader likely holds assumptions about the effectiveness of high degrees of control, order, predictability, stability, and coordinated effort. Consequently, the leader likely creates a tight culture in his or her group by clarifying a large number of norms, defining a narrow range of tolerable behavior, and severely punishing any norm deviation (Gelfand et al., 2006). In contrast, a leader who has experienced a loose culture in a former group may see such a culture as an effective set of solutions to the problems faced by the current group; thus, the leader is likely to sanction fewer behavioral expectations and to grant group members greater discretion (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004).

Hypothesis 1: A group leader transfers past cultural experience to his or her group such that cultural tightness experienced in the past is positively related to cultural tightness in the leader’s group.

Moderators of the Cultural Transfer: Identification with and Tenure in a Former Group

Cultural transfer is more likely to occur when group leaders have deeply internalized their former groups’ cultures. Employees who have internalized a set of certain cultures make


decisions and demonstrate behavior that are closely in line with those that the culture recommends and approves. They do so even without a conscious effort because the cultural characteristics are already deeply entrenched in their minds and thus offer reference points for behavior at the sub-conscious level (see for a review, Schein, 2006). We propose two factors that influence the extent to which the former group culture is internalized: identification and tenure.

We argue that leaders who highly identify themselves with their former groups are more likely to transfer the cultural tightness of their former groups to their current groups. According to group identification theory (Henry, Arrow, & Carini, 1999), group identification increases when members begin to view themselves as belonging to the group such that their self-concept is intertwined with their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Low identifiers are less committed to the group and thus are less likely to adopt the beliefs and norms of the group (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002). High identifiers, in contrast, are more likely to believe that the cultural assumptions in their group are effective and efficient for managing the problems faced by the group, and thus, they deeply internalize group cultures. In other words, they become “patriots” who fervently try to sustain group cultures and actively attempt to enforce them to other members through the use of diverse social sanctioning strategies, such as social ostracism, peer pressures, rewards and punishments. (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). Therefore, a group leader, who identified strongly with his/her former group, is more likely to internalize the group’s level of cultural tightness, and thus bring it to the group he/she comes to lead. We hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and current group is stronger when the leader has higher identification with the former group.
We also suggest that the length (or tenure) of the past cultural experience influences cultural internalization, and thus strengthens cultural transfer. According to the attraction-selection-attrition theory (Schneider, 1987), groups have a natural tendency to attract, select, and retain people who have characteristics that best fit the group cultures (Kristof, 1996). Over time, employees may either come to identify with their groups or choose to exit; the ones who remain longer are often those who identify with their group and thus are more likely to internalize the group cultures (Giberson et al., 2005). However, it is certainly possible that employees remain in their groups without identifying with them. They may maintain their group membership simply because they need to secure their salary or because they feel obliged to do so (Meyer, Allen, & Smith, 1993). However, even if employees do not identify with their group, they must conform to the group norms to maintain their group membership. Conformity and repeated exposure to the same group norms may result in members’ internalization of those norms into their behavioral scripts without necessarily changing their group identification levels (March & Simon, 1958). Therefore, irrespective of their identification with the group, employees with a longer group tenure are more likely to internalize the group cultures. With longer tenure, group leaders create cultural tightness in their current groups that is more likely to reflect their past experience of cultural tightness in their former groups.

_Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and current group is stronger when the leader had longer tenure in the former group._

Consequences of Transferred Cultural Tightness

Cultural tightness has been linked to a number of cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Data from 33 nations showed that tight cultures were related to higher cautiousness, dutifulness, self-regulation, and need for structure (Gelfand et al., 2011). Tight cultures emphasize risk
avoidance, homogeneity, and a preference for stability, whereas loose cultures encourage risk
taking and allow for idiosyncrasies across individuals (Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011).

Among many behavioral outcomes of cultural tightness, a particularly relevant one is norm
deviation (Gelfand et al., 2006). Tight cultures, compared with loose cultures, reduce deviance
from social norms because they clearly outline appropriate and inappropriate behavior, reward
conformity, and punish deviance. In support of this argument, Gelfand et al. (2011) found that
tight cultures (versus loose cultures) suppress norm deviation regardless of whether the
underlying intention of the deviation is positive or negative. For example, tight societies are
more likely to enact policies to reduce negative deviance such as increasing police presence and
retaining the death penalty, which tends to lower murder, burglaries, and crime rates. At the
same time, tight cultures are negatively related to positive deviation such as challenges to
institutions (e.g., signing petitions, attending demonstrations, joining strikes) and innovation (e.g.,
the number of patents). Although those characteristics of cultural tightness should have
important implications for behaviors and outcomes in organizations, the focus of past research on
cultural tightness has been limited to levels beyond the organizations, e.g., state, regional, and
national levels (Gelfand et al., 2006).

The current research expands the cultural tightness literature by demonstrating that
cultural tightness decreases both positive and negative forms of group deviance in the
organizational context. To do so, we focus on counterproductive work behaviors, as a form of
negative group deviance, and promotive and prohibitive voice, as a form of positive group
deviance. From an organizational perspective, negative workplace deviance refers to “voluntary
behavior that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being
of an organization, its members, or both” (Robinson & Bennett, 1995: 556). It includes various
types of counterproductive work behaviors, such as stealing company property, intentionally withholding effort on one’s tasks, and taking unscheduled breaks (Ambrose, Schminke, & Mayer, 2013; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Positive workplace deviance includes norm-deviating behaviors that are intended to benefit the organization (Bashshur & Oc, 2015), and employee voice is among the most frequently studied forms of positive or constructive deviance in the organizational research (Vadera, Pratt, & Mishra, 2013). Scholars have distinguished employee voice as promotive or prohibitive. Promotive voice refers to the “expressions of ways to improve existing work practices and procedures to benefit organizations” (Liang, Farh, & Farh, 2012: 71). It represents specific suggestions and solutions for future improvements to existing work processes for the purpose of helping groups realize group ideals and achieve collective goals. Prohibitive voice refers to the “expressions of individuals’ concern about existing or impending practices, incidents, or behaviors that may harm their organization” (Liang et al., 2012: 72). In this case, members seek to warn the organization of any problems, but they may or may not present solutions. Drawing on the past findings of Gelfand and her colleagues (Gelfand et al., 2017; Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011), we suggest that the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group, which is created based on the leader’s past cultural experience, is negatively related to counterproductive work behaviors, promotive voice, and prohibitive voice.

Hypothesis 4: The cultural tightness of the leader’s current group mediates the negative relationships between the cultural tightness of the leader’s former group and counterproductive work behavior, promotive voice, and prohibitive voice in the current group.

Finally, based on the above, the indirect relationships between the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and the group deviances through the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group should be moderated, respectively, by the leader’s identification with and tenure in
the former group where the leader obtained his or her past cultural experience. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 5a: A group leader’s identification with a former group moderates the indirect relationships between the cultural tightness of the leader’s former group, the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group, and both positive and negative group deviances such that the indirect relationships become stronger when the identification is high.

Hypothesis 5b: A group leader’s tenure in a former group moderates the indirect relationships between the cultural tightness of the leader’s former group, the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group, and both positive and negative group deviances such that the indirect relationships become stronger when the tenure is long.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

We test our hypotheses in two studies. Study 1 is a field study with a sample of employees in sales groups at a start-up manufacturing company in Korea. This study involves three waves of data collection. At the point of Wave 1 data collection, the company had newly created groups within its sales department, and the leaders of these groups were hired from outside the company. This field setting is well-suited for investigating our hypotheses for two reasons. First, testing our hypotheses requires a clear empirical distinction between the former groups, in which the group leaders obtained their past cultural experience, and the groups, in which the leaders currently lead. This setting allowed us to clearly identify the borderline between the leaders’ past and current cultural experiences. Second, this setting naturally controls for any group cultures and characteristics that may have been present before the group leaders influenced group cultures. That is, it naturally controls for any group cultures and characteristics prior to the time point when group leaders were assigned to these groups because no groups existed before the leaders arrived. Thus, we believe that the field setting in Study 1 is suitable for testing our research questions. Study 2, which is a laboratory experiment involving three-person
groups in two waves, further tests our cultural transfer hypothesis. Study 2 builds on Study 1 to establish causality and replicate the cultural transfer we found in Study 1.

**STUDY 1: FIELD STUDY**

**Sample and Procedure**

We collected multi-wave (three waves) and multi-source (employee, group leader, division head, archival records) data on 404 employees in 91 sales groups at a manufacturing company in South Korea. The company manufactures a variety of office supplies, including desks, chairs, and partitioning walls, and the majority of its customers are other organizations. Sales employees visit, for example, universities, government offices, and other companies to explain their products and make product sales agreements. To do that, they must be knowledgeable about not only the characteristics of the products but also sales protocols to ensure that sales activities do not cause legal issues (related to, e.g., legal regulations for visiting and treating customers and laws regarding dumping sales). In addition, they need to be well informed of manufacturing processes because customers frequently request product customizations, which become an important issue in finalizing a deal. We contacted the top management team and explained the purpose of the study. The company allowed this study on two conditions: the surveys collected within the company had to be destroyed once the data were entered into a spreadsheet, and that the aggregated findings had to be provided to the top management team. There were 108 sales groups at the time of the study, and we sent an email invitation to all group leaders. Ninety-nine of the 108 group leaders agreed to participate in the survey.

Data collection in Wave 1 occurred about 15 months after the company was founded. For the first 14 months, the company did not have sales groups but had a single sales department where one department head and two deputy heads loosely supervised the entire sales force. As
the company grew, sales activities became increasingly complex, and the department head felt
the need for subsystems to coordinate sales employees. The department thus decided to create
several groups and to search for group leaders from outside the company. The recruitment for the
new group leaders lasted about four months (9-13 months after the company’s founding). When
the company recruited group leaders, there were two specific criteria for selection. The first
criterion was that the candidates had to have at least two years of experience working in sales
groups. The second criterion was that candidates who had not been group leaders in sales groups
were preferred. The CEO set the second criterion because he held a lay belief that those who
were not leaders would better preserve the existing company routines and cultures.¹ In our
research, this criterion contributed to the validity of our research design. If new group leaders in
this company were also group leaders in their former companies, it is possible that our
observations would not reflect cultural transfer but rather demonstrate that leaders simply re-
create the same culture in their former and current groups. Our research setting, in which the
group leaders were not leaders in their former groups, resolves this issue.

The new leaders joined the company about 14 months after it was founded (one month in
advance of the Wave 1 data collection). In Wave 1, we collected data from group leaders
regarding the levels of cultural tightness of their past groups, their identification with and tenure
in those groups, and their demographic information. Among the 99 group leaders who agreed to
participate in the survey, four were group leaders in their former companies, and three were
internally promoted. Therefore, we excluded these seven leaders, which resulted in a sample of

¹ In an interview with the CEO of this start-up company about the second criterion, he stated, “I thought they (new
leaders who were not leaders in their former companies) would easily assimilate themselves to our company’s
cultures. From my experience, leaders have their own ways (of managing groups) and, to some extent, they are
stubborn. So, hiring new leaders who were leaders in their former companies will resist the ways that I believe
right. I wanted to select leaders who can go together with me” (parentheses added).
92 group leaders in Wave 1. One year after Wave 1, we collected data from group members regarding the cultural tightness of their groups (Wave 2). Between Waves 1 and 2, one group leader left the company. Hence, we surveyed group members of the remaining 91 groups. We made an effort to invite all group members. However, given the nature of their job, some of them were working off-site (e.g., meeting clients) and thus were not available to participate in the survey. We obtained responses from an average of 3.44 members per group ($SD=.77$).

About 8 months later (Wave 3), we collected data on counterproductive work behavior by surveying 6 division heads who were the supervisors of the group leaders. The division heads were in a good position to report on the counterproductive work behavior of the groups they oversaw because they regularly monitor each group’s activities, are physically close to the groups they oversee, and are less likely to intentionally bias their responses regarding groups’ negative deviance than are group leaders who are directly responsible for any negative activities of their groups. Objective data regarding voice behaviors – the number of task-related suggestions (promotive voice behavior) and the number of grievances (prohibitive voice behavior) – were collected from the human resources (HR) department. The company began collecting these data two months in advance of Wave 3. Thus, the data represent the total number of suggestions and grievances reported to the HR department over the previous two months.

Across waves 1, 2, and 3, the overall response rate was 71.63% (404 out of 564 employees; leader response rate=84.26%; group member response rate=68.64%).

**Measures**

We followed the survey translation procedures recommended by Brislin (1990). All items were rated using a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree).

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2 Inclusion of the seven leaders did not change the results to the extent that it influences our hypothesis testing.
The cultural tightness of a leader’s former group. We adapted the 6-item scale of cultural tightness developed by Gelfand et al. (2011). This scale was originally developed for a nation-level culture and had to be modified to represent a group-level culture. A sample item includes, “In this group, there are very clear expectations for how group members should act in most situations” (α=.92).

The cultural tightness of a leader’s current group. We assessed the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group with the same measure, which was used to assess the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group. However, this time, group members evaluated it, and their ratings were aggregated to form the group-level cultural tightness. To justify aggregation, we examined interrater reliability. The ICC 1 estimate was .47 (p<.000). ICC 2 estimate was .78 (p<.000). We also assessed the within-group agreement by calculating Rwg. The average Rwg was .88 (SD=.10; Ranging from .60 to 1.00). Those estimates exceeded the conventional cut-offs suggested by LeBreton and Senter (2007). Cronbach alpha for this scale was .95.

Leader identification with his/her former group. We assessed leader identification with his/her former group using Priesemuth, Schminke, Ambrose, and Folger’s (2014) group identification scale. In our survey, group leaders reported on this variable. A sample item includes, “I identified with other group members when I was in the former group” (α=.93).

Leader tenure in his/her former group. We measured the length of a leader’s tenure in his/her former group in months. The average tenure was 35.14 months (SD=11.29).

Counterproductive work behavior. We measured counterproductive work behavior by modifying Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) 12-item organizational deviance scale. The six division heads rated the extent to which groups displayed counterproductive work behaviors in
the previous 8 months, the period between Waves 2 and 3. A sample item includes, “The
members in this group come in late to work without permission” (α=.98).

**Voice.** We obtained objective data regarding the promotive and prohibitive voice
behaviors of groups from archival records of the company. Every week, sales groups gather
together for a meeting. In this meeting, group leaders collect job-relevant suggestions and
grievances and report them to the HR department. Since the company was a start-up, the top
management team had a strong desire to define efficient and effective work procedures and
environment by embracing employees’ suggestions and fixing problems. As an example of job-
relevant suggestions, one group suggested a need for a telephone hotline for sales employees to
directly contact division heads when they are drawing up a contract with a client. Examples of
grievances include observations of sales practices that are ineffective or that may raise legal
concerns. A HR manager counted the number of suggestions and grievances submitted in the
previous two months by each group, and reported the final numbers to the researchers.

**Control variables.** We controlled for two demographic variables of group leaders: age
and gender. Also, because leaders’ personality traits may influence group cultures they create,
we controlled for the Big-Five personality traits, measured by the mini-IPIP scale (Donnellan,
Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006). In this scale, each of the five personality traits –
conscientiousness, openness to experience, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability –
is measured by four items. Examples include, “I get chores done right away (conscientiousness;
α=.79),” “I have a vivid imagination (openness to experience; α=.86),” “I am the life of the party
(extraversion; α=.88),” “I sympathize with others’ feelings (agreeableness; α=.86),” and “I
seldom feel blue (emotional stability; α=.83).” Lastly, we controlled for group size to address the
possibility that it influences group processes (Madrid, Totterdell, Niven, & Barros, 2016).
Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The variables were collected from different sources. Leaders measured the cultural tightness of their former groups, and their identification with and tenure in their former groups (single item measure). Group members measured the cultural tightness of their current group. Division heads measured counterproductive work behavior. Archival records provided by HR indicated promotive and prohibitive voice (each by a single item). To test the psychometric validity of the four multi-item measures – the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group, leader identification with the former group, the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group, counterproductive work behavior – we conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Results showed that the four-factor model provided an excellent fit to the data ($\chi^2_{(340)}=382.81, p=.025; TLI=.98; CFI=.98; RMSEA=.04$), meeting the standards proposed by Hu and Bentler (1998). Also, we compared the four-factor model with several alternative models. An alternative three-factor model combining the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group and leader identification showed the highest model fit among the alternatives ($\chi^2_{(343)}=675.81, p<.001; TLI=.88; CFI=.89; RMSEA=.10$). However, the results of the chi-square difference test showed that the four-factor model fit the data significantly better than the alternative three-factor model ($\Delta \chi^2_{(1)}=293.00, p<.001$). Thus, the CFA demonstrated the discriminant validity of the variables.

Results of Study 1

The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables are presented in Table 1. Hypotheses were tested using multiple hierarchical regressions. The cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and the two moderators were mean-centered to reduce multicollinearity.

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3 Examples of the alternative models are: a 3-factor model combining the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and leader identification ($\chi^2_{(343)}=682.62, p<.001; TLI=.88; CFI=.89; RMSEA=.11$); a 3-factor model combining two cultures ($\chi^2_{(343)}=723.51, p<.001; TLI=.87; CFI=.88; RMSEA=.11$); and a 2-factor model combining all the variables except for group deviance ($\chi^2_{(345)}=1005.85, p<.001; TLI=.77; CFI=.79; RMSEA=.15$).
and increase interpretability of the zero point of each variable in the regression results (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). We also used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to analyze indirect effects in the proposed mediation (Hypothesis 4) and moderated mediation (Hypothesis 5a and 5b) models.

Hypothesis 1 stated that the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group is positively related to the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group. Results in Table 2 showed that the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group was positively related to the cultural tightness of the group that the leader currently leads ($b=.33, SE=.09, \beta=.36, t=3.52, p=.001$). The result thus supported Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the greater a leader’s identification with his/her former group, the stronger the positive relationship between cultural tightness of the leader’s former and current groups. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the longer a leader’s tenure in the former group, the stronger the positive relationship between cultural tightness of the leader’s former and current groups. The two moderations were simultaneously tested. We operationalized high and low levels of the two moderators using one standard deviation above and below the mean. The results in Table 2 showed that the interaction between the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and leader identification with the former group in predicting the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group was significant ($b=.19, SE=.08, \beta=.22, t=2.31, p=.023$). Similarly, there was a significant interaction between the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and leader tenure in the former group in predicting the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group ($b=.03, SE=.01, \beta=.35, t=3.62, p=.001$). Figure 2a depicts the former interaction. There was a non-significant positive relationship between cultural tightness of a leader’s former and current groups when leader identification was low (simple slope=.15, $SE=.13, p=.250$). However, the
relationship became significantly positive when leader identification was high (simple slope=.52, \( SE=.11, p<.001 \)). Figure 2b depicts the latter interaction. There was a non-significant positive relationship between cultural tightness of a leader’s former and current groups when leader tenure in the former group was low (simple slope=.06, \( SE=.11, p=.587 \)). However, the relationship became significantly positive when leader tenure in the former group was high (simple slope=.61, \( SE=.12, p<.001 \)). Thus, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were supported.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group have indirect negative relationships with counterproductive work behavior, promotive voice, and prohibitive voice in the leader’s current group via the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group. Results in Table 3 showed that the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group had significant negative relationships with counterproductive work behavior (\( b=-.27, SE=.09, \beta=-.29, t=-2.93, p=.004 \)), promotive voice behavior (\( b=-1.35, SE=.56, \beta=-.26, t=-2.40, p=.019 \)), and prohibitive voice behavior (\( b=-.94, SE=.34, \beta=-.29, t=-2.75, p=.007 \)). Then, using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrapping, we tested whether these relationships are mediated by the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group. We found that the cultural tightness of a leader’s current group significantly mediated the relationships that the cultural tightness of the leader’s former group had with counterproductive work behavior (indirect effect=-.12, Boot \( SE=.05, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.26, -.03] \)), promotive voice behavior (indirect effect=-.58, Boot \( SE=.29, 95\% \text{ CI} [-1.29, -.11] \)), and prohibitive voice behavior (indirect effect=-.48, Boot \( SE=.21, 95\% \text{ CI} [-1.02, -.14] \)). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was supported.

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Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3, and Figure 2 about here

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Hypothesis 5 predicted that the indirect relationships, that the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group has with counterproductive work behavior, promotive voice, and prohibitive voice via the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group, is stronger when leader identification with the former group is higher (Hypothesis 5a) or when the leader has longer tenure in the former group (Hypothesis 5b). We tested both hypotheses simultaneously using the PROCESS macro – i.e., moderated mediation where the two moderators influence the first stage of the mediation. Results showed that when leader identification with the former group was high, the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group had significant indirect relationships with counterproductive work behavior (indirect effect = -0.21, Boot SE=.08, 95% CI [-0.40, -0.06]), promotive voice (indirect effect = -1.01, Boot SE=.46, 95% CI [-2.00, -0.20]), and prohibitive voice (indirect effect = -0.80, Boot SE=.33, 95% CI [-1.57, -0.26]) through the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group. However, when leader identification with the former group was low, the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group has non-significant indirect relationships with counterproductive work behavior (indirect effect = -0.06, Boot SE=.06, 95% CI [-0.24, 0.03]), promotive voice (indirect effect = -0.28, Boot SE=.33, 95% CI [-1.29, 0.15]), and prohibitive voice (indirect effect = -0.22, Boot SE=.25, 95% CI [-0.90, 0.14]) through the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group. Similarly, when leader tenure in the former group was high, the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group had significant indirect relationships with counterproductive work behavior (indirect effect = -0.24, Boot SE=.09, 95% CI [-0.43, -0.09]), promotive voice (indirect effect = -1.17, Boot SE=.50, 95% CI [-2.18, -0.24]), and prohibitive voice (indirect effect = -0.93, Boot SE=.33, 95% CI [-1.66, -0.34]) through the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group. In contrast, when leader tenure in the former group was low, the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group had non-significant indirect relationships with counterproductive
work behavior (indirect effect = -.02, Boot SE=.05, 95% CI [-.15, .05]), promotive voice 
(indirect effect = -.11, Boot SE=.24, 95% CI [-.77, .25]), and prohibitive voice (indirect effect = 
-.09, Boot SE=.19, 95% CI [-.57, .21]) through the cultural tightness of the leader’s current 
group. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported.

Discussion of Study 1

Study 1 showed that group leaders’ past cultural experiences affected the cultures of the 
groups they led. Specifically, the group leaders, who had not been leaders in their former groups, 
transferred the cultural tightness of their former groups to the groups they currently led. This 
relationship became stronger when they had highly identified themselves with or held long 
tenure in their former groups. In addition, the cultural tightness that the leaders transferred from 
their former groups to their current groups reduced both negative (counterproductive work 
behavior) and positive (promotive and prohibitive voices) forms of group deviance. Lastly, 
leaders’ identification with and tenure in their former groups respectively moderated the indirect 
relationships between the cultural tightness of their former groups and the three group outcomes 
through the cultural tightness of their current groups.

Although Study 1 supported our hypotheses, there may be alternative explanations that it 
could not fully account for. We certainly do not suggest that a leader’s past cultural experience is 
the only antecedent of group cultures. As mentioned earlier, we acknowledge insights from both 
functionality and leader-trait perspectives, rather than go against them. However, the question of 
whether cultural transfer exists above and beyond the effects of the variables suggested by the 
functionality perspective (i.e., information regarding the effectiveness of certain cultural 
characteristics) and the leader-trait perspective (i.e., leader values and personality traits) still 
remains. Specifically, we identified the following issues.
First, as proposed by the functionality perspective (Schein, 2006), it is possible that group leaders may thoroughly analyze current contingencies, seek to identify effective cultural solutions, and craft group cultures accordingly. In this case, their current groups’ cultural tightness could also be enacted by information about its effectiveness in problem solving, in addition to their leaders’ past cultural experience. Study 1 did not explicitly test whether the influence of a leader’s past cultural experience on group cultures (i.e., the cultural transfer hypothesis) exists above and beyond the effects of information about the functionality of cultures.

Second, the leader-trait perspective suggests that group leaders’ personal values and personality traits influence group cultures. This means that the group leader’s other traits, beyond the Big-Five personality traits that we controlled in Study 1, may also influence group cultures. Study 1 only showed that cultural transfer occurs above and beyond the influences of a leader’s Big-Five personality traits; other leader traits were not controlled for.

Third, Study 1 did not fully resolve the possible influences of group members on group cultures. Despite the past theories and empirical findings suggesting that leaders, rather than group members, influence group cultures (e.g., Berson et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2012; Giberson et al., 2005; O’Reilly et al., 2014), researchers have not directly examined the competing influences that leaders and members have on group cultures. It is possible that if group members, who are the numerical majority in their group, happen to have the same past cultural experience (of, e.g., loose cultures), this common cultural experience may influence group cultures (e.g., loose cultures) even when their group leader has a different past cultural experience (of, e.g., tight cultures). As mentioned before, our argument is opposite to this. We argued that asymmetries in the formal authority and social power between group leaders and members give leaders a disproportionate influence (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) in enacting group
cultures. However, without empirically examining the group members’ past cultural experience and pitting it against the leaders’ past cultural experience, the validity of our theory may be uncertain.

The main purpose of Study 2 is to address those three issues and to establish causality for the cultural transfer phenomenon in a controlled laboratory environment. To address the first issue, we create a manipulation where a group leader receives information regarding the effectiveness of a culture that is opposite to the culture that the leader experienced in the past. In this way, Study 2 is able to test whether cultural transfer occurs above and beyond the effects of information regarding the functionality of countercultures. To address the second issue, we randomly assign participants to the role of group leader. The random assignment minimizes systematic variation in leader traits across groups. To address the third issue, Study 2 manipulates followers’ past cultural experience as well as a leader’s past cultural experience in order to observe whether the latter, not the former, influences group cultures.

**STUDY 2: LABORATORY EXPERIMENT**

**Participants and Procedure**

Five hundred and twenty-seven undergraduate students at a large North American university participated to the 2-wave experiment in exchange for course credit. Five hundred and sixty-seven students participated in Wave 1 (236 males, 291 females, 40 unreported). However, 40 of these participants failed to attend Wave 2. Therefore, the final dataset consisted of 527 participants in 176 three-person groups (220 male, 276 female, 31 unreported). In one group, there were only two participants (one leader, one follower). We included it in the final dataset. The results do not change without this group.
tightness: tight vs. loose) × 2 (members’ past experience with cultural tightness: tight vs. loose) ×
2 (the perceived effectiveness of countercultures: no information vs. information supporting the
effectiveness of countercultures) factorial experimental design.

In Wave 1, participants were randomly assigned to either the tight or loose culture
condition. On the arrival of participants, the experimenter formed a group and told them that they
will take part in three rounds of group discussion tasks. One anonymous confederate joined the
group and was appointed by the experimenter as a group discussion leader. Before the first round
task began, the experimenter provided groups with task instructions. In the instructions, groups
were either presented (in the tight culture condition) or not presented (in the loose culture
condition) with a set of 11 rules and norms for group discussions. In addition to the instructions
presented, cultural tightness was manipulated by varying the degree to which rules and norms
were implemented and reinforced by the leader confederate as will be further explained later.
Note that the cultural tightness manipulation in Wave 1 is the basic setup for manipulating a
leader’s past cultural experience with cultural tightness and the followers’ past cultural
experience with cultural tightness in Wave 2.

After reading the task instructions, the groups participated in three rounds of the group
ideation tasks using the in-basket exercise developed by Shalley (1991). In this task, participants
took on the role of employees at the HR department of a steel company, and they had to respond
to HR-related problems in the company. Out of the 22 HR issues in the original exercise, we
selected three issues for the group ideation tasks. In addition, the task instructions informed
participants of the lottery system where two winners would be selected at the end of the
semester. Each participant had one lottery ticket to begin with, and the leader could distribute
three more tickets per participant after each round of the group discussion tasks. This means that
the leader could distribute a maximum of nine additional tickets to each participant (3 tickets × 3 rounds), and thus each participant in Wave 1 could gain tickets ranging from 1 to 10. With more tickets, participants could increase their chances of winning the lottery. After the three rounds of the group ideation tasks, participants completed a questionnaire that included manipulation check items and demographic information questions.

In Wave 2, approximately 10 days after Wave 1, participants were re-invited to another one-hour study session. On arrival, participants were assigned into a three-person group where one participant was assigned to the role of group leader and the other two were assigned to the role of follower. Four distinct group compositions were created based on the participants’ past experience with cultural tightness in Wave 1: (1) all participants experienced a tight group culture, (2) all participants experienced a loose group culture, (3) the group leader experienced a tight group culture while the followers experienced a loose group culture, and (4) the group leader experienced a loose group culture while the followers experienced a tight group culture. Groups were again provided with task instructions that contained the list of the 11 rules, used in Wave 1, so that they could, if they wanted, refer to it. Group leaders had full discretion whether to enact discussion rules for the group discussion as well as which of the 11 rules to enact. It was also up to group leaders whether to involve the two followers in the rule-setting process. The task instructions also informed participants of the lottery system where leaders could provide three lottery tickets to each member after the group discussion. Therefore, the total number of tickets that each participant could earn from participating in Waves 1 and 2 ranged from 1 to 13 tickets.

**Manipulations**
Past experience with cultural tightness. Participants in Wave 1 were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions – a tight culture and loose culture. In the tight culture condition, participants read the task instructions that they had to conform to the 11 rules adapted from Handelsman, Ebert-May, Beichner, Bruns, Chang, DeHaan et al. (2004), and that the leader confederate was asked to enforce the rules. The task instructions stated that whenever a rule violation is observed, the leader should subtract one ticket from the three tickets that each participant could potentially receive after each discussion round. In addition, the leader had to verbally reinforce these rules during three rounds. When a violation was observed, the leader confederate had to stop such behavior and announce that he would subtract one lottery ticket out of the three from the violator. Examples of the 11 rules were: using inclusive language; treating each other with respect; being open to different and potentially dissenting opinions and ideas; not using certain stereotypes or language that potentially discriminate specific groups of people or make group members feel uncomfortable; and not expressing a sense of superiority and self-importance. In the loose culture condition, the task instructions stated that the leader would play the role of a facilitator, and there were no rules or norms for the group discussion. Also, participants read that the lottery ticket distribution was left to the leader’s discretion. Note that this manipulation is the basis of the next manipulation – a leader’s and followers’ past cultural experiences with cultural tightness.

To check the manipulation, we adapted the 6-item cultural tightness scale developed by Gelfand et al. (2011) to the group context. A sample item is “there are many rules that group members are supposed to abide by in this group.” The Cronbach alpha was .85 for this scale.

A leader’s and followers’ past cultural experiences with cultural tightness. On the basis of the manipulation of the past experience with cultural tightness in Wave 1, we manipulated a
leader’s and followers’ past cultural experiences in Wave 2. That is, we manipulated a leader’s past cultural experience with a tight (loose) culture by randomly assigning participants who experienced a tight (loose) culture in Wave 1 to the role of leader in Wave 2. We manipulated followers’ past cultural experience with a tight (loose) culture by randomly assigning two participants who experienced a tight (loose) culture in Wave 1 to the role of follower in Wave 2.

Perceived effectiveness of countercultures. In Wave 2, the experimenter verbally manipulated the perceived effectiveness of countercultures when handing out the task instructions. In the effective counterculture condition, groups received verbal information from the experimenter that the culture which is opposite to the one the leader experienced in Wave 1 is more effective in performing the task. Specifically, when the leaders experienced a tight (loose) culture in Wave 1, the experimenter mentioned that, “we have run this study over the past two months with about 200 groups. Your participation in today’s session will be a valuable part of our research together with the data collected from the previous groups. For better performance, I would like to give you an important tip. According to the interview after the task, it seemed that the past groups in general believed setting fewer (more) rules and lowering (increasing) emphasis on conformity to the rules are more effective in performing the task you will soon conduct. As a result, they tended to set fewer (more) and put low (high) emphasis on rule conformity.” In the no counterculture condition, the experimenter mentioned that, “we have run a similar study for the past two months with about 200 groups. Your participation in today’s session will be a valuable part of our research together with the data collected from the previous groups.”

To check the manipulation, participants answered one question about the experimenter, “The experimenter mentioned that she has conducted this study over the previous two months
with about 200 groups. What were the beliefs and experience that the majority of past groups had on setting and emphasizing rules in order to perform well in the task?” Participants were provided three options: (1) “setting more rules and strongly emphasizing rule-conformity,” (2) “setting less rules and lowering emphasis on rule-conformity,” and (3) “I have not heard of such information.” In the effective counterculture condition where leaders came from a loose culture, participants should check the first option. In the effective counterculture condition where leaders came from a tight culture, participants should choose the second option. In the no counterculture condition, participants should check the third option. Correct answers were coded as ‘1’ and incorrect answers were coded as ‘0.’

**Measures**

We measured cultural tightness in Wave 2, which is our dependent variable, in two ways. First, we used the 6-item cultural tightness scale adapted from Gelfand et al. (2011). After the group discussion task in Wave 2, the two followers rated the cultural tightness of their group with this measure. As the interrater reliability and within-group agreement (ICC 1=.84, p<.001; ICC 2=.91, p<.001; Average Rwg=.77, ranging from .38 to 1.00) were above the values suggested by LeBreton and Senter (2007), we aggregated the two ratings into the group level. Second, we measured the number of rules set by groups by asking group leaders to check which rules they collectively enacted out of the 11 rules that were presented in the task instruction. Six teams set additional rules outside the 11 rules (e.g., not disrupting group discussion by doing other activities). We included these additional rules in the measure. On average, groups set 5.32 rules (SD=3.59).
Results of Study 2

To check the manipulation of the past experience with cultural tightness in Wave 1, we submitted the 6-item manipulation check scale to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the past experience with cultural tightness as the independent variable. Results showed that participants in the tight culture condition ($M=5.07, SD=1.07$) perceived the culture of their groups tighter than those in the loose culture condition ($M=3.60, SD=1.39$; $F(1, 565)=199.37, p<.001, \eta^2=.26$). Thus, the manipulation of the past experience with cultural tightness was successful. Next, we checked the manipulation of the perceived effectiveness of countercultures. Because this manipulation was done (10 days) after the manipulation of the past experience with cultural tightness in Wave 1, the latter might influence the former. We thus added the latter manipulation into the ANOVA when we check the manipulation of the perceived effectiveness of countercultures. Before performing the ANOVA, we counted the number of correct answers for the manipulation; the result showed that 485 (92%) participants responded correctly to the manipulation check question. The results of the ANOVA revealed that a significantly greater number of participants in the no counterculture condition selected the option, “I have not heard of such information” than those in the counterculture condition ($F(1, 523)=2382.92, p<.001, \eta^2=.82$). Neither the manipulation of the past experience with cultural tightness in Wave 1 ($F(1, 523)=.28, p=.600, \eta^2=.00$) nor the interaction between the two manipulations ($F(1, 523)=.99, p=.321, \eta^2=.00$) influenced the selection of this option.

Within the counterculture condition, we further investigated whether group members chose the right option. Results showed that in the groups where leaders came from a tight culture, the significantly greater number of participants selected the option indicating the effectiveness of a loose culture ($F(1, 254)=457.76, p<.001, \eta^2=.64$). Neither the manipulation of
the past experience with cultural tightness in Wave 1 \((F(1, 254) = .15, p = .697, \eta^2 = .00)\) nor the interaction between the two manipulations \((F(1, 254) = .01, p = .931, \eta^2 = .00)\) influenced the selection of this option. Also, in the groups where leaders came from a loose culture, a significantly greater number of participants selected the option indicating the effectiveness of a tight culture \((F(1, 254) = 503.28, p < .001, \eta^2 = .67)\). Neither the manipulation of the past experience with cultural tightness in Wave 1 \((F(1, 254) = 1.40, p = .238, \eta^2 = .01)\) nor the interaction between the two manipulations \((F(1, 254) = .31, p = .576, \eta^2 = .00)\) influenced the selection of this option. Therefore, this manipulation was also successful.

The means, standard deviations, correlations, and scale reliabilities for all variables are presented in Table 4. To test our hypothesis, we conducted multiple hierarchical regressions. In the first step, we entered the three conditions – a leader’s past experience with cultural tightness \((0=\text{loose cultures}; 1=\text{tight cultures})\), followers’ past experience with cultural tightness \((0=\text{loose cultures}; 1=\text{tight cultures})\), and the perceived effectiveness of countercultures \((0=\text{no information}; 1=\text{information supporting the effectiveness of countercultures})\) – in order to observe main effects of the three conditions on the two dependent variables – the cultural tightness scale and the number of rules enacted by groups. In addition, we entered the two-way interactions in the second step and the three-way interaction in the third step in order to observe if the three conditions interact with one another in predicting the dependent variables.

Hypothesis 1 stated that a leader’s past experience with cultural tightness predicts the cultural tightness of the current group. Results in Table 5 shows that a leader’s past experience with cultural tightness had significant positive effects on the cultural tightness scale \((b = 1.49, SE = .16, \beta = .57, t = 9.06, p < .001)\) as well as the number of rules set by groups \((b = 3.49, SE = .48, \beta = .49, t = 7.33, p < .001)\). However, the influences of followers’ past experience with cultural
tightness were not significant on the cultural tightness scale \((b=.01, SE=.16, \beta=.00, t=.08, p=.937)\) and on the number of rules set by groups \((b=.12, SE=.48, \beta=.02, t=.26, p=.794)\). The influences of the perceived effectiveness of countercultures were neither significant on the cultural tightness scale \((b=.07, SE=.16, \beta=.03, t=.43, p=.666)\) nor on the number of rules set by groups \((b=-.02, SE=.48, \beta=.00, t=-.03, p=.972)\). In addition, none of the two-way and three-way interactions were significant as shown in Table 5. Therefore, further support for Hypothesis 1 was found.

Discussion of Study 2

We believe that Study 2 adds important insights. With the experimental research design, Study 2 ruled out alternative explanations and established causality for the cultural transfer – group leaders created the cultural tightness of their groups based on their past experience with cultural tightness in the former groups. By examining the perceived effectiveness of countercultures, we showed that the cultural transfer existed above and beyond the effect of the effectiveness, or functionality, of cultures. By randomly assigning participants to the role of leader, we controlled for leader traits (e.g., personality, values, etc.) that might influence our results as suggested by the leader-trait perspective. In addition, Study 2 confirmed that it was a leader’s past cultural experience with cultural tightness, rather than the followers’ past cultural experience with cultural tightness, that influenced the cultural tightness of their current group.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Our research suggests that a group leader’s past cultural experience shapes group culture – essentially, the leader transfers the culture that he or she learned in the past to the current group. In two studies, we provide empirical evidence showing that a leader transfers the cultural
tightness of his/her former group to the current group. This relationship becomes stronger when
the leader identified strongly with or had a longer tenure in his or her former group. Just as
important, our research shows that the cultural tightness of the current group, which was created
by a leader’s past experience with cultural tightness in the former group, subsequently reduces
both negative and positive forms of group deviance. Specifically, the leader’s past experience
with cultural tightness reduces counterproductive work behavior, promotive voice, and
prohibitive voice in the current group through its influence on the cultural tightness of the current
group. Lastly, two moderators – the leader’s identification with and tenure in the former group –
moderate the indirect relationships between the leader’s past experience with cultural tightness
and the group deviances in the current group via the cultural tightness of the current group. The
indirect relationships are present only when the leader highly identified with or had a longer
tenure in the former group.

Our research makes significant contributions to organizational research. It offers a novel
answer to the question of where group cultures come from. Our review of the culture literature
identified two distinct perspectives regarding the antecedents of cultures. The functionality
perspective argues that cultures are a set of solutions to problems and thus help groups adapt to
internal and external contingencies. The leader-trait perspective argues that cultures are a
function of a leader’s personal values and personality traits. Our research introduces another
important antecedent, a leader’s past cultural experience, and proposes cultural transfer,
whereby leaders transfer the cultures of their former groups, in which they acquired their past
cultural experience as followers, to their own groups. Although theories of cultural transfer build
on the functionality and leader-trait perspectives, it significantly differs from them. Unlike the
leader-trait perspective, we acknowledge that leaders attempt to create functional cultures
because the leaders are responsible for group effectiveness and performance (Yukl, 2010). However, their limited cognitive capacity (March & Simon, 1958) and the trajectory of their past career (Marquis & Tilesik, 2013) deter them from enacting objectively functional cultures and cause them to rely on accessible solutions learned in the past. Hence, contrary to the functionality perspective, we argue that the enacted cultures are likely to be suboptimal and not sufficiently updated to reflect the real contingencies that the groups face. Our research clarifies the role of leaders in shaping group cultures and identifies another important source of group cultures.

The current research further substantiates our theory by comparing it to an alternative antecedent of group cultures – followers’ past cultural experience. Followers’ past cultural experience may have a stronger influence on group cultures than a leader’s past cultural experience does. Although past research has argued that cultures tend to be created by a leader, not by followers (e.g., Berson et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2012; Giberson et al., 2005; O’Reilly et al., 2014), this argument has not been directly tested in the culture literature. Extant evidence merely correlates a leader’s characteristics with group or organizational cultures without examining followers’ characteristics. In our case, followers’ past cultural experience may influence group cultures above and beyond the influence of a leader’s past cultural experience. Study 2 tested this possibility by examining whether the past cultural experience of the leader, the followers, or both predicts group cultures. The results showed that a group leader enacted group cultures relying on his or her past cultural experience even though followers, who were the numerical majority, had an opposite cultural experience. In contrast, followers’ past cultural experience did not influence group cultures. This evidence persuasively demonstrates that a group leader exerts a greater influence on group cultures than group members do.
Our research also takes an important step toward answering calls to investigate the antecedents and consequences of cultural tightness in organizations (Gelfand et al., 2006). Although cultural tightness is a relevant cultural concept that may significantly influence organizational behavior and performance (Gelfand et al., 2006), research on cultural tightness in the organizational context is lacking. Gelfand et al. (2006:1226) maintained that “perhaps because of the sheer focus on values, there has been almost no research attention to this dimension (cultural tightness) in modern societies, and discussions of cultural tightness–looseness as they relate to organizations are largely nonexistent.” Furthermore, most of the previous work on cultural tightness investigated nation-wide or state-wide cultural influences (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011; Harrington & Gelfand, 2014) or only provided theoretical propositions in organizational contexts (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2006). Our research addresses these issues by investigating both the antecedents and consequences of cultural tightness at the group level. As mentioned above, we find that a leader’s past experience with cultural tightness is an antecedent of a group’s cultural tightness. In addition, we demonstrate both the positive and negative consequences of a group’s cultural tightness. Our findings showed that although cultural tightness increases predictability and stability in groups by establishing clear behavioral norms and reducing counterproductive work behavior, it also inhibits constructive deviance, i.e., voice behavior. Loose cultures, in contrast, welcome heterogeneity and provide a safe environment in which members can point out work-related problems. However, such loosely disciplined environments also promote counterproductive work behaviors. In other words, our research suggests that cultural tightness is a double-edged sword – it increases stability but decreases constructive changes.
Limitations and Future Research Directions

The current research also has several limitations and raises important related questions that warrant future research. Our study strategically chose to focus on cultural tightness, rather than cultural values (e.g., individualism, collectivism, power distance), to study cultural transfer. However, it remains to be seen whether cultural values also work in the same way as cultural tightness in supporting the cultural transfer hypothesis. It would also be interesting to investigate how the cultural values of a group interact with cultural tightness in predicting group outcomes.

Our research demonstrates that tight cultures reduced both positive and negative group deviance. However, it is possible that if a group values voice, tight cultures can even increase employee voice because tight cultures may uphold and reinforce the voice norm. In this case, the voice norm may turn the relationship between cultural tightness and voice positive. Study 1 provides an indirect answer to this question. As mentioned above, the company in Study 1 valued employee voice; they formally sought suggestions and grievances from employees through weekly meetings. Yet, the employees of this organization were still less likely to voice when they were in tight group cultures. Future researchers might more directly test whether and how the voice norm moderates the relationship between cultural tightness and voice.

In addition, our samples are limited to groups that were newly formed in the company (Study 1) and in the laboratory (Study 2). As mentioned, we intentionally chose this field setting because it is beneficial for testing the cultural transfer hypothesis – that is, our setting clearly separates past and current cultural experiences and naturally controls for any prior group cultures and characteristics since none of the groups existed before the group leaders joined. Nevertheless, it still remains an open question whether and how a leader’s past cultural experience influences group culture in an ongoing group. In ongoing groups, the boundary
between past and present cultural experiences is unclear because the present experience constantly becomes part of the past experience. Past cultural experience could be an experience obtained a week, a month, or a year ago. This makes it difficult for researchers to empirically distinguish between the two experiences. Therefore, future researchers studying cultural transfer with a sample of ongoing groups may need a narrower and more specific definition of past cultural experience. For instance, researchers may focus on a leader’s past cultural experience obtained during his or her early career (when he or she was a follower in another group) in examining cultural transfer. This is closely related to the findings of our research. Our leaders in Studies 1 and 2 had been followers in their former groups and took on the leadership position after moving to new groups. Therefore, we expect that group leaders in ongoing groups rely on their cultural experience gained during their early careers when they enact group cultures. The recent research on career imprinting also supports this prediction. It shows that the work experience formed during the first few years of one’s career is entrenched in his or her mind, and its influences last throughout his or her work career (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Tilcsik, 2014). Therefore, future research might investigate cultural transfer in ongoing groups.

Our experimental study (Study 2) also has limitations. First, our sample consisted of students whose behavior may be different from employee behavior in professional organizations. Second, members in the groups in Wave 2 interacted with one another for approximately 60 minutes. A one-hour group discussion may not be sufficient for group cultures to form because culture formation in the real workplace often involves complex, dynamic processes that reflect a web of social interactions between multiple people. Nevertheless, the interrater reliabilities and within-group agreement for the cultural tightness scale in our study offered empirical evidence that group members had formed a shared perception of cultural tightness. Our experimental
design is also consistent with the previous laboratory research on culture (e.g., Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998; Mannix, Neale, & Northcraft, 1995). Third, we manipulated the perceived effectiveness of countercultures through the groups’ indirect experience by having the groups receive information regarding the beliefs and experience of (hypothetical) peer groups. This manipulation did not influence group cultures, whereas a leader’s past cultural experience did. However, it is possible that if a group leader can directly and repeatedly observe the effectiveness of countercultures, which typically requires sufficient time for groups to perform tasks and receive feedback, the leader may be motivated to create group cultures that are most effective for group success (in contrast to our finding in Study 2). It is also possible that group leaders create group cultures based on their past cultural experience initially, but after directly experiencing some failure with the enacted cultures, they may change their approach. These possibilities cannot be addressed in a simplified and controlled experimental environment. Despite these limitations, Study 1’s strengths complement the limitations of the laboratory experiment in Study 2. Study 1 provided empirical evidence on the relationship between a leader’s past cultural experience and group cultures with a sample of employees in a real organization. In addition, it used a multi-wave and multi-source research design whereby group leaders and employees had sufficient time (approximately 12 months) to create group cultures through repeated social interactions and direct observation of the failures and/or successes of their group cultures.

Our studies did not find support for the leader-trait and functionality perspectives. Study 1 did not find significant relationships between Big-Five personality traits and cultural tightness. We believe that this is because cultural tightness is conceptually irrelevant to personality traits. Past research tended to focus on specific cultures that are conceptually close to personality traits.
(e.g., cultural openness to experience, cultural conscientiousness) in relation to a leader’s traits (e.g., openness to experience, conscientiousness). In our case, cultural tightness, which refers to the extent to which groups have many strictly enforced norms, is perhaps conceptually too distant from personality traits, and thus the two are unlikely to be related. In addition, we could not find support for the functionality perspective in Study 2. One possible reason is that groups may indeed pay less attention to environmental contingencies, but group leaders’ past cultural experience influences group cultures the most. Another possibility is that, as mentioned above, our manipulation of the effectiveness of countercultures in Study 2 accounted only for indirect experience. If groups can acquire direct experience of the (in)effectiveness of a certain culture over time, they may actually adjust their cultures to internal and external contingencies in order to be more effective in problem solving. More research is needed to resolve these possibilities.

Our research also limited its focus to groups managed by leaders. Our findings may not be applicable to self-managing groups where there is no group leader, and group members have full discretion to set their own goals and to manage their own task-related activities. In his seminal ethnographic research, Barker (1993) found that self-managing groups tend to create an even stronger “iron cage” in which they set more norms and reinforce them more tightly (i.e., tight cultures). However, the types of antecedents that lead self-managing groups to develop such cultures remains unknown. It is possible that members of self-managing groups collectively contribute to the creation of group cultures because the lack of formal authority and power by any group member reduces the likelihood that cultures are influenced by a single person’s viewpoints. Another possibility is that an informal leader may emerge in the self-managing group and create group cultures by relying on his or her past cultural experience. Future research on the antecedents of self-managing group cultures is needed.
Managerial Implications

Our research has managerial implications for leader self-awareness, leader selection, and performance management. We caution leaders of the potential cognitive and behavioral biases created by their former cultural experiences – the past experiences could mislead the leader and the group. According to our findings, leaders’ past cultural experiences color what they “see” as effective solutions for their groups. However, the past cultural solutions often blindside leaders when solving new problems in a new environment in which different performance standards and contingencies make the old solutions obsolete. The awareness of the possible rigidities of the past cultural experience may help leaders to be more vigilant and responsive toward situational cues that could inform them of better cultural solutions.

When hiring group leaders, the management team should be aware of the potential for cultural transfer through leaders. Our research shows that organizations acquire new cultural characteristics by hiring new group leaders, and the followers of the group leaders come to take on those cultural characteristics. The management team should consider whether the cultures that the new group leaders bring fit well with the existing cultures or cultures that the management team thinks would be desirable for the organization. If the management team prefers specific cultures that are different from those brought by the new leaders, it is necessary to be explicit in their preference and to incentivize the leaders to implement the corresponding cultures. The management team should also expect that the more identified the new group leaders are with their former groups or the longer their tenure in their former groups, the more likely they are to transfer their past cultural experience to their new groups. Therefore, as criteria in making decisions on group leader selection, organizations may need to consider not only the nature of
group cultures that newly hired leaders might bring but also how much the cultures have been internalized.

Our findings also show that organizations can and do have different subcultures that are defined by group leaders’ past cultural experiences. The differences in subgroup cultures, in turn, have implications for group outcomes. Managers should expect that tight cultures may be conducive to jobs where members should follow rules or protocols (e.g., assembly line workers). In contrast, loose cultures may benefit jobs that require a certain level of constructive deviance, such as voicing different ideas and opinions (e.g., software engineers). In other words, organizations need to recognize the potential tradeoff between the system stability produced by tight cultures versus the potential benefit of allowing constructive deviations brought by loose cultures. The top management team in the field study (Study 1) sought both through weekly meetings. They were eager to enact improvements through the suggestions provided by employees while aiming to keep counterproductive behavior low. However, we found that cultural tightness offers only one of the two: tight (loose) cultures decrease (increase) not only counterproductive work behavior but also constructive deviance. This suggests the importance of matching tight-loose cultures to the groups’ tasks and goals.

CONCLUSION

Our research proposes that cultural transfer by group leaders is one of the important drivers of group cultures – group leaders enact group cultures based on their past cultural experiences, essentially transferring cultures from their former groups to their current groups. Using the concept of cultural tightness, we found support for our cultural transfer hypothesis – the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group was positively related to the cultural tightness of the leader’s current group. Furthermore, the transferred cultural tightness reduced both positive
and negative forms of group deviance, and these mediated relationships were stronger when leaders had high identification with their former groups or long tenure in their former groups. We hope that our work stimulates future researchers to uncover other antecedents of group cultures and to further investigate the roles of cultural tightness in the workplace.

REFERENCES


FIGURE 1. Theoretical Framework

![Theoretical Framework Diagram]

- A Leader’s Past Experience with Cultural Tightness in the Former Group
- Leader Identification with the Former Group
- Leader Tenure in the Former Group

The Cultural Tightness of the Current Group

Positive and Negative Forms of Deviance:
- Counterproductive Work Behaviors
- Promotive Voice
- Prohibitive Voice
FIGURE 2. The Interactions between the Cultural Tightness of a Leader’s Former Group and Leader Identification with the Former Group and Leader Tenure in the Former Group.

Figure 2a. The interaction between the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and leader identification with the former group.

Figure 2b. The interaction between the cultural tightness of a leader’s former group and leader tenure in the former group.
| Variables                                           | Mean  | SD    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | 11   | 12   | 13   | 14   |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Group Size                                      | 6.20  | 1.83  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 2. Age                                              | 33.97 | 4.19  | .14  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 3. Gender                                           | .53   | .50   | .01  | .05  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 4. Extraversion                                     | 3.88  | 1.39  | .02  | -.15 | .18  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 5. Agreeableness                                    | 4.87  | 1.17  | .04  | -.05 | .01  | .34**|      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 6. Conscientiousness                                | 4.30  | 1.28  | .03  | -.16 | -.05 | .02  | .14  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 7. Emotional Stability                              | 3.70  | 1.36  | -.11 | -.04 | .21* | .10  | .04  | .06  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 8. Openness to Experience                           | 4.52  | 1.23  | -.06 | .01  | -.03 | .26* | .08  | .30**| .12  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 9. Leader Identification with the Former Group      | 4.97  | 1.02  | .18  | .01  | .09  | .21  | .03  | .05  | .07  | .09  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 10. Leader Tenure in the Former Group               | 35.14 | 11.29 | -.27**| -.41**| -.12 | .12  | -.05 | -.09 | .07  | .04  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 11. Cultural Tightness of a Leader’s Former Group   | 4.22  | .93   | .07  | -.15 | .07  | .07  | -.02 | -.09 | -.13 | .06  | .09  |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 12. Cultural Tightness of a Leader’s Current Group  | 4.45  | .84   | -.03 | -.12 | .00  | .03  | -.05 | .11  | -.16 | .05  | -.14 | .17  | .36**|      |      |      |      |
| 13. Counterproductive Work Behavior                  | 2.65  | .88   | .17  | .22* | .10  | -.12 | -.05 | -.13 | .11  | .10  | .15  | -.33**| -.33**| -.47**|      |      |      |
| 14. # of Suggestions                                | 14.68 | 4.87  | .12  | .19  | -.06 | -.07 | .04  | -.06 | -.04 | -.02 | .14  | -.20  | -.27* | -.40**| .54**|      |      |
| 15. # of Grievance                                  | 8.78  | 3.09  | -.10 | .14  | -.04 | -.17 | -.06 | -.03 | .04  | .06  | .00  | -.27* | -.34**| -.46**| .55**| .44**|      |

*Note. N=91. a Measured by group members in Wave 2 and aggregated. b Measured by group leaders. c Objective archive data. d Measured by division heads. *p < .05. **p < .01. All tests 2-tailed.*
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\[ F \] .67  \[ \Delta F \] .67  \[ R^2 \] .06  \[ \Delta R^2 \] .06

\[ 2.06^* \]  \[ 5.48^{**} \]  \[ .22 \]  \[ .16 \]  \[ .37 \]  \[ .15 \]

\textit{Note.} N=91. Interaction 1=Cultural Tightness of a Leader’s Former Group × Leader Identification with the Former Group. Interaction 2=Cultural Tightness of a Leader’s Former Group × Leader Tenure in the Former Group. *p < .05. **p < .01. All tests 2-tailed.

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| $F$                               | 1.79     | 5.84**         | 1.98*            | .73       | 2.02*     | 3.27**    |
| $\Delta F$                        | 1.79     | 11.77**        | 3.10*            | .73       | 5.17**    | 13.47**   |
| $R^2$                             | .15      | .40            | .06              | .10       | .07       | .15       |
| $\Delta R^2$                      | .15      | .10            | .06              | .10       | .07       | .12       |

*Note. N=91. *p < .05. **p < .01. All tests 2-tailed.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leader’s Past Experience with Cultural Tightness</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Followers’ Past Experience with Cultural Tightness</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Perceived Effectiveness of Countercultures</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cultural Tightness Scale</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>(.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Number of Rules Set by Groups</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.65**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N=176. The value in the diagonal is Cronbach Alpha. *p < .05. **p < .01. All tests 2-tailed.*

### TABLE 5. Multiple Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Testing the Effects of Three Conditions on Cultural Tightness Scale and the Number of Rules – Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Cultural Tightness Scale</th>
<th>The Number of Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b (SE)</td>
<td>b (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader's Past Experience with Cultural Tightness (LT)</td>
<td>1.49** (.16)</td>
<td>1.57** (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followers' Past Experience with Cultural Tightness (FT)</td>
<td>.01 (.16)</td>
<td>.22 (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Effectiveness of Countercultures (PC)</td>
<td>.07 (.16)</td>
<td>.24 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT X FT</td>
<td>-1.13 (.33)</td>
<td>-0.2 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT X PC</td>
<td>-.04 (.33)</td>
<td>.07 (.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT X PC</td>
<td>-2.29 (.33)</td>
<td>-2.18 (.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT X FT X PC</td>
<td>-2.22 (.66)</td>
<td>-2.55 (.96)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| F                                         | 27.43**                   | 13.71**              |
| ΔF                                        | 27.43**                   | 17.91**              |
| R²                                        | 17.91**                   | .24                  |
| ΔR²                                       | .24                       | .25                  |

*Note. N=176 groups. *p < .05. **p < .01. All tests 2-tailed*
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